THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY,
THE THIRD AND LAST VOLUME,
In Five Parts.
By Thomas Stanley.

LONDON,
Printed for Humphrey Moseley and Thomas Dring, and are to be sold at their shops at the Prince's Arms in S. Pauls Church-yard, and at the George in Fleet-street, near S. Dunstans Church, 1660.
THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY,
The First Part,
Containing the Italick Sect.

LONDON,
Printed for Humphrey Moseley and Thomas Dring,
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THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY,
The Fifth Part:
Containing the Epicurean Sect.

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Epicurus, His Life and Doctrine.
Written by Petrus Gassendus.

Chapter I.
Epicurus his Country, Parents, Brethren.

Epicurus is by some conceived to have been a Samian; for Timotheus (in Laertius's) faith, he was the lib. to, last of the Natural Philosophers that came out of Samos. And Constantinus Porphyrogenetus conceives, lib. 1, de that he derived his original from Samos, as well as Thomasus Pythagorius. But the occasion of this was, for that he passed the first part of his younger years at Samos, with his father and brethren; for thither came his father, Apellestes, as Cicero terms him, (that is, one who claims a portion in the division of lands.) Upon the like ground Strabo conceives him a Lampasian, for he lived at Lampasium, and conversed with the chief personages there. But Epicurus indeed was by country an Athenian, as Laertius, Siculus, and infinite other Writers affirm; whence Epicurus, about to praise him, begins thus:

First Ceres-gifts to human indigence, Renowned Athens did long since dispense, And mens disordered wants by laws redress, And fruitful life with greatest comfort bless. When it produced a person of such worth, Whose breast contained, whose lips all truth brought forth.

Now forasmuch as the Athenian people, being distinguished by Tribes, were divided into the adjacent Towns, which were made free Corporations, even from the time of Theseus. Epicurus was born at Gar- ganism, a Town (as Hesychius and Phavorinus describe it) belonging to the Leidi, the Egean Tribe, where Theseus (faith Plutarch) overcame the Pallares in Thess.
**EPICURUS.**

tide, who contputed against him and Eumen; and where Eurystheus (as *Stoic parer relata* was buried. For this reason, he is said by *Lucan in* to have been a *Spartan*; and by *Sextus* c. 250, the *Gallipat* Autho*; and the Gargantua* who was, by *Cicero* and others, simply the *Gorgias*.

*Lucan* (out of *Metamorphosis in his Tendrll of Days*) writes, that Epicurus was of the *family of the Phaides*, the *Phaides* were denominated from *Phaides*, the second son of **s**e, who dwelt in *Athens*, and is mentioned by *Plutarch* who adds, that the *Spartans* also was of the *Phaides*. Of this family was the father of Epicurus, (according to *Lucan* and others) named *Neocles*, his mother *Chryseis*. He is also frequently cited against the *Greek fashion*, Epicurus *Neocles* sometimes simply called *Neocles*, as when compiled by *Mephistion* with *Theophrastus*, whose father was named *Neocles* also. *Timist* that his father was (according to *Stobaeus*) one of the two thousand *Citizens*, whom the Athenians sent to *Samos*, to share the land (and to see) which they had before. *Plutarch* and *Sophocles*, who strictly belonged to the *revolted Samians*. *Timist* also, that he was a *School-Master*, which (besides *Stobaeus*) *Cicero* observes, when proceeding to reproach him. *But his birth* is not being sufficient to maintain, he conceives, be became a *School-Master*.

*Sidous* mentions only two children of Epicurus, *Neocles* and *Cheredemes*; but *Lucan* (out of *Phaedrus* *the Epicurean*) adds a third, *Arifobulus*, whom *Plutarch* sometimes seems to call *Agathobulus*.

By what care and benevolence Epicurus gained their reverence and affection, is excellently declared by *Plutarch*, who conceives it worthy admiration, how he became so, to win them, and they to be won. That all these died before Epicurus, may be inferred from his *Will*, wherein he ordereth nothing, either to them, or of them, as alive, but only appointed a day to be celebrated for his brethren in the Month *Podesian*. And though of *Cheredemes* there is no further testimony, yet of *Arifobulus* it is more apparent from *Plutarch*, who writes, that Epicurus was wholly taken up about *Metemperus*, *Polyamor*, and *Arifobulus*, tending them in their sicknese and mourning for them when they died. But of *Neocles* it is most manifest, from the *same* *Plutarch* relating, that Epicurus broke forth into a kind of joy, mixe with tears, upon the remembrance of the last words of *Neocles*. Of how great and painful sicknese they dyed, is sufficiently aggravated by *Plutarch* and *Sidous*

**CHAP. I.**

The time of his Birth.

Epicurus was born (as *Lucan* relates out of the Chronology of *Apollodorus*) in the 3d year of the 100th Olympiad, the 7th day of the month *Gamelion*; at whose birth, *Plato* saith, the Moon was twenty days old. *Hecatomiden* (the first month) this year falling in the Summer of the year 4371, of the *Julian Period*, now used by Chronologers, it is manifest, that *Gamelion* the same year, being the 7th month from *Hecatomiden*, fell upon the beginning of the year 4371, which was before the ordinary computation from Christ, 3412 complete years. Now forasmuch as in January, in which month the beginning of *Gamelion* is observed to have fallen, there happened a new Moon in the *Attic* *Horizon*, by the Tables of *Celestial Motions*, the fourth day in the morning, (or the third day, according to the Athenians, who, as *Censorinus* (Birth, reckoning their day from Sun-set to Sun-set) and therefore the twentieth day of
of the Moon is coincident with the three and twentieth of January; it
will follow, that Epicurus was born on the 23d of January, if we suppose
the same form of the year extended from the time of Caesar, upwards. And
this in the old style, according to which the cycle of the Sun, or of the
Dominical letters for that year, (being Bissextile) was B.A. whence the
23d day of January must have been Sunday. But if we fix it with the
Gregorian account, which is ten days earlier, (now in use with us) we
shall find, that Epicurus was born on the 24th of February, which was Sun-
day, (for the Dominical Letters must have been E.D.) in the year before
Christ, or the Christian computation, 341. and consequently in the
1794th year, compleat, before the beginning of February this year,
which is from Christ 1634. Some things here must not be passed by.

First, that a Larimirus observes Sophocles to have been Archon the same
year, wherein Epicurus was born, and that it was the 7th year from the
death of Plato. Moreover, it was the 16th of Alexander, for it was, as the
same Larimirus affirms, the year immediately following that, in which e lib. 5,
Aristippus was sent for to come to him, then 15 years old.

Secondly, that the Euhemerists can hardly be excused from a mistake, making the Chron.
Epicurus to flourish in the 11th Olympiad; for at that time, Epicurus fancie
had part of his childhood, and Aristippus began to flourish in the Ly-
caum, being returned the foregoing Olympiad out of Macedonia, as ap-
paars from a Larimirus.

Thirdly, that the error which crept into Suidas, and hath deceived his interpreters, is not to be allowed, who reports Epicurus born in the
79th Olympiad. I need not take notice, how much this is inconfident,
not only with other relations, but even with that which followeth in
Suidas, where he extends his life to Antigonus Gonatas: I shall only ob-
serve, that, for the number of Olympiads, Suidas having doubtfully set
down 86, which denote the 109th Olympiad, the end of they was easily
defaced in the Manuscript, so as there remained only 9, by which means
of 89, was made the 79th Olympiad.

Fourthly, that it matters not that the Chronicon Alexandrinum, Geor-
gius Simplicius, and others, speak too largely of the time wherein Epicurus
flourished, and that we heed not the errors of some persons, otherwise
very learned, who make Aristippus later than Epicurus, and something of
the-like kind. Let us only observe what St. Hieron cites out of Ciceron, de vi. Clar.
pro Gallo; a Poet is there mentioned, making Epicurus and Socrates disf-
courting together, Whole times, faith Ciceron, we know these began not, nor
years, 12167.

Fifthly, that the birth-day of Epicurus, taken from Larimirus and Pliny,
seems to argue, that amongst the Athenians of old, the Civil months
and the Luniary had different beginnings. This indeed will seem strange,
unless we should imagine it may be collected, that the month Geminus
began only from the full Moon that went before it; for, if we account
the 14th day of the Moon to be the first of the month, the first of the Moon
will fall upon the 7th of the month. Not to mention, that Epicurus seems
in his Will to appoint his birth-day to be celebrated on the first Decad of
the days of the month Geminus, because he was born in one of them;
and then ordaineth something more particularly concerning the 20th of
the Moon, for that it was his birth-day, as we shall reason hereafter. Un-
less you think it fit to follow the anonymous Writer, who affirms, Epici-
urus was born on the 20th day of Geminus; but I know not whether his
authority should out-weigh Larimirus. Certainly, many errors, and those
very great, have been observed in him, particularly by Marmus. I shall
not take notice, that the birth of Geminus might perhaps be understood
as
EPICURUS.

of the 20th of the Moon, happening within the month Gamelion, from Cicero, whose words we shall cite hereafter. But this by the way.

CHAP. III.

Where he lived in his younger time.

Aetius, out of Heraclea, in his Epitome of Saion, relates, that a Colony being sent by the Athenians to Samos, Epicurus was bred up there till the 18th year of his age, in which he went to Athens; Xenocrates living in the Academy, Aristoteles at Chalcis. But Strabo adds, that being first brought up partly at Samos, partly at Troy, he spent the first part of his youth at Athens, growing up together with Menander, the Comick Poet. Lucius further relates, that Alexander dying, and the Athenians being oppressed by Perdicas, he went to Colophon to his father, (about the 23d year of his age) and that he lived a while there. And adds afterwards out of Apollodorus, that from the 26d year of his age to the 37th he lived partly at Mitylene, partly at Lamphacus, (whether he made a dangerous voyage, as Plutarch observes). Suidas sets down, how much time he bestowed in each of these places, one year at Mitylene, four at Lamphacus. Laertius adds, that he returned to Athens, when Xenocrates was Archon. Now forasmuch as Anaxarchus (who succeeded Charinus, in the year of whose Magistracy, as Seneca notes, Epicurus write to Polyenus) was Archon in the 24th year of the 18th Olympiad, and consequently the 36th of Epicurus's age, there must necessarily be here a metachronism of one year.

Hitherto of the places where Epicurus lived in his younger times, partly learning, partly teaching, before he feated at Athens, where he instituted a Sect.

CHAP. IV.

His Masters.

AS for the Masters which he had, we read in Lucian, that some reports, Epicurus was Auditor of Pamphilius the Platonick; Suidas, and the fame; Cicero also mentions Epicurus, himself acknowledging, that he heard him at Samos, but exceedingly scanty his doctrine, Others also report the same. Moreover, Clement Alexandrinus and others, report Nauphantes, the Pythagorean, disciple of Pyrrho, to have been his Master, though Sextus Empiricus writes, that he himself deny'd he had been disciple to Nauphantes. Apollodorus, in his Chronology, reports, that Epicurus heard Lysiphanes and Praxiphanes; but this, faith Lucan, he doth not himself acknowledge, in his Epistle to Euclidius. 

Hephaistion indeed have heard Xenocrates, and some there are (faith Cicero) who think, he did hear him, (as Democritus the Magnesian in Lucanus) but Epicurus himself will not allow it.

I would mention Democritus, with whom, Plutarch faith, Epicurus conversed about Syllables and Accents; but that I suspect Democritus to be fairly read instead of Democritus, even from this, that Plutarch adds, that Epicurus stole all his opinions from him, which was the common objection concerning Democritus, as shall be shown hereafter.

I should mention also Metrodorus, whom Stefani calls, Naximachus, his Interpreter; Didymus, the Master of Epicurus, and should suspect he were
were the same with him, whom Solinus makes contemporary with Diogenes the Cynick; did not the opinion, attributed to him of the infinity of Worlds, and of Atoms, argue, that this was Metrodorus the Chian, disciple of Democritus, whom Epicurus might have, not as Dositheus, a Teacher by word of mouth; but as Dositheus, a Leader, by writing.

Thus also is Lucian to be taken, when he faith (sparingly, that Epicurus was disciple to Democritus, making him to be disciple of Archelaus also, by reason of his opinion of Pleasure, wherein yet there was a great difference between them, as we shall show in its due place. But notwithstanding all we have alleged, in Cicero, Plutarch, Empiricus, and others, in locis extra scripta, that Epicurus used to boast, that he never had any Master, but was taught by his own Teacher, and attained Philosophy by his own wit and industry. And though they seem to mention this, not without some disparagement of him, yet it will easily be granted, that he found out many things of himself, since this was that wherein he took most delight at his last end; and which all, seeing he wrote to many books, filled only with his own sayings, as we shall show hereafter. And indeed as Athenaeus, delivering in an Epigram an excellent sentence of his, concludes, as if Epicurus learnt it not from any other, than from the Muses:

And,

Dispensing gifts acquir’d by his own breast,
He roes’d his soul to break the narrow bonds,
Which fetter Nature.

And others of the same kind.

As for those whom Epicurus particularly esteem’d, O Larinius (citiz. Dioceles) affirms, he was chiefly addicted to Anaxagoras, (though in some things he contradicted him) and Archelaus, who was Master to Socrates. Of Democritus we shall speak hereafter. I only add, that Epicurus much admiring the conversation of Pyrrho, continually question’d his disciple Naosiphanes concerning him; as O Larinius faith, in the life of Pyrrho, p lib. 9.

CHAP. V.

When, and upon what occasion, he addict’d himself to Philosophy, and instituted a Sect.

Silicus faith, that he began to apply himself to Philosophy in the sixteenth year of his age, which is confirmed by others, who wrote his life, as b Larinius relates. But Epicurus himself (alleged by the same c Larinius)aretheth, that he did not addict himself to Philosophy till he was fourteen years old. Hermippus (in d Larinius) faith, that, lighting accidentally upon the books of Democritus, he betook himself to Philosophy; but Apollodorus the Epicurean, in the first book of the life of Epicurus, affirms, he applied himself to Philosophy upon dislike of the Sophists and Grammarians, for that they could not explain what Hesiod meant by Chaos. e Sextus Empiricus having related this more fully, it will not be adriv Phys. amiss to transcribe his words. Having proposed some doubts concerning these Verses of Hesiod,

First, Chaos, next brond-breasted Earth was made,
The fear of all—
Pppp
he adds, and some affirm, that this was the occasion of Epicurus’s sudden applying himself to Philosophy; for being yet very young, he asked a Grammarian, who read to him, Chaos was first made: Of what was Chaos made, if it was first made? The other answering that it did not belong to him to teach such things, but to those who were called Philosophers. Then, saith Epicurus, I must go to those, for they are the persons that know the truth of Being.

To omit, what some affirm, that he was, as Hermippus (as in Laertius) relates, before he addicted himself to Philosophy, a School–master: and though the Stoicks, who were much his enemies, reproached him that with his Father he taught Boys for a small stipend, and that with his Mother he went from house to house reading expiatory prayers; I observe, that after he had applied himself to Philosophy, he instituted a School, being thirty two years old, as Laertius relates, and this at Mitylene afterwards at Lampæcum, as may be collected from the relation of Suidas, but had Disciples also from Colophon, as Laertius relates.

Returning to Athens in the 36. or 37th. year of his age, he a while discourses (as as in Laertius) of Philosophy in public, with others; but afterwards instituted a School in private denominated from him. As first indeed, admiring the doctrine of Democritus, he professed himself a Democritian as Philo- sect relates; but afterwards, for that he changed or added many things, his followers were from him called Epicureans.

CHAP. VI.

His School.

Whereas other Professors of Sects made choice of particular places in Athens, as the Academy, the Lyceum, and the like, he purchased a very pleasant Garden, for fourscore Mina, where he lived with his friends and Disciples, and taught Philosophy. Thus, amongst others, as Laertius cites Apollodorus, as Pliny writes, that Epicurus first brought into Athens the custom of having under the name of Horius a garden, the delights of fields and Country-manions within the city it self; whereas, until his time, there was not the fashion to have those kind of mansions (mura) in towns.

Hence we may conjecture that this was the place which Panionius reports to have been called, even in his time, the Garden, adding that there was in it a statue of Venus made by Alcamenes, one of the most eminent things in Athens, (as may be gathered also from Lucian) and that the Temple of Venus, with the statue of cælestial Venus, did joyne to it. This Garden is often mentioned in the Plurall number by Cicero, Seneca, and others, and sometimes diminutively, Horius; as Virgil; but, howsoever it be us’d, it is commonly taken for the Seat or Doctrine delivered in that place by Epicurus and his Scholars. Whence Sextus Empiricus calls the Epicureans, the Philosophers of the Gardens (as the Stoicks, the Philosophers of the Sca a cloister), and Apollodorus, being in his time the Master of the Gardens, was, as Laertius affirms, called uxoruris or the Garden-King.

Besides this Garden, which, with houses belonging to it, joyned upon the City, Epicurus had a house in Miletus, which was a Town of the Cercopian tribe, as Suidas affirms, inhabited by Philists, one of the Ancestors of Epicurus, as was formerly said, having (according to Philostratus) a famous temple dedicated to Horius. His other Epicureans sometimes retired with his Disciples, and at last bequeathed it to his Successors, as we shall declare hereafter.
EPICURUS

CHAP. VII.
How he lived with his Friends.

Epicurus, after his return to Athens, at what time Anaxagoras was Archon, went only twice or thrice to Lonia, to visit his friends, but lived all the rest of his time at Athens, unmarried, nor would never forfake his Country, though at that time reduced to great extremities, as *Lasarius lib. to. observes. The word of which was when Demetrius besieged Athens, about the 44th year of Epicurus's age. How great a famine at that time opprefsed the City is described by *Plutarch. But it is observable, that having related a story of the contest between *Aesop his Son about a dead moufe which had fallen from the top of a moufe, he adds, *They say that Epicurus the Philosopher sustaine'd his friends with Bees which he shared equally amongst them.

Epicurus therefore lived all the rest of his time at Athens, together with so many friends and Disciples whom he conversed with and instructed, as that whole Cities were not sufficient to contain them (they are the words of *Lasarius) who referred to him, not only from Greece but all other parts, and lived with him in his gardens, as he cites out of Apollodorus 3 but especially from Asia, and particularly from Lampsacus, and from Egypt as may be collected out of *Plutarch. Of the temperance, and frugality of his diet we shall speak hereafter. As to his living with his friends, it is remarkable what Diocles, in Lasarius, and others, relate; That Epicurus did not, as *Pythagoras, who said the gods of Friends ought to be in common, appoint them to put their estates into one joint Stock, (for that imply'd a distrust, not a friendship) but that any one upon occasion should be freely supply'd by the rest. This will appear more manifest hereafter. In the mean time, we must not omit an eminent place of *Cicero; Neither (as he) did Epicurus approve friendship in discourse only, but much more by life, actions, and even those manners, which how great a thing it is, the fables of the Ancients declare. For among the many various stories repeated from almost antiquity there are hardly found three pairs of Friends, from Thems his time down to Orestes. But how many great companies of friends, and how unanimously loving did Epicurus keep in one house, and that very little which is done even unto this day by the Epicureans. Thus *Cicero.

Amongst the rest of his friends, *Lasarius mentions Polystratus, who seems to be the same, of whom together with Hippoclides another Epicurean of Paterius Maximus gives a strange account, I shall insert the words of *Lasarius concerning communication of the goods of his Disciples: they are these. Neither may aptly be referred Polystratus & Hippoclides, Philosophers, who, born the same day, followers of the sect of the same Master, Epicurus, joined together in the common possession of estate and maintenance of that School, died very old, in the same moment of time. So equal a society of fortune and friendship, which thinks not to have been begotten, bred, and ended, in the bosom of celestial Concord! Thus here.

CHAP. VIII.
His Friends and Disciples.

Being now to give a Catalogue of the chiefest of his Friends and Disciples, we must not in the first place passe by the three Brethren of Epicurus.
curus, mention'd in the beginning, for they by his advice studied Philosophy with him, as Philodemus (in Laertius) affirms. But Plutarch adds, that they rook in the Philosophy of their Brother, as greedily as if they had been divinely inspired, believing and professing from their first youth, that there was not any man wiser then Epicurus. The most eminent of the three was Neocles; he declaring from a boy, that his Brother was the wife of Mortals, added, as a wonder, that his Mother could contain many and so great atoms as, by their convention, made up such a wise man; as Plutarch relates. Hence it appearing that Neocles followed not any Philosophy of his own, but that of his Brother, I know not why some affirme that he introduced a Sect like that of his Brother, unless perhaps they ground it upon that place of Suidas, where he saith that Neocles writ concerning his Sect: but who sees not, it may be understood, that he writ concerning the Sect which he himselfe professed, but was instiuted by another, especially for that there is nothing said any where of the Sect of the Neocides.

Observe by the way, that this saying of Ecles, Livy clafs (which Plutarch, Aristotle, and Seneca, as among the proverbial speeches) did belong to this Neocles, as the fame Suidas affirmeth.

To his three Brethren, may be added those three Friends, who, (as we read in Seneca) became great persons, through the conversation of Epicurism.

Metrodorus is to be first nam'd; for he was, as Cicero saith, almost another Epicurus. Strabo plainly declareth, he was of Lampacum. For whereas Laertius seems to say he was an Athenian, the place is very corrupt; especially seeing it is manifest he was not an Athenian, from this Antithesis of Cicero, How much was Epicurus happier for being in his Country, than Metrodorus for being at Athens, because Athens was not the Country of Metrodorus: the text of Laertius is this, He had many Disciples; but the most eminent were Metrodorus, Abydon, and Timocrates, and Sandes a Lampacum, who from his first acquaintance with the man never left him, &c. For my part I am of opinion, that these words Abydon, &c.τυχουσετερ, &c. Σαντα should be quite expunged, for if you take them away, the rest joyns together very well; if you admit them, they will not hang together: for it was Metrodorus that was indeed a Lampacum, and with whom all the rest that follows agreeeth, not Sandes, whom, besides other things, it is false that Epicurus should mention in his Will. And though Casaubon conceives, that Abydon may be the proper name of a Man, yet is it strange that we bear nothing elsewhare, as well of Athenaeus as of Sandes, as Epicureans; since Laertius in this place reckons up his most eminent Disciples, but taking these away, the three viz; Metrodorus, Polyanus, and Hermarchus are described in a confirmed series; who, as we said, are put together by Seneca, as most eminent. As for Timocrates, he is mention'd afterwards by the way, when he comes to name Metrodorus as his Brother, and seems here to be inferred amiss. The occasion upon which these names crept into the Text I suspect to be, that, perhaps, some Transcripter had noted in the margent that what is delivered in the Text was confirmed also by Athenaeus, (author of the Deipnoothita) for in him there is something concerning the Epicureans) and by Timocrates (for he also is cited by Laertius) and by one Sandes, (perhaps Suidas, or some other). That many things have hereofore been inferred out of the margents into the texts themselves by carelessness of the Transcripters, is most manifest.

Metrodorus therefore was country a Lampacum, not the fame with that
EPICURUS.

that friend of Anaxagoras, whom P Lartius mentions of the same name, was born in the 12th year of Epicurus's age; for, dying in the 33rd year of his age, (the coherence of the words and sense makes me think it should be read Mortis...vita,) and that being the 7th before the death of Epicurus, who lived to the 72nd year, it is evident, that the year of his birth must fall upon the 12th of Epicurus's. From the first time that Metrodorus became acquainted with Epicurus, (which might happen in the 22d year of his age, at what time Epicurus lived at Lampacus,) he never (as we began to lay out of Lucrinius) parted from him, but one six months, in which time he was absent at home, and thence returned to Epicurus. He had a litter, Banus, whom he married to Idomenes, and a concubine named Leonium. He had children, whom Epicurus recommended in his Will, and in the Epistle which he wrote dying, and particularly a son, named Epicurus. He was a very good man, undisturbed with troubles, or death itself, as Epicurus himself, in Laertius, attests. He had the Dropside: for Cornelius Celsius writes, that whilst he was sick of that disease, and could no longer abstain, as was convenient, from drinking; he used, after he had forborne a great while, to drink, and call it up again. But whether it was of this disease, or of something other, that he dyed; is not certain. The Books which he wrote are, by Laertius, reckoned to be these: Against Physicians III. Of the Senect, to Timocrates. Of Magnanimity. Of the Infirmity of Epicurus. Against the Diatetics. Against the Sophists IX. Of the way to Wisdom. Of Alteration. Of Riches. Against Democritus. Of Nobility. Besides which, P Plutarch cites his Books, Of Philosophy. Of the Poets. Against Timarchus. Likewise P Clement Alexander cites a Treatise, That the cause of felicity which comes from our selves is greater, than that which comes from other things. But of Metrodorus, enough.

Polyenus was son of Atebadorus, a Lampacene also. He was a great Mathematician, to use the words of Cicero, and (to comprise much in little) modest and amiable, as Phidemedus (in Lucrinius) faith.

Hermachus was son of Agemarchus, a Mytilenean, his father of mean quality. At first he studied Rhetoric, but afterwards became to knowing in Philosophy, that Epicurus dying, committed the government of the School to him. He dyed at Lythrai. There is great mention of him in Epicurus's Will. His Writings, which Laertius commends for excellent, the most excellent. Epistles, concerning Empedocles, XXII. Of Disciplines, (for Caesarian well reads not Meditatio, but Meditatoria) two Books. Against Plato. Against Aristotle.

To these must be added, as Leonium, a Lampacene, whom Plutarch calls, one of the most eminent disciples of Epicurus; adding, that this was the man who wrote to Lycephor, that Epicurus honoured Democritus.

Moreover, Cototes and Idomenes, Lampacenes also. Of the former we shall have occasion to speak of, especially because of the two Books which Plutarch writes against him. Lucrinius elsewhere writes, that Megedemus the Cynick was his disciple, (unless perhaps there were some other Cototes of Lampacus.) The name Cototes it is, who, cited by Macrobius, argues, that Plato ought not to have inverst the tale of Erias, because no kind lib. x lib. 6 of fiction agree with the professors of truth. The latter, Idomenes, Epicurus designed to make famous by his Letters, as indeed he did, which appears from Seneca: I will allege, faith he, Epicurus for an example, who writing to Idomenes, (then a minister of State, employ'd in great affairs,) to peruse him, from a fission's kind of life, to true field glory. It is faith he, you affect glory, my epistles will make you more famous, than all the things which you esteem, and of which you are esteemed. Who would have known Idomenes, if Epicurus had not given his name in his Letters? All those Magi-
EPICURUS.

Magistrates and Princes, even the King himself, from whom Idomeneus derived his Title, are now suppressed by a deep oblivion. Thus he, and these (faith Larrius) were the more eminent disciples.

But to these may be added two of Valerius, already mentioned, Polystratus and Hipponides; especially seeing Larrius reckons Polystratus as successor to Hermachus, unless the Polystratus who is joined to Hipponides, were not the same with him that succeeded Hermachus.

We might add Timocrates of Lampacum, Brother of Meandrotes; but he seems to have fallen off, or brooking the reprobations of his Brother. We shall therefore rather joyn to these Min, the servant of Epicurus, who, as Larrius affirms, became an eminent Philosopher, not omitted by Agellus, and Macrobius, in reckoning up those, who, of servants, became famous for Philosophy.

To omit Apelles, somewhere derived by Plutarch, we must here mention three Women, who together with others of the same sex, learnt Philosophy of Epicurus. One, Leontius, who studied Philosophy under Epicurus, as Athenius recites, and may also be collected from Cicero, who, fearing, he wrote a Book against Theophrastus, in an elegant style, and in the Attick dialect. The second, Themis, Daughter of Zosimus, a Lampacene, Wife of the before mentioned Leontius. Of her, besides the testimonies which we shall hereafter allude, Clements Alexandrinus taketh express notice. The third, Philenius, whom Athenius affirms to have written many things; adding that the obscene books ascribed to her, were put forth under her Name, by Polycrates the Sophist, to discredit the Woman.

To these may be added Herodes, to whom Epicurus wrote a little Epitome of Physick, extant in Larrius, and who amongst other things, according to the same Larrius, wrote a book of the youth of Epicurus. Phileaces, to whom Epicurus wrote of Superiour things; extant in Larrius; and who affirmed, when he was but 18 year old, he had not his equal for ingenuity in all Greece, as Plutarch relates.

Maneaces, to whom Epicurus wrote that Epistle concerning Morality, which is extant in Larrius, its beginning recited also by Clements Alexandrinus.

Timocrates, Son of Demetrius, a Poramian, and Amyronymachus, Son of Philocrates of Bare, whom Epicurus made the Executors of his Will.

Nicomachus, whom Epicurus recommended to the care of the said Executors.

Eurydice, one of those to whom, as Larrius saith, he writ Epistles, Dositheus, and his Son Pyrko, and Hegesiarus, to whom Epicurus wrote a consolatory letter, upon the death of their Father, as we find in Plutarch.

To omit Polymedes, Aniades, and others, to be mentioned hereafter in treating of his Books.

CHAP. IX.

How much he wrote.

Neither did Epicurus spend the time in giving his Disciples only Oral Instructions, but bestowed much pains in composing several books, but to understand how much he labour'd herein, by comparison with other Philosophers; hear but Larrius in his Preface: Many things, saith he, Zeno writ more, Xenophon more, Democritus; more, Aristotle; more, Epicurus; more, Chrysippus. Where we see that Epicurus, as to multi-

a lib. 1.

b Saturn. 1.

c Lib. 13.

d de Nat. de.

e Strum. lib. 4.

f lib. 8, and 10.
EPICHURUS.

rude of writings came short only of Chrysippus. But observe, that else-
where Laertius; to shew, he may be thought to have exceeded Chrysip-
bus here; cites Apollodorus; the Athenian, who, faith he, doth shew that what
Epichurus write of himselfe, not borrowed from any other, did far exceed the books
of Chrysippus, faith expressly thus: If a man should take out of the books of
Chrysippus, the things he hath borrowed of others, the paper will be left
blank. But that this may not seem strange, the fame Laertius elsewhere, lib. 10,
relates, that Chrysippus for his emulation of Epichurus in writing much, was
called by Callisthenes, the Erope of his books, because, if Epichurus wrote any
thing (read ekatas not ekatos) he would affect to write as much. Whence it
came to passe, that he often wrote the same things over again, and whatsoever
came next to hand, and presently thrust it in for haste, without correction, and
brought in so many testimonies of other Writers, that his books were filled up
only with them, as may be found in Zeno also, and Arisotle. Thus Laertius,
of Chrysippus, but of Epichurus not so: for he relates that his volumes at
least amounted to three hundred, in which, faith he, there is no testimony of any
other Author, but they are all the very words of Epichurus. Which I obverse,
to shew (seeing Epichurus wrote so many things, a great Writer, as he
termed him, and exceeding for multitude of Books, so as Origen charges, Cell.
ging Calis with temerity, objects as a thing he conceives impossible, lib. 7.
There is not any of us, who, faith he, knoweth all that Epichurus writeth) his fluent
vain, and how he was chiefly employ'd.

CHAP. X.

What Writings of his are, particularly, mentioned by
Authors.

Here it is fit, we give a kind of Catalogue of his Books, not of all he
wrote, but of those whose whole Titles are extant in other Authors. I say
their Titles, for the books themselves have to miscarry by the injury of
time, that besides some few compendiums preserved by Laertius, and some
fragments scatter'd up and down amongst several Writers, there is not
any thing of them remaining, at least, as yet known to us.

To begin with those, which Laertius accounts the best, they are ranked
thus.

Of Nature, XXXVII. They are sometimes cited simply, Of Nature,
sometimes with the number of the Books, as when Laertius hereafter in his
Life, cites the I. the XI. XII. XIII. XV. Galen also mentions the Tit-
le and number of the Books.

Of Atmos, and Vacuum, usuallie cited, b Cleomenes feemeth to mean
the same under another name, Of the Principles of all things,

Of Love.

An Epitome of things appertaining to Natural Philosopher. This Epi-
tome was twofold, great and little; both are cited by Laertius; the latter,
that which is written to Herodotus,

Against the Megarick (or Dialectick) Philosophers, Doubts. These
Doubts, seem chiefly to have concerned certain Moral Arguments, as con-
cerning Justice, Marriage, and Dower: for this seems to be the same,
which Laertius, and Cicero, cite under the name of Doubts, without
adding, To the Megaricks,

Neither Aetius, Maximis or, as Cicero interprets, Maximus ven-
d de fin, lib. 1, semina, because, faith he, they are sentences briefly expressed, which conduc-
exceedingly to living happily. He elsewhere calls them select, and short Sen-
tences, 2.
EPICURUS.

[Epictetus seems to call them Memorable Sayings, Laertius hath put them at the end, and Lucian sometime commends them, as Cicero the Book of Cranes, which is, faith he, not gross indeed, but golden, and, as Panetius advised Tiberius, to be gotten by heart. He was in opinion different from Sidus, who calls them Wicked notions.

The Epistle of Eleclions, so I conceive it ought rather to be rendered, then of Sellis, because in this book Epicurus seems not to design a History of Sects, but Morall Inquisition, which is conversant about the choice of things, as Laertius declares at the end of Epicurus's Epistle to Menecens. Nor to mention, that he teacheth the Ethick kind to consist only of election and avoidance. For which reason, the Book, which is ordinarily next to this cited,

The Epistle of Plants, ought rather to be entituled, The Epistle of Plants, Of things to be avoided; as well for coherence of the title, as for that Epicurus, almost wholly taken up with Morall Philosophy, scarce treated of any particular subject in Phyllick, unless they were such as conduced to take away vain thoughts from the minds of men, of which kind, this of Plants could not be. Moreover, because in Manuscripts, this title is connected to the former by the conjunction and, we may conjecture, that the Inscription was, The Epistle of Plants, or The Epistle of Plants; or under a single title, The Epistle of Plants, or of Election and avoidance. Yet might the Inscription have been in the plural number, forasmuch as it is afterwards said, Election and avoidances are judiacted from pleasure and grief.

Of the end; So this Book is generally cited, as, amongst others, by Plutarch. Neither doth Cicero seem to mean any other, though he cite a Book of the end of good and evil,

Of Eleclions, or the Canon; or, as Cicero translates it, Of the Rule, and of Judgment. But if instead of Judgment we render it Judicatory, the force of the word will be more fully expresst.

Chreodamus or, Of the gods. This is one of those Books, which Epicurus entituled by the names of his brethren and friends, that, being dead, their names might not be forgotten, as Plutarch observeth.

Of Sanitie, or Hegesianax. This perhaps is he, whom Plutarch terms, Hegesianax, concerning whose death, Epicurus wrote to his Parents; unless perhaps it were he who wrote Histories, and Troica, cited by Athenæus; for he was of Alexandria, and Epicurus had friends out of Egypt.

Of Lives IV, which is all one as if the Inscription had been, Of Life and Manners. Neither doth Epicurus seem in these Books to relate the story of some eminent persons, as Plutarch and Laertius have done in their Books of Lives; but to give rules, whereby to lead a quiet life, as may plainly enough be collected from the catalogue of the Morall Treatises, and the places cited out of this by Laertius. The word Lives seems here to be taken in the same sense, as with Plutarch, when he speaketh of the difference of Lives and Politics, which the Interpreter well renders, Of Manners and Publick Influiences. Of these Books, are hereafter cited by Laertius, the first and second.

Of Just Allian.

Needles to Themis. This seems to have been that Needles who was brother to Epicurus, nor his father; for in like manner he called other of his books after the names of his brothers.

The Banquet, cited by Plutarch, Athenæus, and others. Plutarch mentions Questions handled in it, concerning the Heat of Wine, the time of Cocorion, Laertius, concerning troubles about Marriage, &c.

Eurylochus is Metrodorus. I guess, that this Eurylochus was the same with
EPICURUS.

with that Epuridius, to whom, as we said formerly, Epicurus wrote; but the thing is uncertain.

Of seeing.

Of the Angle which is in the Atom.

Of Touching, or perhaps, Of the tangibility of Atoms: for Epicurus called Largus the Vacuums and Chalices, that which cannot be touched.

Of Fate.

Of Pfaffian Sentences to Timocrates.

Negro, Præcognitorum; so I render it, because he seems in this to have confounded the Præcognitive faculty.

Pretepidius (exhortatory) that is, Discourse, for so Isocrates and Celsus, expressly.

Of Images, udax, simulacr, imagine, species, forms, spectres; so several persons variously interpret them, which are now commonly termed intentional species.

Of Phanopoeis, or the impression thereof, which appears in the knowing faculty; for neither did Epicurus, nor most of the ancient Philosophers, understand by this word, as we now for the most part do, the faculty itself.

 Aristofineus: this book bears the name of Epicurus's third brother.

 Of Munific, viz. as it condueth to Manners; for this may be collected from Plutarch and Empiricus.

Of Gifts and Gratitude, mentioned by Empiricus, who cites something

Grammaticall out of it.

Polyomedes; he seems to have been some friend or disciple of Epicurus.

Timocrates, III. Whether meaning the brother of Meteordorus, or the Exeget of his Will, or some other. Hence I should believe, that by Laertius was cited the third book of Timocrates, or written by Timocrates; but that instead of Ts. I suspect it should be written T. relating to the third book, which, by Epicurus, was foentituled. This the text seems to confirm.

Metemtodes V. That this was the same Meteordorus, of whom we have spoken formerly, cannot be doubted. From the first book, cited by Laertius, may be collected, that Epicurus related the story of Meteordorus's life.

Anisidorms II. In this Anisidorms is mentioned by Plutarch, and perhaps by Laertius also, in the life of Heracleides, if we there read Anisidorms for Meteordorus.

The θέου αἰγίς περὶ τῶν Μακρών, Of the South-winds, Sentences, to Mithres. But perhaps the Title ought rather to be read, περὶ τῶν Μακρών, Of Diseases, as well for the reasons alleged about the Title, περὶ τῶν Μακρών, as for that these sentences seem not to have been several opinions, concerning some particular winds, as Metall Sentences to moderate the pain of diseases. This seems to be the same Mithres a Syrian, whom Meteordorus relieved, as Plutarch hath several times delivered; and the same whom Laertius relates to have been the steward of Lyons's house; adding, that Mithres saying to Theodorus, Thou seemest not onely not to acknowledge gods, but Kings also. Theodorus replied, How can I but acknowledge gods, who think thee an enemy to the gods?

Callisthenes, who, it may be presumed, was some friend of Epicurus's.

Of a Kingdom, mentioned by Plutarch.

Anaximenes; perhaps he is the same Lampasene who is mentioned by Strabo, and whom both Plutarch and Laertius seem to mean; for, though he were one of Alexander's Masters, yet did he survive him, (for he wrote his actions) and was, according to Suidas, disciple to Diogenes the Cynick, and consequently younger than he; whereas Diogenes died in

Q q q q q q q
the eighteenth year of Epicurus's age, viz. in the beginning of the 34th th.
Olympiad.

Ephes. Of these, four are extant in Larinius, one to Herodotus, which
was, as we said, the latter Epitome, and under that name cited by A. Achilles
Tatius; Of Natural things. The second, to Pythocles, Of Meteors, or
fiercious things, as well Celestial, as all others above the earth.
The third, to Menecres, Of Manners. The last is very short, which his
writing dying, to Idomeenus. That, besides these, he wrote in numerable others, may
be collected from P. Plutarch, I Larinius, and others. For Plutarch, for
example, cites an Epistle of his, To Anaxarchus; & Larinius his Epistle,
To Aristobulus; also an Epistle, To his friends, At Mytilene. This seems to be
the same with that, which Sextus Empiricus cites thus, To the Philosophers
at Mytilene. But Larinius implied, there were more which bore the
inscription, της πεποτους Μυτιληνοις πτωτος; so as there might
be one of them suppressitious. In the same rank may be reckoned his
Epistles, concerning several institutions of life, hinted by Larinius,
cited by Athenaeus and Eusibius. I omit, that the same Athenaeus
mentions his Epistles to Hermachus; and, not to enquire after any more,
the highest in repute were those written to Idomeenus, as we may understand
from Seneca, who also cite something excellent out of his Epistles
To Polyenus. Amongst those to Idomeenus was that, out of which
Michael Apollonius, cites a fragment containing the original of the
Proverbs, These shall be to thee both Pythian and Delian, apply'd to those
that shall dye within a short time; though Eratosthenes, the Prophet is
fett to be cited out of Memnon.

As to the Epistles, we shall by the way observe, that Epicurus used to
write, by way of salutation in the beginning of his Epistles, sometimes
χαίρε, joy; sometimes εὐχαίρε, well to do; sometimes ἐνεχθέν, some-
times ὑπερεξαίρετον, εὐορκίστατον ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, is defective, there seems some word wanting to
the sentence; neither doth the word ἔγερσα seem to belong to the form
of salutation. And besides, these words, ἀρετής, exclude χαίρειν from the
Epicurean form of salutation; whereas this word is not only put before
his Epistles, extant in Larinius, but it is rendered by Cicero also,
when he alluded that which he wrote at his death. For this reason,
when heretofore I would, in the room of these two words, have put ὑπερεξαί
(as a less alteration, than if I should have substituted ὑπερεξάοι), or (as the
like) the learned Paulo erased it; but withal conceived that χαίρεω ought to be retained; but the excellent Menagius was of opinion, that
since a word is wanting, for ἔγερσα should be read ἥγερσα, used on the
like occasion by Larinius; but that ἀρετής ought to be retained, forso-
much as Epicurus seemeth not to have used the word χαίρεω, it being
mentioned as proper to Cleon, both by Lucian and Larinius himself.

Or whether instead of ἔγερσα we might not put ὑπερεξάοι, or, with the
least alteration, ἔγερσα, signifying, that for salutation, he was at plea-
ted with those words, εὐχαίρετον, and ὑπερεξαίρετον ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν; or might not that τοῖς be
retained, implying, that he did not so much at all the word χαίρεω, but
instead of it sometimes used the other two, as if more were either wanting
or imply it. Indeed, Lucian seems not-obscurely to hint as much, when
relating, that Epicurus was extremely delighted with the word χαίρεω, he
adds, that sometimes he used other words, and that sometimes in his
more accurate and profound Epistles, (which yet he faith were not many)
or when he wrote to his most intimate friends, he chiefly used ὑπερεξάοι.
Larinius therefore attributing the word ὑπερεξάοι to him, may as well
be
EPICURUS.

be thought to have intended \textit{xaipav}, as used by him: since, attributing \textit{aipav} to him also, he makes \textit{megethar} as peculiar to \textit{Plato}, as \textit{xaipav} to \textit{Clean}.

This Catalogue of his Books is compiled by \textit{Laertius}; but besides these, there are others, cited both by \textit{Laertius} himself, and other Writers. \textit{Laertius} formerly cited his Book, \textit{Of Rhetorick}, mentioned also by the School of \textit{Hermogenes}. But that which is cited, \textit{Of Perspicuity requisite to Discourse}, belongs to \textit{Canonic}, which he subtilized in the room of \textit{Diadick}.

He likewise seems to cite his \textit{Hepopurunus}, \textit{Anecdodia}, or \textit{Praepiup}; things precedent or preferred, in the sense of the Stoicks. I should think it meant of some of the Books before cited, if amongst them there were any, wherein that which is alluded were written by \textit{Epicurus}.

There are cited also \textit{Staceiopae}, \textit{Institutions} or \textit{Elements}, \textit{XII}. There seems also to be cited, \textit{Of Worlds}, \textit{XII}. For, describing several Worlds, he is said to have done it in the \textit{XIIth} \textit{pi}fr\textit{etas}, or, as the Manuscripts, \textit{pi du\textit{ar}}\textit{i}, upon this very subject; the rather, because it seems not meant of those XXXVII which are constantly cited, \textit{Of Nature}.

I should add his \textit{Physical Problems}, and \textit{Ethical doctrines}; but that under these names may be comprised, all that \textit{Epicurus} wrote concerning \textit{Nature} and \textit{Morality}.

Moreover, \textit{Cicero} cites his Book, \textit{Of the chief Good}; unless it be the \textit{VII} \textit{II}, same with that, \textit{Of the End}, already mentioned.

By the same also is cited his Book, \textit{Of Pleasure}; this perhaps \textit{Laertius} \textit{de devin}. means, when he said, \textit{It was objected by some against \textit{Epicurus}}, that he usurped the Treatise of \textit{Aristippus} concerning Pleasure, as if it had been his own.

Besides these, \textit{Cicero} cites his Book, \textit{Of Piety towards the gods}, \textit{distinct}; \textit{de nar}, \\textit{deor}; as it seems, from that, \textit{Of Sanctity}, reckoned by \textit{Laertius}, \textit{Of Sanctity}, \textit{falich} \textit{he}, \textit{Of piety towards the gods}, \textit{he wrote Books}.

Again, \textit{Plutarch} declares, that he wrote Books against \textit{Theophrastus} for, the second of them, he faith, contained a discourse concerning Colours. Hirherto of his Books.

CHAP. XI.

His Will.

\textit{Epicurus} having employed his life in Teaching and Writing, and being now grown old, made, as the custom was, his Will, which being preserved entire by \textit{Laertius}, we shall not need to have recourse to those \textit{thir} \textit{to} \textit{fragments of it}, which lye disorderedly in \textit{Cicero}, and other Writers. It was in this form.

Thus I bequeathe. I give all my Estate to Amynomachus, son of Philocrates, of Batis, \textit{(A Town of the \textit{Egcan Tribe}, as \textit{Helychius} describes it)} and to Timocrates son of Demetrius, a Potamian, \textit{(of Potamus, a Town belonging to the \textit{Levanian Tribe}, \textit{Phavorin})} according to the donation which hath already been made, and is recorded among the \textit{Deeds in the Mercorum}, \textit{(A Temple of the great goddesse at Athens, seated upon the Haven, in which the \textit{Lampe}, \textit{Judgments}, and other \textit{Altis} were preserved, as Athenaeus, Suidas, and others affirm)} with this condition, that they befor the Garden and all that belongs
EPICURUS.

longs to it, on Hermachus, son of Agemarchus, a Mitylenian, and those that shall study Philosophy with him; and on those, whom Hermachus shall leave his successors in Philosophy, and to those who shall succeed us in the profession of Philosophy, for ever. And, that it may be preserved with all possible care, I assign the School to Amynomachus and Timocrates, and to their heirs, according to the fairest form of Law, that they may keep the Garden, and deliver it to those who shall profess Philosophy after us. The house which is at Melite, let Amynomachus and Timocrates deliver to Hermachus, and to those that study Philosophy, with him, to dwell in it as long as he shall live. Of the Revenues made over by us to Amynomachus and Timocrates, let them set apart as much as shall be sufficient (advising with Hermachus) to celebrate the exequies of thy father, mother, and brethren, and to keep, as they have done hitherto, my birthday, in the first Decad of the month Gamelion; as also to provide a Feast for entertainment of all those, who study Philosophy with us, every month, on the twentieth day of the Moon, in commemoration of us, and of Metrodorus. Let them also keep a day in memory of my brethren in the month Poseidon, as we used to do, and another to Polyænus, in the month Metaginion. Let Amynomachus and Timocrates take care of Epicurus, son of Metrodorus, and of the son of Polyænus, and let them study Philosophy, and live with Hermachus. In like manner, let them take care of the daughter of Metrodorus, and as soon as she shall be Marriageable, be with her upon some of the students of Philosophy, whom Hermachus shall choose, provided she be modest, and obedient to Hermachus. Let Amynomachus and Timocrates, out of our Revenues, bestow yearly so much as shall be sufficient, for their maintenance, with the consent of Hermachus. For let them so esteem Hermachus, having an equal share in our Revenues, and grown old, in studying Philosophy under us, and left by us Guide of those that studied Philosophy under us, that all things be done by his advice. As for her portion, when she shall come to be marriageable, let Amynomachus and Timocrates take as much as they shall think convenient, with the consent of Hermachus. Lestwise, let them take the same care of Nicanor as we did, that all they who studying Philosophy with us, have communicated the use of their Estates, and expressing all friendship, have chosen to grow old with us in Philosophy, want not any necessaries to the utmost of our power. All my Books I bequeath to Hermachus; but if anything of mortality happen to Hermachus, before the children of Metrodorus arrive at full age, let Amynomachus and Timocrates take care, that all necessaries be decently provided for them, as much as shall be necessary, out of the Revenues left by us. Let all the rest be ordered as we have appointed, as much as is possible. I manumit of my servants, Mus; Licias, Lycon; Phaedria also, I set free.

CHAP.
EPICURUS.

CHAP. XII.

The manner of his Death.

As concerning his last sickness, and death, we must know that Epicurus was of a constitution not very strong. This is implied even by the Title of the Book, written by Metrodorus, Of the infirmity, or unhealthfullness of Epicurus. It is implied also by the envious exaggeration of Suidas, that Epicurus could not endure to put on his Cloaths, nor to rise out of bed, nor to look upon the Sun, and the fire, and the like. in Lec. These may at least persuade, that Epicurus was of a complexion not strong, and as in the whole course of his life, he had not a constant health, so at last he died of a painful disease, the Stone, whereof it is probable he had many fits. in Lecinus, out of Hermachus, in his Epistles, relates clo. cit. that he died of the Stone stopping his urine, having lived sick 14. days.

It is memorable, that being near death, he write that Epistle which Laertius mentions, as written to Idameus, Cicer, to Hermachus; perhaps it was sent to both, because of the τούτου: or to Idameus, rather then to Hermachus, because the children of Metrodorus were sufficiently recommended to Hermachus, by his Will. Moreover it is not likely that Hermachus, his next successor, was absent at that time, especially seeing he sent a relation of Epicurus's death in Letters, not to presse, that he from his youth was more addicted to Rhetorick, then Philosophy, as appeareth from Laertius. The Epistle is this.

Saying a most happy life, and withal dying, we write this to you, fired by the Strangury and Dysenterie beyond expression, yet all these were counterpoised by the joy of mind, which I conceived in remembering our discourses and inventions. But thou, as becomes the good will which thou hast had from thy youth to me, and Philosophy, take care of the children of Metrodorus.

Laertius adds ( out of Hermippus ) that Epicurus went into a bath of eboch. warm water, called for wine, drank it off, and exhorting his friends to be mindfull of his Doctrine, whilst he was discomfting, died. Upon which Laertius hath this Epigram:

Farewell, and bear my Doctrine in your minds;
Saying dying Epicurus to his Friends:
Into a warm bath going, wine he quaffs,
And then from Plato took a colder draft.

CHAP. XIII.

The time of his Death.

Epicurus, died in the 2d. year of the 127th. Olympiad, Pytharum's being Archon. After δευτερο γεραν, which Laertius cites out of Apollodorus's Chronology, Cato's line rightly reads the Καταξας του ελληνικος, η αυτο-και του Ολυμπιαδος: not in the ordinary reading, yet is being wanting, Who could imagine that Epicurus, born in the 106th. Olympiad could die in the 107th. And indeed, the 72d. year of Epicurus, in which he is said to have dyed, falls upon the 127th. Olympiad.

The month and day of the year, in which Epicurus died, is told by Clemens Alexandrinus, who faith, that Antiochus the time of Pythagoras to the death of Epicurus, reckoned 312. years, adding that the death of Epicurus happened on the tenth day of the Month, Gaion, Where
Where observe, if the time of Pythagoras be reckoned from the 60th Olympiad, in which Laertius saith, he flourished; there will be found to be but 270 years, from thence to the death of Epicurus, and consequently the account of Amyclas will fall short 42 years. Wherefore this number must be taken from the birth of Pythagoras, who began to flourish in the 40th year of his Age.

Now whereas Apollodorus faith, that Epicurus lived 72 years, which is confirmed also by Cicero, saying, it is always reported, that Epicurus shall die, having lived 72 years: Pythagoras being Archon (whence some conjecture) Epicurus being in his Climactericall year, which is commemorated by 0, the last or 72d year, is not to be understood as compleat, for Epicurus had but newly entered into it, there being but three days over and above the 71 years; for he was born on the 7th of the Month Gamelion, there being between the time of his Birth, and his Death, 18 compleat Olympiads, except one year. Wherefore this is in the same manner, as when Pliny, Lucian, and Confordius affirm the Sicilian (or Leontine) Gorgias did live 108 years, whereas Cicero, and Valerius Maximus say, he compleated but 107. Here is observable, the computation which Plutarch makes between Epicurus, and Gorgias; for after he had said that Alexus the Comick Poet, (Son of Menander, and Father of Stephenus the Comick Poet, as Suidas relates) lived double the time of Metrodorus, that is 106 years, Metrodorus living according to Laertius, 53, he adds, that Gorgias the Sophist, out-lived Epicurus; and yet Gorgias lived more than one third, for if we take the number 36, it will be the same which Epicurus lived double, Gorgias triple; and whereas Plutarch fables more, perhaps he reflected upon the opinion which Quintilian and a Suidas afterwards followed, that Gorgias lived 109 years.

I see not why the Interpreter of Clemens Alexandrinus, should render Gamelion, October; for though there be some controversy about the order of the Greek months, yet shall we not find any, but make Gamelion the 6th, 7th, or 8th, from Hecatombon; which seeing it cannot begin higher than June, certainly Gamelion will be far distant from October. But since by many arguments it is evinced, that Gamelion is the 7th, from Hecatombon, it ought rather to be reduced to January. Now because the 24 year of the 127th Olympiad began in Summer, in the 4443d year of the Julian period, the Gamelion of that year must fall upon January, in the beginning of the 4444th year of the Julian Period. Upon what day of January, the tenth of Gamelion might fall, it is not easy to determine. But if we may make Gamelion commence, (as is done in the time of the nativity) from the 14th Moon, or from the 7th full Moon after the Summer Solstice, for as much as the new Moon happened upon the 30th of December, and consequently the 14th, Moon upon the 12th of January, hereupon if we make that the 18, of Gamelion the 10th, will fall upon the 21st of January, upon which the death of Epicurus might fall. Where we must further observe, that whereas Epicurus is said to have lived 72 years, it must be understood of the Grecian years, not Julian, for so it would fall short two days, it being already proved, he was born the 23d of January. Now, to reduce the death of Epicurus to our account, is facile: for if we subtract ten days, and for the cycle of the Sun that year which is 20, and for the Dominical Letter D. according to the old style, put C. according to our own, it will appear that Epicurus died the 31st of January, being the 4th day of the week or Wednesday, before the computation of Christ, 270 years.

CHAP.
EPICURUS.

CHAP. XIII.

How dear his Memory was to his Followers.

It remains, that we briefly tell how the memory of Epicurus, after his death, was respected by his followers. For, to omit, that his Country honoured him with a brazen Statue, as Lucullus writes; I observe, that the feast-days, and ceremonies appointed in his Will, were punctually kept by his Followers. * Pliny, (writing 350 years after upon this thing.) On his birth-day, faith he, the twentieth Moon, they sacrifice, and keep feasts every Month, which they call leaders: whence it may be conceived, that the Epicureans were by Greek Writers, as Athenians, termed ἱεροί, from observing this day, as Rhadigius also takes notice. Although some there are who think, they were called Idaei, from Ida an image, because there was not one of them, but had the picture of Epicurus. And of these images, * Pliny also, thus; They keep (faith he) the countenance of Epicurus in their chambers, and carry it up and down with them; and Cicero, in the person of Atticus, Neither, faith he, can we forget Epicurus of any more whose representation we have not only in pictures, but in cups, and rings also. * There are also, who add, that some took great care to have Pictures of Epicurus, not only at Rome, but in cities, as conceiving it a fortunate Omen, to the nation, and their own name. As for the affection which they bare to him, hear Patro, Honour, faith Cicero, Office, right of wills, the authority of Epicurus, the sanctity of Phaedrus, the feast-house, foot-steps of excellent Persons, he saith, that he much prefers, but especially to Torquatus. One we not much to him, faith he, who, as if he had heard the voice of Nature her self, did so firmly and soundly comprehend her, as he brought all ingenious persons into the way of a peaceful, calm, quiet, happy life? And again, Who, faith he, I think only saw truth, and freed the minds of men, from the greatest errors, and delivered all things appertaining to well and happy living.

And because Epicurus dying, advised his friends to be mindful of his Doctrines, * Cicero faith, that all of them got by heart, his Maximis, and some there were who learned without book, all his Doctrines, as particularly Scyros, mentioned in his Academicks. But let it suffice, to allude some few verses of 1 Lucullus, by which we may perceive how affectionate they were, to the memory, and doctrines of their Master. He begins his Third Book, thus.

Who first from darkness couldst a light so clear
Strike forth, and make life's benefits appear,
Great ornament of Gracia, I am near
By thee, and in thy sacred foot-steps tread:
Not to commend, but kindly imitate,
For how can those that Swallowes emulate
The Swan? or tender kids keep equal peace,
With the floes well-bred Steel's impetuous race?
From thee, O Father, every thing receives
Invention, thou gift of precepts, from thy veins
As Beet skip up and down, and sweetly suck,
In fondly groves, we golden sayings pluck;
Golden, deserving an eternal life.

And again:

By these a pleasure I receiv'd from Thee
Divine; without, a reverence, to see
That Nature every way thou hadst improv'd.
And afterwards,

Great Epicurus died, his lives race run,
Whose wise mankind exceeded; as the Sun
Eclipsed by his rising all the Stars.

CHAP. XV.

With what constancy, and unanimity, the succession of
his school flourished,

It deserves to be taken notice of, not only that the succession of his
school was constant, but that his successors and followers did always
agree, as was indeed wonderfull. As concerning the constancy, it is
known that the Presidens of the Garden, or Masters of the School, from
the death of Epicurus, to the times of Julius Caesar, and Augustus, suc-
ceeding one another in a continued Series, were, according to Sniteus,
XIV. and that for 237 years: In which latter times, how many Epicure-
sians there were, eminent persons, and of great account in the State, ap-
pears from Cicero. Lucian also writes, that in his time, there was a
stipend allowed to the Epicureans, by the Emperors; no less than to other
Philosophers: adding, that, when anyone of them died, he whom they
most approved of, was substituted in his room. Lucianus, who lived
after Lucian, declares, that whereas the successions of the other Philo-
osophers did almost quite fail, yet the succession of Epicurus did continually
prevail, so many succeeding one another in government of the Disco-
lines, as could not be reckoned up. Numenius (cited by Eusibius) adds,
that this succession lasted till his time, and that so perfectly, as it was like-
ly to endure a great while after. After these, Latianus: The Discipline of
Epicurus, faith he, was much more celebrious. In a word, as long as Lear-
ning flourished in Greece, and Rome was preserved from the Barbarians, the
School, and discipline of Epicurus, continued eminent.

As for their unanimity, to omit that of Cicero, I will maintain the Epicu-
reans who are so many, my Friends, men that are so loving to one another,
and the like places, and shall rather observe, that whereas other sects al-
most at their very beginning were distracted with inconstant differences, the
Epicurean was far from suffering any such thing. For Themistius writes,
that the Opinions of Epicurus, were kept by all the Epicureans, as Laws of
Selinus or Lycurgus. And, as they had all one Soul amongst them, faith
Gemoc, whatsoever Hermachus affirmed, whatsoever Menodorus, is referred
to one. All things that any man delivers in that Society, go under one man's
name: This will appear more plainly, if we alledge the words of Numen-
ius, the Pythagorean, in this Euseb. who after he had complain'd, that
the successors of Plato did not preserve that unanimity, for which the
Pythagoreans were esteemed, adds, after this manner the Epicureans being
infatuated (though unworthy) seeming not in any thing to differ from Epicu-
rus, and professing to have the same tenets with their wise Master, have
not unjustly sustained their peace. Hence it hath happened to the Epicureans for
a long time, that they never, in any thing worth notice, contradicted either one
another, or Epicurus. Amongst them it is an offence, or rather imperty, and
so bring in any innovation, whereof none dares attempt it. Hence, by rea-
son of their constant agreement among themselves, they enjoy their doctrines
peaceably and quietly, and that Institution of Epicurus resembles the true state
of a perfect Common-wealth: which being far from sedition, is governed by one
joy,
EPICURUS.

The Successors and Followers of Epicurus.

It remains, that we give a Catalogue of those who were eminent in that Sect, after the death of Epicurus. We have already said, that Hermachus succeeded Epicurus, and Polystratus Hermachus. It is also mantined from Laertius, that Diogenes succeeded Polystratus, and Basilides, Diogenes. But, who those ten Successors were from Basilides, to him who governed the School in the time of Augustus, we cannot easily say. Perhaps after Basilides, succeeded Protarchus Beryolus, whom Strabo alib. 14. mentions an illustrious person. The same Strabo faith, that disciple to Protarchus was Demetrius, (surnamed Lycus, who is mentioned also by La. lib. 3. as a Sextus Empiricus faith, eminent amongst the followers of Epicurus. Perhaps after him succeeded Diogenes of Tarfas, Author of the false Schools, whereof Laertius mentions 22 Books. He also cites an Epitome of Morall Doctrine, written by the same person, Laertius mentions also (but whether they belong to this series of Successors, is uncertain) two Poetaries or Alexandria, whether from diversities of complexions, or some others respect, one surnamed black, the other white. He mentions also Orinus, and seems to mention one Democritos, who, in his Tamenagoras, takes notice of Pleasure after Epicurus's doctrine.

There follow two out one of this rank, named by Athenagoras the first, Diogenes of Babylon, whom he describes to have been eloquent, but of an ill life; the other, Lyias, who, as he faith, governed at Tarfas; and being chosen by the Country Stephanophrus, (Priest of Hercules) he enjoyed the supreme government, and wore Regal Ornaments. This is he, who distributed the prizes of the rich amongst the poor, and put many of them to death for refusing to part with them. At what time he lived, we cannot certainly determine; but Diogenes, being contemporary with Alexander King of Syria, and Antiochus his Successor, may be referred to the 15th Olympiad.

About the same time, there hath flourished Encratidas, to whom belongs this Inscription, recited by James Grumers, A Brundiume, before the face of Diosides Athenaeus, a Physician, on the basis: EUCRATIDAS FOR LXXVIII. A RHODIAN, AN EPICURIAN PHILOSOPHER. THIS PLACE APPOINTED FOR BURIAL BY THE SENATE OF BRUNDUSIUM.

Not long after seems to have flourished Apollodorus, whom Laertius teineth eminent, and mentioneth, for that (as I conceive) he bore such sway in the Garden, as Democritus is said to have done in Courts of Judicature. He wrote above 300 Books, amongst which were some concerning the life of Epicurus, cited by Laertius. It may be conjectured, that he was the same, whose Chronology is cited by Laertius, and others.

Auditor of Apollodorus was Zeno the Sidonian, according to Laertius, alib. 7. who adds, that he wrote much, and that he was famous both for Philosophy and Rhetorick; whereas I conjecture, it is the same Zeno, of Ritr whom
Diorymus the Stoick much maligning Epicurus, traduced him exceedingly, producing fifty Epistles very lascivious, as written by Epicurus; to which he added, as Epicurus's also, the short Epistles, commonly ascribed to Chryphillus. No less disaffected to him were Ptolemy the Stoick, and Nicolaus, and Sotion, in the 22d, of his Dioeclean Confutations, (which are in all XXIV.,) and Dionysus Halicarnassus. For they say, He went from house to house with his mother reading expiatory prayers, and that with his father he taught children for a small stipend; that one of his brothers was a pander; that he himself used the company of Leontium a Curtexian, that he ascribed to himself the Books of Democritus concerning Atomes, and of Aristippus concerning Pleasures; that he was not a true Natire of the City, as Timocrates acknowledged, and Herodotus, in his Book of the Youth of Epicurus; That he basely flattered Mithres, Steward of Lycean Heracles, calling him in his Epistles, Apollo and King; That Idomeus, Herodotus, and Timocrates, who published some obscure Pieces of his, did commend and flatter him for the same: That in his Epistles he writes to Leontium thus; O King Apollo, my dear little Leontium, how were we transported and filled with joy at the reading of thy Letter! To Themista wife of Leontius, thus; If you come not to me, I shall roll to you whetherforever you call me. And to Pithocles, a handsome youth; I confine in expectation of your amiable and divine company. And again, writing to Themista, he thinks to persuade her: as Theodorus affirms, in his fourth Book against Epicurus. That he wrote to many other Curtexians, especially to Leontium, with whom Metrodorus also was in love. That in his Book concerning the End, he writes thus, Neither know I what is this good, if we take away the pleasures of the Taste, if we take away those of Sight, if we take away those of the Ear. That in his Epistle to Pithocles he writes; Happy Youth, fly as fast as thou canst from all Discipline. Epicurus calls him, Chreodologum, and rails at him exceedingly, Timocrates, brother of Metrodorus, who was a while a disciple of Epicurus, but at last forsook the School; Faith; That he walked twice a day, upon over-charging his stomack, and that he himself had much ado to get away from their Nocturnal Philosophy, and conversation in secret. That Epicurus was ignorant of many things belonging to Discourse, but much more of those which belonged to Life. That he was of such a miserable constitution, that he was not able of himself for
EPICURUS.

for many years, to get out of bed, or rise out of the chair in which he was carried. That he spent every day a Morn at his Table; as he himself writeth in his Epistle to Leontium, and in his Epistles to the Philosophers at Mitylene, That he and Metrodorus also fed the company of Carpeians; amongst others, Marmarium, Hedia, Erotrum, Nicidium. That in the thirty Books which he writ concerning Nature, he faith most of the same things over and over; and that in them he writes against many persons, and, amongst the rest, against Nausiphanes, and that in these very words; But this man, if ever any, had a way of seeming a Sophistick brag, like many other slaves. And that in his Epistles, he writeth thus concerning Nausiphanes; This so far transported him, that he raileth at me, and called himself my Master. Likewise, that he called Nausiphanes, Lungs (as so stelle), and unlearned, and deceitful, and lascivious. The disciples of Plato, Dionylius's Parasites; Plato himself, Golden; Arifotle, a Prodigall, that, having wasted his Patrimony, was fain to turn Souldier and Apothecary; Protagoras, a Basket-carrier, an Amansfis to Democritus, and a high-way School-maftcr, Heraclitus, Nicomedes, a caurier of confusion; Democritus, Apollodorus, purblind; Aiden, a farmer upon gifts; the Cyrenaiics, Enemies to Greece; the Dialectic, Epicurus; Pyrtho, Unlearned and unmanner'd.

But these men are mad; for, of the excellent candor of Epicurus towards all men, there are many witnesies; his Country, which honoured him with Statues of Brasse; his Friends, who were so many, that whole Cities could not contain them; his Disciples, who were also taken with his Sireneall doctrine, except Metrodorus the Stratonicean, who, perhaps over-burdened with his excessive goodness, revolted to Carneades; the Succession of his School, which, when all the rest were almost quite worn out, remained constant, and ordained so many Masters one after another, as cannot be numbered; his piety towards his parents, his kindness towards his brethren, his meekness towards his Scions, (as may appear by his will, and their studying Philosophy with him, amongst whom, Mus, formerly mentioned, was most eminent); and, in general, his humanity towards all, his devotion to the gods, and love to his Country, was beyond expression. He would not accept of any publick Office, out of an excessive modesty, and, in the most difficult troublesome times, continued in Greece, where he lived constantly, except that twice or thrice he made a journey to his friends on the borders of Ionia. But to him they returned from all parts, and lived with him (as Apollodorus relates) in the Garden, which he purchased with 80 Mine. Diocles, in his third Book, De Incurriance, faith, They used a most frugal (pure) diet, for they were contented with a pint of small wine, and for the most part they drank nothing but water. And that Epicurus would not have them
EPICURUS.

to put their Estates into one common stock, as Pythagoras ordained, saying, The goods of friends are common; for this argued distrust, and where there is distrust, there is no friendship. As for himself, in his Epistles, that he was contented with water only, and coarse bread: And send me, faith he, a little Cytheridan Cheese, that I may feast myself when I have a mind. Such was he, who professed, that Pleasure is the End, or chief Good, for which, Athenæus, in an Epigram, thus commends him:

*Man's most unhappy race for worst things toils,*  
*For wealth (unsatisfied) raisest wars and broils,*  
*Nature to wealth a narrow bound assign'd,*  
*But vain opinions waies unbounded find.*  
*Thus Neoclides, whom the sacred Quire*  
*Of Muses, or Apollo did inspire.*

But this we shall understand better from his own doctrine and words. Hitherto Laertius in vindication of Epicurus, which subject is more fully and rhetorically handled by the learned Gassendus, *De Vita & Moribus Epicuri*, in the six last Books.
The Doctrine of

EPICURUS.

Of PHILOSOPHY in general.

Philosophy, (or, The love of wisdom) is an exercising of the reason; by which, in meditating and discoursing, it acquireth happy life, and enjoyneth it. For, Philosophy hath this propriety above other Arts, that its end is the end also of reason, which it sends to is, that it may rest in the ensnemy of it.

Now, happy life consisting in the tranquility of the mind, and indolency of the body, but especially in the former, (in regard the goods of the mind are better then those of the body, and the ill thereof worse;) it comes to pass, that Philosophy is chiefly the medicine of the mind, in regard it both makes and preserves it found, its foundness or health being nothing else but its tranquility.

Hence it followeth, that neither ought a young man to delay Philosopherizing, nor an old man to be wearied therewith; for, to rectifie and cure his mind, no man is too young; and he who pretends, that the time of Philosophy is neither not yet, or is past, doth, as he which, the time to live well and happily either in nor yet come, or is quite gone.

Both young and old therefore must Philosophy; the one, that whilst he is growing old, he may persevere in advance himself in good things, to continue the excellence of his former actions; the other, that, though aged in years, he may yet be youthful in mind, remaining secure from future eminent harms.

For it is Philosophy alone which breeds in its followers an assuredness and an immunity from all vain fears; whence we ought to devote our selves to it that we may be truly free.

Happy they, who are of such a disposition of body or mind, or born in such a Country, as they can either in themselves, or by the instigations of others, addict themselves to Philosophy, and pursue truth; by attainment whereof, a man is made truly free or wise, and absolute Master of himself.

They who apply their minds hereto, are of three sorts; some addresse themselves to enquire after truth, without the assistance of any; some require help, and would not go, if none had gone before, but follow well; some may be compelled and driven to the right, who need not so much a leader, as an affilient, and, as I may call it, a Driver.

The first are most to be commended; yet the ingenuity of the second is excellent likewise; and the third, not to be contemned. Of the second...
was Merodorus, of the third, Hermacus. As I highly praise the fortune of the former, so I no less admire and value the latter: but although both of them arrived at the same end, yet he defies the greater praise, who, their performances being equal, broke through the greater difficulties.

Now whereas to a Philosopher nothing ought to be more valuable than Truth, let him proceed to it in a direct way, and neither deny any thing, nor admit any thing that is repugnant to another; for every kind of fiction betwixt Professors of truth. Neither is that perpetual inquiry of Socrates to be approved, whereby he extolled the skies, Hypatia, Proclus, Gorgias, and the rest, but preferred himselfe rude and ignorant of all things.

How much better it becoming a Philosopher to have obtained a Fable concerning Erasistratus: for why (if he had an intent to teach us the knowledge of celestiall things, and the disposition of souls) did he not perform this by a naked plain instruction, but rather choose to introduce a person by which carriage the newness of the invention, and the formal scene of a fiction represented on the flage, contaminate the very way of seeking truth with a falsehood?

For this reason, a wise man will neither hearken to the Fables of Poets, nor will himselfe labour in composing fabulous poems; naie rather, he will have an aversion from the jugling tricks & sophilications of Orators: and as he exacts no more from Grammar than congruity, so neither will he exact more from Rhetorick than perspicuity of speech, but will use a plain familiar style; whether he professe to teach or write bookeS, or, explore to the multitude any thing already written, he will be wary that he do it not panegirically and hyperbolically.

But seeing that, of Philoxphers there are some, who affect nothing certaine of truth, but doubt of all things; others, who imagine they know all things, and affect without any distinction: A wise man ought not to behave himselfe so, as that he affect not all, but I only maintain some positive Maxims which are indisputable.

For when there are divers ways whereby some things may be performed, as the eclipses of the stars, their rising setting and other superiour things, so to approve one way as to disapprove the rest; is certainly ridiculous. But when we speake of things that cannot be any way but one (such as are these Maxims: Of nothing is made nothing; the Universe consists of body and Vacuum; the principles of things are indivisible, and the like; then is it very absurd not to adhere firmly to them.

Hence, the proper way is for the wise man to maintain both the manifold ways in those, and the one fingle way in thes, and not to stagger nor recede from science once obtained; nor like those, who as if prescribed by a law, Philoxphize concerning Nature, not in such manner as the things themselves require; but goe out of the right way and run into fables, never considering that to vent, or vainly boast our own opinions, conduceth nothing to happy life, but disturbs the mind.

Now whereas, the principall parts of Philosophy are held to be two; one, Phyfick, consisting in conremplation of nature; the other Erthick, which treats of directing of manners in order to happy life, it is manifest, either that Erthick comprehends all Philosophy, or that Phyfick comes to be a part therefore, only in as much as it conduceth to happy life.

For if those things, which we suspect and dread from the Superior bodies & even from death is felt, breed no disturbance in us, as things unconcerning our condition; if also we could sufficiently comprehend what are the just bounds of our desires, and to what degree the grief which springs from them is to be asswaged; there were no need of Physylogy, or the explication of Nature. But
EPICURUS.

But because it is not possible we should arrive at so great a good without having first surveyed the nature of things, but, as children in the dark tremble and are afraid of every thing; so we miserably groping in the darkness of ignorance, fear things that are fabulous, and no more to be dreaded then those which children fear in the dark, and fancy to themselves will happen. It is therefore necessary that this terror and darknesse of the minde be dispelled, not by the beams of the Sun, but by impressions from Nature and Reason, that is by Physickology. Whence also Physick is to be esteemed a part of Philosophy.

Dialeclick, which some add as a third part, is to be rejected, because, as ordinarily taught, it doth nothing but beger thorny questions, being an empty bubbling, and forge of cavils. Moreover, because it is superfluous to that end which they propose, that is, to the perception and disjudication of the reasons of Naturalists: for there needs no more therefore, then, like the natural Philosophers themselfes, to use terms ordinary and perspicuous.

If besides this, there may seem any thing of use, it can bee nothing but a collection of some few Canons or Rules both concerning terms, and the Criteria whereby we use to dijудicate.

Thus may this short Canonick, or treatise of rules, serve instead of a laborious and prolix Dialeclick, and be reputed either a distinct part of Philosophy (though leaft considerable) for an addition to Physick, by way of Introduction.

The first part of PHILOSOPHY.

CANONICK, OF THE CRITERIES

Forasmuch as every question in Philosophy is either of the Thing or of the Word, to solution whereof many Canons may be given; hence the first part of Philosophy which compriseth them, may be termed Canonick.

But because, of the Word nothing more is sought then the use or signification, but of the thing the truth, which is of an arbitrary Nature; therefore we will, in the second place, comprehend in a few Canons all that belongs to the use of the words; but in the first place lay down those of truth and its criteries (which in number exceed the other), premising some few notes concerning them.

CHAP. I.

Of Truth and its Criteries.

First then truth is twofold, one of existence, the other of Enunciation or judgement.

Truth of existence is that, whereby every thing which exists in the nature of things is that very thing which it is and no other. Whence it comes to passe that there is no falsity opposite to this truth (for, Orichalcum, for example, is not false gold, but true Orichalcum) and therefore it is in all one whether we say a thing is existent, or true.

Truth of Enunciation, or judgement, is nothing else but a conformity of an enunciation pronounced by the mouth, or of a judgement made in the mind, with the thing enunciated or judged.
This is truth which falsehood is opposites; for as it is true that the thing is so, and false to be, so is it so, and is false. As for that which they call a future contingent, 

**EPICURUS.**

are made of conjunctions, or rather those composites, which are called moods of condition, which are made by disjunctive particles, are true; as if we should say, Either Hercules will live tomorrow, or will not live; but neither of these in this disjunctive proposition, taken singly, is true; for neither is there any necessity in nature, that Hercules shall live tomorrow; nor, on the contrary, that he shall not live.

Moreover, because as the thing whose truth is sought, belongs either to speculation only, or to action (the first of which appertains to Physics, the latter to Ethics); we must for this reason have a Criterie, or Instrument of judging, whereby it may be examined, judged, and discerned, in order to both these.

But so much as natural things affect the Sense or Intellect, and mortal things the Appetite or Will; for this reason Criteries are to be taken from both these.

From the Sense, nothing can be taken more than its function, Sensation, which likewise is called Sense.

From the Intellect, so much as besides the function which it hath, whilst like the sense it contemplates the thing, as if it were present and apparent (whence the perception of a thing appearing, which appears to be as well to the intellect, as to the sense, is called phantasie, or appearance); forasmuch, I say, as besides this function, it is proper to the Intellect to cogitate, or deliberate, there is therefore required a perception or anticipation, by nothing upon which something may be inferred.

Lately, from the words of Aristotle, who properly takes pursuit or shun something, nothing else can be taken, but the affection or passion it self, and that either inflame, as pleasure; or overset, as pain or grief. There are therefore in all, three Criteries; Sense, or Sensation; Perception, or anticipation; and Affectio, or passion. Concerning each of these, some Canons are to be prescribed.

**CHAP. II.**

**a. Canons of Sense, the first Criterie.**

To begin with the Canons which concern Sense; of these there may be laid down four.

**CANON I.**

*Sense is never deceived, and therefore every Sensation, and every Perception of an Appearance, is true.*

This is proved, first, because all sense is void of ratioicination, and wholly incapable of reasoning. For neither being moved by itself, nor by any other, is it able to add or detract anything; or to say or dissayne by enunciating or concluding, so as thereby it might think anything, and be mistaken in that thought. The Intellect indeed can do this, but the Sense cannot; whose property it is only, to apprehend that which is present, and move it; as the sight, colour, presented to it; but not to discern, that what is here preferred is one thing; what there, another. Now where there is a bare apprehension, not pronouncing any thing, there is no error or falsihood.
Next, because *there is nothing that can rest or continue the senses of the left eye, fille, for neither can sense of a like kind rest sense of a like kind; as the light of the right eye the sight of the left, or the sight of Plato the sight of Socrates; and this, by reason of the equality of their senses*; or that there is the same reason for both. For a pur-blind man doth not see fee which he sees, then Lycoglas feel that which he see: Neither can this which is an of an unlike kind see, that which is of an unlike kind, as the light the hearing, and the taste the smelling: because they have different objects, and serve not to give judgment of the same things. Neither can one sensation of the same sense feel another, because there is not any sensation wherein we are not affected: and to which, whilst we are affected with it, we do not adhere, and adhere: as whilst we see a taste one white, another, out of the water; another time, part under water, crooked; for we cannot by any means see it crooked in the former condition, or straight in the latter. Lastly, neither can reason or ratiocination, rest the senses, because all ratiocination depends upon previous senses, and it is necessary the senses first be true, before the reason which is founded on them can be true.

This is confirmed: for as much as sense is the first of the criteria, to which we may appeal from the rest, but it is self-evident, and of manifest truth. For if you say, every sense is deceived, you will want a criterion to determine and make good, even that very varying upon any particular sense; or, if some odd only, you will entangle your sense in an intricate dispute, when you shall be demanded, Which sense, how, and when it is deceived, or not deceived? So as if the controversy not being determinable, you must necessarily be deprived of all criteria. Whence may be inferred, that if any appearance to sense be false, nothing can be perceived, or, (to express it in other terms) unless all appearances, and bare perceptions of a thing be true, there were no credit, confidence, and judgment of truth. For, if they who allege the contradiction of appearances one with another, can never prove this contradiction of them, or, that some are true, others false; they cannot prove it by any thing that is apparent, for the question is of things apparent; nor by any thing unapparent, for that which is unapparent, is to be demonstrated by something else that is apparent.

Again, this is confirmed: because, taking away the certainty of the senses, and by that means the genuine knowledge of things, we take away all rule of life and action. For as in a building, if the first rule be amiss, the square untrue, the plummet faulty, all things must necessarily be defective, and awry, and disproportioned: so, must all things in life be preparterous, and full of trouble and confusion, if that which is to be esteemed, as it were the first rule, square, and plummet, for the discerning things good and bad, done or not to be done, be uncertain or perverse that is, if it want the certainty which is, as it were it's redtude. Whence it cometh to pass, that though reason, (for example) cannot explain the cause why things be not at hand are square, but seem round or ar at off; yet is it better to believe and allege some wrong cause, rather than to overthrow the first faith and foundations, wherein the constancy, and security of life is grounded, that unless you dare credit sense, you will not have any way to shun precipitation, and destruction.

Thirdly, because the truth of the senses is manifest even from this, in that *they their functions exist in nature, or really, and truly are. For that we see and hear, as truly something indeed existing, as our very feeling; and there is no difference, (as even now we said) between seeing a thing is existent, and true.

To speak more fully, *As the first affections, pleasure and pain, depend up*...
EPICURUS.

In nature, 

That is, pleasure depends on pleasant things, and pain on painful, and it is neither worse to escape, that what produces pleasure is not pleasant, nor that what causes pain is not painful, but that which produces pleasure, must necessarily be pleasant, that which pain, painful, and offensive to nature) in like manner, as to the sensations of the appearances produced in us, whatsoever is the efficient cause of them, is undoubtedly such as makes this appearance; and being such, it cannot come to pass, that it can be any other thing than such as is conceived to be, which makes this appearance: The same is to be conceived of all the rest more particularly, for that which is visible, not only seem-visible, but is such, as it seems; and that which is audible, not only seems audible, but is indeed such; and so of the rest: Wherefore all appearances are true, and conformable to reason.

Hence it is manifest, that the Phantasies even of those who doubt and dream, are, for this reason, conceived to be true, for that they truly and really exist, seeing that they move the faculty; whereas, that which is not, cannot move any thing. So that there is a necessity in nature, that the species of things, which are received in the intellect, or imagination, being in this manner, moved, mingled, and disturbed; that such Phantasies cannot but be, whatsoever opinion follows them, whereby things are judged to be such in themselves: Of which we are to speak next.

C A N O N . II.

This is proved, because, when a Tower (for example) appeareth round to the eye, the sense indeed is true, for that it is really affected with the species of roundness, which species is truly such, and hath a necessary cause for which it is such, at such a distance: and withal it is not deceived, for it does not affirm that the Tower is such, but only behaveth itself passively, receiving the species, and barely reporting that which appeareth to it. But Opinion, or the mind, whose office it is to conceive or judge, in as much as it adds, as it were from it tells, that, what appeareth to the sense is a Tower, or that, the Tower, really and in it selfe, is round; Opinion, I say, is that which may be true or false.

Whereof may be inferred, that *all phantasies (or sensations) whereby Phenomena's (things apparent) are perceived, are true: but upon none admits a difference, for some are true, others false, as much as they are our own judgments superadded to the appearances; and we judge something to be, others amiss, by reason that something is added, and impost to be the appearances, or something detracted from them: and generally sense which is incapable of sensation charged with falsehood.

But some are deceived by the diversity of those appearances, which are derived from the same sensible object, as in a thing visible, (for example) according as the object seemeth to be either of another colour, or of another figure, or some other way changed, for they conceive that of contrary appearances, one must necessarily be true, and the other which is opposite thereto false. Which certainly is very foolish, and proper to such men as consider not the nature of things. For (to continue our instance of things visible) it is not the whole solid, or the whole solidity of the body which we see; but the colour of the solid body. Now of the colour, that which is in a solid body, and appeareth in those things which are seen nigh at hand, is one; that which is without the solid body, at a species, or image flowing from it, and is received into places sometime one beyond another, such as appeareth in those things which are beheld at a great distance, is another.
EPICURIOUS

This latter being changed in the intermediate space, and assuming a peculiar figure, exhibits such an appearance as its self indeed is.

Whence, neither the sound which is in the braze that is struck, nor the voice which is in the mouth of him who cries aloud, is heard, but that sound of voice which lights upon our sense; for the same thing cannot be in two distant subjects. And as no man finds, but he is falsely, who perceives the sound to be but small at distance, because coming higher, he perceives it, as if it were greater; so neither can we say, that the light is deceived, for that afar off, it seemeth a lesser, little and round; near, great and square; but rather that it is true. For when the sensible object appears so little, and of such a figure, it is not in that place little indeed, and of such a figure, the extremities of those images being broke off, whilst they are conveyed through the air, and thereupon coming into the eye in a lesser angle. And again, when it appears great and of another figure, there is great and of another figure; is not being the same in both places; for here the extremities of the images are more entire, and come into the eye in a greater angle: but it is a great mistake to think, that it is the same thing which appears to sight, and affecteth the eye, near and afar off.

p Neither can we say that the light is deceived, when we see a shadow in the Sun-thine to move, to follow our foot-steps, and imitate our gestures. For shadow being but air deprived of light; and the earth as we go, being now here, now there, successively deprived of the Sun’s light, and successively recovering that whereof it was deprived; it comes to pass, that the shadow seems to change place, and to follow us: but the eyes are not therefore deceived, it being only their office to see the light, and to see the shadow in whatsoever place it is. But to affirm, that the very light or shadow which is here, is the same, or differing from that which even now was there; this belongs not to them, but to the mind, whose office it is to determine and judge. So that whatsoever of falsity happens to be here, it is to be attributed to opinion, not to sense.

q The same answer may be given to a thousand other objections, as of a ship which seems to stand still, and the land to move; of the starrs, which seem to rest; of mountains for a funder; which yet seem to be of height of eyes, who, having made themselves giddy by turning, think the roof it selfe runs round; of the Sun appearing to be near the mountains, when so great spaces divide them; of the appearance of a space under water, as large, as from above it to the sky; of a River, which to those who passe over it, seemeth to flow back; of a Gallery, which seems narrow at the further end; of the Sun, who seems to rise out of the water, and to go down into the water; of Oars, which seem crooked or broken; of Stars in the night, which seem to glide over the clouds; of things, which by drawing the eye on one side, seem double.


canon. iii.

All Opinion attested, or not contradicted by the evidence of sense; is true.

Evidence of sense, there call that kind of sensation, or appearance, which, all things obstructivé to judgment being removed, as distance, motion, indisposition of the medium and the like, cannot be contradicted. Whence to this question, Whether a thing be such as it appears, we ought not to give a sudden answer, but to oblieve till which I call intreatable, in regard that we must say, untill the thing be fully examined and lifted out, according to all the ways that can possibly happen.
EPICURUS.

Attestation, I call comprehension, made by evidence, that the thing conceivable was such as we before conceived it: as Plato coming towards me, from a far off, I conjecture, and think, as far as I can guess at such a distance, that it is Plato; but when he draws nearer, and the distance is taken away, by the evidence of the thing, then, is there made an attestation that it is Plato.

Not-contradiction is said to be the finding out of a thing, no: manifest, which we suppose, and conceive by reflecting on something manifest, or evident; as when I say, there is Vacuum, which indeed is unmanifest, I am induced there to by something manifest, that is, by motion; for if there were no vacuum, there would be no motion, seeing the body that should be moved, would not have any place to go into; all things being full, and close packed together. Whence that which is apparent or manifest doth not contradict that which is unmanifest, since indeed there is motion.

Thus Attestation and Not-Contradiction, is the Criterion, whereby a thing is proved to be true.

CANON IV.

In which words, Contradiction is something opposite to Not-Attestation; being the plain destruction of a manifest thing together with another supposed unmanifest; as far as in man, there is no Vacuum; but joined with this supposition must be subverted a thing manifest, viz. motion. For if there be no Vacuum, Motion likewise cannot be, as we have already showed.

In like manner, Contradiction is opposed to Attestation; for it is a subversion, whereby it appears that the thing conceivable is not such as it was conceived in the opinion; as a man coming towards us from a far off, we at the distance guess he is Plato, but the distance being taken away, it appears to us by evidence that he is not Plato. This is contradiction; for the thing manifest contradicts the preconceived opinion. Thus has Attestation and Not-contradiction is the Criterion by which a thing is proved to be true, so contradiction and not-attestation is the Criterion by which a thing is evinced to be false. Evidence being the basis and foundation upon which all right opinion of true and false is grounded.

To omit that evidence is sometimes had by one sense, as about some proper sensible; sometimes by many, as when the sensible is common, as magnitude and figure, distance and position, reft and motion and such like, which may be perceived both by the sight and touch, and become manifest, if not to one sense, at least to the other. Whereupon it sometimes happens, that by reason of several qualities, several senses may be so mentioned, that the evidence which cannot be got by one may be obtained by the other; as when we cannot discern by sight, whether the bread which is offered us be true or counterfeit, we may summon our Taste, whereby it will evidently appear which of the two it is.

But this I advise, that, after we have exactly considered all, we adhere to those things which are obvious to us; using our senses, either the common about common sensibles, or the proper about the proper. Since we must hold generally all evidence which is freely presented to us by every criterion bare specially by this: and tenaciously Sticke to it, as to an infallible principle, left either the criterions which are established by Evidence be overthrown, or errors being established as strong as truth, turn all things upside down.

I need not repeat or give particular advice what is to be done about the inquest alleged of a Tower; which at distance seems round, but nearer square: for from what is deduced it is manifest, that before we assert any thing
EPICURUS.

thing we must expect or pause, and approach higher and examine, and learn whether the Tower be such when we come at it, as it appeared farr off.

I shall only give this generall rule. That unlesse (the truth of the senses being preserved after the manner aforesaid) you distinguish that which is opinable or conceivible into that which is expectable or requireth time, before it be affected what it is as being not yet duly perceived, and into that which is present and propos'd to us: and throughly examined, it will come to passe, that you will perpetually be disquieted with deceiptfull or vaine opinions. But if, when the things opinable are agitated in your mind, you firmly esteem all that is here called expectable as such: Indeed and, and passe not lightly by it, as if that which is false, not having the attestation of any evideince were firm, and allowable; in this case you will behave your selue as one that is cautious of all ambiguity, and follicitously takes heed to every judgement, which is rightly or falsely pass'd or an opinable thing.

CHAP. III.

Canons of Prenotion or anticipation; the Second Criteris.

OF Prenotion or anticipation may be given four Canons,

CANON I.

All anticipation or Prenotion which is in the mind depends on the senses, either by Incursion, or Proportion, or Similitude; or a Couart of Latent Composition.

I mean that the notion (or Idea and form as it were which being anticipated is called Prenotion) is begotten in the mind by Incursion (or incidence) when the thing inculceth into the sense directly and by it selfe, as a man just before our eyes. By Proportion, when the Prenotion is amplified or excentuated, but the number, situation and figure of the parts with a convenient bignesse of each is retain'd; as when having seen a man of due magnitude, we from the sense form in our mind the species of a Gyan, by amplification; or of a pigmy, by excentation. By Similitude, when according to a thing first perceived by the senses we fancy another like it; as when we imagine a City unseen like to some that we have seen. Lastly, by Composition, when we put as it were into one the distinct notions which we have of two or more things, as when we unite the notions of a horse and a man, as that the notion of a centaur arises out of them, but nor without some affixance or apposition.

CANON II.

Anticipation is the very notion, and (as is were) definition of the thing; without which, we cannot enquire, nor think, nor so much as name any thing.

For by the word Anticipation or Prenotion, I understand a comprehension of the mind, or a suitable opinion or understanding fix'd in the mind, and as it were a certain memory or monument of that thing which hath often appeared from without (which the mind bath retained in it self; after some one of the forementioned manners): Such for example is the idea or form and species, reftelling upon which, we say to our self, that thing is Man. For affon...
as ever we hear this word Man pronounced, immediately the image of a man is understood according to the anticipation formed in the mind by the foregoing sensations.

Wherefore that thing which is primarily and chiefly meant by and conceived under every word, and so apprehended by the mind, is something perspicuous and manifest; for when we enquire after anything or doubt of it or think something we should not do it, unless we already had a praenotion of that thing; as when we enquire whether that which appears at a far off, be a horse or an ox; it is requisite that we should first have seen and known by anticipation the figure of a horse and ox. Indeed we could not form such a name as any thing, unless we first had some image thereof known by Anticipation.

Hence it comes to passe, that if it be demanded what anything is, we define or describe it in such manner as it is, according to the anticipation thereof which we have in our mind; Neither do we thus only, being demanded, what some singular thing is, as what Plato is; but also, what an universal is, as Man, nor this or that, but considered in general; this is brought to passe according as the mind, having seen many singulars, and set apart their several differences, formeth and imprinted in her selfe the anticipation of that which is common to them all; as an universal notion, reflecting upon which we say, Man (for example) is something animate and endued with such a form.

CANON. III.

Anticipation is the principle in all discourse, as being that to which we have regard, when we inferre that one is the same or divers, conjointed with or disjounted from another.

For, whilst we conceive any thing, either by enunciation or ratiocination, it depends upon something first evident, unto which thing we having regard and referring our thoughts, infer that thing of which the question is, to be such or not to be such, that is, the same or another, coherent, or not coherent with it. Thus, if we are to prove that this thing which we hold is a man, we do look back upon the praenotion which we have of Man, as that without any fop were say, Man is something animate and endued with such a form; this that I see, is animate and endued with such a form; therefore this that I see is Man. Or, It is not animate, nor endued with such a form, therefore it is not Man.

But it is not necessary to confine all things with exquisite reasons or arguments, and scrupulous forms of reasoning which are cried up by the Dialecticks: for there is this difference between an argument and the conclusion of the reason, and between a slender animadversion and an admonition; that in one, some occur and (as it were) involved things are unfolded and opened; in the other, things ready and open are judged. But where there are such anticipations as ought to be, then what will follow or not follow from them, or what agrees or disagrees with them is perspicuously discerned, & naturally inferred without any artifice or dialectic construction. Wherefore we need only take care that the anticipation which we have of things be clearer and distinct.

CHAP.
EPICURUS.

CANON VI.

That which is unmanifest ought to be demonstrated out of the anticipation of a thing manifest.

This is the same we said even now, that the anticipations of things from which we infer some thing, and thinking upon which we make judgments or propositions, which are maxims or principles, by which that which is inferred or concluded is conceived to be demonstrated, be perspicuous and manifest. For, as demonstration is a speech which collecting by granted fumptions (or propositions) brings to light a truth not manifest before, Thus to demonstrate that there is Vacuum, which is not manifest, supposing the anticipation of vacuum, & the anticipation of a manifest thing (Motion) these propositions are premised. If there is motion, there is vacuum, but there is motion, and then is inferred, therefore there is also vacuum.

In this place, Motion is taken for the argument, medium, or signe, which properly ought to be a sensible thing: for the sense is that, according to which it is necessary to make a conjecture by ratiocination, ultimately to that which is unmanifest, although such a signe or medium hath not always a necessary connexion with that which is inferred, but is sometimes only contingent, or probable, and might be otherwise.

Of this kind are many from which we argue chiefly in superficial things, those being such, as may be brought to passe not one way only but many, as was hinted formerly.

Hither also may be referred that which I use to term coequall, equivalence by which it is inferred, that one of the contrarys being, the other also must be; and when I argue thus, If the multitudes of mortals be so great, that of immortals is no less, and if those things which destroy be innumerable, those which preserve ought also to be innumerable.

Against those who deny there is any demonstration may be brought this argument: Either you understand what demonstration is, or you understand it not: if you understand and have the notion thereof, then there is demonstration; but if you understand it not, why do you talk of that whereof you have not any knowledge?

They who take away the credit of the senes, and profess that nothing can be known being in the same ranks, do they not, when they confess that they know nothing, imply they know not this very thing, Whether anything can be known? We should not therefore contend against them, that they walk backwards upon their head: Yet if they affirm they do, and I the reason grant that this is known by them, I have a fair occasion to ask them, How, since before they saw nothing true in those things themselves, they came to understand what was to be known, and what to be ignorant.

CHAP. IV.

Canons of affection or passion; the third Criterie.

Affly, concerning affection (or passion,) which is, as I said, a pleasure and pain, there may be four Canons.
EPICURUS.

CANON I.

All Pleasure, which hath no Pain joyned with it, is to be embraced.

CANON II.

All Pain, which hath no Pleasure joyned with it, is to be shunned.

CANON III.

All Pleasure, which either hindreth a greater Pleasure, or procureth a greater Pain, is to be shunned.

CANON IV.

All Pain, which either putteth away a greater Pain, or procureth a greater Pleasure, is to be embraced.

Of these we shall speak more largely in the Ethicks. In the mean time, I shall give this general advertisement concerning Pleasure: Pleasure is desirable of itself, because it is Pleasure; Grief or Pain is always abhorred and avoidable, because it is Pain; whence I conceive, a wise man will have an eye to this exchange or recompence, that he shun pleasure, if it procure a pain greater than itself; and undergo pain, if it produce a greater pleasure. As for my own part, I should forfake pleasure, and cover pain, either if remorse were annexed to the pleasure; or a lesser pain might be taken instead of a greater.

CHAP. V.

Canons concerning the use of Words.

I shall add something concerning the use of words, (which I designd to speak of last) and especially that which concerns discourse; for which, two Canons may seem sufficient, one for the speaker the other for the hearer: They are these,

CANON I.

When thou speakest, make use of words common and perspicuous, lest either thy meaning be not known, or thou unnecessarily waste the time in explication.

CANON II.

When thou hearest, endeavour to comprehend the power and meaning of the words, lest either their obscurity keep thee in ignorance, or their ambiguity lead thee into error.
EPICURUS.

Above all, we must know what things the words signify, that we may have a true
something, reflecting upon which, we may safely discern, whatsoever we either
conceive, or seek, or doubt; otherwise, if all things should escape us undetermi-
ned, they who would demonstrate any thing to us, will proceed to infinite, and
we ourselves gain nothing by our discourse, but words and empty sounds. For
it is necessary, we have regard to the notion and primary signification of every
word, and that we need not any demonstration to understand that thing, in case
we can pitch upon any thing, to which we may refer that point, about which our
enquiry, doubt, or opinion, are busied.

Hence it is, that the method of enquiring after truth, which is per-
formed by a certain orderly procedure, ought first to prescribe certain
rules, by which that affair may be performed, so the discourters may
agree, what it is concerning which they discourse. So that if any man
shall not first agree to this, but hath a mind rather to cavill and trifle
in wordly equivocation, he is not to be discourted with, or still to be
pret to explain himself, what it is he would be at; for by this means, his
judging will be discover'd, and his cavills will solve themselves: Nor will
he be able to intangle his adversary, but rather discover himself a ridicu-
ulous sophister.
EPICURUS.

The Second Part of PHILOSOPHY.

PHYSICK, or, of Nature.

E now come to Physick; which I usually learn Physiology, for that it is a difficulte and ratiocinariam about the nature of things, in the contemplation whereof it is wholly employ'd.

We have already said our scope to be, that, through perspection of the nature of things, nothing of disturbance, either from Meteors, or from Death, or from the unknown ends of Dehtes, or any other way, may arise unto us. Now the things which this contemplation fathoms being so many and so various, it seems very profitable, that some being engag'd in the more profound study of the liberall Disciplines, or, through some other business, not having leisure to know every thing particularly and exactly: we have ready at least a some proper compendium of the whole Science of Nature, that whenever they will apply their minds to the chief arguments of things, they may be assist'd to themselves, according to the measure of their knowledge, in contemplation of Nature.

Besides, to those who have made a greater progress in the speculation of all things, where f Physiology reposed, it is very useful, by some compendium, to preserve the memory of the things themselves digested under heads. For it is often happens, that we need a generall impression of things, but not a particular disquisition. This may therefore is to be observed, and this kind of study continually used in exercising the memory, that our attention to things may be constant and ready, and, in the forms of things or notions, generally comprehended and imprinted in the mind, and else-where throughly examined, according to the first principles, and the terms whereby they are explained, if anything be particularly enquired, it may be found. For whereas such a constancy and readiness is gotten, and the mind is ended with a generall and exquisit information, we are able to understand of a sudden whatsoever we please. I add, according to the words; For as much as it is not possible, that a coherent sum of generall heads can be frequently repeated by heirs, unless it contain every thing, as that it may be explicated in few words, even if any thing come to be examined particularly.

Hence it is, this course being most profitable to those, who are inclined and addicted to Physiology, that I would advise them therein, especially if they enjoy a happy life, that they frame to themselves some such Epitome, and information by generall heads. But if they are not able of themselves, that they get one else-where, of which kind we have freely compoted, for the benefit of the studious; hoping, that if what we have laid down be exactly remembred, as much as possible, although a man runs not out into all particular arguments that may be discoursed, yet shall he obtain a copious knowledge of Physiology, incomparably beyond other men: for he will of himself understand many things in the more general work, and, committing those to memory, will help himself, and continually profit.

For these are of such a kind, that such as have made no little discussion of particulars, and addicted themselves perfectly to their contemplations, may thereby be enabled to raise and compleat more differentiations of all nature; and whatsoever of them are thoroughly vers'd in these, revolving
volving them tacitly within themselves, may be able in a moment, and
disguise, to over-run whatsoever is most considerable in Phylology.

But not to stay longer in the entry, there being so many (as I say) and
various things contained in Phylology; it will be convenient to
divide them into some principal Sections, which may afterwards be pur-
fued particularly; and everything, which especially belongs to any one
of them, may be referred to it.

These Sections may be four. The first of the Univerfe, or the nature
of things, which comprizeth this world, and all other things that are
beyond it. The second, of the World, this wherein we are, and by which
we may conjecture of the innumerable others. The third, of Inferior
things, the earth, to which we adhere, and of the things in it. The fourth,
of Sublime things, which are seen and produced above the earth, and up-
wards from it.

S E C T. 1.
Of the Univerfe, or the Nature of Things.

T o begin then with the Univerfe, it is manifest, that it is so named;
for as much as it containeth all things, even others besides this world;
whence it is also termed, the whole, and, the All; and we usually call it,
the Sum of things, and the Nature of things.

We must first speak generally of the things wherein the Univerfe consists;
next, of what the so many things in the Univerfe are made; thirdly, by what
they are made; fourthly, what kind they are of when made; fifthly, how they
are made; lastly, how they perish.

C H A P. I.
That the Univerfe consists of Body and Vacuum, or Place.

F irst therefore, the Univerfe consists of Body and Vacuum; b
there be conceived any third nature besides these.

Now, c Body is understood by containing a certain soft heap (as it were) of
magna vitæ (or bigness), likewise of figure, resistance, (that is, solidity and
impenetrability) and gravity; withal, to be such, as it only can touch
and be touched.

d Empyseme, or Vacuum; which is opposed to body, and only of pro-
derly, and in it self, is incorporeal, is understood by negation of these,
and chiefly from being of an intangible nature, and void of all solidity, and
can neither suffer nor alter anything, but only affords a most free motion to bodi-
cess passing through it.

For this is e That Nature, which being distinct of body, is called Vacuum, e Pith. plac.
taken up by a body, Place; passed through by a body, Region; considered as 1. 20.
diffused, Intervall or Space.

That there are bodies in the Univerfe, sense attest; whence it is necessary f Latt.
to deduce conjecture from other principles, to that which is manifest, as I
formerly touched. Certainly, all these things which we behold, which we
touch, which we turn up and down, which we observe, are nothing but bodies.

But that there is Vacuum also, is hence manifest, that if it were not in nature,
bodies would neither have where to be, nor any way to perform their motions;
whereas that they are moved, is evident.
EPICURUS.

If all were full, and the matter of things crowded, as it were, together, it could not be, but that all things must be immovable, for neither would any thing be moved, but it must thrust forward all things, nor would there be place left, wherein any thing might be thrust. For whereas some answcr, that Thufes therefore cannot move, because they leave a place behind them, into which the waters, being thrust forward, and giving place, are received; they observe not, that the first impulsion forwards could never begin, because there is not yet any place, neither behind, nor beside, whereinto the water may be received. So as it is necessary, there should be little empty intervals of space within things, especially the fluid, into which the little particles being driven, may be so received, that, by the compression, place may be made, towards which, the impelling body may be moved forward, and, in the interim, leave place behind, into which the compressed fluid may dilate itself, and, as it were, flow back.

Now Vacuum being incorporeal, is so penetrated by bodies, whether existing in it, or gliding by it, that it remains unchanged, and prefers the same dimensions to which it is adequate. Whence a straight line taken in Vacuum, is indeed straight, but not so, that it becomes crooked with the body which fills it, because Vacuum is neither moveable in whole nor in part.

Whence it comes, that whereas the notion of place is, to receive the things placed to be coextensive with it; nor to be moved with it, nor to forfack it; let either the body be moved, yet nor change place; or change place, yet not be moved: It therefore is only compatible to Vacuum, to have the nature of place, forasmuch as it only, both by its corporeal dimensions, length, breadth, and depth; is coextensive with the thing placed in length, breadth, and depth, and exactly adjusted to it. Besides, it is so immovable, that whether the body come to it, or go from it, or stay in it, it continues the same and unvariable.

That I said, No third Nature besides can be conceived; it is for this reason, that, whether we take to be conceived comprehensively, (in which manner the things, which by themselves, and directly, fall into our knowledge are perceived) or comparatively to those things which are conceived, (after which manner those things are understood, which are known only by proportion, as was said above anticipation) whatsoever it be that is conceived, either it hath some bulk and solidity, and so is a body; or it is void of all bulk and solidity, and so it is vacuum: which is to be understood, in case you conceive it to be certain by itself existent, subsistent, coherent, nature, and not as some adjunct or accident thereof.

For since can adjunct is a property, which cannot be taken from the thing to which it belongs, without destruction of the thing; as tinctness from body, inactivity from vacuum; and, in a more familiar example, as weight from a stone, heat from fire, moisture from water: but an accident is that, whose presence or absence violates not the integrity of the nature, as liberty and fertility, poverty and riches, war and peace, &c. Therefore they constitute not some third nature, distinguished from corporeal and incorporeal, but only are as something appertaining to one of these.

CHAP.
That the Universe is infinite, immovable, and immutable.

Now the Universe consisting of Vacuum, and body, is infinite; for that a Læus. which is finite hath a bound, that which hath a bound, is seen from some other things; or may be seen from out of an interwall beyond, or without it. But the Universe is not seen out of any other things beyond it; for there is no interwall, or space, which it containeth not within it self; otherwise it could not be an universe, if it did not contain all space; therefore neither hath it not any extremity. Now, that which hath no extremity hath no end, and that which hath no end, doubtlesse is not finite, but infinite.

This is confirmed; for if you imagine an extremity, and suppose a Læus. some man placed in it, who with great force throwes a dart towards its utmost surface, the dart will either go forward, or not, but be forced to stay. If it go forward, there is place beyond, wherefore the extremity was not there, where we design'd it: if not, therefore there is something beyond, which hindereth the motion, and so again, the extremity was not in the fore-design'd place.

Moreover, this in finitude belonging to the Universe, it must, both in the multitude of bodies, and the magnitude of Vacuum: nay, in infinites thinning themselves forward mutually, alternately, or in order. For if Vacuum were infinite, and bodies finite, then bodies, which are in perpetuall motion, (as we shall anon declare) would rest no where, but be differently carried through the infinite Vacuum, as having nothing to stop them, and restrain them by various repercussions. But if the Vacuum were finite, the bodies infinite, then there would not be place large enough for the infinite bodies to exist in.

Hence we ought not to attribute to the Universe, or infinite space, the being above or below, as if there were anything in the Universe high, or any thing lowest: the former, by conceiving the space over our head, not to be extended to infinite; the latter, by imagining that which is under our feet, not to be of infinite extent, as if both this which is above, and that which is below, were terminated with some one, and the same point, as it happens with us, or the middle of this world, one of its extreme parts being imagin'd highest, the other lowest; for in infinite, which hath neither extremes nor middle, this cannot be imagin'd.

Wherefore it is better to assume some one motion, which may be understood, to proceed upwards into infinite, and in like manner another which downwards; although that moveable, which from us is carried up towards the places over our heads, were a thousand times the feet of those who are above, and (conceiving other worlds) think it comes from below; or which from us is carried towards that quarter, which is under our feet, to the heads of those who are below us, and who are thence apt to imagine, that it comes from above: notwithstanding which imagination of theirs, either of these opposite motions taken entirely, is rightly conceived to be of infinite extent.

To thefe is conflentaneous, that the Universe was ever such, as is now, e Læus. and such as it is now, shall ever be; for there is nothing into which, loing the nature of the Universe, it may be changed, and, besides the Universe, which containeth all things, there is nothing, which by affecting it, can cause an alteration in it.

Rightly therefore, is the Universe esteemed, as immovable, there being Earth, no place beyond it, into which it may be moved: so also immutable, forasmuch as
EPICURUS.

as it admits, neither decrease, nor increase, and is void of generation and corruption, and therefore is eternal, not having beginning, nor end of duration.

And indeed, many things in it are moved and changed, but whatsoever motions and mutations you conceive, they bear no proportion, if compared with the immensity of the Universe it selfe. Nor is therefore the whole Universe either moved into any other place, or changed into any other thing; does it therefore not persevere, to be ever the same, which it ever was? for the motions and mutations in it were always alike, so as

Exef. prep. it may be said, that "there is nothing new done in the Universe, more than what was already done in the infinity of time."

Of the Divine nature in the Universe.

But before we speak of the things in the Universe, which are generated and corrupted, and of the principles whereof they are made, it is fit to premise, and put, as a by-discourse, a Treatise concerning divine Nature; as well for the excellency of that nature, as for that, although it be of the same with corporeal nature, yet is it not so much a body, as a certain thing like a body, as having nothing common to it with other bodies, that is, with tranitory, or generated, and perishable things. Now it first being usually question'd concerning the divine Nature, whether there be any in the Universe, yet the thing seems, as if it ought, not at all to be called in question, for as much as nature her selfe hath impressed a notion of the Gods in our minds. For what nation is there, or what kind of men, which without learning have not some notion of the Gods?

Wherefore, seeing it is an opinion not taken up by any institution, Custom, or Law, but the firme content of all men, none excepted, we must necessarily understand, that there are Gods; because we have the knowledge of them ingrained, or rather innate in us. But that concerning which the nature of all men agreeeth, must necessarily be true; therefore, it is to be acknowledged, that there are Gods.

Indeed, men may seem, when they beheld the course of the Heavens, and the various seasons of the year, to wheel about, and return in certain order, and were not able to know by what causes it were performed; to have recourse to this refuge, to attribute all things to the Gods, and make them obey their beek, placing them with in Heaven, for that they beheld in Heaven the revolution of Sunne, Moon, and Stars: but how could they attribute these to the Gods, unless they had first known that there were Gods?

Did they not rather derive a knowledge of the Gods, from the apparitions of dreams? certainly, they might, by some great images incurring to them, under human forms, by dreams, conceive that there are indeed some Gods, united with such a human form; they might, say, not so much in sleep, as when awake, they called to mind, that those excellent images had appeared to them in sleep, so majestic, so subtle, so compositive, and so well proportion'd in shape, conceive that there is no repugnance, nay, that there was a necessity, that somewhere there should be things of like nature with these, capable also of sense or understanding, because they fancied them moving their limbs and speaking: and those also immortal, because their shape was always present to their apprehensions, because this form remained till the same, and was of such grandeur, that they seemed not easily convincible, but there were such: moreover Blessed, forasmuch as they
they neither fear death, nor take any pains, in effecting their works.

4. They might also by discourse use that concipix, or aequivalent, by de cit. de nat., which, when we treated of the Criteries, we affirmed it was concluded, dict. 1.

that if the multitude of Mortals were so great, that of Immortals was not less; and if these things which destroy be innumerable, those which preserve, is also to be innumerable.

5. Which way soever it came, we have this certainly by preconition, that ei cit. de nat.

we think the gods are blessed and immortal: For the same nature which doth, gave us information of the go is themselves, imprinted also in our minds, that we esteem them blessed and eternal; which if it be so, our opinion is truly laid down, what is eternal and blessed, neither is troubled with any business. Let it.

is self, nor troubles any other; therefore is possessed with favour or anger, for all such a weak.

And if we sought no further than to worship the gods piously, and to be free from superstition, what we have said were sufficient; for the excellent nature of the gods is who-ship of the piety of men, as being eternal and most blessed. For so whatsoever is excellent, generation is due; and all fear, proceeding from the power and anger of the gods, would be expelled. For it is understood, that anger and favour are far separate from a blessed immortal nature; which being removed, no fear hangs over us as to the gods. But for confirmation of this opinion, the soul enquires after the form and the life, and the action of mind, and agitation in God.

All to the form, nature partly infinite, partly reason; for by nature, all cit. de nat.
of all, of all Nations, have no other form, but human, of the gods. For what other deor. 1.

forms ever occur to any men, waking or sleeping? But not to educate all things to their first notions, reason is self declares the same. For seeing it is proper to the most excellent nature, either because it is blessed, or because it is sempiternal, this be not beautiful, what composition of limbs, what conformity of lineaments, what figure, what form can be more beautiful, than the human?

Now if the figure of men excel, the form of all things animate, and God is animate, certainly he is of that figure which is the most beautiful of all.

And for so much as it is manifest, that the gods are most blessed, and none can be blessed without virtue, nor virtue without reason, nor reason consist in any figure, but that of Man; we must acknowledge, that the gods are of human form.

But when I say, that the gods are of the form of a man, and of an animate being, Do I therefore attribute such a body to them, as ordinarily men and animate beings have? By no means; for God is not a thing, as Plato says, merely incorporeal; because what kind of thing that is, cannot be understood, for then he must necessarily want se-s-e, he must want prudence, he must want pleasure; all which we comprehend together with the notion of the gods. But neither is he therefore a gross material body, nor the most subtle that can be coagamented of Atoms; but he is altogether a body of his own kind, which indeed is not seen by sense, but by the mind; nor is he of a certain solidity, nor composed of number, but consists of images, perceived by comparison; and which, compared with those that ordinarily occur, and are called Bodies, may be said to be (not body, but) as before I said, resemblance of body; and for example, not to have blood, but a certain resemblance of blood.

In the mean time, I must intimate by the way, that she is not such a thing.

a kind of body as is coagamented of Atoms, for then he could not be sempiternal; and upon his generation would follow corruption; upon his concetration, diSSIPATION, and so he could not be sempiternal. Thus there are four things to be esteemed eternal and incorruptible, the Universe, which
which hath no place into which it can fall; **Vacuum**, which cannot be touched, nor receive any blow; the **Matter** of things, which unless its did subsist unchanged, those things which are dissolved would go away into nothing; and the **divine Nature**, which is inconcrete, and by reason of its tenuity, cannot be touched or struck.

Hence one of the natural philosophers was in a great error, when he said, that the nature of the gods is such, as to diffuse and tend forth images out of itself; for in this manner, some things might be so taken out of it, as that it might be admitted dissolvable. But hence some have misinterpreted our meaning, when, upon our admitting many worlds, and saying, that there are **Intermundia**, that is, intervals between the worlds, they affirm, we place the gods in the **Intermundia**, lest they should receive any injury by the world's ruins. For, as **Vacuum**, so is the nature of the gods more sublime, than to fear any harm from bodies; which if it did fear, in no place were it more to be feared than in the **Intermundia**, when the world should come to be dissolved.

Neither can we design in what places the gods live, seeing that this our world is not a seat worthy of themselves; but we can easily say in general, such as the poets describe **Olympus**, such are, wherefore they are, the blessed and quiet seats of the gods.

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**CHAP. IV.**

**Of first Matter, or of the Principles of compound things in the Universe.**

Now to resume and pursue our discourse, forasmuch as in the first place 'tis manifest by sense, that in nature, many things are generated, and many corrupted; therefore we must conclude, that heretofore is required Matter, of which things may be generated, and into which they may be resolved; for, **of nothing, nothing is made; and into nothing, nothing goes away.** For if something were made of nothing, everything might be produced from any thing, at not requiring seats; and if that which perishes did go into nothing, all things would perish absolutely, there not remaining those things into which they were dissolved.

Besides, forasmuch as we affect to know the nature of any thing, generated or made, it is first demanded, whether it be something one and simple, or compounded of some things which themselves are simple and precedent. It is manifest, that nothing generated or made, can be one and
EPICURUS.

and simple, seeing that it hath parts of which it was made up, and into which again it may be disdolved, which therefoire are precedent and more simple; and if they still be compounded, they may be conceived to consist of those, which at length are the first and most simple.

Thus again it appears, that, of bodies, some are concrections, or (if you like it better) concere or compounded bodies; others, of which concrections, or compounded bodies, are made. These, if first and simple, are the first matter of things, and are termed Principles, and, by the later Authors, Elements also.

These Principles, or first things of all, must be simple uncompounded bodies, (or rather atoms) and indivisible, or not resolvable by any force, and consequently immovable, or in themselves void of all motion. I mean, if it shall so come to pass, as that in the dissolution of compounds, all things go not into nothing, but that there consist and preserve a certain nature, full, or void of vacuity, and therefore solid; which, being such, it cannot in any part, or by any means, admit a division, and to be dissolved.

Wherefore it is necessary, that these which are called b Principles of compounded bodies, be, as of nature, full, solid, and immovable, so wholly indivisible; whence we use to call them atoms. We reament it an Atom, not as being the least, that is, as it were a Point, (for it hath magnitude) but for that it cannot be divided, it being incapable of suffering, and void of vacuity. So that the who faith, Atom, names that which is free from a blow, and cannot suffer nothing; and which is invisible indeed by reason of its littleness, but indivisible by reason of its solidity.

CHAP. V.

That there are Atoms in Nature, which are the Principles of Compound Bodies.

That there are Atoms, the reason alleged sufficiently convinceth: for, seeing that nature makes nothing of nothing, and reduceth nothing to nothing, there must remain in the dissolution of compound-bodies, something that is incapable of further dissolution. Certainly, if you say, that it is still dissolvable, or divisible, it will be necessary, by subdividing, to come at last to somethings that is solid, and incapable of division; since that neither Nature it self doth dissolve things infinitely, but slays in some last thing; nor can Body admit of an infinite division.

In a finite body, doubtlesse there cannot be parts of infinite either multitude or magnitude; whereof there cannot be understood to be performed in it, not only that division into infinite which is made into lesser, or by parts always lesser, and proceeds ever observing the same proportion of division; but also that progression into infinite, which is made by proceeding not always by effer, but by equal, or those which are called determinates parts. For since infinite parts must needs be admitted, to serve for an infinite division, how can there be infinite of them in a finite body?

He certainly who once hath said, that in every thing there are parts infinite in number, is not able further to understand and declare, how that magnitude whereof he speaks, comes to be finite. For whether the parts, that a division or progression may be made into infinite, be determinates, (that is, equal among themselves) or indeterminates, (that is, always lesser) it is manifest, that the magnitude, whose parts they are, and which consists and is compounded of them, must indeed be infinite.

And so on the other side, a finite magnitude manifestly hath an extreme or
or last part, ease to be perceived and shewn, unless this part may be seen by itself self, and as the last, we cannot, although we should subdivide it, understand any other part; which should be thought the last, rather then this; for that with as much reason will be divisible. Whence it will come, that by proceeding further, and consequently towards an extreme part into infinite, we can never arrive, not even by thought, to that part which is the last, nor be able to over-run, by progression, even the least space.

Add to this, that unless in dissolutions there did remain little bodies so solid, as that they cannot be dissolved by any force, the difference between body and vacuum, could not be sufficiently understood, in as much as nothing of body, by infinite attenuation, would be capable to resist; by which means too, all things would become weak, or soft, and nothing could be made hard, seeing that solidity only is the foundation of hardness. Neither need we scruple, as if, because Atoms are solid, soft things cannot be made of them, for they may be made soft by intermission only of Vacuum, into which the compressed parts retire, and yield to the touch.

Add also the diverse sorts of constancy in nature, as in carrying on Animals always to certain bounds of strength, augmentation, and life; in imprinting always the same distinctions and marks of every particular kind; which she could not do, if the did not use principles, certain, and constant, and therefore not obnoxious to dissolution and mutation.

CHAP. VI.

Of the properties of Atoms; and first, of their magnitudes.

Although all Atoms by reason of this solidity, may seem to be of one and the same nature, yet have they some adjuncts or properties, and certain qualities, by which they may differ among themselves; such as, magnitude, figure, and weight, and if these be any besides which are necessarily allied to figure, as toughnec, and smoothness; for Colours, Heat, Cold, and the rest of the qualities, are not such as are proper to Atoms, but to Compounds, and arising partly out of the adjuncts, partly the accidents of Atoms, of which we shall speak hereafter.

This in brief, at present; but if colour (for example) were in the atoms the tenebres, it would be as intramissible as they are; and so the things consisting of Atoms, that are of one colour, could not change that, and app. under another; whereas we observe, the contrary happens, for the Sea foaming looks white, it being otherwise of a green colour which doubteless, if it were in it by reason of green Atoms, could not be changed into a white colour. For whereas some fay, that contraries are made of contraries, it is so far from being so, that white will sooner be produced out of no colour at all, then out of black. Better they who conceive, the matter of things, that it may undergoe variety of colours, and other qualities, ought to be void of them; as we choose that oil, which is most free from any scent, to make perfumes of.

But to touch a little, every property of the Atoms: whereas in the first place, I attribute magnitude to them, I mean nor any magnitude; for the largest Atom is not so great as to be perceivable by sight, but that magnitude which, although it be below the reach of sense, yet is of some bigness, (for if Atoms were points void of all magnitude, no body of any magnitude
magnitudes could be made up of them.) Whence I use to say of an Atome, that it is some small thing; whereby, as it were not excluding all magnitude from it, but the larger size only.

Yet neither can it be objected, that the magnitude of Atoms is not perceivable by the senses, since we must necessarily confess, there are innumerable things invisible; for can we see the Wind, Heat, Cold, Odor, Sound, or the little bodies, by whose arrival to the sense these are perceived? Can we see the little bodies of moisture, by which garments hung by the water side, are moistened, yet being spread abroad, are dry'd? Can we see those which are rubbed off from a ring long worn, from a wheel that turns round, from a Plough share in ploughing, from a stone which a drop hollowes, which a tread diminisheth, or those by which a plant or animal grows in its youth, decreases in its old age, and the like?

Yet we must not think, that all Atoms are of the same magnitude, it is more consonant to reason, that amongst them there be some greater, others lesser; and, this admitted, a reason may be given of most things that happen among the passions of the mind, and about the senses.

That there may be an incomprehensible variety of magnitudes beyond the reach of sense, may also be understood even from this, for as much as there are some little animals, whose third part, if we imagine them divided, would be invisible, necessarily, to the composition of them, an incomprehensible number of parts is necessary. For how many mult there be to make the entrails, the eyes, the joints, the soul; to constitute all parts, without, which we cannot understand there should be any living, sensitive, moving Animal?

Whether we may not (to use a gross example) this variety be comprehended from those dainty motes, which the beams of the Sun coming in at a window discover? For whereas without such beams, all things are alike dark; yet they coming in there appears an innumerable company of little bodies, in such manner, as that there is an evident difference between the greater, and the lesser; nevertheless, I say not, (as some conceive) that these kinds of little bodies are Atoms, for in the least of them are contained many Myriads of Atoms; I only use them by way of comparison, that whereas the whole nation (as it were) of Atoms is impervious, and dark even to the sharpest sight, yet we may understand it, to be illustrated by the beams of reason; that the Atoms may be perfectly seen by the mind, and that we may conceive, there are several degrees of magnitudes in them.

Hence it happens, that, as in a great and measurable magnitude, we take something, which, that it may be the common measure, must have the proportion of the least, as a foot, a digit, a barley-corn; and in sensible magnitude, we take also something which is accounted the least, as to sense, as the little Creature called Acris; so in intelligible magnitude, such as that of the Atome, we may take something which in it is effected, (as it were) the least; such as in an Atome may be conceived, the very point in which is a sharp angle is terminated.

But this difference there is between the least, under the notion of measure, and the least of those which are sensible and intelligible, that the former, by its repetition, may be underllood to be adequated to the whole magnitude; but these latter are conceiv'd as certain individual points, which either are bounds of magnitudes, or certain connexures (as it were) to interpolate between the parts, as that they have only certain respects to the parts, connected on each side, though they are such, that a beginning of modification cannot be made from them. For nothing hinders but that we may, by the mind, frame some dimensions in an Atom.
EPICURUS.

Although, when as we sa)y, there are parts or connexures in an Atom, it is not so to be understood, as it at any time they were disjoyned, and afterwards united; but we do it to declare, that, in an Atom, there is a true magnitude, consisting of parts, though withall they have that difference from compound-things, that their parts can only be distinguished by designation, not by separation; forasmuch as they cohere by a naturally, indivisible, and perpetuall connexion.

CHAP. VII.
Of the Figure of Atoms.

As concerning Figure, which is the bound of magnitude, it is first necessary, that, in Atoms, it be manifolds; or, that Atoms amongst themselves be variously figured. This is proved, forasmuch as all natural things framed of them, Men, Beasts, Birds, Fishes, Plants, &c. are variously figured, not onely in respect of their genus, but of every particular species or individuum; for there are not any two so like one another, but that if you mind them exactly, you will find some differences, by which they are distinguished.

Again, forasmuch as the kinds of figures in Atoms are incomprehensible for number; for they are round, oval, lenticular, flat, gibbous, oblong, conicall, hooked, smooth, rough, brittle, quadrilateral, &c. as well regular as irregular, without any determination possible to the intellect; yet are they not to be esteemed simply infinite in number; for there would not be so many and so great differences in concrete things, if, in the Atoms, of which they are compounded, there were such a diversity of figure, as could be comprehended by the mind. Yet the diversities of Atoms cannot be absolutely infinite, unless a man conceive in Atoms a magnitude, which is not only so small as to escape sense, but is in reality infinitely little: For in magnitude, or the superficies of magnitude, which is finite, cannot be understood diversities, which are infinite.

But thirdly, although the kinds of figure be not infinite, yet are there in every form, or kind of figure, Atoms simply infinite in number; that is, there are infinite round Atoms, infinite oval, infinite pyramidall, &c. for otherwise the Universe would not be infinite in multitude of Atoms, as was already declared; unless the Atoms which are like to one another in figure, were absolutely infinite in number.

But take notice, that though there are Atoms corner'd and hooked, yet can they not be conceived to be worn away or broken, because both the corners and hooks, as also the middle little bodies themselves, are of one nature, and kept together with equal solidity and necessity, incomprehensible force whatsoever can compress an Atom, either as to the whole, or as to its parts, even its very points.

CHAP. VIII.
Of the gravity (or weight) and manifold motions of Atoms.

Asfjrly, I attribute to Atoms Gravity, or Weight; for, whereas they are perpetually in motion, or driving to move, it is necessary that they be moved by that internall impulse, which is called gravity, or weight.

There first presents itself to us in the atoms, a two-fold motion, one of the gravity or weight itself, whereby the atom is carried after its own
EPICURUS.

own ways: the other, by percussion or reflection, whereby an atom, being driven upon another, is beaten back again. And as for the motion of gravity or weight, that motion is first conceived, whereby the atom is carried on in a straight or perpendicular line. By this motion are all heavy things moved. But because, if all atoms should be moved in a straight line, or downwards, and, as it were, straight on, it should come to palse, that one could never overtake the other; it is therefore necessary, that atoms should go a little aside, the least that may be, that so may be produced the complications, and adhesions, and copulations of atoms to one another, of which may be made the world, and all the parts of the world, and all things in it.

When I say, that otherwise the atoms would not overtake one another, and consequently nor meet; the reason is, that the Universe being infinite hath no middle or center, towards which they may tend, and so meet; but only there may be conceived, according to what hath been said, some region above, out of which, without any beginning, all atoms by their gravity would descend like drops of rain, that is, by motions in themselves parallel; the other below, into which all, without any bound, would be carried by the same motions.

Motion from reflection may be understood to be made, as well when the atom rebounds by great leaps, as when being impell'd and repell'd within short spaces, it doth, as it were, quake and tremble. Whence also it comes to pass, that while it is happeneth, that the atoms run into certain meetings and complications, of many obviating to, and entangling one another, (which is chiefly done in those compounds where they seem to reflect) then are they still unquenched, and as much as they can, and according as they are further from, or nearer to, one another, they get an agitation, or kind of palpitation, being bent down, or repelled by the rest, which make up that affection.

The cause of this, not onely longer rebounding, but also shorter agitation, or, as it were, inward palpitation, continuing still in those compounds, is, partly the nature of Vacuum, which, being incepted even within the most compact bodies, plucks all the atoms adhering from one another, either in whole or in part, nor having power to stay or fix them; partly the solidity connotatural to the atoms, which by collision and repercussion, cause assembling, as much as that complication will suffer that motion to be kept still continued, by the stroke of the descending atoms. Now since weight or gravity is a certain vigour, or energy, as it were, inergetick in atoms; and, as I said, an impulsion, whereby they are fitted for motion, we must therefore take it for certain, that atoms are moved (even with both kinds of motion, of weight, and reflection) continually, and through all eternity, because there is no first instant, since which they began to be made; not onely atoms, but also vacuum, which serves for both motions, being generall.

We must also take it for certain, that nothing occurs, which may divert it by beating against it, or of so great swiftness, as it over-runs any imaginable space, in a moment, that is in an imaginably short; for they ought in velocity to outrun those beams of the Sun, which makes not their course through pure vacuum. I say, to which nothing occurs that bears it back; for otherwise, the frequent reverberation makes a kind of flawsmess, as want of reverberation makes a kind of silence.

Yet does not hereupon the atom, which suffers several repulsions, arrive at such places in such times as may be diforted by the minds, for to different times is not within the power of the mind. Besides, it may so happen that the same atom, though diverted by several repulsions, may be so carried, as that from whence-
EPICURUS.

whencefore it comes, out of that immensity of space, we shall not be able to assigne any place or term, which in that time it hath not overspassed. For the repercussion may be such, (that is, so little, frequent, and so little diverting) that it may in some measure equal the swifness of that motion, which is free from repercussion.

We must lastly take it for certain, that atomes are equally swift, forasmuch as they are carried through vacuums, neither is there any thing that resists their progress: For neither are the heavy carried on more swiftly, than those which are conceived light, setting nothing occurs that may hinder either; nor the lesser more than the greater, forasmuch as the passage is equally free to all, according to their several magnitudes. Neither do the motions which are made, either upwards, or obliquely by collisions, or downwards by their natural gravity, differ in swifness; since an atome, as long as it is not struck on either side, so long keeps on its way, and that by a swifness equal to thought, until being driven on, either extrinsically, or by its own gravity, it meets with the resistance or a fault of the atome that strikes it.

Moreover, as concerning compound bodies, forasmuch as atomes are in their own nature equally swift, therefore one cannot be said to be swifter than another; as if the atomes that are in compounds, and hurried away by the common motion of them, were carried away, sometimes into one place, by a sensible motion, and thus continuously, and in successive time, as whilst such motion is slow; sometimes whether into one or more places, they should be carried in times so short, as can only be conceived by reason, as when the motion is most rapid. But we shall only say, that, which may be discerned the atomes are carried with the compound, they are all the while exalted with unequall, most frequent, or rather innumerable, and therefore, not-sensible, repercussions; until the perpetuity or succession of the motion of the whole body come to be such, that it may fall under the reach of sense.

For what we fancy concerning the imperceptible motion of atomes, as if times conceived by reason might reach the most swift succession of their parts, it is no way true; but rather, whatsoever our mind, attending to the very nature of the things, apprehends, this is to be esteemed true.

CHAP. IX.

That Atomes (not the vulgar Elements or Homoimera's) are the first principles of things.

This premised concerning Atomes, we now must shew, how they are the principles, or first matter of things; but because that cannot be done without treating, at the same time, of generation and corruption; and that cannot be performed, unless we first speak of the qualities of things, and even before that, of the first causes which produce these; it is sufficient in this place to take notice, that atomes are the principles and first matter of things, because they are that first and most simple, of which all generated things are compounded; as also the last and most simple, into which all corruptible things are resolved.

I say, the first and the last; for besides other greater bodies, of which that which is generated may more nearly be compacted, and into which which is corrupted may be resolved, there are little lumps, or certain small thin compounds, which being made by some more perfect and indissoluble coalitions, are, as it were, long durable seeds of things; so that things may also be said to be generated of seeds, not as of first principles, because even these seeds are generated of things precedent,
EPICTETUS.

that is, of Atoms. And likewise things may be said to be resolved into seeds, but not ultimately, because, even these may still further be dissolved into Atoms. 

In like manner, the four vulgar elements commonly admitted, Fire, Water, Earth, may be called Principles, but not the first; they may also be called Materia, but not the first matter, for as much as they have Atoms precedent to them, of which even they themselves are compounded.

And they, who assign one Element only for principle, will that, of it, ibid., by rarefaction, and condensation, the three other be made, and of these afterwards, the rest of things. But how, if it be one, and nothing mixed with it, can any thing be generated? For, of fire, (for instance) rarity’d nothing; but will be produced, but a more languid or air-like fire.

And besides, that they, who reach this, admit not a vacuum, without ibid., which neither rarefaction nor condensation can be made, they seem not to observe, that fire cannot be said to be changed by extinction, into some other thing; because that which is simple cannot be changed, unless by going away into nothing. Or at least, if they admit, that something common remains, which is first Fire, afterwards Aire; since this something is the first and common matter, the first matter is not of itself, either Fire or Aire, but rather those Atoms which, being put together on one fashion, may make Fire, being put together after another fashion, may make Aire.

They who admit many, or all things to be equally first, run moreover into this inconvenience, that, making them contrary to one another, they by consequence make them such, as either can never joyn to make one compound, or, if they do, must destroy one another.

There was a natural Philosopher, who conceived that all things are generated of continuus little bodies, which he called Homuncula, or like pares, (as it were) wax, to the things generated, so as those (for example) of which hot things are made, are hot; those of which fishy things, fishy; those of which bloody things, bloody; and so of the rest. But if principles were of the same nature with the things generated, they might, as well as they, be altered and lose their qualities and be changed, and, being of a simple nature, go into nothing.

Not to premise, that if the things, whereby something is made hot, must be hot; as if things alike be not generated but of their like, there must also be things laughing, that a laughing Animal may be made of them; and things weeping, that a weeping Animal; and the like.

CHAP. X.

Of the first, and radical cause of Compounds, that is, of the Agent, or Efficient.

If followeth, that we speak of Causes, since in the making of any thing is necessary, not only, matter, of which, but a cause, by which it may be made; wherefore to say a Cause, is no other, than to say, that which in the production of a thing is the Agent, or Efficient.

Now of the things that are made, no other first and radical Cause is to be required, than the same Atoms themselves as they are endowed with that vigour, by which they are moved, or continually tending to motion. Neither is it absurd to make matter active, it is rather absurd to make it unaactive, because they who make it such, and yet will have all things to be
be made out of it, cannot say, from whence the things that are made, have their Efficient power, since they cannot have it elsewhere, than from matter.

Therefore, as the first little-compounds, made up of Atoms, have in themselves a certain energy, or power to move themselves, and to set, confisting of the vigour of each several Atom, but variously modiﬁed, as some of them mutually entangling one another, are carried hither, others yonther; so the greater compounds, made up of the lesser, have some power also, and that modiﬁed according to their variety; and every natural body, consisting of those greater and lesser compounds, and Atoms, have a particular energy, or power of moving themselves, and acting, modiﬁed by a certain reason. Thus, motion or action attends to, and proceeds from, its very principles.

Yet we must observe, that though all Atoms are moved alike swiftly, yet, within the compounds themselves, those which are more corner’d, and hooked, are entangled, and hindered, and so made as it were more ﬂuggish and dull, then the smoother and rounder. Wherefore the energy, or power of acting, which is in compound bodies, chiefly comes of these. And because those, of which Fire, the Soul, and, those which are more generally termed, Spirits, consist, are of this nature, hence it comes, that the chiefest energy in bodies, is from those very spirits; which as they have liberty of running up and down, so they have also dominion within those bodies.

But for as much, as all effection, or action, whereby something is made, is either from an internal, or external principle, it is manifest, that artificial things, whose nature is ﬂuggish, and meekly passive, owe all their production to the Efficient, or external agent. But natural things, although they borrow some part of themselves, or some principle, of acting from an extrinsicall cause, yet they owe their production to the principles contained within themselves, as from which intrinsically, according to all their parts, they are ordered, and co-apted.

Moreover, the very action of the external agent is from its own internal principle; which always is turn and direct the action, as that it may with greater strength sustain the violence of most things. For even in sentient Creatures, where there is a kind of voluntary action, it is therefore such, and carried rather this way, then that way, because there occurs to the mind a species inviting it, rather this way, then that way; and the mind, through the dominion, whereby it ruleth the spirits contained in the body, leads them this way, and not that way; and, together with them, the members in which they are.

C H A P. XI.

Of Motion, which is the same with Action, or effection; and of Fortune, Fate, End, and sympathetical and antipathetical Causes.

In the mean time, I shall not need to make any excuse, for that I confound the action or effection of a Cause with motion; since it is known, that both of these are one with motion, and one only the connotation, and for that it must be terminated to the thing done or effected.

I understand, here, no other motion then that which is migration from place to place, which for the most part is called lation, and transient mo-
EPICURUS.

tion; and local motion. For thus they name it in distinction from that motion, which they use to call mutation, and alteration; that whereby a thing remaining unmoved according to its internal nature, is, as they conceive, changed or altered through acquisition, or loss, or some quality, as Heat or Cold.

This mutation or alteration is not a species of motion, different from that which is called local motion or transition. Local motion or transition is the genus, this mutation or alteration nothing but a species thereof, to wit, that whereby moveables are carried through short and indiscernible intervals. For, whatever compound body is changed according to quality, is changed altogether by the local and transitive motion of the atoms and little bodies, creating a quality; whether they be transposed in place and situation in the body itself, or come into it, or pass out of it.

For example: That of sweet, something bitter be made; or of white, black; it is requisite, the little bodies, which constitute it, be transposed, and one come into the rank of another. But this could not happen, unless those little bodies themselves were moved by transitive motion. Again, that hard something soft be made; and of soft, hard; it is requisite, these particles, whereby it consists, be moved locally, so far as much as by extension of them it is softened, and by condensation hardened; whence the motion of mutation is not generically different from the motion of transition.

But to return to that motion, which is propet to the cause or efficient, we may observe, that every thing, the name of cause is attributed, for that they exite motion. For, everything is a cause of some things, can no other way be admitted, than as it is the same with the self-moving and agent cause, and only denotes ignorance of the effect connected with it, and intended by it. Otherwise, if fat is it from being fat to make it a goose, as the ordinary fort of men do, (for by God, nothing is done disorderly) that it is not to be esteemed so much as an unitive cause.

Even Fate also is no other than the self-moving causes, that act by themselves, as they are connected among themselves, and the latter depend of the former, albeit this connexion and dependance be not of that dependance and necessity, which some Natural Philosophers would persuade; for there is no such necessity in nature, but the motion of the declination of atoms, of which already we spoke, breaks it off, so as it intersects neither in a certain line nor in a certain region of place.

Likewise an End is said to be a Cause, as much as it produceth something, or not produceth it, no otherwise than because it moveth. It moveth, I say, by sending a species into the soul; which draws and allures it, by invisible, yet physical, little hooks and chains, as it were, by which, for the most part, together with the soul, the body also is attracted. Certainly, no such attraction can be understood to be made, unless by some reboundings, and entanglements of atoms.

In no such even all those things, which are said to be done by sympathy or antipathy, are performed by physical causes, that is, by some (unless indeed, but) I very small organs, which intervening, some things, are as truly attracted to, or repelled from one another, as those things which are wrought upon by sensible and grosser organs, are attracted and repelled.

For to explain this by an example, How think we comes it to pass, that Lacteal a Lion is not able to endure the sight of a Cock, but, as soon as he sees him, runs away? unless there are some little bodies in the body of the Cock, which being as in looking-glasses, imitated into the eyes of the Lion, so pierce his eye-balls, and cause so sharp pain, that he is not able to
to withstand or endure it, how fierce and furious soever he be. But in our eyes, those bodies produce nothing like this, they being of a different concture, as shall be shewed when we come to discourse of the Senes.

CHAP XII.

Of the Qualities of Compound things in general.

As concerning the qualities belonging to compound things, it is known, that under this term are comprehended All, as well adjuncts as accidents of things, but chiefly the adjuncts, whether they be properly adjuncts, that is, constantly abiding in a compound body, as long as it perseveres, and not separable from it without destroying, or more properly and largely taken, that is, as a mean between adjuncts, properly so termed, and accidents, as much as, like these, they exist in them; but in those, they come and go, may be with or from a body, without the corruption thereof.

The most obvious question concerning them, is, How it comes to pass, that they are in compound things, when, as we said before, they are not in atoms, of which compound-things consist? That they are not in atoms, is already shown; forasmuch as every quality that exists in atoms, as magnitude, figure, and weight, is so natural to them, that it can no more be changed, than the very substance of the atoms; and this, because in the dissolution of compound things, there must needs remain something solid and undisolved; whence it comes, that all motions which are made, are neither into nothing, nor out of nothing.

We answer, that qualities arise in compound things, as well from the transposition that is made of the atoms, now fewer, now more; which in one position afford one quality; in another, another; as from the accession that is made of some atoms wholly new, and the dissolution of some pre-existing. Whence these qualities again are varied, or seem different from what they were at first.

For as Letters give a divers representation of themselves, not only those which are of different figure or form, as A and N, but even the same Letters, if their position or order be changed; position, as in N and Z; order, as in A N, and N A; So, not only atoms, which are of divers figures, (as also of different bulk and motion,) are naturally apt to affect the senses, and, in one, to exhibit colour; in another, odor; in a third, flavor; in a fourth, another: but also those which are of the same, if they change the position or order among them, affect the senses in such manner, that those (for example) which now exhibit one colour, presently exhibit another, as we before instanced in the water of the sea, which, being still, seemeth green; troubled, white: and, as is ordinarily instanced, the neck of a Pigeon, which, according as it is variably placed towards the light, receiveth a great variety of colours.

And as there is made a diversity, not only when the same letters which compose one word are so transposed, as that they exhibit divers forms, but much more, when some are added to them, and some taken away from them; in like manner it is necessary, that colours, odors, and other qualities, be changed, not only when the same atoms change their position and order, but likewise when some come to them, some depart from them, as is manifest from the softening, hardening, crystallisation, ripening of things, and the like.

Briefly, as it is of great concernment amongst Letters, with what other Letters they are joined, and in what position and order they are among themselves,
EPICURUS.

themselves; since, by so small a number of Letters, we signify the Heaven, the Earth, the Sun, the Sea, Rivers, Fruit, Shrubs, living creatures, and innumerable such like; so it is of great concernment amongst atoms, with what others they are joined, and in what other position, and in what intervals and connexions, what motions amongst one another they give or receive; forasmuch as by this means they are able to exhibit the variety, as of all things, so of all qualities in them.

To speak more particularly, some qualities first seem to arise out of atoms, as considered according to substance; and being in such position amongst themselves, as that they have a greater or lesser vacuum intercepted or excluded. Other qualities are made of them, as they are endowed with their three properties, some from a single property, others from a conjunction of more.

CHAP. XIII.

Qualities from Atoms considered, according to their substance, and interception of Vacuum.

And after the first manner arise Rarity and Density; for it is manifest, that no dense thing can be made rare, unless the atoms thereof, or the parts of which it is compounded (they themselves being compounded of atoms) be so far sundered from one another, that, being diffused into a larger place, they intercept within it more and larger vacuities. Neither can any thing rare be made dense, unless its atoms or parts be so brought together, as that, being reduced into a narrower place, they comprehend in it fewer, or more contracted vacuities. Moreover, it is manifest, that, according to the more or less vacuity which is intercepted, the air (for example) or light is said to be rare; but a stone, iron, and the like, said to be dense.

Together with these seem to arise Perspicuity and Opacity; for every thing is so much more perspicuous, (other respects being equal), by how much more it is too rare; so much more opaque, by how much it is more dense: because the more rare is the more patent to lucid and visible beams; the more dense, the more obstructive of them. But I say, (other respects being equal) a more thick body, as glass, may have little vacuous passages placed in it, they may pass more easily through it, than through a rarer body; as a leaf of Cole-wort, whose small pores are petter'd with little bodies variously permixed; even the beams themselves are cut off unless they pass through it, as are in glass.

Again, there ariseth also fluidity, liquidity, and firmness; for a body seemeth to be fluid for no other reason, then because the atoms or parts whereof in consists, have little vacuities lodg'd within them, and are withall so dissociated from one another, as that they are easily movable one in order to another, through the non-resistance of the little vacuities; neither doth any thing seem to be firm from any other cause, than the contrary hereof; that is, the atoms and parts touch one another so closely, and are so coherent to one another, that for the same reason they cannot be moved out of their situation: for such atoms there may be, as being more hooked, and, as it were, more branching, may hold the body more closely compacted. How water, in particular, being liquid, becomes harden'd into ice, shall be said hereafter.

Likewise, those qualities which depend of these, Humidity and Siccity.
EPICURUS.

Siccity. Humidity is a kind of fluidness, only it superadds this, that the parts of a humid thing, touching some body, or penetrating into it, are apt to stick to it, thereby, rendering it moist. Siccity is a kind of firm-ness, adding only this, that a dry body is void of humidity.

Moreover, Softness and Hardness, which cohere with these, and, upon another account, agree also with Rarity and Densitv, in as much as (other respects being equal) every body is so much the more soft, by how much the more rare, and so much the more hard, by how much the more compact; if ay, (other respects being equal) because dirt is soft, and a puncture hard, by reason of the greater cohesion of the parts, which pierce the cavities, and resist the touch, and cannot retire into the hindermost cavities, as otherwise they would.

There are others, which depend upon these; as flexibility, tractility, dulility, and others, from softness; their opposites, from hardness; but 'tis enough to have hinted them.

CHAP. XIII.

Qualities springing from Atoms, considered according to the properties, peculiar to each.

In the second manner, and as far as the properties of Atoms are considered particularly, in the first place, the magnitude, quantity, or bulk of every thing, ariseth no other way then from the coacervate magnitude of the Atoms, of which it is compounded. Whence it is manifest, that augmentation, and diminution of bodies is therefore made, because Atoms, wherefoever they arrive, give to the things an increase; wherefore ever they go away, they diminish them.

Not to mention, that, according as the Atoms are greater or lesser, may be made, that which we call blaneness and aequeness. And thence a reason may be given, why the fire of lightning is more penetrative than that of a taper: or how it comes, that light passeth through horn, which resists rain and the like.

Besides, the very figure of things, though it did not depend upon the figure of Atoms, (whereas it seems to depend upon them, in all things, which are contantly produced in the same figure) yet it is, generally at least, true, that every body is therefore figured, because it comitts of parts terminate and figure; for figure is a term, or bound.

Thus, though out of smoothness, and tougheness, (which as I said are allied to the figure of Atoms) it doth not necessarily follow, that things smooth, are made of smooth, rough things of rough: yet in general, nothing can be conceived to be smooth, but whole parts, to the least of them, are smooth; nor rough, but whole parts are rough.

Here observe, that as well from the figure, as from the magnitude, the reason may be given, why wine floweth easily through a strainer, but oil more slowly, which is, that the oil may consist, not of greater; Atoms only, but also of more hooked, and much entangled among themselves.

Lastly weight, or the motive-faculty, which is in every thing, can arise no other way, then from the weight or mobility of Atoms. But that being declared formerly, we shall here only observe, that all Atoms are heavy, and none light; wherefore every compound body is heavy, there is none that is light; or that is not of it selfs ready to tend downwards. Here presently comes in Fire for an Objection; but although it fore-goeth not its propension downwards, yet it therefore tendeth upwards, for as much
Epicurus:

much as it is driven that way by the ambient aire: after the same manner, as we fee with great force the water refills loggs and beams, things otherwise heavy; and the deeper we plunge them, the more eagerly it casts them up; and bends them back. Whence it comes that those things, which we call leffe, are not absolutely leffe; as if, of their own accord, they did tend upwards, but only comparatively, that is, as they are leffe heavy, and extruded by the more heavy, which preffe themselves down before them. So as Earth being the mott heavy, water leffe heavy, aire yet leffe heavy then that, and fire least of all; the earth drives the water upwards, and far from the middle; water the aire; aire the fire: but if we suppose the earth to be taken away, the water will come to the middle; if the water, the aire; if the aire, the fire.

CHAP. XV.

Qualities from Atoms, considered according to their properties, taken together.

But the properties of Atoms, being taken together, and those things especially of which we have hitherto spoken, rarity, density, and the rest, being committ and varied, there arise faculties of things, which being active and morive, have it from the weight and mobility of the Atoms. And whereas some act one way, some another, they must of necessity have it, as well from the peculiar magnitude, and figure of the Atoms, as from their various order and position amongst themselves, as from their loosenesse, compactedneffe, connexion, sejunction, &c.

Of this kind, are not onely, in Animals, the faculties of Sense, Sight, Hearing, Smelling, Tasting, Touching, wherewith they can perceive sensible things, but also, in the things themselves, those very qualities which are called sensible. These are, in things, the faculties of striking, and affecting the senses, after a certain manner, to the end they may be perceived by them; as colour, and light, the light; found the hearing; odor the smell; savour the taste; heat and cold (above the reit) the touch. Whence it comes, that being to speak of those hereafter, we ought not here to omit these: To treat of which, will be worth our pains.

To begin from Heat: we cannot treat of it, without joining light to it, for without light there are no colours, the variety of colours being taken away by night; whence in the infernal region, all things are said to be black. But though in darkness, all things are alike dit-colour’d, neverthelesse in themselves, or in their superficies, there are dispositions of extrane particles, by reason of which the affued light is so variously modify’d, that, together with this modification reflected on the eye, it exhibits various colours in the eye, as white, for example, when the ball received into it selfe, one kind of blow or froak; black, when another, &c.

For though colours are not coherent to bodies, but generated according to some respective lights, orders, and positions; yet are they not generated, unless light also be adjoin’d to the disposure of their superficies, to complete or make up the perfect nature of colour. Neither, setting this aside, do I see how it can be said, that bodies, which are, in the dark, invisible, have colour.

And indeed, since not onely a Pidgeon’s neck, a Peacock’s train, and the like, exhibit severall colours, according to their severall positions to the light, but also even all other things appear, sometimes in some colours,
EPICTURUS.

Chap. 2.

Sound is nothing but an effusion of tenuous little bodies, sent out from the thing speaking, sounding, or what way soever making a noise, and, by entering into the ear, to affect the hearing.

That it is a corporeal effusion is proved, in that it moveth the sense, and that either by touching it smoothly and delightfully, or roughly and unpleasantly, according to the smoothness or roughness of the little bodies. Also in that it is moved through the air, and being driven against solid bodies, leap back, whence Echo is made; and, by reason of the solidity of the little bodies; also in that it is diminished, and becomes confused, in regard of the long train of little bodies, when it goes forward, or their swerving while they go over-thwart, through some thicker partitions, and the like.

If you demand why Sound can pass, where Light and the species of colour cannot, as when we speak, the doors being shut; the reason is, because light, or the images of colours, cannot pass but in a direct line; but Sound can insinuate itself through oblique tracks. For being excited, it leaps forward in little bodies, which turn upwards, downwards, forwards, backwards, on the right side, on the left side, and every way, in like manner as a spark of fire, sometimes scatters itself into little sparkles, which take a direct course towards all sides.

The same may be said of Odor. For this also is an effusion, which going out of the odorous thing, is diffused every way, and, arriving at the nostrils, moveth the sense of smelling, either by frothing or pricking it. This is corporeal also, even more than Sound, in that it palleth more slowly through space, and commeth not from to great a distance, and penetrateth not through those partitions, through which Sound doth penetrate.

As concerning Sapor, there is this difference, that, though it consist in little bodies, contained in the thing styled Sapid; yet they issue not forth into the tongue and palate at a distance, but then only, when the thing sappid is applied to the tongue, they so insinuate themselves into it, that they affect the contexture of it, either mildly, and then make a sweet taste; or roughly, and so they make a sour taste.

As for Heat and Cold, that sensation which they cause is to be referred to the Touch. But though many of the afoaid qualities properly appertain to the Touch, as hardnesse, softnesse, humidity, fucosity, and the like, which require application of the thing touched to the hand, or to some other part of the body; yet these two may be felt, not only when the hot or cold thing is applied to the hand, or some other part; but also, when it is removed, and at such a distance, as it can transmit some little bodies out of itself into it.
EPICURUS.

Heat indeed is chiefly an effusion of little bodies or atoms, in bulk slender, in figure round, in motion swift. For as they are slender, there is no body so compacted, that they find not little pores, through which they infiltrate into it; as they are round, they are easily moved, and infiltrate themselves everywhere; as they are swift, they rapidly are impelled, and enter into the body, and, more and more milling successing one another, they are so pressed, as that they penetrate through the whole; and if they proceed in acting, they fever and dilocate the parts thereof, and at last dissolve the whole. Such are the effects of Heat, and chiefly the fiery, (for fire is nothing but intense heat) towards all bodies; and in a living creature is only added the sense of the heat, which is from the plucking of under, and loosening what before was continued.

Cold is an effusion also, but of atoms, whose bulk is greater, their figure more corner'd, their motion slower; for, the effects being contrary, the principles must also be contrary. So that whereas heat digregates and disperses, cold compresseth and constricts; and, in a sentient creature, it doth this with a particular kind of lenition; for, entering into the pores of the skin, it keeps back and drives in again the little bodies of heat, by opposing the bodies of cold, and with its little sharp corners, it tears and twingeeth all things wheresoever it pales.

CHAP. XVI.

Of those Qualities which are esteemed the Accidents of things; and particularly, of Time.

It remains, that we a little touch those qualities, which are not so much adjuncts as accidents, and therefore affect not the thing internally, but externally only, and qualify them with a certain kind of respect to some extrinsicall thing. Not but that within the things themselves also there are some accidents, (such are position, orders, intervals of parts or particles, and the like) but that being such, they are accidents of the parts themselves, not of the whole which consists of them.

Accidents of this kind are all those generally, out of what arises some relation, for which every thing is laid to be such or such, in order to another, as like, unlike; greater, lesser; many, few; superior, inferior; right, left; cause, effect; giving, receiving; and innumerable of the same kind.

But it is known, that Relation is a work of the mind, referring and comparing one to another; so that, setting aside the mind, every thing is that only which it is in itself, but not that which it is in respect of another. Whence, to accidents, we formerly referred liberty and health, riches and poverty, &c., because, setting the mind aside, a man is nothing but a man; not free, or subject; rich, or poor, &c.

Now of all accidents, there is one which may be termed the accident of accidents, that is, Time, from which all things are denominated, either present, or past or future; lasting, or little durable, or momentary; sometimes swift or slow.

For first, that Time is an accident, is manifest, in that it is not any thing by itself, but only attributed to things by cogitation, or the mind, as they are conceived to persever in the state in which they are, or to cease to be, and to have a longer or shorter existence, and to have it, or to have had it, or to have it. Whence it comes, that Time is not to be enquired after the same manner as we enquire after other things, which are, in some
EPICURUS.

Some subjects setting in the mind; and therefore neither to understand what it is must be referred to the pretensions of things, which occur to our sight; but we ought to attend to it according to evidence, using familiar speech. And not entangling our selves in circumlocutions, we say, Time is long or short.

Moreover, we call it the accident of accidents, because, whereas some things cohere by themselves, as a body, and as a vacuum or space; others happen, or are accident to the coherent, as days, nights, hours; as also passions and exemptions from them, as motion, rest, &c. Time, by the assistance of the mind, presupposeth all these accidents, and supervenes to them.

For day and night are accidents of the ambient air; day happens by the Sun's illumination; night, by privation of the solar illumination. Hour being a part of night or day, is an accident of the air also, as likewise are night and day; but Time is coextensive with every day, and night, and hour; and for this reason, a day or night is said to be long or short, while we are carried by thought to time that supervenes to them, according to the former notions.

In the same manner happen passions, and indolencies, and griefs, and pleasures to us; and therefore they are not substances, but accidents of those things which are affected by them; to wit, by sense, of delation or of trouble. But these accidents happen not without time.

Moreover, motion and rest, as we have already declared, are accidents of bodies, neither are they without time; wherefore we measure the swiftness and slownesse of motion by time, as also much or little rest. And forasmuch as none understand time by itself, or separate from the motion and rest of things; therefore by understanding things done, as the Trojan War, and the like, which are done with motion, and are accidents partly of the men acting, partly of the places in which they are acted; together with them is understood their time, as they are compared to our affairs, and the existence of the things intervening betwixt those and us.

CHAP. XVII.

Of the generation and corruption of Compounds.

It remains that we add, how things are generated and corrupted, either of which is some kind of mutation or alteration; but whereas by other mutations, a body is not made and exists new, but only that which now is acquires a new quality, and a new denomination from it. Generation is a mutation, whereby every body is first produced, and begins in nature to be, and to be denominated such. Corruption is a mutation, whereby it is at last dissolved, and ceases to be in nature, and to be denominated such; for thus fire, a plant, an animal, and whatsoever is in a determinate genus of bodies, when it first ariseth into the light, and beginneth to be denominated such, is said to be generated; when it goeth out of the light, and can no longer be denominated such, to be corrupted.

When I say, that a body is first produced, or beginneth to be, I mean not, that whatsoever is in it of substance, body, or corporeal, was before; for all the atoms, and little buks or seeds, of which it is compounded, were before. As when a house is said to be made, the stones, wood, and the rest, whereof it is said to be built, are understood to be pre-existent. But I only mean, that the atoms and seeds thereof are so united, and so united, as that they are in a new manner, or in a new form, wherein they were not before; and therefore a body resulting hence, then first begins to be, and be denominated such.

Hence,
EPICURUS.

Hence, because there ariseth not so much a new substance, as a new quality, in compounds, it cometh to pass, that generation is a species of mutation or alteration; and so is corruption likewise, but in a contrary manner. Wherefore also it comes to pass, that Generation and Corruption are performed only, by conjoining and disjoining those principles, and not by changing them; because the Atoms, as we said, are incapable of change.

And indeed, seeing all change, (as we have already said, and shall shortly say, Lutc. again) is performed, either by transposition, adding, or taking away of parts; it followeth, that Atoms, being so compact and solid, as that none of their particles can be transposed, added, or taken away, are immutable, and incorruptible, and such also are their properties, of which sort are those little magnitudes, and little figures peculiar to them, for it is necessary, that these also remain with the substance of the Atom, when the compounds are dissolved: and with good reason; seeing that also in things which we transforme at our pleasure, as when a man, of standing, or upright, becomes sitting, or bowed, (or, if you will, as made black or hot) it is ever understood, that the same magnitudes, figures, and order of parts are in them. But the qualities, that are not in them, nor proper to them, as standins, straightness, white, cold, &c. remain not in the subjects, after its transmutation, as the others do: but perish, or are left to the whole body, or to the parts wherein they were.

Since therefore, Principles are intramutable, and, in generation, are no other then mingled, and put together, it followeth that no such mixture can be made, as is a perfect confusion by coalition; but only that, which is a compounding by apposition; and this, whether those little bulks made up of Atoms, are onely mingled, or whether also the Atoms themselves be mingled with those little bulks, resolved into their Atoms, or first principles, whence it followeth, that the destruction of those little bulks, and of the bodies, confiniling of them, as wine, and water, honey, and the like, goeth accompanied with the generation of the mixt body, and of the other little bulks, which are proper to it: not as if water and wine (for example) but as if aquifying, and vitifying Atoms, (as I may say) were mingled together.

And to the generation, which is made in an infinite Vacuum, we must conceive, that the Atoms severfed from one another, and differing amongst themselves in figure, magnitude, position, and order, are carried through the Vacuum, and, where they concurre, being mutually entangled, are condens'd; whence it happens, that a different temperature of the thing results, for they are conjoined according to proportion of magnitude, figures, positions, orders, and by this means, the generation of compound things, comes to be perfected.

But where the generation of one, is made out of the corruption of another, that usuallly happens after a threefold manner, which we touched, speaking of alteration; either onely by transposition of the parts or Atoms, as when a frog is generated of dirt, a mice of cheese; or by addition of things accessory, as when, by accession of the food, to a greater maffe, (as of rennet into milk, or of leaven into dough) there is begotten a plant, or Animal; after which manner, also augmentation is made, by which the generated thing becomes bigger; or lastly, by taking away something pre-existent, as when fire is generated, by the fervering of water, alby, or other parts which were in wood; wax, by the fervering of honey, which was in the combe; and so of the rest.

Here the former comparison of Letters, will serve to make us understand two things. One, that the particular manners of generation, and their opposite corruptions, which may be comprehended under any of
these three manners, are (if not infinite, at least) innumerable; inexpressible, and incomprehensible. Since, of four and twenty Letters only, which are in the Alphabet, there may be produced a multitude of words almost incomprehensible.

The other is, that as words, accommodated to pronunciation and reason, are not made of every combination of Letters; so in natural things, all things are not made of all things, nor are all Atoms fit, by being joined together, to constitute any species of compound things. For every thing requires such a disposition, as that the Atoms constituting it, shall and as it were associate themselves with those which are agreeable to them, but repel by, and as it were reject others. Whence again it comes to pass, that when a thing is dissolved, all the agreeing Atoms draw one another mutually, and disengage themselves from those which are disagreeing. This is manifestly seen in nutrition, which is generation, and is evident even from this, that otherwise Monsters would be ordinarily generated, as half-men, half-beasts; Chimaeas; and Zoophytes.

In a word, Certainly he never had the least taint of Physiology, who conceived, that any thing which is generated, can be eternal; for what composition is there, which is not dissoluble? Or what is there, that hath a beginning, and no end? Though there were no external causes to destroy its frame, yet wants there not an intemperate motion, and, even within the most compact and durable bodies, an unvanquishable inclination of Atoms downwards; whence their dissolution must necessarily follow.

Yet, this dissolution is not always immediately made into Atoms, but for the most part into little bulks, or parts compounded of them; which are certain kinds of compound bodies, as when there is a dissolution of wood, partly into fire, partly into smoke, partly into some watery moisture, partly into ashes. But what way sooner it be done, we must always hold, that, in generation, there is no new substance made, but preexistent substances are made up into one; so in corruption, no substance absolutely ceaseth to be, but is dissipated into more substances, which remain after the destruction of the former.

**CHAP. XVIII.**

*Whence it comes, that a generated body is in a certain kind of things, and distinguished from other things.*

Moreover, seeing that every body is generated only of the aggregation of matter, or of material, and substantial principles, knitting together in a certain order and position; therefore, that which is concrete or generated, is understood to be nothing else, but the principles themselves, as they are knit together in such an order or position, and thereupon are exhibited in such a form or quality.

This form or quality, whereby a thing generates, is established in such a certain kind of things, as of metallic, or of stone, or of plant, or of Animal, and is distinguished from all the species, and individuals of the Genus, wherein it is; this form, I say, is not one and simple, but rather as it were an aggregation and collection of many, which collection cannot be found in any thing, but in this.

Wherefore we must here observe, that the figures of things, their colours, magnitudes, gravity, and (in a word) all other qualities, which are usually predicated of a compound body, as its accidents, (whether perceived by sight, or by other senses) are so to be understood, not as if they were certain natures or substances,
EPIGRUS.

Substances, existent by themselves, (for our understanding cannot reach this) nor, on the other side, as if only they did not exist, or were absolutely nothing; neither again, as if they were such, as are those other incorporeal things, which are accident to it; nor, lastly, as if they were parts of the body. But they are thus to be esteemed, that whereas a body may be disposed after several manners, the whole complex gains, by the aggregation of them, a certain nature, proper and peculiar to its kind.

Not that a body comes to be such, as is a greater bulk, made up out of a lesser, whether those be the first, least, greatest, or in general made up of others more minute; but only, as I said, that if all these joined together, and by this conjuncting, differing is from others, it possesses a nature proper to itself, and distinct from any other.

All these are comprehended by special notions and conceptions, but so, that still the body which results out of them, as a certain whole, and is not divided in itself, but conceived as one undivided thing, obtains the denomination of a body, which is reckoned up in such a certain kind of things.

The same may in a manner, be conceived to happen by the concurrence of certain accidents, which are found the same in no other body; that is, the things indeed, to which those accidents agree, may be distinguished and denominated from the notions of them, but yet only then, when each of those accidents is conceived to be there. For these are not of that kind of accidents, which, exiting in the thing, become therefore necessary and perpetually conjoin'd to it, and consequently belong on it a perpetual denomination.

Here it may be demanded, whether, if we were dissolved by death, it might happen in process of time, that the very same principles, of which we consist, might, by some odd chance, be ranged and ordered again in the same manner as they are now, and so we come to be denominated the same which we are at this present? To which we answer, that it is doubtless true; but still so, that, to have been formerly would nothing appertain to us, because, in our very dissolution, every disposition which we had, and all memory of those things which compounded us, and which we were, would utterly be lost; by which means, all our remembrance too would so have been totally decay'd, that it were impossible it should come into our minds that we had ever had a being. Thus much concerning the Universe.

SECT. II.

Of the World.

I followeth that we speak of the World, which is a portion of the Universe, or infinity of things, and may not uniformly be described. The whole circumference of heaven, containing the Stars, the Earth, and all things visible.

When I say, the Circumference of Heaven, I imply, that heaven is the outmost part of the world, which may also be called Aether, and the Region of fire from the stars which it containeth; and are, as it were, fixed lightly there.

When I say, the Earth, I mean the lowest, or, as it were, the middle part of the world; in which also there is the Water, and next over it the Aire, immediate to the Region of Fire. And, because the things which we see created of these, and in these, are various; therefore we...
comprehend them under the name of things visible.

But seeing it may, and use to be demanded concerning the World, what form it hath within, what figure without? whether it be eternall, or had a beginning? whether it require any other author, than Nature or fortune? in what manner was the production of the whole, and of its parts? whether it require any Ruler, or perform its vicissitudes by itself? whether, how, and when it shall perish? whether it be One, or, besides it, there be innumerable? We must therefore speak a little of each.

CHAP. I.

Of the form and figure of the World.

And as to the first head, the world by its internal form or constitution is not animac, much less a god, as some think; but whereas what is conceived to be one in its form or constitution, is such, either for that its parts are contained under one disposition, as a plant or animal; or that they are artificially joyned one to another, without mixing their tempers, as a house, or ship; or that they are discreetly distinguishing from one another, yet have some mutual relation to each other, as an Army, and a Common-wealth; the World is only to be conceived One, partly the second way, partly the third.

The second way it may be esteemed one, in regard between the Sun, the Moon, and the rest of the more solid and compacted parts of the World, there is intercepted either aire or other diffusive, whereby a kind of coherence is made. It may also be esteemed one the third way, in regard the Sun, Moon, Earth, and other compacted bodies, are so separated from one another, that, after a determinate order, they posse the situations or feats of superiours and inferiours, antecedents and consequents, things illustrative and things illustrated.

But to say that the World is one the first way also, How can it be made good? since that if it were so, that the world, as some will, were animac, nothing could be thought inanimac; nor a stone, nor a carcasse, nor any thing whatsoever that same disposition called Soul being diffus'd through all things.

Neither do they who affect the world to be animac and wise, sufficiently mind and understand what kind of nature that must be, to which such expressions are proper, since as a tree is not produced in the aire, nor flesh on dry ground, nor blood in wood, nor moysture in a pumice; so neither can the mind or the soul be produced, or be, indifferently in any kind of body. But seeing it must be determinately ordered, where every thing shall grow and increase, the nature of the soul must be looked for about the nerves and blood, not in putrid globes of earth, in water, in the Sun, in the sky, &c.

Now whereas some hold, that the world is not onely endued with mind and senses, but that also it is a round burning god, and ever-moving with resell less circumvolutions; these are prodigies and monsters, nor of Philosophers discoursing, but dreaming. For who can understand what this ever-moving and round god is, and what life is ascribed to him, to be turned about with so great twistes, as is unimaginable to be equal'd? with which I see not how a constant mind and a happy life can consist?

Bur granting the world to be a god, not onely the Sun, Moon, and the rest, are parts of God, but even the earth itself, as being a part of the world, must be also a part of god. Now we see there are very great regions of the earth unhabitable, and uncultivated, part of them being burnt up
EPICURUS.

up by the approach of the Sun, part being oppressed with snow and ice through his distance from it. If then the World be god, these being the parts of the world, are to be reanimated, some, the burning; some, the frozen members of god.

As to its external form or figure, it seems in the first place certain, that there is some extremity of the world, because the world is a kind of segment of the infinite Universe; but what that is, who is able to tell, unless he came thence?

For whereas it seems to be Heaven, there is nothing in all apparent things hinders, but that it may be rare, nor nothing hinders but that it may be dense; rare, forasmuch as the stars which are in it, and appear to be moved, perform their motions through it; dense, forasmuch as it self is able to move the stars fixed in it.

Again, nothing hinders, but that it may be either quiescent, if the stars are moved through it; or circularly moved, if the stars are carried round about with it.

Besides, nothing hinders, but that it may be round, oval, or lenticular, especially if it be moved. Again, nothing hinders, but that it may be triangular, pyramidal, square, hexa-edrical, or of any other plain figure, especially if it be unmoved.

As for them, who, being persuaded by some arguments, assert the world so to have one determinate figure, as that it can have no other, we cannot but wonder at their stupidity. For most maintain the world to be, as immortal and blessed, so also round, because Plato deneyth any figure to be more beautiful than that. But to me, that of the cylinder, or the square, or the cone, or the pyramid, seems, by reason of the variety, more beautiful.

CHAP. II.

Of the late beginning of the World.

As for the second head; The world is not eternal, but began to be at some time.

For first, seeing that the nature of the whole and of the parts is the same; and we observe,that the parts of the world are obnoxious, both to generation and corruption, it follows, that the whole world must be subject to generation and corruption. That the parts of the world are generated and corrupted, is demonstrated even by the sense, and shall be proved hereafter.

Neither let any say, that the mutations which are made in the parts of the world are not of the more principal parts, as of the Sun, the Moon, the Earth, and the rest; but of the lesser only, which are but particles, whereof the principal consist; for he ought to conceive, that if the principal parts consist of parts subject to mutation, those whole parts themselves are subject to mutation; and though ordinarily there occur not causes so powerful as to change them, nevertheless nothing hinders, but that such may sometimes occur, as even among the lesser parts, some continue safe a great while, which at last, in progress of time, find causes of mutation.

Besides, seeing that the most ancient Histories of all things exceed not the Trojan and Ilian Wars, what is the reason of this, but because the world is not old, so far it is from being eternal? For if eternal, why did not other Poets celebrate other things? How came the memorable acts of so many eminent persons to perish? why are the records of eternal fame nowhere extant?
EPI CURUS.

In like manner, seeing that we have all arts newly invented, and their inventors are not unknown, (for, that daily, many arts are advanced and receive increase, is very manifest,) how comes this to pass, but because the world had not its beginning long ago; for the world could not be so long without arts, which are of so great importance to life.

If you believe that in times past, there were such Records and Arts as now, which perished by some great conflagrations, deluges, earth-qua kes, being subverted together with the Cities and Nations themselves, do you not acknowledge it necessary, that there must be at some time to come a destruction of earth and heaven, as it had happened; if in those cases some greater calamities had lighted: For we our selves think our selves mortal for no other reason, but for that we perceive our selves to fall into the same diseases, as they whom we see dye.

The world therefore had a beginning; not was, as may appear by what we said, of very great antiquity. But whenoever it begun, it is most probable it begun in the Spring, because then all things sprout, flourish, and bring forth; and the newness of the world required a temperate heat and cold, for the cherishing of its young brood, before it should pass to either of the extremities.

CHAP. III.

Of the Cause of the World.

As to the next head: We must first acquire the divine power from the follicitude and labour of framing the world, for it could not be a cause blest and immortal that made it.

With what eyes could Plato look upon the fabric of so great a work, as to conceive the world made and built by God? What designs, what tools, what beams, what engines, what ministers, in so great a task? How could aire, fire, water, earth, obey and serve the will of the Architect; whence sprung those five forms, of which the rest also are framed, lighting aptly to make up mind and fenes? It were too long to repeat all, which are rather in our wish, than in our power to find out.

Again, this God of whom he speaks, either was not in the former age, wherein bodies were either immovable, or moved without any order; or he then slept, or wak'd; or did neither. The first cannot be admitted, for God is eternal; nor the second, for if he slept from eternity he was dead, death being an eternal sleep. But neither is God capable of sleep, for the immortality of God, and a reigning death, are far abhor. Now, if he were awake, either something was wanting to his felicity, or he was perfectly happy. But the first would not allow him to be happy; for he is not happy who wants any thing to make up his felicity; the latter is absurd, for there were a vain action for him who wants nothing, to trouble himself with making any thing.

To what end then, should God desire to adorn the world with fair figures and luminaries, as one that dresses and lets out a Temple? If to the end that he might better his habitation, it seems then, that for an in finte time before, he lived in darkness as in a dungeon. Again, can we think, that afterwards he was delighted with the variety, wherewith he fed the heaven and the earth adorned? What delight can that be to God, which, were it such, he could not so long have wanted it?

But some will say, That these were ordained by God for the sake of men. Do they mean, of the wise? Then this great Fabrick of things was made for a very few persons. Or, of the foolish? There was no reason he
he should do such a favour to the wicked. Again, what hath he got by doing so, since all fools are even in that regard most miserable, for what more miserable than folly? Besides, there being many inconveniences in life, which the wise sweeten by compenstation or the convenience; fools can neither prevent the future, nor sustain the present.

Or, did he make the world, and, in the world, men, that he might be worshipped by men? But what doth the worship of men advantage God, who is happy, and needeth nothing? Or if he respect man so much, as that he made the world for his sake, that he would instruct him in wisdom, that he would make him Lord over all living Creatures, that he would love him as his Sonne, why did he make him mortal and frail? Why did he subject him whom he loveth, to all evils? seeing rather man ought to be happy, as conjoined with, and next unto God, and immortall as He himselfe is, whom he is made to worship, and contemplate?

For these reasons, ought we to say, that the world rather was made by Nature; or, as one of the Natural Philosophers said, by chance.

By nature, for such is the nature of the Atoms, running through the immensity of the Universe, that in great abundance running against one another, they can lay hold of, entangle, and engage one another, and, variiously commingling themselves, first roll up a great kind of Chaos, in manner of a great Vortex, (close or bottom) and then after many convolutions, evolutions, and making several attempts, as it were attempts, trying all kinds of motions and conjunctions, they came at last into that forme, which this world bears.

By chance; for the Atoms conccute, cohere, and are co-apted, not by any deffines, but as chance led them. Wherefore, as I said, Chance is not such a Caeae, as directly, and of itself, tends to mingle the Atoms and dispose them to such an effect; but the very Atoms themselves are called chance, in as much as meeting one another, without any premendiation, they fallen on one another, and make up such a compound, as chance thence to result.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Generation of the World.

But to discourse this matter more narrowly, and to come to another head; the world seemeth to have been elaborated, and molded into this round figure, by a certain kind of reason, without bellowes, anvile, or other instruments.

First, whereas the Atoms, by an inconsiderate and casuall motion, were continually, and swiftily carried on, when they began to run in multitudes, into this immense place, in which the World now is; and to often upon one another, they presently became heaped into one rude, and indigellte malle, in which great things were mingled with small, round with cornered, smooth with hooked, others with others.

Then in this confused crowd, those which were the greatest and most heavy, began by degrees to settle down, and such as were thin, round, small, dirty, these in the concurrence of the others, began to be extruded, and carried upwards; as in troubled waters, until it rest, and groweth clear, the earthy parts settle downwards, the watery are as it were thrust upwards; but after the impulsive force, which drove them upward, grew languid, nor was there any other strow, which might restore them that way, the Atoms themselves, endeavoring to go down again, met with obstacles from others, whereupon they flew about with greater activity, to the
EPICURUS.

the utmost bounds, as also did others, which were reverberated by them, and repelled by others, that closely followed them, whence was made a mutual impression, which did generate Heaven.

Burthole Atoms, which were of the same nature (there being as we said many kinds of them) and carried round about in heaps, whilst they were thrust upwards, made the Sun, and Moon, and other Stars. These were chiefly signifying Atoms; those which they left, as not able to rise so high, produced the Aire.

At length, of those which felled down, the Earth was generated; and seeing there yet remained much matter in earth, and that condensed by the beatings of the winds and gales from the Stars, that figuration of it which consisted of least particles, was squeezed forth and produced Moisture. This being fluid, either run down into hollow places, fit to receive and contain it, or, standing still, made hollow receptacles for it selfe. And after this manner, were the principal parts of the world generated.

To say something of the lesse principall, the particles as it were of the former parts; there seems in that first committal, to have been made the diverse seeds of generable and corruptible things, of which, compounds of diverse natures were first framed, and afterwards in a great degree propagated.

Stones, Metalls, and all other Mineralls were therefore generated within the body of the earth, at the same time it was formed, because that matter was heterogeneous, or consisting of Atoms, and seeds of different natures; and in that the bulk of stones did diversely twel out to the very superficialies. Whereupon mountains came to be made, and consequently valleys, and plains multihave have been between them.

Soon after, about the mountains and the hills, and in the valleys, and in the fields grew up Herbs, shrubs, Trees, almost in the same manner, as feathers, hair, brittle, about the bodies, and members of birds, and beasts.

But as concerning Animals themselves, it is likely that the earth, retaining this new generall seed, brought out of it selfe some little bubbles, in the likeness of little wombs, and shee when they grew mature, (nature so compelling) broke, and put forth young little Creatures. Then the earth itself did abound in a kind of humour, like to milk, with which Aliment living Creatures were nourished.

Which Creatures, were so framed that they had all parts necessary for nutrition, and all offices. For as when Nautilus takes the fields, and the earth beginneth to grow dry, through heat of the Sun, the Husbandman turning up the globe finds severall living Creatures, part begun, part imperfect, and maimed, so that in the same Creature one part liveth, the other is meer earth: in like manner, amongst those first efforts of the earth, besides the living Creatures perfectly formed, there were some produced, wantag hands, feet, mouth, and other parts, without which there is no way to take nourishment, or to live long, or to propagate their kind.

What I say of other living Creatures, I hold also in Man, that some little bubbles and wombs, sticking to the roots of the earth, and warmed by the Sun, first grew bigger, and, by the assistance of nature afforded to infants, sprung from it a communall moisture called milk, and that those thus brought up, and ripened to perfection, propagated Mankind.

Two things I add: One, that it is by no means to be allowed, what some affirm, that at that time were produced Creatures, Sirens, Chimeras, and other Monsters consisting of parts, of different kinds. For how in a Centaure,
Epicurus.

Chapter V.

Here followeth a question, Whether the world be governed by itself, or by the providence of any Deity?

First therefore, we ought not to think, that the Motion of Heaven, or the Summer and Winter, course of the Sun, or the eclipse of the Sun and Moon, or the rising and setting of the Stars, or the like, happen, because there is some Ruler over them, who so disposes, and hath disposed of them, and withall poseseth humility and immortality; for with felicity agree not businesse, sollicitude, anger, and favour; these happen through imbecility, fear, and want of external help.

Neither ought we (as being a troublesome employment, and wholly unserve from a happy state) to think, that the nature which, poffeth felicity is such, as that (knowing and willing) it undergoes these commotions or perturbations of mind, but rather to observe, out of respect unto it, all veneration, and to use some kind of address to it, suggesting such thoughts, as our of which arise no opinions contrary to veneration.

We should rather think, that, when the world was produced, there were made those circumstances of Atoms, involving themselves about one another, that from thence the celestial bodies being framed, there was produced in them this necessity, whereby they are moved in such a manner, and perform such periods; and after the same manner all the rest perform their tasks, in order to the course of things once began.

And why should we not rather think thus? For whether the world is itself a god, as some conceive, What can be less quiet, than unceasingly to roll about the axis, with admirable swiftnesse? But unless it be quiet, nothing is happy. Or whether there be some god in the world, who rules, governs, conserves the courses of the stars, the mutations of seasons, the vicissitude and order of things, who is present in all places, at all times; and how great forever is the variety, or rather innumerable of all particular things, is distracted by too many cares, by taking order that they be done this way, and no other; indeed he is, as before objected, involved in businesse, troublesome and laborious.

Besides, though it were but one ly supposed, that God doth not take care of things, Shall we not find, that all things happen no other wise, than as if there were no providence? for some fall out well, but the most ill, and other wise than they ought. To omit the rest, if Jupiter himself did thunder, or guide the thunder, he ought at least to spare Temples, though it were only not to give occasion of doubting, whether it proceed.
EPICTETUS.

ceed from fortune or divine counsell; that is, all things, in a manner, holding on their course, as it was at first begun.

This also is of no little weight, that they affect a special providence in respect of Men. For (not to repeat what I even now laid, that a happy and immortal nature cannot be profess'd with any anger or favour) but care, that God takes no care of the affairs of men, how can they come to be otherwise than they are? In them there is an equally, or rather greater imbecility, than in other creatures, equal inconveniences, equal ills:

Some of them making women are preferred from shipwreck; how many have made vows, and yet perished? Many pray for children, and obtain them; how many pray for children in vain?

But, to be brief, Why, if God takes care of the affairs of men, is it ill with the good, well with the bad? Truly it is an argument with me, when I see crosses always happen to the good, poverty, labours, exile, loss of friends; on the other side, wicked persons to be happy, to increase in power, to be honoured with titles; That innocence is unsafe, wicked actions go unpunished; That Death exercises his cruelty without observing manners, without order and distinction of years; some arrive at old age, others are snatch'd away in their infancy; others in their full strength, others in the flower of their youth are immutably cut off. In War, rather the best are vanquished and perish. But that which prevails most with me, is, that the most religious persons are afflicted with the greatest ills; but to them, who either wholly neglect the gods, or worship them not religiously, happen either the least misfortunes, or none at all.

Moreover, I think, it may not be ill argued thus: Either God would take away ills and cannot, or he can and will not, or he neither will nor can, or he both will and can. If he would and cannot, he is impotent, and consequently not God; if he can and will not, envious, which is equally contrary to God's nature; if the neither will nor can, he is both envious and impotent, and consequently not God; if he both will and can, which only agrees with God, whence then are the ills? or why does he not take them away?

CHAP. VI.

A Digression, concerning Gami or Demons.

It is all one, whether God takes care of things by Himself, as some will have it, or (as others hold) by Ministers, whom they generally call Gami and Demons; for things happen no other wise, than as if we should suppose no such Ministers; and though it were granted that there are some, yet can they not be such as they reign, that is, of a human form, and having a voice that can reach to us. To omit, since for the most part they are said to be ill and vicious, they cannot be happy and long liv'd, since both much blindness, and a proneness to destruction, perpetually attendst wickedness.

How much were it to be wished, that there were some who might take care of us, and supply what is wanting to our prudence, and to our strength; especially, how much were it to be wished, by such as are Leaders in War, of most pious and honest attempts, that they might confide not only in arms, horses, ships, but also in the assistance of the gods themselves?

And indeed, some are said to appear sometimes to some persons; and why may it not be, that they who affirm Demons to have appeared to them,
EPI CURUS.

them, either lie and reign, or are melancholy, and such, that their dis-temper'd body either strangely tainteth, or diverts their imagination to extraordinary conceits. It is well known, that nothing is more apt to be moved and transformed into any species, (although there be no real ground) than Imagination. For the impression made upon the mind is like that in wax, and the mind of man having within it self that which represents, and that which is represented, there is such a power in it, that, taking even the very least of things seen or heard upon some occasion, it can of itself easily vary and transfigure the species, as is manifested by the commutations of dreams which are made in sleep, from which we perceive, that the imaginative faculty puts on all variety of affections and phantasies; so that it is no wonder, if, where the faculty is unfound, they seem to see Demons or other things, of which they have had any foretaken conceptions.

Moreover, they use to allude divination as an argument, to prove both Providence and the existence of Demons; but I am ashamed at human imbecility, when it fetcheth divinations even out of dreams, as it God, walking from bed to bed, did admonish supine persons, by indirect visions, what shall come to pass, and out of all kinds of portents and prodigies; as if chance were not a sufficient agent for these effects, but we must mix God, not only with the Sun, and with the Moon, and severall other living creatures, but also with all brahs and itone.

But to instance in Oracles only: Many wise may it be evinced, that they are mete impositions of Priests, as may particularly be discovered, for that the Verses which proceed from them are bad, being, for the most part, maimed in the beginning, imperfect in the middle, lame in the close, which could not be, if they came from divine inspiration, since from God nothing can proceed, but what is well and decent.

And I remember, that, when in my younger days I lived at Samos, that Oracle was much cried up, by which (as they reported) Pythiades King of that Island, celebrating the Pythian and Delian Games, sent at the same time to Delus, demanding of Apollo, Whether he should offer sacrifice at the appointed time? Pythius answered, These to thee are the Pythian and the Delian; whereby (said they) it was signified, that those should be his last, for soon after he happen'd to be slain. But how could it be signified by that answer, that these sacrifices should be the last rather than the middle? but that the vulgar sort of men are most commonly led by hear-fay, and are greedy of strange stories.

CHAP. VII.
Of the end or corruption of the World.

That the world shall perish and have an end, is consequent, forasmuch as it was generated and had beginning; for it is necessary, that all compounded things be also dissipated, and resolved into those things of which they were compounded, some by some causes, others by others; but till all from some cause, and at some time or other. Whence it is the more to be admired, that there should be some, who, not only broaching the opinion, that the world was generated, but even in a manner made by hands, thence define, that it shall be ever. For, as I argued before, what coagulation can there be indissoluble? or what is there that hath a beginning, but no end?

Certainly, the world seems like an animal, or plant, as generated, so subject to corruption, as well because, no otherwise than they, it consists Z z z z 2 of
of Atoms, which by reason of the interline motion, wherewith they are incessantly moved, at length must cause a dissolution; as also because there may happen both to them, and the world, some extrinsical cause, which may bring them to destruction: especially, it being known that every thing is produced but one way, but may be destroyed many; as also, because, as there are three Ages in them, youth, middle state, and old age; so the World first began to grow up, (as also after the time of its generation, there came extrinsically from the Univerfe, Atoms which intimated into the pores as it were of the World, and by which Heaven, the Stars, the Aire, the Sea, the Earth, and other things were augmented, the congruous Atoms accommodating themselves to those that were congruous to them;) then, because there ought to have been some end, of growing, it rested in a kind of perfect state; and at last began so to decay, as plainly shows, that it declines towards its last Age.

This is first proved, because as we see, in progress of time, Towers fall, Stones moniter, Temples and Images decay, whereby at last they come to be dissolved; so we may perceive the parts of the World, sensibly to moulder, and wear away; a great part of the Earth goes away into Aire, (not to say anything of those greater concussions, which make us fear sometimes, left the whole should fall, and sinking from under our feet, sink, as it were, into an abyss) the water also is partly exhaled into air, partly so distributed through the earth, that it will not all flow back again: the Aire is continually changed, many things going forth into it, and many produced again out of it. Lastly the fire, (nor only ours, but the Starry fire also, as that which is in the Sunne) sensibly decays by the emanation, and casting forth of light. Wherefore, neither is there any reason, to think, that these bodies of the world will continue ever.

Again, because we see there is a continual flight amongst the bodies of the world themselves, through which sometimes happen conflagrations, sometimes deluges, as it were with equal strength. But, as in wrestling, so is it necessary, that in the world one of the contraries prevails at last, and destroys all things. If any shall demand, which of the two is the more likely to prevail, it may be answered, The Fire, as being the more active, and receiving particular recruits from the Sun, and Heaven; so as at last, it will come to get the upper hand, and the world thereupon perish by conflagration.

Lastly, because there is nothing indissoluble, but either as it is solid, as an Atom, or intaçtile, as vacuum; or hard nothing beyond it, whence either a dissolving cause may come, or whether it felf may go forth, as the Universe. But the world neither is solid, by reason of the vacuum intermix'd; nor intaçtile, by reason of corporeal nature; nor hard nothing without it, by reason of its extremity: whence it follows, that a destruction may happen extrinsically, by bodies inciting to it, and breaking it; but, both extrinsically, and intrinsically, it is capable of being dissolved.

This I add, because the world may perish, nor only by conflagration, or if you will by inundation also, but by many other ways; amongst which the chief is, that, as a living Creature, (to which I already compar'd it) the frame of the soul being unity'd, is dissolved into several parts, and thefe at length are quite dissolved also, either by being dispersed, and turning into air, and the most minute dust, or serving again for the production of some other living Creatures; So the walls, as it were, of the world decaying, and falling, the several pieces of it are dissolved, and goe at length into Atoms, which having gotten into the free space of vacuum, rush downwards in a Tumult, and recommence their first motions; or run forward,
forward, far and long; or soon fall upon other worlds; or meeting with other Atoms, joyne with them to the production of new Worlds.

And though indeed, as a living Creature may be sooner or later dissolved by departure of the soul, so may either of these happen to the world: yet it is more probable, that it will so come to pass, as that in a moment of time, nothing thereof shall remain except Atoms, and a defolate space; for which way forever the gate of death, as it were, shall be first opened, think will all the crowd of matter through to get out.

That the world, as I said, is declining towards its last age, is probable, for that the seeming earth, as I late touched, scarce bringeth forth even little Animals, when as formerly the produced large; and that the not without extreme labour, brings forth corn and fruits, whereas at first she brought them forth of her own accord, in great plenty. Whence it comes, that there are frequent complaints, railing the former ages, and accusing the present, for that they perceive not that it is the course of things, that all things should decay by little and little, and, wearied with long space of age, tend as it were to destruction. I with reason, rather then the thing itself did persuade, that within a short time, we shall see all things shattered in pieces.

**CHAP. VIII.**

**Of Infinite Worlds.**

Moreover, as to the demand, Whether there are, besides this, not one, but many, even infinite: this seems to be the answer, That there are infinite Worlds. For the Atoms being infinite, as we formerly showed, are carried through infinite spaces, and in their several ways, in far distances from this world, and there meeting one another in multitudes, may joine to the production of infinite Worlds. Since the Atoms, being of this nature, that a world may be made up, and consist of them, cannot, by reason of their infinity, be consumed, or exhausted by one, nor any determinate number of Worlds, whether these worlds be supposed, framed after one fashion, or after divers. It is not impossible therefore, but that there may be infinite Worlds.

And indeed it is, as absurd for a single world, to be made in an infinite Universe, as for one care of corn, to sprout up in a vall field, sow'd with many grains; for as in the field, there are many causes, to wit, many seeds apt to grow up, and places to produce them; so in the Universe, besides places, there are causes, not many, but, infinite, namely Atoms, as capable of joyning, as those, of which this World was made up.

Besides, we see not any generall thing, so one, as that it hath nor many like it selfe, in the same kind, (for so men, so beasts, so birds, so fishes are multiplied each under their particular species.) Wherefore, seeing that not only the Sun, the Moon, the Earth, the Sea, and the rest of the parts of the World were generated; but even the whole World itselfe, which consists of them, we must acknowledge, that not only the parts, but the World itselfe, are not single, but many, as to number, and (for the reasons allledged) infinite.

Now there being nothing to hinder, but that some Worlds may be like this of ours, others unlike it, for there may be equal, there may be greater, there may be lesser; there may be, that have the same parts, disposed in the same order; there may be, that have different parts, or disposed in a different order; there may be, that have the same figure; there may be, that have a different; (for though Atoms cannot have infinite variety of figures, having a determinate space in their superficies, yet may they be of more
EPICURUS.

more figures than we can number, as Round, Oval, Pyramidal, &c., although I say, there be no repugnance in this, yet all these diversities are only certain kinds of conditions, which vary the common quality, and nature of the World.

But it seems, that each of the other Worlds, as this of ours, and every compound which is made in that vast vacuity, and hath any resemblance with those things which fall under our observation, is generated apart, and after a fashion peculiar to itself, by certain convolutions, and inter-textures of Atoms proper to it; and this, whether it be generated in the intermundia, (so we term the interval, included betwixt two or more Worlds, not far distant from one another) or in a multivacuous place, (that is, in which though there be great and little bodies, yet vacuities take up the greater share of it) or Lastly, in a great unmixed, and pure vacuum, though not as some (who all that a vacuum) describe it.

For we are to understand, contrary to them, that there floweth together, if not from infinite, as least from one, or more Worlds, or intermundia, some apt feeds, that is, a congruous heap of Atoms, or little bodies, which are by degrees mutually adopted here and there, and variously formed, and change place diversely, according as it happens, and withal receiveth some same rigorous as it were accretions; until a bulk, consisting of the whole assembly of all these, be made up, and gain a confidency, as much as the principles, of which it was made, can well bear.

For it is not sufficient, for the generation of a World, that a great heap of Atoms be thrown together in a Vacuum, and, by the accession of others, grow bigger, till it roule into another vacuum: in the same manner, as a heap of Snow, being tumbled upon snow, gathers still more, and growes bigger, as was the opinion of a certain Philosopher, holding a necessity of such a method: since this is repugnant to our daily experience. For a heap, whose innermost kernel, as it were, is solid, and its outermost shell solid also, can neither be rolled up and down, nor increased, if the part intercepted betwixt the kernel and the shell, be fluid, as in the world it is.

Finally, that the other worlds also are, because generated, subject to corruption, is too manifest, to be mentioned; that some may be dissolved sooner, others later, some by some causes, others by others, is a thing necessarily consequent to the peculiar diversities of every one.

SECT. III.

Of Inferior Terrestrial things.

But that (omitting the rest) we may speak more particularly of this our world, since all things in it, are either contained within the compass of the Earth, or exceed not the height of the ground, or are placed on high, that is raised above the earth's superficies, and therefore, may generically be divided into the low, or terrestrial part of things, and those which are sublun, celestial, or aerial; let us then so order our discourse, as to speak first of the former, in regard, that as they are nearer, and more familiar to us; so we may thence ascend, by orderly degrees to discourse, and define, what we should most rationally conjecture of the latter, which are more remote from us, and least visible to us.

In the first place, we are to take a general view of the body of the earth, next of the water, a considerable part of this Malle, and mingled diversly with the earth, partly in its superficies, partly in its very bowells; afterwards
wards of these other bodies, with which we see that whole mass replenished, whether inanimate, as minerals, stones, and plants; or animates, usually called animals.

CHAP. I.

Of the Earth situate in the middle of the World.

First then, as to the Earth, we have already said, how it was framed together with the other parts of the world; for it had been to no purpose to form it first, beyond the utmost surface of the world, and then convey it into the world already framed, since it was sufficient for that effect, that there were such seeds found in the univitall mass, of which it was, with the other parts of the world, might be generated; in the same manner as it would be unnecessary, that living creatures should first be separated from, and carried beyond this infinity of things, and beformed there, that, being now perfected, they might be brought thence into this our region. Nor was it needful that they should first be exactly brought in heaven, and thence transmitted to our earth, seeing no man can know why there must needs be found such seeds there, of which animals, plants, and other visible compounds are made up, and could as well be found here; or whence heaven hath this privilege, of having sufficient conveniences for their generation and nutrition, more then our earth.

It is already said, that the Earth, when the Heaven, and other higher bodies did fly, as it were, upwards, settled into the middle of the world, and there rested as in the lowest place; we add now, that as it is the middle part of the world, towards which all heavy things fall, it follows not, that there is also a middle part of it, called the Center, towards which all things that ponderate are directed in a straight line; for all heavy things fall in parallel motions, without any endeavours to meet in any angle, thence being, as in the Universe, so also in our world, one region above, from which all heavy things come, and one below towards which they tend.

Whence, as they are not to be approved of, who say, there are Antipodes, or men so situated in a strange region of the earth, that they walk with their feet diametrically opposite to ours, in like manner as we see the images of men or other things, either stand or go with their heads downwards under the water; for these Philosophers endeavour to maintain, contrary to the laws of nature, and of heavy things, that men and other terrestrial bodies placed there tend upwards or towards the earth; and that it is equally impossible they should fall down from the earth to the inferior places of the sky, as that bodies amidst us here should not impell'd mount up to heaven. However, upon another account they speak consequentially to their hypothesis, that 'tis day with the antipodes when 'tis night with us, and night with them when 'tis our day.

The earth then is framed indeed after a circular figure, but yet as a dish or a drum is, not like a sphere or bowl; for this surface of it which we inhabit, and which indeed is only habitable, is flat or plain, and not globous, and such as all heavy things are carried to it in a straight line, or perpendicularly, as was formerly declared.

This being so, here ariseth a great difficulty, how it can then be that it should stand steady, and not fall downwards into that region, into which the Antipodes would slide; but, therefore why the earth falls not, is, because it rests upon the air, as we say, so is it in nature; nor doth it any more move but in the air than animals, which are of like nature with the earth, but chosen the earth.
Nor is it hard to conceive, that in the air beneath there is a power to sustain the earth, because the air and the earth, by the general constitution of the world, are things not of different extractions, but all depend one another by a certain affinity; whence, as being parts of the same whole, one cannot but be subjected to the other, but are held by a mutual embrace, as if they had not gravity at all, especially since this earth, however in this upper part of it more compacted and heavy, may, descending lower, be, by degrees, less solid, and so less weighty, till at length, in its lowest part of all, it approach very near the nature of the air which supports it.

And for this reason I said, that the earth was not made in some place out of the world, and thence brought into it, because then it would have pressed the air with its weight, as our bodies are sensible of the least weight, if imposed from without; whereas neither the head nor other parts are heavy to one another, by reason that they are agreeable to one another in nature, and knit to one another by the common law of the same whole.

And that it seem not incredible, a thing so tenuous as air, should be able to uphold so gross a bulk, do but consider how subtle a thing the soul or animal spirit is, and yet how gross and weighty a bulk of the body it upholds and governs, and that only by this means, because it is a thing joined to it, and applied united to it, as the air is to the earth.

But we must not therefore conceive the Earth to be animable, much lesse a goddess, for we have formerly proved the contrary; the earth indeed many times brings forth several living creatures, yet not as being her self animable, but because, containing various atoms, and divers seeds of things, the producer many things many ways; of which animates being are formed. Some there are who call the earth, the great mother of the gods, and Barcynthia. That to the earth these names be attributed, if it be lawful to make use of divine things thereby to signify natural things, may perhaps seem tolerable; but to believe that there is a divinity in the earth, is no way allowable.

CHAP. II.

Of Earth-quakes, and the flames of Etna.

It seems wonderful, how it comes to pass, that the Earth is sometimes shaken and trembles; but this is an effect which may happen from divers causes, supposing that the Earth, as I see no reason to doubt, is in all parts alike, and that below as well as above; it hath caverns, breaches, and rivers, rolling great billowes, vast flames, &c.

For the water may move the earth, if it hath been worn away some parts, which being made hollow, it can no longer be held up, as it was whilst they were entire; or, if some wind drive upon channels, and takes, or standing-waters within the earth, and the [bellow] impulsion either shake the earth from thence, or the agitation of the wind increasing with its own motion, and stirring up it, is felt carried from the bottom to the top, so a vessel cannot stand fast, unless the water which hath been troubled in it give over moving.

Likewise the earth may receive a shock, by some part thereof suddenly falling down, and thereby be moved, supposing that some of its parts are upheld, as it were, with columns and pillars, which decaying and sinking, the weight that is laid on them quakes: For we see whole houses shake, by reason of the jumbling and succession of Carres and Chairs.
EPICURUS.

All the very wind it selfe may move the earth, either if the earth (its interior and lower parts, being full of crannies and chinks) be shaken by some wind variouly disposed, and falling into those hollow caverns, and so tremble, in such manner, as nut limbs, by intimation of cold, tremble, and are moved, whether we will or no; Or, if the wind getting in at the top, and driving downwards, the earth is driven upwards, by the air under it; which is somewhat grosse and watery, (for it sustains the earth) and shaken as it were from beneath, leaps up, which happens to all things: not only to those which are forc’d against any thing, hard or firme; or so stretched or bent, that being prest upon, it recoiles; but also against a fluid thing, if it be able to strike it back, as when Wood is plung’d into water.

The force of this wind, if we conceive it turned into fire, and resembling thunder, may be carried on with a great destruction of all things, that oppose its passage. For as lightning, engender’d in a cloud, breaks thorough it, and shakes the Air with wonderful violence so in like manner, may the fire generated within the Caverns of the earth, of a coacervate and exagitated wind, break thorough it, and make it tremble.

Now as there appears not any cause, more likely then that which is taken from the wind, and chiefly in this last manner, either by distributing it self into many severall cavities of the earth; or causeth a trembling only, and (as if there were a cranification through the looser earth) the earth is not so broken thorough, as that there is a breach made, or fomerling overthrown, or turn’d awry; or else by its being heaped up together in greater Caverns, there may follow such a fucceffion and impulsion, as may heave up, and cleave under the Earth, and make grofs big enough to entombe whole Cities, as in divers places it hath often happen’d.

What I say concerning the force of the wind, which being turned into fire, breaks thorough and shakes the earth, may serve to make us understand, that the eruptions of fire which often happen in the same places, as at Erina, proceed from the same cause.

For this Mountain is all hollow within, and so underpropp’d with vaults of flint, that the wind may in them, groweth hot, and being enkindled, forceth its way thorough the breaches which it finds above, and eats into the sides of those Caverns, whence (together with flame and smoke) it calls up sparkles and pumices.

And the better to bring this to passe, the Sea lies at the foot of the Mountain, which rolling its waves to and from the shore, unres which the Caverns of the Hill extend, thrusts in, and drives forward the ait, whereby, the fire is augmented, and cherish’d, as with the blowing of bellowes.

CHAP. III.

Of the Sea, Rivers, Fountains, and the over-flowing of Nilus.

As for those waters which are on the Earth, (for of those which are generated on high, and thence fall down in rain, we shall speak more opportunely hereafter, first there is a vast body of them, which we call the Sea; for besides those in-land Seas which wash our shores, there is also an extern Sea, or Ocean, which flowing about all the habitable earth, is believed by some, to be so immediately placed under the Arch of Heaven, that the Sun and other Stars rise from it, and set in it, as we shall have occasion to shew else-where.
And indeed, the vastness of the Sea being such, it may be esteemed not the most inconsiderable reason, why the Sea seems not to be increased by the flowing of so many Rivers into it; for all the Rivers are hardly like a drop, compared to so immense a body. And withall the Sun, who with his beams, so soon dries wet garments; although he suck not up much moisture from every place, yet from so large a compass, cannot but take away a great deal. Not to mention, how much the winds, which in one night many times dry up the waies, and harden the dirt, may in sweeping along the Sea, confume of it.

But, the chiefest reason seems to be this. The earth being a rare body, and easily penetrat'd, and withall, washed on all sides by the Sea, the waters, as well as they are poured from the earth into the Sea, so must they also foke down from the Sea into the earth, that they may rise up in springs, and flow again.

Neither need it trouble us, that the water of the Sea is salt; and the waters of springs, and rivers fresh; because the water passing out of the Sea into the earth, is strained in such manner, that it purges off the little bodies of salt, and returns quite strip'd of them. For, the body of the Sea, being commix'd of salt, and of water; for as much, as the feeds of salt are more hook'd, and those of water more smooth, therefore, these glide easily away, whilst the others cannot but be entangled, and are all along left behind.

Hence appeareth the cause, (which seemeth the principal) of the perpetual flowing of Springs: where they rise up, there may indeed be some great quantity of water gather'd together, which may serve for supply; but upon another account, they may be supple'd, for as much, as there is something continually flowing, from beneath into them. And though these subterraneous rivolts, (as it were) might be made up of the several feeds, which are dispers'd through the earth, yet must these feeds be supplied by the Sea, which foaks into the earth.

Whence it comes to passe, as was said, that those rivolts dispersing themselves into lesser streams, and running down into lower hollow receptacles, and meeting there, at last, join together in great Channells, and make large Rivers, which continually renew, and supply the immense Sea.

But since, there is not any River more wonderfull then Nilo's, for that every summer, it over-floweth and watereth Egypt, we must not therefore, omit to say, that this may happen by reason of the Eetian winds, which at that season, blowing towards Egypt, raise up the Sea to the mouths of Nile, and drive up lands this her; so as Nile cannot but stop, and swell, and rising above its Channel, over-flow the plaine which lies beneath.

Perhaps also, it happens, for that the Eetian winds blowing from the North, carry the Clouds into the South beyond Egypt, which meeting at some very high Mountains, are there crowded together, and squeeze forth rain, by which Nile is increased.

It may happen also, that the exceeding high Mountains of Ethiopia, may be cover'd with Snow, which being disolv'd by the Sun's excessive heat, fills the Channel of Nile.
EPICURUS.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Properties of some Waters, and of Ice.

But, that we may feel besides some properties of water, which seem wonderfully to the vulgar, I omit at present that property, which is of kin to those we last mentioned, that although the water so easily dissolves salt, and admits to be imbued by it, yet there are some sweet fountains which spring out of the midst of the sea. For this plainly happens, that the water bursting forth from the bottom of the sea, rises up with so great vehemency, that it drives away on all sides the sea-water, and neither suffers it nor its salt to be mingled with it.

Wonderfull is that fountain in Ephesus, over which flax or a taper is no sooner put, but it is presently set on fire and flames. It seems, that from the earth which is beneath it, so many feeds of heat are breathed forth, as that though they are not able to heat the water in their passage through it, yet as soon as ever they get out of it into the open air, running into the flax and tapers, they associate themselves with the fiery feeds, wherewith such things abound, and break forth into flame; in the same manner as when putting flame to a candle newly extinguish'd, you may see it light before the flame touches it.

But what shall we say of that fountain, which is reported to be at the temple of Jupiter Hammon, cold in the day time, and hot in the night? Certainly, the earth about this fountain, though it be looser than other earth, yet being compressed by the cold of night, it strikes out, or squeezerth forth, and transmits into the water many feeds of fire which it contains, whereby the water grows hot; but being loosed by the heat of day, it fucks back again, as it were, the same feeds, whereby the water becomes therewith cold.

It may likewise come to passe, that the water which is made hot through the same feeds, which are repelled in the night-time by reason of the cold aire, may become cold in the day-time, the beams of the Sun passing over through the water, that they afford to those feeds a free vent into the air: just as ice is dissolved by the same piercing and rarifying beams; and though the effects are contrary, yet may they proceed from the same cause, as the melting of wax, and hardening of clay.

'Tis from the same cause, that water in wells is hot in the winter, and cold in the summer. For in summer, the earth is rarify'd by heat, and exhaleth the feeds of heat which are in her, by which means the water which is kept close within her, becomes colder. But in winter, the earth is compressed and condens'd with cold; whence, if she hath any heat, she squeezereth it forth into the wells.

These put me in mind to speak of Ice, by which the water, forgetting, as it were, its natural fluidity, grows so solid and hard. Here we must conceive, that those bodies only are capable of being made solid, which are made up of parts or little bodies, that have plain surfaces; because, by exclusion of vacuity, the parts cohere left with one another; whereas if those little bodies be round, or joyned to round, or intermingled with plain, there is a vacuum contained round about them, into which the round may roll, and the plain bend; whence followeth its so much and (unless there be some hooks that stay it) flexibility.

Ice, therefore, is made, either when the round little bodies which cause heat are thrust out of the water, and the plain which are in the same water (part whereof are acute-angled, part obtuse-angled) are thrust up close
close together; or when those little bodies are brought thither from
without, (and that for the most part from the air,) when it is made cold
by them) which being closely pressed, and thrusting out all the round that
they meet, bring solidity into the water.

CHAP. V.
Of things Terrestrial Inanimate.

Our method leading us to speak of those things which are generated
of earth and water, it is in the first place manifest, that those
things are either animate or inanimate. Animates are those which
have sense, and are vulgarly called Animals; inanimate things are those
which want sense, whence under this name are comprehended all those,
to which the name of Animal is not applied.

Of this sort are, first, certain moist things which are grown consisten
t, as we see salt, sulphur, and ill-freted biremen generated in the earth.
Now these are the chief cause, not only of subterraneous heat, and igni
vomous eruptions, (as that of Seima, already spoken of,) but also of
peliferous exhalations, which being carried on high, cause Avernum
lakes and diseases. Wherefore we will speak more amply of these, when we
meet of Meteors. Concerning Amber, which attracts straws, we shall
say something hereafter.

Of this sort also are Metals, which were first found out upon occa
sion of some woods, being burnt by lightning, or some other fire, which
being quite burnt up, the metals were melted and stuck to the roots, and
thereupon dazzled the eye with their splendour, and were observed to retain
the same figure with the chinks in which they flowed. Whence men con
jectured, that the same metals being melted by the force of fire, might
be formed into any figure, even, acute or pointed; and by reason of the fo
lidity they had acquired, might be made fit to nail, or to strike, or for
other uses.

Moreover, not only Lead, but also Gold and Silver lay neglected, as
being solid metals commodious for those uses, and Brass only was in
esteem, of which were made darts, swords, axes, plough-shares, and the
like; until Iron came to be found out; of which, then, they chose rather
to make these things, by reason it was of greater hardness.

Of this sort also are Stones, wherein as many are daily generated, many
broke off from rocks, but the main bodies of rocks and stones were made
from the beginning; for by this means, as we said formerly, mountains
were first occasion’d, and sometimes we find, that the earth encloseth
her bowels, caves, rocks, and broken stones, as well as rivers, chann
nels, and winds.

Now as Stones are ordinarily discerned by their hardnesse and solidity,
sio in the first rank, as it were, may be reckoned Adams, not dammify’d
by blows, (for arrayl of them being made upon anvils, they spit the
iron) and huge Flints, out of which, by the stroke of iron, fire Flyeth, for
they contain seeds of fire close hidden in their veins; neither doth the
cold force of the iron hinder, but that being fitted up by its stroke, they
meet together in one body or spark.

Lastly, of the inanimate kind are Plants, that is, herbs and trees; for the
soul is not without sense. And we see, that of animate beings, which
from thence are called animals and living creatures, some have a moving
and desiderative soul, others a diffusive; but plants neither have sense,
nor either of those souls, and therefore cannot be called animate things.

Something
Something indeed they have common with living creatures, that is, nutrition, augmentation, generation; but they perform these things by the impulse of nature, not by the direction of a soul, and therefore are only analogically, or for resemblance-take, said to live and die as animals. Whence also whatsoever may be said of them, may be understood by parity, and, in some proportion, by those things which shall be said of living creatures.

I would add, that the original of sowing and grafting was, upon the observation men took, that berries and acorns shedding and falling to the ground, sprung up again, and begot new plants, like those of which I lost they themselves were. But it is enough to have hinted this.

CHAP. VI.
Of the Loadstone in particular.

But we must infift a little longer upon a thing, inanimate indeed, yet very admirable; I mean, the Herculane Stone, which we call also Magnet; for that it was first found in Magnesia. It is much wondered at by reason of its singular power (or virtue) in attracting Iron.

To explicate this power, we must suppose three or four Principles; one is, That there is a continual effusion of little bodies out of all things; as, out of coloured and lucid bodies, flow such as belong to colour and light; from hot and cold bodies, such as belong to heat and cold; from odorous bodies, such as belong to smell; and so of the rest.

A second is, that there is no bodie so solid, but hath little vacuities contained within it, as is manifest by all bodies, through which pitheth moisture, or (sweet) light, sound, heat, or cold.

The third, That these effluent little bodies are not alone adaptable to all things. The Sun, by emisision of his beams, hardens clay, melts snow; Fire resolves metal, contracts leather; Water makes hot iron harder, leather softer; the Olive tree is better to the taste of man pleasing to goats; Marjoram is sweeter to the smell of man, hateful to swine, &c.

The fourth, That the little vacuities are not of the same compasse in all things, wherefore neither can the same be accommodated to all little bodies. This is manifest from the contextsures of the fences, for the little bodies which affect these move not thole, or thole which affect some one way, affect others another; as also from the contextsures of all things else, for what will penetrate one, will not penetrate another.

From this it is understood, that the Load-stone may attract Iron (and Amber Straw) upon a double account. For first, we may imagine the atoms that flow out of the stone so to suit with those which flow out of the Iron, that they easily knit together; wherefore being dafted on both sides on the bodies of the Iron and the Stone; and bounding back into the middle, they entangle with one another; and draw the Iron along with them.

But forasmuch as we see, that the Iron which is attracted by the Stone, is it self able to attract other Iron; whether shall we say, that some of the particles flowing out of the Stone, hitting against the Iron, bound back, and there are they which catch hold of the Iron. Others insinuating into it, pate with all swiftnesse through the empty pores, and being dafted against the Iron that is next, into which they could not all enter, although they had penetrated it; from thence leaping back to the first Iron, they made other complications like the former; and if any happened to penetrate farther, they likewise might attract another Iron, and that another, upon the same ground,
Moreover, it may be conceived in this manner, that there flow certain little bodies, as well out of the Magnet, as out of the Iron, but more and stronger out of the Magnet; whereby it comes to pass, that the air is driven away much farther from about the Magnet, than from about the Iron, whereupon there are many more little vacuities made about it than about the Iron. And because the Iron is placed within the compasse of the dispelled aire, there is much vacuum taken up between it and the Magnet. Whence it happens, that the little bodies leap forward more freely, to be carried into that place, and thereupon run towards the Magnet; but they cannot go thicker in a great and extraordinary company, without enticing along the things that cohere with them, and so the whole mass, consisting of such coherent things, goes along with them.

It may also be said, that the motion of the Iron is assisted by the aire, through its continual motion and agitation. And that first from the outward aire, which continually pressing, and pressing more vehemently where it most abounds, cannot but drive the Iron into that part where there is leffe, or which is more vacuous, as towards the Magnet. Next from the inward, which in the same manner continually agitating, moving, and driving, cannot but give it a motion into that part, where there is greatest vacuity.

CHAP. VII.
Of the generation of Animals.

We come now to speak of Animals, which are of so different natures, some walking, others flying, others swimming, others creeping; some being greater, some lesser; some more perfect, some less perfect (even we our selves also being Animals) and yet withall till of one nature, that nature discovers an admirable power in the composition of them.

For since nature is, as it were, instructed by the things themselves, and from their orderly procedure, and compelled by a kind of necessity, or by the concatenation of motions, to perform these so many and so different effects, which we call the works of Nature; this especially appears in Animals, because the concatenation of motions shows it fell to be artificial, chiefly in them, although proceeding from a substance utterly void of reason.

And although the atoms themselves be not endued with reason, nor their motion governed by a rational conduct, yet the nature of every living creature in the beginning of the world grew to be such, that according to the temperature of those motions, which the atoms then had, other motions still and others followed, which being caused after the same manner, still produced their like. By which means those motions, which in the beginning were meere casual, in process of time became artificial, and succeeded after a constant and determinate order.

But to discourse more fully hereupon, Divers kinds of Animals being produced in the beginning of the world, it came to pass first, by their receiving congruous aliment, that those atoms which are adaptable to one another, were attracted and intangled by their fellow-atoms, which were already in the Animal, (those which were not adaptable being cut off) so that a peculiar nature to every one of them, viz., such a compound of such atoms grows up first, and at length becomes confirmed.

Next, that by the perpetuall motion of atoms, and their intrinsecall ebullition, some of them being till thrust out of their places, and running
EPICURUS.

ning into the genital parts, meet there from all places, and, there being a distinction of Sexes, after murrall appitition and coition, are received in the womb.

After this, that the Atoms, or seminal bodies compounded of them, and flowing from all parts, (whence therefore, the seed may be conceived as something incorporeal, not in rigour indeed, because only vacuum is truly such, but in the most familiar sense of the word, by which we term any thing incorporeal, which easily penetrates through the most solid bodies) that the Atoms I say, or those seminal little bodies, which thus flowed from all parts, did therefore, (this motion continuing) withdraw them from the tumult of others, and, like Atoms drawing their like, therefore those that come from the head, would betake themselves to one place; those from the breasts, into the next place; and those which come from every other part, each rank themselves in their distinct situations; and so at length, a little Animal is formed like that, whence the seed was taken.

Moreover, that this little Animal is nourished, and increafeth by the attraction of like Atoms, or little bodies meeting together in the womb; until the womb being wearied, and no longer fit to nourish them, slackens its motions, or rather opens the door, and gives them leave to go out.

Further, that this Animal being after the same manner, fully grown up, and the continual agitation of the Atoms, pursuing one another, not ceasing, it begreeth another, like thing, and that other consequently another.

At length, that nature being by little and little accustomed hereto, leanteth, as it were, fo to propagate Animals like in their kinds, as that from the motion, and perpetual series of Atoms, it derives a necessity of operating continually in this manner.

Thus much for the generation of those Animals, which are made by propagation; as for those, which we sometimes see produced otherwise, they may be generated after the same manner, as all things at first were; whether some seeds of them were remaining, formed from the very beginning; or whether daily formed, either within, or without, the Animals themselves; and if within, then thrust out, (as in the generation of worms and flies, leaving behind them some remainders, either in the earth, or else-where; of which, other Animals, of the same kinds, are begotten.

What I said of the defluxion of seed, I meant not only, on the parts of the Male, but of the Female also, seeing that the likewise emiteth, having pariall or cuticles, though placed in a contrary way, and therefore, is the definos of coition.

And this indeed, seems necessary to be granted, towards, giving the reason, why a Male or Female is formed; for nothing can be alledged more proper then this, that whereas, the young one consists of the seeds, both of its fire and dam, if that of the fire predominates, it proves Male, if that of the dam, Female.

Hence also, may be given a cause of the resemblance which it hath, to either, or both its parents: for if the Female with a sudden force attacks, and snatcheth away the seed of the Male, then the young one becometh like the dam; if both alike, it becometh like both, but mixtly.

If you demand, why children are sometimes like their Grand-fathers, or great-Grand-fathers, the reason seems to be this; the seed is made up of many little bulks, which are not always, all of them dissolved into Atoms, or neerest to Atoms, in the first, or next generations, but at length in some one of the following generations, they unfold themselves in such manner as that, what they might have done in the immediate, they exhibit only in the remote.
EPICURUS.

But whence comes barrenness? From the Seed's being either thinner when it ought, so as it cannot fallen on the place; or thicker, so as it cannot easily be commixed; for there is requisite, a due proportion between the seeds of the Male, and of the Female; whence it happens, that many times, the same Man or Woman, who are incapable of having Children by one, may yet have them by another. I omit other reasons, as from the Aliment, since it is manifest, that Aliment by which seed is increased differs from that, whereby it is renewed, and waited.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the use of parts in Animals.

Hence follows, that the parts of Animals were not from the very beginning, of things framed, after the fashion they have now, for their ends and uses, whereto we see them now serve, (for there was no cause to foresee this end, nor anything precedent to which that cause attending, and thence taking a conjectural aim, might designe any such fashion) but because it happened, that the parts were made, and did exist as we now see them; therefore they came to be applied to these uses, rather then to others, and being first made, themselves became afterwards the occasion of their own usefulness, and instructed the knowledge of it, into the minds of the users.

The eyes therefore, were not made to see, nor the ears to hear, nor the tongue to speak, nor the hands to work, nor the feet to go, a for these members were made before there was Seeing, Hearing, Speaking, Working, Going; but these became their functions, after they had been made.

For the soul being formed together with, and within the body, and moreover being capable of sense, the eye happened to be made of such a contexture, that the soul being applied unto it, could not but produce the sensitive act of seeing; and the ear of such, as that being joynd to it, it could not but produce hearing; and there being within the body, made together with it, an Animal spirit capable to impell and move, the tongue happened to be framed after such a contexture, as that this spirit coming to it, could not but move it, and break the aire, (which at the same time is breathed forth) into words. In like manner, the hands, the feet, and the rest of the Limbs, were so fashioned, as that this spirit rustling into them, could not but give this motion to one, and that to the other.

As for the Tendons, which are plainly the organs, by which the parts are stir'd, it is evident, that the actions are not strong, because these are big; nor remisse, because they are small; but the actions are such or such, according to the occasions of frequent, or seldom using them: But the bigness of the tendons, follows the quantity of the motion, so that, those which are exercised are in good plight, and grow conveniently bigger, those which lie idle, thrive nor, but wait away.

Wherefore, the Tendons were not so formed by nature, as if it were better, that they should be strong and big, for the discharge of vehement functions; weak and slender, for the weaker, (for we see even Apes have fingers fashioned like ours) but, as was said before, those which are exercised, must of necessity be big, because they are well nourished, and those which are not exercised, small, because they are lefe nourished.

For confirmation hereof, may be allledged, that moist parts are sometimes directed to those uses, for which no man will say they were design'd; and this, when either necessity or occasion, or some conjecture taken elsewhere,
EPICURUS.

where laies them open to us, as men would not so much as dream of fighting with weapmons, if they had not first fought with their hands; nor of holding shields before them, if they had not first hit. It wounds that were to be avoided; nor of making soft beds, if they had not first slept on the ground; nor of making up, if they had not drunk water first out of their hands; nor of making houses, if they had not been acquainted with the use of caves; and so of the rest.

CHAP. IX.
Of the Soul, the intrinsically form of Animals.

Let us now come to the Soul, by which Animals are, and from it have their denomination. In the first place, we must conceive it to be corporeal, from most tenebrous or subtle bodies, made up of most subtle particles. Doubtless, we who affirm it is incorporeal, besides that they abuse the word, play the foists exceeding f; for, ex epit, if it were such, it could neither act nor suffer. It could not act, for it could not touch any thing; it could not suffer, for it could not be touched by any thing, but would be as a mere vacuum, which, as I said before, is such, that it can neither act nor suffer any thing, but only affords a free motion to bodies passing through it.

Now that the soul acts and suffers something, is manifestly declared by those things, which happen without senses and affections, as also by the motions wherein it impels the members; and, from within, governeth the whole Animal, turneth it about, transports it with dreams, and, in general, by its union and consent, to mix in one compound with this groffer matter, which usually, upon this occasion, is more particularly termed the body.

I say, it is a most tenebrous and subtle body, for that it is made up of most tenebrous or most subtle little bodies; which, as they are for the most parts, exceeding small, are the very v, and, otherwise they could not permeate, and unite intrinsically with the whole body, and with all its parts, as with veines, nerves, entwists, and the cell. Which is manifest even from hence, for that when the soul goeth out of the body, we finde not that any thing is taken off from the whole, neither as to its figure nor weight; nor like Wine, when its flower or spirit is gone; or like Alchymists, that hath lost its scent; for the wine and unguent retain the same quantity, as if nothing of them were perished. So that the Soul, if you should imagine her to be rolled up together, might be contained almost in a point, or the very least of places.

Nevertheless, though it be of such a subtle constitution, yet it is mixed and compounded of four several natures; for we are to conceive it a thing, made up and contemplatered of something hard, something aerial, something inflammable, and a fourth which hath no name; by means whereof, it is endued with a sensitive faculty.

The reason is this, because when a thin breath departeth out of the body of a dying person, this breath is mixed with heat, and heat arreates aire, therefore no heat without aire. Thus we have three of these things which make up the Soul; and because there is none of these three from which sensitive motions can be derived, we must therefore admit a fourth, though without a name, whereunto the sensitive faculty may be attributed.

This may be confirmed from hence, for that there is a certain breath or gale, as it were, and wind, which is cause of the body's motion; aire, of its reit; something hot, cause of the heat that is in it; there must BV BBBBB likewise
EPICURUS,

likewise be some fourth thing, the cause of its sense.

Now the necessity of this fourth being manifester, upon another account, Anger, by which the heart boils, and fervour sparkles in the eyes, convinced, that there is heat in it; fear, exciting honour throughout the limbs, argues a cold or copious breath or wind; and the calm state of the breath, and serenity of the countenance, demonstrates there is air.

Whence it comes to passe, that those animals in which heat is predominant, are angry, as Lions; those in which a cold breath, are timorous, as Harts; those in which an aerial portion, are more quiet, and, as it were, of a middle condition between Lions and Harts, as Oxen. The same difference is also to be observ'd amongst Men.

Lately, although the Soul be a mixt and compounded thing, and this fourth nameless thing, or sensible faculty, be the chief of its parts, (it being, in a manner, the soul of the soul, for from it the soul hath that it is a soul, and it distinguishes animals from other things, as their intrinsic form, and essential difference) nevertheless these parts are so perfectly tempered, that of them is made one substance, and that most subtle and most coherent; neither, as long as the soul is in the body, can those four be separated from one another, any more than odor, heat, or vapor, which are natural to any inward part of the body, can be separated from it.

Now this substance, being contained in the body, and coherent, as it were, with it, is, in a manner, upheld by it, and is likewise the cause of all the faculties, passions, and motions in the body, and mutually containeth the body, and governeth it, and is moreover the cause of its health and preservation, and can no more be severed from the body, without the dissolution thereof, then scent can be divided from frankincense, without destruction of its nature.

I shall not need to take notice, that one of the Natural Philosophers seems, without any reason, to conceive, that there are as many parts of the soul, as of the body, which are mutually applied to one another. For the substance of the soul being so subtle, and the bulk of the body so gross, doubtless its principles must be more subtle, and fewest then those of the body; so that every one of these cohere not with another, but each of them to little bulks and heaps, as it were, that consists of a greater number. Whence it comes to passe, that sometimes we feel not when dust, or a garl lights upon the body, nor a milt in the night, nor the spiders thred, nor feathers, nor thistle-down, or the like, when we meet with them: it being requisite, that more of the little bodies, which are mingled with the parts of the soul, be filtered up, before they can feel any thing that toucheth or striketh them.

We must further observe, that there is some internal part of the body of such a temperatur, as that where the soul adheres to it, it receives an extraordinary perfection. This perfection is the Mind, the Intellest, or that which we call the rational part of the soul; because (the other part dissipated through the whole body being irrational,) this only discourses.

Now for (much as the irrational part is two-fold, Sense, and Affection or Appetite, and the Intellest is between both,) for it hath the Sense going before it to judge of things, and the Appetite coming after it, that by its own judgment it may direct it. We shall therefore, being to speak of each, begin with the Sense.
EPICURUS.

CHAP. X.

Of Sense in general, which is the Soul (as it were) of the Soul.

To speak therefore first of Sense in general: we must observe, that the soul possesses it in such a manner, as that both to have it, and to use it, it requires the body, as being the thing wherein it is contained, and with which it operates. Now the body affording this to the soul, Latr. viz., that it hath a principle of sensation, and is able to use it, becometh itself also a part of this effect, which dependeth upon that principle; (that is to say, it feeleth or perceiveth) but not of all things that belong thither, as of tenacity, and the like.

Wherefore it is not to be wondered at, that the body, when the soul is bid departed, remaineth void of sense; for it did not of itself possess this faculty, but only made it ready for the soul, which was congenial with it; which soul, by means of the senses so fitted in the body, exercising, by a peculiar motion of hers, the act of sensation, gave sense, not only to itself, but to the body also, by reason of their neighbour woods, cobwebs, or union with one another.

Thus it comes to passe, that not the soul alone, nor the body alone, perceive or feel, but rather both together; and though the principle of sensation be in the soul, yet who ever holds, that the body doth not perceive or feel together with the soul, and believeth, that the soul intermingled with the whole body, is able of her self to perform this motion of sensation, he oppugn a thing most manifest.

And they who say, (as some do) that the eyes see not any thing, but Lucet, it is the soul only that seeth through them, as through open doors, observe not, that if the eyes were like doors, we might see things much better if our eyes were out, as if the doors were taken away.

Now that which here be us the greatest difficulty being this, How it comes to passe, that a thing sensible, or capable of sense, may be generated of principles that are wholly inintensive, or void of sense; we are to take notice, that this is to be ascribed to some necessity and peculiar magnitudes, figure, motion, position, and order of those principles, as was before declared when we treated of Qualities, for the faculty of Sense is one of the qualities; which that it appear where it was not, requisite, that there be some addition, deduction, transposition and, in a word, a new contexture, able to do that which the former could not.

Yet we must not therefore believe, that stones, wood, clods of earth, and such like compounds, perceive or feel; for, as other qualities, so this also, is not begotten of every mixture, or of the mixture of any kind of things, but it is wholly requisite, that the principles he endowed with such a bigness, such figure, motions, orders, and the like accidents; whence it comes to passe, that even clods of earth, wood, and the like, when purged by rain, and heated by the Sun, the position and order of their parts being changed, turn into worms and other sensitive things. This may be understood from the several ailments, which being applied to the bodies of living creatures, and variously altered, do, in like manner, of insensitive become sentient; as wood applied to fire, of not-burning becometh burning.

And that it may appear how much some are mistaken, who assert, that the principles whereof sense and sentient things consist, must be sentient; consider, that if they were such, they must be loth, forasmuch as no
EPICURUS.

hard, or solid thing is capable of sense; and consequently, as we argued before, they must be corruptible; because, unless they are solid, they may be diminished, and so lose their nature, whereas the principles of things, as we have often heretofore alleged, must be incorruptible, and permanent.

It may otherwise be proved thus. If we allow the principles to be incorruptible, we cannot conceive them to be sensitive; neither as parts, for parts severed from the whole, feel not; neither as wholes, for then they would be Animals, and consequently mortal, or corruptible, which is contrary to the Hypothesis. Moreover, if we should admit that they are both Animals, and Immortal, it would follow, that no such Animals as we now behold, (that is, of a peculiar kind, and agreeing in one species) could be generated; but only a heap of several little Animals.

Furthermore, if sensitive things must be generated of sensitive, that is, like of like, it will be necessary, as we said before, that a man, (for example) consist of principles that laugh, weep, ratiocinate, discourse of the mixture of things, and of themselves, enquiring of what things they consist, and these being like to corruptible things, must consist of others, and those likewise of others, into infinite.

Now it being well known, that in the bodies of Animals there are five distinct organs of sense, by which the soul (or the sensitive faculty in her) apprehends, and perceives sensible objects, several ways: that is, by seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching, nothing hindereth, but that we allow five senses, the sight, the hearing, the smell, the taste, and the touch.

All this diversity ariseth from hence, that on one side the species of colours, and visible things, as also sounds, odors, savors, and other qualities, are made up of little bodies, endowed with particular magnitudes, figures, positions, order, and motions. On the other side, the organs of sight, hearing, and the rest of the senses, are of such con-textures, as contain little vacuities, or pores, which have likewise peculiar magnitudes, figures, positions, and orders, and those organs being various, have several aptnecess and proportions, to which the several little bodies of the qualities are comminutated, so some can receive into themselves these, others those, whence it happens, that only these little bodies of which the species of colour consist, are capable of penetrating into the organ of sight, and to move, and affect it after that manner: but so are not the little bodies, which are only capable of piercing, moving, and affecting the organ of hearing, or those, which can only affect that of the touch, and so of the rest.

Hence also, when we observe, that not only Animals of different kinds, but even amongst Men themselves, some are not affected with the same sensible objects, we may understand, that there is not in them the same kind of contexture. And since in all little bodies blended, and mingled together; some will naturally agree with others, some not, therefore, neither can the impression, and apprehensions, or sense of the same quality, be made in all animals, neither can a sensible object affect all animals alike with all its parts, but each one with those qualities only which are suitable to their senses, and convenient to affect them.

I shall add nothing concerning the common objects of sense, as magnitude, figure, motion, and the like, which are perceptible by more senses than one; for what we said of them in the Canonick, is sufficient.
EPICURUS

CHAP. XI.

Of Sight, and of the Images which glide into it.

Being to speak something of every sense, we must begin with Sight, whose organ manifestly is the eye; nor is it less evident, that the external appearances, and forms of things, are therefore seen by us, because lastly, something glides from without, or from the objects, into us, that is, into our eye. But before we undertake to show, that this is far more probable, then what others assert; we must declare, whether there be any thing, which comes from the things themselves, into our eye, and of what nature it is.

First then we affirm, that nothing hinders but that certain effusions of Atoms, perpetually flying in an uninterrupted course, are seen from the surfaces of bodies, in which also the same position, and form, order may be preserved, which was found in the superficies, and joints of the very bodies themselves, whence such effusions are, as it were forms, figures, or Images of these bodies, from which they are derived, and resembling them in all their Lineaments, and moreover, are far more subtle then any of the things themselves, which by them are made visible to us. This then is the name of those forms or figures, which we use to call: Idols, or Images.

Nor is it difficult, that such kind of effusions should be found in the middle. \*Lucet.\* ibid. air, or ambitiously diffused space; nor that these should be in the things themselves, and especially in the Atoms, certain dispositions rendering them apt to make representations, which are only mere empty cavities, and superficialities of no determinable depth. \* But in this place, we speake of those effuviums, which are as it were thin films, or skins stript from the remaining bodies. \*Lucet. loccit.

Nor yet is it difficult, that images of this nature should flow from the other sides of bodies, as is hence proved, that there flowing ever something from the inner parts of bodies, is finelly, heat, cold, (as we hinted formerly) it is far more caufe, that something should flow, or be carried away from their out most parts; since the Atoms, as well in one as in the other, are in a perpetually endeavoured dissolving themselves to get away, but in the former case, being cover'd with other atoms, they find reluctance, whereas in the latter, being placed in the fore-front of the body, they find none, Add to this, that hence also they gain the advantage of flying out from the superficialities in the fame order, and rank which they held there; whereas those which come from within, cannot but change their postures, being often disturb'd in the way, by their avaricious passages.

Now that there are indeed such effuviums, may hence be proved, ibid. if the Sun beams passe thorough curtains, red (for example) or of any other colour, drawn before the Theaters, such subtle emitions are sent from them, as make all things behind them appear so coloured. But the experiment from Looking-glasses, is more then sufficient; for these clearly show, that there are indeed such effuviums emitted from bodies, in regard, the bodies being present, they light upon the glass; if any thing intervene, they are hindered from coming thither; if the bodies be mov'd, they move also; if inverted, they are inverted; if the bodies retire, they also go back; if they are taken away, they wholly disappear.

But forasmuch as there is no point of time, in which these images flow not into the Mediums, doublets, their production must be made in a point of time, and be perpetually flowing out at the superficies, in a continued stream. For the reason, why they cannot be discerned apart, is, because, when one image goes away, another coherently succeeds, and supplies its room; and instantly preserves the
EPICURUS.

the same order and position of atoms, which is in the superficies of the solid body, and that for a long time, and as a great distance, (although at first they are confounded.) When e't it comes to pass, that the body always appears with the same accidents, and in the same form.

I mean here, that form which is proper to the body, and is conceived to be a collection (as it were) of parts, divided in a certain order, or (as it were) the superficies last behind by the image, which flies away from it.

It may here seem strange, that the body seemeth no more to be diminished, than as if nothing at all were taken off from it; but this is by reason of their extraordinary tenacity, which cannot be under stood, without first conceiving the tenacity of the atoms. Concerning this, we imagine'd formerly, an animal so small, as if we suppose it divided into three parts, each of them will be indiscernible; and yet for performance of those animal functions which it differengeth, it must necessarily be made up of such parts and particles as can hardly be formed, without innumerable myriads of atoms.

Not to mention, in confirmation of the probability hereof, that there are many odorous things, out of which, though something incessantly flow, yet for a long time nothing appeareth to be diminished, either as to their figure or weight; notwithstanding that the effluvia out of them are far greater, and more numerous than these images, which flow out along with them; yet are so inconsiderable a part of the things that flow out, as no man can express.

Wonderfull also may seem their celerity in flying out; but this must be understood by the celerity of the atoms, formerly declared; for these images, by reason of the tenuy we spoke of, being nothing else but certain concretions of simple atoms, have a celerity beyond all imagination, and their passage through the transparent place which is round about them, is like that which is through the infinite spaces, there being but much difference, because they meet few or no obstacles in the space which surrounds them. Certainly, if the light of the Sun and other Stars can come so swiftly (as we observe) from heaven, the celerity of these images ought to be, if not greater, yet not lese, by reason of the atoms which stand in the surface of the body, ready for motion, and have nothing to retard them.

CHAP. XII.

That Seeing is performed by means of those Images.

These things presupposed, some conceive, that external and difficult things are therefore seen by us, because they impress in our eye the image of their colour of figure, the air intervening between them and us, performing the office of a Seal, by means of which, this impression is made. Others think, that this is effected by the rays or effluvia, sent from us or our eyes to the object; but it is far more probable, that it is performed by these images we spoke of, which coming from the things, or their colour and figure, flow into us, and preserving a congruous magnitude, enter into our eyes, and strike our sight with a very swift motion.

This figitation (or impression) indeed is a thing extream hard, and perhaps impossible to be explicated; and as for the emission of rays out of our eyes, it is unimaginable what the Looking-glasses send out of them, that they also should have images painted in them; or what this is, which in a moment is sent from the eye, into the whole vast circumference of the heavens.

To omit, that since in hearing, smelling, tasting, touching, we send nothing
nothing out of our selves, but receive something from without, which cause a sensation of it tells, (for it tells a voice comes into the ears, odors into the nostrils, lights into the palace, and things which may be touched are applied to the body;) it is obvious to be conceived, that neither is anything sent out from our eyes, but that something (viz. those images) come into our eyes from the things themselves.

But the soul, in as much as it is in the eyes, cannot but see, that is, apprehend the colour and outward form of that thing which is presented to it; for by reason of the polite and perspicuous contexture of the organ, it receives the image of the thing, and is struck by it according to all the preferred parts.

And forasmuch as those things are beautifull which delight the sight, those deform'd which offend it; how should we imagine this to be, but that the images which come from the one consist of bodies, which, by their smoothness, are gently accommodated to the contexture of the eye; but those which come from the other consist of such, as by their ugly figure rend the contexture?

And when the eye is troubled with the Jaundies, how comes it, that all things seem yellow? but that the images, in their application to the eye, receive a contexture; or they may be (in'd also without the eye, coming amongst the yellow little bodies or images, which proceed in like manner from the eye.

But how happens it, that we see not only the colour and form of a body, but we discern its distance also? This proceeds from the air, which the image drives on before it. For though it comes to the eye exceeding swiftly, and in imperceptible time; yet it comes thither, and touches upon it orderly; and by how much the longer it is in doing so, so much the more distant the thing appears to be; by how much the sooner, so much the nearer.

Hence also may be given a reason, why an image seems to be beyond, and the Looking-glass; for as when a man from any place within a house, looks upon a thing that is without doors, the air commeth to him impressed, as well that without to the door, as that withen from the door; so to him who looketh in a glasse, commeth successively, as well that air which is from the glasse to the eye, as that which is from the object to the glasse.

Hence also may be given a reason, why, being in the dark, we can see the things that are in the light; but being in the light, cannot see those that are in the dark. For the enlightened eye succeeding the dark, the eye informed by it is enabled to see; but not when the dark succeeded the enlightened.

How comes it, that the images in a glasse seem to walk as we do? This ibid, happens by reason of the varied parts of the glasse, from which several parts there must necessarily be made a reflexion upon the eye, and thereupon the image seem to walk as we.

If you ask, Why the image which goeth from us to the glasse represents ibid, nor the back side, but the fore-side, and that so, as that the right part is on the left side, and the left on the right; take notice, that this happens on the very same fashion, as if the image of a man made of chalk or clay, not quite d.aid, should be hung to a ball or pillar.

But if the images be reflected from one glasse to another, and thence to ibid, the eye, the situation of the parts is restored, fo as the right parts appear on the right side, and the left on the left; (and by this means it may be brought to pass, especially if there be many glasses; that such things as are hidden behind something, and one of sight, may be brought to view) which
which may also happen even in one glasse, if it hath little sides, whereof
one reflects the image to the other.

Thus much concerning the Sight; to which also some things, formerly
hinted in our discourse of the Criteries and of Qualities, have reference.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Hearing.

Concerning Hearing, we must repeat what we have touched formerly,
that, it being confess'd, the ear is the organ of the hearing, As seeing is
performed by the coming of something into the eye; so hearing also is per-
formed in the ear by an emission of something, conveys'd either from the thing
that speaks, sounds, makes a noise, or is some other way disposed to set the
sense of hearing. This kind of effluvium, as it affects this sense, is called
Sound.

Moreover, this effluvium, either in the mouth of the speaker, or gen-
really in the thing struck upon and making a noise, is scattered there by motion
into innumerable little pieces of the same figure, ('round; if the whole eff-
luvium were round; inequilateral and triangular, if the first effluvium were such) in like manner as we observe, that little drops are made when we pour any thing out of bottles, or when Cloth-workers spurt water
upon their cloaths.

These little pieces, or small bulk, are thereupon dispersed in such manner,
as that they preserve a certain mutual conformity to one another, (and strike
the hearing of several persons alike,) so as they all seem to hear one and the same
sound, though it be not the same, but like only) and keep fast also within them-
selves, each by a particular coherence, whereby, it comes to passe, that they are
known to have reference to that thing, from which they were sent forth, and for
the most part make such a sensation, as was first made by that which sent forth
the sound, (as when the sound comes not from far into the ears, and passeth
through a free space.) But otherwise, (as by reason of a great distance, or some
partition) something from without bringseth in the sound confusedly only. For
 Dionysius a kind of conformity and coherence, deduced and preferred from the very
thing sounding, there could never be any distinct hearing.

Thou must we not imagine, that when the voice (for example) is sent
forth into the air, the air is perfectly imprinted or formed, either by that
voice, or by some others made by it, into like voices, which (as one expres-
seth it, fly away together, as one) and with another, as the voice of a swan.
It was too great a task, that the air should be defign'd for any such employ-
ment; but as soon as the blow is made within us when we speak, the voice
being articulated out of certain little pieces, of a most spiritual, and with a
slight friction, fit for this office, and arriving at the ear, causes hearing in us.

That these little pieces which influence into the ear have a figure, may
be argued, by reason that Sound could not affect the hearing pleasantly and
unpleasantly, if it had not such a smoothness as suits with the contexture
of the organ, nor such a roughness as rends the organ. This may better be understood, by comparing the grating of a Saw with the swet-
ness of a Lute, or the hoarse cawing of a Crow with the sweeter melody of
a dying Swan.

Not to repeat some things spoken heretofore, which seem to conclude
hereunto, I shall only touch his difficulty, How it comes to passe, that
sounds in the night-time are both louder and clearer than in the day.
To solve this, we must assume what is manifest from our discourse for-
merly, That Motion is made through Vacuum, and that there is much of
vacuum
vacuum scattered up and down through the little bodies, or bulks of air, which are made up of atoms; and that in the day-time it is being hot, and these little bodies rarify'd, and the atoms diffused, the little vacuities contained in them must necessarily become narrower and (trai ter; but in the night, it being cold, and these little bodies posit up close, and the atoms crowded together, the vacuities become larger. This is evident from all things, which in a vessel are boiled, foittened, and melted; but if they take up a larger place, they cool, return to their temper, and become contracted.

Hence therefore it happens, that the sound in the day-time passing thorough the dilated air, and lighting upon many bodies in its way, is either quite stop'd, or torn, and much knocked and worn away. But when in the night it pallest thorough a space free from bodies, it arrives at the hearing by a full, ready, and uninterrupted carriage, and with that swiftness preserves its clearness and distinction.

From the same ground it springs, that empty vessels being struck, ibid. found, the full sound not; and that the more solid bodies, as Gold, make a slow dull noise; the less compact, as Brasse, a greater and clearer.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Smelling.

As concerning Smelling, we must understand, that Odor (as was in Proportion declared concerning sound or voice, when we treated of Hearing) would not make any impression or stamp of itself, unless from the odorous thing there were deduced some little bodies or bulks, so communifurated to the organ of smelling, (the nostrills) as to be able to move, and affect it.

That odors flow and come out of things, is manifest, forasmuch as all things called odorous have a stronger scent, being broken, pounded, or disolved by fire, than whilst they are whole. For the flock of these little bodies, which are fit to move the smell, is pent up, as it were, within the odorous body, and bound; but, the body being broken, pounded, or burnt, it leaps forth, and spreads itself like a vapour or cloud, and affects the smelling, if it can light upon it.

It used to affect the finer two waies; either unequally and unsuitably, Lat. whence proceed unpleasant odors; or smoothly and aptly, whence pleasant odors.

For some of the little bodies of odor having a smooth and even surface, others, more or greater angles than is fit; and hence it happens, that some odors affect the organ with delight as touching it smoothly; others with a kind of pain, as if they tore it.

There must needs be a difference betwixt the penetrations of these little bodies into the nostrills, when carcases are burnt, and when the Theater is newly strew'd with Saffron. And it may be conceived after this manner. As the land, if we put Down to a, peltch upon it; but if a Nettle, snatcheth it fell back, (for the smoothness of the one, and the roughness of the other by its prickles, affect two different waies) in like manner the little bodies which proceed out of the Saffron, are smooth; those which out of the carcase, prickly: so as the first gently broke and deligh the nostrills, the other prick them, and make them draw back.

Moreover, there being so great variety of tempers amongst animals, (even amongst men one in respect of another) and the contexture of the organ of smelling being different in several persons, it ought not to seem strange, that some seem pleasant to some others, others; by reason of the dissimilitudes of the figures of the little bodies, of which they consist;
nor that Bees delight in flowers, Vultures in carion; or that Dogs find out by the scent, which way beasts have gone, which we cannot perceive, as it in passing, they left a leam which cannot strike our smell.

CHAP. XV.

Of Tasting.

W e come next, to speak of Tasting. Whereas it is manifest, that the organ thereof is the Tongue and Palate; and that "we then taste and perceive the sapour in our mouth, when chewing the Meat, we squeeze out the juice. As when we press with the hand, a sponge full of water, and thereupon, the juice which is squeezed forth, is distributed thorough the pores, or complicated holes of the Tongue and palate, we may ingeniously affect that the little bodies, whereof are accommodated to the organ, gently and smoothly; on the contrary, that to be bitter, salt, sharp, acid, sour, hot &c. which roughly and unfruitfully. For neither could Honey or Milk affect the tongue pleasanly, nor Wormwood or Centory unpleasantly, if it were not, that those consist of smoother and rounder little bodies, these of more harsh, and hooked; so as those rough gently, these prick and rend it.

He therefore not defined the thing amiss, who saith, that the Atoms which make a sweet sapour, are round, and of a convenient size; Those which a foot, large; Those which a harsh, mult-angular, and nothing round; Those which a sharp, acute, conicall, crooked, not slender, nor round; Those which an acrid; round, slender, corner'd, crooked; Those which a salt, corner'd, dilibert, &c. equivocall; Those which a bitter; round, smooth, dilibert, little. Those which a fat; slender, round, little.

But more particularly, seeing that the tempers, not onely of Animals, but even of Men among themselves, are so various, and that as they differ in the outward lineaments of their bodies, so they cannot but differ also in their inward contextures, hence we may say, that the sapors, that are pleasing to some Animals or men, are displeasing to others, by reason that the little bodies, of which they consist, are suitable and accommodate to the contexture of the organs of those, but unsuitable and unaccommodate to the contexture of the organs of these; since the round pores that are in the organ, can receive the round Atoms smoothly, but the triangular difficultly; and the triangular pores, can receive the triangular smoothly, but the round difficultly.

Hereby also is understood, how it comes to passe, that the things which were formerly pleasant to us, are in a soever dissatisfuitive, for the contexture is so disordered, and the figures of the pores so altered, that the figures of the little bodies which infinuate into them, though formerly they were adaptable, now become unsuitable, and incongruous.

From the same reason it is, that the meat which agreeeth with one Animal, is poison to another; as henlock, or hellebore is destructive to a man, yet it fattens goats, and quails. This happens by reason of the interiour contextures, which differing from one another, that which is accommodable, and adaptable to one, is inadaptable to another.

CHAP.
Ally concerning the Touch, I mean not that which is common to all \textit{Lami.} bodies, as they are said to touch one another by their superficies, (contrary to the Nature of vacuum, which can neither touch, nor be touched) but that which is proper to Animals, nor performed without perception of the soul; and hath not one, but all parts of the body for its organ. Concerning this Touch, I shall only declare, that what is perceived by it, is perceived three ways.

For first, a thing is perceived by the Touch, when it is extrinsically \textit{ibid.} applied, or, from without insinuates it selfe; applied, as when the hand feels a stone clapt to it; insinuated, as when a hot thing emitting heat, or a cold thing, cold, certain little bodies get into the pores, which according to the state wherein the body is, either refresh or disturb it.

Secondly, when a thing which is within, is driven out: which sometimes happens with pleasure, especially, when the thing it selfe was burdensome and incumbersome, \textit{udum femen exterminat;} sometimes with pain, as when by reason of the angles of the little bodies, it excites the passage, as by the strangled or difficulty of urine.

Lastly, when some things within the body, take some of these motions, \textit{ibid.} as by impulsion, diution, distraction, convulsion, compunction,utura, excoriation, inflation, tension, breaking, and innumerable other ways, it disturbs the natural constitution, and confounds, and troubles the sense. Thus all styes and pains of the head, and other parts within, are caused; and the Animal doth in such manner affect it selfe, as if a man should with his owne hand strike a part of his body.

CHAP. XVII.

Of the Intellect, Mind, or Reason, and its seat.

Hitherto of the sense. We must now speak of the Intellect, which is also usually called Mind, Reason. The rational and Hegemonick parts sometimes, Cognition, Imagination, Opinion, Counsel: Its property is when the sense strikes it, to think, apprehend, understand, resolve, mediate, discours, or deliberate something.

The contexture of this Intellect consits of little bodies, the most subtle smooth and round of all, so farre as nothing can be more subtle, not of quicker motion. Neither is there any thing that can stir up it selfe sonly, or perform any thing quicker then the intellect, which it design or begin any thing, brings it to passe in a moment; whereas we acknowledge, that nothing can be swifter then (her action) Thought.

And certainly, as Water is muchest to move, and more fluent then Honey, by reason that it is made up of little bodies, which are smoother, leeter, and rounder, nothing consequently can consist of rounder, leeter and smoother then the Mind, for nothing can be readier for motion, quicker or more plant.

And in whatsoever part of the body, the intellect inheres, it so cohereth to the soul, or to that portion of the soul which coexcepts with it in that part, as that it is indivisibly conjoyned to it; and constitutes one nature with it, yet it always to prediletes and retains its owne nature, as that it is the property of the Intellect to think, of the Soul, to undergo affecti-
Epicurus.

Indeed, the intellect is void of affection or passion; but because, as the passions depending on sense, are stirred up in the soul about those parts wherein the sense is feared; so those which depend on cogitation, are stirred up in the soul about that part where cogitation is; and in which part, the soul is one thing with the intellect (thinking); Hence it comes meth to pasce, that as if the aggregate or compound of the intellect and the soul, residing in that part, made up only intellect, the passions come to be attributed to the intellect itself.

Thus, whether the intellect be taken distinctly or joyntly, it hath this property beyond the other part of the soul, that, As when the head or eye akeeth, we are not thereupon pained all over the body; for sometimes the intellect is affected with grief or joy, when the other part of the soul, which is diffused through the body, is free from this affection. I Say, sometimes, because it may happen, that the intellect be seiz'd with a fear so vehement, as that the rest of the soul may be struck together with it, and thereby may be caused sweating, paleness, trembling of the speech, the eyes grow dim, the ears posseied with a humming, the joynts grow faint, and, in a word, the man may fall into a swoone.

Moreover, the intellect may be conceived to partake of life more perfectly than the soul, or the other part of the soul, forasmuch as the soul cannot subsist never so little in the limbs, without the intellect; but the intellect, though the limbs round about it were cut off, and thereby a great part of the soul taken away, would nevertheless subsist and preserve life: like the ball, which conduceth more to light than all the rest of the eye, because the ball being hurt, though the rest of the parts be sound, the light is destroy'd; but as long as the ball is sound, though the other parts be destroy'd, the light continueth.

It seemeth not, that there can be any other fear assign'd for the intellect, or rational part of the soul, than the middle part of the breast, and consequently the entrails, or the heart, which is in the midst of the breast. This is manifest from the affections of fear and joy, proceeding from cogitation, or the intellect thinking, which we perceive to be in the breast.

CHAP. XVIII.

That the Soul thinketh by Images, which glide into it.

Here is onely this difficulty, how the intellect can be stirred up to think something? But it being manifest, that things are thought by the intellect in the same manner, as they are seen by the eye; it is also evident, that as sight, so thinking or cogitation, is made by images which glide into it.

For besides those images which glide into the eye, and being of something a greater bulk, are accommodated to the consortedure of the eye, and produce in it the act of seeing, there must necessarily wander through the air an innumerable company of others, far more subtile, and those either peel'd off from bodies, or form'd in the air it self, as was formerly said; which penetrating through the body, and being adaptable to the consortedure of the intellect, as soon as they arrive at it, move it to think.

Wherefore it comes to pass, that as we fee (for example) a Lion, because the image thereof glides into our eye: so we think a Lion, because the image of a lion glides into our mind. That we think or imagine Centaurs,
EPI CURUS.

caus, Syllae, and the like, which neither are, nor ever were: this may happen, not so much by images framed on purpose, as for that when the images (for example) of a man and of a horse are presented to us, they, by reason of their tenacity or subtlety, like a cob-web, or a leaf of gold, are joined together, and made one, such as is attributed to a Centaur.

But take notice, that when sometimes we persevered in the same thought, whether waking or sleeping, this happens not, for that we use some one image of the same thing, but that we use many images succeeding in a continued fusion, which it they come to us in the same posture, the thing thought or imagined seemeth unmoved; if in a varied, it seems moved. Which is the reason why, in dreams especially, images seem to us to be moved, and to stir their arms and other limbs one after another.

But how comes it to passe, that whatsoever any man would, his mind or intellect immediately thinks that very thing? Because, though there are every where images of all sorts, yet the greatest part passeth by unthought of, and those only move the mind which the her self takes notice of, or would observe, or frames her self to think of. And, Observes we nor, that the eyes, when they begin to have a sight of something very little, bend and fix themselves upon it, and, till they see something plainly, all other things are as if they were not, although they receive their images also.

Now as there is some inten mittence requisite to the mind, that it may apprehend things distinctly, so much more that it may simply think or give some judgment, by affirming or denying; but most of all, that it may discourse of them, as if its greatest care were, not to be deceived.

But this we declared formerly, in treating of the Criteres. It will be sufficient, as to the speculation of natural things, here to observe, that human discourse first admires the things that are produced by nature, and then enquires into them, and finds out their causes; but in some sooner, in others later, and sometimes evinceth this, or arrives atsthe full knowledge, in a longer time, sometimes in a shorter.

CHAP. XIX.

Of the Affections or Passions of the Soul.

There besides sense another part of the irrational soul, which may be called Affectuous, or Passionate, from the affections or passions raised in it. It is also esteemed the Appetite or desire, from the chief affection which it hath, called appetite or desire; some distinguishing it into Concupiscible and Irascible.

Now whereas it was already said, that the affections which follow sense are produced in the organs of sense, those which follow opinion in the breast; thereupon there being two principal affections, Pleasure and Pain; the first, familiar, and suitable to the soul; the other, incommodious, and unsuitable to nature: It is manifest, that both these are excited, not in the breast only, where Pleasure, for the most part, comes under the name of joy, gladness, exultation, mirth; and Pain under that of grief, sorrow, anguish, &c. but also in the other parts, in which, when they are removed from their natural state, there is raised pain or grief; when they are restored to that state, Pleasure.

If all the parts could continue in their natural state, either there would be no affection, or if there were any, it must be called Pleasure, from the quiet and calmness of that state. But because either by reason of
EPICTETUS.

of the continuall motion of principles in the body of an animal, some things depart from it, others come to it; some are taken aunder, others put together, &c. Or by reason of the motion which is in the things round about, some things are brought which infinuate into them, change, invert, disjoune, &c. Pain is caufed (from the firft ocation, as by hunger, thirst, &c.); from the second, as by burning, bruifing, wounding. Therefore the affection of pain feems to be firft produced and withall, because it is of an oppofite nature, that of avertion or avoidance of it, and of the thing that bringeth it, to which, for that reafon, is attributed the name of ill.

Hereupon followed a defire of exemption from pain, or of that flate which is void of pain, and consequently of the thing by which it may be expelled, and to which, for that reafon, is given the name of Good; and then the pain being taken away, and the thing reduced into a barren, that is, into its naturall flate, pleafure is excited, and goeth along with it; fo as there would not be pleafure, if fome kind of pain did not go before, as is eafily observable even from hunger and thirst, and the pleafure that is taken in eating and drinking.

For this pleafure is onely made, because (most of the parts being diffipated by the action of the intrinfeall heat, by which means the body it felf becomes rarify'd, all nature deftroy'd, and the stomack efpertially grip'd, or otherwise fome little bodies of heat rolling about it, make it glow, whereby is caufed pain) because I lay, near commeth, and fuppliceth the defect, supports the limbs, appeareth the defire of eating, which gapeth throughout the members and the veins; drink comes and extinguifheth the heat, mollifieth the parts which before were dry, and reduceth them to their firft flate. And besides, both are made with a smooth and pleafing fenfe of nature, which, as it is manifeft is then abfent, when a man eats, not being hungry, or drinks, not being a thirst.

Thus the generall affections of the Soul feem to be these four; Pain and Pleafure, the extreme; Aversion and Defire, the intermediate. I fay, generall, because the reft are kinds of these, and made by opinion intervening, and may be reduced principally to Defire and Avertion.

For Defire is particularly called Will, when the Mind will; that which it thinks, and conceiveth it to be good; and Aversion is called Aversion, when it turneth away from that which it thinketh, or conceiveth to be ill. Hereupon, Love (for example) is a will, whereby we are carried to the enjoyment of something, Hate is an aversion, whereby we withdraw our felves from converting with something. Again, Anger is nothing but Defire, whereby we are carried on to vengeance. Fear is an Aversion, by which we shrink at some future ill, and retire, as it were, within our felves; and fo of the reft.

But forasmuch as Defire (as alfo in proportion Avertion too) is parti- 
larly excited by nature, and by reafon of some indigence, which muft neceffarily be fupplied, that nature may be preferved; partly is begotten by opinion, which is fometimes conformable to the defigne of nature, and fo tends to remove her indigence, as that yet it is not neceffary it fhould be quite taken away. Lastly, it fometimes conduces nothing either to nature, or to the taking away of its indigence. Hence it commeth to paffe, 
that of defires, fome are naturall and neceffary; others naturall, but not neceffary; others, either naturall nor neceffary, but vain.

Naturall and neceffary are thofe, which take away both the indigence, and the pain proceeding from the indigence; fuch is that of meat, of drink, of clothing to expell the cold. Naturall, but not neceffary, are thofe; which onely vary the pleafure, but are not absolutely neceffary to the taking
EPICURUS.

- taking away of the paine, as those which are of delicate meats, even that which is of venereal delights, to which Nature gives a beginning; but from which a man may abstain with no inconvenience. Lastly, neither natural, nor necessary, but those, which contribute nothing to the taking away of any pain, caused by some indigence of Nature, but are begor only by opinion; such are for instance, those of Crowns, Statutes, Ornaments, rich Clothing, Gold, Silver, Ivory, and the like.

Moreover, it is to be observed, that whereas pleasure consists in the fruition of good, pain in suffering ill; for this reason, the first is produced with a kind of dilatation and exaltation of the soul, the other with a contraction and deprestion thereof; and therefore it is not to be wondered at, if the soul dilates her felle, as much as she can to make way for the good to come into her, and contracts her felle to prevent the ill.

There is a dilution, or dilatation; for as soon, as ever the form of a good and pleasing thing strikes the sense, or moveth the mind, the little bodies of which it consists, to intwine into the organs of sense, or into the heart it felle, as that being accommodated as well to the soul, as to the body; they in a more particular manner, gently stroke and delight the soul; and like little chains, allure and draw it towards that thing, out of which they were bent; whereupon the soul being turned towards, and intent upon that thing, gives a great leap, as it were towards it, with all the strength it hath, that it may enjoy it.

On the other side there is contraction; because as soon, as ever the form of a painful thing strikes the sense, or the mind, the little bodies of which it consists, as to many little darts or needles, prick the very soul together with the organ in such manner, that they loosen its contexture, while she, to prevent them as much as she can, thrusts her felle up, and retires to her very Centre, or root, where the heart or intellect is placed.

It will not be necessary to repeat what we formerly said, that it depends upon the contexture of the soul, why one Animal is more inclined to anger, another to fear, a third to calm smooth motions; nor to add, that this difference is found in men also, according as their souls participate more of a fiery, or of a flaminous, or of an aerial principle. Or we may observe even in men that are polished by Learning, these leads cannot but root out, but that one is more propens to anger, another more subject to fear; a third more prone to temperance than he ought. Moreover the difference of manners, which is observed to be so great, not amongst Animals only, but in men from one another, is plainly enough derived from the various commotion of these leads.

CHAP. XX.

Of voluntary Motion, and particularly, of speaking, and imposition of names.

Now the soul being naturally stirring, and ready for motion, and able to move the body wherein it exists, and the Members thereof; it is well known, that whenever the soul moves the body, or its members with any motion whatsoever, he therefore doeth it, because the heart will to move them, and that this will is stirred up by the Intellect, imagining; and that this imagination is caused by the image that strikes it: for the Intellect, or Mind, never doeth any thing, but first the fore-feeth it, not fore-feeth it, unless the first have the image of that thing.

Thus, when we move, for example, the thighs and walk, this is therefore

Lucret. 4. 89.
fore done. because first the images of walking coming to the mind, strike it; thence proceeds a will to walk; then when the Mind hath so mov'd it selfe, as that it wills to walk, it instantly strikes the soul in that part whereto it is joyned; that part strikes the rest of the soul, which is diffused through the whole body, and especially through the thighs and feet. Thus the whole frame is by degrees thrust forward, and moved; Not to mention that the aire conducteth something thereto, by reason that, as the whole body becomes rarify'd, the aire intimates into its parts. The body therefore is moved from two causes, like a ship, which is driven on by Oars and Wind.

That the beginning of motion proceeds from the heart, where the Mind is seated, is manifest, for that we see sometimes horses (for example) cannot, as soon as ever the barrier is let down, break forth, nor liars away so suddainly, as their will prompts them; because the whole substance of the soul diffused thorough all the Limbs, must first be summoned, that, being hir'd up, it may follow the designe of the mind. Thus it proceeds first from the will of the mind, and then thorough the body and limbs.

It may perhaps seem strange, that so little bodies as those, whereof the Mind consists, should be able to move, wrest, and turn about to bear a weight, as is that of the body. But what wonder, when the wind, a thing so fabulous, can with so great a force drive forward a vast ship; and one hand, one rudder, turn it about and guide it, though under full sail? And are there not Engines, which by pulleys and force, move and draw up huge weights, and that with no great force?

But forasmuch, as of the motions, with which we move the parts of the body, as we will our selves, that of the tongue is most considerable, which is called speaking, it seems requisite to say something of this in particular.

The Tongue being framed in breathing Animals after such a manner, as that it can break, and as it were mould the aire which is vehemently breathed forth, and thereupon causeth a sound; hence it happeneth, that as because every Animal perceiveth its own power, by which it can do something, and hereupon the Bull buts with his horns, the Horse strikes with his heels, the Lion seareth with his teeth and claws, the Bird trusts to her wings; hence it happeneth I say, that Animals, and chiefly Men, perceiving the ability of their tongue to express the affections of the mind, (even when they would signify something, that is without them) they send out a sound which is called Voice, and by the interposition of the tongue, and other parts serving for that variation, bend and mould it in severall fashions.

I instance Animals also, because we see, that they likewise send forth several voices, according as they are joy'd or griev'd, or fear, or purruse anything; dogs, for example, make severall noises, when they assail furiously, when they bark, when they play with their whelps, when they fawn, when they are hurt, and cry of howl; a horse neigheth after a different manner, when he rouseth himselfe, when he followeth a mate, and when he is spur'd by his Rider. And birds make different cries, when they strive about their prey, and when they perceive change of Weather, and when they sit idly, still.

Now Man, above the rest, perceiving the great power of his Tongue, and how he can bend it various ways, so as to make diverse articulate sounds, which may be accommodated to signify severall things, hence proceeds speech, by which, men ordinarily discourse with one another, expressing the passions of the mind, and other things, no otherwise then as by nodding the head, or pointing with the finger.
EPICURUS.

Here, because it is usually demanded, How men came at first to impose names on things; we must know, that names were not imposed merely by invention of man, nor by some Law; but the very natures, or natural affections of men, which were in several nations, being, upon the presence of things to them, affected with passions or motions of the mind, and compelled by images proper to the things, sent forth the air out of their mouths after a peculiar fashion, and broke and articulated it, according to the impulse of the several affections or phantasmes, an sometimes according to the difference of places, as the Heaven and the Earth is various in different Countries. The words which were thus pronounced, and particularly with a will of denoting things to others, became the names of things.

Some also desiring to mention some things to others, which were out of their Law, signs pronounced certain sounds or words, and they were constrained to repeat the same words; whereupon the hearers finding out the thing by some discourse and controversy, as left, with much use, understood what the others meant.

And because several men used several names, to signify the same things to others; and thereupon there was a variety of names; for this reason, Names proper to signify things were in every nation by degrees, and, as Laws, it were, with common consent chosen and appointed, so as their in usuall significans mig by be left ambiguous, and things might be explicated by a more comprehensiv way of speaking.

For this reason I conclude, that the first man imposed names on things, not out of certain sciences, or by the command or dictate of anyone man; for how should he come by that science, or have power to compell many men to use the words which he dictated? But rather, that they imposed them, being moved by a certain natural impulsion, like those who cough, sneeze, belch, burp, sigh. And therefore we may say, that names are not by imitation, but by nature, seeing they are the effects and works, as it were, of nature; for, to see and hear things (which are certain effects and works of nature) are of the same kind, as the giving of names to things.

CHAP. XXI.
Of Sleep and Dreams.

IT tells, that we add something concerning Sleep, and the Death of Animals, two things near of kin: for one is an intermission, the other the extinction of sentience; and death is ordinarily termed an everlasting sleep.

Sleep is caused, when the parts of the soul, which are diffused through the Laws, whose constitution of the body, are either confused or segregated; or else some little bodies, either from the head, or from food, light upon the dispersed parts, which bring them away from the body; partly crowd them into the body, and discompose them. For hereupon the body, as demented of its ordinary support and government, bemeth with the limbs grow feeble, the ears and eye lids hang down, the knees sink, and, in a word, there is no more sentience.

For it being certain, that sentience proceeds from the soul, it is no less evident, that when sleep hindeth the soul, the soul is disturbed and thrown out of doors; not the whole soul, for then it were not sleep, but death; but a part only, and yet so, that as that which is left behind is oppressed within, and buried like fire taked up in ashes. And as, if we shut up the fire, it wakes, as it were, and a flame rises from it, in appearance extinguished; so the sentiences are restored throughout the members, and

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raided
EPICURUS.

raised again out of a thing in appearance dead.

Lucet.

When I say, that little bodies comming from the aire cause this disturbance, I mean, partly the exterior air, which never ceaseth to beat and drive against the body, (whereby it comes to paife, that the outward part of every animal becomes solid and hard) partly the interiour, or that which is drawn in at the mouth, and blown out again. For the stroke of each of these passing through the little vacancies, to the principles and first elements of the body, their positions are so disordered, that parts are cast out, part thrust in, and the rest, which is diffusd through the limbs, are not able to discharge their office, by reason that they are intercepted, and not joined one to another.

Lucet.

I add, that this happens from the food also, because the food, being convey'd inwards by the veins, performs the fame thing as the air, and that with more abundant and greater force. Whence it comes to paife, that the sleep which is caufed by mea, by reason of the greater disturbance of those particles, is more found then ordinary, as is that also which proceeds from excefsive weariness, by reason of their greater disipation.

Lucet.

Now forasmuch as it may seem strange, that dreams should come to us in sleep, we must observe what was laid not long since, that every where there are images of innumerable things, continually raving up and down, which, by reason of their subtlety, are able to penetrate into the body, and able to strike and affect the mind, which is feated in the midst of the brain, fo as it is stirr'd up to think of those things, whereas they are the images. Hereupon, forasmuch as these penetrate and strike the mind, no leisure in sleep then in waking, it comes to paife, that we seem to behold things as well in sleep as awake.

Lucet.

But it happens, that we receive the things which appear to us in this manner as true, because our senses being stuified, nothing can occur to us, that may give us notice of the error, and convince the falsity by true things; and besides, our memory being laid asleep, we esteem (for example) those men to be alive who are dead, because their images are present to us, and we remember not their death.

Lucet.

If you demand, Why we dream most of those things in which we chiefly delight, or to which we are most particularly addicted when awake, (for Orators plead, Soldiers fight, Mariners contend with the winds, Gamesters play, and so of others;) Neither is it thus with men only, but amongst other animals also; Horses sweat and blow, as if they were running a race; Hounds stretch their legs, cry, and snuff the air; and so of the rest.) We must say, that this happens, forasmuch as by reason of the impression lately made in the mind, the passages are left open, into which the same images insinuate, and, above the rest, move the soul again.

Lucet.

From the same ground it seems to proceed, that he who is chiefly dreams of a fountain, and that he is drinking; he that hath need to urine dreams of a chamber-por, and that he is using it. For the intrinsic motions open, as it were, the ways, into which the images of things of the same nature insinuate, strike the mind. Hence also it comes to paife, that many images of the same thing meeting together, there are produced certain great motions in the mind, and then who dreameth, imagines that he possessed great knowledge, performed great actions, speaketh excellent things; and sometimes crieth out as if his throat were about to be cut, or himself to be devoured by a Lion or Panther, and no less affrighted, than if he had call himself down from a high Mountain, or as when he awakes, he has scarce the use of his reason.

Chap.
EPICURUS.

CHAP. XXII.

Of Death.

As far as it is nothing but a privation of sense, by reason of the departure of the soul. By sense here, I understand not only the action, of which sleep also is the privation; but the faculty likewise of feeling or perceiving, which perishes with the soul; and together with these, the mind also; so that the soul going forth, the mind which is joined with it goeth forth also.

For, as long as the soul exists in the body, although some other part fail, yet Lucret. there is not a privation of sense: but sense perishes together with the soul, as soon as ever that wherein it is contained, whether it be the whole body, or some part in which it is seated, happens to be dissolved. Neither can it be observed, that the body remaineth a while undissolved, either in whole or in part: For it is nevertheless void of sense, as soon as such a company of atoms, as is necessary to constitute the nature of the soul, goeth out of it.

Moreover, the body being dissolved, the soul itself is dissipated, and hath no life longer the same faculties, nor any longer is mov'd, nor any longer hath sense; for we cannot imagine, that the same thing doth any longer feel or perceive, when it is no longer as the same motion, when it is no longer is in the same composed, when those things no longer are by which it was clarified and preserved; and in which existing it performed such kind of motions. Is it the same with the soul as with the eye; which, being taken out, and divided from the body in which it was, cannot see anything.

When I say, The soul is dissipated, I imply the mind also; since the mind is indivisibly joined with it, neither can it subsist if the soul perish. So that here it is all one to say, the mind and the soul, for the same dissipation happens to both. Now this dissipation is made, not into nothing, (as they must necessarily affirm, who hold the soul to be harmony, or such acomposition as health) but into the principles and little bodies, of which its concreture is made; and this not to much like water, which runneth about when the vessel is broken, as like smoke, or a mist, which goes away into air, but much more easily; its concreture being more subtle, since it is capable of receiving impressions from the images of smoke and mist.

That the soul is dissipated and perisheth, is manifest; for that it is compounded and hath a beginning. Some indeed there are, who conceive it to be eternal, denying it to have a beginning, to avoid its dissipation; and affirming for granted, that it was before the body, and came from without into it, that they may maintain, that it survives after the body, out of which it goes entire. I shall omit, that they seem not to observe, that nothing can be durable for ever, unless it be such, either by reason of its solidity, as an Atom; or for that it is incapable of being struck, as Vacuum; or for that it wants place where to it might remove, as the Universe. Neither do they reflect how great a madness it is to conceive, that things so different as immortall and mortall, may be joyned together.

I omit this, I say, and demand only, How it is possible the soul can, from without, be infused into the body, and dissolv'd through its parts, and yet not be divid'd and dissolv'd, as meat distributed through the limbs? And must it not dwell in the body, as a bird in a cage, rather than be thought to grow, and be extend'd with the body? And how then arrives it together with the body, at the flower of age? And why is it, that in old age it fears, not to joynceth to go out of the body as out of her prison,
prison, and like the serpent to call her decay’d skin? And if forsaking the body, it leaves some relics of itself behind, is it not dissolvable? But if it leaves none, how comes it, that so many worms are generated in a carcasse?

For to say, that so many souls flow thither from without, and fly up and down like shadowes, and chafe their own matter, and frame their own bodies, and the like, How absurd is it? Neither is it leffe ridiculous, that there should be a swarm, as it were of souls, hovering round about at the coition, and birth of Animals, concerning one another, which shall enter into the body.

And if souls did so often shift bodies, would not their natures, by degrees, become changed, and to the Lion in time not be fierce, the Hare not timorous, the Fox not crafty, the dog afraid of the Hare, the Hauke of the Dove? And if any shall say, that human souls only paffe into human bodies, he cannot give a reason, Why the soul, of wife, becomes foolish; why no children are wise, why we, as the first Author of these Opinions feigned of themselves, never remember our past life, and the actions performed in it.

The soul therefore hath a beginning, from which, as it groweth up, and flourishteth with the body, so must it necessarily tend to an end, growing old, and decaying by degrees, together with it.

This I say likewise of the Mind, which by degrees is perfected, and decayeth; seeing that it not onely bears a share in the diseases, and pains of the body, but suffereth diseases, and pains of her owne, and is cured by Medicine: which could not be, if something were not added to, or taken from, or transposed in her constitution. We need not instance, what happens to her by drunkenness, the falling sickness, or durance.

We must observe, that she is affixed to some certain part of the body, no other wise then the ear or the eye, so that, accordingly she begins and ends with the whole; and this is manifest, forasmuch as every thing, (trees, fishes, &c.) hath a certain determinate place in which it is produced, liveth, and at last ceaseth to be, and cannot exist out of it.

And forasmuch, as a man dieth limb by limb, and expires by degrees, the soul being, as it were divisible; who can say, that the Mind (or Intellect) doth not evaporate out of the midst of the breath, but goeth entire out at the throat and mouth? For that the soul her self goeth out, fitted as it were, and fever’d thorough the whole body, is argued, even for the fench which after her departure is in the dead carcasse, proceeded from no other cause, than that its several parts are got into that place, which was taken up by the several parts of the soul. Not to mention, that, otherwise, when the body is suddenly cut asunder, into two or more pieces, the soul could not be cut into two or more pieces as the body.

As therefore, the soul was not before the generation, so neither will it be after the dissolution, or death; and as, before that, we did not feel any pain; so neither shall we feel any, after this; as well, for that there will be no longer Touch, or any other Sense, which cannot exist in a separate soul; for that, it is now without those organs, in which onely the senses reside, and with which onely, they can act and suffer.

Hence it is manifest, that all fears of the Inferi is vain; Ixion is not roll’d upon a wheel; Sisyphus does not thrust a stone uphill continually; Prometheus’s liver cannot be devoured and renew’d every day. These are but Fables, as are also those which are reported of Tantalus, of Cerberus, of the Dragon, of the Furies, and the like; which if they are made good anywhere, it is in this life, through the depraved manners of men.
EPICURUS.

SECTION. IV.

Of superior things, as well Celestial, as Aerial.

Hitherto, of inferior things; we come now to the superior, which appear in the Region above the Earth; such are the Sun, the Moon, and other Stars, and all that belong to them, as Rises, Settings, Tropic-likes, Eclipses, and the like. Moreover, Clouds, Rain, Wind, Lightning, Thunder, Thunderbolts, and the like. For though some make a distinction, and call these latter only Meteoric Superior things, yet is it convenient, to call the former also Meteorics, and to include both within Meteorology, that is, a Treatise of superior things.

Here we must repeat, what was said at first, that we must not propose any certain other end of the knowledge of superior things, whether they be treated of jointly with others, or separately, and by themselves, as elsewhere we have done; than an undisturbed state of mind, and unswerving judgment; as also in the rest of the things, of which we use to discours.

For superior things being such, as that they either have, or may have a habit, manifest cause of generation, and declaration of their being, conformable to that which we perceive by the senses; we ought not to adhere to one particular way, as we do in Moral Maxims, or some in Physick, such as are, The Universal Body and vacuum; the Principles of things are indivisible, and the like, which agree only one way with the Phenomena: but firmly hold, that these things are indeed explicable; not one, but many ways, whether ought we to attempt any thing about the reach of human power, by defining one certain way, after which only the thing may be performed.

This, I say, we must repeat; for as much as it is requisite to conceive, that it is the office of Physick, accurately, to examine the causes of the chief things which are in nature, and that from hence proceed all the felicity which consists in knowledge of superior things; and on that especially, that we examine, what kind of things those are, which are discovered in these superior ones, and whatsoever has affinity with them. And with all, inviolably to observe this rule, that it is competent to these things, to be done many ways, and not necessarily to one way only; but, that they may be brought about some other way also.

This, I do expressly inculcate; left, if we adhere only to one way, and that happen to displease us, we presently recur, not to some other natural cause, but to the divine; for this were to acknowledge a manifold manner, where there is but one. Thus, to the divine nature, we should attribute trouble and bitterness, whereas it is simply and absolutely necessary, that in an Immortal and Blessed Nature, there be none of those things which cause dissolution and trouble; for the mind immediately apprehends, and concludes from the consideration of an immortal and blessed condition, that is absolutely impossible, any such thing should happen to it.

And doubtless, for want of this consideration, it comes to pass, that the contemplation and observation of risings, settings, eclipses, and the like, make our knowledge nothing the happier, but they who have considered these things, (yet know not what are the nature of those bodies, and what are their chief Causes) fear as much, and perhaps more, than if they had not contemplated them at all; by reason, that the admiration which arises from their consideration, cannot be satisfied, as to the disposition and manner, whereby they are performed. For this reason we endeavour to find out, and alledge many several causes of risings, settings, eclipses, and the like, conformable to things of the like kind, which happen amongst us on the earth.
EPICURUS.

Before we must not think, that an accurate enquiry after these things, conduces to acquisition of tranquility and felicity. In superfluous things, and others that are obscure, we ought to seek our causers, according to the several ways by which the like things happen among it; supposing those who neither know one certain way by which a thing is effected, nor a manifold way, but content themselves only with the appearance of things as preferred at that distance, and yet are ignorant in what consists or not consists imperceptibility. Truly, if we conceive it may fall out, that a thing may be done one certain way, and thence we are not troubled; truly I say, knowing on the other side, that the same thing may be effected many several ways, we shall be no safer undistinguished, then if we knew it could be done by a certain way.

But whenever one has a mind to adhere to, or defend anything that is likely in itself, that speculating is sufficient in this present subject which runs congruously, according to the manifold ways the Phaenomena afford us. Yet is it necessary to derive our conjectures concerning superior things, from those which are done among us; from those, I say, which are observed to resemble those in things which are seen above; for those things are affected several ways; therefore also that which appears in every superior thing, is to be considered by those things which agree with it, and may be affected several ways among us, as several things may happen.

But I inflict too much hereupon. To come therefore to the business. Although the whole Region above Earth is sometimes called Heaven, for even the nearer part of it, the Air, is sometimes called so too; yet by the word Heaven and Æther we will understand the superior part of the Region, which containeth the Stars; and, by Air, the inferior, in which Clouds, Lightning, and the like are generated. We shall begin with the celestial superior things, and speak afterwards of the Aerial.

CHAP. I.

Of the Substance and Variety of the Stars.

We must first lay down what was formerly touched, that the Sun, Moon, and other Stars, were not made a part, and afterwards brought into the world, but received their figure, augmentation, and magnitude, immediately, and together with the world, (as the Earth, the Sea, and whatsoever is in the world,) by the concomitants and convolutions made within it, of some more eminent natures, and those either aerial, or fiery, or both; for this our sense suggests to us.

Hence some Stars seem to be of a more fiery substance, especially the Sun, whose heat is so manifest to sense, but withall, they seem not so much to be pure fires, as some mixed concretions, to which fire is annex.

Or, it may be, they are, as it were, certain glatty smooth dishes, capable to receive the bright, fiery little bodies, which, coming from the ætherial region thorough which they run, light upon them, and to reflect them, and to show them to us in that form wherein they appear: For the like is done amidst us. Or that they may be clouds, enlightened, and, as it were, enkindled; for the Meteors called the Paretii, are caufed no other way.

Or, it may be, they are, as it were, deep vessels, containing fire in their hollow part, like a Lamn-horn, or Chafing-dish, which holdeth coals, or melting mettalls. Or, they may be, as it were, glowing plates, or, as it were, stones burning in a furnace; for there is nothing in all these that implies a contradiction.

In like manner, the Sun in particular may be nothing else, but a thick kind
Epicurus.

kind of clod, which being like a pumice, or a sponge full of pores, and little holes may, containing fire, dart light out of them.

Only the most impossible thing seems to be what some affirm, that the Stars are animate, or of many Animals, and moreover, to many gods.

For though we should grant, that each of them is a kind of World, or rather, as it were, an Earth, which hath not only an aide, but an other peculiar to itself. Nevertheless, as this our Earth, though it produce th Animals, is not therefore it felt an Animal; so neither would the Stars be, although we should grant, that some Animals may be generated in them.

But if we should admit this, yet what they further preface, that there are such a kind of round and rolling gods, needs to be repeated only; for we formerly proved, that these are prodigious fancies, not of discoursing, but dreaming Philosophers, when expressing immortal beings by the language proper to mortals, they pronounce things contrary to the felicity of the gods, and which seem so far beneath their excellent nature.

The Stars have been already distinguished into two kinds, some are fixed, which observe the same position from one another, and keep the same course from East to West, never altering it. Others are wandering, whence called Planets or erratic Stars, because they never observe the same position, neither towards one another, nor to the rest; and sometimes perform their courses nearer the North, sometimes nearer the South.

If you demand from whence this diversity proceeds, I shall say, that it may be the Stars were from the beginning moved round with such a necessity, that some took a circular motion uniform and even, others, an irregular and unequal one.

It may also be, that, in the places through which they move, there may be some even diffusion of spaces, which may carry them on the same way one after another, whereby they may move evenly, but that where they may be uneven for the same reason; the varieties which we observe, in their motions proceeding from thence.

To alled one only cause for these, seeing that the Phenomena's argue that the cause may be many, is madness, and not rightly considered by those, who date on us Aphiology, and trivially explain the cause of some things; and in the mean time will not allow the divine nature (to which they ascribe most of these) to be free from the task of several troublesome offices.

CHAP. II.

Of the Magnitude and Figure of the Stars.

Concerning the magnitude of the Sun, and of the rest of the Stars, it may be considered, either as to us, or in itself. As to us, it is so much as it appears to be, for the sense is not deceived; and whatsoever magnitude the eye feeth in them, is such in them, for they have not any other thing immediately encompassing them without, which is visible; nor any thing of their own, which falls not within view of the eye.

But this magnitude considered in itself, or as to the thing itself, may be either somewhat greater, or somewhat less, or exactly so much as it appears to be. For with such variety are fires presented to our senses, even at a distance, in the day-time, or by night. For either they are just so big, as they seem, as the light of a candle, if we look near it; or lesser, as when we see the same light in the day-time at distance; or greater than indeed they are, as when the same light is seen in the night-time at rest.
I say, somewhat greater or lesser, in regard this diversity betwixt the appearance and the true compasse cannot be very great, as may be evinced from our ordinary fires; for, from what distance whether we perceive the heat of any fire, from the same its just form appeareth to us. In like manner, since we perceive the heat of the Sun here from the place where he seemeth to us to be, his just magnitude cannot be sensibly different.

That nothing perceivable is taken off from the Stars by this distance, is confirmed, because those things which we behold at a great distance, and much are mediating between, are presented to us with a confused circumference; but the Sun, to those who can look upon him, appears to be of an exact compass; nor can any thing be seen more distinctly than the circumference of the Moon. There are indeed some Stars which twinkle, and seem to shoot forth trembling beams; but upon another account, this argues they are so near, as to be seen exactly. For fires amongst us seem, in like manner, to wave and tremble, when we behold them at a distance, which, near at hand, seem fixed and contam.

Again, this is confirmed, because if the Stars did lose their due magnitude by reason of distance, they would much more lose their colour; for we know, that a thing at distance ceaseth to be seen in its native colour, sooner then by reason of its litteness it totally disappears, or comes not to be seen at all. But though there be no distance more capable to effect this (for there is not any length greater) yet the Stars do not therefore lose their true colour.

Many things may be objected against this, but they are easily solved, if a man stick close to those things which are manifest to us, as we have shewed in our Books concerning Nature, where we bring in this distinction of magnitude, considered in it self; and, according to us, we declared, that neither he did absurdly, who said, The Sun is a fluid body; nor he that said, it was many times bigger than Pelops pentees; nor he who said, it is of equal bigness with the earth; forasmuch as of things which in themselves are greater and lesser, there may be as to us one magnitude, according as they are nearer or farther off.

As for the figure, I shall only say, that since it appeareth round to us, it is globous and plain like a plate, and therefore the Stars are either as disks, or as cylinders, or as cones and tops, or as certain nailsfixed in the sky. For none of these hath any thing that implyeth a contradiction, nor dissimilarity from the Phenomena.

**CHAP. III.**

*How the Stars move, out-run one another, and are turned round.*

Having said, not long since, that, of the Stars, some are fixed, others erratick, and that this difference proceeds from their having different motions; we must now say, in general, that the motions of both may be made, either by the turning about of the whole heaven, in which one or more of them are, supposing it to be solid, and carrying them about with it, like nails fastned into it; or else, the Heaven standing still, as a fluid or pervious things, by their being whirled about, and moved thorough it.

Now for as much, as whether it be the motion of Heaven, or of the Stars, it may have begun from a necessity made at the very time, that the world was generated, and imposed east-wardly; it might in the first case, (that is, if it be in the whole Heaven) both have begun, and be continued by
by the hurry of some ares. For these may not so well extricate or
some thing being aground, and the Heaven round the Wells, as
the former, which on all sides, as is fome times the Poles. In the
case, (that is,) the motion in the polar wheels may be a
by the hurry of our air, or by the current of the fire.

For it may have been fo, or by the course of the fire.

For it may have been so. For the very beginning,
that a great company of little bodies, evaporating, and dissolving
themselves, might break the air

and cause the pillars of the arch, and along the air, receiving the
are thus becoming the cold of the Moon, its fill being
and cause thus continuing circular运动, which is full being
and go according to the same proportion, which agrees with the phenomenon,
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EPICURUS.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Rising, and setting of the Stars, and of the alternate length of days, and nights.

The Rising, and setting of the Sun, Moon, and the rest of the Stars may happen three ways.

First, by appearance above, and occultation beneath: For that the Stars being always bright and never extinguish'd, are so carried about, above, and below the earth; that sometimes they rise, sometimes they go down, or set: and the Sun, in particular, when he goeth down causeth darkness with us; but returning, he enkindleth as it were the Heaven with his morning-beams. There is not any thing amongst the Phenomena's which contradicts this.

Again, by being enkindled in the East quarter, and extinguished in the West: For, there may be such a disposition of the Medium in both these places, as that, whilst the Stars passe through it, what I affirm may be effected, there being nothing in the Phenomena's that contradicts it; seeing, there are not only fountains, that extinguish, but such also, as enkindle Tapers, as that at Spire, formerly mentioned. So that the Ocean compassing the earth, the Sun may be extinguished by it in the West quarter, and return all along it, passing along the north into the East quarter, and from thence arise re-enkindled.

Thirdly, by a new production every day; for nothing hindreth, but that there may every day arise new Suns; for example, there flowing together to the East, several fires, or seeds of fire, which joyn in one round body, and shine, and are carried on impetuously towards the West. For it is reported, that the like happens in the mountains of Ida, and chiefly about the rising of the Dog-star; and that fires may meet in great bodies together at certain seasons, may be understood from what is observed to be done at some determinate time in all other bodies. For, from the confusion and defluxion of seeds, Trees at a certain time bring forth leaves and fruities, at a certain time shed them; at a certain time teeth are bred, at a certain time cast; and so in other things, which it were too long to instance.

Now the Sun's continuance above the earth making day, and his absence night; How comes it to passe, that all daies are not equally, and all nights equally, but that in Summer the daies are longer, the nights shorter; in Winter alternately, the nights longer and the daies shorter? This also may happen three ways.

First, For that the revolutions of the Sun above and beneath the earth, are sometimes performed faster, sometimes slower, according to the alternate lengths of the places, or waies in which the Sun paffeth: And this by reason of the position of the Orb called the Zodiac, through which the Sun paffeth obliquely, and in two Signes of it makes the nights and the daies equall. But when from thence he declineth to the North or South, as much of his journey as he taketh off from one part, either above or below the earth, so much he adds to the other.

Secondly, Because there may be certain places in the Aether, which, by reason of their gravity, and the resistance which happens thereupon, cannot be paffed through so swiftly as others. Such are those which make the Sun stay long beneath the earth in the Winter, whereby they make the night longer and the day shorter than in Summer. Some things of the same kind may be
EPICURUS.

be observed amongst us, according to which it is convenient to explicate superior bodies.

Thirdly, that in the alternate parts of the year, the fires, or seeds of fire abovesaid, flow together in such manner, as that they make a Sun sooner or later; and the Sun rises out of that part from which he begins, a longer or shorter course above the earth.

They who insist and fix upon but some one particular way, to explicate these effects, both contradict things apparent, and deviate from that which falls under human contemplation.

CHAP. V.

Of the light of the Stars, and of the changes and spots in the Moon.

Let us now say sometbing of the light, nor only of the Sun, but of the rest of the Stars, and particularly of the Moon. First, men admire, that the Sun, being so little, should pour forth so much light out of himself, as sufficient to enlighten and warm the Heaven, the Earth, the Sea, and yet not be it self exhausted. But the Sun is a kind of fountain, into which there flow together from beneath on every side perpetually rivulets; for the seeds of heat throughout the whole world flow into the Sun, as that immediately from him, as from one fountain or head, both heat and light overfloweth every way.

Moreover, the substance of the Sun may be of such thickness, and the light and heat which floweth from him of such thinness, that as a little current or a rivulet, streaming from a spring, watereth the meadows and fields round about it, without any loss to it self; so, that of the Sun may be sufficient to irrigate, as it were, the whole world, without any sensible diminution of the Sun.

Moreover, the aire may be of such a nature, as that it may be kindled, as it were, by a little light, diffused from the Sun; as a whole field of corn may be set on fire by one spark.

Likewise, the Sun may have his aliment round about him, which may supply what he loseth, as the flame of a lamp is fed by the oyle which is put to it. It may happen also many other wares.

As to the rest of the Stars, especially the Moon, it may be, that they have their light from themselves, it may be they borrow it from the Sun; for amongst us we see, that there are many things which shine of themselves, many things which borrow light from others; and there is nothing appearing in the superior things themselves, which hinder, but that either of these opinions may be true.

If a man preserve steadfast in his mind the manifold wares, and the suppositions conformable to it, and consider the causes together with it, left minding things that are incoherent, he grow vanly proud, and sometimes fall into one particular way, sometimes into another.

As for the Moon, it is in the first place wonderfull, how she comes to have so many changes, or in real or decreal light. It may be, that being round, and receiving light from the Sun, she is successively to signified, (after the same manner as the aire, when the Sun riseth, is enlightened, and when he setteth is darkened successively) as that going away from the Sun, the seemeth every day to encrease, because the showeth more and more other enlightened-face to us, till the presents it as full; and then going towards the Sun, decreaseth every day, because the showeth less
and leave of it, until at last the turneth no part of it towards us, but is quite unseen.

Moreover, it may be, that the Moon being round, one part of her may be bright, another dark, and as the turneth her body about may discover two, alternately, more or less of each part.

It may also be, that being bright or, it self, she may be obscured by an interposition of some opacous body comming under her, which is hemispherical and hollow, and, moved along with her, is continually rolled about her.

Neither doth anything hinder, but that there may everyday (according to what we formerly said) be made a new Moon of a several form and figure; as in like manner the stations of the Spring, Summer, Autumn, and Winter, and many things in them, come and go, are produced and perish, at our times.

In fine, it may be any way, wherein those things which appear to us may be applied to explication of that manner, unless some man, being much in love with one singular way, shall vainly reject the rest, nor considering what things it is possible for a man to know, and thereupon aims at the knowledge of those things which man cannot attain.

Moreover, they admire in the Moon, that there appear spots in her face; but her face may appear so, either from the various and different nature of the parts of the Moon, or from the interposition of some body, not so much opacous as dusky; not rolling about her, but perpetually adhering to her and not solid all over, but full of holes like a Racket.

Or it may be any other way of all those which are observed to be conformable to things apparent. This is the course to which we must adhere, concerning superior things; for no man, if he content against apparent things, can ever partake of true tranquility.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Eclipses of the Stars, and their set Periods.

But there is nothing which useth to strike a greater terror into men, then that sometimes they observe Eclipses, and defects of light in the Sun and Moon, to happen on a sudden. Yet why not this also happen many several waies?

For first, the Sun may be eclipsed, for that the Moon being interposed, puts her dark orb or opacous body before him, and keeping away his light from the earth, causeth darkness in her, until by her removall the light is restored. The Moon may be eclipsed, for that the earth being interposed betwixt her and the Sun, takes the Sun off from her, and darkens her, while she comes within the cone of the shadow, until passing from out of it, the recovereth light.

Again, the Sun may be eclipsed, for that some part of heaven, or some other opacous body, such as is the earth, may move along with the Sun, and at certain times come underneath him, and interpose his light. And the Moon in like manner, for that some other opacous body passing betwixt her and the Sun, keeps off the beams of the Sun from her, or moving together with her, doth not only perform its phases slowly, but sometimes overcasts her with a sudden darkness. Nor to mention, that if the be dark on one side and bright on the other, it may happen, that she may sometimes on a sudden turn her dark side towards us.

Moreover, both the Sun and Moon may suffer Eclipse, for that they may passe thorough places pernicious to life, and thereby their light be-
come extinguished, until going beyond them they renew and recover it.

Thus ought the several ordinary ways to be heeded, and some of them also put together, if being possible, that many causes may concur.

The periodic order, by which eclipses happen at certain times, is conceived to be kept up by the same causes in some things, as in the vicissitude in the seasons. There is no need of recurring to the divine influence for the bringing of these to passe; let us allow those to be free from all business, and expeditiously happy,

Unless this be done, all discourse of causes in superior things will be vain; as hath already happened to some, who taking an impossible course became privation for that they approved only one, and rejected all the rest, though they were possible, and were transported to dreams of that which exceeds the capacity of the intellect, and were never able to admit, as they ought, apparent signs, nor understand, as they say, how to rejoice with God.

CHAP. VII.

Of the Prefigurations of the Stars.

IT remains, we speak of the prefigurations of the changes of the ayre attributed to the stars, as rain, wind, drought, heat, and the like; which happen according to the time of the rising or setting of certain stars, as of the Dog, Orion, the Pleiades.

These prefigurations may be made either according to the condition of the seasons, as it happens in those living creatures, which being seen at one time with Lune, or another with others, so that either this, or that, or these, are signs, not causes of the season; for the rising and setting stars may have causes but signs of these mutations; or as it happeneth certain, but casually, as what time the star is rising or setting, there are causes of some mutation in the ayre.

For neither of these is repugnant with things apparent; and what cause there may be, besides these agreeable with things apparent, we cannot perceive.

It is not without some reason what I hinted of prefigurations, which are observed in some animals, to be made according to the condition of the season which at that time comes in, so as the motions observed in animals only declare the cause, but make them not. As thistles, for example, which depart from us in Autummus induce not any necessity of the winters being at that time; neither is there any divine nature which first and marks the departure of living creatures, that it may make good what is foretold by them.

This is a kind of folly that cannot fall upon any animal in which there were the least grain of wit; so far is it from being in that nature which possesteth all felicity.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Comets, and those which are called Falling Stars.

What hath been hitherto spoken of the stars, belongeth to the Sun and Moon, and Stars which having been made from the beginning of the World continually inhabit and appear in heaven. But besides these, there are other stars, which sometimes are generated or newly appear, and after some
EPICURUS.

Some few days or months either perish or lie hid. They are called Comets, quafi Commae Stella hairy-stares, for that they have a long train like haires.

Some also there are that last but for a moment, vanishing almost aloof as they appear; and seeming in some kind of excursion to fall down, they are ordinarily termed falling-flats.

As for the Comets, they may be generated; either for that some fire is sometimes kindled in some of those superior places, and being kindled is for a time nourished and moved, according to the abundance and disposition of the matter. Or else they appear, for that heaven as to that part which is over our heads, hath some peculiar motion according to several vicissitudes, so as these stars are driven to be made manifest. Or else, they come forth by reason of a certain disposition as sometimes; and, as soon as they come lower towards us, they become manifest.

Comets disappear to our sight through the causes contrary to these: either the matter convenient for them is not placed all along as it is in that place where they are observed to inhere, so as by degrees through want of aliment, they consume as it were and go out, or that some thing opposed their motion. And that may happen, not only for that this part of the World, round about which the rot is turned, remains not unmoved as some affirm; but also, for that there may be in the aire some impetuous gyration which may hinder their moving round, and drive it another way, as may also happen to the other stars which are called Planets as the Tropicke.

Moreover this may happen many other ways, if we discourse upon that which is conformable to things apparent.

As for those which are called falling-flats, they may be made either by pieces broken off from the true stars, or from the falling down of that matter whereof there is a kind of diffolation, as may happen also in lightning; or from a company of ignifying atoms meeting and joining together to effect us: the motion being made, according as the force of meeting together was from the beginning. Or from the driving of winds together within certain cloudy bottoms or vallies, and setting it a-fire whilst it is rolled up and down, and breaking through the bottoms which restrain them, and moving so that part towards which that impulsion carries them.

There are other ways not fidious, by which this may be done. But of celestiall Meteors, enough.

CHAP. IX.

Of Clouds.

Next these are the aerial Meteors, which are made nearer us in the aire. We shall begin with the Clouds, than which nothing is generated above in the aire of leen, more frequently.

A Cloud therefore may be generated and have its being, by some accumulation as it were of the aire, the winds driving it, so as that a cloud is nothing but a thickning of the air. Again, by implication of some atoms cohering mutually to one another, and fit to produce such a compound; and this when they first come together into little bodies of clouds, and those are gathered together into greater bulks, so as at last they become greatest of all.

They most commonly seem to rise at the tops of Hills, for that the first little compounds are so subtle as that they escape the sight, and are carried on by the wind, until being by little condensed, they appear on the tops of the hills which by reason thereof seem to smoke.

If any shall doubt, from whence there can come so great a conflux of atoms as is sufficient to make such great bulks of Clouds, let him consider,
EPI CURUS.

Of the Wind, and of Presfers.

Wind may be generated, first, when the atoms or little bodies leap out of some new places and fly through the air, there being a more vehement effusion made from some heaps which are proper for such kind of emissions. When in a narrow vacuum there are many little bodies, there is a sensation of wind; and contrary, the air is quiet and calm, when in a great quiet vacuum there are but few little bodies.

For, as in a market place or street, as long as the people are but few they walk without any trouble; but when they run into some narrow place, they tangle and quarrrel with one another; in this space which encompasseth us when many bodies crowd into one little place, they must necessarily tangle one another, and be thrust toward, and driven back and entangled and squeezed; of which is made the wind, when they which concreted yeld and having been long toil'd up and down by uncertain shrinks, but when a few bodies tisre up and down in a large space, they can neither drive nor be driven imperiously.

Again, Wind may be caused when the air is driven on and agitated either by emissions comming from the earth and water, or by the Sun's pressing upon it from above; for it is manifeast, that where the air is agitated and tistred, there is caused wind, so as wind seems to be nothing else but the waves of the air. Whence we may conceive that the wind doth now thefe resembles water troubled, and the more violent winds come from being tistred by some more vehement cause. after the former manner as torrents rage and make, when when there happen a vast defluxion of waters by great showers falling upon the mountains.

Presfers are wingy whilings (for the fiery, and those which burn, from which the name is taken, are a kind of thunder). They may be generated either from the depression of a cloud of former flames towards inferior places, whilfe it is carried down and driven on by abundance of wind, which don't is self about, and tears away the flesh of the cloud, the wind itself stretched on the cloud immediately from whence, or from the wind standing round about, when as the air pressing upon it from above, and withall the air which is seen on and diffused round about hindering by reason of its density, the great abundance of wind knoweth not what way it may go. it self, and being driven back, as well by the sides as from above, it necessarily thrills the cloud downwards.

When this Presfer is thrust down upon the land, it causeth whirl-winds; when upon the sea, whirl-pools. Whirl-winds are telle frequenly seen, because the
the mountains snatch them away before they come within our sight; whirl-pools more frequently, by reason of the wide smoothness of the sea, into which we may behold a cloud like a pillar descend from heaven, and push it down, as it were, with the force of an arm or fist, until the violence of the wind breaking through it, the sea works and boils, and the ships incur a danger almost inevitable.

CHAP. XI.

Of Thunder.

It was not without reason that I said, there are also fiery Pref ters, which are not different from Thunder. For, Thunder seems to be caused by the manifold conglomeration of blasts, swelling with fiery little bodies, within the bulks of the clouds; and by the evolutions and strong enkindling of them, and breaking of the cloud by the fire, which is so forcibly varted to inferior places, according as that breaking forth is, sometimes directed towards a high mountain, (which kind of places are oftentimes struck with thunder) sometimes toward other things.

For that the nature of thunder is fiery, is manifest, even because it often burns both the houses upon which it is darted, and for that it leaves behind it a stench like brimstone. That it is generated within the clouds, is evident, for that it never thunders when the sky is clear; but the clouds first gather together all along the air, and darken the sky, and there arise a foul night, as it were, of flowers. Lastly, that many little bodies or seeds, as it were, of fire, are contained within a cloud, may be argued, as well from the effect, as for that amongst the little bodies of a cloud rising up from beneath, are intermingled, not only watery, but fiery also, and of other sorts. Withall, it cannot be, but that the cloud must receive many things from the beams of the Sun.

When therefore the blast or wind which drove the clouds together, hath intermingled itself with the seeds of fire, that are in the bofoms, as it were, and cavity of the cloud, there is caused a whirling or vortex within it, which being carried about very rapidly, goeth hot by motion; and either by intention of this heat, or the contagion of some other fire, breaketh out into perfect thunder, and tearing the cloud is darted forth. Now the cloud is cleft and broken, by reason that the places round about the whirling or vortex, are taken up, and fluffed thicker with the part of the cloud; neither, by reason of their being squeezed up to close together, is there any chink open, whereby whist it is spread with the wind may infinuate itself, and retire, by penetrating into it by degrees. Whereupon it is necessary, that the fire lately made, being dilated by the wind, breaks thorough the cloud with violence, which makes the noise of thunder; and comming forth, shineth and filleth all parts with a glittering light.

It may also be, that the force of the wind may light from without upon the cloud, at such time as the thunder is masture and perfect, and rending the cloud, make way for the fiery vortex to break thorough.

It may also be, that the fiery vortex, though not set on fire when it breaks forth, may be kindled afterwards in its passage through the air; after the same manner as a leaden phlegg passing thorough the air, grows hot, and takes fire. It may also be, that the fire is made in the very dashing against the thing which it hits, the seeds of fire being struck out of both, in the same manner as they are struck by a flint out of steel.

There are many other ways by which this fire may be kindled, or thunder made.
EIGHTH.

EPICURUS.

made, only let us cast away all fiction; and cast away it will be, if we take our
confidence of things, not from that which is conformable to things, apparent.

Hence may be given the reason, Why it comes to pass, that it thunders
often in the Spring and Autumn, than in other seasons. In Winter, there
waits the leaves of trees; in Summer, the blades and heaps of clouds; in
the Spring and in Autumn, all things convenient are ready.

But how comes it to pass, that the motion of Thunder is so swift, and
its stroke so violent? This proceeds from the great violence of the
creation, and the tenacity; by reason of which, nothing in the way resists
it, and force, which is, as it were, doubled by gravity, and enlarged
by motion.

How comes it to perpetuate thorough the walls of houses, to melt me-
tals in a moment, to draw out all the Wine out of full vessels? This pro-
cceeds from the tenacity, and quick motion, and violent force of the little
bodies, whereby it can in a moment disseparate and disperse those things,
which the ordinary fire of the Sun cannot under a long time.

CHAP. XII.

Of Lightning and Thunder-claps.

Although I hinted by the way, how Lightning and how Thunder are
genrated; yet nothing hinders, but that they may be generated many
ways besides.

For Lightning, may be made either by the rubbing, or striking of the clouds
against one another, such kind of figures arising from them; or by such
figure, and disposition of atoms, rushing up together, as cauteth fire,
and generates lightning; after the same manner as we observe it to be
done, when iron and aleine are united one another.

O: by the winds stirring up out of the clouds those bodies, or little bodies
that is, atoms, which cause this shining brightness; for that the wind
(and especially if it grow hot like a leauh plume) strikes off the same little
bodies, which are struck by the mutual attrition of the clouds.

Or by squeezing forth there being made a compression either by the clouds on
with another, or by the winds driving them, which is caueth over and above
the force of collifion.

O: by intercession of the light which is diffused by the Stars, which there-
upon is driven by the motion of the clouds as winds, and falls bow of the clouds.

Or by the falling down of some most intense lights out of the clouds, whilst
the clouds are impartially gathered together by the fire; and withall, thunder
is caueth like a kind of bounce by their motion.

Or by the enkindling of a wind, which is caueth, as well by a vehement in-
tense fire, as composition of motion.

O: by a breaking of the clouds by the winds, and falling down of fiery atoms,
which cause lightning to flame.

That lightning may be generated many other ways, he will easily per-
ceive, who adheres to things apper, and is able to understand what suits
with them.

Thunder-claps may be made thus, Either by the rolling of a wind within the
cavities of the clouds, as in ordinary vessels, when something is rolled in them.
Or making a crack by the very diffusion and ebullition, as it were, of the fire,
within the same clouds.

Or by the breaking and tearing of the same clouds, as when a swollen blad-
der cracks, paper is torn, or a shrowd rent.

Or by the same clouds, rubbing and driving against one another, having
acquired an icy kind of concretion, and this by reason of the winds driving them,

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Litur.
as tall woods crackle at the blowing of the East-wind, waves unbroken hammer, garments hung up, and papers carried away and beaten, as if were, by the winds, make a clattering noise.

Or by extinction of the fire of thunder, breaking out of one cloud, and lighting upon another which is waterish, whereupon it blisters like red hot iron, taken out of the fire, and cast into the water.

Or by the bursting of some dry cloud, which crackles like a branch in the fire.

In a word, that this also may be explained for all rains, the things which appear rude and teach us, that we think not, with ignorant and superstitious persons, that the noise of thunder denotes the appearance of some god, since other bodies, being struck against one another, make a sound also, as Mill-stones in grinding, or the hands clapped together.

Left any wonder how how it comes to pass, that lightning is seen before the thunder is heard, this may happen, either for that in some certain disposition of the clouds, as soon as the wind lightens upon them, there leaps forth such a configuration of little bodies, as causes lightning, and thereupon the wind, by rolling up and down, maketh this sound.

Or for that they being both generated together, the lightning is brought to us with a quicker swiftness: the thunder commeth later, as happened in some things which are seen at distance, and made a sound by blows: for it is manifest, that the stroke is seen before the sound is heard.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Rain and Dew.

We must now speak of watery concretions, whereof some continue fluid, others acquire some solidity by the impression of cold; those which continue fluid are Rain and Dew, whereof one is made, the heaven being cloudy; the other, when it is clear.

Rain may be made of the clouds, either when being thinner than ordinary, the wind driving them, or they pressing upon one another, are squeezed together, and kist into drops; or when being thicker than ordinary, they are rairf'd and changed by heat or by the wind; or, like wax, melt so, that they fall down in drops.

That there are seeds of water contained in the clouds, is so well known, that we need not speak of it. They ascend together with the clouds, they encrease together with them, and are dispersed thorough them, as blood through the parts of our body. Neither doth there ascend moisture into the clouds from all rivers onely, but the clouds also which hang over the seas receive moisture, like a fleece of wool.

Wherefore rain may flow from the clouds, either when the force of the wind thrusteth the clouds up together, and great flore of flowers, being raised above them, presteth and thrusth them; or when the clouds by the power of the winds are raised, and suffer their moisture to flow abroad; or by the heat of the Sun are so disdissolved, that they fall down in drops, and, as I said, like melting wax.

It may happen, that rains sometimes last a long while, because it then happeneth, that many seeds of waters, rising up to several clouds, and dispersed every way, may supply the rain. Sometimes also the earth reeking, exhales back again all the moisture which she receiveth.

Dew is made, either by the meeting together of the little bodies in the air, which are of such nature, as to be fit to generate this kind of moisture, or by the bringing forth of little bodies, which chiefly generate dew above, when they so meet together as to make that moisture, and flow down
of watery Concretions, which by impression of cold are congealed into some solidity, there are two which are made when the heaven is cloudy, Hail and Snow; one, when it is clear, Frost.

Hail is generated, either when the congelation is stronger, by reason of the feeling of a cold wind which is on every side, and preseth the drippings or drops of the clouds, which otherwise would go away into rain, or when the congealed bulk cleareth asunder in many places, and by a moderate liquefaction, watery drops insinuating into the chinks by compression of the parts, and breaking the whole frame into pieces, they cause that the parts exit compacted severally by themselves, and make a heap of fragments, which are thereupon dispersed.

That these fragments be in a manner round, nothing hindreth, either, for that the utmost corners are cut off on every side, by reason of their long falling; or, for that in their very forming, something either watery or windy, surrounds all the parts evenly, as we said, so that their surface is round, and not un-even.

Snow happeneth to be made either by thin water poured out of the Clouds, so as that it froath (some Clouds fit for the purpose prefiguring, and the winds blowing them abroad) and is afterwards congealed in the very Motion, by reason, of some more vehement cold in the lower places of the Clouds.

Or by some smooth congealing, caused in the Clouds; unto which, whilst the little watery bodies, comprized by, and neighbouring to, one another, arrive, there is caused an ageneration of such loothnesse, as the flocks of snow have, whereas, the same driving one another harder, cause hail, which two things chiefly are made in the aire.

It may also be, that a kind of ejaculation of the snow, which falleth down in heaps, may be made, the Clouds which were first congealed, breaking it asunder.

Lastly, frost is made of the same little bodies as dew, when, as the little drops of dew made either way, are by the cold temperament of the Aire congealed, and in congealing, receive a light compactednesse.

Of the Rain-bow, and Halos.

We must not here passe by two remarkable things, which appear in the Clouds or above, The Rain-bow, an Arch of various colours, ever against the Sun; and Halos, which sometimes like a white crown compasseth the Moon.

The Rain-bow is made either, for that the moist aire shineth by the opposite splendor of the Sun; or for that it is the particular nature of light, and of the aire, to present such kind of colours either all of them, or one only, from which (shining forward) the neighbouring parts of the aire are so coloured; in like manner, as we observe to be done, when the parts of any thing which is enlightened, make the parts of other things next to it shine also.

As to the roundnesse of its figure; this is caused by reason, that it is Fig. 2
Epicurus.

Convey'd to the beholders eye, from a distance every way equal; or, for that the atoms, which are carried out of the aire into the Cloud, are so compelled, that every concretion made of them, is formed into this roundness.

A Halos is made about the Moon, either by the carrying up of a somewhat grosse or lightly-cloudy aire towards the Moon; whilst in the mean time, some effusions derived from her, do as it were set it (for they do not absolutely differ from it) in such manner; that they are formed into a circle about her in this cloudy figure.

Or by the aire, compelled about the Moon, after such a manner, as to make this round and grosser figure about her; which some conceive to happen according to some of her parts, or by some effusion driving together from without, or, by infusion of heat from beneath, fit to effect this.

Chap. XVI.
Of Avernall places.

If refts, that we speake some things of Avernall places, so termed, for that they are pernicious to birds; for when birds attempt to flye over them, they instantly fall down and dye: As also concerning the caufes of Pestilence, as far as they depend on the aire.

I must here only repeat, that the earth containeth all kinds of little bodies so diversly figured that some are fuitable to the natures of Animals, others hurtful; and by reason that the contextures of Animals are so unlike to one another, some of these are convenient and wholesome to some Animals, which to others are inconvenient and pernicious. And why not? when the contexture and remper of the fame perfon being changed by a Fever, the same wine, which before did him much good, is now as deadly to him as to be flabb'd to the heart.

It is manifest that many things unpleafant, troublesome, and pernicious ordinarily come into the raife, the smell, the touch, and all the fenses, not to mention some trees which either cause a heavinesse to those who sleep in their shade, or by an ill fene kill them; nor strong wine, or the fume of coals and the like. How many places are there, which exhale strong and hurtful fcent of brimfom and fulphur? They who dig in Mines, who look to wa, and dye fo soon, how many notfome vapours do they find to breathe out of the inmoft parts of the earth?

Thus there are some places out of which these vapours breathe, which being carried up into the aire, diffus'd round over it, in some manner poften it, and infect it with a deadly quality; so that, when birds come to passe over it, Veluti f Melior mensum tempore Cafforeum alfaciat, they become stupefy'd, and immediately fall down dead.

It may also be, that the aire which lies between the birds and the earth, being cleas funder by the force of a vapour breaking forth, and the place becoming almowt vacuous; the birds may not have a support, upon which to reft their spreading wings, and continue their flight, fo that they sink and fall, over-burthen'd by the weight of their own body. Thus much for Avernall places.

Chap. XVII.
Of Pestilence.

Though Pestilence, or a morall affefion of the aire may come from above, like a Cloud or dew, yet it is most commonly caufed, when the
the earth is purify'd by unseasonable rains and heats, and such a vapour
arises out of it, as infects the air, and killeth fat and near, not only men
but other living Creatures.

That the air easily enterainis the affection (or quality) of the vapour
breathed immediately out of the earth into it, is manifest, from the diffe-
fers that are particular to Countries, as here with us, the snow is frequent;
among the Achaens, forenec of eyes; among the Egyptians, the Le-
profe; As also for that, Travellers find it by experience, acknowledging
that the air in several places is, very different.

That this affection is sometimes propagated by the air, the nature of
the Pestilence declareth, as that especially, which, in the memory of our
Ancestors beginning in Ethiopia, ran on into Libya and Egypt, and
moist over all the dominions of the King of Persia, so as it came into our
City and Country also, and quite laid it waste.

This propagation is made, when the poisonous vapour intermingling
its little bodies with the air, doth so disordere, and pervert the fequation
of the little bodies thereof, that whatsoever of them are like it's owne, in
formeth into the same contexture: as when fire inflamming with it's little
bodies into wood, so altereth its composition, that it liketh forth all the
fiety little bodies that are in it; and, out of it, maketh a new fire like to it
felt. Moreover, as fire running along, in its swift motion, is able to
spread it felie thougth a whole Wood; so this Pestilence affection, by
reason of the little bodies, of which it consists, creepeth forward by De-
grees, and changeth the air a great way, until it be reprefl'd by an affection
quite different, in like manner, as when a Cloud or Mist creeps through
the air, and by little and little, changeth, and disturbs it all along as it
goeth.

Not to mention, that when men by breathing, draw the air into their
bodies, they suck in at the same time, the little bodies of this affection;
wherewith, those which are like them in the body are tranfposed, and per-
verted in the same manner, as we said of the air; and by contagious a infla-
tion, they are transmitted on to others, which caufe the same perversión,
whereby the disease spreads every where.

Thus much concerning not Meteorology onely, but all Phyfiology; of
which the few things that we haue said are such, as that by contemplating
them, we may thoroughly understand the things that are done, whereby the
things that are of affinity with them, may be comprehended; and the
causes of particular effects in Nature, known. For they, who pursue not
these with all possible diligence, are far from understanding them, as they
ought, and from obtaining the end, for which those are to be understand;

And never must we call out of Mind the Criteries, (not the evidence
that belongs to every one of them) because, if we forget not these, we
shall with right reason find out from whence perturbation ariseth, and
what it is that caufeth fear, and shall quit ourselves from it, understanding
the cause of superior things, and of all others which ordinarily happen,
and strike great fear into others.

But, presupposing the Criteries, it avails most to apply our selves to
speculation of the principles, of which all things conifit, and of the infini-
ty of Nature, and other things coherent with these, and with constant re-
membrance to preserve the chiefest and moft general Maxims concerning
them. For by this means, we shall be farther off from Fables, and obtain
that undisturbed state of mind, which is the true and only mark at which,
in all this discourse, we have aimed.
The third PART of

PHILOSOPHY.

ETHICK, or MORALS.

It is well that we speak of Ethick, or the Philosophy of Manners; neither is it without caufe that we laid at first, that this is to be esteemed the principal part of Philosophy, because that which is, of Nature would be useless, unless it conformed to the end of life with an Ethical consideration. Even Prudence itself, which belongs to this part, therefore excels natural Philosophy, because it rules it, and uses it as a means to moral Philosophy.

In saying this part concerns the end of life, I show why it is commonly called the Philosophy concerning Life and Manners, or concerning the Institution of the actions of life (for Manners are no other than the customary actions of humane life); likewise concerning the End, that is, the extent or greatest of the goods which we pursue; and concerning things eligible and avoidable, as much as it prescribeth the election of such things as conduct to that end, and the avoidance of such as divers from it.

For the end of life by the racit content of all men, is Felicity; and since almost all mis of that end, must not happen either for that they propose not to themselves that felicity which they ought, or for that they use not the right means to attain it?

When we behold so many, who, abounding in all things necessary to the use of life (swimming in wealth, adorn’d with titles, flourishing in a hopeful issue; in fine, posses’d of all things commonly esteemed desirable) are notwithstanding anxious and querulous, full of cares and solicitudes, distracted with tortures, in a word, leading a miserable life; thence we may infer, that they know not wherein true felicity consists, and by what means it may be attained: their hearts resembling a veseth, which either being leaky and full of holes, can never be filled; or being tainted with ill liquor, cornebs and spoyles whatsoever it receives.

It is therefore worth our pannes, by the benefit of this Philosophy (which treats of the End and of Felicity) to cleanse and mend our heart, that it may be satisfied with a little, and be pleased in the enjoying of any thing, we must Philosophize not for show but seriously; for it is requisite, not that we seem found, but that we be found: We must philosophize forthwith, and not deferre it to the morrow; for even to day it concerns us to live happily, and it is a mischief of folly that it always begins to live, or deferre to begin, but in the mean time liveth never.

A strange thing is it! We have been borne once, we cannot be born twice, and age must have an end; Yet thou O Man, though the morrow be not thy power, in confidence of living to morrow, purse thy self off to the future, and losest the present: Somest live waste with delay, and hence it is that some of us dye in the midst of businesse: Every man leaves the World as if he had but newly entered it; and therefore old men are upbraided with insafety, because, as if employed in business that concerns them not, they do not take notice that they live, and so their whole life passeth away without the benefit of life.
EPICURUS.

Let us therefore endeavour so to live that we may not repent of the
time past; and so enjoy the present, as if the morrow nothing concerned
us. He most sweetly attains the morrow who least needs or desires
the morrow; and that hour overtakea a man most welcome, whereas he
had framed to himself the least hope. And since it is usual to always
to begin life, let life be always to us as it were perfect and absolute, and
as if there were nothing to do but measure. The life of a fool is unpleasant,
as it is in sinner, it is wholly carried on to the future; let us endeavour
that ours be pleasant, secure, not only present, but even now settled
in safety.

Doubtless, the way to fly folly is to ascend that watch-tower (as it
were) of wise men, from whence we may behold the rest wandering, and,
in life, vainly seeking life. If you think it pleasant from land to be-
hold Martineers striving with storms, or, without endangering yourself,
see Armies joying battell; certainly, nothing can be more delightful
then from the calm throne of Wisdom to view the tumults and con-
tentions of fools. Nor that it is pleasant that others be afflicted;
but it pleaseth that we are not involved in the same evils.

But that we may in some measure, to our ability, help those who de-
side to attain this height of wisdom, we will collect our meditations upon
these things, treating first of Felicity, which is man's greatest good, and then
of those things which conduce to the making and preferring it, which are
nothing else but the former themselves.

CHAP. I.

Of Felicity, or the end of Good as farre as Man
is capable of it.

Felicity we must first take notice, it is termed the end, that is, the
last, the extrem and greatest of Goods because since those things are
called Goods which allure the appetite to put them, and of these
Goods some are desired for themselves, some for other things, Felici-
ty is such a Good as all goods ought to be referred unto, it itself to
none.

And though Felicity, or Beatitude, and happy life be the same thing,
yet doth not hinder us, but that we sometimes mention the end of hap-
py life, when we do according to the vulgar phrase taking the end of hap-
py life, and happy life, for the same thing; but not implying any further
end, to which happy life may be thought to be referred.

This premised, we must first distinguish felicity into two kinds: one
superem, incapable of intention and remission; the other subsistent in
which there may be addition and diminution of pleasure.

The first, is conceived to be a state, than which none can be imagined,
better, sweeter, more desirable; in which there is no ill to be feared; no good
warming; there is nothing that would and may not be done; and which is
sure that it can at no time be lost.

By the other, we understand a state, in which it is as well as may be, or
in which there are very many necessary goods, very few ills; and in which
it is permitted to lead a life to sweeter, so quietly, and contently, as the
Company, Course of life, Constitution of Body, Age, and other circum-
stances will allow.

Nor without reason is it I make this distinction and definition. For,
though it seem manifest, that the first kind is proper only to God; yet
there
there are, who, having a high opinion of themselves, and of their own wisdom, dare promis and arrogate it to themselves, and therefore affirm, that they are equal to God; and model among them, are they who, repute themselves inerior to none but Jupiter.

But these truly seem forgerfull of their own mortality and weakness, when as all, who are conscious thereof, cannot but acknowledge, that men are capable only of the latter, and that wisdom doth much, if all men being in some manner miserable, it place thee in a state, wherein thou shalt be the least miserable of all men. Or, if among the several degrees of miseries, to which thou art obnoxious by birth, it place thee in that wherein thou shalt be least miserable. For that is so be happy, to be free from those ills, wherewith thou mightest be afflicted; and in the mean time to enjoy such goods, than which, greater cannot be had in the condition wherein thou art.

This indeed is the reason why I conceive a wife man, though deprived of sight and hearing, may nevertheless partake of happy life, because he will yet perceive in as many goods as he can, and be free from those ills, if not of body, at least of mind, which otherwise might have afflicted him.

I further declare, that a wise man, though he should be cruelly tormented, will yet be happy, by felicity not divine but human; which in a wise man is always as great, as can be for the condition of the time.

For in torments he feels the pain indeed, sometimes grievous and acute; but because there is a necessity of suffering them, he not exasperates or makes them greater, by impatience or despair, but rather, with as great constancy of mind as is possible, mitigates and renders them somewhat more easy. Herein certainly he is more happy than if he suffer under them, like those, who being under the same torments, bear them not with equal courage and constancy, nor have the like assistance from wisdom, which confers at least innocence of life, and security of conscience) to lighten them.

Therefore neither is there any reason to cavil, that the Bull of Phalaris, and a bed of roses, are all one to us; and the wise man, burning in that Bull, mult cry out, *How pleasant is this! how unconcern'd am I!* Since there are somethings, which a wise man had rather should happen to him, as rest of body free from all disturbance, and leisure of mind, rejoicing in contemplation of its own good. There are other things, which, though he would not have them; yet, when they do come, he bears them contemptuously, even commends and approves them, inasmuch as they give him occasion to please himself in his own constancy, and to say, *I burn, but yield not,* Why may it not be wished, nor indeed to be burnt, but to be vanquished?

This I say, in regard a wise man is obnoxious, both to the pains of sickness and the torture of Tyrants, although he neither invites those, nor provokes those, so far as decently he may. Besides, the times are not such always to all men, as that they may by indolence live happy.

**CHAP. II.**

That Pleasure, without which there is no notion of Felicity, is in its own nature good.

Seeing that to live without pain is sweet or pleasant, and to enjoy good things, and be recreatby them; it follows, that Felicity cannot consist without both, or at least one of these: (by pleasure, sauity, jucundity,
Therefore before we enquire, whether felicity really consists in pleasure, we must know, that pleasure is in its own nature good, as its contrary, pain, is in its own nature ill.

Certainly, since that is good which delighteth, pleaseth, is amiable, and allures the appetite; that, consequently, ill which barmeth, is unpleasant, and therefore excites hate and aversion: There is nothing pleaseth more than pleasure, delighteth more, is lov'd more, is desired more; as on the contrary, nothing incommodes more than pain, displeaseth, is abhorred, and shunned.

So as pleasure feels not only to be a good, but the very essence of good, it being that by which any thing is good or desirable: Pain not only an ill, but the very essence of ill, as being that by which any thing is ill or hateful.

For though we sometimes find pleasure, yet it is not the pleasure itself, which we shun, but some pain annexed accidentally to it; as, if at any time we pursue pain, it is not the pain it self that we pursue, but some pleasure accidentally joynt to it.

For, (to express this more plainly,) no man fleigheth, hates, or shuns pleasure, as pleasure; but because great pains overtake thole, who know not how to follow pleasant pleasure. Nor is there any who loves, pursues, would incur pain, simply as pain; but because sometimes it so happens, as that with labour and pain, he must pursue some great pleasure.

For to instance in the least things; Who amongst us undertakes any laborious exercise of body, unless that some commoditie arise by it? Who can justly blame him, who desires to be in that pleasure which hath no trouble? Or him, who shuns that pain which procures no pleasure? But we esteem and esteem those worthy of contempt, who, blinded and corrupted, with the blandishments of present pleasures, foresee not the troubles that must ensue. Like faulty are they, who defer their duties out of finenes of mind, that is, the avoidance of labour and pains.

Of these things, the distinction is easie and ready. For, at a free time, when our election is at liberty, and nothing hinders, but that we may do what pleaseth us most, all pleasures to be embraced, all pain to be expelled. But at sometimes it often falleth out, that pleasures are to be rejected, and troubles not to be declined.

Thus, although we esteem all pleasures a good, and all pain an ill; yet we affirm not, that we ought at all times to pursue that, or to avoid this; but that we ought to have regard, as to their quantity, so also to their quality; since it is better for us to undergo some pains, that we may thereby enjoy the more abundant pleasures; and it is expedient to abstain from some pleasures, lest they prove the occasion of our incurring more grievous pain.

Hereupon this was, as it were, the fountain, from which, in treating of Criteries, we deduced several Canons concerning Affection or Passion, esteeming pleasure or pain the Criterie of Election and Avoidance. And not without reason, forasmuch as we ought to judge of all these things, by the commenuration and choice of things profiting or hurting, since we sometimes use a good as an ill; and, on the contrary, sometimes an ill as a good.

Hence therefore, to premise this further, I say, that no pleasure is ill in it self, but some things there are which procure some pleasures, but with all, bring pains far greater than the pleasures themselves. Whereupon I add,
EPICURUS.

add, that if every pleasure might be reduced within itself, so that it

neither should compribe within it, nor leave behind it any pain, every

pleasure, by this reduction, would be in itself perfect and absolute; than

the principal works of Nature, and consequently there would be no

difference amongst pleasures, but all would be expedible alike.

Moreover, if those very things which afford pleasure to luxurious

persons, could free them from the fear of Meteors, and of death, and

pain, and could instruct them what are the bounds of desires; I could not

find any fault, forasmuch as they would be every way perfect with plea-

sures, and have nothing grievous or painful, that is, ill.

CHAP. III.

That Felicity consiists generally in Pleasure.

Now to come to what was proposed, Felicity seems plainly to con-

sist in Pleasure. This is first to be proved in general; then we must

show in what pleasure particularly it consists.

In general, Pleasure seems to be, as the beginning, to the end also of

happy life, since we find it to be the first good, and convenient to our, and

to all animal nature; and is that from which we begin all election and

avoidance, and in which at last we terminate them, using this affection as

a rule to judge every good.

That Pleasure is the first and connatural good, or (as they term it) the

first thing suitable and convenient to Nature, appears; for that every

animal, as soon as bare, delights pleasure, and represents it, as the chief good;

although pain as its greatest ill, and to its utmost ability, repels it. We see

that even Hercules himself, tormented by a poisonous spider, could not

with-hold from tears;

Crying and howling whilst the Lucrian stones,

And high Euboean hills return his groans,

Thus doth every undisposed Animal, its own nature judging incorruptly and

entirely.

Cic. de fin.

There needs not therefore any reasoning to prove, that pleasure is to be de-

sired, pain to be shunned; for this is manifest to our senses, as that fire is hot,

snow white, honey sweet. We need no arguments to prove this; it is enough that

we give notice of it. For since that if we take away from man all his sensibilities,

is nothing remaining, it is necessary, that what is convenient or contrary to na-

ture, be judged by nature herself, and that pleasure be expedible in itself, and

pain in itself to be avoided. For what precedes, or what judges, either to pursue

or avoid any thing, except pleasure and pain?

That pleasure, as being the first thing convenient to nature, is also the

last of expirables, or the end of good things, may be understood even

from this; Because it is pleasure only, for whose sake we do desire the

rest, that it self is not desired for the sake of any other, but only for it

self; for we may desire other things to delight or please ourselves, but no

man ever desired a rest, why we would be delighted and pleased.

Certainly no more, than for what cause we desire to be happy; since plea-

sures and felicities might be repaid, not only in the same degree, but

to be the very same thing, and consequently, the end, or ultimate, and

greatest good, on which the rest depend, but it self depends on none.

This is further proved, for that Felicity is, as we hinted formerly, no

otherwise, than because it is that state, in which we may live most sweetly

and
and most pleasantly, that is, with the greatest pleasure that may be. For, take from life this sweetness, jucundity, pleasure; and Where, I pray, will be your notion of felicity, not of that felicity only which I esteem divine, but even of the other, esteemed human? Which is no otherwise capable to receive degrees of more and less, or intention and remission, than because addition or deduction of pleasure may befall it.

To understand this better, by comparing pleasure with pain, let us cite de fin. Suppose a man, enjoying many great incertain pleasures, both in mind and body, no pain hindering them, nor likely to disturb them; What fate, can we say, is more excellent, or more desirable than this? For in him who is thus affected, there must necessarily be a constancy of mind, fearing neither death nor pain, because death is void of sense; pain, if long, hath no relief; if great, short, so as the forrune makes amends for its greatness, the lengthness for its shortness. When he arrives at such a condition, at he trembles not with horror of the Deity, nor suffers the present pleasures to pass away, whilst his mind is busied with the remembrance of past, or expectation of future good things, but is daily joyed with the reflecting upon them; What can be added to better the condition of this person?

Suppose, on the other side, a man afflicted with as great pains of body, and griefs of mind, as maus natures is capable of; no hope that they shall ever be eas'd, no pleasure past, present, or expected; What can be said or imagined more misterious than he?

If therefore a life full of pains be al things must be avoided, doubleffe the greatest ill is to live in pain; whence it followseth, that the greatest good is to live in pleasures. Neither indeed doth our mind any thing else, wherein, as its center, it may rest; all sicknesses and troubles are reduc'd to pain, nor is there any thing else which can remove nature out of her place, or disoblige her.

CHAP. IV.

That the Pleasure, wherein consists Felicity, is Indolence of Body, and Tranquillity of Mind.

There being (as before is intimated) two kinds of pleasures; one in stasis or rest, which is a placability, calmness, and vacancy, or immobility from trouble and grief; the other in motion, which consists in a sweet movement, in gladness, mirth, and whatsoever moveth the sense delightfully, with a kind of sweetness and relishation, as to eat and drink out of hunger and thirst. It may be demanded, Whether in both, or in either, and in which consists Felicity?

We say, that pleasure, wherein felicity consists, is of the first kind, the stable, or that which is in stasis; and so can be no other than indolence of body, and tranquility of mind.

When therefore we say in general terms, Pleasure is the end of happy life, we are far from meaning the pleasures of luxurious persons, or of others, as considered in the motion or act of fruition, by which the sense is pleasantly and sweetly affected; as some, either through ignorance, diffident, or ill will, interpret. We mean no more but this; (to repeat it once more) Not pains in body, nor trouble in mind.

For it is not perpetual feasting, and drinking; nor the conversation of beautiful women; nor rarities of fish, nor any other dainties of a profuse table, that make a happy life; but reason, with sobriety, and a serene mind, teaching the cautions, why this object is to be preferred, that to be rejected; and expelling opinions, which occasion much trouble to the mind.
EPICURUS.

The better to understand why this pleasure only is the End, we may observe, that Nature tends to no other pleasure primarily, as to her end, but to the stable, which followeth upon removal of pain and trouble. The moveable she not proposes as the end, but provides only as a means conducing to the stable, to sweeten (as it were) that operation of hers which is requisite to the extirpation of pain and trouble. For example, Hunger and Thirst being things troublesome and incommodious to an Animal, the primary end of Nature is to constitute the animal in such a state as that it may be free from that trouble and inconvenience; and because this cannot be done but by eating and drinking, she therefore seafons with a sweet relish the action of eating and drinking, that the animal may apply himself more readily thereto.

Most men, indeed, live preposterously, transported inconsiderately and intertemporally, they propose for their end the pleasure which consists in motion; but wisdom, hummed to our relief reduceth all pleasures into decent order, and teacheth that pleasure is to be proposed as the end; but that which is the end according to Nature, is no other than that which we have spoken of. For while Nature is our guide, whatsoever we do tends to this: that we neither be pained in body nor troubled in mind; And as soon as we have attained this, all disturbances of the mind are quieter, and there is nothing beyond it that we can aim at to compleat the good both of our Soul and Body. For we then want pleasure when its absence excites pain in us: but as long as we are not pained, we want not pleasure.

Hence comes it that abstinence excites pain in us: but as long as we are not pained, we want not pleasure.

Moreover, hence it appears, that they insult without cause, who accuse us that we mean not by want of pain some middle thing between pain and pleasure, but to confound it with the other part (in the division) as to make it not only a pleasure, but the very highest of pleasures. For, because when we are delivered out of Pain, we rejoice at that very freedom and exemption from all trouble, but every thing whereat we rejoice is pleasure, as every thing whereat we are offended, pain; the privation of all pain is rightly named pleasure. For, when hunger and thirst are expelled by eating and drinking the very abstraction of the trouble brings pleasure; so in every thing else, the removal of pain causeth satisfaction of pleasure.

Hence also may be shown the difference when they object, that there is no reason why this middle state should rather be esteemed a pleasure than a pain. For discontent ensues not immediately upon abstraction of pleasure, unless some pain chance to succeed in the room of the pleasure; but on the contrary, we rejoice at the loss of pain, though none of those pleasures which move the sense succeed. By this we may understand, how great a pleasure it is, not to be pained, which if any doubt, let him ask those who are oppressed with sharp sicknesses.

Some laugh hereat: They object, that this pleasure is like the condition of one that sleeps, and accuse us of sloth, never considering that this
this constitution of ours is not a mere stupidity, but rather a state wherein all actions of life are performed pleasantly and sweetly. For, as we would not have the life of a wise man to be like a torrent or rapid stream, so we would not should be like a standing dead-pool: but rather like a river gliding on silently and quietly. We therefore hold his pleasure is not unactive, but that which reason makes him to him.

But to omit these, and return to our subject, there are two good things of which our chiefest Felicity consists: That the mind be free from trouble, the body from pain; and so as that these goods be so full, and all trouble taken away, that they admit not increase. For how can that increase, which is full? If the body be free from all pain, what can be added to this indolence? If the mind from perturbation, what can be added to this tranquillity? As the serenity of Heaven being refined to the sincerest splendor, admires no greater splendor; so the state of a man who takes care of his body and soul, and connects his good out of both, is perfect, and he hath attained the end of his desires, if his body be neither subject to pain, nor his mind to disturbance. If any external blandishments happen, they increase not the chief good, but, as I may say, season and sweeten it; for that absolute good of humane nature is contained in the peace of the soul and the body.

**CHAP. V.**

*Of the means to procure this Felicity; and of Virtues the chief.*

Now seeing this peace of body and mind, tranquillity in one, indolency in the other, is the compleat felicity of man; nothing more concern us, than to consider what things will procure and preserve it; for when we have it, we want nothing; while wee want it, all we do is to obtain it; and yet (as we said) for the most part we fail of it.

First, therefore, we must consider of Felicity no other wise than as of Health; it being manifest, that the state in which the mind is free from perturbation, the body from pain, is no other than the perfect health of the whole man. Wherefore it comes that as in the body, so in the mind also, those things which produce and conserve health are the same with those which either prevent diseases, or cure and expell them.

Now seeing that to provide against the diseases of the body belongs to the art of Medicine, as well for the prevention as cure of them, we shall not need to say much hereupon, but only give two cautions which may be sufficient.

One, that for the driving away all diseases, or at least making them lighter and easier to be cured, we use Temperance and a sober continent life.

The other, that when there is a necessity of our suffering them, we bear our selves to fortitude and undergo them with a constant mind, not exasperating them by impatience, but comforting ourselves with considering that, if great, they must be short; if long, slight.

Against the diseases of the Mind, Philosophy provides, when we justly esteem it the medicine of the mind: but it is not with equal facility, confuted, or applied, by those who are sick in mind. For we judge of the diseases of the body by the minds, but the diseases of the mind, we
neither feel in the body, nor know or judge as we ought by the mind, because that whereby we should judge is diltempered. Whence we may understand, that the diseases of the mind are more pernicious than those of the body; as amongst those of the body, the word and most dangerous are such as make the patient insensible of them; as the Apoplexy, or a violent fever.

Moreover, that the diseases of the mind are worse than those of the body, is evident from the same reason which demonstrates that the pleasures of the mind are better than those of the body; viz. because in the body we feel nothing but what is present, but in the mind we are sensible also of the past and future. For, as the anxiety of the mind, which ariseth from pain of the body, may be highly aggravated, if we conceive (for instance) that some eternal and infinite Evil is ready to fall on us; so (to transfer the instance) pleasure is the greater, if we fear no such thing; if being manifest, that the greatest pleasure or trouble of the mind doth more conduite to a miserable or happy life, then either of the other two, though they should be equally falling in the body.

Now forasmuch as there are two principal diseases of the mind, Desire, and Fear with their severall offsprings, and accompany'd with discontent and trouble, in the same manner as pain is joyned to the diseases of the body; it is therefore the office of Philosophy to apply such remedies as may prevent them from invading the mind, or, if they have invaded it, expell them. Such chiefly, are the vain desires of wealth, of honours, fear of the gods, of death, and the like, which having but once taken possession of the mind they leave no part thereof found.

The remedies which Philosophy applyeth, are the Virtues, which, being deriv'd from reason, or the more general prudence, easily drive away and expell the affections. I say, from Reason, or the more general prudence; because, as there is a more particular prudence, serving for the direction of all the particular actions of our life; so is there a more general prudence, which is no other than reason itself, or the dictate of reason, and is by most esteemed the same with wisdom; whereas, virtue is only a perfect disposition of the mind, which reason or prudence doth create and oppose to the diseases of the Mind, the vices.

CHAP. VI.
Of Right-reason, and Free-will, from which the Virtues have all their praise.

Being therefore to proceed in our discourse to Virtue and its severall kinds, we must premise something concerning Reason itself, and likewise concerning the Free-will which is in it; for thence is derived all the praise belonging to Virtue; as also its opposite, the reproach due to Vice.

Forasmuch as Reason generally is nothing but the faculty of ratiocinating or judging and inferring one thing from another, we have taken it particularly for that which judgeth, inferreth, and ratiocinates in things of action, subject to election or avoidance.

But whereas, judgement or reasoning may be either right or wrong, that reason, whose judgement is false, is not properly reason, and therefore we term it opinion; yet in respect it is the common phrase, you may call it also reason if you please, meaning wrong reason; as right reason.
EPICTETUS.

reason may be termed Opinion, meaning sound Opinion.

Right reason arises either from ingenuity, or experience, and deliberation or observation. Being grounded upon firm and correct principles, our rationalization becomes solid, and justly do we appeal to the judgment of him, who is expert and knowing in things. But of this already in the Canonick part, concerning the Critics, which need not repetition.

When I say, things subject to election and avoidance; I take for granted, that there is in us a free or arbitrary power of reason, that is, a faculty of choice and of purpose of that which reason hath judged good, and of avoiding and shunning what it hath judged ill.

That it really is in us, is proved even by experience; and by common sense, with manifesting, that nothing is worthy of praise or displeasure, but what is done freely, voluntarily, deliberately, and by election; and therefore must depend on something within us, which is beyond compulsion, and in respect whereunto, all rewards and punishments are rightly ordained by the Laws; than which nothing were more unjust, if the actions of men were to be imputed to that rigid Necessity, which some affer, derived from Fate, as the sole commandress of all things, declaring, that whatsoever comes to pass, flowereth from an eternal truth, and combination of causes.

Truly it is much better to be addicted to the fabulous (that is, the common) Law of opinion of the gods, than to the belief of Fate, according to some Naturalists holden, imposing on our necks as an everlasting lord or Tyrant, whom we are to stand in awe of night and day. For, the common opinion hath some comfort in it, that the gods will be moved with our prayers; but this, imposes an insupportable necessity.

True indeed it is, that in things void of reason, some effects are necessary, (yet not to necessary, but that they might have been prevented, as we declared in the Canonick; and where we treated of causes,) but, in Man, endevour’d with reason, and as far as he makes use of that reason, there can be no Necessity. Hence it was, we endeavoured to avert the declination of motions in atoms, that we might from thence deduce, how Fortune might sometimes intervene, and put in for a share amongst human affairs, yet, that which is in us, our Will, not be deliroy’d.

It behoves us to employ all our wit and endeavours to maintain our own free-will against that temptiremal motion, and not to suffer wickedness to escape unresistable.

But what I say of fortune, implies not that we ascribe any divinity to it, not only to the vulgar, but even as those Philosophers, who esteem her an unalterable Cause; though they conceive not, that the heitens of men, any thing of good or ill that may conduct to happy life, yet think that the gods gives occasions of very considerable goods and ills. We imply not this I say, but only mean, that, as many things are affected by necessity and counsell, so also by Fortune; and therefore it is the duty of a wise man to assume himself against Fortune.

Now seeing, what ever good or ill there is in human actions, depends only upon this, that a man doth it knowingly, and willingly, or freely; therefore the mind must be accustomed to know truly, that is, to use right reason; and to will truly, that is, to bend the free will to that which is truly good, from that which is truly ill. Forasmuch, as this accustomed begeteth the disposition in the mind, which we described to be virtue; as the accustomed of it to the contrary, begeteth that disposition which we may justly define Vice.

Not to mention, that what produces pleasure, since without any pain, trouble, or repentance, attending or ensuine thereupon, is truly good;
good; that which produces pain, sincere without any pleasure, or joy succeeding upon it, is truly ill. It only gives this hint of both to distinguish each of them from what is only apparent and dissimulated: such as that good which begets present pleasure and afterwards introduces pain and trouble; and that ill which procures pain or trouble, but afterwards pleasure and cheerfulness.

**CHAP. VII.**

**Of the Vertues in General.**

Forasmuch as all Vertues, is either Prudence or the dictate of right reason, as we accustom ourselves to it, or is directed by, and depends on Prudence, and the dictate of right reason; it is manifest, that to this latter kind belongs, as well, that whereby a man is affected toward himselfe, as that, whereby he is affected towards another: for by Prudence, a man is made capable to govern not only himselfe, but others.

The Virtue which relates to others, is generally called Justice; that which concerns our selves, is ordinarily distinguished into Temperance, and Fortitude. But we use to confume both under the term Honesty, as when we say, to act virtuously is no other, than to act Prudently, Honestly, Justly; they who live soberly and constantly are said to live Honestly or Decently; they who do valiantly, are thought to behave themselves honestly or decently.

Hereunto, we (as others) distinguish Virtue into four kinds, Prudence, Temperance, Fortitude, and Justice; but, as that we oppose not Prudence to any affection so much as to Ignorance, Ignorance, Folly, (except by accident, in so much as perturbation blinds reason and causeth a man to act imprudently); nor Justice, to any affection so much as to Malice, whereby a man is prone to deceive (unless by accident in so much as anger, hatred, covetousness, or some other passion may cause a man to do unjustly); Temperance we oppose to desire, Fortitude, to fear.

Hence is manifest, when I formerly said, A sober or well-ordrd reason procures a pleasant or happy life; we are to understand that it procures it by means of the Vertues which it in generat and prefers. And whereas I added that it searched out the causes why things are to be embraced or avoided, and chafeth away opinions with occasion great trouble in the mind; we are to understand that it is one universal prudence, the principle of all things experient and avoidable, and consequently the greatest, because the vertues which arise from it appease perturbations, teaching that we cannot live pleasantly, unless prudently, honestly, and justly; nor prudently, honestly, and justly, unless pleasantly.

By this you find, why I conceive, that the Vertues are con-naturall to a happy life, and that it is impossible to separate happy life from them. All other things, as being frail and morral, are transitory, seperable from true and constant pleasure; only Vertues, as being a perpetual and immortall good, is inseparable from it.

By this also you may understand, that all the vertues are connected within one another, and that by one; because to the principall, Prudence, all the rest are conjoynd, as the members to the head, or as rivers to the spring from which they flow; the other, because as well prudence, as all the rest cohere with happy life, there cannot be a happy life where the vertues are not; neither can the vertues be there, where the life is not happy.

Notwithstanding, that the Vertues are all connected within one another, yet are they not therefore all equal, as some conceive, who hold that all vices
VICES and faults are also equal. For a man may be more inclin'd to Justice, then to Temperance; and temperance may be more perfect in one, than in another. As for instance, (without envy be it spoken) my selfe, by length of time have made to great a progress in Sobriety, as selfe then an obsequy serves me for a meal; Metamorbus, who hath not yet made to great a progress, a whole obsequy. And it is evi'dent, that, of men, one is wiser then another; and of them, who do rightly according to vertue, equal rewards are not allotted to all, as neither equal punishments to all offenders. Even sense and manners confute them, who make all equal, and hold that they offend alike, he who beats his servant wrongfully, and he who his parent; seeing, some there are who make no difference betwixt eating a bean, and the head of our father.

Others condemn, and explain on us, for affirming, that the vertues are of such a nature as that they conduces to pleasure or felicity, as if we mean, that pleasure which is obscene and infamous; but let them raise as they please. For as they make vertue the chief good, so do we: if the discourse be of the means conducing to happy life, neither is there any of so great power as vertue, therefore not more excellent, (not wealth, not honour, not friends, nor children, &c.) But if the discourse be of living happily or felicity, why should not this be good, superior to vertue, to the attainment whereof, vertue itselfe is but interview?

They ex taimes again, that we enervate Vertue, in not allowing her so much power, as to render a wife man free from all passion or affection, but to prevent him to be moved therewith, as (for instance) to grieve, weep, and sigh at the death of friends; but as we set a high value upon vertue, as being able to deliver us from vain cetous and superfluous desires, the chief head of all grievous perturbations; so likewise not a little esteem it, for that it reduceth the rest of the affections to such a mediocrity, in which there remain some sense as it were of humanity.

Certainly, that is all exemption from grief, which seven men boast of, proceeds from some greater ill, cruelty, and immoderate ambition of vain glory, and kind of madness. So that it seems much better, to feel some passion, to be affected with some grief; to feel some tears, such as proceed from persons, touched with Love and tenderness, then to be wise as these would have us, and grin like brute beasts.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Prudence in generall.

WE must now say something of every vertue in particular, beginning with Prudence, whose office being to govern the life, and so to provide for every accident in life, as to direct it to happiness; it seems alone to comprize the offices of all vertues.

That the propriety of Prudence, is to dispose all accidents and actions of life to felicity, or pleasaure, is most manifest. As we value Medicine, not for the science it selfe, but for health; and the art or pleasing, not for its ingenuity, but use in navigation; so Prudence, the art of living, would never be desired, if it were nothing efficacious in life; but being so, it is desired, as the art, by which pleasure is sought and obtained.

For Prudence, or (if you like the word better) Wisdom, alone it is, which not only provides, that nothing happen which may afflict the body, but likewise above all, expels faults from the mind, nor permitting us to be daunted with fear; Under which governesse we may live in tranquility, extinguishing the ardor of all desires. For desires are inflammable, they

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subvert
subvert not onely single persons, but families, many times a whole Common-wealth. From desires arise hatreds, discontents, discord, seditions, wares; neither do these onely revell abroad, or with blind fury assault others onely, but likewise, shut up in the breast, they disagree and quarrell with one another; which must necessarily make life exceeding bitter. Only the prudent and wise person, cutting off all vanity and error, content with the limits of nature, can live without discontent, and without fear.

Now seeing life is disturbed by errout and ignorance, and that it is prudence alone, which rescues us from the violence of Lafts and fears, reacheth us rempetarely to sustain the injuries of Fortune, and sheweth us all the ways that lead to quiet and tranquillity. Why should we flock to affirm, that Prudence is expetible in order to pleasure, and imprudence to be shunned, for trouble's sake?

That we say, A prudent Person temperately sustaineth the injuries of fortune, the reason is, that he fore-fees them, if not in particular, at least in the general; Neither, if anything happen contrary to his expectation or designes, is he troubled, for that he knoweth it, not to be within the reach of human industry, sagacity, or power, either to foore-fee, or to prevent, that nothing adverse or troublesome happen. He judgeth it better to be, with well-ordered reason, (as far as human frailty will admit) unfortunat, than with inconsideration fortunate, and thinks nothing more handsome, than, if fortune bring about a thing fairly and prouerably, that it was not undertaken without judgment and deliberation.

But indeed, a wise man orders to himself, that cutting off vain desires, he contrasts himselfe within necessaries, which are few and small, as hardly any fortune can snatch them from him. Thus, since none, or very little fortune can intervene to a wise man, he may say to her, I have seiz'd on thee, (Fortune) and intercepted thee, so as thou canst not come at me.

Concerning the cutting off all desires, we shall speak hereafter. Now so much as prudence may be considered, either as it governs our selves, or a house, or a family, or a City, or a Common-wealth, and so is distinguished into Private, Domestick, Civill; let us say something upon each.

CHAP. IX.
Private Prudence.

Private Prudence consisteth almost wholly in this, that a man understandeth his own Genius, and undertake nothing whereunto his nature is averse, that he deliberately pre-examine the part in which he is to spend his whole life, and to which he must so accommodate all the actions of life, as that, as much as possible, he may live in indolence and tranquillity.

For he ought to have the end or scope of life fixed, and constantly fix before his eyes, and, consult with right reason, according to all evidence, whereby we are to weigh whatsoever we think or determine. For unless this be done, all will be full of indiscreet temerity and confusion, and our designs and enterprizes will be overthrown by too late repentance.

Besides, if upon every emergent occasion, you refer not each of your actions both to this kind of scope, and to that end of nature which you proposed to your self in designing it, but turn aside to pursue or flye some other thing, the actions of your life will not correspond to your own words. For example, you extoll tranquillity in words, but in actions discover your self base and obnoxious to trouble.

He
EPICURUS.

He understands the bounds prescribed by Nature, to those who enter the course of life, who discern, how easily procurable that is which is necessary to life, or what is sufficient to remove any thing that afflicts the body with indigence. Thereby he knows, for well to order the whole series of life, as never to need such things or business as are contentious, and consequently full of hazard and danger.

Hence it is, that a wise man is not much afraid of poverty, it happening seldom, that any man wants the things necessary to life. Yet if those should chance to be wanting, and he not have money to procure them, he will not betake himself to beg, as the Cynicks; but rather apply himself to intract some persons in learning, thus taking an employment not mil-becoming wisdom, and at the same time supplying himself with necessaries from those, who have full estates.

Whilst we are obliged to this or the like employment, if necessary fail us, and our business be, to entertain daily occurrences with a settled courage, we must have recourse to wisdom or Philosophy for relief. To an ill counsellor we resign the ordering of the things that concern us, if, what is necessary to nature, we misuse and provide without Philosophy.

It is therefore proper a Philosopher to bethrow time in looking after these things, until by diligent care he hath furnished himself with them. But as long as he hath so much of these, as he can spend of them, yet retain perfect confidence, he is not to apply himself to acquisition of wealth and provisions.

Thus is Philosophy to be our guide in these things, by which we shall soon perceive, what a virtue, and how great a good it is, to require only what is simple, light, and very small; because what is most sweet and free from trouble in all a man's life, depends upon our being contented with the least. But, by those impediments which a solicitous acquisition of things draws upon us, being quicke discover'd, either by the pains and toil of the body, or by the difficulty of their procurement, or by their drawing the mind away from the most advantageous speculations, (which me ought ever more highly to esteem) or by some other cause, we shall clearly find, this is altogether frivellous, and not of countervalue with the troubles which follow it.

I advised, that every man should examine his own genius, and advise with himself, that he may apply himself to that which is proper for him; because otherwise, nothing can be more miserable, and more at a distance with tranquillity, than to be engaged in a course of life, for which nature has rendred thee unfit.

For neither is an active life to be undertaken by an unaactive person, nor an unaactive life by an active person. To one, rest is quiet, and action labour; to the other, rest is labour, and action quiet. A timorous and soft person must avoid the military life; a bold and impatient, the calme; for one cannot brook war, nor the other peace. The same it is in all the rest. So that nothing can be more safe, than to undertake that course only which thou canst run through, without any reluctance or repugnance of nature.

I shall openly add this, That every man, as far as lies in his power, to the end the state of life which he chooseth may be the more secure and quiet, ought to choose it mean, neither very eminent, nor very absolute. For it behoves him to live in a civil society, neither as a Lion, nor as a Gnat, left, resembling the one, he be cast out; the other, caught in a snare.
Domestic Prudence.

Domestic Prudence being either conjugal and paternal, or domestic and possessor; we shall in the first, only consider that which ariseth from what hath been said, concerning the Instigation of life.

If you find that you cannot, without much trouble, live single; that you can patientlie bear with a crosse-wife, and disobedient children; that you will not so much as vex, to behold your children crying before you; that you shall not be perplexed and disquieted with various solicitudes, how to provide all things requisite to a married life, how to prevent all inconveniences, and the like: in this case, to marry a wife, and to beget children, for whom you may provide with a conjugal and fatherly prudence, is lawful. But unless you know your self to be such, you sec, by Marriage and Fiture, how much you will hinder the happiness of your life, True tranquility.

Presume you may, of having a loving wife, dutiful children, cares neither great nor many; but you can onely presume it, there is not any god will warrant the success of your presumption. Since therefore the case is hazardous, it is no wisdom voluntarily to undergo the venture, and throw your self into a condition; out of which, should you afterwards repent, you can never retire.

I say, voluntarily, for some circumstance of life may exact, that, though unwilling, you marry and beget children; as if your condition he such, as that it requires you to serve your Country herein. For whereas some pretend propagation of the species, to which we are in a manner oblig'd, certainly there is no danger, that there should be wanting such as will marry and procreate; so that some few wise men, may be allowed to abstain from this employment.

But if some case, or certain counsel, or necessity, enforce you to marry, you must so dispose your wife, as that she may be loving to you, and a partner in your cares. You must take such care for your children, as is partly prescribed by Nature, which obligates us to love them as soon as born, (common also to sheep, woolls, and other living creatures); partly by prudence, which advises to bring them up, as they may be obedient to the Laws of their Country, and desirous themselves may become wise.

Neither is this care to be taken for our own children only, but likewise for the children of our friends, especially if they are our Pupills; there being nothing more befitting friendship, than to be Guardian in the room of a parent to thofe, whom our deceased friend entirely loved, and hath left Orphans needing protection.

For the other kind, as having slaves and Servants under us, (a possession, though necessary, yet for the most part not very pleasant;) a wife man must take order, they grow not insolent and foward, that he may behave himself mildly (as far as is fitting) towards them, and civilise the disobedient, remembering they are men; with a kind of unwillingness; being ever ready to forgive, especially if they are diligent, nor of an ill disposition. And not onely this, but if he find any inclined to learning, (such as we had, particularly Mus) let him delight to further them, call them Friends, and study Philosophy with them.

As to his Estate, he must take care of it, and provide for the future, but for, as without covetousness, and the desire of growing rich, of which hereafter.
EPICURUS.

Lately, as to Civil and Prudence, we must likewise repeat what we inferred concerning the choice of a course of life.

They who are naturally ambitious, desirous of honour, active withall, and fit to manage public affairs; as also they, whom the quality of their birth, or fortune, and opportunity invite, by an easy accession to public government; those men may decline quiet, and comply with their own nature, by adorning themselves to publick government, and an active life. For their disposition is such, that a quiet life gives them trouble and molestation, whilst they obtain not what they desire.

But they who either are naturally inclined to quiet, or have suppressed ambition and vanity by the power of reason; or, having made trial of hereof, have escaped, as out of a storm, or took warning by many eminent precedents; there will justly conceive, that quiet is much the best for them; and that it is not convenient to exchange it for an active life, unless by chance some accident intervene in the Common-wealth, requiring their industry. Whence we conclude, that a wise man must not involve himself in public affairs, unless upon some intervening necessity.

What else? Since he in pursuit of quiet, may far more easily and safety attain to that end, which the ambitious aim at by dangers and labours.

For to speak of their scope, there never wanted some, who, to procure security of men, (according to the condition of sovereignty and rule, by which they commonly think it gained;) have affected to excel in honour, and to become illustrious, thinking by this means to attain secure and quiet estate. But if their life be secure and quiet, they have acquired the chief good of nature; if not secure and quiet, (as indeed it can hardly be;) then have they lost it, because they sought that which is convenient to nature in Dominion.

But the wise man's scope being the same, security and tranquillity of life, by how much nearer a way doth he arrive at that end, when flying the troubles of civil life, he directly and immediately settles himself in a most profound quiet, as in a still calm haven? Happy indeed, who knows The chief good and a blessed life, consists not in Sovereignty or power, not in
in numerous wealth or plenty, but in indolence, composite of affections, and such a disposition of mind, as, circumscribing all things by the boundaries of nature, makes him, in being content with little, obtain the which they, who rule over many, and possess great treasures, despair ever to arrive at.

Truly, if it be fit to speak of myself, I esteem it a great happiness that I was never engaged in the factions of our City, and never studied to flatter and please the people. To what end should I, when as, what I know, the people approve not; what the people approve, I know not. That Met)redorim and I lived private, How far it was from doing us harm, when among the large goods enjoyed in narrow gardens, and in obscure Me)tie, Greece was so far from knowing us, that she had scarce ever heard of us.

I said, unless something intervenes as to the Common wealth: because, if the Common-wealth should summon and really need our assistance, we should be inhuman, where we might benefit many, not to do it; injurious also to our selves; for unless the common-wealth be safe, we cannot be what we most desire, quiet.

A wise man therefore doth not like some, who, professing wisdom, have, through excessive pride, so great an opinion of their own judgement in civil government, that they think they could equalize Lycurgus and Solon.

But if he be desired to make laws, and to prescribe a form of Government, and the offices of Magistrates, he will not refuse it; knowing that they who first made laws and ordinances and constituted Government and Magistracy in cities, settled life in a secure and quiet condition: for if that be taken away, we shall live like beasts, and every man devour the next he meets with.

And if he be called to the supreme power to govern the Common wealth according to the laws and form of Government already established, he shall not refuse; knowing that though the thing is false for the most part full of hazard, yet a wise man may have such regard to all things, and such a provident care of all, as that little our fortune, as I said before, shall intervene to him; but the greatest things, and such as are of most concernment be managed by his advice and conduct. He will first take care that the weaker sort of men, discharging their duty towards the more powerful, be neither oppressed by them nor permitted to want those necessities of life wherein the others abound; it being the end of every society and common-wealth, that by mutual assistance the lives of all be safe, and as happy as is possible.

Lastly, if he be summoned by his Prince, and some occasion require that he serve him either with his advice or help, neither shall he refuse this, knowing that as it is not only more honourable, but more pleasant to give then to receive a benefit, it is, as the most honourable, so the most pleasant thing to oblige a Prince who confers so many obligations on others. Hitherto of Prudence.

CHAP. XII.

Of Temperance in general.

Next follows Temperance, the first part, as we said, of honesty, and which seems to contain the greatest share of what is honest and decent. For it being the office of Temperance to suppress the mind when it desires, as of Fortitude to exalt it when it fears; it is esteemed less un-
EPICURUS.

243
decent to be objected by pusillanimity, than exhalted by desire; and ther-efore to resist desire, is more decent than to oppose fear.

Concerning Temperance, we must first observe, that it is desired not for its own sake, but for that it procureth pleasure, that is, brings peace to the minds of men, pleasing and soothing them with a kind of concord. For, it being employed in moderating desires, and consequently in advising that in things to be pursued or avoided we follow reason, it is not enough that we judge what is to be done or not to be done, but we must fix upon that which is judged.

But most men, nor able to hold and keep to what they have resolved on, being vanquished and debilitated by the appearance of a present pleasure, reign themselves to the fetters of Lust, nor foreseeing what will follow; and hereupon for a small unnecessary pleasure, which might otherwise have been procured, or wholly wanted without incurring pain, they fall into great miseries, losses, and infamy, and many times into the penalties of Law.

But they who so enjoy pleasures as that no pain shall ensue, and who prefer their judgment confiant, nor are overcome by pleasure, to the doing of what they know ought not to be done; these men obtain the greatest pleasure, by a persevering pleasure: they also many times suffer some pain to prevent falling into greater.

Hence it is understood, that Temperance is to be desired, not for that it avoids some pleasures, but because he who restrains from them declines troubles, which, being avoided, he obtains greater pleasures. Which is to do, as that the action becomes honest and decent, and we may clearly understand, that the same men may be Lovers both of pleasure and of decency, and that such as esteem and practice all virtues perform for the most part those actions and attain those ends, as that by them it is manifest, how odious to all men cruelty is, and how amiable, good-nature and clemency; and that those very things which ill men most desire and aim at, happen also to the good.

Now forasmuch as of the desires about which Temperance is employ'd, some are natural, others vain; and of the natural, some necessary, others not necessary (to omit, that, of the necessary, some pertain simply to life, as that of meat and drink, and the pleasure which consists in motion; others to felicity it itself, as that of indolence and tranquillity of stable pleasure), it is manifest, that not without good cause we in our Philo-sophy distinguished desires into three kinds, some both natural and necessary; others natural but not necessary; others neither natural nor necessary, but vain, or arising from vain opinion.

And as much as we said, that those are natural and necessary, which, unless they be satisfied, cause damage and pain in the body; it is evident, that those which infer no damage nor pain, though not satisfied, yet are accompanied with earnest and vehement intickings, are such not by necessity, but vain opinions, and though they have some beginning from nature, yet their diffusion and excels they have not from nature, but from the variety of opinions; which render men worse than beasts, that are not obstinately to such diffusion or excels. Likewise, that such desires are not only not necessary, but not natural, may be proved, for that they have a different excessive appetition, very hardly or never to be satisfied; and are, for the most part, justly esteemed causes of harme.

But to discourse of some chief kinds of Temperance, according to some chief kinds of desires, we may make choice of Sobriety opposed to Gluttony, or the excessive desire of meat and drink; Continence to Lust, or the
EPICURUS.

Chap. XIII.
Of Sobriety opposite to Gluttony.

It can hardly be expressed how great a good Sobriety is, which reduces us to a thin simple and spare diet; teaching us how little that is which Nature requires, and clearly showing that the necessities she has under may be abundantly satisfied with things light, and easily provided, as barley-cakes, fruits, herbs, and water.

For these things being every where to bee bad, and having the simple nature of moist and dry, moist aliment sufficiently removes the trouble of the body arising from want of sustenance. Whatever is more than this amounts to Luxury, and concems only the satisfaction of a desire, which neither is necessary, nor occasion'd by any thing, the want whereof doth necessarily involve any offence to nature: but partly for that the want of some food is born with impatience; partly for, that there is a presumpition of an absolute delight without mixture of any trouble; partly (to speak in theore) for that there are vain and false opinions inherent in the mind, which serve neither for the supplying of any natural defect, nor tend to the acquisition of any thing by the want of which the frame of the body would be dissoved.

Those very things which are ready at hand, abundantly suffice to supply all nature's wants; and they are such as partly for their simplicity, partly for their fitness are easily made ready. Here, for example, who feeds on flesh, needs other things inanimate to eat with it; whereas he who is content with inanimate, needs but so much as the other, and sustains himself with what is easily got, and cheaply dress'd.

There are four benefits arising from Sobriety; the first, that to accustom our selves to a simple diet brings and prefers health: for it is sumpruous feeding and variety of meat which begets exasperates, and continues crudities, head-aches, rheums, gouts, fevers, and other diseases, nor plain and simple food, which nature makes both necessary and wholesome, and not only to other animals but even to man himself, who yet depraves them by his exorbitancy, and corrupts them by such delicacies, as which while he affec'ts, he affec'ts only his own destruction.

Therefore if we are wise, let us beware of that meat which we much desire and long for, but affoan as we have bad it, and it was pleasant to us or to our barns. Such are all costly and luxurious meats; whilst the eating flesh is lese to be approved, as being rather prejudicial to health than wholesome, as may be argued because a health is preferred by the same means whereby it is recovered; but it is manifested that it is recovered by a thin diet and abstinence from flesh.

Neither is it any wonder that the ordinary sort of men conceive the eating of flesh to conduct much to health; for, they in the manner think, that the way to preserve health is to swallow in pleasures, even the generell; whereas of notwisethess there is none benefits any man, and it is well if it have no

The second is, that it makes a man ready and quick in the office necessary to life. For if you look upon the functions of the mind, it prefers her serenity, acutenesse, vigour; if upon the functions of the body, it keeps
it sound, active, and hearty. But tepletion, over-satiety, surfeiting and
drunkenness cloud the mind, make it blunt and languid; the body deisa-
sed, unactive, and burdened. What, I pray, can you expect extraor-
dinary from that man whose limbs are unwieldy, his knees feeble, his
tongue falting, his head swimming, his eyes full of them, his
mouth of the pick-up, bawling, and clamour; and all this, through
excess of Wine?

Certainly, a wife man who ought to content himself with a homing
of small Wine; or to eifteen the next water he comes at to be the most
pleasant of all drinks, will be far from spending the night in drunken-
ness; and as far from surfeiting himself with meats that are high, or bur-
thening his stomack with such as are lubricous and gross, who ought
to be content with the most simple, even the very free gifts of Na-
ture.

Indeed such simple and slender diet will not make a man as strong as Milo,
nor conduct him absolutely to an intense corroboration of the body; but neither
doth a wise man need such intense strength, seeing his employment consists in
contemplation, nor in an active and pestilential kind of life.

The third benefit is, that if sometimes the table happen to be more pleni-
ously furnished, we shall come much better prepared to taste what it yields. No
but that homely fare affords as much delight as sumptuous feasts, when
hunger, which, in want of food, doth still the seat of pleasure; for barley-cakes
and water are highly pleasant, if taken only when we hunger and thirst; but
because they who are daily accustomed to more costly viands are not so
fensible of their sweetmeats by reason of their being almost continu-
ously cloyed with them; as a wise man is, who the better to relish them
brings along with him a taste prepared by mean dyet: in like manner it
comes to pass, that he, if at any time he chance to be present at publick
feastacles, is taken with them more fensibly than are others.

What I affirm concerning the coarsest meats and drinks, that it affords
no less pleasure than the greatest delicacies, cannot be denied by any but
by him who deceevereth himself with vain opinions; who observeth not that
they only enjoy magnificence with great ease pleasure, who least need it;
who never hath tasted coarse bread and water pressed with hunger and
thirst. For my own part, when I eat coarse bread and drink water, or
sometimes augment my Commons with a little Cytheridian-cheefc
(when I have a mind to feast extraordinarily) I take great delight in it,
and bid defiance to those pleasures which accompany the usual magni-
ficence of feasts; so that if I have but bread, or barley-cakes and wa-
ter, I am furnished, to contend even with Jove himself in point of Fe-
licity.

Shall I add that magnificence of feasts, and variety of dishes not only not
free the mind from perturbation, but not so much as augment the pleasure of
the body, forasmuch as this also, when that trouble is removed, hath found its
end? For example, the eating of fish (which we usually intimate) neither takes
away any thing particularly that is a trouble to nature, nor performs any thing
which would occasion trouble, if not fulfilled. But it hath a fore'd delight, and
perhaps mingled with that which is contrary to these, for it conduceth little
to long life, and serves only to variation of pleasures, like various feasts, and
the drinking of foreign wines, without which nature or life may well
subsist: for these things without which it cannot subsist, are most com普通
and may be obtained, easily without breach of Justice, Liberality and Tran-
quility.

Neither is in any matter, whether the ordinary sort of man be of this belief or
not; since peulancy and intemperance abound in such persons, so that we need
not
not fear, but there will be those who will feed on flesh. For though all men had
the best and right judgement of things, yet would there be no need of Fowling or
Fowlers, or Fishers, or Swine-herds, these Animals, living by themselves, are,
and without a keeper, would, in a short time be destroy'd by others pregning upon
them, and supposing the wofulness of their increase, as happens to infinite others
which men eat not. But since there are nought always a multiplicious, or rather
universal folly amongst men, there will never be wanting an innumerable com-
pany of gluttons to feed on these.

Lastly, the fourth benefit is, that it renders us fearless of fortune. For
they only must stand in awe of Fortune, who, being accustom'd to live
sump turiously, conceive their lives cannot be otherwise then most mifera-
ble, unless they are able to spend Pounds, and Talents every day. Whence it
happens, that such men are for the most part subject to a troublesome
life, and often commit rapines, murthers, and the like villainies. But he,
who is content with coarse food, as fruits and falladis, who is satisfy'd
with bread and water; who hath confin'd his desire within thee, what
can he fear from Fortune? For, who is there so poor as to want thes? Who
so diletter'd, that he cannot easily meet with beans, pulse, herbs,
fruits? As for waters, what need I mention it?

For my owne part, truly (that I may with modesty influence my selfe)
I am content, and highly pleas'd with the plants and fruits of my owne
little Gardens; and will, that this Inscriptton be set over the gate, Stran-
ger, here you may lay; here the supreme God is Pleasure; the Master of this
little house is hospitable, friendly, and will entertain you with politely, and
afford you water plentifully, and will ask you, How you like your entertainment?
These little Gardens invite not hunger, but satiety; nor encourseth with
drinks, but extinguishts the natural pleasure.

In this pleasure, I have grown old, finding by account, that my dier
amounts not fully to an obolus a day, and yet some days there are, in
which I state somewhat even of that, to make trystall, whether I want any
thing of full and perfect pleasure', or how much, and whether it be worth
great labour.

CHAP. XIV.
Of Continence, opposite to Lust.

Moreover, continence or abstinence from venereal pleasures is a great
virtue; for the use of them, as I said formerly, doth never benefit,
and it is well if it hurts not.

Certainly to abuse them imtemperately, is to make a man destitute of
vigour, anxious with cares, painfull with diseases, and of short continu-
ance. Wherefore a wife man must stand upon his guard, and not suffer
himselfe to be caught with love, far from conceiving love, to be some-
thing sent from the Gods above, and therefore to be cherished.

And that a man may be left subject thereto, and want the chief excite-
ments to venereal delights, nothing more avails then spare diet, of which
we lately treated; for excessive in eating causeth abundance of that humour
which is the food and fuel of love's fire. The next antidotes are, an hon-
est employment, (especially the study of Wisdom) and Meditation upon
the inconveniences, to which they, who suffer themselves to be transport-
ed with Love, are liable.

The general inconveniences, which attend love of women and boyes,
are, consumption of strength, decay of industry, ruine of estate, mortga-
ges and forfeitures, losse of reputation. And while the feet wear Sicypo-
nian
EMICURUS.

nian buskins, the fingers emeralds, the body other ornaments; the mind in the mean time, conscious to it self, is full of remorse, for that the lives idly, and suffers good years to be lost; and the like, which it were ease to instance.

But as to particulars, What ill doth it not draw upon a man to despire the company of a woman prohibited to him by the Lawes? Doubtless, a wise man will be very far from thinking of such a thing; it being enough to detest him from it, to reflect upon the vait sollicitude, which is necessary to precautions, of those many and great dangers which interwove, it happening, for the most part, that they who attempt such things are wounded, murdered, imprisoned, banished, or suffer some great punishments. Whence it comes, that (as we said before) for a pleasure which is but short, little, and not-necessary, and which might either have been obtained other ways, or quite let alone, men expose themselves to great pain, and sad repentance.

Besides, to be incontinent, to resign up our selves to this one kind of pleasure, were to defraud our selves in the mean time of other pleasures, many and great, which he enjoys, who lives continently according to the Lawes. He so applies himself to wisdom as that he neither blumes his mind nor excruciates it with cares, nor disturbes it with other affections; and for his body, he neither enervates it, nor vexeth it with diseases, nor torment it with pains. And thus he acquires the chief good, which (as I said) is not gotten by keeping company with boys or women, not having a table plentifully furnished with choice of fish or fowl.

Yet there is no reason any one, from this commendation of generall abstinence from general delights, should infer, that therefore a man ought to abstain even from lawful marriage. What our judgment is of that particular, we have formerly declared. I shall only add, that whereas I said, Love is not sent from the gods, it gives us to understand, that if a man hath no children by his wife, he must not attribute it to the anger of Cupid or Venus, or hope to become a Father, by Vowes, Prayers, and Sacrifices, rather then by natural remedies.

I shall add, that a Wifeman ought not to live after the manner of the Greeks, or to behave himselfe with such immodesty, as they shew in public. For whilst they plead they follow Nature, and reprehend and desire us, for using it obscene, and dishonour to call things which are not dishonour of their names, but things which are indeed dishonour we call by their proper names; as to rob, to cozen, to commit adultery, are dishonest indeed, but not obscene in name; whereas to performe the act of generation, is honest in deed, but obscene in name; and allledge divers other arguments against modesty; they seem nor sufficiently to consider, that they live in a civil society, nor in the fields, like wild beasts, and therefore ought not to follow Nature exactly.

For, from the time that we enroll'd our names in a society, Nature commands, that we observe the Lawes and Customs of that Society: to the end, that, participating of the common goods, we draw no evil upon our selves; but this is, (besides all other punishments) the very inimi of ignorance, which attending Impudence, or the want of such modesty, as is prescribed by the Customs and manners of the society wherein we live, and from which, in the voice, the countenance, and behaviour, that modest respect, which is deservedly commended by all, is denominated.

Lastly I add, that it is not a little conduceth as to modesty in particular, so to all kinds of continency, to abstain from Musick and Poetry, for that their pleasing songs and airs are no other then incentives to lust.

Hence is our Maxime, that a wise man onely can treat of Musick and Poetry.
EPICURUS.

Poetry aright, and according to virtue. For others, easily, taken with the allurements of both, indulge to both; only the wise man duly foreseeing the harm that would ensue, calls them away; declaring that Musick is, amongst other things, an allurement to drink, an exhaler of Money, a friend to idleness, conducting nothing to good, honest, and generous works; that Poetry hath always made men prone to all sorts of vices, especially to lust, even by the examples of the gods themselves, whom it introduced, inflamed with anger, and raging with lust, and represents not only their Wars, conflicts, wounds, hatreds, discords, divisions, births, deaths, but also their complaints, lamentations, imprisonments, contention with mortals, and mortal children of immortal Parents, and the like, which certainly sober men would abhorre.

CHAP. XV.

Of Meekness, opposite to Anger.

Moreover Lenity or Meekness, whereunto are reduced Clemency and Pitty, is so excellent an antidote against anger, or desire of revenge, that it is esteemed a most eminent virtue; in as much as anger, especially if excessive, causeth madness for the time. For by anger, the mind is heated and darkned, the eyes sparkling with fire, the breath ready to burst with rage, the teeth gnashing, the voice choaked, the hairs standing on end, the face glowing, and discolored with menacing looks, horrid, and ugly to behold, so that the mind seems to have lost the command of her life; and to have forgotten all decency. But, lenity cures the mind, or to her prefers it found; so, that it is neither moved in it itself, nor is there any eruption of passion into the body, that may cause the least undecency.

Now anger being commonly kindled, and set on fire, by opinion of some injury received; but men are injured through hatred, envy, or contempt; how can a wise man so bear an injury, as to behave himself with Lenity, and sweeten it towards those who did it? By submitting himself to the government of right reason; whereby, (as I formerly said,) he must fortify himself against fortune. For, he accounts an injury among things of chance, and differently conjoined, it is not in his power to make other men just, and free from passion; and therefore, is as little moved at injuries done to him by men, as at the incommodities, or losses which happen by accidents of fortune, or by any other cause above, beyond his own power.

He is not, for example, troubled at the great heats or colds of the seasons of the year, because it is the nature of the seasons in their vicissitudes, which he cannot alter! In like manner, neither is he troubled at the injuries, which dishonour and malicious men do to him, because in doing so, they act according to their own natures, and to make them do otherwise, and to change their natures, is not in his power. Besides, he conceives it not agreeable to Reason, and Wisdom; to add evil to evil, (to add, unto the harm which happens to him from without, perturbation within by opinion) or, because another man would afflict his mind with vexation, he should so foolish as to admit that vexation, and further the ill designs of his enemy upon him.

Yet is it fit, that a wise man take such care of his reputation, as not to become contemptible, since there are some pleasures, that arise from a good Name, some troubles from an ill, and the contempt that follows it; but he must take care of his reputation, not so much by revenging injuries,
rerie, or being offended at those that do them, as by living well, and innocently, giving no man a just cause of concumely or malediexion. To do this, is in our power; not, to hinder another from exercising his owne malice.

Whence, if one that bears you ill-will, and is your professed enemy, shall demand any thing of you, you must not deny him, provided what he demand be lawfull, and you are nothing the lesse secure from him; he differs not from a dog, and therefore must be appeased with a mosell. Nevertheless, nothing is better or safer, than to confront his malice with innocence of life, and the security of your own Conscience, and withall, to show that you are above injury.

Especially, seeing it may so happen, that a wife man (as I said before) may be arraign'd, and suffer not onely injury, but calumny, accusation, condemnation: Even then he considers, that to live well and virtuously, is in his power, but, not to fall into the hands of envious unjust persons; not to be unjustly accused by them; nor to be sentenced by unrighteous Judges, is out to his power. He therefore is not angry, either with the accusers, winneles, or judges but confiding in a good Conscience, isoth nothing of his honesty and tranquility, and chalking himselfe to be above this chance, he looks upon it undaunted, and behoves himselfe in his tryall boldly, and with courage.

Let not any object, thus, what I here advise concerning lenity, be repugner, to what I formerly said of the clamming of servans; for I limited cantigation, onely to the retaryory and perverta. It is manifest, that punishment ought to be inflicted on offenders, as well in a private family, as in a Common-wealth; and that in a Prince or Magistrate punisheth the offences of his subjects, without anger; to the Father of a family may, without anger, punish the faults of his servants.

Moreover, a wife man must not onely bear injuries, nor onely pardon them mildly, but even kindly, encourage, and congratulate him, who behoves himselfe to a better course. For since the beginning of reformation is to know our fault; therefore must this gratulation, and encouragement be given to the penitent offender, that, as he is affected with horror at this knowledge of his crime, so the excellence, and beauty of that which he ought to have done, and hence forward must do, may be fully represented to him, and the love of it increase daily in him.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Modesty, opfisite to Ambition.

As concerning Modesty, there needs little more to be said, then what we formerly declared, when we showed it was not the part of a wife man to affect high Offices, or honours in a common-wealth, but rather to contain himselfe, as to live in one private corner: Wherefore, here I shall once more give the same counsel, which I give to all my friends. Live close, or private, (provided no necessities of the common-wealth, require otherwise) for even experience teacheth, that he hath lived well, who hath well concealed himselfe.

It is but too frequently seen, that they who clime up to the top of honour, are cast down by envy, as with a Thunder-bolt, and then too I acknowledge, it is much better, quietly to obey, then by laborious climbing up the narrow path of ambition, to arise at command and fore-agrancy, and to arrive there, where nothing can be expected, but great and dangerous precipitation. Besides: Are not they, whom the common people
people gaze upon with admiration, glittering with titles and honours, the most unhappy of all men; for that their breasts are gnawed with weighty and troublesome cares? You must not imagine that such persons live quiet and secure in mind; for it is impossible but that they who are feared by many, should themselves fear many.

And though you see them fend out great Navies, command Legions, compassed with Guards, yet you must not think they live all quiet, or indeed do at all partake of any true pleasure, for all these things are ridiculous pageantry and dreams: fears and cares are not afraid of the noise of Armies, nor stand in awe of the brightness of gold or splendor of purple, but boldly intrude among Princes & Potentates, and, like the Vulture, which the Poets talk of, gnaw and prey on their hearts.

Neither must you think that the body is any thing the better for this, since you see that Feavers go away nothing the sooner, if you lie in a bed of Tyrian purple, in a Chamber furnished with rich Tapestry, than under a plain homey covert; and that we take no harm by the want of purple robes, embroidered with Gold and Pearl, as long as we have a coarse plain Garment sufficient to keep away the cold. And what, if, being full and contented with rags and a bed of straw, you should instruct men how vain those are who with antiquity and ridiculous minds gaze and thirst after the trifles of magnificence, not understanding how few and small those things are which make a happy life? Believe me, that which you shall say will appear far more magnificent and high, being delivered from a mattress covered with coarse cloath; for it is not only spoken but practis'd.

Though your house shine not with silver and gold, resound not with musick, hath not any golden images of boys holding tapers to light you at your nightly Revels and Banquets; truly, it is not a white leafe pleate and to repose your selfe on the soft graces by a purling stream, underneath a spreading tree, and especially in the spring, at what time the fields are sprinkled with flowers, the birds entertain you with their musick, the West wind fans you, and Nature her self smiles on you.

Why therefore should any man, that may live thus in his own fields and garden, pursue honour; and not rather modestly restrain his desires within this compass? For to aim at glory by ostentation of Verses, Science, eloquence, nobility, wealth, attendants, attire, beauty, meen, and the like, is a ridiculous vanity: in all these, Modesty requires no more than that we transfer not decency through vulgarity, stupidity, or negligence. It is (as I said) equally base and absurd to grow infeolent upon possession of these, as to be call'd down at their loss.

Hence a wise man, if he happen to have the images or statues of his Auncillors or other personages, will be far from taking pride in them, or showing them as badges of honour: yet on the other side, he will not neglect them, but place and keep them carefully in his gallery.

In like manner, neither will he be solicitous about his own funeral, or give order that it be performed magnificently. He will only consider what may be beneficial and pleasant to his successors, knowing that as for himself or his dead body, it is all one what becomes of it. For to propagate vanity even beyond death is madness, and such also is the nature of those who would not that their dead bodies should be devoured by wild beasts. For, if that be an ill, must it not be very bad to have them burnt, embalmed, and immered in honey, to grow cold and lie under a Marble-fonc, to be press'd and consumed with fire?

CHAP
EPI CURUS.

CHAP. XVII.

Of Moderation, opposite to Avarice.

The next is moderation, or that disposition of mind by which a man is contented with little, and than which he cannot have a greater good. To be content with little is the greatest wealth in the world; for so much as a man or a proportion'd to the law of nature is great riches. To have wherewithall to prevent hunger, thirst, and cold, is a felicity equal to that of the Divinity; and who possettes so much, and desires no more, however the World may esteem him poor, is the richest man.

How sweet a thing is this poverty, cheerful, and contented with what is enough, that is, with those riches of nature which suffice to preserve from hunger, thirst, and cold? Truly, being the riches of nature are finite and easy to be had; but those that are covered out of vain opinions, are without measure and infinite, we ought to be thankful to kind Nature, for making those things necessary, that are easy to be had; and those that are hard to be got, unnecessary.

And since it behoves a wise man to hope he shall never, as long as he lives, want necessaries, doth not the easy acquisition of these cheap and common things abundantly cherish that hope? Whereas, on the contrary, things of magnificence affords him not the like hope. And this is the reason why ordinary men, though they have great possessions, yet as if they feared they might fail them, labour still to heap up more; never thinking their store complex.

This may teach us to content our selves with the most simple things, and such as are easily gotten, remembering that not all the wealth in the world put together is able in the least measure to allay the perturbation of the mind, whereas things that are mean, ordinary, and easy to be had, remove that indigence which is inconvenient to the body; and besides are such that the thoughts of parting with them is nothing grievous to him who reflects upon death.

Miserable indeed are the minds of men and their hearts blind, in as much as they will not see that Nature dictates nothing more to them than this, that they supply the wants of the body, and withall enjoy a well pleased mind, without fear or trouble; not that they should employ their whole life in scraping together that which is necessary to life, and that with such greediness as if they were to out-live death, never thinking how deathly a cup, from our very birth, we are design'd to pledge.

What though those things which are purely necessary, and in respect whereunto no man is poore, yield not the delights which vulgar minds doe on? Nature wants them not, and yet the ceaseth not to afford real and sincere pleasures, in the fruition of those mean and simple things, as we already have declared. Whence a wise man is so indifferentely affected towards those things, for whose sake money is coveted (to supply the daily expences of love, and ambition) as that being at a great distance from them all, he hath no reason either to desire or care for money.

Whereas I said, that the riches which are covered through opinions, have not any measure or bound; the reason is, that though Nature is satisfied with little, yet vain opinion, ushering in desire, always thinketh of something which we have not; and as if it were really needful, directs the desire to that end. Whence it happens, that he who is not satisfied with a little, can never have enough; but the more wealth he hath, the more he conceives himself to be in want.

Where-
EPICURUS.

Wherefore seeing there can never be want of a little, a wife, man, possessing that little, ought to esteem it great riches, because therein is no want; whereas other riches, how great forever in esteem, are indeed small, because they want multiplication to infinity. Whence it follows, that he who thinks not what he possesses is sufficient and plentiful, though he was master of the whole world, would yet be miserable. For misery is the companion of want, and the same vain opinion which first perverted him, that his own estate was not sufficient, will continue to pervert him, that one world is not sufficient, but that he wants more and more to infinity.

Would you then make a man rich? Know, that it must be done, not by adding to his riches, but by detaching from his desires. For when having cut off all vain and superfluous desires, he shall compose himself to the rules of nature, and covet no more then she requires, then shall he find himself to be rich indeed, because he shall then find that he wants nothing. Whence this also should be inculcated to him, if you live according to Nature, you shall never be poor; but if according to Opinion, never rich. Nature deites little, Opinion infinite.

Certainly this disposition or faculty of the mind, whereby a man moderating himself, cuts off from his desires whatsoever is not necessary to nature, and contents himself with such things as are most simple and easy to be got; this disposition, I say, begets that security which is found in a quiet retirement, and avoidance of the multitude; moreover, by it, even he who lives with much company wants no more, than he who lives alone. Hence also it proceeds, that who soever endeavours to beget a confidence and security to himself out of external things, the better way that may be, seeks after things possible to be got, as being not unsuitable to him: but the impossible he esteem unsuitable. Besides, even of the possible, there are many which he attains not, and all those which it is not necessary for him to attain, he renounceth.

Now for want of this renouncing or detraction, how great misery is it for a man, to be continually pouring into a bored vessel, never able to fill his mind? For not to mention, that many who have heaped up wealth, have therein found only a change, nor an end, of their misery; either because they run themselves into new cares, to which they were not subject before, or because they made way for shares, in which they were entangled and taken. Not to mention this, I say, the greatest misery is, that the more thou feedest, the more thou art starved with hunger.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of Mediocrity, between hope and despair of the future.

Lastly, seeing that all desire whatsoever is carried to that which is not possessed, but proposed as possible to be attained, and accompany'd with some hope of obtaining it; which hope, cherishing the desire, is accompanied with a certain pleasure; as its contrary, Despair, fomenting a fear, that what is desired cannot be obtained, is not without trouble. Something therefore must be added concerning Mediocrity, which is of great use, as well in the general, concerning things hoped or despaired, as in the particular, concerning the duration, or rather perpetuity of life, whereof, as there is a desire kindled in the breasts of men, the despair of it torments them.

In the first place therefore we must look upon this as a general rule: In contingencies, that which is to come is neither absolutely sure, nor absolutely
EPICURUS.

not ours; so that we are neither to hope for it, as if it must certainly come to pass, because it may be diverted by some accident intervening; nor to despair of it, as if it must certainly not come to pass, because it may fall out, that no accident may intervene to divert it. Thus not being definite of all hope, we shall not be without some pleasure; nor being quite frustrated of our hope, we shall not receive any trouble.

This difference there is between a wise man and a fool; the wise man expects future things, but depends not on them, and in the meantime enjoys the present, (by considering how great and pleasant they are) and remembers the past with delight. But the life of a fool (as I said before) is unpleasant and timorous; for that it is wholly carried on to the future.

How many may we see, who neither remember the past good, nor enjoy the present? they are wholly taken up with expectation of future things, and choose being uncertain, they are perpetually afflicted with anguish and fear, and are exceedingly grieved when they too late perceive, that they have in vain addicted themselves to the getting of riches, or honours, or power, or glory; for they fail of obtaining those pleasures, with the hopes whereof being enflamed, they had undergone many and great labours. Not to say any thing of those others, who being object and narrow-hearted, despair of all things, and are for the most part in:levolent, envious, morose, sulleners of the light, evil speakers, monitory.

I say, a wise man remembers the past goods with delight and gratitude; but indeed it cannot sufficiently be lamented, that we are too ungrateful towards the past, in not calling to mind, nor accounting amongst pleasures all the good things we have received; forasmuch as no pleasure is more certain, than that which cannot now be taken from us. The present goods are not yet confummate and wholly solid; some chance or other may intervene and cut them off in half; the future are dependent and uncertain; what is already past is only safe, and out of all danger to be lost.

Among the past goods I reckon, not onely such as we have enjoyed, but even the avoidance of the ills that might have betain us; as also our deliverance out of such ills as did fall on us, and might have lasted longer; likewise the remembrance and delight, that we sustained them comitantly and bravely.

As to the desire of prolonging life to a vast extent, I already hinted, that a wise man must cut off that desire, because there would immediately upon it follow desperation, which is never without trouble and anguish. Hither it conduceth to consider, that no greater pleasure can be received from an age of infinite duration, than may be received from this which we know to be finite, provided a man measure the bounds of it by right reason.

For seeing that to measure the bounds of nature by right reason, is nothing else but to consider, (as I said before) that the supremum pleasure is no other, than an exemption from pain and trouble, it is manifest, that it can neither be made greater by length, nor lesser, or more remis, by shortnesse of time.

And though the hopes of a more prolonged pleasure, or of a longer age, seems to render the present pleasure more intense; yet it is only so with those, who measure the bound of pleasure, not by right reason, but by vain desire; and who look upon themselves so, as if, when they die and cease to be, they should yet be troubled at the privation of pleasure, as if they had been alive. Whence it happens, that as I hinted formerly, To understand fully; that death nothing concerns, much conduceth to our enjoyment of this mortal life, not by adding anything of uncertain
time, but by casting away the desire of immortality.

Wherefore seeing that since Nature hath prescribed bounds to corporeal pleasure, and the desire of eternal duration takes them away, it is necessary, that the mind or reason interposes, that, by discouraging upon those bounds, and extirpating the desire of sensibility, it may make life every way perfect, so that we being content therewith, shall not want a longer duration.

Moreover, neither shall we be deprived of pleasure, even then when death shall involve us, forasmuch as we have attained the perfect and delightfull end of the best life, departing like guests in and well satisfied with life, and having daily discharged that office, to acquit our selves of which we received life.

CHAP. XIX.

Of Fortitude in general.

We come next to Fortitude, which I affirmed to be the other part of Honesty, because it withstands fear, and all things that use to cause fear; whereby, they who behave themselves not timorous and cowardly, but valiantly and stoutly, are said to behave themselves honestly and becomingly. This may be manifested many ways, especially from War, wherein, they who behave themselves with courage and honesty, get honour above the rest. Whence Honesty is almost the very same with that, which in the common esteem is Honourable.

That this virtue conduceth also to pleasure, may be inferred from hence, for that neither the undergoing of Labours, nor the suffering of Pains, are things in themselves affective, nor patience, nor patience, nor warrings, nor industry, though so highly commended, nor Fortitude itself; but we pursue these, to the end we may live without care and fear, and so (as much as possible) free both the body and mind from molestation.

For as by the fear of death, (for example) all the quiet of life is disturbed; and as to sink under pains, and to bear them with a dejected and weak mind, is a great misery, and by such lowness of spirit, many have quire undone their Patents, Friends, Country, and even themselves: so on the other side, a strong and gallant mind is free from all care and anguish, for it comports death, because they who suffer it, are in the same case, as before they were born; and is so fortify'd against all pains, as to remember, that the greatest are determined by death, the least have many intervals of ease, the middle fort we our selves can master; if they are tolerable, we can endure them, we can contentedly quit this life, when it no longer pleaseth us, as if we went off from a stage.

Hence it is manifest, that timidity and cowardliness are not dispraised, nor fortitude and patience praised, for their own sakes; but, those are rejected, for that they cause pain; and these desired, for that they produce pleasure.

Whereas I said, that Fortitude withstands fear, and all things that use to cause fear, it tends to let us understand, that they are the very same ills, which torment when they are present, and are feared, when expected as future; and therefore, we must learn not to fear those ills, which we either fancy to our selves, or any ways apprehend as future, but to bear those which are present with constancy and patience.

Of the ills, which we fancy to our selves, but are not really future, the chiefest are those, which we fear either from the Gods, as if they were ill themselves,
Epicurus.

themselves, or could be the Authors of any ill to us; or from death, as if that brought along with it, or after it, some temperamental ill. Of the Ills which we fear, for that they may happen, and yet in the mean time are so present, that they afflict and trouble us, are, those which either cause pain in the body, or discomfit in the mind.

Those which cause pain are, ficknesses, stripes, fire, sword, and the like: those which cause discontent, are such as are termed externall ills; and of these some are publick, as Tyranny, war, destruction of our Country, pestilence, famine, &c. Others private, of which are servitude, banishment, imprisonment, infancy, loss of friends, and the like.

The difference betwixt all these things on one part; and pain, and discontent on the other; is this, that pain and discontent are absolute ills in themselves, the others are not so, but only in as much as they relate to pain and discontent, as causes; for if they did not cause pain and discontent, there were no reason why we should shun them.

We shall say something, in order, upon these: but first take notice, that fortitude is not to be looked upon, as if ingenerate in us by nature, but acquired by reason. Fortitude is different from audacity, ferocity, inconsiderate remittency, for those are found even in brute Animals also, but this is proper to man, and to such men only as act advisedly and prudently; and therefore it is to be measured, not by the strength, and violent carriage of the body, but by the firmness of the mind, constantly adhering to an honest intention or purpose.

CHAP. XX.

Of Fortitude, as to fear of the Gods.

We must first clear of a twofold fear, far transcending the rest: For if anything ever produced the ultimate good, and chief pleasure, proper to the mind; it was the expounding of those opinions, (and all allied to them) which have impressed the greatest fear upon the mind. Such is the condition of miserable Mortals, that they are not led by sound opinions, but by some affection void of reason; so that not discerning what is ill indeed, by reason they suffer an equal, and no lesser intense perturbation, then as if these things, for which they are troubled, were indeed such.

That, which in the first place, useth to possesse men with greatest fear, and consequently, cause in them the greatest perturbation, is this, that, conceiving there are certain blessed and immortal Natures, they do yet think them to have wills, passions, and operations, plainly repugnant to those attributes, (of beatitude and immortality) as perpetual licentious, businesse, anger, favour; whereby it comes to paxiue, that ill men receive great harms by way of punishment, the good protection and benefits, from these Natures, that is, from the Gods. Thus men being nurset up in their own, that is, in human affections, fancy and admiring Gods like to themselves; and whatsoever suits not with their own dispositions, that they conceive incompetent to them.

Hereupon, it cannot be express'd, how great unhappiness mankind hath drawn upon it self, by attributing such things to the Gods, especially anger, and severity by reason whereof, Mens minds being dejected, every one resembles wretched, when the Heaven Thunders, or the Earth quakes, or the Sea is Tempestuous, or any other thing happens, whereby he is perplexed, that the gods intend to punish him, miserable man.

But it is not so with those, who, intrusted by reason, have learnt, that...
EPICURUS.

the gods live in perpetual security and tranquility, and that their natures is too far removed from us, and our affairs, or them to be either pleased, or displeased with us. Truly if they were, and did hear the prayers of men, how soon would all men be destroyed, who continually imprecate mischief on one another?

Therefore, when you conceive God to be an immortal and blessed Animal (as the common notion concerning God nuggets) take heed of attributing any thing to him, which is either incompetent with immortality, or repugnant to beatitude; but let all your conceptions be such, as may conflict with immortality and beatitude.

Gods indeed there are, for the knowledge of them is evident, as we formerly proved; but such as men commonly conceive them, they are not. For first, they describe them by some adjectives or properties, as when they say, they are immortal and blessed, and then overthow what they affered, by applying other attributes to them, repugnant to the former, as when they say, that they have businesse, or create businesse for others; that they are affected with anger or favour, which, as I hinted formerly, imply imbecility, fear, and want of extraneous assurance.

Neither need you fear, that this will make you esteemed impious; for he is impious indeed, not, who denies the vulgar Gods of the multitude, but he who ascribes to the Gods the opinions of the multitude. For those things which are commonly delivered concerning the Gods, are not genuine pronouncements, but false opinions.

By the same reason likewise, he is not pious, who out of fear to the gods addresseth himself to every stone, to every altar, be sprinkles every Temple with the blood of Victims: but he, who, contemplating all things with a serene and quiet soul, conceiveth right of the Gods, and worshipping them in his mind, not induced thereto by hope or reward, but for their excellent Majesty and supreme name, observes all kind of veneration towards them, and with expressions suggesting such thoughts, as out of them arise no opinions repugnant to veneration, and consequently, suffereth not that which others suffer, in whose minds, this contrariety causeth an extraordinary perturbation.

CHAP. XXI.

Of Fortitude, as to fear of Death.

That which next stirrieth greatest terror into the minds of men is Death, for that they expect, and fear. I know not what everlasting ill, as Fables tell them, (and which is strange: in the very privation of sense, which then happens, as if they should still have being,) not knowing that all stories concerning the infernal places, (which we (speak of formerly,) are meer fiction of Poets; or if they contain any thing of truth, it is made good in this life, by vain fears, superstitious cares, insatiable desires, and other violent passions, which torture unhappy men in such manner, that their life is worse then hellish.

That you may exempt your selfe, therefore, from these terrors, accustom your selfe to this thought. That death nothing concerns us; and to this argument, That all good or ill that happens to us is with sense, but death is a privation of sense; for death is a dissolution, and what is dissolved, remains without sense. So that death seems easy to be conceived; because it is an ineffectuall Agent, and in vain they are pains; when the patient is nor.

Indeed the ordinary fear of men abhor death, because they look upon it some-
EPICURUS.

Epictetus on the greatest of pains, sometimes because they apprehend it as the consummation of all things that we enjoy in life; but without cause it is, that is true, or not to be, if fear the, for when it comes to that, we shall not have any faculty left whereby to know that, nor to live, is ill.

Hence we may conclude, that they are very foolish who abhorre, amongst other things, to think, that after death their bodies should be torne by wild beasts, burnt by fire, devoured by worms; for, they do not consider, that then they shall not be, and do not feel not complain, that they are torn, burnt, devoured, turned into corruption. As also, those who are troubled to think, that they shall no longer enjoy the conversation of their Wives, Children, Friends; no longer do them good offices nor assist them; for, these consider not that then they shall have no desire of such things.

Death therefore, which is esteemed the most horrid of all ills, death (as I said) last, nothing concern us, because, while we are, Death is not; and when Death is, we are not; so that it concerns neither the living nor the dead; the living is touch-est not, the dead are not.

Now the aforesaid knowledge that death nothing concern us makes us enjoy this mortal life, not adding uncertain time to it, but casting away the desire of immortality. For, in life, there can be nothing of ill to him, who perfectly understands, that there can be nothing of ill in the preservation of life. Whence, as we make choice we of the most meat, but of the best, so should we covet, not the longest, but most pleasant life.

Neither can be beacquainted of folly, who says he fears death, for that, when it comes, it brings not any trouble, but because it afflicts the mind with griefs before it comes: for, that which brings no trouble with it, when it comes, ought not to make us sad with expectation. Certainly, if there be any thing of inconvenience or fear in this businesse, it is the fault of him that is dying, nor of Death: nor is there any trouble in death, more then there is after it, and it is no lese folly to fear death, than to fear old age, since as old age follows youth, so death follows old age.

Moreover, we are to hope at least, that eieh we shall feel no pain at the point of death; or if any, so short, as the very consideration of that may comfort us; for no great pain lasts long; and every man ought to believe, that, though the dissolution of his Soul and body be accompanied with some torment, yet that being past he shall feel no more pain.

He also who advised young men to live well, and to dye well, was very ridiculous, for these are not to be parted; the meditatiom of living well and of dying well is one, and the same; seeing that a young man may dye suddenly, and an old man har something more of life behind: besides, the last act is a part, even the crown of life.

But young and old ought to consider, that though men may provide for their security in other things, yet as to death it self, all men live as it were in a City without walls or bulwarks.

Besides, a young man may dye happy, if he consider that he should find nothing more in a longer life, than what he hath already seen and experienced; and an old man may live unhappy, if, like a vessel full of holes, he suffer the goods of life only to run thorough him, and so is never full of them, nor, as a sober gaest of Nature, after a plentiful feast of life, is willing to go away, and take his repose.

Think not any old man happy for dying old, but for dying full and well satisfied with goods.

Lastly, for more foolish and ridiculous is he, who saith, It is good either not to be born at all; or at soon as born to passe the gates of death. For, if he speak this
CHAP. XXII.

Of Fortitude against Corporeal pain.

Corporeal pain is that which alone would deserve the name of ill, even of the greatest ill, did we not of our selves add to it the pain of the mind, which is worse than that of the body. For discontent of mind taken at the loss of riches, honours, children, and the like, many times becomes more intolerable than the greatest corporeal pains; but this is by reason of our own opinion, which if it were right and found, we should not be moved by any such loss, in regard that all such things are without or beyond us, and touch us not indeed, but only by mediation of that opinion which we frame to our selves. And thereupon we may inferre, that there is no real ill, but the pain of the body, and that the mind ought not to complain of any thing, which is not joyned to some pain of the body, either present or to come.

He therefore who is wise will be very cautious that he draw not any corporeal pain upon himself; or do any thing upon which corporeal pain may ensue; unless it be done either for avoidance of some greater pain or acquisition of some greater pleasure, as we formerly declared. Hence we may well wonder at those Philosophers, who accounting health, which is the state of indolence, a very great good, as to all other respects, do yet, as to this, hold it to be a thing indifferent; as if it were not a trivialis playing with words, or rather a high folly, to affirm, that to be in pain, and to be free from pain, is all one thing.

But if any necessity either of the natural constitution, whereby the body is obnoxious to diseases, or of any external violence done to him, which, as humane affairs stand, cannot sometimes be avoided (for that a wife and innocent person may sometimes be arraigned, condemned, beaten...
EPICTETUS.

ten and torpid, is manifest) if either of these shall bring pain upon him, then is it his part to endure that pain, with a constant and valiant mind; and patiently to expect, either the solution or relaxation of it.

Certainly, pain never continues long in the body, but that which is great, or highly intense from caæth, for either it is determined of itself, and succeeded, if not by absolute indolence, yet by very great mitigation, or is taken away by death, in which there is no pain. And as for that pain which is lasting, it is not only gentle, but hath many lucid intervals; so that it will not be many days, nor any hours, ere the body hath not only ease, but pleasure.

And may we not observe, that long or Chonical diseases have more hours of ease, and quieter intervals, than of pain and trouble? For, (not to mention that the thirst which they suffer, increases the pleasure of drinking) they allow as time for repast, strength to talk, some recreation and sports; and for the most part have many long intermissions, in which we may apply ourselves to studies and banter. Whence it is evident, that as great pain usually is short, so long pain is height; thus the shortness makes amends for the greatness, the tumultuance, for its length.

Let us therefore often reflect, that pain either is not intolerable, or not perpetual; for if it be long, it is height; if great, short. Provided, that you remember the bounds, prescribed to the things themselves by nature, and add nothing through your own opinion, whereby you may think, and make it greater than it is; and oppressing your selfe with complaints, and impatient exasperations, help not only to render it more insupportable; whereas, on the other side, nothing doth assuage pain more than constancy, and insulance to suffering. Whence it comes, that a wise man, accustomed to pain, can many times rejoice and smile, even in the height of his sickness.

Thus much we can testify of our friend Metrodorus, who hath at all times behaved himselfe undauntedly, aswell against death, as pain. For concerning my selfe, I need not say any thing, who frequently suffer such pain in the bladder and bowells, as none can be greater: and yet full amends for all these, is made by the alacrity of mind which redounds to us, from the remembrance of our sufferings, and inventions, and by our constant patience; whereby we forbear not to esteem those very days, in which we are torment with those diseases and pains, happy.

And this indeed is the reason, why we formerly said, that a wise man, though in torments, may yet be happy; because he both suffers, by his patience, the necessity which he cannot break; and, as much as possible, with-draws his mind from his suffering body, converting no otherwise with it, then as with a weak and querulous part. He be-thinks himselfe, what he hath at any time done honestly and generously; and fixing his memory upon those things, which he hath most admired, and have most delighted him, cheers himselfe with the past goods, for which he is far from shewing himselfe, as fools usually do, unthankfull.

He also considers, that he can do nothing, more worthy that vertue and wisdom which he professeth, than not to yield the victory to pain, though the most hard to be sustained of all things, to bear up courageously, to repulse by patience so dangerous an enemy; and at length to make so perfect a conquest, as that the very remembrance of it will be most delightfull, and especially, through absolute indolence, which will be to much the more pleasing, as a quiet Haven is much welcome after a Tempest.

Now if a wise man, is not without his alleviations and comforts in the greatest pain, what shall we say of him in remisile and gentle pains, or at the
...EPICURUS.

the losse of some limb or sence? Truly, it was not without reason; that I said formerly, A wise man, though depriv'd of the best of senses, Sights, would yet be happy: for if the night doth not diminish the happiness of life, why should blindness, that so nearly resembles night? However he may want some pleasures that depend upon the light, yet are there severall others left him, and what is much above all the rest, he may delight his mind with many things, and many ways without seeing.

For since to a wise man, to live is to think, certainly his thoughts are not oblig'd to his eyes in the businesse of searching into truth. And that man, to whose doctrine I gave up my name, could livelong and happy, without being able to distinguish colours: but without the knowledge of things, he could not have lived happy. Moreover, he was of opinion, that the perspicacity of the mind was very much dim'd by the light of the eyes; and while others, could scarcely be said to see things that were before them, he travelled abroad into all infinity, not stopping at any bounds.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of fortitude, against discontent of mind.

I said, that Discontent of mind is commonly taken at such things, as are conceived to be externall ills, and the contraries to those goods, which we most love and desire. For men call some things adverse, others prosperous: and we may generally observe, that the mind, which is elevated, and insolem with prosperity, and cast down with adversity, is abrupt and base. Hence is it, that all we should here say, concerning the ills which cause discontent: and against which we have need of fortitude, may be sufficiently inferred from what we formerly said, touching those goods which are the general objects of our desires or inclinations, and in respect whereof we have need of Temperance.

Let it suffice in general, to repeat what we formerly said, that discontent of mind is not grounded upon Nature, but merely upon opinion of ill. Wherefore, who conceives himselfe to lie under some ill, whether only fore-seen and expected, or already come upon him, must of necessity be discontented. For how comes it, that a Father whose son is kill'd, and he knows it not, is not a whit lesse cheerfull or merry, than if he were alive? Or that he, who hath lost much of his good fame abroad, or all his goods, and castell by robbery at home, is not at all sensible of either losse till he heare of it? Is it not opinion only which discontent him? For, if Nature did it, at the same minite wherein the Son was slain, the father's mind would be struck with a sense of his death; the like would be perceived in the losse of honours or goods.

Therefore, to raise discontent in the mind, it is necessary that opinion, not nature, intervene. And that you may doubt the losse of this, observe, that a man who thinks a supposititious child his owne, and his owne supposititious; if news be brought him of the death of his owne son, he will not be moved, but if of his supposititious, he will be exceedingly afflicted; and this comes not from nature, but Opinion.

But that those things which afflict us, are not indeed ills to us, appears even from this, that they are without or beyond us, and cannot reach us of themselves, but only by our owne opinion are made ills to us. And hence it was that I said, it is reason, which makes life happy or pleasant, by expelling opinions, for which the mind is posset'd with trouble. For
it is discontent alone which disturbs the mind, and its quiet and content.

But how can reason expel these opinions? By teaching a wise man to arm his mind against fortune. For the external things which we think Goods, and the loss of which causeth discontent in our minds, are learned the goods of fortune, because indeed they are not ours, but come and go as Fortune pleaseth.

For this reason, a wise man seeth them no more belonging to him, nor to others; nor polliceth them to, as nor to be ready to part with them. He hath extolled that opinion which tells us, Such goods are our own, and can never be lost; and hath put on the right opinion, which affurseth them they are uncertain and transitory, as indeed they are. And hereupon he considers with himself before-hand, what he shall do if he chance to lose them; he considers, I say, before-hand, that when it happens, he may not be afflicted with vain grief, but take it quietly that fortune re-demands, what she give or, but only lent.

Certainly to those who think, that to be deprived of these goods is an ill, the most unhappy thing of all, is, that premeditation encreaseth the ills, which it might have much diminished, if not wholly prevented; and thus becomes only a foolish consideration of ill to come, and which perhaps will never come. Every ill is of itself troublesome enough when it comes, and if it chance never to come, we draw a voluntary misery upon our selves to no purpose, and by that means shall never be free from trouble, either by receiving, or apprehending some ill; for he who always thinks, that some ill or adversity will befall him, to him that very thought is a continual ill.

Now if that happen also to a wife man, that by being long accustomed to the possession, and use of the goods of fortune, he hath not quite blotned that opinion of his mind, and some little of Fortune interfere, and give him a blow, by reason whereof, he falls into some discontent, and perhaps grieves: In this case, the allurage'th of his discontent consists in two things, formerly prescribed as remedies against corporeal pain; viz. Diversion of his thoughts from his loss, or the cause of it, and an application of them to those things, which he knowes to be grateful and pleasant to his mind.

For the mind of a wise man is conform'd to reason, and followeth the conduct thereof; but reason forbids to look on those things, which create and nourish discontent; and thus he abateth the mind from bitter thoughts, to convert it to think upon goods, either future or past, especially those which he knowes please him most.

Those sad and importune thoughts indeed are very apt to return, but he must infall upon that diversion and application of the mind whereby it is brought by little and little to wear out, and deface its force. Neither doth time diminish discontent any other way, than by exhibiting various occasions of divertilement, which, by degrees, take the mind off, and make her forget, as it were, the things that caused her discontent.
Treats we speak of Justice, which, as I said before, wholly relates to others, and therefore belongs to a man, as living in a civil society. And certainly it is a common eye, without which, no society can subsist, it being a virtue which gives to every one that which is his, and takes care that none receive injury.

And to begin with that with which I used to begin, i.e., treating of the other virtues, truly not unlike are the things that may be said of this. For, as I showed, Prudence, Temperance, Fortitude, are inseparably joyned to pleasure, the same may be said of Justice, which not one, but, on the contrary, always preserves and nourishes something, that calms and quiets the mind; and this as well by its own power and nature, as by a hope, that none shall ever want any of those things, which pure undepraved Nature desires.

Now for as much as temperance, lust, and cowardice, always excruciate the mind, always perplex and trouble it; it is impossible, that a mind in which injustice dwells, should, for that very reason, because injustice dwells in it, be otherwise than unquiet: because though such a mind should attempt any unjust action with the greatest secrecy imaginable, yet can it not perforce itself, but that it will at last come to light. And though some men may think their cozenesses sufficiently barriaco'd and fortifie'd by their wealth, yet they dread the divine powers, and imagine, that those very solicitudes and troubles, which torture their souls day and night, are sent by the immortal gods for their punishment.

But, how can we expect, that unjust actions should diminish the troubles of life, so much as remorse of conscience, penalties of the Law, and the being hated by our countrymen encrease them? And yet, in some men, there is not any bound or moderation of wealth, of honour, of power, of lust, of gluttony, and other delights, which nothing that is unjustly gotten diminisheth, but rather increaseth and exalteth, so that they are fitter for restraint than instruction.

All found and judicious persons therefore, are, by right reason, induced to justice, equity, honesty; but neither can unjust actions benefit a child or impotent person, for such can neither easily effect what they endeavour, nor obtain their ends when they have effected it. Besides, riches are more fruitful to fortune, or a noble genius, which they enjoy, procure to themselves a general respect and good-will, and (what most conduceth to quiet living) an endearment from others, especially there being no cause of offending.

For the desires which proceed from Nature are easily satisfied, without injuring any man; those which come from vain opinions are not to be followed, for they aim at nothing which is defirable; and there is more detriment in the injury itself, than advantage or benefit in the things that are gained by the injury.

Nevertheless, no man can say rightly, that Justice is a virtue, explicable only for itself, but because it brings great pleasure along with it. For to be beloved, and to be dear to others, is pleasant, because it renders life more safe, and pleasure more full. We therefore conceive, that Injustice ought to be avoided, not only for the inconveniences which happen
happen to the unjust; but much more, for that as long as it is in the mind, it never suffers it to take breath, never to bear rel.

These considerations might perhaps be sufficient; yet I shall add something, partly concerning Right or Just, from which Justice is denominated, that we may come the better to understand what is its original, among whom it is practised, what are its benefits; and partly concerning some other virtues nearly allied to Justice, as, Benevolence, Gratitude, Piety, Obversion, and Friendship.

CHAP. XXV.

Of Jus (Right) or Just, whence Justice is denominated.

First therefore, forasmuch as Justice is so named, for that it prefers the Jus or Right, due to one another, or performs that which is just, it is worth our knowing, what that is which ought to be esteemed Right or Just.

Now in regard Justice was instituted in order to the common good, necessary it is, that Right or Just, to which Justice hath respect, should be such a good, as is common to all and every member of the Society. And because every one, by the direction of nature, desires what is good for himself; it is also necessary, that what is right or just be conformable to nature, and therefore esteemed natural.

It is not without cause that I hint this: for sometimes it happens, that in a Society, something is prescribed as Right and Just, which is not good for the Society, and so being not natural, or contrary to nature, it cannot, but by abuse, and only in name, be reputed Right or Just, since that which hath the true reason of natural right or just, is such, as that it is not only prescribed as profitable and good, but is really such.

Wherefore to speak properly, natural right or just is no other, than a symbol of utility, or such an utility agreed upon by concurrence of voices, as may keep men from hurting, or being hurt by one another, so that they may live securely. A good which every man is taught by nature to desire.

There take Profitable and Good for the same thing; and I conceive, that, to a thing's being just or rightly kept, two things are requisite: One, That it be profitable, or respect the common utility, that is, security: The other, That it be prescribed by the common consent of the Society; For nothing is compleatly just, but what the Society, by common consent or agreement, hath decreed to be observed.

Hence it is, that the name of Right or Just is usually given to both these, since not only what is profitable is said to be just, but also the very common covenant or prescription of the Society, which is termed Law, as being that which prescribes to every one what is profitable or just.

Some there are who conceive all things that are just, to be just of their own proper and unalterable nature, and that Laws do not make them to be just, but only declare and prescribe, according to the nature which those things have. But it is not so, but rather after the same manner as is observed in other things, which are profitable, as in those which concern health, and many others of the like nature, which are beneficial to some men, hurtful to others; by which means they often fail of their mark, as well in common as in private.
And seeing that every thing is apprehended every where, always, and by all men to be really such as it is in its own nature, because its nature is unalterable, whether are those things, which these men call just, just in all places and always, and amongst all men? Ought they not to have observed, that many of those things that are constituted by Laws, and consequently accounted lawful and just, are not constituted and received amongst all nations alike, but are neglected by many as things indifferent, rejected of others as hurtful, and condemned as unjust? And are these not some who account things not generally profitable, to be nevertheless such; and accordingly embrace those things which are not generally approved, if they find them advantageous in respect of their own Society, and seem but to promise some general benefit?

In fine, that is universally just, or hath the nature of just, which is profitable or conformable to the pretension of right or just even now described; for particularly, according as utility is various among several nations, so also is right or just, varions; infomuch as what is esteemed just in one, is unjust in another. Whence, if it be demanded, whether just or right be the same among all men, I answer, that, as to the general, it is the same, for it is something that is profitable in mutual society: but the differences of several Countries, and various causes amongst them being considered in particular, it comes to passe that it is not the same amongst all.

And (to deduce some few particulars hence) whatsoever is by experience found profitable to a mutual Society, or the common participation of such things as are esteemed just, that thing hath the nature of just or right, if it be such as its utility extends unto all. But if any man shall establish such a thing for just, and yet it shall happen not to be profitable to mutual Society, it hath not the true nature of just or right.

Again, though sometimes the utility of that which was esteemed just may fail, nevertheless, if there be sometimes some utility in it, so that it corresponds to the pretension of just or right, it is truly just for that time: they certainly will esteem it so, who confound not themselves with vain loquacity, but look more generally into humane affairs.

Lastly, where no new circumstance of things intervening those very things, which were esteemed just in the actions of men, are found not to correspond with the notion of just, they are not just at all: but where, upon innovation or change of affairs, those things which were formerly decreed to be just, cease to be profitable, they were just, as long as they continued profitable to mutual Society, but, as soon as ever they ceased to be profitable, they ceased to be just.
But that we may go higher and deduce the thing from its original, it appears that Right and Just are as ancient, and Justice hath been kept amongst men as long, as they have had societies amongst themselves.

For, in the beginning, men wandering up and down like wild beasts and suffering many inconveniences, as well from beasts as from the injuries of weather, a certain natural agreement amongst them (by reason of their likeness in form and soul or manners) persuaded them to join together in several companies, and to make some provision against those inconveniences, by building huts or cottages, and furnishing themselves with other shelters, as well against wild beasts as the weather. But in regard every one was desirous to be in a better condition than another, hereupon there arose frequent contentions about food, women, and other conveniences, which they took away from another; until at length they perceived, that they could not live secure and commodiously, unless they made a covenant not to injure one another, and that in case any one did harm and injure another, the rite should punish him.

This was the first band of Society; which, supposing that every one might have something proper to himself, or which he might call his own, as being his, either by first possession, or by gift, or by purchase, or by acquisition through his own industry, or otherwise; decreed, that it should remain in the possession and disposal of that person. Now this band or covenant was no other than a common law, which all were equally bound to observe, and which did confirm to every one a certain right or faculty of using whatsoever was his own. Whereupon that very law also came to be (as I formerly intimated) the common right as it were of the Society.

I need not mention how the whole Society transferred their power of restraining or punishing, upon some few wise and good persons, or else on one, who was reputed the wisest and best amongst them. I shall only observe, that in the Society those were accounted just or favourites of justice, who being content with their own rights invaded not those of other men, but did injury to none; those unjust, or doers of injustice, who being not content with their own rights, did assault the rights of other men, and harming them by rapine, personal violence, or some other way, became injurious to them.

Thus men lived a while peaceably and happily, especially being under one or more Kings or Princes, the wisest and best, who being wholly intent upon the conservation and utility of the publick, made, and with content of the people, established divers Laws, to prevent divisions from rising, or, if any did arise, to compose them. But, such is the corruption of mens manners, in course of time the government fell into the hands of Princes or Kings that were not good; and those being either deposed or slain it reverted to the people, whereupon tumults were raised by the factions of such as aspired to the supreme power, until at length, the people languishing under eminities and divisions, and weary of living by force and hostility, became willing to submit again to the government of Magistrates or Princes. But because the wills of Princes had
had formerly pass’d for absolute laws, they made a covenant with their
governours; about those Laws: according to which they devided to be go-
graved, and thus brought themselves again under Laws, that is, under first
Rights.

But not to descend to later times, but to touch only upon that chief
head, which concerns the preservation of life, for whose security (as being
the most precious of all things) war was taken from the beginning: that
might be established by common covenants or Laws: *it appears that
those most wise and good founders of Laws, having regard to the socety of
life, and to those things, which men usually do each to other, declared it a wick-
edVol to kill a man, and decreed that the Murtherer should be punish’d with
more than common ignominy, and losse of life. And to this they seem to have
been induced, partly by considering the conciliation of men among themselves
(of which I treated even now) in respect whereof men ought not to be
as forward to destroy an animal of their own kind, as one of different
kind, which is lawfull to kill; partly, and indeed chiefly, by considering,
that men ought to abhorre, what is no way advantageous to life, but tends only
to evil.

Indeed from the beginning, to those who had regard to the utility of that
confederacion, there needed not any other cause to make them come themselves
from doing any such act: but they who could not sufficiently comprehend
what great concernment it was, abstained from murdering one another, only
out of a fear of those great punishments; both which we may observe to have
happened even in our own days. They who consider the great advantages of
such a confederation are sufficiently disposed for a constant observance thereof:
but they who are not capable of understanding it conform themselves to
one fear of the punishments threatened by the laws, and ordained by the more
prudent, against such as had no regard to this utility, the greater part of the mul-
titude admitting them as legall.

For none of the laws written that have been devised to us,
and shall be transmitted to our posterity, did at first subsist by any force or
avidence, but (as it was) merely by the consent of those who used it. For it was pru-
dence, not strength of body or imperious ways, wherein they who folted these laws
upon the people, transcended the usurpation, and this, by inducing some men to
consider, what would be profitable (especially when they did not before so well
understand as they ought) and by terrifying others with the greatness of the
punishments. Nor could they indeed make us of any other remedy for cure of
the peoples ignorance of this utility, than fear of the punishments prescribed by
the Law. For even now also, it is fear alone that keeps the ordinary sort of men
within the bounds of their duty, and biders them from committing anything
against either the publick or private good.

Now if all men could alike understand, and bear in mind what is truly pro-
fetible, they should need no laws at all, but would of their own accord beware
of doing such things as the Laws forbid, and do what they enjoy: since only to
know what is profitable and what hurtful, is more than sufficient, to induce
them to avoid this; and pursue that. But as for those, who discern not what is
beneficial, what hurtful, doubting the communition of punishment, against
such as highly necessary; in short, as the fear of the punishments im ponderant
causes them to suppress and bribe those hands of their passions, which incite
them to unjust actions, and in a manner compel them, though against their wills,
to do what is right.

Hereupon was it, the Law-makers ordained, that even involuntary killing of a
man, should not be free from all malice and punishment. Not that they might not,
to such as were not to commit wilful murder, give any occasion of pretext or
excuse,
EPICURUS.

"...infinitum, Not could this course but prove beneficial for the same cause, for which men were expressly prohibited to kill each other. So that considering, that, of these allusions, of this kind, that are done involuntarily, some happen from a cause, that could not be foreseen, nor prevented by human nature, others merely through our negligence, and heedlessness of the imminent danger; therefore to prevent negligence, which might send to the destruction of others, they provided, that even the involuntary allusion should not pass altogether unchastised, but took away the frequency of this sin, by the fear of Law.

Moreover I conceive, that even those slaughterers of men which were permitted by the Laws, were made liable, to those accustomed expiations, by publick Lustrations, and that by order of the same persons, who first ordained them, for no other cause but this, that they had a mind to preserve men from involuntary slaughter, which was not too frequent.

For the vulgar sort of men, good in need of something, to restrain them from doing any thing hurtful, which might not conduct to the publick utility, which these first Law-makers understanding, not only decreed severe punishments, but writ full force another fear into their minds, the reason of which was not so manifest as the other, declaring that such as had killed a man, by what means or accident soever, should be impri"munt till they had used lustrations.

For the benefit part of the soul, in which the affections and passions reside, being instructed and reformed, came at length to that gentleness which now flourishes amongst us, by applying the art of seeming and civilizing our savage affections, which were invented, and practised at first, by those who ruled the multitudes; of which, this is one chief art among the rest, that men should not destroy one another, without any distinction.

CHAP. XXVII.

Between whom, Right and Justice is to be exercised.

Now since, it may be demanded, betwixt what Persons, as well Right, and the violation of it, which is Injury, as Justice, and what is opposite to it, Injustice properly confin'd? We shall therefore explicate this, by comparing men with other living Creatures.

As therefore, there is no reason of Right or injury, or just and unjust betwixt Animals, that could not make a common agreement, nor to hurt, nor be hurt by mutuall invasion; so neither, is there between those nations which either would not, or could not, enter into a mutuall engagement, nor to hurt, nor be hurt by one another.

For just, or right, the conservation whereof is Justice, hath no being at all, but in mutuall Society, whence Justice is the good of a Society, informed as by it, every one of the associated Persons live securely; free from that anxiety, which is caused by the continual fear of harm. Whence it follows, that whatever Animals, or what Men ever, either cannot, or will not make an association, nor enter into covenant among themselves, must want this good, not being reciprocally oblig'd by any bond of right or Justice, whereby they might live securely; and so to them, there can remain no other reason of security, than only this, to do harm to others, that they be not harmed themselves.

As therefore, when one of those brute Animals, amongst which there hath past no such agreement or pact, doth hurt another, though it may be
said that one hurts the other, yet it cannot be said that one doth an injury to the other, because we are not bound, by any right, compact, or Law, not to hurt the other. In like manner, it is one man of that nation, among whom there is no covenant, or association hurt another. It may be said that he hurts him, but not that he wrongs or doth him an injury; because he was not obliged by any compact or Law, nor to hurt him.

I speak of brute Animals, nor as if there were any even of those who live in herds or flocks, that are capable of entering into covenants, nor to harm or be hurt by each other, and so might be conceived to be just, if they do not hurt each other, and unjust if they do; but only in the end, that from hence it may be the better understood, that even among men, justice in its self is nothing, for that it is found only in mutual Societies, according to the amplitudes of every Country, in which the inhabitants may conveniently enter into agreements; and covenants of not doing, or receiving any hurt, since otherwise, and in man fingly considered, there is no justice at all; and what is Justice in one Society of men, many times is, in respect of contrary covenants, injustice in another.

But can there be Justice betwixt Men and other Animals? Certainly not. For if men could make a covenant with brute Animals, as they can with other men, that they should not kill, or be killed by them, without any distinction; then indeed, might the reason of right or wrong be founded betwixt them and us, since the end of that covenant would be the security of both parties; but, because it is impossible, that Animals void of reason should be obliged by one Law with us, it quite also impossible, for us to obtain more assurance of security from Animals, than even from inanimate things. So that, there is no other way for us to secure our selves from brute beasts, but only to execute that power of destroying them, which Nature hath given us.

Perhaps you will, by the way, demand, why we kill even such Animals, as can give us no occasion of fear? This we may do neither through intemperance, and a certain natural savageness or cruelty, as we exercise cruelty even upon men, who live out of our society, and cannot give us any fear. But it is one thing, to break the rules of Temperance, or any of its kinds, as Sobriety, Lenity, or Mansuerude, or (if you please) meet humanity or goodneffe of nature; another, to violate Justice; which presupposes Laws and Covenants establisht by mutual consent.

* Nor can it be alleged, that we have a power granted us by Law, to destroy any such Animals, as are not offensive or defruitive to mankind. I mean such, there is no such kind of living Creatures, among all those we are allowed to destroy, which being permitted to increase in vast multitudes, would not prove pernicious to mankind, but being preserved in such number as ordinarily, they are, are not some ways usefull to life.

For sheep, kine, and all such like, as long as they are prefered to a moderate number, afford us many necessaries for life: but if they were suffered to multiply in a far greater manner; certainly, they could not be prov'd very hurtful to us, as well in regard of their strength, as for that they would devour the fruts of the earth; this would serve for our subsistence. And for this very cause is it, that we are not prohibited to destroy such Animals, yet preserve so many of them as may be useful to us, and safely rule by us.

For of Lyon, Poultry, and all such as are called wild beasts, (whether little or great) we cannot take a certain number, which being prefered, may afford us any relief necessary to life, as we may of kine, hogs, and the rest; that are called tame Creatures. Whence it comes to pass, that we endow them wholly to exterminate these, and of these cut off only so many as are prejudicial, about a competing stock.
E P I C U R U S.

Hereupon (to touch briefly on this also) we may conceive that even among those nations who make their choice of certain sorts of Animals for food, the matter was determined and prescribed by certain Laws, grounded upon reason, corresponding to those we have previously spoken of. And as for those Animals that were not to be eaten, there was respect had to their utility and immortality, and for some reason peculiar to each Country; to the constitutions whereof there is no necessity for us to adhere, who live not in those places.

Hence we come to understand, that, from the very beginning, a difference was put between the killing of Men, and the killing of all other Animals; for as to other Animals it is manifest, that those primitive wise Peripatetics, who prescribed what we should do, and what not, did not forbid to kill any of them, because the profit that arises from them is perfected by the contrary action, that is, by killing them. For it could not be, that men, living promiscuously among each other, could preserve themselves in safety otherwise, than by expelling or destroying them.

But as concerning Mankind, "Some, who at that time were more generous, perhaps than the rest, perhaps were they, that persuaded men first to enter into that commonwealth of" remembered; that in those places who men lived promiscuously, they had sometimes abstained from slaughter, out of a respect to that utility which conduces to their safety; as also represented to others in their meetings what had happened, that restraining from slaughter of an Animal of the same kind, they might defend the society of life, which is generally the cause of every man's particular safety. And it was profitable at first to quit the society of other other Animals, or men meeting together, at least not to have any, to avoid the incensing of, not only other Animals of several kinds, but also men; who are all of the same, and spoilt enough of themselves to do harm. Whence, upon this account, men restrained laying hands upon an animal of their own species, that this should itself be to the communication of things necessary, and contribute some benefit to society.

But in process of time, there being a great increase on both sides, and animals of different species being forced away, men began to make use of their reason, (whereas before that time they had trusted altogether to reason,) and to enter into consultation what was to be done in order to their safety, when they should come together, and conjoint their habitation. For they endeavoured strongly to restrain those, who rashly and imprudently would murder one another, and thereby made the utmost assistance, that men were able to afford each other, daily the weaker; and this chiefly, because those general inconveniences, which had frequently fallen out in former times upon the life of men, were utterly forgotten. Now whilst they endeavoured to bring this to pass, they at length introduced the Laws and Constitutions, which continue in all Cities and Nations even to this day, the common people of their own accord conferring to them, as I said; being sensible how much greater utility would from thence accrue to them, living in mutual society. In like manner, it conduces also to security, both to destroy without any pity what is pernicious, and to preserve what ever is useful to exterminate it.

Thus it is probable, but upon these considerations, the slaughter of all other animals came to be permitted, and that of men prohibited. But I insist too long hereupon.
EPICURUS.

CHAP. XXVIII.

With what right Justice is to be exercised.

Justice being established by a mutual agreement, it remains, that every man, whether a native or alien, ought, from the time he has given up his name to a Society, to account himself a member of that Society, upon this condition, either expressly or tacitly, that he hurt none of his fellow-members, nor be hurt by any other. Wherefore he must either stand to the Covenant, or depart out of the Society; for he is not to be suffered to live in the Society upon any other terms. Whence it follows, since by nature, no man is willing to receive harm from another, that he do not that to another, which he would not should be done to himself.

Hereupon it may be imagined, that the Laws in all Societies were made in favour of the wife, not to prevent wise men from doing unjustly, but that others should not injure them. For as for them, they are so well disposed, as that if there were no Laws, yet would they not do harm to any. They have prescribed bounds to their desires, and accommodate them to nature, which requires nothing that must be obtained by ways of injustice: nor indeed is there any of nature's pleasures, which induceth a man to do injury to another, but some exorbitant desire arising from vain opinion.

For nature having (for example) provided herbs, corn, fruits, for food, competent and useful, and water for drink, things safe to be had; it cannot be the pleasure of satisfying hunger and thirst, that should cause a man to rob his neighbour, or commit any of those injuries which they usually do: but the vain desire of living at a higher rate, more splendidly and wantonly, that so he may acquire wealth enough to discharge the expenses of his luxury. The same may be said also of those, who not content with plain apparel, a plain house, a plain match, and the like, through ambition, pride, luft, and other passions, desire more than nature needs.

Moreover, seeing that a wise man, as I hinted formerly, doth all things for his own sake, nothing certainly can more conduce to his advantage, than to observe justice exactly. For in giving to every one his due, and harming no man he to his utmost, prefers and keeps safe that Society, which, unless it be safe, he cannot be safe himself; nor doth he provoke any man to revenge an injury suffered at his hands, or fear any hurt or punishment to be inflicted upon him by publick decree. Thus being conscious to himself of no ill done, he remains free from all perturbation, which is the greatest benefit and fruit of justice; and while he reaps that, what can be more to his own advantage?

Neither ought you to think, that he, who, though secretly and without, the knowledge of any man, violates right, or the Covenants ratified by general consent to prevent the committing and suffering of wrong, can live in the same security and indisturbance as the just man doth, because (as I said) he cannot assure himself, that his injustice shall never be brought to light: for crimes, though they may be secret, can never be secure, nor doth it avail an offender to be concealed from others, while he can never be concealed from himself.

Truly, though his offence were never so well concealed for a time, yet is it very uncertain, whether it will continue so concealed till his death, for still, there is a jealousy and suspicion that follows upon ill actions; and
EPICURUS.

and again, there have been many who have detected themselves, some in dreams, others in raving fits, others in drink, others through incognizance. So that a wicked man, though he may for a time lie hid both from gods and men, (as they say,) yet he hath reason to mistrust, that it will not be concealed for ever.

Hence it is, that notwithstanding injustice is not an ill in itself, because what is reputed unjust in one place, may be just in another; yet it is an ill in respect of that fear, which, stifling the conscience, creates in it a continual suspicion, that at some time or other, his unjust deeds will come to the ears of the avengers of injustice, and so he be called to a severe account for them. Thus there is nothing that more conduceth, as to security, so likewise to a quiet and pleasant life, than to live innocently, and upon no occasion to violate the common covenants of peace.

Wherefore since the just and unjust are in this opposition, that the just, of all men, are the most free from perturbations; What can be more profitable to those than justice? what more hurtful to these than injustice? For how can any anguish of mind, sollicitudes, daily and nightly feats, be profitable to any man?

Justice therefore being so great a good, and injustice so great an ill, let us embrace one, and abhor the other. And if at any time our mind seem to stagger, and we are in suspense what to do; let us fix on some grave good man, and suppose him to be always present with us; that we may live and do all things, as if he looked upon us.

By this means, we shall not only avoid the doing of any thing openly against justice, but also of offending in secret against the rules of honesty. This good man will be to us in head of a Guardian or Tutor, whom, because we reverence, we fear to offend. Following this counsel therefore, thus argue: If he were present, I would not do it. Why do I do it in his absence? He would find fault with it, because, it is ill. Why do not I think ill of my self? Thus, do all things, as if some such person looked on; for if you in this manner reverence another, you will soon come to be reverenced yourself.

CHAP. XXIX.

Of Beneficence, Gratitude, Piety, Obedience.

We come next to the Vertues which we said were allied to Justice, for that they have regard to other persons; and though they are not as Justice is) prescribed by Laws and Covenants, Yet they import our decency, a certain obligation like that of Justice.

The first is Beneficence, or the doing good to others, whereunto those are obliged, who are able to assist or relieve others, either with their hands or purse. If they deny the assistance of their hands, they are cenured as barbarous, cruel, inhuman; if that of their purse, they are thought the same, as also, God, beneficent, generous, and the like. But if they assist others, they are accounted courageous, civil, kind, liberal, munificent, magnificent; &c. So that they are obliged for their own sakes to do good to others, so as may be without prodigality.

For those who practice this vertue procure to themselves, good will, and (what most of all conduces to quiet living) and dearness and tender estimation from others; they who use it not, ill will, and (what most occasions trouble some life) contempt and hatred. Take heed therefore you omit not to be beneficent, or least in small matters, that so you lose
not the advantage of being accounted ready to gratifie others, even in
great.

Nor, without reason, did I say formerly, that it is not only more honourable,
but also more delightfult to give, than to receive a benefit; because,
the giver thereby makes himself superior to the receiver, and reaps more
over the interest of Thanks; and there is not anything that joys a man
more than thanks. A beneficent person, is like a fountain, which if you
should impose it to have a reasonable font, what joy would it not have
at the sight of so many corn-fields, and pastures, which flourish and smile
as if we were with plenty and verdure, and all by the diffusion of its streams
upon them?

The second is gratitude, to which every man that receives a benefit, is
reciprocally obliged, unless he would incur the greatest hatred and igno-
nomy. For ingratitude is worthily hateful to all men; because seeing
nothing is more suitable to nature, then to be propenfe to receive a good,
it is highly contrary to nature, not to be readily grateful towards the au-
thor of that good.

Now since, no man is more gratefully affected towards his benefactors
than the wife man, we may justly affirm, that only the wife man knows
how to fulfill the duty of gratitude, because he alone is ready upon all
occasions to express his thankfulnes to his friends, both present and ab-
dent, even to those, that are dead.

Others pay thanks only to present friends, when present, and this per-
haps for their own farther ends, to encourage them to some new favour;
but how few are there, who gratefully commemorate their absent bene-
dactors! Who require the good they did them upon their Children or oth-
er relations? How few who honour their memory after death; who
rejoice nor rather, as if their obligations were cancelled? Who love those
that were dead to them, respect them, and as far as in them lies, do good
to them?

The third is Piety, the most sacred species of gratitude. It looks upon
our parents in the first place, to whom every man is more obliged than
to all the World besides: for to others, they may owe other things; but to
his parents he owes himself. Therefore if ingratitude to others be hate-
ful, that which is shown to parents must certainly be the most horrid and
deretable.

We say, in the first place, because piety in the second place extends to
kindred, and chiefly to our Brothers and Sisters, to whom we are obliged
by the interest of our parents; in such manner as that we cannot shew
our selves disrespectful and unkind to them, but we must be at the same
time highly ungrateful, to our parents, and all our progenitors, who in
the circle of their love and benevolence comprehended all that were, and
should afterwards be derived from them.

Nor is his piety distinct from that dearness, we are to bear toward our
native Country, which comprehends our Parents and all our kindred,
and receives us at our birth, brings us up, and protects us. And as by the
interest of our parents we are obliged to our kindred, so by the interest of
our Country we are obliged to respect all our Country-men; but
more especially, the Magistrates and Princes, who defend the Country in
faily, and the laws of it, and give us this benefit in particular, that under
their protection we may live securely and peaceably.

The fourth is reverence, or that reverence which we owe all persons
prominency in any kind. This is accompanyd more with gratitude and
piety. For we, cannot, any way, better express the gratefulnesse of our
minds
minds then by giving due veneration and worship to our Benefactors, Parents, Government, Princes, and all men of dignity and power) and partly with honour and respect, as it is the best testimony we can give of our internal sentiments of their deserving, who excel in Age, Wisdom, Learning, and Virtue, the most honourable of all things.

To this observance belongs that which men call Religion and Sanction toward the Gods, whom we are bound to reverence and honour no otherwise than as our parents, not through hope of any reward, but (as I said before), for their transcendent majesty and the supremacy of their nature. Because, whatever is excellent deserves a just veneration, and no excellence is greater than that of the divine Nature, for it is immortall and most blessed.

Thus understanding that the Gods neither create troubles to themselves nor give others, we piously and holily reverence their most excellent nature.

CHAP. XXX.

Of Friendship.

The last is Friendship, to which all are mutually obliged, who love and are reciprocally beloved. And well may it be the close and crown of this discourse; for amongst all the means procured by wisdom, to make life happy, there is not any thing more full and pleasant than Friendship; and the same reason that confirms the mind to bear any illing or external ill, doth also assure that, in life, there is no Sanctuary safe, or no protection so sure as that of friendship, which together with that security, conferreth also very great pleasures.

For as hatreds, envies, defiles are enemies to pleasure; so are friendships, not only most faithful confessors, but effectual causers of pleasures, as well to our friends as to ourselves: by which means not only enjoy present things more fully, but are cheered with hopes of those to come. And a solitary life distrueteth of friends being full of fear, and subject to treacheries, reason it sall advise us to procure friendships, by which the mind is confirmed, and possessed with hopes of enjoying future pleasures.

Now though friendship is contrasted in respect of use and utility, in like manner as we sow the earth in hope of a crop hereafter, and the first meetings and conversations of friendship are made in respect of the utility and pleasures which are hoped from thence; yet, when this custom hath gone on to intimacy, then love so flourisht, that though there were not any benefit of friendship, yet friends would be loved for their own sakes. If we love places, temples, cities, academies, plains, houses, dogs, sports, out of an habitual custom of exercising or pursuing how much easier and more justly may we do this in conversation with men?

But in the choice of our friends, we must be exceeding cautious and prudent; for if it concern us to be more circumstanced with whom we eat, then what we eat, and though to eat alone, without a friend, be a full life of a Lyon or Wolf, yet we must be careful to choose such a friend whose conversation may be the best sauce to our meat. We must seek one to whom nothing is more in esteem than candor, simplicity, and frankness, one that is not morose, quarrelsome, and murmuring at all things, none who by his complacency, alacrity, and pleasantness may render our life sweeter.
EPICTETUS.

Friendship, I grant consists in; and is kept alive by, the mutual participation of pleasures or goods which we may enjoy whilst we live; yet it is not necessary that the goods of friends should be put into one common stock, as he conceived, who said, *Amongst Friends all things are common.* This implies a difference (that all their wills may not concur constant) and they who are different are not friends; such only are friends, who can with full confidence and freedom take and use so much of their friends goods or estate as they need; although kept in several stock, no other wise than as if it were their own, eftimating them to be no less their own, than if they had them in their own possession and keeping.

This sounds strange in the ears of the vulgar; but what are they to us? There is no faith or constancy in their kind; and friendship, they being incapable of these things and of the least part of commendable Wisdom. Moreover, he that is one of the vulgar, understands not what is profitable in private or publick; nor can distinguish between good manners and bad.

I speak therefore of the wise manly; amongst whom there is a kind of league, and covenant not to love their friends less than themselves, which we know may be done and see it often comes to pass; whence it is manifest, that there can be nothing more conducing to pleasant living than such a conjunction.

Wherefore we understand, that the placing of the chief good in pleasure is so far from being obstractive hereunto, that with that there can be no intimation of friendship.

For it being impossible for us to conserve the sweetness and security of our lives, time and sitting with our friends' and to prefer friendship, unless we love our friends as much as our selves, this therefore and pleasure are the inseparable adjuncts of friendship; for, we rejoice in our friends joy as much as if it were our own, and are concerned equally in his grief.

A wise man therefore will be alike towards his friend as towards himself; what labour and pains he undergoes for his own pleasure, the same will be undergone for the pleasure of his friend. And as he would rejoice to think that he hath one that will do all for him, if he should be sick, and relieve him, if he were cast into prison, or fallen into want, so will he rejoice at having one by whom, if he should fall sick, he may be set, and whom if imprisoned, or fallen into want, relieved. And not only this, but his love will be so great, as to undergo the greatest torments, even death itself, for his friend's sake.

We have known it certainly happen (and that within the memory of our parents) that many, who had the happiness of procuring to themselves full confidence and security in the society of men living in the same opinion and the same affections with them, have in the assurance of this comfortable league, lived most sweetly together and been conjointly with no absolute necessity, as that one could, without the least reluctance, will to suffer for the other condemned to dye.

This is all I had to say concerning ETHICK, which in the beginning is allotted to be the chief part of Philosophy. You who ever you are that aspire to true wisdom, practice and meditate upon these rules, considering them as the grounds of honest, well, and happy living.

And lastly, I say upon this day and night, as well when you are alone, as when in company of some faithful companion who is like your self.
and to whom you may say, We are indeed alone, but by this means we have the greater opportunity of making inquisition into truth without prejudice. I speak not too many, but to you; and you speak not too many, but to me; and that’s enough, since each to other is a theater large enough.

Do you not now grant, that no man can be compared to him whose mind is rightly informed as concerning the Gods, and is fearless of death, and who hath to reaforemed concerning the end of nature, and the ultimate good, as to understand, that it may be compleated and attain’d with the greatest facility imaginable, and that whatever ill he must endure, either is short, if vehement, if long, gentle; and tellleth himself that there is no such thing as an inevitableness of fates concerning him, but that he hath an absolute freedom of will, and that nothing at all or very little of fortune can at any time intervene to crote him; and the evil which we have laid down.

Certainly when you shall come to be such a man as this, you will never be troubled waking nor sleeping (for even in sleep you will be just as you are when awake by reason of the well-composed state of your mind) but shall live like some Deity among men. For that man who spends his life in the enjoyment of immortal goods, is far different from a mortal creature. Hitherto Gaffendus.

CHAP. XXXI.

Wherein Epicurus, asserting Pleasure to be the ultimate good, differs from the Cyrenaicks.

Though Epicurus agrees with the Cyrenaicks in asserting Pleasure to be the ultimate good, yet concerning this Pleasure, they disagree. The Cyrenaicks admit not pleasure to consist in rest, but in motion only; Epicurus allowed both, as well that of the Soul as of the body; as he afferts in his Book Of Election and Avoidance, and in his seript of the End, and in his first book of Lives, and in his Epistle To the Philosophers at Mitylene. Likewise Diogenes in the eleventh of his Settle Rules, and Aristotle in his Timocrates, say thus; Whereas pleasure is twofold, one consisting in motion, the other in rest. And Epicurus in his treatise Of Elections expressly shews: of pleasures, indulgence and imperiousness consist in rest; joy and delight in motion.

Moreover, he differs from the Cyrenaicks, for that they conceive the pains of the body to be worse than that of the mind; whereas it comes to pass, that upon Malignants, corporal punishment is inflicted as being the most grievous. But Epicurus held, that the pains of the mind are the greatest, for that no ill can afflict the body longer than whilst it is present; but besides the present, the past and future also torment the mind, and by the same reason, the pleasures of the Soul are the greatest. Thus much of the Epicurean, the last of all the Italick Stiles.

FINIS.