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Δ, Ε, Ζ

ΜΕΛΠΟΜΕΝΗ ΤΕΡΨΙΧΟΡΗ ΕΡΑΤΩ
HERODOTUS

THE FOURTH, FIFTH, AND SIXTH BOOKS

WITH INTRODUCTION, NOTES, APPENDICES,
INDICES, MAPS

BY

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VOL II
APPENDICES INDICES MAPS

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CONTENTS

APPENDIX I

THE SCYTHS OF HERODOTUS

SECTION PAGE
1. Four stories in Herodotus on the origin of the Scyths 1
2. The habitat of the folk 1
3. Theory of a Mongolian descent 2
4. Theory of an Aryan descent 3
5. The four proofs (i. Physique, ii. Language, iii. Religion, iv. Affinity) discussed 4
6. Exaggerated value ascribed to the testimony of Herodotus and of Hippokrates 8
7. Evidence in Herodotus as to the original home of the Scyths 9
8. The supposed invasion of Media by the European Scyths 10
9. Disappearance of the Scyths in history; its bearing on the Herodotean problem 12

APPENDIX II

GEOGRAPHY OF SCYTHIA

1. Difficulty of reconstructing a map of Scythia according to Herodotus 15
2. Composite character of the Scythica, or Scythian Logi 16
3. Composite character of the specifically geographical element 16
4. The description of Scythia, in Bk. 4, cc. 99-101 17
5. The geography of Scythia, as implied in the narrative passion 20
6. The account of Scythia, in Bk. 4, cc. 16-20 22
7. The rivers of Scythia, Bk. 4, cc. 47-57 25
8. General results of the analysis of these various passages 28
9. Agreement and disagreement with the actual map of S. Russia 30
### APPENDIX III

**THE DATE, MOTIVES, AND COURSE OF THE EXPEDITION OF DARIOS IN EUROPE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The chronological problem</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Vagueness of the date given by Herodotus</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The suggestion of Grote: later confirmation</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Materials for determining the actual date</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The two revolts of Babylon</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Proposed epoch for the Scythian expedition: 512 B.C.</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. The motive of the expedition, according to Herodotus</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Modern theories on the subject: Niebuhr, Baehr, Sayce</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Supposed commercial policy: Niebuhr, E. Curtius</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. The substantial truth of the story assumed</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Characteristics of the story</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Summary of criticisms</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Error of separating the scenes on the Danube from the rest of the story</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Thirlwall's suggestion as to the story of Miltiades</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Duncker's suggestion as to the story of the campaign in Scythia</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Did not Darius fully accomplish his real purpose?</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Suggestions explanatory of the fictitious story</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Detailed analysis of the text of Herodotus</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### APPENDIX IV

**THE PERSIANS IN THRACE (512-489 B.C.)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Delimitation of the subject</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Persian operations in Thrace previous to the coming of Darius</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The advance of the king from the Bosporos</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The return of the king to the Hellespont</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Composite character of the ensuing passages</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Anthropological elements</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Literary stories and anecdotes</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Military operations, during the residence of Darius at Sardes</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Loss and recovery of Thrace and Macedon between 500-490 B.C.</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### APPENDIX V

**THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE IONIAN REVOLT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The fixed data for the chronology</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The three problems involved</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. What event marks the apostasy of Aristagoras?</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONTENTS

SECTION PAGE
4. How is the 'sixth year' computed? 63
5. The Attic Calendar 63
6. How are the events to be distributed? 64
7. Two passages capable of chronological extension 65
8. Hypothetical reconstruction of the sequence and synchronisms 66
9. Tabular exhibition of the chronology 69

APPENDIX VI

ANNALS OF THE TRIENNium 493-491 B.C.

1. Delimitation of the connected narrative of the Persian operations 71
2. Annals of the year 493 B.C. (i. the recovery of the Hellespont; ii. the ordinances of Artaphernes) 71
3. Annals of the year 492 B.C. (i. the expedition of Mardonios; ii. the omitted story of Macedon) 72
4. Annals of the year 491 B.C. (i. the treatment of Thasos; ii. the mission of the Heralds) 75
5. Was Herodotus the original author of this chronicle? 77

APPENDIX VII

SPARTAN HISTORY

1. Materials in Bks. 4, 5, 6 for the early history of Sparta 79
2. Materials in Bks. 4, 5, 6 for the history of Sparta c. 519-489 B.C. 80
3. Chronology of the reign of Kleomenes 82
4. The story of Dorius 83
5. The stories of Demaratos 85
6. The story of the end of Kleomenes 88
7. The anecdote of the Scythian embassy 90
8. The application of Aristogoras 90
9. The war with Athens 96
10. The war with Argos 96
11. The alliance with Athens against Persia 97

APPENDIX VIII

ATHENS AND AIGINA

1. Character of the subject and of the records 102
2. Story of the origin of the feud (§ 82-88): its chronology, sources, and significance 105
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>The alliance of Aigina and Thebes (5. 79-81, 89): chronology, sources, and significance of the story.</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>The mediation of Aigina; the appeal of Athens to Sparta</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>The exorcism in Bk. 6, on the Atheno-Aiginetan war: (i) the mission of Leotychides, cc. 85, 86; (ii) the seizure of the Theoroi (return of the hostages), c. 87; (iii) the conspiracy of Nikodemos, cc. 88-91; (iv) the three great battles, cc. 91, 92. Chronology, sources and significance of these stories.</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Summary of results</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**APPENDIX IX**

**INNER ATHENIAN HISTORY: HERODOTUS AND THE AΘΗΝΑΙΟΝ ΠΟΛΙΣΙΑ**

1. Athenian history in Hdt. Bks. 4, 5, 6 | 121 |
2. Relation between the 'Αθηναϊκαν πολεις and Herodotus | 123 |
3. The death of Hipparchos | 124 |
4. The expulsion of Hippias | 126 |
5. The struggle between Isagoras and Kleisthenes | 127 |
6. The New Constitution: Hdt.'s express account | 128 |
7. Herodotus' implicit description | 130 |
8. Authority of the 'Αθηναϊκαν πολεις on the constitutional question | 131 |
9. The institutions of Kleisthenes as described in the treatise | 132 |
10. Antecedents of the Τριττος | 134 |
11. The abolition of the Ναυκρατίας | 138 |
12. Motives of the legislator | 140 |
13. The consequential measures | 141 |
14. Ostrakism | 142 |
15. The chronological problem | 145 |

**APPENDIX X**

**MARATHON**

1. Subject and plan of this Appendix | 149 |
2. Brief analysis of the Herodotean account | 150 |
3. Six major omissions: (i) The supernormalism | 151 |
4. (ii) The exaggeration | 155 |
5. (iii) The anachronism | 156 |
6. (iv) The inconstancy | 159 |
7. (v) The omission | 161 |
8. (vi) The shield-episode | 164 |
9. Six minor omissions | 169 |
10. The Herodotean story of Marathon tried by Herodotean standards | 170 |
11. The use of secondary authorities | 174 |
12. Pindar | 175 |
13. Athenian speakers από τον Ηροδότον | 177 |
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTION</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14. Aischylos</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Simonides</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Aristophanes and the Comedians</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Thucydides and the Periklean reaction</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. The revival in the fourth century B.C.</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Plato</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. The Orators (Lykurgos, Aischines, Democthenes)</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Isokrates</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. The Epitaphios of the pseudo-Lysias</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Aristotle</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Summary of the evidence: transition to the Roman Period</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Cicero and Pompeius Trogus</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Cornelius Nepos and Diodoros</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Plutarch</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Pausanias (and C. Plinius Secundus)</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Suidas (et scholia)</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Ktesias (apud Photius)</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. Present state of the problem: four canons for its determination</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. Topography of the battle-field</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. Strategic situation on the Athenian and Persian sides</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. The motive for the Athenian attack</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. The actual engagement</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36. Question respecting the Persian camp</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37. Parts of the general and the soldiers respectively in the battle</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38. Results, immediate and remote, of the Athenian victory</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## APPENDIX XI

### THE PARIAN EXPEDITION

1. General character of the story in Hdt. 6. 132-136 | 249
2. Chronology of the events, and of the record | 249
3. Sources | 251
4. Significance, and truth, of the Herodotean story | 253
5. Alternatives (Ephoros) | 254
6. Supposed ingratitude of the Athenians towards the victor of Marathon | 256

## APPENDIX XII

### THE LIBYAN LOGI

1. General character and contents of the Libyan Logi: purpose of this Appendix | 259
2. Story of the Persian expedition into Libya: the fate of Barke, the deliverance of Kyrene, the end of Phereime: chronology | 261
3. Antecedents: story of the colonisation of Thera from Lakodaimon | 264
4. Story of the colonisation of Libya from Thera: chronology | 265
HERODOTUS

5. History of the Battiadai (six reigns): sources 268
6. The geographical element in the Libyan Logi: general conception of Libya 270
7. The region best known to Herodotus: his conception and knowledge of N. Africa 271
8. The Oases 275
9. Sources of the geography (Herodotus and Hekataios) 276
10. The value of the Herodotean geography and ethnography of Libya 279
11. Libya and Egypt 284
12. The ultimate problems of Libyan ethnology 286

APPENDIX XIII

THE ROYAL ROAD FROM SUSA TO SARIDS

1. Three problems to be distinguished 289
2. Difficulty created by the state of the text 289
3. The actual Itinerary of Herodotus 291
4. Comparison of the Itinerary with other passages, of various kinds, in Herodotus 291
5. The actual course of the Royal Road: materials and methods for determining the problem 295
6. Course of the road from Susa to the Euphrates (Kiepert) 296
7. Course of the road from Sardes to the Halys (Ramsay) 297
8. Course of the road between the Halys-bridge and the Euphrates-ferry (Kiepert, Ramsay, and an alternative) 298
9. Mr. D. G. Hogarth on the passes of the Taurus and the crossings of the Euphrates 299

APPENDIX XIV

HIPPOKLIDES—THE PEACOCK

1. The Indian fable of The Dancing Peacock 304
2. Antiquity of the fable 305
3. The story as told by Herodotus 305
4. Relation of the fable of The Dancing Peacock to the story of The Wedding of Aparists 307
5. Advent of the Peacock, and of the Peacock-fable in Europe 308
6. Historic elements in the wedding-tale not discredited by the fabulous contamination 310
7. Resemblance and contrast between the Buddhist and the Hellenic applications of the original fable 310
CONTENTS xi

INDICES

I. Lectionum 315
II. Verborum 317
III. Auctorum 328
IV. Nominum et Rerum 384

MAPS

1. Thrace and Scythia, to illustrate Appendices I.-IV. To face Title
2. Scythia, as conceived by Herodotus To face page 32
3. Marathon " 248
4. The Libya of Herodotus " 259
5. The Royal Road " 289

CORRIGENDA

P. 133 notes line 6 for Hauquoulier read Haussoullier
P. 241 notes line 4 for Devaux read Devaux: and see further, Mémoires de l'Acad. Royales de Belgique 41. ii (1875)
Pp. 275, 279 notes for Dümichen read Dümichen
APPENDIX I

THE SCYTHS OF HERODOTUS


§ 1. THE traditions touching the origin of the Scyths, preserved by Herodotus, comprise two obviously mythical stories, the 'Scythian,' Bk. 4, cc. 5-7, and the Hellenic, cc. 8-10, which agree in representing the Scyths as indigenous; and two quasi-historical, that of Aristaeas, c. 13, and a 'Graeco-barbarian,' c. 11, which agree in representing the Scyths as immigrants, the former bringing them from the north-east, the latter from the east or the south-east. The Herodotean evidences are further complicated by the story of the Scythian invasion of Asia, Bk. 4, c. 1, and ref. ad i., though not to an extent seriously to interfere with a reasonable conclusion regarding the general question of the origin and nationality of the Scyths, as described in the fourth Book of Herodotus—a question which resolves itself presently into the problem concerning the value and authority of the Herodotean record.

§ 2. It is evident, in the first place, that the Scyths in the fourth Book of Herodotus are a tribe, or group of tribes, inhabiting the north shore of the Euxine, and the steppe inland, a region denominated Scythia, Σκύθη, by the Greek geographers. These 'Scyths' were apparently distinguished from other inhabitants of the region, not merely Hellenic colonists, but a 'barbarian' population, including Kimmerian, Tauric, and perhaps other elements, within Scythia, to say nothing of non-Scythic tribes, clearly located beyond the frontiers of Scythia proper. In the time of Herodotus, however, a marked distinction apparently obtained between western and eastern Scythia, the former, or perhaps more strictly speaking the river valleys of the former, having been advanced to a condition of agriculture, while in eastern Scythia the population was still nomadic.
The geographical aspects of this distinction may be more conveniently discussed in a separate Appendix (II.). It need only here be added that, if the Scyths were, indeed,* a people sui generis, a reasonable doubt may exist as to the extent to which the western part was really cultivated, or even occupied, by genuine Scyths; it can hardly, at least, be doubted that it is the Nomad or Royal Scyths of Herodotus, who represent the true flower of the nation, and to whom primarily the ethnological problem applies. An overlordship, or dominion, they may probably have exercised, extending vaguely to the Pruth, or even to the Danube; but pure Scyths were, perhaps, to be found, even in the time of Herodotus, if anywhere, mainly to the east of the Borysthenes.

§ 3. It has been held by very eminent authorities, both in Germany and in England, that the Scyths of Herodotus were of Mongolian extraction. In Germany, B. G. Niebuhr was, perhaps, the leading advocate of this view, and the most elaborate defence of Niebuhr's theory was put forward by K. Neumann; 1 while here the fact that both Grote and Thirlwall adopted Niebuhr's opinion gave it vogue among us. Rawlinson has clearly stated, 2 in order to refute them, the two chief arguments for the Mongolian theory, viz. (1) the physical resemblance, (2) the resemblance of manners and customs, between the Scyths of Herodotus and the Mongol tribes, as described by modern ethnologists. The first of these arguments is based on the testimony of Hippokrates: the second on that of Herodotus. Rawlinson's refutation, which need not here be reproduced in detail, is based on two chief theses: (1) the physique of the Scyths, as described by Hippokrates, does not really coincide with the Mongolian type in essentials; (2) the argument from Herodotus is weakened by the consideration that manners and customs may have been borrowed, or transferred from tribe to tribe, specially in proximity. Rawlinson substantially added that similar customs are to be found all the world over among tribes in similar conditions of life. But further, it is to be observed that the argument, and the rejoinder, alike permitted the Herodotean record to pass unchallenged. It was taken for granted, by both sides alike, that Herodotus was describing customs not merely in themselves real and historical, but also proper to the 'Scyths.' The observation was not made that Herodotus ascribes to the Scyths customs which are not all easily reconcilable. The idea was not even suggested that there may have been a transference of customs from people to people not at all, or not merely, in actual fact, but mainly, or wholly, by fallacy of observation, or carelessness.

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of record. The reporter who could ascribe to Dareios the substitute for a calendar only appropriate to a savage, in the stage of culture of Prince Le Boo's father, is hardly to be trusted to have discriminated, carefully and critically, between customs of the Scythians and customs of tribes or strata of population inhabiting 'Scythic' territory. If customs are reported of the Scythians, which seem to belong to somewhat different stages of culture, as the modern anthropologist conceives them, this result may be due to a progress, or differentiation of culture among the Scythians, or it may be due to a critical imperfection in the observations. A similar remark applies to the argument from Language. Taken by itself (as Rawlinson takes it) that argument cannot support the conclusion, at least in this case. Not merely is language itself of all customs the most changeable and easily transferred, but also, in this case, the evidence is far from copious, and the witness is not highly qualified. It should be remembered that the advocates of the 'Mongolian' hypothesis undertook to find Mongolian analogies for Scythian words, and even Rawlinson himself admits that the argument from proper names is a weak one. It is more germane to the methods followed in this volume to observe, first, that we have very little guarantee for Herodotus' competence as a linguist, or philological witness: secondly, that granting the truth and accuracy of the forms, and words, as reported by him, it is still a further question, whether the words so established are all genuine Scythic. To take one particular class, the river-names: it is a bold assumption that these are evidences of Scythic speech: if the Scythians were immigrants, it is more likely that the river-names were praes-Scythic: to do Herodotus justice, it cannot be said that he commits himself in regard to this class of words.

§ 4. The view maintained by Rawlinson, against Grote and Niebuhr, is the view now generally prevalent, in regard to the ethnic affinities of the Scythians. It has found recently its broadest expression from the late Professor A. von Gutschmid, and the arguments on its behalf are easily accessible to English readers in his article on the subject in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, and in somewhat fuller measure in an essay, now printed in the posthumous edition of his collected works.

1 Cp. Note to 4. 98.
4 Cp. Introduction, p. lxxix.
5 Perhaps 'Kimmerian,' perhaps even older. If South Russia were, indeed, the cradle of the 'Indo-Europeans,' the river-names might very well be 'Aryan,' without being 'Scythic.' I venture to hint, as an obiter dictum, that etymologists are apt to diminish the true perspective: the oldest ascertainable forms of language have still, probably, a long history before them.
7 Kleine Schriften, iii. 421-445 (1892). The argument was inaugurated by Zeuss, Die Deutschen und ihre Nachbarstämmen 275 ff. (1837), and culminated in Müllenhoff's Herkunft und Sprache der pont. Skymen und Sarmaten, Berl. Ak. 1866, 549 ff., printed with corrections and additions in his Deutsche Alterthumskunde, iii. pp. 101 ff. (1892). Lesser lights, who see, with Freisl, in the Germans, or with Cuno, in the Slavs, the posterity of the Scythians, of course agree, on the previous question, of the Aryan origin of the Scythians, with Zeuss, Müllenhoff and Gutschmid.
The full argument is fourfold, turning upon the evidences of physique, language, religion, and affinities: and it may be granted that the evidences are cumulative, and that, as against the positive hypothesis of the Mongolian origin and character of the Scyths of Herodotus, the alternative of their Aryan, or Indo-European origin is on the whole preferable. The relative importance of the arguments has fluctuated, in the statements of the advocates of this view. Thus Zeuss placed the argument from religion in the forefront, and with him the linguistic argument, which holds the chief place with Rawlinson, as later with Müllenhoff, appears but an incident of the argument from affinity. The physiological argument he did not use, except negatively. Gutschmid regarded the affinity with the Sauromatae as the strongest argument for the Aryan character of the Scyths. The argument from manners and customs, which still figures prominently in Rawlinson’s Essay, as an obstacle to the Aryan theory, has practically disappeared; for, though it would be easy to find many points of resemblance in custom between the Scyths of Herodotus and admittedly Aryan peoples, the advocates of the Aryan hypothesis have wisely determined to make no use of such analogies. The most now said upon the point is that, as undoubtedly Aryan peoples have followed nomad customs, such customs among the Scyths can be no argument against their Aryan origin. The four arguments actually in vogue require further elucidation.

§ 5. i. The physiological argument in its present form comprises two sides. On the one side it is urged that Hippokrates, in describing the Scythian physique, omits the most important notes of the Mongolian type: on the other side that the archaeological evidences favour the rival hypothesis. With this last observation the argument certainly advances a step. But it is to be remembered that some allowance may have to be made for the idealising tendencies of the ‘best’ Greek art, some also, perhaps, for the presence and admixture of Hellenic elements in Scythia; two factors which would, at least, partially explain the non-Mongolian types on monuments and other remains of an obviously philo-Hellenic population, or section of the

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2 Zeuss identified the Skoloti with a Persian or Medo-Persian stock, not immediately with the Sauromatae.
3 Müllenhoff, op. c. p. 102.
5 “A glance at the works of the best (schönsten) Greek art, found in the Crimea and the region on the Samara, described by Herodotus 4. 53, 56, 71, representing Scythian princes and people in every detail of their appearance, is enough to convince one that these persons were not North-Asiatics” (Müllenhoff, op. cit. p. 101). But ‘glances’ are apt to be superfluous: the works in question are comparatively late: in any case, what could Greek art, good, bad, or indifferent, prove in regard to the origins of ‘barbarians’? The archaeological evidence is now available in S. Reinach’s edition (Paris, 1892) of the Antiquités du Bassphore Cimmérien (1854), and in the Antiquités de la Russie méridionale, recently issued (1891 ff.). Neither of these publications, however, wholly supersedes the great work of F. Dubois de Montpréaux, Voyage autour du Caucase (Paris, 1838), with Atlas (Neuchâtel, 1843).
population. The physiological argument, even in its most advanced stage, has hardly more than a negative force: but if it helps to discredit the 'Mongolian' theory, in the paucity of alternatives, it may amount to a constructive proof of the Aryan origin and type of the Scyths.

ii. The argument from language, as stated by Rawlinson, requires, apparently, both addition and revision, in order to bring it up to date. Additional evidence is now producible from epigraphic materials, in the shape of native proper names of undoubted Iranian stamp. The explications and etymologies of several of the Scythian words do not appear to have been indisputably established. Rawlinson takes Arimaspi exactly at Herodotus' valuation, to mean "one-eyed men"; Müllenhoff argues that it, "without doubt," means "having obedient horses." Rawlinson had no difficulty in Aryanising the Herodotean etymology for Oiôprota, Müllenhoff finds the true reading in the form Oiôprôta, and the true meaning not in "man slaying" but in "man ruling." Rawlinson's etymology of the Plinian Temerinda is doubly objectionable, the better form being Temarunda, and the first two syllables possibly identical with the word Mater (Metar). Müllenhoff concludes that of some sixty Scythic names and words, recoverable from Herodotus, one quarter are demonstrably 'Iranian,' and another quarter arguably Iranian. The etymology of Herodotus himself counts virtually for very little in this connexion, and the last authoritative word on the subject can scarcely be considered very conclusive evidence, in and by itself, that the Skoloti were the Aryan folk of 'Scythia.' Even if thirty words, taken at random, and, therefore, without prejudice, may be held to prove that an Aryan tongue prevailed in Scythia in the time of Herodotus, this conclusion would not in itself exclude a non-Aryan, or mixed, origin for the speakers: nor, considering the admitted incompetence of Herodotus as a linguist, could we be quite sure that these words, even if used in 'Scythia,' were all genuinely Scythian, in the narrowest sense of the word. While, if it be held that S. Russia is the original habitat of the 'Aryans,' and that the 'Scyths' were immigrants, additional doubt must attach to the linguistic argument.

iii. The argument from religion has been anticipated by the argument from language, so far as the names of the Scythian deities
are concerned. It is impossible to deny to the Scythian Pantheon, as described by Herodotus, a strongly 'Aryan' and even 'Iranian' character. The worship of the Fire-goddess (Tabiti), Heaven (Papaio), Earth (Api), his wife, the Sun-god (Oitosyros), and, perhaps, a moon or war-goddess (Artimpasa), are patent analogues to the religions of Aryan type. The identification of Thammasadas with Poseidon leaves something to be desired;  
the deity was, perhaps, the bad-weather god of Scythia (Zeus υψίος, Jupiter Pluvius). Not less typical than the Pantheon is the observation that statues, temples, and shrines, are conspicuous by their absence from the Scythian religion. These two features led Zeuss to identify the Scythian with the Medo-Persian religion. But not very much stress could be laid upon the absence of the paraphernalia of cults among nomad tribes, and the Medo-Persian look of the Scythian Pantheon might be, at least to some extent, a result, not indeed of the Scythian invasion of Media, but of the Persian invasion of Scythia. Information about the Scythian religion may have come to Herodotus from sources already to some extent coloured by syncretistic tendencies. Another trait in the Scythian religion, the worship of the ancestors, though Aryan, cannot be claimed for Aryans exclusively. Still less can the details of sacrifice, divination, and so forth, reported by Herodotus, be claimed as typically Aryan: and some of the religious items are even, perhaps, typically an-Aryan. Still, after making every deduction for the error, imperfection, pragmatism of the record, the conclusion may well be that the religion of the Scyths, as described by Herodotus, was to a large extent Aryan in character. Ancient peoples changed their religions, as they changed their languages, but perhaps less easily: and while particular cults might gain a footing in fresh peoples or countries, the general type of the religion of a people was preserved. Where a conflict of cults, or cult-ideas, appears, we may safely argue to a mixture or contact of races, as in the case of the Scyths themselves. Among the arguments in favour of regarding the predominant population in Scythia, in the time of Herodotus, as Aryan, none is perhaps in itself stronger than the evidence he affords under the

1 cp. 59, Tabiti, Papaio, Api, Oitosyros, or Oitosyros, Artimpasa or Artimpasa, Thagmasadas, or Thammasadas. The cult of Ares (c. 62), and of Herakles (c. 59), for whom Herodotus gives no native names, are possibly of foreign origin, the one, perhaps, Turanian, the other, perhaps, Hellenic: or the ascription of the cults to the 'Scyths' may be erroneous.

2 Müllenhoff etymologises the word, with considerable misgiving, into 'earth-shaker,' from ἥματι, 2d. zem, and μασάρη, which we are to assume means 'mighty,' but cp. Rawlinson, iii. 2 p. 196.

3 cp. 59.


5 Not, of course, that Persian ideas were introduced into Scythia, but that Persian ideas may have coloured the report of Scythian religion.

6 c. 137.

7 Cp. 4. 172. Ancestor-worship is, of course, one of the most truly catholic forms of religion, as all anthropologists now recognise.

8 c. 60.

9 c. 67.

10 e.g. the worship of 'Ares,' c. 62, the crucifixions, c. 72. See notes ad ii.

11 cp. 79-79, 163, 108.
head of religion. Whatever the religion of the 'Scyths,' if there was Aryan religion, there were, probably, Aryan inhabitants in Scythia.

iv. The proof from known affinity is in itself largely a product of the separate classes of evidence already noticed, but admits of being stated as a distinct argument. With Zeuss it took the form of a direct affinity between the Scyths and the 'Medo-Persians': with Müllenhof and Gutschmid the affinity is mediated to a greater extent through the Sauromatae. The Sauromatae, in this argument, are treated as the better known quantity; their Aryan, or Iranian, character on the one hand, is regarded as above suspicion, while their affinity with the Scyths on the other hand is considered as proved, partly by the statement of Hippocrates, that they were a Scythian folk, partly by the story of their origin, narrated by Herodotus. The fact that this story is a pragmatic and etiological legend certainly does not detract from its evidential value, rightly understood. The story is evidence of the existence of facts, which it was invented to explain. The principal facts are two in number: 1. a general resemblance between Scythians and Sauromatae, in spite of a marked difference in the position and practices of women. 2. A close resemblance between the speech of the two nations in spite of the occurrence of solecisms in the Sarmatian dialect. It is a matter of very nice judgment to decide, in the absence of further evidence, the nett result of this argument, or to assign the respective values to the difference in domestic institutions on the one hand, and the resemblance in language on the other. But once the argument from institutions has been abandoned, the first point is of little evidential force, one way or other. The stress lies on the second. If, indeed, Scythian and Sarmatian were but two dialects of one and the same speech the case might be considered established. The evidence, however, rests not upon the production of particular instances, but simply upon the authority of the general statement in Herodotus. That statement, however, may rank as good evidence, being evidently due not to any linguistic observations and inferences on Herodotus' own part, but to a state of things more or less notorious on the Pontine coasts. If the speech of Sauromatae and of Scyths was about the same, and that same an Aryan language, the agreement must count as immensely strengthening the theory of the Aryan descent and character of both peoples. It is still, however, worth while to observe that the two peoples stand in a different order in the evidences and argument. In the modern argument the Aryanism of the Sauromatae is treated as the better known quantity, and the Aryanism of the Scyths is an

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1 Müllenhof admits (op. cit. p. 103) that the belief in a Median origin for the Sarmatians (Diodor. 2. 43, Pliny, 6. 19) was probably based in the first instance on mere externals of dress; but adds that the comparison of Sarmatian and Iranian names places the close relationship of the two stocks beyond question. The affinity argument is ultimately a linguistic one.

2 De aor. § 89.

3 4. 116-117.

4 So Müllenhof, op. cit. p. 104.
inference therefrom: in the ancient legend of the origin of the Sauromatae the Scythians are the primary, primitive and better known stock. Which of the two views is correct is a question open to discussion. The solecisms in Sarmatian speech may have been better Aryanisms: and the geographical position of the Sarmatians at the time might be held to square better with their more immediate ‘Iranian’ extraction. On the other hand it might be difficult to determine whether the Sarmatian gynaeocracy, or the Scythian ‘subjection of women,’ looked more like Aryanism proper. But the difficulty has been avoided by regarding the position of women as turning rather on a degree of civilisation, than on a difference of race.

§ 6. It has been observed that throughout the argument a very high degree of evidential value is attached to the witness of Herodotus, and to the witness of Hippokrates. The latter can hardly count as a wholly independent source. He may have used the Scythian Logi of his elder contemporary, or still more probably, one, or more, of the common sources (Hekataios). A part of the difference between the two chief witnesses might be put down to the natural interest of a physician in the physical characteristics; but it is obvious that Hippokrates was far from being simply dependent upon Herodotus, though it cannot be proved that he visited Scythia, or studied the Scyths in loco. Hippokrates describes the physical characteristics for the Scythians, but on the whole in a disappointing and inconclusive manner, tried by a modern standard: beyond this, he merely testifies to (1) the connexion between the Sauromatae and the Scyths, (2) in a lesser degree, the difference ex hypothesis between these two related tribes, and other tribes or peoples. This point, however, is more explicitly stated by Herodotus, who supplies also the materials for the arguments from language, religion, and institutions, so far as they go.

It is not easy to see why advocates of an Aryan origin for the Scyths, have laid such stress upon the supposed difference between the Scyths and their neighbours, unless it could be shown that their neighbours

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1 In the fluctuating and highly-dubious canon of the works of Hippokrates the tract πετά δέορον, ὁδότρον, ῥήπασθαι has been almost universally recognised as genuine. (Cuno, Forschungen, p. 97, insinuates a doubt.) Its composition has been dated about 424 B.C. or even earlier: Behr, in Pauly’s Real-Encycl. iii. 1361. It is only the end of the tract, §§ 89 ff. (ed. Petersen, 1833), which bear upon the matter in hand. The end might be less genuine than the beginning, but the whole was surely in existence before Aristotle used it. Cf. É. Littré, Œuvres d’Hippocrate, i. 333 (1839), and ii. 1-93 with l’Avertissement (1840).

2 Hippokrates notices the atrophy of the right breast among the Sauromatae; explains the relation between the climate and the physique of the Scythians, and also the physical rationale of the ‘sacred disease,’ much more elaborately than Herodotus. Such points might have been expected. On the other hand he describes the Scythian waggons as having some four others six wheels; he supplies the Greek name for the Scythian cheese (καρπάκη), he has the expression Ἡ Σκύθων ἔργυλη, which does not occur in Herodotus, and he believes in the Rhiphean mountains, which Hdt. had discarded. Is it a mere coincidence that the analogies of Egypt haunt the mind of Hippokrates (§§ 91, 94, 101), as of Herodotus (4. 39, 42, 47, 50, 55, etc.), in dealing with Scythia, or is the coincidence based upon a common source (Hekataios)?

3 So e.g. Gutschmidt.
§§ 5-7  THE SCYTHS OF HERODOTUS 9

were certainly not Aryan. The supposed gain apparently lies in the recognition that Herodotus and Hippokrates, by isolating the Scyths, may be taken to supply evidence of special care and knowledge in dealing with the case. Such isolation might well be to a considerable extent artificial. As a matter of fact it is not so complete as Gutechmid seems to imply. Thus, with Hippokrates the Scyths are partly representative of the inhabitants of all that region, and the implication of the argument is, that in similar climates and conditions a similar racial character obtains. The difference between rich and poor Scythians is perhaps as great, with Hippokrates, as the difference between Scyths and their neighbours. With Herodotus there is something more of a constant contrast, expressed or implied, between the Scyths and their barbarian neighbours. Yet this contrast is partially evanescent.1 Anyway, without unduly depreciating the fifth-century texts it may safely be said that their evidence might be more satisfactory. It is a case where those much interested in Aryan, Iranian, or Indo-European antiquities are fain to make the best of the evidences such as they are. But the critical student of Herodotus may be forgiven if he rather insists upon the imperfection of the record, which forms the basis of the arguments.

§ 7. In dealing with the original home of the Scyths, evidences, or indications, of three possible theories, may be found in Herodotus, but the point has little bearing on the ethnological problem. The 'Scythian' theory represented the nation at once as indigenous, and as of recent origin (cc. 5-7). The same points practically emerge in the legend of the 'Pontic Hellenes' upon the subject (cc. 8-10). The two points should be mutually exclusive. In the light of modern science the indigenous claim of the Scyths could only have an historical significance upon the suppositions that the Scyths were Aryans, and that 'Scythia' was the original home of the Aryans. On the other hand, the belief in the recent origin of the nation in situ cuts off all connexion with the primaeval population and makes it an inconvenience to attempt to rationalise these traditions into agreement with the modern hypothesis, which has placed the cradle of the Aryan peoples in South Russia. Moreover, if the autochthonous claim on behalf of the Scyths is merely 'pragmatic,' to ascribe any genuine historical memory to the legends in which it is expressed is wholly gratuitous. Further, the modern theory, which sees in South Russia the original home of the Aryans, carries the perspective back to a point long before the question of the immediate origin of the Scyths

1 The Argippaei c. 23, Issedones and 'Arimaspi' c. 25, Tauri cc. 99, 103, Budini c. 103, and border tribes cc. 104-107, are contrasted with the Scyths: nevertheless the Argippaei wear 'Scythian dress,' the Neuri follow 'Scythian customs,' the Androphagi wear clothes 'like the Scythian,' the Melanchlaeni too follow 'Scythian customs.' There are here, probably, some distinctions without much difference: see Notes ad l. In the Helleno-pontic legend (cc. 8-10), it is implied that the Scyths are related to the Agathyrsi and to the Geloni.
of Herodotus arises. The Scyths of Herodotus may have been Aryans, and invaders, even if they invaded the original home and cradle of their primitive ancestors. On the whole the better traditions, and the political state of the tribes, as indicated by Herodotus, notably the existence of a subject population, point to the ruling race or horde of Scyths having entered Scythia within the historic period. Herodotus himself inclines to a theory, or tradition, which brings them from Asia, and ascribes their movement westwards to the pressure of other tribes (cc. 11, 12). It seems that by ‘Asia’ in this passage Herodotus, or rather his source, understood an Asia bounded by the Tanais, or at least by a frontier running north and south: for he can hardly be supposed to mean that the Scyths came out of Media by the Caucasus, and then pursued the Kimmerians by the same route back into Media. The Araxes in this passage is not a river flowing from west to east, but one flowing from east to west, or even perhaps from north to south. Asia in this passage is not Asia as delimited in his own theory elsewhere, but the conventional Asia of his predecessors. If there were really ‘Scyths’ to the east and north of the Caspian, they might represent a remnant of the nation left within, or nearer, its original home. Herodotus was precluded from using this evidence, by the rival theory that the ‘Asiatic’ Scyths were ‘colonists’ from Scythia, a view which rather implies that Scythia was the primitive seat of the whole people. Correcting this tradition, or story of the ‘Asiatic’ origin of the Scyths, by dropping the pragmatic account of the subsequent invasion of Media by the European Scyths, this tradition might count as a partial anticipation of the modern theories of the ‘Iranian’ affinities and origin of the European Scyths, and Sarmatians; and the Scyths might really have entered historic Scythia by the Caucasus. The tradition, or theory, preserved from Aristeas (c. 13) would point rather in a north-eastern direction for the route of the invading Scyths. If the Skoloti are to be recognised as Mongolian, and if the Scythian ‘colonists’ were really closely akin to the Scyths in Europe, and occupied the earlier habitat of the nation, something might still be said for this direction. But if the Aryan character of the Scyths is to be conceded, and if it be recognised that the Scythian colony beyond the Iurki is a product of fallacious combination on the part of Herodotus or his sources, there remains very little to be said for this theory, which traces the Scyths of Herodotus to Northern or Central Asia.

§ 8. It remains to discuss the statements in Herodotus respecting the subsequent invasion of Media by the European Scyths. Of all the problems stated in this Appendix this one admits the simplest solution. That solution exhibits the artificial character of the combinations effected or found by Herodotus, in the clearest light,

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2 Cp. note to 4. 40. 4. 37-40.

3 4. 22.

4 See below § 8.
and is thus an invaluable test of his historiography. The European Scyths are represented as invading Media, and occupying a great part of Upper Asia, where they exercise a dominion or lordship lasting twenty-eight years. The Herodotean account of these proceedings is in itself unintelligible, and even self-contradictory: and the conclusive argument against it lies in the simplicity of its explanation. Why the Scyths should have pursued the Kimerriς into Asia, Herodotus does not explain: still less why, if they had themselves just come out of 'Asia,' they should return thither; nor are we at liberty to recombine the Herodotean combinations and suppose that the Scyths came from the north-east into Scythia (Kimmeria) and pursued the Kimerriς toward the south-east into Asia again. The explanation of the error in Herodotus is not far to seek. He himself supplies elsewhere the clue, and it is fully confirmed by the best evidence. There were Scyths and Scythians. The Scythian hordes which swept over Upper Asia, helped to overthrow Assyria, passed through Palestine, and only stayed their course on the borders of Egypt, were nomads of Central Asia from the steppes east of the Caspian, not the Scyths of European Scythia. They bear, equally with the European nomads, the name of Saka among the Persians: and among the Greeks they became Scyths.1 The historical fact of the inroad of these Asiatic nomads over Assyria and Palestine is well attested:2 the statement that they exercised an empire is patent exaggeration, and misconception; the precise duration assigned to their dominion is likewise artificial.3 The opinion, or assumption, in Herodotus that they were the European Scyths rests upon the confusion of Saka and Saka, and it involves him in the inconsequent and improbable opinion that the Kimerriς entered Asia by the Caucasus. The Kimerriς certainly entered Asia;4 but all probability is in favour of the view that they entered Asia Minor, far west of the Caucasus.5 The case is valuable as showing that precision and exactness of statement are not final guarantees, in the pages of Herodotus, for historic truth and credibility; though it may not always be possible to explain the pragmatic combinations at the base of a plausible story so easily as in this case.

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1 αὐτὸς Ὁρώμων καλεῖται τὸν Σκύθον καλείται Σάκαν, 7, 64, is somewhat of an Hysteron-proteron, and might, perhaps, have run as well: αὐτὸς Ἐλληνες τοὺς Σάκας καλείται Σκύθον. In the following ref. the Σάκας are plainly to be sought between the Kaspian and Bactria, 1, 153, 3, 98, 7, 64, 9, 118. In other passages they are inferentially identical: 6, 119, 7, 9, 184, 9, 31, 71. The Saka of the Behistun Insr. col. 1, § 6, 2, are plainly the people usually so described. I know no sufficient reason for regarding "Sakuka the Sacan," in the supplementary column, as a European Scyth. See Records of the Past, i., p. 69.

3 Jeremiah, 6, 22 f. et al.; cp. Gutschmid, op. c.
4 "Herodotus' twenty-eight years are simply the period between the accession of Cyaxares and the taking of Nineveh" (Gutsmidh).
5 Contemporary evidence of Assyrian monuments confirms an event which has left considerable traces in Greek tradition. Cp. Ed. Meyer, Gesch. d. Alterth. i, § 438 ff. Among the Greek authorities Kalinioς was contemporary with the event. Cp. Bergk, Poet. Lyr. ii, 4, p. 5.
6 Cp. note to 4, 11.
§ 9. The subsequent fate of the European Scyths concerns the student of Herodotus only so far as it might be thought to affect the hypothesis of their origin and affinities. It is complicated, specially in its later stages, by the growing laxity of the authorities in the employment of the ethnographical terms.\footnote{The authorities are most fully set out in Ukert’s \textit{Geographie der Griechen und Römer}, iii. 2 (1846).} Two tendencies are apparently visible in the later history of the ‘Scythic’ nation, the process of Hellenisation, and the process of extermination, owing to the pressure and advance of the Sauromatae, and perhaps of other harder folks. The one tendency is well illustrated in the period of the epigraphic and archaeological evidences above referred to;\footnote{See note 5, p. 4 supra.} the other is exhibited in the growing prominence of the Sarmatians in the authorities of the Roman period. The two tendencies, if genuine, were probably standing in a causal connexion to one another, and to the general decline of the Scythic kings and people. Even in the tract of Hippokrates the physical characterisation of the Scyths is not that of an advancing population, and to Aristotle the Scythian kings are notoriously effeminate.\footnote{\textit{Eth. Nicon.} 7, 7, 6, 1150b.} All this makes it additionally improbable that the Scyths of Herodotus are to be found in the modern Slavs,\footnote{As with Cuno, \textit{Forschungen}, etc. (1871).} much less in the modern Germans.\footnote{As with Freidl, \textit{Die Scythen-Saken}, \textit{die Vorfahren der Germanen} (1896).} The conclusion at which Rawlinson arrived is practically endorsed by Gutschmid, the Scyths of Herodotus have absolutely disappeared. But this conclusion ought surely to have been something more of a stumbling-block to scholars, who nevertheless believed that the Scyths of Herodotus were an independent folk of victorious Aryan, who swept at a comparatively recent date into a district already occupied by Aryans (Kimmerii), driving them out to form new and lasting powers and elements in the modern world, remaining themselves to perish, and that soon, in the land, no very luxurious land, they had conquered. Ethnologists might do well to reconsider more fully the question whether the Scyths of Herodotus are much more than an ideal ‘contagmination,’ a combination of diverse elements, determined rather by geographical than by ethnographical considerations: whether the strong or prevalent Aryan elements in Scythia may not have been to a considerable extent a bequest from Kimmerian, if not from primaeval Aryan times: whether the Skoloti, to whom Herodotus restricts the term ‘Scythians,’ strictly speaking, were more than a small tribe or family of rulers, or a ruling class, the subsequent absorption or disappearance of which is a comparatively trifling matter: whether in short, the whole Scythian question has not assumed exaggerated importance and proportions, largely owing to the fact that the area described by the Greek and Roman geographers as ‘Scythin’ has been taken as a measure of the ethnographical importance of the ‘Scyths’: the
§ 9 THE SCYTHS OF HERODOTUS

'true Scyths' (Skoloti, Paralatae) being, perhaps, but a very small number of houses, or families, exercising lordship, or power over a population made up of many different elements, Aryan and an-Aryan.\footnote{Cp. note to Bk. 4, c. 6, and Baehr’s note to 4. 54.}

This suggestion is supported by the following points:

i. Scythia, even with Herodotus, extends far beyond the territory to which he confines the Scythians proper. This area is contained between the Gomphi, or at farthest, the Pantikapes, on the west, the Melanchlaeni on the north, the Maeotis and Tanais on the east, and the sea on the south.\footnote{τῶν ἔθνων τῶν ἄρχων 4. 71.}

ii. Within this region there is a large number of nations subject to the Scythians, which are admittedly not ‘true Scyths.’ To them may fairly be reckoned the remnant of the Kimmerii, the slaves,\footnote{4. 81.}

the Kallipidae, Alazones, Aroteres, and Georgi. The Tauri, though not strictly subject, also illustrate the presence of the non-Scythic element in the population of Scythia.

iii. The native legend as reported by Herodotus gives an obscure classification of the Scythians. It might appear that the Scyths comprised four great sub-divisions, Auchatae, Katiari, Traspias, Paralatae, and that these four all called themselves Skoloti; or it might be maintained that the only true Scyths were the Paralatae, descendants ex hypothesi of Kolaxais, and divided into three kingships or chieftainships, a point which is exactly reproduced in the story of the campaign of Dareios, and is probably authentic. No use is made elsewhere of the terminology or ethnography suggested by this native legend, and the story itself is mainly dynastic, i.e. it explains the origin of the government, not of the people.

iv. The number of genuine Scyths is expressly stated to be disputable.\footnote{4. 19, 20, 54-57. With Hippokrates Scythia extends to ‘the Rhipaean mountains’!}

The question here is not as to the population of Scythia, or even as to the nomads who wandered over the steppe. The question is whether there was a great and numerous Aryan nation, differentiated off from the rest of the population, and from its neighbours, which had entered Scythia comparatively recently in the days of Herodotus,\footnote{The date of the Scythian invasion is fixed approximately by the flight of the Kimmerians. Cp. note 4, p. 11 supra.} and effected a conquest, and has since disappeared, leaving not a wreck or remnant behind: or whether this theory be not an abstract ideal, based upon evidences which only can prove that there were Aryan elements in the population of Scythia, and that in the time of Herodotus certain nomad tribes, or families, were predominant in the land, and their ancestors regarded as the ancestors of nearly the whole population.

The one really strong argument is that Herodotus seems to distinguish sharply between the ‘Scythian’ and the ‘non-Scythian’ elements in the population; but the sharpness of this contrast has been, as above shown (§ 6), decidedly
exaggerated. The contrast is itself artificial, and abstract. Taken as the basis of a modern ethnological theory, it has naturally led to an equally sharp and perhaps ideal result. The artificiality of this result is suggested by the difficulty of accounting for the rapid degeneracy, the total extinction of the 'Scythians,' after the time of Herodotus: a difficulty which of course his theory or statements did not encounter. The growing indefiniteness of the use of the term 'Scythian' by post-Herodotean authorities may be explained by the gradual disappearance of the Scythian nation; but it may also be explained by the difficulty of maintaining a classification and exception which had all along been artificial and ideal. In fine, the Scyths of Herodotus, as a nation, may be an artificial product, evolved out of the nomads of the steppe,1 endowed with some Aryan and some an-Aryan institutions, for which there was local evidence, but not really deserving a unique ethnological title, in contradistinction to the other peoples within Scythia, and in its neighbourhood.

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1 The etymology of the word may be called in to support this point: cp. note to 4. 4. 'Archers' can hardly be an ethnological title. The name Scyth was (perhaps) used by Hesiod: Eck. Eratoth. ap. Strabon. 300 (Gutschmid). The Hippemoi'gi and Gluktephagi of Homer and Hesiod were sometimes in antiquity regarded as tribes or nations. Cp. Ueber, Geogr. d. Gr. u. Röm. iii. 2. pp. 412 f.
APPENDIX II

GEOGRAPHY OF SCYTHIA

§ 1. Difficulty of reconstructing a map of Scythia according to Herodotus. § 2. Composite character of the Scythos, or Scythian Logi. § 3. Composite character of the specifically geographical element. § 4. The description of Scythia, in Bk. 4, cc. 90-101. § 5. The geography of Scythia, as implied in the narrative passim. § 6. The account of Scythia, in Bk. 4, cc. 16-20. § 7. The rivers of Scythia, Bk. 4, cc. 47-57. § 8. General results of the analysis of these various passages. § 9. Agreement and disagreement with the actual map of S. Russia.

§ 1. The attempt to reconstruct the Herodotean map of Scythia is foredoomed to failure, unless it start with a clear understanding of the nature of the materials, and the limits of the problem. If Herodotus is committed to inconsequent or inconsistent utterances on the subject; if his statements are drawn from different sources; if conceptions expressed or implied in one part of his text, conflict with expressions or implications of other parts; if he has no single, clear and consistent projection in his mind; then it is impossible to exhibit upon one map, as previous editors and commentators have attempted to do,¹ self-contradictory and discrepant data. There are required, if only there were sufficient material in each case, as many maps as there are schemes, or sources, in Herodotus. Moreover, every effort in this direction must suffer shipwreck, which is based upon the full and true projection of the modern cartographer. To say nothing of the mathematical antecedents, Herodotus does not supply empirical data for continuous outlines or figures: he merely suggests features and points. All his remarks on these points and features are not self-consistent; they cannot all be reconciled, so as to give a single result, nor can they be understood or explained, without reference to the disparate matter contained in his Scythica, and the different sources from which the various elements combined in his text have been derived.

¹ For such maps, see Renne, Geographical System of Herodotus, i. 45 (1880); Rawlinson, Herodotus, iii. ad inst. (1875); Forbiger, Handbuch d. alt. Geogr. i. 68 (which erroneously represents water to the N. of Europe); Stein, Herodotos, Buch iv. and for the best, Bunbury, Anc. Geog. i. 175, 206.
§ 2. Two obviously different elements enter into the composition of the portion of the text, which may conveniently be called the Scythica, or Scythic Logi. There is an element of express geography, which might have been based upon autopsia, or upon personal observations and calculations conducted on the spot, if not by the historian himself, then at least by his informants or authorities. This element would comprise the descriptions of the permanent facts of nature, and the geographical positions of tribes and cities, at least so far as obtaining in the writer’s own day. Into this chapter, so to speak, historical matter, as generally understood, only enters where changes in the position of the inhabitants, or changes in the conditions of nature, in historic times, are recorded, or may be inferred. Secondly, there are in the text historical passages, narrating events and affairs, which were things of the past in the writer’s own day, for his acquaintance with which he was necessarily indebted to previous historians, or to tradition. Narratives, the scenes of which are laid in Scythia, imply all along geographical facts, or conceptions. It might very well be that the facts or conceptions implied in the narrative chapter, conflict with statements in the geographical chapter, or again, that statements in both conflict with the actual facts. In any cases of such conflict the question arises, whether the discrepancy is to be explained away by changes in the physiography and ethnography of Scythia, between the date of the events narrated and the date of composition, between the date of composition and our own day, or whether a simpler explanation suggests itself. In some cases, certainly, the former method may be ruled out of court without delay. For example, Herodotus describes at some length the great rivers of Scythia (cc. 47-57). But in the narrative of the Persian marches through the land, these rivers are not mentioned, are not even implied: on the contrary, not merely are the rivers ignored, between the Istros and the Tanais, and drinking water supplied otherwise (τὰ φρέατα . . . τὸς κρίμας c. 120), but the Persian performance, if conceivable at all, is conceivable only on the supposition that no such rivers exist in Scythia, as have been described. There is here, then, a flat contradiction between the history and the geography in Herodotus; the rivers were certainly in existence in the days of Dareios: it is not the geography that is mainly at fault. Herodotus has presumably ‘contagminated,’ in somewhat uncritical fashion, matters which belong to different orders, and come from different sources.

§ 3. It is not, however, merely between the historical element and the geographical element, that discrepancies arise: the geography of one part of the history may conflict with the geography of another; one express geographical chapter may conflict with another. These two subordinate classes of discrepancy do in fact occur in the text of Herodotus. For example, in c. 6 a list of Scythian tribes is found, the titles or designations of which are given on professedly

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native authority; but the names occur there once for all, and are not related to the tribal aggregates, which are subsequently implied in the narrative, or enumerated in the geography. Again, a geographical description of Scythia is undertaken cc. 17 ff. Another geographical description of Scythia is introduced cc. 99-101. These two descriptions are irreconcilable upon certain important points. The most simple solution of the difficulty is to suppose that the two descriptions belong to different sources, perhaps even to different periods, and places, in the composition of the work as we have it. It is certainly not necessary to suppose one or other passage from a different hand; the constancy of such observations, throughout the work of Herodotus, forbids such an apology. Nor are discrepancies which occur between express, or implicit, geographical statements in Herodotus and the modern, i.e. true, map of Scythia, or of the adjacent districts, to be explained away by the supposition of changes in the physical character of that region effected since his day. If his conceptions of the course of the Danube, the size of the sea of Azof, the shape of the Crimea, are not in accordance with present day facts, it need not be supposed that the facts have greatly altered; it is more reasonable to suppose that his knowledge was imperfect and inaccurate. The alternative hypothesis involves an exaggerated estimate of the sources at his command, and of his own critical and philosophic standard; to say nothing of objections against such an appeal to the Deus ex machina arising from the absence of any natural evidence of changes on the scale required to save the credit of our author.  

§ 4. In some ways the clearest and most scientific looking geographical description of Scythia is the passage cc. 99-101, which is generally taken as the point of departure for the reconstrucation of Herodotus' geography, and may conveniently be first considered here. According to the data of this passage Scythia (η Σκύθεια) is an equilateral rectangular figure (τετραγώνοι . . . πάντων οίων, c. 101), i.e. a square, each side being twenty days' journey, or 4000 stades (i.e. about 500 Roman miles) in length. Two of its sides are washed by the sea, to wit, the south and the east. The eastern side is marked by a line formed of Taurikè, the Kimmerian Bosphorus, the Palus Maeotis or 'eastern sea' (θάλασσα η ἡ θαλάσση, c. 100), and the Tanais, or the mouth of the Tanais. The southern side is bounded by the Pontos, in a line extending from the mouth of the Istrus to the city of Karkinitis: from Karkinitis the line extends overland eastwards to the Palus Maeotis, across the base of a projecting corner of the land, the Taurikè, inhabited not by Scythians, but by the Tauri, and comparable to Siumion, or to Iapygia. Half-way between Istrus and the

1 A considerable sitting up of Azof, and other similar changes, are not here denied. Maps such as those in Geikie's Prehistoric Europe (1881), which represent S. Russia in the Ice Age, or in early post-glacial times (pp. 564, 568), on present-day lines, can hardly be correct: but even recourse to pre-historic geography will not really save the credit of Herodotus. Cp. notes to § 40, 47, 49, 54, 56, etc., and Burnaby, i. 178.
Palus in this line is Borysthenes (c. 101). On the north, at a distance of twenty days (4000 stadia) from the sea the frontier of Scythia is marked by the territories of four tribes, named in order from west to east, Agathyrsi, Neuri, Androphagi, Melanchlæni. The boundary of Scythia on the west side is not very clearly indicated; but from the description of the north side which begins from the Istros (c. 100) it may be inferred that the Istros forms the western boundary, and the emphasis laid upon the south-eastward aspect of the mouth of the river (c. 99) does not militate against this inference, but rather makes for it. The same result may be reached by the general orientation of the outlines, without giving any distinct bend to the mouth of the river. The notice of the gulf of the sea between Thrace and Scythia (c. 99) may also facilitate the recognition of a generally southward direction of the stream, though its mouth is turned (south) eastwards, into this gulf, towards Scythia and away from Thrace. (Cp. further, § 7, p. 26 infra.)

Upon this passage, as thus interpreted, several observations suggest themselves: first, in regard to the ‘orientation’ of the territory, it appears that Herodotus here conceives Scythia as lying approximately due north and south, east and west. The base, or south side, of his figure is an ideal line running E.N.E., and the whole of Scythia might be described as facing towards the south-east (πρὸς ἐστὸν), the parallels, which run inland, viz. the west and east boundaries, lying, to speak strictly, north-west and south-east. The deflection is not, however, so great as to compromise his conception, if it be admitted, as is reasonable, that the outline is regarded as ideal, and the meandering of the coast and physical frontier neglected. In this reconstruction the phrases τὸ ἐς τὴν μεσόγαιαν φέρων and τὰ ἄββα τὰ ἐς τὴν μεσόγαιαν φέροντα (c. 101) are understood of the west and east sides: τὰ κατὰπέρα ἐς τὴν μεσόγαιαν φέροντα (c. 100) is referred to the north side. About the south side no obscurity arises in the text. But, in respect to the relation of the figure thus described to real knowledge, it must be observed that Herodotus’ conceptions are not in accordance with the actual facts. Thus, the east side of Scythia in this passage is formed by the Palus Maeotis, from Taurikê to the Tanais. But as a matter of fact the said coast-line lies, not north (west) and south (east), but west (by south) and east (by north), thus forming a direct continuation of the ideal line, from the mouth of the Istros to Karkinitis, or Taurikê, which marks the southern side of Scythia in this passage. The coast of the Palus might thus have formed a part of the southern side of Scythia: but to reckon it thereto would just double the estimate of time and distance given as the measurement for the south, and consequently for each side of the square. This result, as will presently appear, is elsewhere dimly attained, but not in this context. In accordance with this great error in the orientation of the east and south sides of the rectangle, the Crimea (Taurikê) is represented as situate at the angle of the south and east sides, and no knowledge of its narrow connexion with the mainland is indicated.
§ 4  GEOGRAPHY OF SCYTHIA

It is a further consequence that the Don (Tanais) which might, perhaps with the Donets, have afforded a natural eastern frontier for Scythia, is not so utilised in this passage. This is an omission which also, as will presently appear, is elsewhere rectified. In this passage the eastern side, like the southern, is bounded by the sea, and the Crimean is located at the south-east corner. A physical frontier is also implied for the western side, as already observed, in the Istros (Danube). The modern map shows that a real frontier in nature might have been found in the Pruth; and it is not unreasonable to suppose that some confusion between the Danube and its tributary may underlie the obscure assumption in the text. In regard to the northern frontier, no physical boundary is indicated: the line is determined simply by political, or ethnical, facts, so far as appears from this passage. Elsewhere this defect also is, as will appear presently, to be corrected. In respect of the mensuration, upon which special stress is laid in this passage, it is obvious that the square is erected, so to speak, upon its southern base, which extends from the mouth of the Danube to the shore of the sea of Azof. Borythenes, the city not the river, is described as half-way between these two points, and the base-measurement may be founded upon some empirical knowledge. The measurement of the whole square gives as a result 16,000,000 square stadia, or 250,000 square miles (Roman).

The bearing of these measurements upon what follows is important: for it is obvious that the ideal measurements of Scythia, as given in c. 101, accord sufficiently well with the plans and achievements of Dareios, as displayed in the narrative portion of the Book: and this accordance is heightened by the absence, in this passage, of any notice of physical obstacles, in particular the rivers. The Istros is mentioned, but its passage has been recorded (cc. 97, 98); the Tanais is mentioned, but its passage is to be recorded (c. 122): the other rivers of Scythia disappear in this description almost as completely as from the narrative of the king’s adventures. It may fairly be argued that Βορυσθηνης in c. 101, refers to the town of that name. In any case the geography of Scythia in this passage offers no explicit obstacles to the march of Dareios. The measurement accords with his directions to the Ionians to await him sixty days and no longer; Scythia is but twenty days’ march from end to end. This passage occurs in the midst of the narrative of the campaign, and is presumably related to it. It is followed by the anthropology of the tribes which figure in the narrative (Agathyrsi, Neuri, Androphagi, Melanchlaeni cc. 104-107, Tauri c. 103, Budini, Geloni cc. 108, 109, Sauromatae cc. 110-117). It looks, in short, like an ideal scheme of Scythian geography intended to serve as a complement to the historical narrative. As such, it might have been part of the original draft of the Scythian Logi, assuming that the work of Herodotus received a large addition, or revision. (Cp. Introduction, § 21. vol. I.) It is, to all appearance, an effort on Herodotus’ own part, as may be inferred from
the prominence of the personal references (ἐστιμαί... λέγω... ἔγω... δηλώω... λέγω... συμβεβληται...): it is not a passage found ready-made in his source for the story of the campaign. It is manifestly a passage, which might have been written before, or without ever, setting foot in Scythia. The references to Attica and to Iapygia are indeed generally referred to autopsy, and made to carry the inference that visits to Athens and to the west preceded the composition of the passage. But even admitting the former reference, the words carry no more than a revision subsequent to those visits. The conclusion of c. 99, and in especial the words referring to Iapygia may be a late insertion. The words δὲ δὲ τῆς Ἀττικῆς... τῶι ἦ... Ταυρίκη... look extremely like an author's note. There is therefore some reason to suspect cc. 99-101 as an essay on Scythian geography, due to Herodotus' own speculation (γνώμα), and designed to illustrate the narrative of the campaign, which he had derived from Ionio-Athenian sources. It is not, however, merely inferred from the story of the campaign, but presumably based upon information, oral or scriptural, acquired by the author at home, in Samos, in Athens, or anywhere but in Scythia.

§ 3. The problem at once arises as to the nature of the geographical ideas and knowledge incidentally conveyed in the story of the Persian invasion of Scythia: as to the relation of the geographical scheme in the former passage (cc. 99-101) to the geography implicitly contained, or conveyed, in the narrative of the campaign. It has already been observed that there is a prima facie agreement between them in respect to the size of Scythia, and in respect to the physical features, so far as silence argues agreement. Further scrutiny, however, reveals points in which the geography of the narrative is in better agreement with the facts of the case than this blank ideal: points, that is, in which Herodotus has misunderstood his own narrative.

In the narrative it appears that Dareios enters Scythia by crossing the Istros (c. 97 et al.) and leaves Scythia by crossing the Tanais (c. 122). In another narrative too, the Istros appears as the frontier between Thrace and Scythia, c. 80. On returning westwards (ποτὲ ἐντομὸν, c. 124) and overtaking the Scyths, who had escaped him by a détour to the north (τὰ κατεπερθε, c. 124), the king is led by them through the territories of the Melanchlaeni, Androphi, Neuri: from Neuris, as the Agathyrsi defend themselves, a return is effected into Scythia: and after some episodes, the scenes of which are not even approximately indicated, the Persians regain the Istros 'by the same way,' whereby they had left it. No rivers within Scythia are mentioned: an absence of rivers seems suggested by the φρεατα and κρήνας of c. 120 (ἐν τὰ ἡδα, c. 140). This item, and the 'sixty days' which are considered sufficient to over run Scythia, accord well with the ideal Scythia of cc. 99-101. The same remark applies to the enumeration of the tribes to the north of Scythia, here given in the order from east to west, there given in the order from west...
to east. On the other hand, in one important respect the implication of the narrative differs from the geographical description. In the narrative the Tanais forms the eastern boundary of Scythia (οἱ Πέρσαι ἔδωκαν πρὸς ήτα τα καὶ ἦθω Τανάδος c. 122), and Scythia is left behind when the Tanais is crossed. It may be said that the Tanais is only conceived as just forming the northern extremity of the east side of Scythia; but this cannot be admitted, if it appears that the Palus Maeotis in the narrative, as in real nature, forms part of the south boundary of Scythia. The words ἦθω Τανάδος ποταμοῦ παρὰ τῷ Μαυρίτῳ λίμνῃ ὑποφεύγοντος, c. 120, suit this supposition, and suit likewise the natural facts, though it can hardly be said that they are incompatible with the other alternative. How the Scythian waggons, women and children are to drive due north (c. 121) without running into the territories over which Idanthryscos and his division are proposing to draw the Persians (c. 120), is not obvious. It might be that the conception underlying the narrative was as follows: the north side of Scythia might be marked by a desert, intervening between Scythia proper and the territories of the Agathyrsi etc.; into, or towards, this desert the women and children are to retire. Meanwhile to the south the division under Skopas is to make due east, along the coast of the Palus, while the division under Idanthryscos draws the Persians northward, and then turning east moves parallel to the other division, through the territories of the Agathyrsi, etc. The plan of campaign laid down in c. 120 is not, however, followed; and it is perhaps, as a more or less abstract scheme, not reconcilable with the other indications in the narrative, or with the geography of cc. 99-101. One point is observable in the narrative, that the Scyths are all treated as nomads, and no account is taken of the geography of cc. 16-20, any more than of the river-system, cc. 47-57. No city or village in Scythia is named, but the burial-place of the kings is referred to, c. 127. The narrative rationalised leads us to place the Agathyrsi west of Scythia, and north of the Danube. (Cp. Appendix III.)

All the more remarkable, in view of the vagueness of this geography, is the fact that more local colour and definition seem given, in the narrative, to the district east of Tanais, than to Scythia proper. After passing the Tanais the Persians go through the territory of the Sauromatae, reach that of the Budini, destroy there a wooden town, and traversing the territory reach a desert, c. 123. This desert extends for 1400 stadia (seven days’ journey). Beyond it dwell the Thyssagetae, from whose territory four great rivers flow through the Maetians into the Maeotia. The names of the four rivers are Lykos, Oaros, Tana, Syrgia (c. 123). On the Oaros Dareios halted, and partly builded eight forts, 600 stades (three days’ journey) apart, i.e. covering a line of at least twenty-one days’ march (4200 stadia). This passage contains almost more of geography than of narrative: the geography in it seems to belong to a stratum, i.e. a source different from the strata represented in the narrative, or in
the geographical passage, cc. 99-101. In especial the mention of the Thyssagetae takes us back to the only other geographical passage in which they are mentioned. This anomaly may fairly be met by the old supposition that the route of Dareios beyond the Tanais is described, not indeed from genuine reminiscences or records of the king's march, but from genuine though distorted traditions of a great trade-route, which passed from the Palus Maceotis up N.E. to the Ural district and beyond. ¹

§ 6. Much the fullest account of Scythia is contained in the chapters numbered 16-20. This passage occurs at the beginning of the fourth Book, and is expressly geographical, yet the shape of Scythia is not stated, nor its size, though some implicit indications occur, which enable us to formulate a scheme under these heads. The point of departure in this description is not the Istros, as naturally enough in the narrative, and significantly enough in the geographical excursoe cc. 99 ff., but a point on the middle of the coast, viz. Olbia. This place is not called Borysthenes as in c. 101, but "theemporium of the Borysthenetae," though the name by which it became afterwards known, the name in favour with its own inhabitants, is indicated in c. 18 ("Ολβετεοτυλίτις"). The bare outlines of Scythia as suggested by cc. 99-101 are here filled in with some politico-ethical details, and some indications are afforded of the physiography of the country. East of the Borysthenes are three districts or territories of Scyths, to be thought of vertically on the map, with different titles, and with physical boundaries. According to the narrative of the campaign of Dareios all Scyths are nomads, and wander freely from the Istros to the Tanais: according to this passage nomad Scyths are confined to a district between the river Pantikapes and the river Gerrhos, with the agricultural Scyths (γεωργοί), to the west of them, as far as the Borysthenes, and the royal or ruling Scyths to the east of them, between the Gerrhos and the Tanais; or perhaps, between the Gerrhos and a line extending from Taurike —or the Taphros —through Kremni, on the Palus, to the embouchure of the Tanais. To the west of the Borysthenes, along the river Hypanis, are located certain Scythic tribes, whose territories are to be conceived as running horizontally, so to speak, upon our map, Kallipidia or Hellenized Scyths to the south, Alazones, and Ploughmen (ἀγροτικοί) to the north of them. How far they extend to the west is not stated, but as no other tribes are mentioned, they may be taken to extend to the western limit of Scythia. No physical frontiers are indicated in this passage for the tribes west of the Borysthenes (Dniepr), but elsewhere, c. 52, incidentally, Exampaio is mentioned as marking the boundary between the Alazones and the Scythic Plough-men.

The boundaries of the whole territory thus parcelled out among

¹ Op. notes to 4. 21-23. The route, which lies strictly speaking beyond Scythia, is there fully indicated; but the passage might here be adduced as another distinct stratum in the Herodotean geography of the region at large.
some six Scythic tribes, three vertically to east and three horizontally
to west of the Borysthenes, are not fully indicated in this passage. η ἡ
παραθαλάσσωμα, c. 17, may perhaps be taken as confined to the south
side, or side on the Pontos. Its western extremity is not marked,
but may be presumably placed at the Istros: and Taurike, or the
Palus, may be taken to mark its eastern limit. The eastern side
appears constructively to be marked by a line drawn from Taurike,
or the Taphros, along the Palus through Kremni to the Tanais (c. 20),
though according to the opening words of c. 21, the Tanais appears
as the eastern, or as part of the eastern boundary of Scythia.¹ (So
the Tanais and the Kimmerian Bosporos are made by some geographers
the boundary between Asia and Europe, c. 45, but this they
might be consistently with the true orientation of the shores
of the Palus.) The northern boundary of Scythia as defined in
this passage might be regarded as an improvement upon the
description in cc. 99-101, or in the narrative of the campaign.
The tribal frontier is to some extent helped out by physical
features. The Agathyrsi, indeed, disappear, or do not yet appear,
in this description—an omission which is agreeable to the vague-
ness of the geography of western Scythia in the passage, and is
only partially redressed by a subsequent note, in c. 49. The Neuri,
Androphagi, Melanchlaeni appear, however, and in the established
order from west to east, their exact positions being more nicely defined
in relation to the Scythians, and the divisions of Scythia. Thus the
Neuri are located west of the Borysthenes, and immediately north of
the Ploughing Scythians: no natural frontier is specified between the
Scyths and the Neuri in this passage, though elsewhere (c. 51) a lake
intervenes between Scythia and Neuris: north of the Neuri is a
desert. To the east of the Borysthenes and north of the Agricultural
Scythians comes a desert, north of the desert dwell the Androphagi,
north of them comes a 'real' desert. The nomad Scyths are left
without an expressly defined northern neighbour or boundary. (The
distinction between the nomad Scyths and the 'most numerous and
lordly Scyths' is perhaps as illusory as the distinction between the
Aroteres and the Georgi: the measurements at least bear out this
remark: see next section.) North of the ruling Scyths are the Melan-
chlaeni—'a non-Scythic tribe'—north of the Melanchlaeni, lakes and
desert. Thus, the northern boundary of Scythia agrees with that
indicated in the narrative, and in the geographical excursus, cc. 99-101,
but with four differences: (1) the omission of the Agathyrsi; (2) the
interposition of a desert between the Georgi and the Androphagi; (3)
the specification of a desert, inferentially continuous, north of the
Neuri, Androphagi, Melanchlaeni; (4) the mention of lakes, in the
last connexion. These lakes, with others, are destined to reappear
subsequently. It is, perhaps, significant that, while no desert inter-

venes between the Scyths and the Neuri, probably a historic people, nor between the Scyths and the ‘black cloaks,’ perhaps a mere epithet for the Scyths themselves, a desert does come between the Scyths and the ‘Androphagi,’ a very questionable ethnic appellative. (This desert might do as a refuge for the women and children, whose line of retreat, as above shown, is not otherwise well provided for, e. 121.) The western boundary of Scythia is left in this passage undetermined. Neither the Istros, nor any other river, neither the Agathyrsi, nor any other tribe, appear to define it. The description of Scythia west of Olbia contrasts with the description of Scythia east of Olbia. The parts first traversed by Dareios in his expedition, the parts to be traversed apparently by Idanthrysos and his division (c. 120), are less fully described than the parts further east, whereSkopasis and his division were to operate: nomad Scythia is more fully described than cultivated Scythia. Critics who believe that Herodotus omitted to describe Thebes in Egypt, and its monuments, because Hekataios had previously described them, may take refuge in a similar hypothesis on the present occasion: but a less exquisite supposition will perhaps meet the case.

The size, shape, and measurements of Scythia are not given with the same particularity in this passage as in the excursus cc. 99-101, but some data are supplied for a reconstruction of the map under this head, and these data stand in irreconcilable contradiction with the map as projected in cc. 99-101. Though the western limit of Scythia is not indicated yet the statement that ‘the emporium of the Borysthenites’ (c. 17), or of the ‘Olbiopolitae’ (c. 18), i.e. Olbia, is exactly at the middle of the sea-coast of the whole of Scythia, i.e. bisects the sea-coast, furnishes a clue to the mensuration. Interpreted in the light of c. 100, where the Palus is called a θῆλασσα, this description of Olbia might be taken to mean that the city is situated half-way between the west end of the coast of Scythia on the Pontos, and the east end of the coast of Scythia on the Maeotis, i.e. between the mouth of the Istros and the mouth of the Tanais. This would involve a monstrous blunder: but for present purposes it is right to keep the separate geographical passages apart, and in any case τὰ παραθαλάσσια in this context might fairly be restricted to the Pontine coast. Somewhat to the east of Olbia lies the river Borysthenes, and from the Borysthenes to the eastern boundary of Scythia the following measures are given, or may be inferred. From the Borysthenes to the Pantikapes is three days’ journey; from the Pantikapes to the Gerrhos is fourteen days’ journey: how far it may be from the Gerrhos across the country to the eastern boundary is not stated: it is the territory of the ‘best and most numerous Scyths’ (ἀρωτοὶ τε καὶ πλείωτοι Σκύθαι, c. 20). Could it be less than three days’ journey? That would give twenty days’ journey from Olbia, or rather from the Borysthenes, east of Olbia, to the eastern frontier. Doubling that, gives forty days’ journey apparently as the measurement for the base
of Scythia. The reduction of this to stadia gives 8000 stadia as the measurement, or 1000 Roman miles. Such an estimate of course disregards obstacles, sinuosities, and so on: but so has the estimate in cc. 99-101 neglected such elements. In any case, the base of Scythia, as resulting from this passage, is twice the length of the base, as estimated in the former passage, and if a square were erected upon the said base, it would be four times the size of the square as estimated in c. 101.

There is, however, no call to convert Scythia, as described in this passage, into a square. The only indication of distance inland in this context is the statement (c. 18), that the Scythic Georgi extend eleven days northwards up the Borysthenes: after them comes a desert. (This distance in c. 53 appears as a ten days' voyage: the suggestion that in the latter case the voyage is down stream scarcely affords an harmony. The 'forty days,' just above, carry the traveller far beyond Scythia. These figures occur in the excursus on the rivers: cp. § 7 infra.) A voyage, specially by river, as a basis for calculations of distance, would be even more fallacious than a voyage by sea, or a journey by land. There are no materials for estimating the extent of Scythia northwards, in this passage. If an idea of symmetry were imported into the passage, if the ten, or eleven, days' voyage were taken as a base for estimate, and it were supposed that a dim outline floated before Herodotus' mind, in this passage, it might be argued that Scythia was to be conceived as a parallelogram, or as an irregular figure, measuring roughly forty days' journey from east to west, and ten days from north to south—a statement which would give an area equal to the area of Scythia as measured in cc. 99-101. But it will be safer to recognise simply the negative conclusion that in this passage the ideal symmetry of Scythia, as described cc. 99-101, is destroyed, and its lateral extent vastly increased. It is further obvious that the ethnography and physiography are more fully developed, and the considerations that the tribal sub-divisions may be unreal (Arotetes, Georgi: nomads, ἄρτοποι), that the rivers cannot all be identified (Pantikapes, Gerrhos), that the deserts and lakes are rather fictions than facts, do not prevent our recognising, in this passage, evidence of better knowledge than in the pure schematism of cc. 99-101. And it may here be pointed out that for this passage (cc. 17-31) special sources of information are implied (c. 16), and special care and research guaranteed. If Herodotus visited Olbia, and made inquiries upon the spot, or even if he had inquired carefully of persons who had visited Olbia, and other emporia in Scythia, might not such inquiries (ἄρτοπια) have resulted in a geographical description very like that which is furnished in this passage?

§ 7. A passage which contributes additional features, and additional perplexities to the Herodotean map or maps of Scythia, and demands separate treatment, is the enumeration and description of the rivers of Scythia, cc. 47-57. Of the eight main rivers of Scythia
here enumerated in order from west to east, five (Istros, Tyrras, Hypanis, Borysthenes, Tanais) can be identified with certainty, a sixth (Hypakrya) only comes near identification, two (Pantikapes and Gerrhos) are out of all recognition: in other words, the four rivers west of Olbia, in the settled part of the country, can be identified: the four rivers east of Olbia cannot be identified, until the Tanais is reached. The Istros is specified as the first river of Scythia on the west (c. 48), but its relation to Scythia, as conceived in this passage, is not clear. Its place as the first river on the west, and the admission of a tributary flowing east, suggest a course north and south; these words ἐστὶν πᾶλαμα τῆς Σκυθίας ἅπαξ λαλεῖ confirm the assumption that it forms the western frontier. The mention of five tributaries in Scythia, one at least flowing eastwards, complicates matters: for how can a Scythian river enter the Istros on the west, if the Istros forms the west boundary of Scythia? This said tributary, Porata or Pyretos, is to be identified with the Pruth, which as a matter of fact flows from north to south; it is the only one of the five tributary streams which can be identified. The notice (c. 49) of an exo-Scythian tributary, the Maris, further west, flowing from the Agathyrsi seems to remove this tribe from the northern frontier of Scythia, where they appear in c. 100 (if the generally received interpretation of that passage be correct), and to set them west of Scythia proper. It may further be observed that the Istros has here five mouths (c. 47), although in the passages previously discussed it has had, for all that appears, but one mouth. The geography of the Istros as it is carried back through Europe can hardly be derived from a Pontine authority; it belongs to the more general scheme of geography in Herodotus, and is here incomplete. We discover the Greek town at its mouth, Istria, as well as the name of the mythical city at its source, Pyrene, elsewhere (2. 33); there also we learn that Hdt. some time conceived the idea that Istria, Sinope and Egypt were, so to speak, in the same meridian (2. 34), an indication which confirms the general presumption that in his settled view the lower course of the Istros ran from north to south.1

The descriptions of the other Scythian streams apparently are drawn, directly or indirectly, from Pontine (Scythian) sources. The approximation of the Hypanis to the Tyrras in its upper course, and to the Borysthenes in its lower course, the specification of distances on the Hypanis and the Borysthenes, the mention (c. 52) and description (c. 81) of Exampaios, and perhaps of the footprint of Herakles by the Tyrras (c. 82) are ‘notes’ of personal experience, if not by the author, then by his immediate authorities. Not less significant is the comparatively minute topography of the mouth of the Borysthenes (c. 53).

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1 On the meridian cp. Appendix XIII. § 4. The supposed analogy between the Danube and the Nile, the great extension of Thrace (Hdt. 5. 8), and the fact that the Danube does flow from S. to N. before meeting the Pruth, all support the contention in the text. Op. § 4, p. 15 supra.
The description of the site of Olbia opposite the temple of the Mother, upon the tongue of land named the Point of Hippolaoos, has the stamp of actuality upon it. On the other hand, the omission to notice the Rapids of the Dniepr (c. 53) is a serious cruz, and in general the geography of the rivers, specially in view of the geographical data previously considered, creates more difficulties than it solves. The Tanais (c. 57) rises in a lake and flows into a larger lake, the Palus Maetis: not the river but the Palus is here expressly made the boundary between Scythia and Sauromatis: the Tanais has a tributary the Hyrgis, a stream which has previously appeared as the Syrgis (c. 123 ad fin.). It is nearly as probable that the difference in the name is due to differences in the author’s sources, as to indifference in a subsequent scribe’s operations. The Gerrhos reappears here (c. 56) as the boundary between the nomad and the royal Scyths (as in cc. 19, 20), but it is reduced to a canal joining the Borysthenes and the Hypakyris. The Hypakyris appears as a new feature in the district of the nomads, rising in a lake, debouching by the city of Karkinitis (c. 99), to the left of the Hylaea and Dromos Achilles. The Pantikapes reappears (c. 54) as the eastern boundary of the Georgi (c. 18), but three new features are added to its geography: the lake-source, the passage through the Bush (Hylaea), the junction with the Borysthenes. Thus it is obvious that the excursus on the rivers adds both detail and confusion to the Herodotean map of Scythia, and multiplies difficulties for the narrative of the Persian campaign. Five tributaries are added to the Istros, within the confines of Scythia; the only one of these which can be identified (the Pruth) is wrongly orientated. Two rivers of Scythia make their appearance for the first time (Tyra, Hypakyris); four lakes are added to the map, two certainly within Scythia, the source of the Tyrs between the Scythians and the Neuri (c. 51), and the ‘Mother of the Hypanis’ only nine days’ voyage down to the sea (c. 52): to them might be problematically added the lake-sources of the Pantikapes (c. 54) and the Hypakyris (c. 35), though not, of course, of the Tanais (c. 57) which must lie far beyond the confines of Scythia. Thus Scythia is furnished with a chain of lakes on its north side, below the tribes, which elsewhere determine its frontier, and below the desert, or deserts, which might serve as well. For forty days’ journey the upward course of the Borysthenes is known: whether the desert through which it flows lies south or north of that point is not clear; from that point the Gerrhos starts (c. 56) to form the boundary between the nomads and the royal Scyths; but it does not follow that the Gerrhos is forty days’ distant from the sea, or from the Hypakyris: its course may be more direct than the course of the Borysthenes, though no clear suggestion in regard to the winding of these streams is given, as in the case of the Hypanis and Tyra (c. 52). Finally, this chapter on the rivers is followed by the great passage on the anthropology, or culture, of the Scythians (cc. 59-75), which is full of traces, if not of
autopsy, at least of local and proximate authority, and before the narrative is resumed, two stories are inserted, one of which (the story of Anacharsis) contains an express reference to a first-hand Scythic authority (Tymmes, c. 76), the other of which (the story of Skyles) is a chapter from contemporary history, possibly gathered in Olbia; while the whole concludes with two passages (cc. 81, 82) which, more than any other, imply a personal visit of the author to some points at least in the land he has been describing.

§ 8. To define the moral of these analyses and criticisms is not a simple matter, for the moral is no clear one. It appears, indeed, certain that the text of Herodotus contains many data upon the geography of Scythia which conflict with each other, many too, which conflict with fact. It is manifest that the geography is to be found in various contexts, and it seems not improbable that these various contexts come from various sources, and even belong to different periods, perhaps to different recensions, in the genesis of the work as a whole. It is undeniable that two different elements go to the making of the Scythian Logos, or Logi: a narrative element, in particular the story of the Persian campaign in Europe, about 512 B.C., which implies and contains geographical data; a descriptive element, clearly separable from the history, and derived from a different source, or from different sources. Traditions and stories of the Scythian campaign must have come to Herodotus more or less ready-made. The geography of Scythia is something altogether above and beside the narrative. The narrative is part of the general history of the progress of the Persian empire. It shows no real signs of having been drawn from Scythian sources, or composed in Scythia; it lacks such notes as occur in the stories of Anacharsis and of Skyles. A Scythian or local Greek source could not have ignored the physical facts, as the narrative of the campaign ignores them. The narrative is independent of the graphic passages on the land, the rivers, the culture of the inhabitants. This remark does not apply to the abstract scheme of Scythian geography in cc. 99-101, which occurs embedded in the narrative, and is in the main consistent with the narrative; in the main, for minute consistency cannot obtain between two self-contradictories. The narrative might have been composed almost anywhere in the Greek world, specially by an author in command of Milesian, Samian, Athenian sources. The scheme of Scythian geography associated with it has little or no actuality about it, it fits a narrative, in itself impossible, though the fit is not perfect: in some respects the geography implied in the narrative is manifestly superior.

The character of the geography in the imposing geographical passages cc. 16-20 (the land), cc. 47-57 (the rivers), is entirely different. It is not free from errors (course of Pruth etc.), abstractions (lakes etc.), obscurities (Gerrhos, Pantikapes), omissions (rapids of the Dniepr), but it is rich in realities too. It is such geography as a visitor might have gleaned in Olbia, or by very careful inquiry from
good empirical authorities. It implies a scheme differing from the
scheme in cc. 99-101: it completely refutes the main substance of the
narrative. We have, in short, three geographical elements to deal with:
an element which came to Herodotus involved in stories, which he
hardly stayed to criticise; an element which he introduced and
applied, apparently, as the material for a map of the campaign; an
element which was prefixed mainly on its own merits, and is due not
improbably to his own travels, and inquiries on the spot. A great deal
in the way of fact and fiction might no doubt have been ascertained
by Herodotus without visiting Scythia at all, as well from inquiry as
from written sources. Hekataios and his geographical theories are
certainly present in the context; but too little remains of the geography
of Scythia (Müller, F. H. G. i., Hecataei Frag. 153-160) to enable us
to judge how much of his geography Herodotus borrowed here of this
predecessor. Such material might have been utilised by him as well
for his measurement and scheme of Scythia (cc. 99-101) as for the
outlying geography and ethnography (cc. 103-109). The internal
evidence in this passage certainly points to commercial sources for the
graphy, especially for the eastern portion of it, and might have
been compiled almost as well out of Scythia as therein: the An-
drophagi and Melanchlaeni reappear (cc. 106, 107 cpd. with c. 20)
and the prominence of Kremní (c. 110) suggests the possibility that
the legend of the Sauromatae came from that quarter, and that an
identical or cognate source underlies the geography of eastern Scythia,
and the country beyond (cc. 20, 21-23, 24-28): which is certainly not
derived simply from Greeks who trade with Olbia (cp. c. 24). It
would, however, be an exaggeration to suppose that the several
geographical passages can be exactly allocated to various sources: for
example, the military geography contained in the narrative, to the
sources of that narrative, which may have come to Herodotus more
or less ready-made: the geography of Scythia and the surrounding
peoples to inquiries instituted by Herodotus, or to itineraries and
Periploi already in existence: the scheme of Scythia in cc. 99-101 to
Herodotus' own afterthought or speculation, working upon the narrative
and other casual materials: the details found in the passage on the
rivers to increased knowledge, acquired by the author in a visit to
Olbia, subsequent it may be to the first composition of his work, or
this portion of it. In the present or final constitution of the text the
contagmination of various elements has been achieved, not indeed with
skill sufficient to obliterate all traces of their diverse provenance, date,
order and merit, but with skill sufficient to disguise the simple history
of their genesis. Here, as elsewhere, Herodotus was not writing his
own biography, nor the history of his literary work: the objective
interest is supreme: the various sections of the text have been revised
in the light of his latest thought: the result defies not material
analysis, but a chronological, or quasi-chronological, recapitulation.
Fact and error lie side by side in every section: no single clear
theory in regard to the size, shape, boundaries, physical features, ethnographical divisions of Scythia, rules the whole and every part.

§ 9. It remains to indicate how far particular items, taken from the various parts, derived from the various sources underlying those parts, accord, or ever accorded, with matters of fact: in other words, how far the Herodotean miscellany reproduced, or anticipated, realities of the map. Here the true map of Scythia must be laid down as the basis of the report. Physical changes may have taken place within the historic period, but not on a scale to make the application of the items in Herodotus to the actual map an unreasonable proceeding. His accounts have neither the authority nor even the self-consistency and coherence to justify the assumption that, where error appears, natural transformations should be invoked. The Palus may have silted up, but it was not in the fifth century B.C. "nearly as big as the Euxine," the size of which itself was indeed greatly exaggerated by Herodotus. 1 It is useless to rationalise the lakes into marshes, and to find the marshes near the sources of the Borysthenes—the sources of which Herodotus says are unknown—for the lakes are evidently in the main the outcome of a theory. But conversely, so far as the items in Herodotus are verifiable in the map of the country to-day, so far at least we may conclude with assurance to the value of his own empirical observations, and of the contributions from his various sources.

The Scythia of Herodotus may be taken to correspond approximately with a portion of 'South Russia' extending from the Danube-Pruth to the Don (Tanais), and comprising the five provinces of Bessarabia, Kherson, Taurida, Ekaterinoslav, and the country of the Don Kossacks. 2 Podolia and Kiev need hardly be reckoned to Herodotean Scythia; though the fancy measurements of c. 100 would include them, and the remainder of 'Little Russia' to boot. 3 The idea, found in the earlier part of the Book, that the diameter of Scythia E. and W. greatly exceeds its diameter N. and S. is to be preferred. The ideal measurement of the base in c. 101 is sufficiently accurate, if understood of a straight line from the Danube to the Don or perhaps of the sinuous coast from the mouth of the Danube to the isthmus of Perekop: 4 the double measurement, to be inferred from cc. 17-20, may be an approximation to the actual course of travel from the Danube to the Don, in Herodotus' own

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1 4. 85 doubles the actual length, and almost doubles the width of the Pontos, see notes ad l. It is characteristic that Hdt. does not connect his measurements of Scythia in any way with his measurements of the sea.
2 'South Russia' comprises the whole region from the Danube to the Caspian: cp. Arti. fig. de la Russie mérid., Introduction, and map, p. 231.
3 The list of 16 'governments' and 3 'provinces' comprised in the Scythia of Hdt. (Rawlinson, iii. 205) seems unduly extensive.
4 Hdt., though he measures the greatest length of the Pontos from the Bosphorus, appears to have known that there was a large gulf in the Thracean coast (c. 99 εκάστου . . . ἐκ τῆς ταύτης ἐκ. τῆς Θρησκευ.), but he betrays no notion that there was a deep concavity in the coast of Scythia between the Danube and the Dniepr.
day: but Karkinitis, not Olbia, would have been the approximate half-way station on such a journey. This conception of the base of Scythia disregards those passages where the Palus is made the east, or part of the east, boundary of Scythia, and accords with those passages where the Tanais is made the eastern boundary, and where movement along the Palus is recognised as eastward movement. The error in regard to the Palus might be explained by reference to the east side of the Krimea, and may have been confirmed by authorities from Kremni.

The great fact of the projection of the Krimea southward into the Pontos is known, though the isthmus is ignored. The existence of the straits (Kertch, Yenikale) is known to Herodotus, and also apparently the eastward projection of the peninsula of Kertch (the Trachea Chersonese, c. 99), though he does not mention the Greek town (Pantikapion) upon it. The Tanais, or the Tanais and the Palus, the general inclination of which is S.W. to N.E., may be taken as the genuine frontier between Scythia and Sarmatia in Herodotus' day. The river is far from making a right angle with the Palus, but in its higher course, where it is approached by the Volga, it runs decidedly from the north. It is possible to see the Volga in the Oaros of Herodotus, and even the Donetz in the Hyrris or Syrgis: but such bald identifications have little value. The northern boundary of the Scythia of Herodotus cannot be defined by existing physical facts. A consciousness of this defect is, perhaps, indicated in the purely tribal frontier furnished in the narrative, and in the historian's own ideal scheme: the afterthoughts, by which lakes and deserts are called in to provide a natural frontier on the north, though not devoid of all basis in actual fact, are too artificial to justify identification. The tribal frontier in Herodotus is evanescent. The 'Black coats,' a non-Scythian tribe (c. 20), with Scythian customs (c. 107), may be dismissed as Scyths in disguise, or rather in their native dress. The Androphagi are concealed by an epithet, which has perhaps strayed hither from the Issedones (c. 25). The Neuri remain, perhaps a genuine folk, though the lake between them and Scythia does not help to locate them. The width of Scythia from north to south fluctuates from nine to ten days' journey. The Agathyrsi must be placed rather north of the Danube than north of Scythia. The western frontier of Scythia may be distinguished from the frontier in the west. The Danube in part supplies the latter, but the actual course of the Danube is grossly misconceived. It seems more than

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¹ Hdt. does not say whether the Trachea has any inhabitants or not, c. 99, and it might be argued that the Greek colonists are understood; but in c. 20 the Taphros is part of the east frontier of Scythia (though in c. 28 there are Scyths ἀφὸς τῆς ἄφεσιν), and one might be tempted to make it the frontier not between the Tauri and the Greeks, but between the Scyths and the Tauri. As a matter of fact the analogies in c. 99 suit the Trachea better than they suit Tauriké. The ethnography would have been complete, if Herodotus had said that the Hellenes in the Trachea stood in relation to the Tauri as the Tauri to the Scyths. On the Taphros cp. notes to U. c.
possible that a confusion between the Pruth and the Danube has taken place, and that the Pruth marks the western limit of Scythia in the fifth century B.C., the Danube, so far as it enters into the matter, belonging rather to the south line. Within the territory thus delimited three streams with certainty may be identified: Tyrras (Dniestr), Hypanis (Bug), Borysthenes (Dniepr): but the identification applies only to their lower courses: their sources and upper courses are practically unknown. Of the other physical features of the country, the Hylaea, the Dromos Achilleos, the Point of Hippolaos, Taurikó and the Trachea, the marshy lake into which Hypanis and Borysthenes empty, are all verifiable, as also the broad features of the steppes. Exampaos, and the footprint of Herakles, are acceptable though not verifiable items.

Over the distribution of population within this area, and among these coasts and rivers, great obscurity lies. Points of light on the coast are indeed afforded by the Greek cities mentioned or indicated: Istria, Tyritae, Olbia, Karkinitis, Kremni. So much cannot be said for the mysterious Geloni. In regard to the Scythian, or quasi-Scythian, tribes inconsequence reigns supreme. Recourse might be had here, if anywhere, to the hypothesis of change between the date of the expedition of Dareios and the date of Herodotus' visit or researches, for we are in the sphere of political geography. But it is doubtful whether recourse to such an hypothesis is necessary or satisfactory: imperfect knowledge, and 'plentiful lack' of criticism, seem adequate to explain the phenomena. To the west of Borysthenes the Scythic tribes are settled on the soil and stratified horizontally as one might pass through them going up or down stream. To the east of Borysthenes the tribes are stratified vertically, as one might pass them making from Olbia to the Tanais; the Georgi and Arderes are simply the same people on different sides of the stream: a similar remark applies to the nomad and the royal Scyths. The Kallippidae on the west look like the Hellenised Alazones; a tribal difference between them seems hard to maintain: the distinction between the agricultural Scyths and the nomads may be a real one, but can scarcely be dated subsequently to the invasion of Darsios. The most authentic-looking division of the Scythian tribes, and one harmonising with the implication of the narrative that there were three kingdoms, or chief-doms, among the Scyths, disappears from the geography altogether.\footnote{4. 6, cp. p. 13 supra.} Of non-Scythic or exo-Scythic tribes, the Tauri, Sindi, Sauromatae, Neuri and Agathyrsi may be regarded as real, and approximately located: even the Thyssagetae, Iurki, Issedones can hardly be denied places on the map, but with the Argippaei and Arimaspi we are approaching the realm beyond the north wind, the way to which is kept by the griffins, and from which Herodotus himself has warned us off.\footnote{Cp. notes, esp. cc. 17 ff.}
II. SCYTHIA ACCORDING TO HERODOTUS, 4.17-20.
Appendix 11, 86.

IV. THE RIVERS OF SCYTHIA.
APPENDIX III

THE DATE, MOTIVES, AND COURSE OF THE EXPEDITION OF DAREIOM IN EUROPE


§ 1. *Herodotus* expressly dates the expedition against the Scyths “after the capture of Babylon”; μετὰ δὲ τὴν Βαβυλώνα αἱρέσει εἵνεκα ἐνὶ Σκύθοις αὐτοῖς Δαρείου θάλασσα, 4. 1 ad init. The Scyths in question are undoubtedly the Scyths of Europe (S. Russia), but unfortunately Herodotus does not specify how many days, months, or even years after the capture of Babylon Dareios moved against the European Scyths, nor is the historian, aware that there was more than one capture of Babylon after the accession of Dareios. There are in fact two problems here involved, the one touching the date of the expedition as conceived by Herodotus, or as implied in his narrative: the other touching the true date of the event, so far as it is ascertainable in view of the whole evidences, which now transcend not merely the indications preserved by Herodotus, but the data open to the modern commentators and historians, even as recent as Grote, Thirlwall, Baehr, Niebuhr, and Larcher.

§ 2. The dates for the accession and the death of Dareios have long been ascertained, and fixed to the years 521 B.C. and 485 B.C., and the year 490 B.C. may be accepted as the date of the battle of Marathon. Unfortunately Herodotus, though he gives the duration of the reign of Dareios, does not chronologise events by reference
to the years of the king’s reign, and for the determination of the inner chronology of the period we are, for the most part, abandoned to the material sequence of events, and to merely incidental suggestions. It seems thus very doubtful whether Herodotus had any clear or conscious opinion as to the exact date of the Scythian expedition. The express synchronism with the Libyan expedition in no way justifies a more favourable verdict, for the exact year of the Libyan expedition is not independently ascertainable, while the precise synchronism is in itself highly problematic. In the absence of verifiable data, and in view of analogous cases, it must be regarded as more probable that the two expeditions have been artificially juxtaposed than that they actually belonged to one and the same year. Of the two, the expedition of Dareios into Europe must be regarded as the better known, even in regard to its chronology. An approximate term might be reached by arguing back from the epochs of Marathon, and of the Ionian revolt, the latter of which might here be provisionally fixed circa 500–499 B.C., but the record in the Herodotean text is neither full nor systematic enough to justify any certain result on this method. The chronologists who have dated the Scythian expedition as late as 508 B.C., were presumably led to this epoch by the difficulty of filling in the course of events, the story of which seems given or implied in Herodotus, if much more than seven or eight years were allowed between the Ionian revolt and the Scythian expedition. Book 5 takes up the story from 4.145. It is difficult to spread the events narrated by Herodotus, between the return of Dareios to Asia and the outbreak of the Ionic revolt, over fifteen years, or even over half that period. Thus arguing backwards from the Ionian revolt we might pause about 508 B.C. as the date of the Scythian invasion. But this argument assumes the completeness of the Herodotean record or perspective. There is, however, an indefinite chronological gap implied by Herodotus before the outbreak of the trouble in Naxos, which brought about subsequently the Ionian revolt. Moreover, other authorities suggest that, between the Scythian campaign and the affair at Naxos, more lengthy operations in Thrace were required than Herodotus appears to have realised. Further, material considerations make it probable that he had displaced a part of the record which belongs to the interval. Finally, his own explicit sequence implies an earlier rather than a later date for the Scythian campaign, for he dates it “after,” i.e.

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1 Duncker saw in the synchronism an explanation of the non-employment of the Phoenician fleet against Europe; but is it certain that no Phoenician vessels were employed against Europe, or that all were employed against Libya? Cp. note to 4.87. 2 Cp. Appendix V., where the first campaign is dated 498 B.C.

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2 e.g. Larcher, vii. 635, Beehr, Rawlinson, Manual, p. 92.
4 Cp. Appendix IV, and § 15 sqqera.
next after, the capture of Babylon, and he represents the revolt of Babylon as synchronous with the expedition against Samos,\(^1\) and the attack on Samos as the first aggressive achievement of the new reign.\(^2\) If such indications are to weigh, irrespective of other evidences, they point to the conclusion that Herodotus dates, or would have dated, the Scythian expedition early in the reign of Dareios. The same conclusion is likewise suggested by the conversation between Dareios and Atossa reported by Herodotus.\(^3\) But these indications are obviously devoid of scientific value. They may point to a date which Herodotus more or less unconsciously tends to determine: but the proper inference from them is not to a precise chronological figure but to the casual and anachronistic nature of the record.

§ 3. The real chronology, so far as attainable, is to be reconstructed by the light of the monumental evidences, in conjunction, of course, with the facts or traditions, as presented by the Greek historians. But as Grote’s date and argument represent the best results reached without the monumental evidence, and as the latter cannot be taken wholly to supersede the former, it will be convenient to set Grote’s position on the matter in full relief.

Grote\(^4\) dates the expedition “about 516-515 B.C.” and the argument by which he supports that date is twofold. On the one hand he shows the difficulty of dating the expedition less than five years after the accession of Dareios, which stands fixed to 521 B.C. On the other hand he argues that the expedition falls before 514 B.C. It must fall as late as 516 B.C. because less than five years would be too little time to allow for the suppression of the revolted satraps and provinces;\(^5\) it was before 514 B.C. because in that year Hipplias of Athens gave his daughter in marriage to Aiantidas, son of Hippoklos, despot of Lampasakos, perceiving that Hippoklos and his son had great influence with Dareios (Thuc. 6. 59). That influence must have been gained, Grote argues, during the Scythian expedition, on which Hippoklos served.\(^6\) Grote’s argument has received a partial confirmation from a Greek inscription,\(^7\) which places the passage of the Bosporus in the year of the murder of Hipparchos, that is 514 B.C.\(^8\) While Hippoklos of Lampasakos is winning the king’s favour on the Danube, Hipparchos has been assassinated and Hipplias led to contemplate a Persian, or philo-Persian alliance. The inscription, thus putting two facts together which Grote had independently

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\(^1\) S. 150.
\(^2\) S. 139.
\(^3\) S. 138 f.
\(^4\) iii. 473.
\(^5\) Grote specifies only the rebellions of “Oroetes, the Medes, Babylonians, etc.” Much virtue in this “etc.” See below.
\(^6\) Hdt. 4. 138. This point is endorsed by Duncker, vi. 271 note, and Busolt, Gr. G. ii. 12, note 6.
\(^7\) C. I. G. iv. 6855, cp. Busolt, Gr. G. ii. 12 note.
\(^8\) Cp. note to 6. 56. The calendrical year would be 514-513 B.C. and the crossing would fall in the spring of 513 B.C., but the campaigning might be reckoned from the spring of 514 B.C.
brought into conjunction, though modifying his date by one year, may seem to be a remarkable confirmation of his hypothesis generally. But interesting as are the argument and the coincidence, they are not convincing. The inscription does not of necessity prove more than that the process of reasoning exhibited in Grote’s case may have been anticipated in antiquity; even short of that, the death of Hipparchos may have been artificially put into juxtaposition with the most striking fact of general or non-Hellenic history of about the same epoch. Moreover, Grote asked only five years for the reduction of the empire to peace and order, after the accession of Dareios. Grote wrote in ignorance of the Behistun inscription, and was therefore unacquainted with the extent and magnitude of the task imposed upon Dareios by the ‘revolts’ in more than half the provinces of his dominions, before he could think of attempting further conquests. Both the material and the formal aspects of the monuments of Dareios seem to favour a date later than that of Grote, and earlier than the date favoured by the older authorities, whose opinion Grote was refuting. Arguments from the Greek side favour the same conclusion.

§ 4. The chief contemporary monuments which have here to be reckoned with are two in number, the great Behistun inscription, and the sepulchral inscription of Naksh-i-Rustam.1 Neither of these inscriptions is exactly or formally dated, but the latter may be regarded as one of the latest of Dareios’ monuments, and might even be dated after Marathon.2 The great inscription at Behistun is not less probably, to judge by its contents, one of the earliest, cut by the king’s command so soon as he was firmly established upon the throne of Kyros, but before any additions had been made to the empire of the Achaemenids. Thus the main body of the inscription is silent not merely with respect to the Scythians and Thracians, and other tribes of Europe, who appear on later lists, but there is not even any mention of the Indians, who were in all probability reduced before the king turned his attention westwards.3 It follows that the Behistun inscription was cut before the king’s adventures in Europe,

1 A comparison of the lists of subject provinces and peoples, contained on the two inscriptions, shows the additions to the empire made, or claimed, in the interval. A third inscription (Persepolis), probably intervening, also contains a list. These inscriptions have, of course, been frequently edited and commented; they are most conveniently accessible to English readers in the Records of the Past, vols. i., pp. 107 ff. (Behistun), v. 149 ff. (Nakah-i-Rustam), vi. (Behistun, again), ix. pp. 65 ff., O. I. P., containing all the other texts, and including the Behistun appendix.

2 J. Oppert in Les anciens des Achéménides (1851) dated it before 496 B.C., in Records of the Past, ix. 76, “after B.C. 496.” It is, of course, difficult to say at what date Dareios set about preparing his own epitaph, but the fact that the expedition of Datis and Artaphernes is not mentioned would not prove the earlier date.

3 Sakae appear, indeed, col. i. § 6, but the name cannot stand there for a tribe in Europe: they belong obviously to the eastern portion of the empire. They are, presumably, the “Çaka Hannavargâ” of Nahak-i-Rustam, the “Amyrgian Scyths” of Edi. 7. 64. The eastern provinces are enumerated before the western at Naksh-i-Rustam.
which may have preceded the appendix at Behistun, and have justified certain items in the other lists.  

§ 5. But although the Behistun inscription was cut, in respect to its major part, before the expedition of the king in person against the Scyths, it records two revolts and reductions of Babylon. It becomes a matter of obvious importance to determine the dates of these events, in view of the language of Herodotus, and to determine, if possible, to which of the captures of Babylon the statement of Herodotus may be referred. The first of the two sieges and captures of Babylon was consequent upon two great battles, one on the Tigris, the other on the Euphrates; it was conducted by Dareios in person; it lasted a very considerable time, and its successful termination probably secured for Dareios the throne of Asia. It was altogether an event of primary and catholic significance, urbi et orbi. The second siege and capture of Babylon was a smaller event, not merely in the king's mind and record, but in itself. The recovery of Babylon was effected by a lieutenant-general. Who can doubt that the capture of Babylon, the fame of which had reached Herodotus, or his authorities, was the first conquest of Babylon, recorded on the rocks of Behistun? In regard to the work of Intaphres the Mede—still sufficiently memorable to be there recorded—no information had reached Herodotus. But, for the determination of the real date of the Scythian expedition, it is the date of the second capture of Babylon which is important, inasmuch as it appears from the monument that the expedition against the Europeans must have succeeded the second reduction of Babylon, and that by a considerable interval. Thus, while there can be little doubt that the capture of Babylon, to which Herodotus refers as the immediate, or at least the most notable antecedent of the king's expedition against the Scyths, is the first capture mentioned on the monument, there is as little doubt that Dareios must be taken to date his conquests in Europe after the second capture of Babylon, and sundry other achievements likewise.

As to the date of the capture of Babylon by Dareios in person there is approximate agreement, but the event is itself insufficient for the exact chronology of the Scythian expedition: it must in any case be set soon after the king's accession. But the second capture of Babylon is practically the last event of importance recorded in the

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1 The "Çaka Tigrakhaudā," of Naksh-i-Rustam, now generally interpreted "Scyths with pointed capes" may be represented by Skunkha (Saku'xa) in the Behistun appendix, but these Scyths were probably Asiatic. Oppert in his last version (Recordis, ix. p. 66) finds not merely the Haumavarga and the Tigrakhaudā, but also the Transmarine Scyths in the Behistun appendix, and the "Scyths beyond the sea" apparently without doubt appear at Naksh-i-Rustam. The geographical scheme of the inscription favours the location of these 'Scyths' in Europe.

Behistun monument, and might therefore be the immediate antecedent of the western expedition. It becomes, therefore, a matter of interest to determine the interval between the two events at Babylon. Unfortunately Dareios, though frequently specifying the month, and the day of the month, for his achievements, has omitted the years. But material considerations seem decidedly to favour the view that a considerable time elapsed between the first and the second capture of Babylon. Dareios seems to have done his work efficiently in the first instance; to have reduced Babylon after an obstinate resistance, and to have prolonged his residence in the city after its reduction. An immediate rising, as soon as his back was turned, seems improbable. Moreover, several revolts are successfully dealt with before the rebellion of Arakha and the second siege of Babylon. It seems, therefore, difficult to date this event before 516 B.C., and reasonable to bring it down even lower.

§ 6. If 515-514 B.C. be adopted as the latest provisional date for the second reduction of Babylon, 512 B.C. would seem to be the earliest date possible for the king's passage into Europe, allowing for necessary preparations, and the march to Sardes, and Kalchedon. A later date than that year seems very improbable. For reasons already stated it seems likely that Hippias was still in Athens when Dareios crossed the Bosporas, and recrossed the Hellespont: the expedition took place therefore before the expulsion of Hippias from Athens (511 B.C.). This conclusion is confirmed by two further considerations from the Greek side. It is not, indeed, easy to date exactly the retirement of Hippias to Sigeion, but if he had reached Sigeion before the king's expedition, or even during the king's presence in the west, we should probably have found him already at the king's side, in the Scythian campaign, or at the court in Sardes. The Scythian campaign was therefore, probably, over, and the king himself no longer at Sardes, when Hippias took up his residence at Sigeion; and this supposition would make again any date as late as 508 B.C. or even perhaps 510 B.C. The story of the mission of the spies also

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1 Oppert and Duncker both follow Herodotus in regard to the duration of the siege of Babylon by Dareios, and the Behistun inscription (pace E. Meyer, op. cit. i. p. 614) seems to show that Dareios was detained a good while before or in that city. Cp. col. ii. §§ 2, 12. That the king does not explain the cause of his long stay at Babylon is not surprising, nor is it necessary to suppose that the acts recorded in § 1 preceded the events recorded §§ 2-11.

Oppert discusses the point at some length, Le peuple etc. pp. 179 ff. The argument does not appear to me quite clear, and in one place he appears to date the usurpation of the Armenian Arakh in Babylon from Sept. 513—August 512 B.C., while elsewhere he dates the second capture of Babylon to Feb. 512 B.C. (op. cit. pp. 180, 188). Ed. Meyer, op. cit. supra, p. 615, dates it as early as 519 B.C., but op. cit. previous note. Duncker, vi. p. 283 note, regards 517 B.C. as the date suggested by Behistun, and 515 B.C. as the date suggested by the gap in the Egibi-tablets (Babylonian contracts): there being no text for the seventh year of Dareios. But Oppert, op. cit., mentions one. On the whole the date can hardly be regarded as yet exactly ascertained.

2 This was Oppert's date formerly: Les inscr. des Achéménides, p. 158.
points to a similar conclusion, if with Duncker we replace that mission in its natural context, after the return of Dareios from Scythia, and maintain the connexion between the Persian mission and the fortunes of Demokedes. The Krotoniate on his return to his native city marries the daughter of Milo, an event which may be taken to imply that the Pythagorean aristocracy was still in power. The aristocratic régime was, however, overthrown about the same time as the expulsion of Hippias from Athens. Thus the mission of the spies would fall, at latest, into the year 511-10 B.C. This result would accord well enough with the date 512 B.C. for the Scythian expedition.¹

These material sequences, and problematic synchronisms, are but unsatisfactory grounds upon which to erect an exact chronology, and if the year 512 B.C. is here adopted as the date of the Scythian expedition, it is so adopted merely for regulative purposes. The foregoing discussion may in any case be serviceable as exhibiting the state of evidence and opinion upon the subject.

§ 7. With regard to the aim, object, or motive of the expedition there has hardly been more agreement than in regard to the date. To Herodotus the Scythian expedition affords an illustration of a favourite theory, an instance of the lex talionis, mediated in this case by the intervention of human passion: ἐπεθύμησε δὲ Δαρείος τίμωσθαι Σκύθας, ὅτι ἂκείνοι πρῶτεροι ἐργαλύτες ἐς τὴν Μηδείαν καὶ νεκρασίες μάχῃ τῶν ἀντιμισών ἔπρεπεν ἀδίκης (4. 1). But this express motivation involves Herodotus in a double inconsequence. In the first place, if the expedition was thus morally justified, it should not have resulted in a fiasco; the Scythians should, as the guilty aggressors, have received their due reward. The sequel, however, turns the tables upon Dareios, and it is the Scyths who become the divinely-ordained instruments for his chastisement.² In the second place Herodotus elsewhere assigns a somewhat different motive for the expedition, which, if not inconsistent with the statement of the causa beli in Bk. 4. 1, yet plainly belongs to another order of ideas, a different cycle of tradition. There the action of Dareios is determined by two motives, the one personal, the other political. The former urges him to show the Persians that they have a man set over them (surely a work of supererogation on the part of one who had just laboriously reconquered the empire of Kyros!)—the latter, a political device, common to despotums, dictated an aggressive foreign policy in order to distract the minds of his subjects from home affairs (a motive in marked contrast to the policy of internal organisation, which helped to win for the king the nickname of ‘cheap-jack’³).


motivation of the war in Bk. 4, is to be found in the consideration that, even if the Medes had a grievance against Scythians which the Persian Dareios might have undertaken to avenge, he can hardly have anticipated the Greeks in the error of confounding the nomads of South Russia with the nomads who had swept over Asia in the time of the Assyrian dominion.  

§ 8. In view of the inadequacy of ancient authority on the point, moderns have been not a little exercised to discover an adequate or rational motive for the Scythian campaign. Niebuhr, indeed, seems to have asserted, in one moment, that the great king had no policy or intention in the matter: “Dareios seems to have advanced at random without any definite object, and wherever in his empire he found a people still unsubdued, he found sufficient reason for attacking and subduing it like the rest.” So far as this passage can be taken to mean that conquest was the law of ancient empires, some reason may be latent in it. Others have seen in the Scythian expedition a sort of precautionary or prophylactic measure. Thus Baehr endorsed Osander’s view that the invasion of Scythia was undertaken as a preventive measure, to secure the frontiers of the Persian empire from aggression. This appears to have been Professor Sayce’s view when he wrote that “Dareios was now [after the conquest of the Punjab] free to secure his north-western frontier. The Scythian coast on the Black Sea was explored as the Indus had been, the Bosporus was bridged by Mandrokles the Samian, and the steppes of Southern Russia were swept by the Persian army. The impression left on the Scythian mind was never wiped out; the empire was henceforward safe on that side.” But the theory so stated seems to involve some transfiguration of the facts. The Scyths, at the time of the expedition, could hardly have threatened the empire except on the Caucasus: it was there, if anywhere, that a Scythic invasion might be apprehended. The reduction of the Caucasus is, presumably, to be placed before the reduction of the Punjab. Asiatic Sakae appear among the tributaries of Dareios on the Behistun monument, they accompanied him across the Bosporus. No danger threatened the Persian empire from the

2 Trogus Pomptinus had a charming reason for the expedition, so completely after Herodotus’ own heart that, not finding any hint of it in his text, we must suppose it unknown to him: Huc (regi Iasmyleo) Darius rex Persarum . . . cum sibi eis nuptias non obtinisset bellum intulit (Justin. 2. 5. 9). Cp. Hdt. 3. 1.
3 Lect. on Anc. Hist. l. 140. Niebuhr himself did not publish that work, and the in consequence need not be ascribed to him.
4 ii. 2 pp. 710 ff. (Excursus VIII. ad Herodotum iv. 1.)
5 Probably a reference to the recorded mission of Ariarames, Ktesias, Pers. 16 (Gilmour, p. 150). Cp. Duncker (E. T.), vi. 265.
6 The Ancient Empires of the East, p. 444.
7 Strabo, 303, quoting Choerilus, through Ephorus: μηνομαχεῖ τε Σάκας γενέσθαι, αὐτὰρ καὶ ἢν ἀσθένεῖ.
8 Ἀδίσις πυροφόρους νομάδοις τε μὲν ἔστην ἄθικον.
steppes of S. Russia, nor did the Persian army sweep that region unless the story of the campaign as told by Herodotus is after all a vera historia. The impression left on the Scythian mind by the expedition of Dareios, if we may judge from the stories preserved by Herodotus, was one not of terror but of amusement and contempt; Greeks took a similar view: only the craven loyalty of the Ionian despot to the foreign sovran had saved him from utter annihilation. The impression made on the Greek and even on the Persian mind is more obvious than any impression made on the Scythian. If the Scyths play little part in the subsequent history, it can hardly be because they had been overawed by the disgraceful flight of the Persian king, 80,000 of whose soldiers were reported, even perhaps in official records,¹ lost beyond the Danube, but rather because the existence of flourishing Greek colonies on the Pontos, and the rise of the great Thracian monarchy of the Odrysææ made much deeper impressions upon Scythic minds and manners! Moreover, an attack upon the nomad Scythians from the west would have been well calculated to drive them round the Pontos into Asia. If the steppes of S. Russia were swept by Dareios, as a preventive measure, to safeguard his empire’s frontier, surely never was a campaign not merely a more disgraceful fiasco, but so utterly unnecessary and foolish an undertaking. Kyros against the Massagetae, Kambyses in Aethiopia, were “mellow music matched with” Dareios in Scythia.

§ 9. A more plausible reason, or intention, for the Scythian expedition of Dareios, and one consonant with the traditional lines of his policy, has been freely assigned by those who see in the attack upon south Russia and the Pontos an attempt to open up fresh markets and sources of wealth. So Niebuhr: “there can be no doubt that the Persians were attracted by the wealth resulting from the commerce with the Scythians . . . that commerce was extremely important, not only on account of the gold, which came from these quarters in great abundance, but also on account of the corn trade . . . the Black Sea was the indispensable condition of that trade.” Niebuhr even formulates the policy of Dareios in this expedition as having for its object “to change the Euxine into a lake in the interior of Persia.”² This note is struck again, perhaps more cautiously, by Curtius: “the undertakings of Dareios all bear a perfectly unique character. Made wise by the experiences of his predecessors, he endeavoured to avoid large territorial acquisitions as well as undertakings in the interior. The point of view from which he acted was, as it were, to round off the empire, and by the discovery of new routes by sea to continue to increase its share in the general commercial intercourse of nations . . . above all, he was attracted by the reports as to the gold of the Scythians, and as to the great navigable rivers of their country . . . there he hoped to be able to open up new

¹ Ktesias, Pers. § 17. ² Lect. on Anc. Hist. i. 140.
routes of trade, and to unite a series of important cities with the empire by means of a campaign passing along the length of the coast, and accompanied by his fleet." 

§ 10. It is to be observed that all these theories and comments, alike those which describe the expedition as aimless or insane, and those which discover profound motives of military or commercial policy in the undertaking, assume the substantial truth of the Herodotean record of the campaign, even if they dismiss the details as exaggerated and fictitious, or select only such indications in the story as suit this or that theory. If the behaviour of Dareios was insane, it would be largely because he plunges off into space beyond the Danube, cutting his communications with his base, sweeping the steppes of south Russia, making himself a laughing-stock to gods and Scythians. If the story is all fiction and fancy, the king's insanity disappears. Conversely, if Dareios wished to make the Euxine into a Persian lake, for commercial purposes, he must indeed have aimed at sweeping the steppes of south Russia, but not unaccompanied by his fleet. The campaign would have been conducted upon the lines indicated by Curtius, viz., to pass with the land-forces along the coast, the fleet accompanying. Thus the problem of the motive, aim, object or policy of the expedition of Dareios in Europe cannot be solved apart from the question of the actual course and conduct of the operations, or rather, the character and authority of the stories which ostensibly record those operations. It remains, therefore, to consider the actual course of events, so far as recoverable from the record.

§ 11. It has been generally admitted that Herodotus gives an intelligible account of the advance of Dareios from Sardes to the Danube. The passage of the Bosporos on the bridge constructed by Mandrocles the Samian (who took no shame thus to ease the king's object?), the march of the land-forces through lower and eastern Thrace, the transit of the Balkans, so easily effected as to have left no trace in the narrative—they have never, as Niebuhr remarked, and as has been proved afresh since his time, been a serious obstacle to soldiers:—the reduction of the Getae between the Balkan and the Danube, the arrival of the army on the 'neck' of the river to find the fleet (or a strong squadron of it) already in possession, and the bridge, a fresh though anonymous triumph of Hellenic skill: all this is of comparatively simple comprehension. Nor have critics, with one notable exception, seriously challenged the truth and authority of the scenes laid on the Danube. But, once across the river, and lo! the character of the action changes, nor can the contrast between the story of the operations in Thrace, and the story of the adventures in Scythia, be much diminished even by the tardy recognition of an

1 History of Greece, ii. 194 f. (E. T.). The passage is the same in the sixth German edition (1887), i. 604 f.
2 Cp. Curtius, op. cit. i. 606.
ambiguity in the intervening scenes on the river. Niebuhr and Grote long ago pointed out in general terms the main objections to the story of the Scythian campaign as told by Herodotus, who, in the words of Grote, "conduces the immense host of Darius as it were through fairy land—heedless of distance, large intervening rivers, want of all cultivation and supplies, destruction of the country (in so far as it could be destroyed) by the retreating Scythians, etc." The critique of Grote has been endorsed and developed by Duncker in a thorough manner, and (with one exception) there is not very much to add to his masterly treatment of the matter. It will, however, be proper to recapitulate the chief points in the narrative, which are open to criticism, the case being a crucial one for our estimate of Greek historiography. Considering the date, notoriety and sources of information available in the case, if fiction, exaggeration and misconception have here obscured and distorted the true policy and conduct of events, is it to be wondered at, if the story of the Ionian revolt, or even the story of the Marathonian campaign should leave still much to be desired from the point of view of scientific history? We cannot expect to pass, as by a wave of some magic wand, from myth and legend to history, from poetry to fact. The writer who can offer the story of the Scythian campaign as a sober or veridical history can hardly be a final authority upon the five campaigns in the Ionian revolt, or on the tactics of Miltiades at Marathon.

§ 12. Briefly stated the critique of the Herodotean story goes to show that the account of the Scythian campaign consists of a mixture of physical impossibilities, of inconsistencies or inconsequences, and of absurdities attributed to Dareios and to the Scythians, which render the whole affair doubtful in the highest degree. Moreover, in two notable respects the narrative contradicts the geographical context, for it completely ignores the river-system of Scythia, and it assumes that the nomads ranged freely from the Danube to the Don. What standard of historic probability is exhibited by an author who commits himself to such a performance, in which satire and fun seem to run riot? Could a Thucydides have been capable of such reckless and unreasoned story-telling? Can we even see in it "that large

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1 iii. 475.
3 Without bridges, ships, or food, Dareios carries an army of 700,000 men over several huge rivers, hundreds of miles forwards and backwards over Scythia, in something over two months: a feat impossible in itself, and still more impossible in the time indicated.
4 The Scyths (according to Edt.) have no infantry, yet they offer battle with infantry and cavalry: they desire to deprive the Persians of all supplies, and yet allow part of their flocks to be captured: they challenge Dareios to seek out their fathers' graves at Gernos—a district the king has just passed through, or near: Dareios returning from the Agathyrsi comes by the same road as he had traversed in moving eastwards.
5 The story of the congress of barbarous chiefs; the plan of leading the king to the territories of the distant tribes who have joined the Scyths; the forts of Dareios on the Oaron; the battle array, and the episode of the bare, etc., etc.
sweep of imagination, admissible in epical treatment"? 1 Is not the story of the trans-Danubian adventure at once too comic and too doctrinaire to be regarded as a legitimate exercise, whether of a truly poetic or of an historic muse? 2

§ 13. The criticism, however, which has demonstrated the impossibilities, the inconsequence, and the absurdities of the story of the campaign in Scythia has been content to accept in substance the account of events most closely related thereto. Between events on the Danube and events beyond the Danube Grote draws a hard and fast line, and the line so drawn has ruled, though to a less extent, his successors. Grote believes nothing in the story of the adventures of Dareios in Scythia save the broad facts that he went in power and glory and returned in fear and disgrace: all reported to have passed in the interval is, in Grote's words, "nothing better than a perplexing dream." To compensate as it might seem this scepticism Grote asserts that "we re-enter the world of reality, at the north bank of the Danube, the place where we before quitted it." 3 Thus we are directed to accept the stories told of, or by, the Ionians respecting affairs on the Danube, the behaviour of the Greek despots, the conduct of Dareios, the words and acts of the Scythians, and so on. Grote believed that Dareios first ordered the bridge to be broken, that fortunately for him Koes of Mytilene questioned the wisdom of that order, whereupon Dareios graciously accepted the suggestion that it would be wise to cover his retreat, and thereupon "altered his resolution," i.e. changed the whole plan of campaign. Grote even believed the story of the knotted cord, down to the great king's making the knots with his own hand, and cites the 'anecdote' as "disclosing the simple expedients for numeration and counting of time then practised." 4 Grote has overlooked the absurdity of supposing that the whole fleet was left to guard the Danubian bridge, if the king intended to make his way back to Asia round the Euxine-Maeotis and across the Caucasus. Grote has overlooked the inconsistency involved in believing that, while the bridge over the Bosphorus was left standing, the bridge over the Danube was to be destroyed, the king not intending to return that way. Grote credited Dareios (who had reconquered the empire of Kyros, and added Caucasus and Panjab thereto, organised tributes, armies, civil governments, and just reduced a great part of Thrace, including the warlike Getae) with overlooking the necessity of keeping up communications with his rear, on a fresh and difficult

1 Grote, iii. 476. Epic treatment would have introduced the supernatural, which is conspicuous by its absence: cp. Introduction, vol. I. p. cxvi.

2 However adverse the verdict on this or any other particular story or passage in the work of Herodotus, we must beware of admitting an equal prejudice against the work as a whole: cp. Introd. vol. I. pp. xxvii, xxx, etc.

3 Grote, iii. 478.

4 Thirlwall, ii. 481.
expedition, needing quick-witted Greeks not merely to build him his bridges, but to criticise his campaigns. As a matter of fact the Persians were old hands at such warfare as Dareios might have in view beyond the Danube, and among the king's forces were tribes specially well fitted to beat the Scythians at their own game. As Grote credits the story of the advice of Koes at the Danube, so not unnaturally he credits the dramatic warnings of the sage Artabanes,¹ which, if heeded, would have rendered that advice unnecessary. A more serious flaw in Grote's critique is his attempted rationalisation of the conduct of the Scythians on the river. Grote believed in the appearance of "a body of Scythians" at the river—this "body" is Grote's rationalised representative of the moiety of the Scythian forces under Skopasis,² thus diminished the better, perhaps, to explain the mildness of their suggestions to the Ionians. Grote, however, implies that this body of Scythians, had they not missed the track, might have prevented the "host of Persians" from reaching the Danube. The sixty days appointed were over before the king returned. This figure is generally accepted as historical, but why the king should have fixed just sixty days as the limit for the Ionian watch on the Danube remains obscure. In fine, Grote, and others, have been too easily content in this whole matter. There is not the hard and fast line, proposed by them, between what happens, according to Herodotus, in Scythia and what happens on the Danube. The historical and the unhistorical are not separated, in our sources, from each other in the manner approved by Grote. There is more history in the fiction and more fiction in the history than Grote's rather inelastic analysis recognised. As in the case of Greek myths and legends generally, so in the present instance, a more sympathetic and tentative criticism than Grote's may give a better result. To accept the Greek traditions of the behaviour of the Ionians on the Danube, and their dealings with the Scythians, as simple history is as unnecessary and uncritical as to despair of recovering any historical items or indications in regard to the conduct of Dareios and the 'Scythians' beyond the Danube. The story of what took place on the Danube cannot be admitted as simply representative of fact in respect of the action of Dareios, of the Scythians, or of the Greeks. In regard to Dareios it is implied that he left his whole force to guard the bridge: that he intended to go round the Pontos and yet left his fleet behind, or left his fleet behind and yet cut himself off voluntarily from his base, that he gave the Greeks leave to abandon him to his fate after two months, and that for the purpose of counting the days he and they had recourse to a method of primitive barbarism, or savagery. All this is absurd in itself, and inconsistent with what is known of the character and conduct of Dareios: it is therefore,

¹ 4. 83, cp. 7. 10.
² ἡ Σανδρέων μια μάρα ἡ ταχθείσα πρό- ρησις την Μαγιτον Κίμωνον προκειται, 4. 138.
in all probability, untrue, but it is not therefore devoid of significance. Further, the story of events on the Danube involves the Scythians in action improbable if not absurd: they appear once and again upon the river-bank in force, and yet content themselves with quiet parleys, and an exhortation to the Greeks to use the opportunity for recovering freedom. The part assigned to the Greek despots in the story is not its least suspicious feature. They are all but on the point of acting upon the suggestion of the Scythians, and of Miltiades; it is only when Histiaios has pointed out the solidarity of their own and the Persian interests, that the Ionian tyrants ‘find salvation’: and this, notwithstanding the loyal and excellent advice previously tendered by Koes the Lesbian to the king, notwithstanding the fact that Dareios, well assured of their loyalty, had not hesitated, according to the same group of traditions, to leave them sole guard on the Danube behind him!

§ 14. Few stories told by Herodotus are more largely or more obviously products of afterthought than this drama, the scene of which is laid on the Danube. In the time of Herodotus, and for some time before, it was patent to all Greeks that the Ionian despots had found loyalty to Persia their best policy, and that some of them had stood specially high in the king’s favour, notably Histiaios of Miletos, Koes of Lesbos. If they had been loyal, they had their rewards: if they were rewarded, it must have been for some signal services. Grote, and other critical historians, have credited the story of the debate in which Histiaios and Miltiades take sides for and against the king. It is doubtless as authentic as some other debates in the work of Herodotus. Thirlwall perceived the pragmatic and suspicious character of the story, and traced it to its probable occasion. Thirlwall perceived that it was probably more or less on the strength of this story of his conduct on the Danube that Miltiades was acquitted when brought to trial for ‘tyranny’ on his return to Athens in 493 B.C. But if Miltiades had really taken on the Danube the line ascribed to him in Athens twenty years after, is it conceivable that the Persians could have remained ignorant of it, or that on learning it, they would have left him unmolested in possession of the Chersonese? He retired, indeed, from the Chersonese afterwards, and Herodotus mentions that it was an inroad of the Scythians which caused his first retirement. Grote converts the Scythians into Persians: Herodotus says Scythians, and the more inconsistent this item may be with the rest of the narrative the more likely is the incidental point to be true, and the suspiciously pragmatic narrative to be false: it is just such inconsistencies which not infrequently enable us to go behind an artificial and rationalised story, and to sift the more from the less probable. How much of the story of the affair on the Danube had already done

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But see notes ad l.
duty at the first trial of Miltiades, and how much the story may have been improved, on later occasions, in the light of later events, in connexion with other more or less highly pragmatised stories, it were indeed a bold attempt to determine precisely: the story has not lost colour, we may be sure, in its transit through the work-room of Herodotus.

§ 15. If Thirlwall long ago performed a service, somewhat unduly ignored, in regard to the story of events on the Danube, and specially the conduct attributed to Miltiades, Duncker has subsequently done more than any other scholar to rescue the story of events beyond the Danube from total and indiscriminate condemnation. The items indeed in Herodotus are not all equally improbable, and when sifted in the light of traditions, or of accounts preserved by other Greek writers, they yield an historical deposit. It must, of course, be granted that the possible or the plausible record, recovered from Strabo and other sources, based perhaps upon Ephoros, may be in part or in whole a product of reflection and criticism, rather than a survival of living memory and tradition: but, on the other hand, it should be remembered that we are here dealing with historic persons and situations, and moreover that the plausible theory gains some confirmation from the actual monuments of Dareios. If Dareios crossed the Danube at all, if the passage of the river be anything more than an exaggerated replica of the passage of the Bosphorus, if the king penetrated the country north of the Danube, why should no memory or tradition have survived of events, comparatively recent, beyond the river? The traditions in Herodotus mark the territory of the Agathyrsi as the furthest point in the N.W. reached by Dareios, and as the point from which his retreat begins: Ktesias makes fifteen days the extent of his march: fifteen days would not have carried such a host very far from the river. Dareios retreated, according to Ktesias, because he found, after exchanging bows with the Scythian king, the Scythian bow the stronger. Ktesias professed to follow Persian sources; his phrase might be a metaphorical Persian way of saying that the Scythian archers were too mighty, or too many, for the Persian. Strabo marks the desert of the Getae, who in his time were to be found beyond the Danube, as the scene of the king's adventure. We may surely take it for certain that, if Dareios had intended to go eastwards, across the rivers and round the sea, he would have taken engineers with him, and the fleet, or a good part of it, would have accompanied the army. We may take it for more than probable that Dareios neither crossed, nor intended to cross, a single great river north or east of the Danube.

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1 Dareios records the digging and destruction of his canal in Egypt (Records of the Past, ix. 80, cp. Hdt. 4. 39), and he specifies, apparently, an expedition across the sea against Scyths (Records, ix. 68 f.), but he nowhere, apparently, records the transit of the Danube, the greatest river in the world as conceived by Hdt. 4. 48.
3 Strabo, 305 (ed. Meineke-Teubner, ii. 419).
It seems improbable that Dareios voluntarily cut his communications with the Danube; it seems probable that they were cut, and therefore cut by the Scythians. If so, an opportunity was certainly given to the Greeks of leaving the king to his fate. Some of the Greeks actually adopted that course, viz. the ships of Antandros and of Lamponion. It is characteristic of Herodotus' methods, and of his sources, that this fact is mentioned incidentally, and not in connexion with the debate on the Danube, to which time and place we may restore it.\(^1\) Kalkhedon and Byzantion also, in the absence of Dareios and their own despots, seized the opportunity of getting rid of the Persians and of the Tyrrannis at one blow.\(^2\) Abydos, Antandros, Perinthos revolted and had to be reduced. The Greek towns on both sides the Hellespont, Propontis and Bosporos threw off the Persian yoke, and had to be reconquered, with exception, indeed, of the district subject to Miltiades; it was just from the Chersonese that Dareios crossed safely back to Asia. The king went and came, through Thrace, leaving a large force in Europe to extend his conquest west, and to recover the Greek towns. The 'Scythic' expedition cost him little, and led to much. If it was insanity, never was an insanity so cheaply atoned. The Persians remained in Europe. They retained Thrace, or so much of it as was worth retaining, they proceeded to extend the frontiers of the Empire, the Strymon and the Danube were for a while their boundaries. North of the Danube the tribes may have paid the king no homage: but Macedonia, west of Strymon, submitted.

§ 16. Is it, then, certain that Dareios did not accomplish the main objects of his campaign? As Thirlwall here too suggested, it is possible that the subjugation of Thrace was the king's principal object, and that he only crossed the Danube to terrify the Scythians by the display of his gigantic power.\(^3\) Curtius improves on this suggestion by crediting Dareios with the curiosity of a scientific explorer, and even with the zeal of a religious missionary.\(^4\) The various motives assigned by Curtius may not appear all quite consistent: but he endorses on the whole the view that the king's aim in regard to conquest and acquisition was confined to Thrace: in this object he was successful.

This being so, Dareios never intended to make the Euxine into a Persian lake. Commerce was not the idea uppermost in his mind, but fresh provinces and fresh tributes. Still less was the invasion of Scythia a bid for the favour of his Ionian or Hellenic subjects.\(^5\) If

\(^1\) Hdt. 5. 27.
\(^2\) Cp. note to 4. 143.
\(^3\) Thirlwall, ii. 222. Rawlinson, Anc. Monarchies, iv. 436, approves. The analogy of Alexander's expedition in 335 B.C. (Arrian, Anab. i. 3, 4) might be adduced.
\(^4\) Dareios hatte mehr Entdeckungs- als Eroberungstrieb; er wollte das Land aus-

kundschaften und dabei den Ruhm gewinnen als ein ehemaliger Nachfolger des Kyros in den Wiisten Turans den Namen des Persergottes durch persische Waffen zu Ehren gebracht zu haben, i.e. 607 (cp. E. T. ii. 162). The religious propaganda of Kyros has still to be proved.
\(^5\) Curtius, i. 605.
Sceuthian commerce had been his object he would have aimed at attacking the Greek towns on the north shores of the Euxine, in which case the fleet would not have been left in the Danube. If Dareios ever crossed the Danube at all, it was a demonstration against possible inroads, not of the empire generally, but of the new provinces added, or just about to be added, thereto.

§ 17. The genesis of the transfigured legend on the subject is not difficult to motivate. Kyros had (so one legend, perhaps falsely, alleged) lost his life in warring with a savage queen: Kambyses had made a mad expedition into Aithiopia: Xerxes had fled in ludicrous terror from the soil of Hellas. Was Dareios to be the only great king of all the enemies of Greece to whose name no personal discredit and disaster should attach? Had he alone of barbarous potentates never a moment of insolent pride followed by a speedy and certain nemesis? Greek theories and memories of the tyrannis reinforced the main motive of the pragmatic logo-poets. The utter hatefulness of Despotism, how should it better be proved than by exhibiting the connexion between the foreign and the domestic foes of Hellenic liberties? Nor was that all. There were persons, families, even states, interested in the stories told by Herodotus: there were circles and centres, in which the reputation of the Ionians for courage and love of liberty did not stand high, when Herodotus was collecting his materials, some half century, or more, after the event: hinc iliae fabulas.1

§ 18. It is still worth while to follow somewhat more minutely the actual structure of the story as told by Herodotus. The narrative is contained wholly within the first part of Bk. 4, but is interrupted by excursus and by digressions as shown in the Analysis (Introduction, § 13, vol. I. p. xxxi). Restored to continuity the record runs through the following passages: cc. 1, 83-98, 102, 118-144, in which references, however, allowance must be made for some minor digressions (cc. 85, 86 on the Pontos: cc. 94-96 on Salmoxis). It is obvious that the narrative is given in two main portions, cc. 83-98, and cc. 118-144. The first of these portions carries Dareios from Susa to the Danube (Istrae), and is mainly concerned with his march and operations in Thrace: it is introductory to the narrative of the campaign proper (announced in c. 1), which is evidently of chief interest to the Greek historian. The Danube is, not a hard and fast line, but still a dividing line in the narrative, as in the campaign itself. The story of the adventures beyond the Danube (cc. 118-142) is absolutely continuous, homogeneous and highly artificial; the matter in c. 102 must be reckoned to it, and forms a curiously exact balance or counterpart to the matter in c. 1. The differences in place, scene, character and composition of the two main portions of the narrative (cc. 83-98, 118-142) may correspond to some essential difference in the

1 With this section, cp. Introduction, vol. I. § 17.
sources from which they are respectively derived. There is, indeed, no express intimation of the sources from which the narrative of the Scythian campaign was obtained by Herodotus, nor is it easier here than elsewhere to decide what elements, or items, in the narrative are solely his own contribution. The few lines of geographical digression in c. 123 may fairly be ascribed to a distinct source, one or other of those sources from which the geography of this part of the work is drawn: the mention of the extant remains of the fortifications of 'Dareios' on the Oaros may suggest information gathered in person by Herodotus in Scythia (Olbia), but would not preclude a literary source for the geographical passage. The 'opinions' (γνώμαι) of Dareios and Geobrias (c. 132) might be traced to the same kind of authority as the anecdotes of Megabazos (cc. 143 f.), Artabazos (c. 83), and Oiobazos (c. 84). The exact list of tyrants (c. 138) can hardly be put down to mere oral tradition. The prominent 'Ionian' interest in the story (cc. 133-142), especially if viewed in connexion with indubitably Ionian sources for the earlier stages of the story (cc. 87-89), and the Ionian (Milesian) interest in the Pontos, might suggest Asianic authority for the whole narrative; but the strong anti-Ionism of the moral (c. 142) almost precludes Milesian or Samian authority for the affair at the Danube, and the adventures beyond, involved to some extent in the episode at the bridge, require the lapse of time, and so forth, accounted for by them. The most probable hypothesis in regard to the sources of the Danubian episode is that suggested by Thirlwall. This hypothesis is rendered only more probable by a consideration of the relations of Kimon and of the Athenians to the Ionians in the days of Herodotus. The passage contains not merely a glorification of Miltiades, but indirectly a justification of the Athenian 'empire' and its founders, Kimon included. Whether the 'Philaid' tradition, which Herodotus can scarcely have been the first to commit to writing, included an account of adventures beyond the Danube or not, can hardly be determined. The prolonged absence of Dareios beyond the river, the repeated offers of the Scythians to the Ionians, were probably items in the family tradition dating from the trial of Miltiades. The episodes with which the time was filled up may have been a product largely based on later reasoning and fancy; yet they probably came to Herodotus in an already well-developed form. He might not shrink from constructing politico-philosophical debates for barbarous chiefs (cc. 102, 118, 119), but even he could hardly have overlooked the glaring inconsistency between the story of the campaign and the geography of the rivers as described by himself, unless the former had come to him at one time and place, the latter at another.

The Analysis of the passage cc. 118-142 exhibits four subordinate divisions (cc. 118-123, 124-125, 126-134, 135-142). These divisions being drawn in a consecutive narrative are more or less artificial, and less obviously justified than the main division drawn between the
two great passages cc. 83-98 and cc. 118-142 (144). Yet the subdivisions in question may seem to correspond fairly (a) to the literary structure of the historian’s narrative, (β) to the material course of the hypothetical campaign (res gestae).

I. In the first part (act) cc. 118-123, the Scythians attempt to form a league with their neighbours (cc. 102, 118, 119), and concert with the tribes joining them a plan of action, which is put into operation (cc. 120, 121). According to this plan the Scythians and their allies divide so as to form two armies, one of which under Skopasia comprises a third, or tribe, of Scythians together with the Sauromatae, while the other contains the two remaining Scythic tribes, under their respective chiefs Idanthyrsos and Taxakis, together with the Geloni and Budini. The movements of these two armies are clearly distinguished; when united Idanthyrsos appears as supreme king, or commander, over against the Persian monarch. The women and children are sent northwards (c. 121), a vague indication which may keep them within or take them beyond the sphere of operations marked out for Idanthyrsos. The Persians first sight the army under Skopasia, and are drawn, according to the Scythian plan, by his retreat all across Scythia, and far beyond the Tanais, to Gelonos, and the ‘desert of the Oaros,’ where Dareios stays to erect, but not to complete, a remarkable series of forts (c. 123). Meanwhile the forces under Skopasia have fetched a compass, returned to Scythia, and effected a junction with the army under Idanthyrsos.

II. In the second subdivision of the narrative (cc. 124, 125), the two armies of Scythians are reunited, and pursued by Dareios (from E. to W.) through the territories of the Melanchlaeni, Androphagi and Neuri (cp. cc. 102 ff.) to the borders of the Agathyrsi. The last named people, notwithstanding their effeminate manners (c. 104), resist the Scythian advance, and the Scythians retire (southwards) within their own territory.

III. Here apparently Dareios comes up with the united Scythian forces under Idanthyrsos. The scene of the third stage, or subdivision, of the story is laid in Scythia, but the story is doubled and complicated by two series of synchronous events, the scene of the one series being laid (mainly) on the Danube, the scene of the other many days’ march inland. (a) The one series comprises the following episodes: i. messages between Dareios and Idanthyrsos (cc. 126, 127); ii. skirmishes between Scythians and Persian (cc. 129, 130); iii. the gifts of Idanthyrsos to Dareios and their interpretation (cc. 131, 132); iv. preparations for a pitched battle: the hare episode (c. 134). (β) The other series of events is given in two intermediate passages: i. Skopasia and his forces are despatched to the Danube to deal with the Ionians (c. 128); ii. the first appeal and offer of the Scythians (under Skopasia) to the Ionians at the Istrian bridge (c. 133).

IV. In the fourth subdivision (cc. 135-142), i. Dareios (like the hare) takes to flight (c. 135). ii. It appears that the two armies of
Scyths are re-united in the pursuit, and reach the river before the king. There follows the second appeal to the Ionians to break up the bridge, leave the Persian to his fate, and secure their own liberties, and there takes place the great debate among the Tyrants (cc. 136-139). iii. The Scythians returning to meet the Persian king miss him on the march, and Dareios makes good his escape from this game of hide and seek (cc. 140, 141). iv. The moral of the story is summed up from the Scythian (or Hellenic, Attic) point of view: Ionians were born slaves (c. 142). The two chapters which follow serve as a \textit{finale} to the story of the Scythian campaign (cc. 143, 144).

Although the story of the Scythian campaign is thus exhibited as a continuous narrative extending from c. 118 to c. 142, it must not be argued that the passages thus envisaged were originally earlier or independent of their immediate context. The highly artificial geography of Scythia cc. 99-101 is consistent enough with the story of the campaign, both alike, \textit{inter alia}, omitting all notice of the rivers which made the story ridiculous. The ethnographical passage (cc. 102-109) is implied or pre-supposed in the narrative (esp. cc. 124, 125). The legend of the Sauromatae looks more like a later insertion (by the author's hand) cc. 110-117. The same remark may apply to some smaller passages, \textit{e.g.} in c. 99. Not, indeed, the comparison of Taurike to the Attic promontory, which betrays the original source, as one may conjecture, of the whole story: but at least the additional illustration from Iapygia, which plainly suggests autopsy and a western audience. An insertion may also be suspected in the geographical note with which c. 123 concludes, for that note changes the tone of the narrative, and betrays an interest foreign to the immediate context. A more difficult question, however, arises in regard to the relation of the story of the Scythian campaign proper, and the portions of the narrative the scene of which is laid outside Scythia, and mainly within Thrace, or on the Danube; and in the first instance, the stories of the march of Dareios from Susa to the Istrus (cc. 1, 83-98). The 'Thracian' interest is not confined to this passage (ep. cc. 143, 144, 5. 1 ff.), nor is the whole of the passage concerned with Thrace and its inhabitants. Thus cc. 1, 83, 84 are 'Scythian': c. 1 stating the project, or \textit{casus belli}, against the Scythians; c. 83 recording the opposition of Artabanes to the project (ep. 7. 10); c. 84, a cruel act of the king, or the penalty of disloyalty in relation to the Scythian expedition. The first of these items is largely theoretical (γυρωμεν), and might well be all due to the author's own combinations; the second may be carried back from the tradition, or source, in 7. 10; the third is an anecdote which might do duty on any similar occasion (ep. 7. 38, 39). With c. 85 a passage is reached (cc. 85-98) which is mainly concerned with Thrace, and which would require very little alteration if the whole object of Dareios had been merely the subjugation of the country south of the Danube, and a 'demonstration' on the further side to secure his new frontier. The passage falls into three subdivisions, clearly distinguish-
§ 18  THE EXPEDITION OF DAREIOS IN EUROPE 53

able: i. the passage of the Bosporos cc. 85-88 (omitting the geographical note upon the Pontos); ii. the march through Thrace cc. 90-93 (omitting the note on Salmoxis and Thracian immortality cc. 94-96); iii. Dareios on the Danube cc. 97, 98.

i. Of these subdivisions the first betrays very plainly two sources from which the story is derived, of a kind which guarantees the bare facts, leaving little doubt of the reality of the building of the bridge, and the passage of Dareios and his army into Thrace. The one is the painting which Mandrocles offered to the Samian Hera, and which Herodotus, in all probability, had seen in the Heraion at Samos (c. 88), the other the bilingual monument at Byzantium, which Herodotus probably had seen, perhaps years after he visited Samos. The geographical note on the Pontos (cc. 85, 86) is in no way essential to the narrative, and may here be dismissed with the remark, that it may date from the author’s visit to those parts, and not be due to his original authorities, though it is of course far from proving that Herodotus had ever personally explored the Pontos.

ii. The second subdivision (cc. 90-93) is the passage most essentially ‘Thracian’ in the whole context: (a) the verdict of the periœci upon the water of the Téaros, and the itinerary from Perinths and from Apollonia (c. 90), do not supply any evidence that either Dareios or Herodotus visited the fountain-head: the stele and inscription of Dareios stated to have been there erected (c. 91) stand on a very different basis to that of the stele at Byzantium (c. 87). But it cannot be proved that Dareios did not visit and commend the Téaros. (b) The lightness of touch with which the fate or conduct of the Odrysae is passed over (c. 92) is doubly significant when considered in connexion with the record of Sítalkes in c. 80, and the great importance of the ‘Thracian’ question at Athens in the last Periklean decade (439-429 B.C., cp. 7.137). The ‘heaps of stones’ in c. 92 are not much more or less evidential than the ‘ruined forts’ in c. 124. (c) The case of the Getae is very different (cc. 93-96). The passage on the athanasia of the Getae, cc. 94, 95, is indeed not essential to the narrative, and might be an addition to his materials for the story, from the author’s own hand, dating after his visit to the Hellespont (πυρθώμαι τῶν τῶν Ἑλλήσποντον ὁλκεύτων Ἑλλήνων c. 95). It may be that tradition or writing preserved some memory of a stout resistance offered by the Getae to the Persians, while the Odrysae and other Thracian tribes had made easier terms. The name of the Getae would probably be almost as familiar in Athens, through imported slaves, as that of any other Thracian tribe.

iii. The third passage (cc. 97, 98) places Dareios on the Danube. The action is essential to the story of the Scythian campaign, and

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1 It may here be suggested that these inscriptions were rather bi-literally than bilingual. As in other Achæmenid monuments the cuneiform letters may have expressed more than one tongue.

the narrative seems to belong to the same group or fountain of traditions as the passages later on (cc. 128, 133, 136-139) recording the behaviour of the Ionians on the river: in other words, it has an Athenian or quasi-Attic source. The introduction of the knotted cord rather detracts from the verisimilitude of the story (see notes ad l.): but the sixty days, or two months, may be a genuine reminiscence of the time during which, and more, Dareios was absent in 'Scythia.'

From this point the Scythian λόγοι are taken up: for although the strictly narrative portion hardly begins before c. 118, yet as has already been shown the geographical passage cc. 99-101, the ethnographical passage cc. 102-117 (omitting perhaps cc. 110-117) are essential constituents of the original Scythian story (τῶν κατ' ἀρχὰς ἡμι λέξεων λόγον c. 82). Thus, there is not any hard line between the adventures of Dareios, the scene of which is laid in Thrace, and the adventures beyond the Danube, according to the conception, or in the composition, of Herodotus.
APPENDIX IV

THE PERSIANS IN THRACE (512-489 B.C.)


§ 1. The continuous narrative of the Persian advance in Bks. 4, 5, 6, interrupted by the Libyan Logi, is carried on, or back, by the opening passage of Bk. 5, into Thrace and Macedon; the stories of the conquest of Thrace (cc. 1, 2, 12-15), the accession of Macedon (cc. 17-21), the recovery of the Propontine states and addition of Lesbos and Imbros (cc. 26, 27), carry events onwards to the eve of the Ionian revolt. The march of Dareios in the previous year forms a prelude to the operations of the Persians under Megabazos and under Otanes in Thrace (511, 510 B.C.): and the passages in Bk. 4, the scene of which is laid in Thrace, must briefly here again be taken into account, together with the passages in Bks. 5, 6, which form the natural sequel to the story.

§ 2. Throughout the Scythian Logi the king’s march through Thrace, and at least the partial subjugation of the inhabitants en route, are treated as merely ancillary to the invasion of Scythia. Thrace, as is incidentally shown in the narrative, contained two very different orders of inhabitants, native tribes and Hellenic colonists. It may be inferred (for it is not expressly recorded) that some of the Greek cities on the European side of the Hellespont, in the wider sense, had submitted to Dareios before the bridge was thrown across the Bosporos, although they are not specified among the tributaries in Bk. 3 nor yet in the Behistun inscription. In the episode laid at the Bosporos (4. 85-89) there is nothing to suggest a very recent conquest: Ariston, tyrant of Byzantion, and Miltiades, tyrant of the Chersonese, are the only tyrants on the European side mentioned in the story, but their presence guarantees to the king control of the two ends of the all-important water-way between the
Aegean and the Pontos. It is probable that Perinthos, if not already subject to Persia, was reduced at this time (cp. 4. 90 note), though no attack on it is expressly recorded: the reduction mentioned 5. 1 being correctly dated. The first reduction of the Hellespontine towns, in short, is omitted by Herodotus, even as the surrender of the Phoenicians by Kambyses is omitted, on an earlier occasion.

§ 3. Bk. 4. 90-93 carries Dareios northwards through Thrace. As the king crossed the Bosporos and reached the ‘neck’ of the Danube (c. 89) it is more than probable that his route lay well to the east of the river Hebros (cp. c. 90 notes) and that he somewhere crossed the Balkans (Haimos), though Herodotus makes no mention of the mountains. The identification of the Tearos with the Simerdere (cp. cc. 90, 91) supports that view, though the location of the Odrysae on the Arteskos en route may be an error in time, or in place (cp. notes ad l.). The character of the inscription given c. 91 may not be calculated to raise our opinion of the critical faculty in Herodotus: but it is in no way improbable that Dareios visited the springs. In c. 93 the historian distinguishes the fates of two groups of native tribes, the Kurmanian and Nipssaei, who surrendered without a blow, the Getae, who had to be reduced by force of arms. Nothing is said of the treatment of the Odrysae. The Getae may be placed between the Balkans and the Danube: the two other tribes are plainly south of the mountains. The passage may preserve a genuine memory that the country between the Bosporos and the Balkan submitted easily; while the king had to fight his way through the Balkan to the Danube.

§ 4. On these reminiscences of the more or less effective reduction of Thrace (east of the Hebros), there follows the story of the actual invasion of Scythia (to which the scene on the Danube cc. 97, 98 more intimately belongs). After delighting his hearers, or readers, with the fable of the hair-breadth escape of the great king Herodotus hurries Dareios rapidly homewards through Thrace, c. 143. Here the remarkable statement is encountered that Dareios recrossed into Asia from Europe via Sestos in the Chersonese! By what route he reached Sestos from the Danube, Herodotus does not betray. As far as the springs of the Tearos the route might have been the same as on the outward march. It is indeed surprising that Herodotus takes Dareios back to Sardes, via Sestos, without a word upon the position or treatment of Miltiades, the tyrant of Sestos, after his proposal at the Danube! Why did the king choose Sestos for his crossing? By reason of the loyalty, or of the disloyalty, of his despot? Facts recorded by Herodotus, not in this connexion, but elsewhere, and

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1 Jochmus' map, Geogr. Journal, 24, marks Dareios' passage E. of the mountains, close to the sea. Dareios might here have been in touch with the fleet; but that ill agrees with Hdt. 4. 89.
confirmed by independent tradition, explain the king’s choice. Perinthos, Byzantion, Kalchedon, were in revolt. If they had not revolted Megabazos (§ 5. 1) and Otanes (§ 5. 26 f.) would have had no need to reconquer them. Ktesias, Pers. 17 (Baehr, p. 68, Gilmore, p. 151) goes further than Herodotus, and Polyainos (7. 11, 5) gives a story of the siege and capture of Kalchedon by Dareios, which may with some plausibility be referred to the reduction by Otanes. There is little reason to doubt the loyalty of Miltiades at this moment: indeed, the subsequent fate of his eldest son (§. 41) points to a debt of gratitude owned by the great king, and perhaps incurred on this occasion. Even the very ship in which Dareios crossed from Sestos (to Abydos?), may have belonged to Miltiades. But Perinthos and other Greek towns had thrown off their yoke, and the Hebrs had marked the extreme limit of the king’s acquisitions in the west: it is, therefore, plain enough why Megabazos was left in Europe, with 80,000 men, more or less (4. 143). Some of the Greek colonies had to be recovered, and the Persian hold upon the non-Hellenic peoples maintained, and extended.

§ 5. The records of the Persian operations in Thrace between the return of Dareios to Asia and the outbreak of the Ionian revolt extend, with some interruptions, over the first twenty-seven chapters of the fifth book (§. 1-27). There are at least three very different elements in the composition of this passage, which came to Herodotus perhaps at different times, and from different sources, and which he has combined, as usual, with such skill as almost to defy detection. The passage now in question contains first, more or less dis-connectedly, the history of certain military operations and undertakings in Thrace, associated with the names of Megabazos (father of Bubares) and Otanes (son of Sisamnes), directed partly against the native, partly against the Hellenic residents in the country, conducted apparently so soon after the return of Dareios from Scythia that they were completed, or almost completed, before his departure for Susa, and apparently so far successful that at least the nominal over-lordship of the king was established in the great region between the Danube, the Aegean, the Pontos and the Strymon, and perhaps even over a larger area: secondly, there are materials for the ethnography and anthropology of the tribes and people inhabiting this region: and thirdly, there are certain stories of a more obviously literary turn, notably the stories of the Paionian girl, cc. 12, 13, and of the young men in women’s clothes, cc. 18-21, not to speak of similar but shorter anecdotes, or articles, such as the duel between the Paeonians and Perinthians (c. 1); the verdict of the Hellenodikai (c. 22); the Seat of Judgment (c. 25)—which are not even ex hypothesi direct contributions to the chronological sequence of the main story. It is almost impossible to avoid the appearance, and perhaps to some extent the reality, of arbitrary methods in the criticism of such composite passages. The final appeal must, to some extent, be left to a sort of
tact and trained judgment, and the results cannot be equally satisfactory to every mind. But what is the alternative? To abandon all notion of extracting history from the text, and to treat it as pure literature. But this counsel of despair is not really a feasible alternative, because there can be no doubt that we are dealing with an historical authority, with historical persons and events, and there is history in the solution. We are bound to extract it, with whatever admixture of other matter, more or less valuable, according to the critic's point of view. The man of letters will always have an advantage, perhaps the last word, in such cases: but the historian is within his rights and duty in attempting to classify the materials, according to the scale of historic probability.

§ 6. In dealing with the ethnography and anthropology of the Thracian tribes, as given by Herodotus, we are presented with material ex hypothesi verifiable in the historian's own time, and therefore not mere history to him. These data might have been gained by inquiry on the spot, or from eye-witnesses and travellers, or have been based on information gained at various times from various sources. It would be rash to argue from the indications afforded by his text that Herodotus had himself penetrated far into the country, or that he made no use of previous written works, or even that all this material is quite free from fancy, or opinion, and immediately available for historical and scientific purposes nowadays. No doubt the extent to which the practices or ideas described by Herodotus can be paralleled by modern instances, is favourable to his authority in the matter; still, anthropologists would do well to remember, in citing these, and other such passages, that they are not dealing with facts guaranteed by scientific travellers, or verified by anxious research. On the whole the wonder may be, considering the character of much of the history in Herodotus, that the anthropology, tested by modern methods, appears so sound. The explanation may lie in the fact, that in this respect Herodotus writes to a great extent as a contemporary. ¹ He is not, however, free from exaggeration and defect in dealing with the Thracians: his theory in respect to their politics may illustrate the one,² his account of their religion the other.³ We may suspect that Greek sentiment has touched the account of Thracian pessimism,⁴ but the account of the domestic institutions is less open to suspicion, and the description of the lake-dwellings is probably unique, as a contemporary account of that primitive European style of life.⁵

§ 7. A very much lower degree of credibility seems to attach to those passages in the delimited text which preserve stories, only too good, anecdotes only too lively: the story of the Paionian belle (5. 12, 13), the story of the young men in women's apparel (cc. 18-20),

² Cp. 5. 8 notes.
³ 5. 7 notes. 
⁴ 5. 4.
the story of the Perinthian Paian (5. 1), the anecdote of the Judgment-seat of Otanes (5. 25), and so on. That there is no historical foundation for such stories it would in general be too much to assert: but it is safe to affirm that the more obvious the motive, or moral, the more suspicious is the form, in which the history is concealed. On such principles none of these passages comes out so badly as the story of the deliverance of Macedon, or the young men in women's apparel. The story is in itself obviously incomplete, and inconsequent; it is inconsistent with admittedly historic events and situations elsewhere recorded by Herodotus himself; it has a transparent and obvious motive, or tendency, and it utilises, or incorporates, details and actions, which were already data in Greek literature and in Greek religion.\(^1\) The story which does duty as an explanation of the conquest of Paonia is not so transparently fictitious: but it is hardly more acceptable as it stands. Dareios did not require the living picture of a Paonian girl to motivate his orders for the conquest of Paonia, and the leading element in the situation had already done duty in a more plausible connexion.\(^2\) The implication that Paonian chiefs, or adventurers, co-operated in the overthrow of their country, is too much in accordance with the usual course of things to be either very probable or very improbable in the context. The story of the Perinthian Paian (5. 1) looks like an attempt to explain or qualify an historic disaster, to the making of which Herodotus has contributed little or nothing. The anecdote of the Judgment-seat of Otanes (5. 25) belongs to a class of oriental illustrations, of which there were, perhaps, collections in existence even before the days of Herodotus. The truth of such anecdotes it is hard to determine. On a different level to any of these literary and artistic gems stands the memory of Alexander's appearance at Olympia (5. 22), though there is nothing in Herodotus' mode of recording the event to betray clearly the source from which he derived it.\(^3\)

§ 8. With all these categories of events, or statements, stands contrasted the thread, or threads, of history relating to the events immediately subsequent to the return of Dareios from Europe, and contemporary with his residence at Sardes, and in part connected with it. In the record as given by Herodotus the operations of Otanes (cc. 26, 27) are placed very distinctly after those of Megabazoe, and at least in part after the departure of Dareios from Sardes.

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\(^1\) See notes \textit{ad} \textit{l.}

\(^2\) See notes to 5. 12, 13. Ed. Meyer (\textit{Forschungen}, i. 168) apparently suggests that Nic. Damasc. got the story from Herodotus, and that Constant. Porphy. misquoted Nic. Damasc. as telling the anecdote of Alyattes. I do not recognise the verbal agreement between the Fragment of Nicolas and the text of Hdt. on which Meyer bases this suggestion: on the contrary, it might be argued that the story in Hdt. has all the appearance of an improved version of an anecdote, which he may have got from the original source of the story in Nicolas. But however that may be, the story in Hdt. remains self-condemned as a fanciful account of the Persian attack on Paonia.

\(^3\) On all these items see further notes \textit{ad} \textit{il.c.}
and Otanes is represented as the official successor of Megabazos. But it is rather curious to find the Greek towns on the Bosporos left in revolt, while Megabazos, after the reduction of Perinthos, turns his arms westwards, overruns Thrace as far as the Strymon, or farther, and even receives the surrender of Macedon. The suggestion is at least permissible that the operations of Otanes were more or less contemporary with the operations of Megabazos, and that the commission issued to each had been successfully discharged before Dareios left Sardes.\footnote{Cp. Duncker, vi. 294 (E. T.).} Otanes may then have been left behind in command of an army, and this circumstance may have led to a disturbance in the historic perspective. Whether the operations of Otanes on this occasion have been at all confounded with operations of his later on, is a fair question. In that case Megabazos may have reduced other Greek towns beside Perinthos on the Hellespontine waters, and there might even be something in the tradition of a siege of Kalehedon by Dareios himself. But such questions are useful less as leading to definite results, than as showing the extremely insecure basis of tradition with which we are dealing. Still more characteristic of Herodotus’ methods is the omission of all notice of Doriskos in this context, a place elsewhere asserted, rightly or wrongly, to have been occupied by Dareios, what time he was making his expedition against the Scythbs.\footnote{7. 59 ἐν δὲ Δορίσκος ἔστι τῆς Ὀρησίας αἰγαλώς τε καὶ πέδιον μέγα, διὰ δὲ αὐτοῦ μὲν πολὺ τοῖς ἔτεσίν ἐν πόσον μεγάς ’Εβρος ἐν τῷ τεῖχος τῆς ἐκ ἐκέλευσι βασιλεύον τούτῳ τοῦ ἄθηναν εἰκόνα, καὶ Περίκλεως φημή ἐν αὐτῷ καταστάθηκε ὡς οὕτως ἐν Δαρείου ἐς ἐκείνου τοῦ χρόνου ἔπειτε ἐπὶ Σκύθας ἐπρατείνετο. The date is difficult to reconcile with the recorded movements of Dareios, and with the story of the Paionians in 5. 98 (cp. note). The last objection lies against the supposition that the fortification of Doriskos was one of the acts of Megabazos. It may be conjectured that the work was actually accomplished by Mar- douros in 492 B.C. Cp. Appendix VI. § 3 infra.}

How much time Dareios spent in Sardes after his return from Europe is not stated. Time enough at least for Megabazos to fulfil his commission to the king’s satisfaction;\footnote{5. 23.} the story of the recall of Histiaios from Myrkinos also implies a further appreciable interval.\footnote{5. 24.} Duncker with no little probability placed the historic incidents in the story of Demokedes, so far as Dareios is concerned, at this period, including the mission of the exploring party to the west, and perhaps its return.\footnote{Cp. Introduction, vol. I. p. xxxv., Appendix III. § 6.} The return of Dareios to Susa probably preceded the expulsion of Hippias from Athens, and certainly his retirement to Sigeion,\footnote{Cp. Appendix III. § 6.} but there is somewhat of a chronological lacuna unfilled between the reduction of Thrace and the affair of Naxos, which led to the Ionian revolt.

§ 9. It is obvious that the Ionian revolt cost the king his dominions in Europe. One of the first active symptoms of the movement is the return of the Paionians to their own land (5. 98), a
tradition which there seems no reason to reject, though its provenance is not obvious. The second year of the revolt witnessed the accession of Byzantion and all the other cities of the Hellespont to the cause (5. 103), a statement which covers Sestos and the Chersonese. As a matter of course, Thrace west of the Hellespont was quit of the Persian yoke for the time being, and a year or two later Aristagoras sought a city of refuge there, beyond the reach of the king's arm (5. 126). Later on Histiaios had his buccaneering headquarters at Byzantion (6. 5, 6), and it was not until the year 493 B.C. (6. 31-33) that the European side of the Hellespont was recovered for the king by the action of the Phocicians. It was then that Miltiades finally evacuated the Chersonese (6. 41), and returned to Athens: a course which seems to imply that he had forfeited the king's favour, presumably by his action, or inaction, during the Ionian revolt. It was perhaps during that revolt that Miltiades had acquired Lemnos for 'Athens' (6. 137 ff.). The expedition of Mardonios in 492 B.C. (6. 43-45) plainly recovered western Thrace and Macedonia for the king, and in the same, or the following year (cc. 44, 46), the Persian position was further secured by the reduction of Thasos.

The events thus briefly summarised belong to the history of the fifth century, and in great part to the annals of the years immediately preceding the invasion of Datis and Artaphernes, and the pragmatic tendency of the narrative, notably in the case of the record of Mardonios, does not succeed in obliterating the course of events, or disguising the fundamental fact that by the year 491 B.C. the Persian authority was firmly established in Thrace, at least upon the Hellespontine and Aegean coasts, and for some distance inland: while Macedon was for the time being a loyal vassal. The battle of Marathon did little or nothing apparently to shake the Persian authority in those regions. Lemnos must have passed out of Athenian hands—small wonder that its acquisition stood Miltiades in little stead on his second trial—he, who had gone, not to Thrace and Thasos, the land of Gold, but only to Paros, and there failed. Though civilised Egypt revolted, perhaps on the news of Marathon, Thrace and Macedon remained apparently in their obedience, and Xerxes issued his commands to the cities and nations of those parts, and made an unbroken progress through the region in 480 B.C. For some thirty years, save for the five years of the Ionian revolt, the Persian was lord of the cities and nations to the north of the Aegean.

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1 Could it have been at this time, after all, that Miltiades first evacuated the Chersonese before the advancing Scyths, i.e. Thracians? Cp. 6. 40, and notes.
2 But cp. notes ad l. c.
3 Cp. Appendix VI. §§ 3, 4 infra.
4 Cp. Appendix XI.
APPENDIX V

THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE IONIAN REVOLT


§ 1. The point of departure for determining the chronology of the Ionian revolt must be found in the statement of Herodotus, that the capture of Miletos took place in the sixth year from the rebellion of Aristogoras (ἐκ τοῦ ἐκτείνοντος τῆς Ἀριστογόρου τῆς Ἀρσενάκτης 6. 18). Subsequent indications enable the chronologist to fix the capture of Miletos to the (late) autumn of the year 494 B.C. according to our reckoning; for it is recorded that the winter following the surrender of Miletos was passed on the spot by the king's forces (6. 31), and from that point onward to the battle of Marathon the operations of the Persians are clearly marked year by year in such a way as to establish the chronological sequence and intervals from Marathon, a fixed and ascertained point in 490 B.C., back to the winter 494/3 B.C. Thus the campaign of 490 B.C. opens 6. 94: the events of 491 B.C. begin with 6. 46. The acts of Mardonios in 492 B.C. are recorded 6. 43-45. The operations of 493 B.C. are contained in 6. 31-42 (omitting the digression, cc. 34-40). The winter preceding 493/4 B.C. takes the narrative back to the point of departure, which is thus fixed to the autumn of 494 B.C. But from that point upwards the chronological indications are more obscure. This obscurity arises in part from the fact that, although the given date for the capture of Miletos assumes apparently at least five years of warfare, yet in the course of the narrative little or no account is taken of that assumption, and no conscious effort made to distribute the events recorded over the five or six years implied between the termēnī.

§ 2. In order, therefore, to determine the inner as well as the objective chronology of the Ionian revolt these three problems must be resolved: I. what event marks the 'apostasy of Aristogoras,' in
APP. V §§ 1-5 THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE IONIAN REVOLT 63

‘the sixth year’ from which the reduction of Miletos took place? II. How is the ‘sixth year’ computed by Herodotus? III. How are the campaigns, battles, and other events, which are comprised in the story, or stories, of the Ionian revolt, chronologically distributed over the interval, between the ‘apostasy of Aristogoras’ and the capture of Miletos? And, in so far as that distribution is unsatisfactory, how is it to be amended?

§ 3. I. What event or act marks (or is to be identified with) the apostasis of Aristogoras? The terminology of Herodotus leaves little room for doubt as to the answer to this problem. The circumstances of the event in question are recorded in Bk. 5, cc. 36-38, and comprise in especial the seizure of the medising tyrants at Myus, where the fleet, which had operated against Naxos, was still to be found, and the general expulsion of tyrants in the city-states (τυράννων κατάταξις), which immediately ensued: οὕτω δὴ ἐκ τοῦ ἐμφανῶς ὁ Ἀριστογόρης ἀπετέλεσε (5. 37). In view of the marked coincidence of language there can be no doubt that the τυράννων κατάταξις is dated by Herodotus to the sixth year before the capture of Miletos in 494 B.C. and is practically identical with the ἀπόστασις Ἀριστογόρηως.

§ 4. II. How is the sixth year computed by Herodotus? It might seem self-evident that when two events are named together, one of which is stated to have occurred ‘in the sixth year after’ the other, the years so indicated are determined by the terminal events themselves. Thus, if the capture of Miletos occurred in the autumn or early winter of the year 494 B.C., the ‘apostasy of Aristogoras’ would, on this principle, fall into the sixth autumn previously, that is, reckoning inclusively, the autumn of the year 499 B.C. As a matter of fact that is the date to be adopted in the case: but it is doubtful whether the years were so reckoned and determined. Had they been so determined, we should presumably have found the intervening events dated with reference to the two termini: but throughout the story of the Ionian revolt no use is made of the two terminal events for chronological purposes. Moreover, the extreme difficulty of filling in the interval, or spreading the record over five or six years, seems to show that the period between the two termini was not fixed by a full, accurate or precise chronicle of the interval. The intervening years are not precisely marked, either by reference to the terminal events, or by reference to any other standard, such for example as five or six well-remembered successive campaigns: otherwise our third problem could hardly exist. It follows that the precise date given by Herodotus must have been arrived at by some external standard, and not derived from the inner record of the war itself.

§ 5. Such external standard can have been supplied only by a civil calendar, and if one calendar more than another is likely to have been the basis of the computation, the presumption is in favour of the Attic calendar (cp. 1. 32), in view as well of the subject and probable sources of the story, as of the date of its redaction by
Herodotus.\(^1\) We may suppose that in Athenian tradition or other sources it was known that the Archon, in the first half of whose year Miletos was taken by the Persians, and in the second half of whose year the Μίλητον ἄλωρις of Phrynichos\(^2\) was presented in the theatre, 6. 21, was the sixth name, reckoned of course inclusively, from the Archon in whose year Aristagoras had expelled the tyrants from the Ionian cities, and come to Athens to seek and find support for the Ionians in their rising against the Persian king. The same official year would of course cover the despatch of Melanthios with his twenty ships (5. 97, 99), and even the march to Sardes: but the hypothesis that the 'sixth year' is a datum drawn from the Athenian calendar, and from an Athenian source, goes some way towards explaining the indistinctness which characterises the distribution of events between the two given chronological termini. It will subsequently appear that the result is the same whether the six years be reckoned from the two extreme events, or by reference to the Athenian Archons, but this result must be regarded as accidental, and the chronological problem resolves itself into the direction to distribute the events recorded over six Archontic years.

§ 6. III. Before doing so, it would, however, be well to examine the inner chronological indications supplied by the record itself: or in other words to solve the problem in its first form, viz. how are the events of the Ionian revolt distributed by the historian over the interval between his two chronological termini?

The nature of the subject, the manner in which the years are marked for the campaigns of 493 B.c. (6. 31), 492 B.C. (6. 43 ἄπα ἄπα τῆς ἀράτης), 491 B.C. (6. 46), 490 B.C. (6. 94), and the analogy supplied by the story of the great war in Bks. 7, 8, 9 might lead us to expect that, so far as Herodotus had a clear chronological perspective of the Ionian revolt, the years would be reckoned from spring to spring, the season marking year by year the resumption of active hostilities, particularly at sea, and that the events would be clearly distributed over five campaigning years. A scrutiny of the portions of the text bearing on the Ionian revolt supports the contention that the natural chronology of the story anticipates the method of Thucydidcs, but that Herodotus has not consciously or systematically employed that method in this matter. The successive campaigns and operations presumably opened with the sailing and marching season, and notably the mission of the Athenians under Melanthios 5. 99, and the expedition to Kypros 5. 108, but the chronological fact is not explicitly recorded. Nor is it possible to distribute the events recorded of the period between the apostasis of Aristagoras and the capture of Miletos so as to fill continuously five campaigning seasons. The years are not indicated during the interval between the termini, and synchronisms are barely suggested.

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\(^2\) On the supposed title of the drama cp. Introd. § 21, vol. I.
The ‘year’ (ἐτῶν) of Cypriote freedom (5. 116) is not clearly attached to any epoch, and the vague chronological reference at the beginning of c. 108 seems to serve rather a literary than a scientific purpose. A similar touch in c. 117 would be more useful, if we could know for certain how long after the event the news from Karia reached Daurises on the Hellespont. A sequence, and a chronological order, obtain among the stories of the revolt, and at some points, as in the account of the end of Histiaios, the indications of time allow us to determine a chronology with considerable assurance: but for the most part, the operations are grouped in geographical rather than in chronological order, and while the scenes are well defined, Ionias, Hellespont, Kypros, and so on, the sequences and the synchronisms are largely matters of conjecture. The literary analysis of the story, as told by Herodotus, might even suggest that the whole body of military operations, comprised in the Ionian revolt, occupied three campaigning seasons and no more: 1. Into the first would fall the expedition to Sardes, and the battle of Ephesos (5. 99-102). 2. In the second might be placed the campaign in Kypros (5. 108-115), and the campaign in Karia etc. (5. 116-123). 3. Into the third should be placed the battle of Lade, and the capture of Mileto (6. 6-18). But this scheme is wrecked, so far as its chronological hull is concerned, on the rock of the one irresistible date given by Herodotus for the Ionian revolt, viz. the ‘sixth year,’ 6. 18, which necessitates five years between the revolt of Aristagoras and the capture of Mileto, in 494 B.C. Are we to suppose that two campaigning seasons have simply dropped out of the record, without leaving a trace? Or are we to suppose that there were actually two seasons, during which military operations were absolutely suspended? Either hypothesis is so unlikely that we must acquiesce in the remaining alternative and seek some redistribution or temporal extension of the events, which shall leave no natural year between the two terminal events wholly unrepresented in the narrative.¹

§ 7. The first campaign is so clearly marked to the first year of the war (Sardes, Ephesos), the war in Kypros is so clearly fixed at a year’s, or a season’s, duration, and the last season’s operations (Lade, Mileto) are so obviously contained within a single year of our reckoning B.C., that there are only two passages, or groups of events, left where a chronological extension can be given to the scheme above

¹ It is, of course, more than possible that Herodotus has failed to record all the fighting. Grote (lil. 500) accepts the tradition (Plutarch, Mor. 86) that Mileto was invested before the coming of the Athenians, and that the march to Sardes raised the siege. Still more probable must it seem that the operations of the Ionian fleet are not fully recorded. There was, perhaps, a victory off Pamphylia in the year 498 B.C. (cp. Plutarch, I. c.) which ushered in the Cypriote year of freedom. The fleet is accounted for below in the first, second, and fifth campaigns, but the third and fourth are practically a blank. The intrigues and adventures of Histiaios might help to explain, as they certainly exhibit and imply some remissness of the Ionian fleet after the victory off Kypros. See further, note ad fin.
indicated: the first passage is the record of the land operations of
the Persians on the Hellespont, Propontis, in the Troad, in Ionia, and
in Caria (5. 116-123); the second is the passage recording the
adventures of Histiaios from his reappearance to Sardes as his
occupation of Byzantium (6. 1-5). The following reconstruction is of
course hypothetical, but cannot be overruled by appeal to the chrono-
logical indications in 5. 103, 108, 116, for these indications are
themselves certainly vague, and probably hypothetical, i.e. results of
combination or inference on the part of Herodotus (or his authorities)
and not explicit tradition, such as preserved the 'sixth year.' Even
the year (ἀναφόρος) of Kyprian freedom is a datum as likely to be due to
inference as to tradition, though the fact may have been inferred
correctly. It is, however, obvious that, in regard to the two passages
above cited, dramatic unity, based in the one case on topography and
military significance, in the other case on the personality of Histiaios,
may have obliterated the temporal perspective. The campaigns in the
first case are certainly sufficient to fill more than one season, in
accordance with the polemic methods of the age and peoples. The
anecdotal and biographical passage which opens Bk. 6, seems to cover
and suggest political intrigues and combinations, at Sardes and in the
Ionian states, taking the place for a season of active hostilities. The
connexion of the ταραχῆς περὶ Σάρδος, of the hopes of Histiaios, of the
attempt on Miletos, of his subsequent relations to Chios, Lesbos, and
'the Ionians' (c. 26), with each other, and with the course of the
revolt, is not clear; but it is fairly obvious that Histiaios played a
considerable, though ill-remembered or ill-understood, rôle in the course
of events, and after the deaths of four Persian generals, and the
detection of a dangerous political intrigue against the satrap, if not
against the king, in Sardes, a campaigning season may well have
slipped by in Ionia without very much in the way of large military
operations to show for it. Assuming, then, that the military oper-
tions under Darius, Hymas and Otanès (5. 116-123) occupied more
than one season, and that the biographical passage (6. 1-6) represents
another season, we may recover the following perspective of the events,
which is at once chronologically and materially plausible, and we
may construct in tabular form, as given below, the chronological frame
for the whole period, consistently with the major indications in the
narrative of Herodotus, even if the minor indications leave us in doubt
how far he anticipated, or would endorse, this clearer representation of
the eventual chronology.

§ 8. The 'revolt of Aristagoras' is marked by the expulsion of
the Tyrants (τυράννων κατάταξας 5. 38) and must be dated imme-
diately after the return from Naxos (5. 36). This event falls
obviously in the autumn of the year 499 B.C., some four months (5. 34)
after the start (in spring). The visits of Aristagoras to Sparta and
Athens may be placed in the winter. The escape of the Άιλος
(5. 98) is dated after the revolt (ὦν γὰρ Ἰωνίας πάντα ἄπτετοικε ἀπὸ
§§ 7, 8 THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE IONIAN REVOLT

βασιλέως), after the return of Aristagoras from Athens to Miletos, but before the arrival of the Athenian and Eretrian ships: it therefore occurred in the early spring of 498 B.C. The march to Sardes, and the events following, including the defeat of the Ionians at Ephesos, are the events of the first campaign. The attitude and intentions of the Ionians were no secret, for preparations had been made to anticipate them (προσπροσπέρημεν ταῦτα οἱ Πέρσαι κτλ. 5. 102), but the Persian garrison barely saved the Sardian acropolis, and the blow inflicted on the Ionians at Ephesos cannot have been a very severe one: perhaps it fell mainly on the men from Athens and Eretria: anyway, it did not check the spread of the revolt, which quickly reached from Byzantion to Kypros—the two constant termini of such movements in later days likewise. Karia joins the revolt after the burning of Sardes has shown that the Ionians 'mean business' (v. 103); how long after, unfortunately Herodotus does not specify, and it may here be fairly questioned whether the accession of Karia should be dated before the succeeding spring, 497 B.C. The Karians who joined the movement do not appear to have included (καὶ Ἐλλήνων ταύτην τήν χώρην οἰκεῖον) the Hellenes, i.e. the Dorians, settled in Karia, 1. 174, nor is anything much more remarkable in the whole story of the revolt than the fact that not a word is said of the Dorians, and their attitude to the movement. The date at which Kypros revolted was presumably before the taking of Sardes, or before the news reached Kypros: for the seizure of Salamis by Onesios is dated ὡς καὶ τοὺς Ἰωνας ἐνέδειξεν δραπέταιναι 5. 104, and may be placed in the summer of the first campaigning season: the same point is reached by reckoning back from the death of Onesios, and the Persian reconquest of Kypros. The scene laid at Susa (5. 105-107) would presumably be in the winter after the burning of Sardes, i.e. after the first campaign, though τὰ πρὸ τῶν ναυσιν, the vow of Dæreios, is probably an Athenian anecdote. The synchronism attempted by Herodotus between the items recorded in this passage and the campaign in Kypros (5. 108 ff.) can only be admitted to a limited extent. Onesios may have been besieging Amathus while the news of the burning of Sardes was on its way to Susa, though we need not allow three months (5. 50) for the courier-service (cp. 8. 98). The mission of Histiaios and his journey down to Sardes are apparently placed in the summer of the second campaigning season, and thus synchronise with the warfare in Kypros: but of that, anon. The advent of Artybios, the despatch of the Ionian fleet must surely belong to the spring and summer of the second season, 497 B.C. The year (εἰςαυτός) of Kyprian freedom must, on this showing, be dated from about the time of the capture of Sardes to the death of Onesios. Soli was besieged four months more and taken (πᾶς τὸν ἔμφασιν) c. 115. Whether these four months are included in the year or not makes no difference to the general scheme: probably they are not.

The land operations of Daurises on the Hellespont seem to be
dated immediately after the battle of Ephesos, 5. 116. But on
general and strategic grounds they may more probably be placed
after the winter. If the whole operations of Daurises (and his
colleagues) lasted, as might appear for all said by Herodotus, no more
than one season, they would synchronise with the campaign of
Artybios in Kypros (5. 108-115 = 116-123). But it may well be
doubted whether the two great battles, on the Marsyas, and at
Labraunda, were fought in one and the same summer, not to speak of
the night engagement of which Herakleides, son of Ibanollis, was the
hero (c. 121). The operations of Hymeas in the Troad are made
synchronous with those of Daurises in Karia (5. 122). One thing is
obvious. A great plan was concocted at Sardes, during the first
winter following the outbreak of the war, by Artaphrenes assisted
presumably by Daurises, Hymeas, Otanes, for the recovery of the
Propontis, Hellespont, Aiolis, and Ionia. According to this plan
three Persian armies were apportioned, under the command of
Daurises, Hymeas, and Otanes, respectively, for the recovery of the
coast lands from the Propontis to Ionia. The Bosporos apparently
lies outside the sphere of these operations: Byzantium is unassailable
without a fleet. As Karia does not appear to have been included in
the plan it may be fairly conjectured that the Karians openly
revolted in the second spring, or campaigning season (cp. cc. 117, 103).
The battle of the Marsyas (c. 119) may be placed in the second
summer, about a year after the burning of Sardes, and about the same
time as the double engagement in Kypros. The crushing defeat of
the ‘Karians’ by Daurises, the operations of Otanes in Ionia, the
refusal of the Athenians to send out further help, or join the second
campaign (c. 103), may help to explain: i. the flight of Aristagoras
(5. 124-126); ii. the return of the fleet from Kypros (5. 115), two
events which may approximately synchronise. Meanwhile Histiaios
is coming down from Suss (5. 108, 6. 1); but how long he was en
route, or the precise dates of departure and arrival, are not specified.
His presence might well be dispensed with for some time, and his
journey down to Sardes placed in the following summer (496 B.C.), in
which case he may have arrived soon after the second crushing defeat
in Karia, at Labraunda, in which the Milesians are involved (5. 120).
In that case we might the better understand the question addressed
to him (6. 3). The death of Daurises (5. 121) might explain some
laxitude in the prosecution of the war in the fourth campaign,
the record of which is virtually a blank. The Persians at Sardes
await the tardy mustering of a fleet, which is to include Phoenician,
Egyptian, Kilikian, and Kyprian vessels (6. 6), and may have taken
some two years to prepare. Political intrigue may for a time have
taken the place of active warfare, and the fourth season may have left

1 Especially if, with Grote, we admit that Aristagoras, on his return from Athens to Ionia, “found the Persians engaged in the <first> siege of Mileta.”
little impression upon tradition except in the memory of the Protean rôle played by Histiaios about this time (6. 1-5). The fifth campaigning season is fully covered by the naval operations, which centre at Lade and culminate at Miletos (6. 6 ff.), while Histiaios is clearly placed at Byzantion during this summer and autumn (6. 26). The annals of the next season open clearly in c. 31, but the death of Histiaios, though narrated previously and independently (cc. 28-30), evidently occurred after the advance of the Persian fleet from Miletos in the spring of 493 B.C., for it is subsequent to his blockade of Thasos, which he raises in consequence of the news ὧν οἱ Φοίνικες ἀπεστάλησι ἐκ τῆς Μιλήτου ἐπὶ τὴν ἄλλην Ἴωνήν, c. 28.

§ 9. The following scheme exhibits the chronology as reconstructed upon the lines above indicated. The determining datum is the statement that Miletos was captured in the ‘sixth year’ from the revolt of Aristogoras (6. 18, 5. 37). The years thus indicated are assumed to be the years of the Attic calendar, in connexion with which it was remembered, or recorded, that six Archons marked the interval between the alliance with Aristogoras, or the commission of Melanthios (5. 97) and the ‘capture of Miletos’ (6. 18, 21). The campaigning years do not coincide with the Calendarian years, but five campaigns, or campaigning seasons, intervene between the two terminal events, which again would place the latter in the sixth year after the former, although the interval cannot, for reasons above given, be clearly inferred from the story of warfare, or even clearly verified in it; and therefore cannot be supposed to have been inferred or constructed from it.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>493 B.C.</td>
<td>Failure at Naxos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>492 B.C.</td>
<td>Aristogoras in Sparta, and in Athens.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>490 B.C.</td>
<td>Deepash of Athenian fleet. [Victory off Pamphylia.]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>489 B.C.</td>
<td>Burning of Sardis. Battle of Ephesos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>488 B.C.</td>
<td>Spread of the revolt from Kypros to Byzantion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>487 B.C.</td>
<td>Refusal of Athens to send further aid (5. 103).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>486 B.C.</td>
<td>Daurises on the Hellepont.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>485 B.C.</td>
<td>Revolt in Karia. Campaign in Kypros.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>484 B.C.</td>
<td>Battle of the Maresias.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>483 B.C.</td>
<td>Flight of Aristogoras.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>482 B.C.</td>
<td>End of the revolt in Kypros: capture of Soli (?)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The dates given for the failure of Aristogoras at Ennae Holoi by Thucyd. 4. 102 confirm the date above given for the flight of Aristogoras from Miletos. cp. Clinton, Fasti, ad ann. 497, 465, 437, and his Appendices v. ix.
Ol. 71.
Archon iv.
(Hipparchos.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Season</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Summer</td>
<td>Battle of Labraunda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autumn</td>
<td>Battle of Mylassa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winter</td>
<td>Intrigues at Sardes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spring</td>
<td>495 B.C.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ol. 71, 2.
Archon v.
(Philippos.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Season</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Summer</td>
<td>The adventures of Histiaios.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autumn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spring</td>
<td>484 B.C.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ol. 71, 3.
Archon vi.
(Pythokritos.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Season</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Summer</td>
<td>Battle of Lade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autumn</td>
<td>Capture of Miletos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winter</td>
<td>Histiaios at Byzantium.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spring</td>
<td>493 B.C.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes.—The chronology of the Ionian war as reconstructed by Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.*, ii. pp. 30 ff., differs considerably from the above scheme. Busolt compresses into the first year of the war 498 B.C. the march to Sardes, the operations of the Ionian fleet in the Hellespont and Byzantium, the revolt of Karia, the movement of the fleet to Kypros, the double battle of Salamis, and the Persian reduction of the island (winter of 498/7 B.C.). Meanwhile, in the summer of that same year 498 B.C. the operations of Daures, Artaphernes and Otanes are proceeding successfully, and before the year's end the battles of the Marystas and of Labraunda have been lost and won. Nor is that all. Aristagoras has fled, and met his fate. Daures is no more, and Histiaios is in Sardes, before the end of the same year. At this pace the Persians are ready to invest Miletos, by sea and by land, in the spring of the year 497 B.C. The siege of Miletos begins in the autumn of 497 B.C. and lasts three years. Busolt treats the record in Herodotus as complete, and uses the scenes laid in Susa as bases for sound chronology, e.g. an expedition was ready to start against Kypros, when *Darius heard of the burning of Sardes*, Hist. 5, 108, therefore the revolt of Kypros must be dated to 499/8 B.C. (op. c. p. 35, note 2; cp. p. 36, note 1). If the siege of Miletos had lasted three years we should surely have known it. If the Ionians put all that into the first campaigning season the year 498 B.C. was indeed an *anni mirabilia* : the Hellenes in 480 B.C. *et seq.* take things much more slowly. If the naval operations in the Hellespont and the victory off Kypros belong to the first year of the war, where were the Athenians? With this Appendix should, of course, be compared the notes on the text, where details are discussed as they arise.
APPENDIX VI

ANNALS OF THE TRIENNIA 493-491 B.C.

§ 1. Delimitation of the connected narrative of the Persian operations. § 2. Annals of the year 493 B.C. (i. the recovery of the Hellespont; ii. the ordinances of Artaphernes). § 3. Annals of the year 492 B.C. (i. the expedition of Mardonios; ii. the omitted story of Macedon). § 4. Annals of the year 491 B.C. (i. the treatment of Thasos; ii. the mission of the Heralds). § 5. Was Herodotus the original author of this chronicle?

§ 1. THE annals of these years, a full triennium, are given in accordance with the natural periods for naval or military operations, and may be conceived as extending from spring to spring (cp. 6. 31, 43, and Appendix V. § 6 supra). The connected chronicle is, however, much interrupted over this portion of the text by digressions and insets. The references for the continuous story are as follows:—

Bk. 6. 31-33, 41, 42 = events of 493 B.C.
6. 43-45 = " 492 B.C.
6. 46, 48-51, 61, 64-66, 73 = " 491 B.C.

The present Appendix deals with the continuous chronicle: the more important digressions demand separate treatment.

§ 2. 493 B.C. Into the spring and summer of this year fall the reduction of the islands Chios, Lesbos, Tenedos (c. 31), and of the European side of the Hellespont (c. 33) effected by the Phoenicians; the death of Histiaios (cc. 28-30), the escape of Miltiades (c. 41, cp. c. 104), and capture of his first-born Metiochos; the flight of the Byzantines and Kalchedonians, and their settlement in Mesambria (c. 33), with other incidents of the recovery of the coasts from the Hellespont to the Bosporos. In the meanwhile, or in the winter, may be dated the ordinances of Artaphernes, recorded in c. 42.

The temporary liberation of the Hellespont, as of Thrace and Macedon (cp. Appendix IV. § 9 supra), was fruit of the Ionian revolt, and almost pure gain to the cause of Hellas. The reappearance of the Phoenician fleet in these waters, for generations past dominated by Hellenic settlements, revives a forgotten terror in the hearts of the Greek. Among the unrecorded causes which prepared the Ionic revolt,
may have been a recrudescence of the old commercial rivalry between
Ionian and Phoenician, the importance of Tyre and Sidon reviving
somewhat under Persian auspices. Anyway, Ionia’s extremity was
Phoecinia’s opportunity. The same terror which sent the men of
Byzantion and Kalchedon flying eastward, caused Miltiades to hurry
homeward, if home it could be called, to Athens (c. 41); but the
reception extended to Metiochos by the great king ill accords with the
false loyalty of the father, the story of which procured his acquittal
from an Athenian dikastery (cp. 4. 137 ff. Appendices III., IV.). In
what year exactly the first trial of Miltiades (6. 104) is to be placed,
seems doubtful. If he reached Athens in 493 B.C., the trial might
have taken place in the following winter, or spring: but it is possible
to maintain that, even if he left the Chersonese in 493 B.C., he only
reached Athens in 491 B.C. He had friends, as well as enemies,
among the Thracians.

On the question of the ordinances of Artaphernes (c. 42) assigned
to this year, something has been said in the notes ed l. The apparent
contradiction, or inconsequence, between the vague report in c. 32 of
the severities inflicted on the Ionian states by the Persian generals,
and the precise report in c. 42 of the benefits conferred by Artaphernes,
admits of explanations so many and so obvious as to be almost
embarrassing. The severities and the benefits are in all probability
both alike exaggerated. The treatment of all states may not have
been identical, indeed a natural distinction is drawn between the case
of islanders and the case of mainlanders. The Phoenicians on the
fleat may have left anything but an agreeable memory behind. The
contrast and the comparison with the Athenian régime permeate
and affect both passages alike, as a subauditum. The statement of
Herodotus that the ordinances of Artaphernes were maintained down
to his own day (αἰών τῆς καὶ εἴς ἐπέ) is embarrassed by the verb τὸ πρόεστος.
Without it the phrase might, perhaps, be explained as referring to the
birth or youth of the writer, in fact to the whole period down to the
battle of the Eurymedon (c. 465 B.C.), when presumably the Ionian and
Karian towns were liberated from the Persian tribute, and joined the
Delian League. The passage can hardly be supposed to have been
written before that date. On the other hand after 454 B.C., after the
disaster in Egypt and transfer of the treasury to Athens, still more
after the death of Kimon, and under the demagogia of Perikles, many
of the towns on the mainland probably lapsed again to the Persian.
The statement of Herodotus need mean no more than that at the date
of writing (ὁμαναλοίωτος) those towns in Ionia (or Karia) which were
now and again under the Persian, paid tribute according to the
assessment of Artaphernes. Incidentally this statement may seem to
condone the policy of Athens. (See further, notes ed l.)

In this connexion an omission remains to be observed, which
involves, among other points, the constantly-recurring problem of the
relation of Herodotus and his work to the life and work of Hekataios.
A fragment in Diodoros 1 ascribes to Hekataios of Miletos a prominent and successful mission to Artaphernes, in connexion with the re-organisation of Ionia, and apparently transfers to Artaphernes the restoration of autonomy to the city-states, which Herodotus has ascribed to Mardonios (6. 43). It is possible that the passage of Diodoros may be based upon the authority of Hekataios himself, directly or indirectly: in any case there is nothing suspicious or historically unacceptable in it. On the contrary, it is easier to explain the disappearance, or disarrangement, of the episode in the Herodotean record, than to account for its introduction, if unauthentic, by Diodoros. It is to be feared that Herodotus was not zealous to promote the fame of Hekataios: and irrespective of any personal feeling, a passage recalling the Persian amnesty, and the good-will of the Ionians in return, would not be in harmony with the strong Athis in the annals of this period, as preserved by Herodotus. Our historian prefers to remind his readers that Artaphernes destroyed the local autonomies of Ionia, and reassessed the tributes, reserving for Mardonios, with great improbability, the privilege of establishing democracies in Ionia, and dropping all mention of Hekataios and his services in the matter.

§ 3. The annals of the year 492 B.C. are given by Herodotus 6. 43-45, that is to say, the acts and events recorded in this passage must, in accordance with the chronological scheme underlying this part of his narrative, be assigned to the year 492 B.C. The record simply comprises the work and the failure of Mardonios, who here appears for the first time on the stage of Greek history. The name of Mardonios was well, and for good cause, remembered in Athenian tradition. On the political achievement ascribed to him, the establishment of "Democracies" in Ionia, and its bearing on the later situation created by Athenian primacy, as well as upon the relation of the passage to Bk. 3. 80 ff., and other points, enough is said in the Notes ad l. The short story of his military expedition (cc. 43-45) is transparently tendensiosus, pragmatic. It is admitted, indeed, that Mardonios, as supreme commander of fleet and army, recovered the European main, Thrace and Macedon, to which the Ionian revolt would seem to have restored liberty for a while, and that he added the island of Thasos to the Persian dominions. Yet the net result of the expedition is represented as failure and disgrace, and partly by what is said, partly by what is suppressed, the balance-sheet of the account proves Mardonios bankrupt. But the auditors have still some remarks to make.

(1) The partial wreck of the fleet off Athos is not in itself improb-

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1 10. 25, 2 'Εκαταιος δ' Μιλέτου προε-
βευτην ἐκπέμπειν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἰωνίων ἱπτή-
τες δε' ἡ ἀπίαν ἀπενεκτέναι αὐτόν ἐλπίζο-
ἀφείνει. τοῦ δὲ ἐνέκυκλον, μη τοὺς ὑπὸ-
τὰς ἐκαταληκτέντας κακῶς ἐπέθευ μάχῃ-
κακῶσις. Οὐκοῦν, ἐφησεν, εἰ τοῦ ἑπτο-
θῆσαν καὶ τὴν ἀπιστίαν περιτοί, τὸ-

"Without guaranteeing the ip-
sissa verba of the reported dialogue, one might still accept the fact of the embassy."
able, but the scale of the disaster is exaggerated. Herodotus himself suggests this criticism by his sceptical hint λέγεται γὰρ ὁ c. 44. (2) The successful skirmishing of the Brygi, and the wound of Mardonios, have nothing improbable in them, except the obvious intention to cover Mardonios with confusion. Herodotus himself declares that Mardonios remained in Thrace until he had subdued the Brygi (c. 45). (3) The magnitude of the fiasco is heightened by the utter failure to reach the proper goal of the expedition, Athens and Eretria. But the prominence of Athens and Eretria is surely a pragmatic exaggeration, traceable to the same source as the bow and arrow story (τὰ περὶ τὸ τόξον 5. 105), and to some extent qualified and corrected by the immediate context, where it appears that Eretria and Athens were after all the limit of the commission of Mardonios, which amounted to a carte blanche for the wholesale reduction of the Hellenic city-states. The major exaggeration cancels the minor. In truth this expedition which succeeded within a single campaign in recovering Thrace and Macedon for the great king, and in adding the wealthy Thasos to the list of Persian tributaries, can hardly have been pronounced a disgraceful fiasco at the Persian court. Rather might it appear that the young grandee had on the whole successfully discharged his mission. His disappearance from the scene for some ten years may have been due rather to his success than to his failure: though his wound, or his wedding (placed by Herodotus before the European expedition), may help to account for his retirement. In any case Artaphernes and his son had claims on the king even stronger than the son of Gobryas.

The problem of omission is more complicated and perplexing. It is plain that Macedonia, now in 492 B.C. in the hands of Alexander, was on this occasion incorporated, or rather re-incorporated, in the Persian empire. Herodotus in Bk. 7. c. 9 puts into the mouth of Mardonios the assertion of his unopposed advance to the threshold of Hellas; the speech may be purposely cast in a braggart mould, yet the express testimony of this passage (τὸ τῆς ἀντιτάξεις ἐπιγραφῆς ἦν ἡ κεντράντα, ἡκατοντάρχης 6. 44) confirms the boast. The fact has received some further confirmation from the discovery of Macedonian and Thracian tribute coins of this date in the bed of the Tigris. (So Duncker, vii. 5 104, but cp. B. Head, Hist. Num. p. 193.) In any case it is here distinctly asserted, and in somewhat strong language. The total omission of any mention of Alexander is all the more surprising in the light of the story told above, 5. 17 ff. (Op. Appendix IV. § 7 supra.) What seals on this occasion the lips of our historian? Were his sources here silent? Or had he personal reasons for reticence?

Whatever the attitude and conduct of Alexander may have been some seventeen or eighteen years previously, it is evident that in 492

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1 To this year might perhaps be referred the effective occupation of Doriskos 599; cp. Appendix IV. § 8 supra. Mardonios must at least have recovered the fort.
Mardonios had easy work with Macedon. Whether Alexander was already linked with the Athenians on the one hand (cp. 8., 136, 5. 94) and with the Persians on the other (cp. 8. 136, 5. 21), whether his Hellenic descent had been already recognised (5. 22) are matters of conjecture. When Herodotus came to record the annals of 492 B.C. there was probably no tradition of any resistance to the Persian on the part of the Macedonian king. The Hellenic ruler may be here implicitly contrasted with his Macedonian subjects, yet it cannot be said that the phraseology (δούλος προσεκτήσαντο) is philo-Macedonian, and to suppose that Herodotus is deliberately suppressing a record of the Macedonian compact with Persia is superfluous in the light of his admissions elsewhere. It has been argued from the phrase τὰ ἱερὰ Μακεδονῶν ἔθνα that Herodotus derives his information in this passage from an Asiatic source. The argument is over-subtle. The phrase is natural from the intrinsic standpoint of the narrative, which carries Mardonios from Kilikia to Ionia, from Ionia to the Hellespont, from the Hellespont to Ateus: to say nothing of the native standpoint of the historian himself. The record of Mardonios' work in the year 492 B.C. is saturated with Athenian self-interest and self-importance. The establishment of democracies in Ionia, the goal of Mardonios' long journey, the enslavement of the nations, including the Brygi, and possibly other touches in the narrative betray an Athenian source: and the interests of Athens and the Athenian settlements in the northern Aegean render it not improbable that even traditions preserved in loco would be infected with an Attic tinge.

§ 4. In the annals of the year 491 B.C. there is less to perplex the modern reader, although both what is recorded, and what is here, in Bk. 6, omitted, alike present some difficult problems, as well in regard to the objective order of events, as in regard to the composition of the historian's record. The notice of the surrender of Thasos (6. 46) reads strangely after the notice of its submission to Mardonios in the previous year. It might perhaps be argued that the subsequent disasters to Mardonios had inspired the Thasians with a hope of recovering their liberty: but those disasters are, as shown above, exaggerated in the story, and the continued loyalty of the neighbouring states (ἄπτυχοτέρων), the ready submission of the Thasians to the king's anonymous messenger (ἄγγελον) conveying the king's verbal command (βασιλεία καλεώντα) seem to show how little danger was to be apprehended from Thasos. The development of Thasian power noticed in c. 46 can hardly be immediately subsequent to the surrender to Mardonios in 492 B.C. (c. 44), and is indeed expressly referred back to the blockade by Histiaios in the spring of 493 B.C. (cp. 6. 28). The record in c. 46 seems to refer more properly to a date long before the advance of Mardonios, unless it be a duplication of the surrender to Mardonios

1 The mention of Histiaios in c. 46, though apparently referring to the blockade of 493 B.C., might suggest that the efforts of the Thasians to develop their powers offensive and defensive went back to the date of the occupation of Myrkins, 5. 11 (511 B.C.).
already recorded. If so, it would probably be the result of a duplication in the sources. If the account of the surrender to Mardonios in c. 44 is from one source, and that source an Athenian, the account of the surrender to the king’s messenger, in c. 46, may be from another source, and that source not Athenian. The immediate context, c. 47, proves a personal visit to Thasos by Herodotus. It may, therefore, be legitimately suggested that the record in c. 46 is from Thasian tradition (cp. δεσμαλήθησαν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀττικέσθων), and it may fairly be argued that it refers to the first surrender of the Thasians to the king, which was perhaps identical with the submission to Mardonios.

In the story of the mission of the heralds to Greece (c. 48), the appeal of Athens to Sparta against Aigina (c. 49), and the extradition of the Aiginetan hostages (cc. 50, 73) by Sparta to Athens, we seem at first sight to have a genuine historical record: but the omission in this context of any notice of the conduct of the Athenians and Spartans recorded elsewhere (7. 133), the difficulty of finding room for the elaborate intrigues of Kleomenes and Leotychides and the deposition of Demaratos during this single summer (cc. 51, 61, 64-66), and the serious doubts as to the chronology of the Aigineto-Athenian wars, lay the record in this passage open to suspicion. If Persian heralds were sent to Athens in the year 491 B.C., their ultimatum must have included a demand for the restoration of Hippias, though even the story of Marathon does not expressly record this aspect of the case. Such a demand had been already made and rejected at Athens (5. 94), and meanwhile the Athenians had taken part in the Ionian revolt against the king. The notion that the king now sends pacific messengers to Athens is inconsistent with the traditions, no doubt pragmatic, but not more pragmatic than the story of the wrath of Talithybios in Bk. 7, which have ascribed to the king an instant and passionate desire for the punishment of Athens (5. 105), and have assigned to Mardonios in the previous year Athens as his real objective. The obvious interest in this passage (cc. 48-50) is in the relation of Athens and Aigina, and beyond that interest comes an effort, on the historian’s part, to establish, in accordance with his method, a synchronism between the internal affairs of the Greek states, particularly Sparta and Athens, and the general course of Hellenic-Persian history. But this effort may have involved him in anachronisms, and in other not less serious errors and inconsequences. It is not easy to find time during the one season of 491 B.C. for the elaborate and complicated intrigues which are associated with the story of the Aiginetan hostages (cp. cc. 51, 61, 64-66). No express mention is here made of any application on the king’s part to Athens and Sparta; and the internal evidence supplied by the story in Bk. 7. 133 ff. proves that it must be dated as late as 430 B.C. and suggests afterthought rather than genuine memory. On the other hand the extradition of the Aiginetan hostages may belong to the autumn or winter of 491 B.C. or for that matter the spring of 490 B.C., and their
internment in Athens explains, what would otherwise be well-nigh inconceivable, how the Athenians, a year or two later, could pass by Aigina and attack Paros, without exposing themselves to Aiginetan attack (see further, Appendices following).

§ 5. The general character of the chronicles, thus delimited and envisaged, challenges some further observations. Nowhere, perhaps, is the composite or conglomerate nature of the work of Herodotus, and in particular of the portion of it which serves to connect the first and the last volumes, and rises to its highest pitch of intensity in the portion of the text comprised in the sixth Book of the conventional division, more apparent than in the string of passages here under review. From the record of these years has been segregated, for separate treatment, all that does not directly bear upon the recovery, or advance, of the Persian power. Those omitted elements involve apparently some anachronism, and in any case are obviously derived from sources very different to the traditions of the Persian campaigns. The remainder has a curiously explicit chronology, anticipating, even more obviously than the story of the Ionian revolt, the chronological method of Thucydides, and suggesting that Herodotus may have had a chronicle, of some kind or other, to furnish the framework of his record. But if any such chronicle existed and was used by Herodotus, its outlines have been not merely broken by personal researches, as in Thasos, by personal theories, as perhaps in regard to the Ionian democracies, by express digressions, as on the Attic occupation of the Chersonese, but also obscured by the intrusion of an account of the hostilities between Athens and Aigina, which almost certainly belongs to quite another source. Even the curiously compact story of the operations of Mardonios in Europe seems hardly to belong to the same stratum of tradition as that which has preserved the conclusion of the story of the Ionian revolt (cc. 31-42). It might possibly be that the annalistic system had been to some extent employed in a chronicle of the Ionian revolt and that Herodotus has attempted to carry it onwards to the battle of Marathon, more explicitly in regard to the years where his authority forsook him than in regard to the years of the Ionian revolt, where he might have more closely followed his chronological authority, with better results. ¹ If any written chronicle of the Ionian revolt existed, it may have been from the pen of the Milesian statesman, whose services in connexion with the matter Herodotus, as just above shown, has apparently passed over, or, as elsewhere shown, has recorded only where they reflected little credit upon his great predecessor.² Unfortunately we know of no work ascribed to Hekataios on the history of his own times, and it would be straining a point to suppose that Hekataios had introduced largely into his Periegesis of Asia, for example, an explicit record of

¹ But cp. Appendix V.
the Ionian revolt, though he might very well have mentioned the reforms of Artaphernes, and even his own services in connexion therewith. On the whole, in this case too, it seems hardly possible to determine, with any assurance, the exact provenance of the various elements and parts of the Herodotean conglomerate: nor can we deny that the annalistic appearance presented by this portion of the work may be a result of an original essay in chronology on the part of Herodotus himself. But, in any case, the well-marked peculiarities of the record of these years contribute to justify the views advanced in the Introduction, in regard to the composite character and transitional purpose of these Books, and especially the sixth, in the general economy of the work.

**Note.**—The Archons' names for the years in question, viz. Ol. 71. 4, 72. 1, 2, are recorded as Themistokles, Diogenes, Hybrides: cp. Clinton, *Fasti* ii. 26 ad ann. If the first name stand for the best-known Themistokles, the occurrence of the name may be related to a systematic but unacceptable chronology of his life (cp. J. A. R. Muir in *The Classical Review*, Oct. 1892). The Herodotean chronicle may have been based, to a greater or less extent, on the Attic Anagraphe for the Triennium, as for the years of the Ionian Revolt. Cp. Appendix V. § 5 supra, and IX. infra, note ad fin.
APPENDIX VII

SPARTAN HISTORY


§ 1. There is a large amount of materials in these Books (4, 5, 6) bearing upon the institutions and history of Sparta from early times down to the author’s own day: materials of very different orders, and drawn from very different sources. The present Appendix is concerned mainly with those passages which exhibit the domestic condition and the foreign relations of Sparta during the period, 519-489 B.C., proper to these Books. Certain passages, as not falling within this scheme, may be somewhat summarily dismissed. Apart from the considerable excursus, setting forth the official or conventional view of the privileges of the kings,1 two passages are easily detachable, which carry back the perspective to a point long before the period proper to the chronological narrative in these Books: i. the story of the origin of the dual royalty 6. 52-59; ii. the story of the Minyan rebellion 4. 145-149. These two stories are plainly little more than etiological legends, or transfigurations of the facts, in the light of afterthought. The story of the royal twins has all but destroyed every hope of recovering the true explanation of the most remarkable of Spartan institutions, the double kingship. Of this story it is here enough to say that it is professedly from a Spartan source, it involves a non sequitur, and cannot be accepted as history.2 The separation of history and fiction in the legend of the Minyae is, perhaps, a somewhat less desperate undertaking. As in the former case so in this it is obvious that the record attempts to explain existing arrangements in Laconia by a story which inverts the historical relations of the two strata in the population, Dorian and praec-Dorian, the conquerors and the conquered, so as to

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1 6. 58-59, for criticism of details see notes ad ill. 2 See further, notes ad l.
justify the invasion and conquest. The Minyan rebellion may be
more nearly connected with the institution of the dual kingship than
either story, taken by itself, would suggest: and both stories alike
imply the recognition of a considerable non-Dorian element, at least
in early or prae-Lykurgean Sparta, the disappearance of which in
historical times is, perhaps, in general too easily accredited. However
that may be, the legend of the Minyae, which represents the Minyae
as coming to the Spartans, and claiming kinship, ignores the fact that
the Spartans are ex hypothesi Dorian, but lately arrived in Lakonia to
invade and conquer—Minyae. The advent of the Minyae from Lemnos
may be understood as an afterthought based on the fact of the survival
of 'Minyan,' Pelasgic, or prae-Hellenic population in its purest, or most
obvious, form in that island.\footnote{5. 25, 6. 140. Whatever may be the
relations between Lemnians and Etruscans, the discovery of the celebrated non-Hellenic
inscription in Lemnos (C. Paulli, \textit{Eine vorgriechische Inschrift von Lemnos}, 1886)
supports the view above advanced.} Whether the story, as told by Herodotus,
is a mere Spartan \textit{sage}, may be questioned: he gives it as common to
Sparta and Thera; its chief interest for him, as for his informants or
authorities, was apparently the metropolitan claim established by it for
Sparta over Thera and Kyrone, through Minyan elements common to
all three. Attic the legend is in no wise, notwithstanding the Attic
claim to Lemnos.

§ 2. The materials for the history of Sparta contained in these
Books, for the period 519-489 B.C. proper, in the general scheme of the
work, to these Books, are of various kinds, and are presented by
Herodotus in very different connexion. There are passages of purely
local or inner Spartan history, easily separable from the general
structure of the Books, such as the excursus in the fifth Book on the
succession of Kleomenes (cc. 39-41), a passage which strictly speaking
is before the chronological point of departure, and the story of the
adventures of Dorieus (cc. 42-48), which fall strictly within the stated
limits.\footnote{Cp. Introduction, vol. I. p. xxxvii.} To these must be added the excursus or digressions on
Spartan affairs in the sixth Book,\footnote{Cp. Introduction, vol. I. pp. li, lii.} so far as these have not already
been ruled out of court by the preceding section. The remainder
comprises several more or less distinct stories about Demaratus, his
birth, deposition, exile (cc. 61-70), and the account of the end of his
great enemy Kleomenes, which is very deeply implicated with other
matters of more than personal interest.\footnote{Cp. the Analysis in vol. I. p. lii. of
the Introduction.} It will be convenient to
detach, and consider briefly in one connexion, these stories illustrative
of the domestic state of Sparta during the period under review.
There are, however, a still larger number of passages which exhibit
Sparta in her foreign relations, either to other Greek states, or to
Persia, and the Persian question. These passages, however, are not
presented by the historian as primarily Spartan history, or from
Spartan sources: as a rule, they are implicated in the main course of the narrative, or in the excursus on Athenian affairs; it is only in regard to the Argive war that a Spartan story emerges into obvious individuality (6. 76-82). Characteristic of the incidental nature of these records is the fact that the important notice of the part played by Kleomenes and the Spartans in relation to the alliance between Athens and Plataia occurs, not in its natural context side by side with the other notices of the hostilities between Athens and Sparta,¹ much less as an item in a survey of Spartan action or policy as a whole, but casually in a note on the battle of Marathon (6. 108). In regard to the main subject of these Books, the advance of the Persian power between 519 B.C. and 489 B.C., there are but three points or passages where Sparta seems to play a direct part in the action: i. the story of the Scythian embassy to Sparta, connected with the Scythian expedition of Dareios 6. 84, which is, however, a purely casual record in Herodotus. ii. The story of the application of Aristagoras, connected with the Ionian revolt, 5. 49. iii. A more numerous and complicated series of passages, offering several points of contact with the main narrative, yet substantially connected with one another, and focussed on a single problem, to wit, the relations of Sparta to Athens in the Marathonian campaign. In particular, these passages comprise two items: 1. the story of the Aiginetan hostages (6. 49, 50, 61, 73), which leads directly into the domestic scandal of Sparta; 2. the mission of Philippides, and the expedition of the two thousand (6. 106, 120), which is primarily a chapter in the main story, and obviously from an Athenian source. It will be convenient to consider this third batch of notices in this Appendix simply under the title of the Atheno-Spartan alliance against Persia. The isolation or discrimination of all the various elements for the history of Sparta during the thirty years represented by these three Books is, of course, not to be taken to mean that the facts recorded, or implied, were without causal relations or bearings, one to another. On the contrary, it is obvious that the inner condition of the Spartan state and its foreign policy were closely related to one another at every stage, and that the various transactions of Sparta with states, in and outside the Peloponnese, reacted largely on each other, and on the domestic condition of Lakedaimon. Of the mutual bearings of the Persian, the Athenian, the Argive, and other questions on each other, on the relations of Sparta to her own allies, on the inner conduct of affairs in Sparta itself, there is very little consciousness displayed by Herodotus: but this naiveté indirectly redounds to the credibility of the records, and renders them more responsive to criticism. The particular consideration of the several stories which serve for Spartan history during the period under review, will show that, to a very great extent, the facts, as recorded by Herodotus, supply an intelligible and consistent rationale of the conduct of Sparta.

in relation to the external questions of the day. If an equally satisfactory result is not attainable in regard to the inner state of Sparta, the reason may be that in this department, from the nature of the case, not merely were the facts in themselves less notorious and discoverable, but also the sources had a more direct motive for suppression or obscurity. Yet even in these stories, critically examined, not a little is preserved to illuminate the working of Spartan institutions, and the conduct of historic persons. One man in especial emerges throughout as the greatest figure in the Spartan or Hellenic tradition of those days, in spite of efforts or tendencies calculated to damnify or to obliterate his memory, which culminate in the story of his awful end. It is Kleomenes who expels Dorieus, deposes Demaratos, makes Leotychides king. It is Kleomenes who overthrows Argos, and thrice invades Attica. It is Kleomenes who sets Athens and Boeotia at variance. It is Kleomenes who deals out wars and alliances, or refuses them, to Samians, Ionians, Athenians. Over his memory broods the horrible suspicion of a tyrannic ambition, which aimed, perhaps, at a monarchy in Sparta, in Peloponnesse, in Hellas, and was marked by significant acts of impiety and outrage. To Kleomenes were veritably due some of the sharpest sayings, as well as some of the strongest doings, which made the thirty years of his reign memorable to posterity. In more senses than one the history of Sparta, during the thirty years covered by these Books, is primarily the history of the reign of Kleomenes.

§ 3. The chronology of the period is not, however, so clearly conceived by Herodotus as might have been anticipated: a further symptom of the character of his sources and of his own methods. Kleomenes is king when Aristagoras visits Sparta in 499 B.C. (or thereabouts), but he had been king some time ere the coming of Aristagoras. His action in the expulsion of the Peisistratids from Athens carries his reign back to 511 B.C. Before that, Maiandritos on coming to Sparta, as early as 515 B.C., finds Kleomenes already king.\(^1\) Earlier than this point we cannot force back the reign of Kleomenes for certain,\(^2\) though it is arguable that Kleomenes had succeeded his father ere the Samian oligarchs made their appeal for assistance against Polykrates,\(^3\) an event which falls into the reign of Kambyses, and must be dated before 521 B.C. The dates of the deposition and of the death of Kleomenes are left by Herodotus in almost equal obscurity with the date of his birth, or of his accession. The legitimate inference from the evidence, as presented by Herodotus, would be that he dated the death of Kleomenes prior to the battle of Marathon, an inference in fact drawn by Clinton: but such a conclusion is virtually untenable.\(^4\) If we place the deposition of

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\(^1\) 3. 146.

\(^2\) On the date of the reply to the Plataians, see note to 6. 108.

\(^3\) The witicism (3. 46) might be attri-buted rightly to Kleomenes without his being actually king at the time.

\(^4\) See notes to 6. 85, and § 11 infra, ad ju.
Kleomenes before the battle of Marathon, we have done all that is possible in the matter: room must be found thereafter for his return and his death.\(^1\) The supposition that he was in exile at the time of the battle of Marathon might help to explain some of the features in the story of the Spartan action, or inaction, at that crisis: the delay, the small force tardily despatched, the anonytness of the commander. That passage is probably from an Athenian source: had a Spartan king, had Kleomenes been in command, Athenian tradition would probably have preserved his name. Yet, as will subsequently appear, the story of Marathon does not absolutely preclude the hypothesis that Kleomenes was on the throne at the time. A couple of days later; and Kleomenes at the head of a larger force might have been in Attica, to take part in the fray. However that may be, it is plain that the reign of Kleomenes was by no means a short one: it extended very nearly over the period covered by the main narrative in these Books, and the express assertion to the contrary \(^2\) is one of the most unintelligent and unintelligible mis-statements for which Herodotus is responsible. It is hardly worth while to suppose that the root of the error is to be found in the brief tenure of power by the king after his exile and restoration, for that would be to explain one error by creating another. The blunder seems rather to show how, in telling a particular story, Herodotus will sacrifice consistency and probability for the sake of a point, especially a moral point. The historian’s own text proves that the reign of Kleomenes was not only a long but a stirring one, and that the king played an exceptionally important rôle throughout, both in domestic and in foreign affairs. The further details in this chronology depend on the discussion of the particular events recorded for the period, and will emerge naturally in the course of the paragraphs following, in which the several stories, or passages, illustrative of Spartan history are to be discussed.

§ 4. The first passage which calls for consideration here, is the story of Dorieus, 5. 39-48. Taken in connexion with the introductory passage, the story goes to show that Kleomenes, son of Anaxandridas, king of Sparta, had three half-brothers, Dorieus, Leonidas, and Kleombrotos. So uncertain, however, were the family reminiscences that there were those (in Sparta) who asserted that Leonidas and Kleombrotos were twins; but as Leonidas actually succeeded his half-brother Kleomenes, and as it was not disputed that Dorieus was the eldest of the second family of Anaxandridas, there was no doubt that had Dorieus remained in Sparta (and survived Kleomenes), he would in due course have been king in his stead. Dorieus, however, left Sparta in consequence of his eldest brother’s accession, and after one failure to effect a settlement in Libya, passed away to the west, where

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1 The death, or, perhaps, rather the exile, of Kleomenes might be dated to 490 B.C. Cp. Appendix VIII. § 5.

he met his end in another attempt to establish a colony in the neighbourhood of Eryx in Sicily.\footnote{1}

The sources from which Herodotus derived this story, were plainly not pure Spartan sources. So far as the scene of the action is laid in the west, in Italy, in Sicily, he is drawing explicitly (cc. 44, 45), or inferentially (cc. 46, 47), from local Italioi and Sikeliote traditions, though whether he himself ever went further west than Thurii is not demonstrable.\footnote{2} It is, of course, probable that some memory of the fate of Dorieus survived at Sparta, and it was presumably known there that he had perished with his comrades in Sicily. The total absence of any reference to Dorieus in the passages in the fourth Book, where the river and district of the Kinyps are mentioned (cc. 175, 198), is some guarantee that the story in Bk. 5 is independent of ‘Libyan’ sources; and though Philip of Kroton may have attached himself to Dorieus in Kyrene (cp. c. 47), there is nothing in the passage to suggest Kyrene as the focus of the traditions. The familiar introduction or preface to the story (cc. 39-41) can hardly be referred to any ultimate source but a Spartan one; and if so much in the story as can be directly ascribed to the west is segregated, the remainder may be looked upon as Spartan. This analysis would leave as Spartan residuum cc. 42, 43 and perhaps the first few lines of c. 46, the connecting passages and appendix being supplied from elsewhere; not but what the news of the end of Dorieus must have reached Sparta from Sicily in the first instance, while per contra those in the west, who were interested in the later career of Dorieus, would have had some account to give of his antecedents. The conclusion of the story (c. 48) may contain a speculation of the historian’s own; for it is difficult to suppose that a Spartan could have made so egregious a blunder as is involved in the statement that Kleomenes only reigned a short time. Not, indeed, that it is easy to understand how Herodotus himself could have made a mistake which can be completely refuted out of his own mouth, were it not that, where a good moral is in view, Herodotus is apt to leave chronology to shift for itself.

The chronology of the events of this story is more or less determined by the incidental mention of the destruction of Sybaris, in which Dorieus had, or at least \textit{ex hypothesi} might have had, a part. That event is independently ascertained for the year 510 B.C.\footnote{3} It might be a year or two afterwards that Dorieus, Philippos and their companions met their end: it would be a year or two earlier that Dorieus had returned from Libya, after an absence of some two years (\textit{πρίγε ἔρει} c. 42). This would place the attempt to colonise the Kinyps about 514/13 B.C., and would agree sufficiently well with the date 515/16 B.C. above given for the latest date at which the accession of Kleomenes can be placed.

\footnote{1 For criticism of details, cp. notes \textit{ad loc.}} \footnote{2 Cp. Introduction, vol. I. p. 367.} \footnote{3 Cp. note \textit{ad loc.}}
The process of damning the character and memory of Kleomenes is seen already operating in the story of Dorieus. Kleomenes succeeds to the kingdom simply in virtue of his superior age, and in spite of his being οὐ φρενίμης ἀκρομανής τε, 'not merely disordered but stark mad.' Dorieus on the other hand was a very prince among his peers, and, if the succession had been determined by merit, must have been king. Yet the sequel of the story ill accords with this panegyric. That peerless prince is too impatient and too proud to play a part in Sparta's second to his elder brother. He is too impious or too hasty to consult the divine wisdom in his first colonial adventure, or to betake him straight to the divinely-ordered bourne in his second; no wonder, the one ended in disaster, the other in death. The story does not fulfill the promise of its beginning; the sermon refutes the text. For how much of this inconsequence Herodotus himself is responsible, who can say exactly? At least he is guilty of overlooking the fallacy. But the story is not therefore insignificant. Introduced by Herodotus ostensibly to explain the succession of Kleomenes (an object accomplished by cc. 39-41), it ends by being an explanation of the failure and fate of Dorieus. In the story Dorieus is, after all, the transgressor. Ambitious, impatient, proud, almost impious, never a man who more richly, or more obviously, deserved his fate. The desire to blacken Kleomenes has led to a non sequitur: the person who comes worst out of this story is Dorieus.¹

That the story deals in the main with historical persons and historical events cannot be doubted; they shine through the texture of the pragmatic and inconsequent composition. It is the moral, the afterthought, the motivation, the causality, which are questionable and refutable. Other points of significance may lie in the story. Polygamy is a practice which breeds quarrels in the household. Was there in the case of Kleomenes and Dorieus a question of succession? Was Kleomenes, indeed, in some way less acceptable to the Dorian Spartiates than his half-brother Dorieus? Did Delphi perhaps direct a decision in favour of the elder brother? Such questions may fairly be asked, for they stand in an intelligible relation to the story—but the traditions fail to decide them: καὶ πάρεστι ὑκοτέρως τις πλιθεῖται αὐτῶν ποτότωι προσχωρέων.

§ 5. The story of the deposition of Demaratos (Δημαρήτου ἡ κατά-
πανεις τῆς βασιλείης 6. 67) involves further the stories of his birth (6. 61-64, 68, 69), and of his exile (6. 67, 70); and the three may here be treated in one connexion. The accession of Demaratos cannot be pushed back much before 510 B.C. (cp. Clinton, Fasti, ii. p. 259), and need not be pushed quite so far back; for Clinton relies on a statement in Pausanias, 3. 7, 7, that Demaratos was associated with Kleomenes in the Liberation of Athens, a statement worth next to nothing. If, indeed, Kleomenes succeeded about 520/19 B.C., and

¹ For a similar fallacy, cp. notes on the speech of Sokles, 5. 92.
if the Argive war took place, as Pausanias affirms, soon after his accession, and if Demaratos was king and commander in that war, then the accession of Demaratos would approximately synchronise with the accession of Kleomenes. But the better date for the Argive war is supplied by the synchronism with the capture of Miletus, and it finds further confirmation in the chronology of the reign of Demaratos. The first clear evidence of the accession of Demaratos is his joint-command in the invasion of Attica perhaps as late as 507/6 B.C. He might have been thirty years of age, or a little more, at that date, and still have been living in 465 B.C. as required by the anecdote in Plutarch’s Life of Themistocles, twenty-five years after his deposition. The chronology would not, indeed, preclude his accession ten years earlier, circa 515 B.C., but the later date for his accession is more consistent with the material indications of the story, or stories, of his reign. In the light of these stories, it seems improbable that Demaratos had been a decade on the throne, before the feud with Kleomenes broke out. It is more probable that the quarrel began soon after the accession of the Prokleid king. It was this quarrel which led to the deposition of Demaratos. On three distinct occasions the feud came to a head: (1) at Eleusis in Attica, before 506 B.C. (Hdt. 5. 75); (2) in the Argive war, some ten or twelve years later (cp. § 10 infra); (3) in the year before Marathon, in connexion with the policy and action of Sparta towards Persia, Aigina and Athens. In connexion with the first of these occasions Herodotus records the enactment of a law in Sparta which, as argued in the notes ad l., was more probably a sequel to the second occasion of quarrel, if at least the Argive war is correctly post-dated. Herodotus has no express record of the quarrel in the Argive war: we owe our knowledge of it to the Argive story preserved by Pausanias; but even those who refuse to accept the joint-command of Demaratos in the Argive war, the desertion of the Prokleid king by his colleague, and the consequent impeachment of Kleomenes on his return, may fairly be expected to see in the anonymous ‘enemies’ of Kleomenes at home, indicated by Herodotus, the friends of Demaratos, if not that king himself. The quarrel in and after the Argive war finds a natural sequel in the intrigues of Demaratos against Kleomenes in Aigina, all the more natural indeed if the date and occasion which I have given for the law, de uno imperatore constitucendo, be acceptable.

The date of the deposition of Demaratos is fixed, if any date can be fixed by Herodotean evidences, to the year before Marathon. In that year occurs the extradition of the Aiginetan hostages, the

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1 *Mutatis mutandis,* it might be argued that Kleomenes only succeeded about 512 B.C., and that the Argive war took place a few years later. But this argument sacrifices the weighty considerations above urged in regard to the chronology of the reign of Kleomenes, without really saving the authority of Pausanias, even if that were worth saving in this case.

2 Cp. § 10 infra.

3 Hdt. 5. 75.

4 C. 29.

5 Cp. notes to 6. 76-82, and § 10 infra.
necessary antecedent of which is the substitution of Leotychides for Demaratos as colleague of Kleomenes. The process by which the deposition was effected is comparatively clear. Leotychides, suborned or encouraged by Kleomenes (ικ τῆς Κλεομάνεως προθυμίας), makes an affidavit against the legitimacy of the Proklesid king (κατάμνησα, καταμνησία): a trial takes place, the court being in all probability constituted by the Gerusia, Ephors, and Kleomenes, with Leotychides as prosecutor (ἐσφυγκτή): witnesses were produced, certain Spartans, surely now well stricken in years, who averred that they had, as Ephors, been present—perhaps at a meeting of the Gerusia—when news was brought to Ariston of the birth of Demaratos whom he had straightway disowned, as no son of his. It is tolerably obvious that no suspicion had attached itself to the birth of Demaratos until Leotychides made his affidavit, and the story, which figures now as a part of the narrative in Herodotus (6. 63), was produced and attested at the trial. The next step in the process is not quite so plain. It looks as though the matter had been discussed in the Apella (c. 66), and the ultimate decision referred to Delphi. It may fairly be conjectured that the court of first instance decided in favour of Leotychides, and that the discussion in the Apella was raised by Demaratos and his friends, with good prospect of success, until the motion was carried for an appeal to the Pythia—the result of which was already determined by Kleomenes. A Delphic decision had such weight in Sparta as to shake, if we may believe the story of the interview between Demaratos and his mother (6. 68), even the deposed king's own faith in his legitimacy. A venal decision is not ipso facto a false one; men have been bribed to speak the truth: and it is difficult to infer what the Spartans would have done, on discovering the corrupt practices of Kleomenes (6. 74), if the previous medism of Demaratos had not relieved them of a difficulty. Could Leotychides have been displaced, and Demaratos restored? The alternative, suggested by Herodotus, that Demaratos was the son of Ariston or of Astrobakos, and the whole tendency of the reported interview between Demaratos and his mother, go to justify the practical result, even while glorifying the true descent of the deposed king. To rationalise any further the memoir of the wonders connected with that anonymous lady (cc. 61, 69), is hardly necessary for strictly historical purposes.

The story of the actual flight and medism of Demaratos is comparatively simple and straightforward; the only questions it need excite are a doubt as to the exact chronology of the affair, and a doubt whether the whole truth concerning the medism of the deposed Spartan king has been told. In regard to the chronology: the Gymnopaidia, at which Demaratos was insulted by Leotychides, cannot be dated earlier than midsummer 491 B.C., and can hardly be the festival

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1 Cp. Pausanias, 3. 5, 2; G. Gilbert, Handbuch, t. 1 p. 60, n. 2 (1893); note to 6. 82.
2 On the date of the Gymnopaidia, which fell as a rule in the Athenian month Hekatombaion, see Manno, Sparta, i. ii. p. 213, and note to 6. 67. For χροσώδες cp. Xen. Ages. 2. 17.
of the next year. This date leaves just sufficient room, perhaps, for the deposition of Demaratos in the early summer of 491 B.C., and his election as χρονοσπιώς, if that was the office which he held, on the one side; and for his flight, the discovery of the corruption of the Pythia, and the disgrace and exile of Kleomenes, before Marathon, on the other. As to the medism of Demaratos: there is no hint of such treachery, prior to his voluntary exile; but that exile, and other circumstances in the whole story would be, not less, but more intelligible, if Demaratos had been intriguing with the Persian for some time. His interference against Kleomenes in Aigina amounted, at least constructively, to medism; and his welcome at the Persian court loses nothing by the suggestion that he had friends there already.

§ 6. In regard to the story of the end of Kleomenes, 6. 74, 75, little remains to be said. It is just possible to find time for his mysterious retirement to Thessaly, before the arrival of the Mede in Euboea, or in Attica. It might, however, be argued that the whole circumstances, narrated in the passage cited, fell out after Marathon. In that case Kleomenes was still king at the time of the battle. On the whole it is reasonable to conclude that the Spartan excuse for delay on that occasion was bona fide; the rapidity with which the two thousand reached Athens after the full moon, supports that conclusion, and the two thousand Spartiates may have been an advance guard, the plan being that the king, Kleomenes, should follow with the main body, perhaps recruited from the Symmachy. It was something of a fiasco, from a Spartan point of view, that the Athenians had been allowed to win, virtually single-handed, the first victory over the Persian on Hellenic soil. Discontent with that result may have contributed to aggravate the unpopularity of Kleomenes, though he of all Spartans was probably least responsible for the blunder. The rationale of his subsequent intrigue in Arcadia is more obvious than the reason for which he selected Thessaly as his first place of refuge: in Arcadia he was heading a movement against the Spartan hegemony. Matters wore so formidable an appearance that the Lakedaimonians restored him to his full privileges. Kleomenes was no longer young. His death will have taken place not less than thirty years from the date of his accession, possibly even some years later (§ 3 supra). The circumstances of his death are eminently suspicious, but it can hardly be said that, granted the madness of the king, the story as told by Herodotus is incredible. It can only be said that the Spartans took poor care of their mad king.¹ It is vain to speculate what

¹ Duncker, vii. 167, goes further, and suggests foul play. The story of Kleomenes has, mutatis mutandis, a curious parallel in modern times. Cetewayo, the former king of Zululand, died on the 8th inst., so suddenly that his death is attributed in Natal to poison. . . . It is much more probable that he died of disease of the heart, accelerated by the excitement of his later years, the war, his capture, his visit to England, his “restoration,” and his failure to repair his place among his subjects. According, too, to the statement of Mr. Whiteley, who had some kind of
his brethren the lion-hearted Leonidas, the ill-starred Kleombrotos, what his daughter, the precocious and shrewd Gorgo, were about all this while! Long ere Herodotus gathered his materials for the biography of Kleomenes, ill fame and misfortune had accumulated upon the Agid house. Pausanias the Regent was no more, his pride and his dishonour had eclipsed even the memory of Kleomenes;¹ the feeble Pleistoanax had succeeded the short-lived Pleistarchos, and must have been in exile, when these Books were being written;² the Prokleid kings were for the time at least de facto in the ascendant (cp. 6. 71). Was any one in Sparta, or Hellas, concerned just then to rehabilitate the greatest of the Agid kings, or even to look for any reasonable plan, or purpose, in his remembered acts?

The memories of the Persian war rose to obscure the career of the strong man, who had taken no part in that contest, or whose part in it had been eclipsed by the greater glories, and the greater crimes of the heroes of Thermopylæ, of Plataia, of Mykale. Even the medizizing Demaratos was to Herodotus a more familiar and acceptable personage³ than Kleomenes, and Herodotus could deliberately explain the ghastly doom of the phrenzied old king as a divine judgment upon him for his intrigue against Demaratos.⁴ To be sure Demaratos in exile was to do duty, if in the order of Herodotus' composition he had not already done duty, as wise-man in the suite of the invading Xerxes.⁵ Is it strange that through the mists of oblivion, rivalry, prejudice and afterthought the figure of Kleomenes looms as an enigma in Spartan history rather than as an intelligible and manageable agent? And yet, without going beyond the acts of Sparta during the reign of Kleomenes recorded by Herodotus himself, it may be made plain that the state pursued an energetic, though not wholly successful, foreign policy, for which the king is made largely responsible. But to obtain a proper view of these recorded acts, they must be detached from the anecdotal or accidental contexts in which they are embedded by the Herodotean method, and must be envisaged in their natural relations, to the main current of events, during the period, and to each other. How far the success and failure of Sparta were due to the genius or the madness of the king; how far his successes abroad were thwarted or foiled by opposition at home, it is not easy, at this distance of time, and with these materials, to decide: one result appears plain, that the Spartans,

¹ For the chronology, see Clinton. Fasti, ii. 262.
² One strong phrase can be quoted against Demaratos from Herodotus: ὁδικεῖον ἀλήθειαν ἐν φθορῇ καὶ ἑαυτῷ νομισματίζειν 6. 61. This remark Hdt. may have taken over from his source, though it would, perhaps, have pleased him, as helping to explain the king’s misfortunes.
³ 6. 84.
⁴ 7. 8, 101-104, 209 etc.
⁵ 8. 82.
as on more than one later occasion, for fear of a monarchy forfeited an empire.

§ 7. The story of the Scythian embassy to Sparta, 6. 84, is marked by many of those characteristics which perplex the modern historian in his attempt to recover bare facts from the Herodotean record. The story does not appear in its natural or chronological connexion; it is introduced apparently in a purely biographical interest. This fact may be explained, as similar facts in other cases, by a difference in the sources for the story of the Scythian campaign in Bk. 4 and for the story in Bk. 6 here under discussion. The latter story is expressly described as a Spartan story (αὐτοὶ δὲ Ἡπαρτέπγαλα φανεῖ... λέγοντες... ὅσοι αὐτοὶ λέγουσι... οὕτω δὴ Ἡπαρτέπγαλα τὰ περὶ Κλεομένα λέγοντες). Herodotus no doubt believes the tradition that Scythian ambassadors visited Sparta, and made the proposal on record: all he discredits is the asserted connexion of this visit with the subsequent fate of Kleomenes, and the purely rationalistic theory of the Spartans on this subject. But can we accept as facts any such visit, or any such proposal? Scyths may have been seen from time to time in Sparta (ep. 4. 77), but a formal embassy of Scyths to Sparta does not appear in itself very probable. The proposal of the Scyths makes the story doubly suspicious. A Scythian invasion of Upper Asia was an event for which there was good precedent (ep. 4. 1); but the idea of Greeks, and especially Spartans, marching up from Ephesus to Susa in the sixth century B.C. is an anachronism, as may presently and fully appear; while the strategic combination proposed by the Scyths to the Greeks reads more like one of those veiled satires or criticisms of which Scyths were sometimes made the vehicle (4. 77, 79, 142), than like matter for a serious discussion. Moreover, it may fairly be doubted whether the term ἐκακτῆσεν, for ‘to drink unmixed wine,’ dated subsequently to the accession of Kleomenes, or was invented in Sparta, even though Athenaeus (x. vii. p. 427\*\*) endorses the statements in Herodotus; for Athenaeus in the context quotes Anakreon (Σκυθίκην πῶς πλατέοις ὀίνῳ μελετήσει) as proof of the practice and phraseology: and even if the verb ἐκακτῆσεν was invented in Sparta, perhaps by Kleomenes himself—for he had a pretty wit (Plutarch, op. c. p. 91 infra)—that would not prove the presence of a Scythian embassy, much less the truth of the proposal here ascribed to the Scyths, though it would make the genesis of the anecdote easy to understand. The weight of argument is against believing that the Scyths sent an embassy to Sparta, much more against believing that such an embassy made the proposition here recorded. That Kleomenes was a hard drinker may be true, and that he, or the Spartans, may have contributed the term ἐκακτῆσεν for the practice, which had previously been called Σκυθίκην πῶς ὀίνῳ, is not impossible. Herodotus seems to admit that the term was a Laconism, and the verb does not occur except in this passage.

§ 8. The story of the application of Aristogoras (probably in the
year 499 B.C., cp. Appendix V. § 4) as told by Herodotus, 5. 49, stands on a very different footing to the anecdote just discussed. It is an integral part of the main narrative; it occurs in its natural order; and the critique of the story renders the central fact, that Aristogoras went to Sparta in order to obtain support for the Ionians, altogether probable, although it divests that fact of the pragmatic colours with which it has been decorated by Herodotus, or his authorities, and sets the suit of Aristogoras and its rejection at Sparta, in a new light and in new relations. Grote\(^1\) long ago pointed out that this story was, at least in part, from a Spartan source, and condemned it as involving an anachronism. The anachronism lies in the proposal, that the Spartans should march to Susa, and there attack the king: such an idea belongs to a period long after 500 B.C. Moreover, the proposition is altogether inconsequent in the actual circumstances; Aristogoras may have asked the Spartans to march to Sardes, but in his wildest moments can hardly have projected the invasion of Upper Asia. But Grote condoned the assumption and virtual assertion, throughout the story, that the whole negotiation is conducted simply and solely as a transaction between Aristogoras and Kleomenes.\(^2\) To suppose, or admit, on the strength of this passage, that in the year 499 B.C. either (or both) of the kings could, solely upon the hypothetical prerogative, πᾶλομυ εκφάνων ἐν ἧν ἢ ἀν βούλωμαι χάρην κτλ. (6. 56), take a Spartan army to Susa, or even to Sardes, without going to Gerusia, or Apella, for consent, betrays an inadequate appreciation, as of the spirit and nature of Spartan institutions, so of the qualities and character of Herodotus’ histories. A custom, which may have prevailed at one time in regard to the warfare of Sparta in the Peloponnesus (πρὸς τε Μεσονήσου καὶ ἀρκάδας τε καὶ ἀργείων 5. 49), could never have sanctioned an expedition to Asia. The cases on record are themselves open to criticism: the records are imperfect and pragmatic. The Samian oligarchs before 521 B.C. apply to Sparta for aid against Polykrates, 3. 46. They are introduced, or produced, ἐν τοῖς ἀρχηγοῖς, a first and a second time. The two Laconisms recorded are worthy of the wit of Kleomenes; the first of them is actually ascribed to him by Plutarch (APEOPPTH. Lac. Mor. 223); the second is, in the circumstances, entirely inappropriate, and cannot be correctly placed by Herodotus, who has apparently confused a repartee, addressed to some famine-stricken Chians, with an answer given to the oligarchs of Samos.\(^3\) There is nothing anyway in the story to commit Herodotus, or us, to the view that the king or kings, by the royal prerogative, despatched the expedition to Samos; the co-operation of the Corinthians makes

\(^1\) III. 498 (Pt. II. c. xxxv).
\(^2\) Grote, ill. 498 n., from accepting the record too easily has inferred that “the Spartan king had the active management and direction of foreign affairs—subject, however, to trial and punishment by the Ephors in case of misbehaviour.”
\(^3\) Cp. Stein’s note, ad l.c.
against it, and the formula, βοηθεῖν ἕν ἔν ἐδοξεῖ αὐτῶι (3. 46), is most naturally to be referred to a decision of the Apella. The story of the application of Maiandrios (3. 143) leaves the decision unprejudiced, or if it weigh in either scale, it is against the theory that the king, or kings, could have taken an expedition to Samos solely on the royal prerogative. The anecdote, indeed, makes directly against the historical authority of the account of Kleomenes and his interviews with Aristagoras in two particulars: in the earlier case Kleomenes shows himself incorruptible, and he invokes the Ephors to enforce the xenelasy; in the later case he finally succumbs to temptation, but for the providential exclamation of the innocent child, and he orders Aristagoras out of Sparta on his own authority. If it were worth while to devise psychological and constitutional hypotheses to harmonise these inconsequences, it might be said: the morals of Kleomenes did not improve with age; the action of the Ephors is to be understood as subauditum—Maiandrios is one person, Aristagoras another, and so on; but is this kind of apologetic worth much cultivation? The simplest hypothesis is the best: we are not dealing with a plain record of plain facts: the stories are not disinterested, the facts have been transfigured. Going further, the apologist fares no better. The great passage (5. 62-93) dealing primarily with Athenian history records four distinct expeditions of the Spartans beyond the Isthmos (in the years 511/0 B.C. ff.) for the purpose of hostile operations against Athens. The first of these is not set on foot by the king, nor even under the royal command, 5. 63. The second is under the command of Kleomenes, but it is sent by the 'Lakedaimonians,' and the king is specially appointed general, 5. 64. The second expedition of Kleomenes (5. 69-72) reads more like an unauthorised venture on the king's own part: he is summoned by Isagoras, he first sends a herald to 'exterminate' Kleisthenes and the Accursed, who apparently retired at the herald's bidding, yet Kleomenes none the less makes his appearance in Athens, and attempts to destroy the new constitution, with its authors. His attempt ended in failure and disgrace. Yet the Athenians addressed no remonstrance to Sparta, ἑπιτίκια γὰρ σφοι Ἀλεξαδαμιόνιοι τε καὶ Κλεομένη ἐκπεπολεμώθαι. It is not likely that Kleomenes was acting without commission: either his action may have been covered by the former commission, or a fresh one had been issued. Least of all is the third expedition under Kleomenes (5. 74, 75) to be regarded as a private adventure on the king's part, or one undertaken ἄνευ Ἑπαρπητείων τοῦ κοινοῦ. Many points in the record are open to suspicion: (1) 'Kleomenes assembles a great army from the whole of Peloponnesos.' Is it really credible that the Spartans, Ephors, and rival King, who is present in the army, would have allowed such action unchallenged? (2) 'The destination of the expedition is kept a secret.' What, from the Spartans themselves? And

did no one then suspect it, after the previous fiaschi? Or what possible destination could such a force have had at the time, if not Athens? (3) The Boeotians and Chalkidians were moving on Attica at the same time, ἀλλὰ συνθήματος. The circumstances are indeed suspiciously like the situation just before the Thirty Years' truce (Thuc. I. 113, 114), but even if the earlier record has here been coloured by the later situation, it will not altogether lose credit; and if the Boeotians and Chalkidians were moving at the same time as Kleomenes, and by agreement with him, they probably knew the destination of his hosts: what was no secret to them can hardly have been a secret to the Corinthians, to the Spartans themselves, to Demaratus, who was associated with Kleomenes in command of the Spartan forces (συνεξαγουσί τε τὴν στρατιὰν ἐκ Λακεδαίμων 5. 75). Whether Demaratus and Kleomenes had always been on good terms until the quarrel at Eleusis, and whether it was on and immediately after this occasion that the law was passed which is recorded in 5. 75 (ἀλλὰ δὲ ταύτης τής διχόστασις ἐπίθετο νόμος ἐν Σεισάρῃ μὴ ἐξεῖναι ἐπισταί ἀμφίστροφος τοῖς βασιλεῖς ἐξώσεις στρατιῶν) are questions which have been discussed in another connexion (cp. § 5 supra). If the conclusion there reached be correct, it confirms the suspicion of inaccuracy and pragmatism raised against the account of the third expedition of Kleomenes. The break-up at Eleusis is followed by the project for restoring Hippias, which is likewise wrecked, according to the story (5. 90-93) by the opposition of the Symmachy led by Corinth. The date of the congress at Sparta might be a year or two after the affair at Eleusis, for Amyntas of Macedon is still alive (c. 94). The king, the kings, disappear from this passage, except for the remark that the oracles brought by Kleomenes from Athens had something to say to the new departure (c. 90). It is the 'Lakedaimonians' who are moved to send for Hippias, it is the 'Spartiates' who summon representatives from the allies (συμμάχων ἀγγέλων) and address them in a speech, which its author cannot have conceived as uttered by Kleomenes (ἡμᾶς μὲν καὶ τῶν βασιλεῶν ἡμῶν περιμένας ἐξῆλθε). The speech of Sokles, which follows, proves that we are not in the presence of an accurate record, for such a story-telling would have been utterly out of place under the given circumstances: but the case so far as reported, and the preceding cases, when examined critically, lend no support to the view that a Spartan king could sponte sua take a Spartan army, or an allied army, into central Greece, much less across the sea. It is thus a great waste of ingenuity to attempt to fix a point between 500 and 480 B.C. as the date at which such power passed from the king, even though Aristagoras is reported to have interviewed Kleomenes, and Kleomenes alone, and the Athenians in 479 B.C. address themselves to the Ephors (9. 7). The latest case does not prove that the Ephors were competent to despatch a Spartan army hither or thither at any time of their own will: nor does the earliest case prove any such competency of the king. If Aristagoras
interviewed Kleomenes, it was not because the king, on his own sole authority, could take the Spartans to Asia; but because the king’s voice, vote, and authority would doubtless be important factors in the decision of Gerusia and Areopaga. If the Ephors figure prominently in the record of 479 B.C. their action suggests nothing more than their exercise of powers habitually exercised by them in the fourth century, as appears from the Hellenica of Xenophon, a writer far better informed in regard to the details of Spartan government than Herodotus. The testimony of Thucydides, and the evidence supplied by him, should be of some weight in this connexion. It is his deliberate opinion that for upwards of four centuries there has been no essential change in the institutions of Sparta, 1. 18. This statement is certainly exaggerated, and ignores the true perspective of Sparta’s constitutional history: but it is of some authority in regard to the question whether as late as 500 B.C. one of the kings could have declared and carried war against Persia on his own authority; and whether that power had passed to the Ephors within the next twenty years. Both questions may safely be answered in the negative. Neither in 499 B.C. nor in 479 B.C. could king or Ephors act in such matters ἀνέν τοῦ κοινοῦ. The procedure described with some approach to fulness by Thucydides, as observed before the breach with Athens and the outbreak of hostilities in 431 B.C., is on the very face of it primitive and should be regarded as exemplary. (Cp. Thuc. 1. 79-87.) The Spartan Areopagus (or Ekklesia, as the Attic writers termed the Assembly) has the decision of questions of peace and war, treaties and alliances. If such matters were ever decided by kings, or by Ephors, it was by delegation, or by usurpation, or by force of circumstances (cp. Thucyd. 8. 5). In Sparta itself, in times of peace, there would be little chance for such disloyalty. We may amend the critique passed by Grote upon the story of the application of Aristogoras by pointing out, in the first place, that it was not to the Ephors, much less to the king, but to the Spartiatae in their Assembly that Aristogoras in the supreme moment must, or should, have addressed himself. And it is worth while to observe that the speech reported by Herodotus, 5. 49, and rehearsed ex hypothesi by Aristogoras to Kleomenes in a secret interview, to be reproduced in the Athenian Ekklesia, a few days later, 5. 97, might very well have been addressed to the Spartan Assembly, to which ex hypothesi the speech of Sokles had been addressed some years previously (5. 92). In short, we may conclude that Aristogoras at Sparta in 499 B.C. laid his application before the Spartans, though in the story as told by Herodotus the whole matter appears as transacted simply between the Milesian and Kleomenes.  

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1 Cp. the passages cited in notes, 6. 56.  
2 This contention is completely borne out by the phraseology of the story concerning the Platian application, 6. 106.  
3 Busolt, Gr. Gesch. ii. 30 n., apparently endorses G. Dümmer’s representation that the reigns of Kleomenes and Demaratos, down to about 500 B.C., exhibit an almost
Later scholars, notably Duncker,\(^1\) have somewhat advanced on Grote’s argument, which was mainly negative. The origin of the story in Herodotus has with some plausibility been referred to an apologetic afterthought. Grote had pointed out the anachronism involved in the proposal that the Spartans should march in 498 B.C. to Susa. The idea belongs to a period subsequent to the Persian wars, the Greek victories. Ascribed to Aristogoras, before the Ionian revolt, it convicts the Milesian stranger of absurd folly, and acquits the Spartan king and Commons of all responsibility and discredit. After the ‘wars of Liberation,’ everybody in Greece could see that the Spartans were to blame for not supporting the Ionian revolt in 499 B.C. (cp. the criticism put into the mouth of the Corinthians, Thucyd. 1. 69). This criticism, Indeed, is partially anticipated by the Herodotean Aristogoras (Ἰωνικοὶ παίδες κτλ. 5. 49, ll. 7 ff. vol. I. p. 189).

But the apology of the Spartiate was two-fold: Aristogoras had made an absurd proposal, and he had applied to the wrong quarter: he had asked Kleomenes to go to Susa, not the Spartiates to go to Sardes.

But how if this story be, indeed, a mere pragmatic apology? How if Aristogoras merely asked the Spartiates to do what he afterwards persuaded the Athenians to do? The problem is shifted from the ‘subjective’ to the ‘objective’ order: the fact to be explained is not the Spartan ‘apologia,’ and afterthought as found in Herodotus, but the actual refusal of Sparta in 499 B.C. to go to Ionia. The solution of this problem is fully though unwittingly contained in the facts recorded by Herodotus. That he himself does not realise the bearing of these facts upon that problem, is a further guarantee of the authenticity of the facts. The sufficient reasons for the refusal of Sparta to help Ionia against Persia in 499 B.C. are to be found not in the folly of Aristogoras, nor in the incorruptibility of Kleomenes, but in the circumstances and position of Sparta at the moment, and the events of Spartan history during the preceding decade. These facts and circumstances comprise at least two sets of events and considerations: the relations of Sparta with Athens, and the relations of Sparta with Argos. The two are more or less intimately connected, and also suggest further factors in the case, as for example the relations of Sparta, during the period indicated, or during the reign of Kleomenes, to her allies in Peloponnesse, to Delphi, Boeotia, and the northern states, as well as the inner conditions of the Spartan state itself: but these considerable factors of Spartan action and policy in 499 B.C. are not presented by Herodotus in what now plainly appears their mutual bearings: the relations to Athens have to be recovered from the excursus on Athenian affairs, derived from Athenian sources; the relations to Argos are presented simply as a biographical

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\(^1\) Gesch. d. Alterthums, vii. 41 (1882).
anecdote in explanation of the fatal end of Kleomenes, though the story is plainly from Spartan sources.

§ 9. The items in the first story have been already to some extent anticipated. They have shown that the Spartan king could not make war simply at his own discretion: viewed in another connexion they will serve to show that Sparta had good reason to avoid undertaking any bold enterprise beyond the sea, although the reason was not one which the Spartans themselves were likely to proclaim. The Athenian record of Atheno-Spartan relations for the period between 512 and 499 B.C. proves that Sparta had undertaken a series of expeditions into central Greece, and against Athens, which one and all had ended in discomfort and disgrace. Four times had Sparta been foiled in Attica. She had expelled the tyrant only to find an ungrateful democracy established in his stead. The cup of humiliation had been drained a fifth time in the presence of the allies assembled on the soil of Lakedaimon itself—perhaps "between Babyka and Knaktion"—when the projected restoration of Hippias, and the promise of a subservient Athens, had been wrecked on the opposition of the Corinthians. Athens was sprung into the position of a leading power, had established a constitution of dangerous omen for Spartan interests, was extending her borders and increasing her wealth at the expense of her neighbours. The attempt to check the new democracy by fostering dissension in central Greece, the division of Boeotia (6. 108), the co-operation with Chalkis, to say nothing of possible friendship with Aigina, had all turned out more to the advantage of Athens than to the advantage of Sparta. Even if Sparta was safe from Athenian reprisals, or aggression, the results of the ten years before the appearance of Aristagoras in Hellas proper were more likely to ensure him a good reception in Athens than in Sparta.

§ 10. It looks as though the dissensions of Kleomenes and Demaratos, and the series of failures which marked the action and policy of Sparta towards Athens after the overthrow of the tyranny, had reacted unfavourably upon the position of Sparta in the Peloponnesos. So far as the record can be trusted, it appears that the break-up of the allied army at Eleusis was due to the initiative of the Corinthians, and that the representative of Corinth had brought about the failure of the Congress, summoned to vote the restoration of Hippias. The relations of Sparta to her allies at the moment were not favourable to the suit of Aristagoras. Nor was this all. Argos, the secular rival and antagonist of Sparta for the headship of the Peloponnesian, had surely recovered from her defeat and losses half a century before: a fresh war with Dorian Argos could be merely a question of opportunity. In such a situation how could Sparta have sent a force across the sea to Ionia? Argos held her in check; and the overthrow of Argos was the obvious preliminary to the realisation of the one legitimate dream of Spartan ambition, indisputable supremacy within the Peloponnesian.

The synchronism between the Argive war and the fall of Miletos,
implied by the oracular juxtaposition of the two events, is the one clear indication of the approximate date of the former; but the material sequence is all in favour of dating that war after the visit of Aristogoras to Sparta. No great stress need be laid on the invitation of Aristogoras to postpone the wars with Argives, Arkadiana, and Messenians: but, if we admit that the Spartans had just all but annihilated Argos, one of the chief reasons for the refusal to support the Ionian revolt disappears. The supposition that the Argive war took place early in the reign of Kleomenes is met by the plea of the Argives in 481 B.C., and the story of the war, as recovered from Plutarch, accords very well with the stages in the quarrel between Kleomenes and Demaratos, above indicated, and supplies an immediate motive for the opposition of Demaratos to Kleomenes in Aigina in 491 B.C. On almost every ground, then, the later date for the Argive war, suggested by Herodotus, is preferable to the earlier date extracted from Pausanias. To fix the event to a precise year is not possible, for a literal synchronism is not required by the oracle. A date rather before than after the fall of Miletos is, however, desirable, as better allowing for the development of friendly relations between Sparta and Athens, subsequent to the double event. In regard to the actual story of the war it is unnecessary to add anything more to what is said above, and in the notes on the text, except to emphasise again the importance of the passage as significant of the real determinants of Spartan policy during this period, and as illustrative of the character of the sources available to Herodotus, and of his own methods of employing them. He has surrendered to an ex parte Spartan version of the affair, and he has preserved the story simply as the account which the Argives might offer as explanatory of the awful doom of king Kleomenes.

§ 11. A great change appears to have come over the policy of Sparta before the end of the decade 500-491 B.C., as compared with the policy pursued in the preceding decade. Though Sparta was supported by some of her allies against Argos in 496 B.C., the latter city had enjoyed no assistance from Athens. The suppression of the Ionian revolt, the reappearance of the Phoenicians, the recovery of Thrace and Macedon by Mardonios, may have contributed to convince Sparta, with some of her allies, perhaps Corinth, who had interests in the north, that the Persian advance was a serious menace to southern Hellas. Yet the good understanding effected between Athens and Sparta, in or before the year 491 B.C., is still something of a mystery. The story of the Aiginetan hostages 6. 49, 50, 61, 73, the story of the mission of Philopappus 6. 106, and the despatch of the two thousand hoplites to Attica 6. 125, appear to establish at least the bare fact of an agreement and alliance between Sparta and Athens against the Persian. The

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1 7. 148; but how little reliance can be placed on an Herodotean recovrt, appears in the note to 6. 40. On the date of the Argive war cp. note to 6. 76.
formal recognition of Spartan prostasia, involved in the appeal of Athens against Aigina, seems hardly in itself sufficient to account for the change. The evidence is to be reinforced by replacing here, in its natural sequence, the story told by Herodotus 7, 133 concerning the treatment of the heralds of Dareios at Sparta and Athens, a year before Marathon. If there were any truth in the story, it might be taken to confirm the indications of the existence of an agreement and alliance between Athens and Sparta at the time. Unfortunately the story is open to grave suspicion. The whole passage, 7, 133-137, obviously belongs to the latest series of additions by Herodotus to his work. The story must be taken to have come to the knowledge of Herodotus after the summer of 430 B.C. in explanation of the fate of Nikoae and Aneristes in that year. The reason why the story was not inserted in its natural, or chronological, context is not far to seek: the idea of a mission of Persian heralds to Athens in 491 B.C. is inconsistent with the previous relations of Persia and Athens, as also with the spirit of the narrative in the present triad of Books. Persia had already received the promise of earth and water from Athenians 5, 73, and the repudiation of that pledge was in itself a causa belli. The Persians had already demanded the restoration of Hippias, and that demand had been indignantly rejected 5, 96, before the advent of Aristagoras to Athens. The Athenians had supplied aid to the Ionians, and joined in the attack on Sardes in 498 B.C. Was the king likely to send heralds to Athens in 491 B.C. after the diplomatic and military passages just indicated? If the historical facts are against the probability of any such heraldic mission to Athens in 491 B.C., the literary fancies of the historian are no less adverse to the insertion of any such mission in Bk. 6. It would be fatal to the story of the vow of Dareios (τὰ περὶ τὸ λέγοντας 5. 105) and the scene laid at Susa in the winter of 498/7 B.C. It would be equally fatal to the expressed destination of the expedition of Mardonios in 492 B.C., 6. 43. If Dareios had prayed Zeus (Ormazd) to grant him vengeance on the Athenians, and had a servant daily reminding him of his vow, all these years: if the expedition of Mardonios in the year 492 B.C. had been directed against Athens: what room or reason is there in the historian’s pages for an embassy to Athens in 491 B.C. with the comparatively tame demand for the symbols of surrender? Is it to be argued that Hippias had pleaded, not in vain, that a chance for repentance should be granted his native city? If that were so, why should not the fact have been recorded in its proper place? Is it not more probable that Athens has been associated in the crime with Sparta, at a time when the true perspective of the relations between Athens and Persia had been confounded? The only circumstance which lends plausibility to the story of the conduct of Athens is the mention of the Barathon.1 But such pieces of local colour are not beyond the

1 Later anecdotes, which introduce Miltiades (Pausan. 3, 15, 7) and Themistokles (Plutarch, Them. 6) into the affair, add little to the credibility of the outrage.
art of the story-teller: and what of verisimilitude is gained by the notorious pit at Athens is lost in the nameless well at Sparta. The anecdote has the air of a preconcerted arrangement between the Coryphaeans to pass a sorry jest upon the king's messengers: this characteristic makes the double performance none the more probable. If such an episode must be given up for Athens in 491 B.C., it is not very easy to save it for Athens at some other date. The most appropriate moment for the mission of heralds to Hellas from the king is about 515-511 B.C., in connexion with the king's invasion of Europe; and such a mission might be dated during one of the king's visits to Sardes, and most probably after his return from Scythia (cp. Appendix IV. § 8). If Persian heralds had reached Athens during the régime of Hippias they would not have been cast into the Barathron. If Hippias had medised before his expulsion, would the fact have been forgotten in Attica? The tradition in Thucydides 6. 59 of the intrigue of Hippias to procure the king's favour, after the death of Hipparchos (cp. Appendix III. § 3), leaves no room for this story of the treatment of the Persian heralds at Athens. Misplaced, omitted, or forgotten in its right place, a complement of the Spartan action, improbable in itself, and inconsistent with the record and the recorded facts, how can the story of the Athenian outrage on the Persian heralds stand for truth? In the case of Sparta\(^1\) can judgment go differently? The fate of Nikoiaos and Aneristos in 430 B.C. is beyond question, but it was not exacted by the Persian, nor is any reference to the crime of Sparta and Athens ever made, until it is raked up to explain, upon ethical principles, the fate of Nikoiaos and his colleague. Can it be certain that the 'devotion' of Bulis and Sperthias in 481 B.C. is strictly historical, or that it was undertaken as an act of reparation for the outrage of 491 B.C.? Why should the Spartans in that year have outraged the heralds even of a non-Hellenic power? They were not ignorant of the state of things in Asia, they had no special reason to provoke the great king to anger. Doubtless in, or before, that year Sparta decided to do for Athens what she had refused to undertake for Miletos a few years previously. Much had happened meanwhile: the revolt and reduction of Ionia, war between Athens and Aigina, war between Sparta and Argos, the surrender of Thrace and Macedon to the Persian. But that Sparta treated the Persian embassy after an impious fashion, the memory of which disappears for fifty or sixty years, to be revived in connexion with an episode of the second year of the Peloponnesian war, is improbable. The account of that episode given by Thucydides 2. 67 lends no colour to the historical pretensions of the Herodotean anecdote for 491 B.C., but rather the reverse; in particular,

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\(^1\) Wecklein, U. d. Tradition d. Perser-Kriege, p. 42, observes that pit and well supply earth and water. He believes, however, that something had happened in Sparta to make the Spartan conscience uneasy. Busolt, Die Lakedaimonier, 1. 547, finds the Spartans guilty.
the addition of a third Spartan victim (Stratodemos) quite spoils
the precision of the Herodotean moral. In short, Persian heralds
may have visited Sparta in 491 B.C. or earlier, but it is not likely
that they were ever treated as Herodotus reports, in Bk. 7. Had
they been so treated, the act would have been mentioned as a
*casus belli*. The story may be a pragmatic adaptation of some tradi-
tion in regard to the relations of Athens and Sparta before the
Marathonian campaign. It seals the memory of their alliance
by the ascription of a common crime. A Laconic jest, possibly
a *bon mot* of Kleomenes, may have been the peg on which the
story was hung. Its genesis may be identical with its resurrection
about the year 430 B.C. to explain the fate of the Spartans in Athens,
for which the religious consciousness of the day demanded some
excuse, perhaps in the very interests of Athens herself.1 The mission
of the heralds, the surrender of Aigina to the Persian in 491 B.C. will
rank as historic facts, whatever the reception accorded to the king’s
messengers elsewhere. Herodotus expressly represents the heralds as
sent to many Greek states; but in the absence of proper names, and
in view of the goal and purpose of the expedition of 490 B.C., it may
fairly be doubted whether a summons from the Persian was addressed
to any other state but Aigina. The failure of Aigina to co-operate
with the Persians in 490 B.C. for the restoration of Hippias can be
explained; but where were the other Greek states who had submitted,
according to this story, to the great king?

The other items of evidence in regard to the relation of Sparta to
‘the Persian question’ at this period call for little remark in this
connexion. Apparently in the year 491 B.C. at the request of
Athens the Spartans interfere against Aigina for ‘medism,’ and after
some difficulties, which display the inner condition of Sparta in an
unfavourable light, the Spartan kings take and deposit hostages of
Aigina in Athens (6. 49, 50, 61, 73). These hostages were
presumably still in Athenian custody at the time of the battle of Mar-
athon. They may have had the effect of reducing Aigina to impotence
in the Marathonian campaign. It is certainly remarkable that the
Persians are not recorded to have had any support from Aigina in
490 B.C. The further bearings of the story of the hostages may best
be considered in connexion with the accounts of the wars between
Aigina and Athens (see Appendix VIII.). The events affecting
Sparta in the record of the year 490 B.C. comprise only the applica-
tion of Philipides for aid (6. 106), and the tardy despatch of 2000
Spartan hoplites, under an anonymous commander, who arrived it may
be the day after the battle (6. 120). The former event is narrated by
Herodotus without any clear suggestion, or indication, of an already

1 It is significant that Hdt. 7. 133
proffes himself unable to indicate the
divine visitation upon Athens for her part
in the common crime. Pausanias 3. 12. 7
supplies the omission. The silence of
Thucydides is, perhaps, an intentional
censure of the Herodotean story.
existing agreement between the two states for mutual assistance: it is, however, natural to assume that there was already existing συμμαχία, or at least an ἐν μαχίᾳ, ἐν τῷ Μήδῳ, between Sparta and Athens, and that the mission of Philippides had for its object to apprise the Spartans that the case for support had become urgent. His interview at Sparta is with the ἄρχοντες. Who or what may be concealed under this phrase is not self-evident, but it probably covers the Ephors (cp. 9. 7), whose function it may have been φρονμαντὶ φαίνειν. The zeal of Sparta on this occasion on behalf of Athens does not seem urgent, and if Demaratos had just fled to Asia, and Kleomenes was intriguing in Arkadia, Sparta's lukewarmness might be all the more easily defended. Yet the rapidity with which the support moved, when once in motion, looks like 'business'; and the celebrated criticism uncritically directed against the malice of Herodotus, as evidenced in his remarks on the cause of the Spartan delay, might really point to bad faith on the part of the Spartans, but that the only month in question was probably the Karnean, in relation to which the Spartan excuse may have been sincere. (Cp. Plutarch, de malign. Herodoti, 26, notes to 6. 106, and Appendix X. § 27.) It is, however, possible to maintain that Kleomenes was still in Sparta, and that the reaction after Marathon helped to his downfall. (Cp. § 3 supra.) Anyway it is obvious that there was a great change of feeling and policy in Sparta, after the Athenian victory, which may better be considered in connexion with the attempted recovery of the Aiginetan hostages (Appendix VIII. § 5). The proceedings connected with the expulsion, restoration and death of Kleomenes might help to explain why the intervention of Sparta on behalf of Aigina in 488 B.C. was confined to a purely moral argument, as may be inferred from the speech put into the mouth of Leotychides, 6. 86.

1 Cp. § 8, pp. 93, 94 supra.
APPENDIX VIII

ATHENS AND AIGINA

§ 1. Character of the subject and of the records. § 2. Story of the origin of the feud (5. 82-88); its chronology, sources, and significance. § 3. The alliance of Aigina and Thebes (5. 79-81, 89); chronology, sources, and significance of the story. § 4. The medism of Aigina; the appeal of Athens to Sparta. § 5. The excursus in Bk. 6, on the Atheno-Aiginetan war: (i) the mission of Leotychides, cc. 85, 86; (ii) the seizure of the Theoroi (return of the hostages), c. 87; (iii) the conspiracy of Nikodemos, cc. 86-91; (iv) the three great battles, cc. 91-92. Chronology, sources and significance of these stories. § 6. Summary of results.

§ 1. The story, or stories, of the relations between Athens and Aigina, during the main period covered by this volume, with some additions for the periods before and after, are set out with comparative richness in the fifth and sixth Books, as shown in the Introduction. It would appear that the struggle between Athens and Aigina, specially during the latter years of the period, was a matter of interest second only to the questions of the relations of Athens to Persia, to Sparta, to the exiled tyrant. Unfortunately the chronology of the passages dealing with the subject leaves a great deal to be desired, and the chronological inconsequence infects the causal connexion of events. One problem in particular presents itself at starting. Prima facie, all the events under this heading narrated in these Books took place before the invasion of Datis in 490 B.C., and the implicit dates in the text, so far as they go, seem to bear out that presumption. Only two points of detail can be dated as subsequent to Marathon, consistently with the historian’s conception of the case, the one inferentially a few months or years,\(^1\) the other demonstrably more than half a century, after that epoch.\(^2\) But, if with these two exceptions the whole story, as here related, is to be understood of the period closed by Marathon, what has become, in the Herodotean records, of the history of the relations of Athens and Aigina between

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\(^1\) Vol. I. pp. xxxviii f., xlvi, lii.

\(^2\) The expulsion of the Aiginetans from their island, c. 91, in 431 B.C., Thuc. 2. 27.

\(^2\) Τὰ ἁγνέα μὲν δὴ Ὑπότροπων ἐγίνετο 6. 90.
490 and 481 B.C. In the latter year, according to Herodotus, the feud (διεθνή) between the two states was composed at the Isthmian congress, and the greatest war of the time (δ μέγας πόλεμος) terminated.\(^1\) There was, then, some fighting during the decade between Marathon and Salamis, and to that period may surely be assigned the project of Themistokles for the enlargement of the fleet, which is closely associated with the Aiginetan struggle.\(^2\) Yet, unless some of the events, recorded by Herodotus in Bks. 5 and 6, belong to the decade between Marathon and Salamis, the fighting of that period has entirely disappeared from his Histories. An attempt will be made in this Appendix to cover some of this loss by transferring materials, dated apparently by Herodotus before Marathon, to the succeeding decade. This attempt cannot be described as unjustifiable, and is to be defended by a consideration of the general character of the stories and by particular indications, including the anachronisms, contained in them. We are certainly not dealing with a single coherent and well chronologised narrative. It appears far more likely that Herodotus has been guilty of one more anachronism, even a very considerable one, than that his Histories contain no memory of the warfare between Athens and Aigina after Marathon. The exact amount of material to be transferred is a nice question, upon which it is less easy to make up one's mind, or to expect agreement from others. But, in any case, a good deal will be gained, as well for the objective history of the Atheno-Aiginetan war, as for our critique of the Herodotean logography, by a detailed examination of the traditions on the subject preserved by Herodotus, which contain, together with the usual literary transfigurations, indubitable evidence respecting the actual course of affairs.

Not less remarkable than the major omission or anachronism above indicated is a secondary omission in the Herodotean record, which redounds in a way to its historical credit. Accustomed as we rightly are to discover, in the work of Herodotus, an appreciable influence of later and, so to speak, contemporary politics and interests upon the record of earlier actions or events,\(^3\) we may be surprised to search the stories of the Atheno-Aiginetan feud for indications of such influences almost in vain. The story of the pollution (δύνας) proves, indeed, that the moral of a remote episode in the struggle was drawn, as late as 431 B.C., from an event of that year:\(^4\) but we are not obliged to infer that the whole context is of equally recent origin with the notice of the final and divine judgment upon the Aiginetans, nor has the last event seriously distorted the antecedent record. In a passage in the fifth Book we may perhaps detect a reference, apparently unconscious on the historian's own part, to the great war of 458 B.C., which resulted in the complete victory of Athens and the incorporation

\(^1\) 7. 145.
\(^2\) Edit. 7:144, Thuc. 1. 14, "Aθ. νικόλ. c. 22.
\(^4\) 6. 91.
of Aigina in the list of Athenian tributaries. But apart from these passages the story betrays little if any evidence, as a whole, of any influence or coloration traceable to the relations of Athens and Aigina during the Pentekontaetia (478-431 B.C.). Rarely does Herodotus exhibit a clearer perception of the difference between his own time and the time about which he is writing than he shows in dealing with this topic. If by mistake, or misdirection, he has antedated an important section of the story, one effect of the great anachronism is to detach more completely the earlier war (of 487-481 B.C.) from the war of 458/7 B.C., and more completely to ignore the latter. Herodotus, indeed, might almost be accused of fighting shy of that penultimate episode altogether, so little does it seem to have affected his account of earlier affairs. Not that the historian of the Mede wars was bound to notice the reduction of Aigina in 458/7 B.C. any more than the reductions of Thasos, of Naxos, of other allies by “the tyrant city” during her tenure of empire. But it is none the less remarkable that the later politics had so little influence, in this case, upon the earlier history, seeing the distinct reference made to the fate of the Aiginetans in 431 B.C., and the extent to which, in other cases, we may detect the influence of later interests or situations upon the record of former times. Can it be that, in this case, it was the events of 458 B.C. which preserved, or revived, the stories, which Herodotus, some time afterwards, gathered up for his purpose? Can it be that, but for the events of 458 B.C., these stories would never have come down to us? May it not be that the notorious character of the last stage in the struggle, with which he himself was contemporary, at once explains the interest which Herodotus takes in the earlier episodes, and also saves him from confounding, in this case, the present and the past? The episodes of the past he may have disarranged, or misconceived, but he held them clearly away from the transactions of his own day; the only one of the latter which he cares to relate being one which carried an irresistible moral.

The passages here to be considered given simply in order as they occur in the text are as follows: 5. 79-89, 6. 49, 50, 61, 73, 85-93 (7. 145). But this order represents neither chronological sequence, nor rational causality, and some rearrangement of the material is requisite for present purposes. It may be convenient to observe that the records, as a whole, comprise four great heads or subjects, under which the various stories may be distributed: viz. I. the origin of the feud (5. 82-88); II. the alliance of Aigina and Thebes (5. 79-81, 89); III. the medism of Aigina and the appeal of Athens to Sparta.

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1 5. 89, cp. Thuc. I. 108.
4 The following passages may usefully be read in the same connexion: 2. 175, 3. 50, 4. 155, 7. 147. The record of Aiginetan action in the war of 480 B.C. must also be taken into account: Bks. 7-9 passim. At the date when the oracle, recorded in 8. 122, was given, Delphi must have been well disposed towards Aigina.
6. 49, 50, 73; IV. a set of stories, or records, presenting the subsequent relations of Athens and Aigina so far as the record ex hypothesi goes, 6. 85-93, of so complex and disputable a character that it is hardly possible to mark their quality or contents by a single title. It will be convenient to consider each of these four sections in turn, with special reference to the chronology, the sources, and the historical character, or significance, of the given passage. It will then be possible to summarise the general results, and even to present, in tabular form, the more probable perspective of the historic events. It must throughout be remembered that we are primarily concerned with the period from 519 B.C. to 489 B.C., but that owing, on the one hand, to the nature of the case, and, on the other hand, to the nature of the record we are compelled somewhat to disregard these limits. The first passage will naturally carry back before the limit. Owing to circumstances there is practically little or nothing to record of the first decade (519-510 B.C.) of our period. The hither end is reached not in 489 B.C. but only in 481 B.C. The period actually or mainly in view comprises three decades: the decade before the Ionian revolt, from the expulsion of Hippias to the advent of Aristagoras; the decade from the outbreak of the Ionian revolt to the battle of Marathon, or the Parian expedition; the decade from Marathon to Salamis, or from the failure at Paros (489 B.C.) to the congress at the Isthmus (481 B.C.). These are natural periods for the subject, and the final problem is to distribute the materials, contained in these Books, in an acceptable sequence over those thirty years.

§ 2. I. The first chapter in the story, as a whole, is the account of the origin of the feud between Athens and Aigina, Bk. 5. cc. 82-88. This passage forms a distinct excursus or digression in the course of the main narrative,¹ but it is itself in turn compacted of several stages, or strata. It will suffice here to observe that the story of the dealings between Athens and Aigina only begins in chapter 84 with the words πρὸς ταῦτα οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι εἰς Αἰγίναιν προμαχότας κτλ.: what lies before that puts Athens into relation with Epidauros, and Epidauros into relation with Aigina, and is virtually another story, though a story consequential, or antecedent, as the case may be, to the story of the actual outbreak of the feud between Aigina and Athens. It is not necessary in this place to recite the story, or stories, in detail: taking them as read, we may at once proceed to examine the chronological data, to discuss the probable source, or sources of the story or stories, and to determine, so far as may be, the truth, or at least the significance, of the events narrated.

a. Chronological. Distinguishing the story of the origin of the quarrel into its two natural stages, and dealing first with the latter portion, the initial problem is to determine the date of the Athenian demand and attack on Aigina (cc. 84 ad fin., 85). The mention of

a trireme, the return to Phaleron are not of much chronological service in this connexion, any more than the *thalassocracy* of the Aiginetans. A more important chronological indication lies in the statement which dates the event immediately before the adoption of Ionian (alias Karian) dress by the Athenian women. This synchronism might be just, even though the reason given for the change were pragmatic and fictitious. Unfortunately the adoption of the Ionian fashion in dress at Athens cannot be precisely dated. If, however, analogy and combination may supply the place of direct testimony, or if the adoption of Ionian dress may be taken as symbolical of a policy and a new departure, then it is not unreasonable to refer the given situation to the epoch of Solon, or of Peisistratos, and to connect it with the revived or developed Ionism in their conduct of affairs. Other particulars in the history of Athens under Solon and Peisistratos support this hypothesis. The successful war with Megara, the conquest of Salamis, the new coinage, the development of trade and commerce at Athens, the patronage of Delos, the alliances with Naxos, with Argos, and so forth, were each and all calculated to bring about, and that soon, a quarrel between Athens and Aigina. In fine, the historic events which are preserved, with more or less accuracy, in cc. 85-87 may be assigned to the lifetime of Solon or Peisistratos, and rather to a date anterior to 560 B.C. than to a later year.

The preceding chapters, 82-84, open up a further vista, for which it is hardly worth while to attempt exact chronology. The revolt of Aigina from 'Epidauros' and its establishment as an independent power might plausibly be connected with the fall of the Temenid dynasty in Argos, even as the previous subjection of Aigina to the mainland might plausibly be dated to the reign of Pheidon. Before that epoch, again, rises the problematic vision (c. 82) of a time when Epidauros was a loyal servant of the Attic deities, when olives were cultivated only in Attica (ός λαμπρών), albeit statues were already made of metal or of marble. It is possible to see in these references a dim and distorted memory of relations dating from the days of the Kalaurian amphitryon, but to what extent they have been transfigured by afterthought, or diminished by oblivion, who shall determine? In any case, they lie far beyond the immediate beginning of the quarrel between Athens and Aigina as narrated by Herodotus, which, as above argued, need not carry us beyond the limits of the sixth century B.C.

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1 5: 85, cp. Thuc. 1. 13.
2 Cp. 6. 116.
3 c. 83. Though mentioned in the first part of the story the date must approximate to the proceedings in the second part.
4 c. 88. See notes ad l.
5 Cp. Curtius, Gr. Gesch. 1. 5 352 ff. The curious anecdote of Solon and the young men in women's clothes might have a place in this connexion. Cp. notes to 5. 18.
6 Cp. notes to 6. 126.
7 Strabo 374 (plainly after Ephoros). The Epidaurians, however, seek counsel from Delphi, Hdt. l.c. K. O. Müller, *Aegineticorum liber*, § 8 (1817), dated the League circa Ergiini et Thesei temporis.
§ 2

ATHENS AND AIGINA

107

What the date of the story itself may be, is a further question. To us it is in its present form no older than Herodotus, but it came to him, in the course of his researches probably after 458 B.C.; in some form or other as ancient history. The story of the statues, i.e. of the first attack of the Athenians upon Aigina, appears in the context to be traced back to the epoch, some few years before 500 B.C., of the Aigineto-Theban alliance against Athens. But it would scarcely be safe to argue from one passage that the story was not older or younger than the implicit epoch. Unless the story be a pure fiction, it must in some form be as old as the events themselves; unless it be true in every detail, it owes a debt, probably cumulative, to a series of *récits* terminating in Herodotus himself.

8. Sources. The passage just quoted might seem to refer the story to an Aiginetan source: but the body of the story itself (especially cc. 85, 86), proves that various and rival authorities are represented in the text of Herodotus. It can hardly, however, be doubted that the conflicting authorities are introduced as variants upon a more or less continuous story, extending from c. 82 to c. 88 inclusively. The prominence of the oracle in c. 82 is no adequate reason for ascribing what may be called the nucleus, or the main thread, to Delphic memories. The passage with which the story concludes (c. 88 *ad fin.*), suggests a more probable and hardly less august source. The story of the statues of Damia and Auxesia—what is it primarily but a legend told in the Aiginetan temple of those divinities? It explains many facts: to wit, why the statues were of olive-wood, why they were kneeling statues, why the women offered such extraordinarily large brooch-pins in that temple, why none but enchoriial pottery was used in the sanctuary. The Attic complements, or correlative, of the story are easily recognisable. The statement that there was a monopoly of olive-trees in Athens, the truth of which Herodotus himself does not guarantee (*λέγεται δὲ κτλ.* c. 82), may be from an Athenian authority. A phrase applied to the Aiginetans (*ἀγνωστούργής χρησάμενοι* c. 83) is hardly what Aiginetans themselves would have used, but it might of course be a happy thought of Herodotus' own. Athenian authority is expressly cited (in cc. 85, 86), as contradicting the Aiginetan version of the story, and (in c. 87) as contradicting an 'Argive' statement, while in the same passage an admission and a complement to the joint Argivo-Aiginetan story are expressly given from Athenian sources. Whether the passage on the change of dress at Athens is from an Attic source, or is a result of the historian's reflection (*γνώμη*), may be considered a disputable point. The remark that the so-called Ionian style was really Karian comes with special but suspicious force from a born 'Karian'; how much of

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1 Cp. 5. 89.
2 8. 89 τὸν δὲ Ἐθναῖων ἑπικελεομένων, προβάμα τῶν περὶ τὰ ἀγάλματα γενόμενων ἀρχαίοις κόμοις οἱ Ἀιγινηται κτλ.
the antecedent history of Attic dress is Herodotean speculation, how
much of it Attic tradition, who can decide? It seems unlikely that
the adoption of the ‘Ionian’ dress at Athens was as late as Solon
or Peisistratos: it seems still more unlikely that the reason for the
change was the women’s work recorded in the text.

c. Historic character or significance. The preceding remarks upon the
chronology and the sources of the whole passage imply a certain estimate
of its value and significance for historical purposes. The story is not
exactly history, but there is history in it. We cannot be sure that
we have the real answers to the questions why Attic women wore
the Ionnian chiton, why Argive and Aiginetan women affected and
dedicated such large brooch-pins, or used only local ware for certain
hieratic purposes. Nor can we believe that the story of the statues
supplies the only and sufficient reason for the feud between Athens
and Aigina, for which there were plainly good grounds in political
and commercial interests, supposing the date of the feud to have been
rightly ascertained. On the other hand, the narrative teems with
local colour, with historic facts and real causes, if interpreted in the
light of our general knowledge of the course of Greek history. With
that knowledge the story is reconcilable, though from the story by
itself we could never have discovered its full significance, nor does
Herodotus betray any suspicion of it.

§ 3. II. The next stage in the struggle between Aigina and
Athens is that recorded in 5. 79-81, 89. The story again comprises
two distinct episodes: (1) an alliance of Thebes and Aigina, and the
loan of the Aiakid idola; (2) a piratical warfare (πόλεμοι ἀκήρυκτος)
originating from the side of Aigina, without recorded provocation on
the part of Athens. These two episodes, or series of acts, it is important
to discriminate: but they need not be recounted here further.
It will be sufficient to envisage the chronology, and to examine the
indications of origin and significance which the text contains.

a. Chronology. How much time is covered by cc. 79-81 is not
very clear: but a chronological terminus a quo is supplied for the action
of Aigina in the connexion with Thebes, and the representation of this
alliance as consequent on the defeat of the Boeotians and Chalkidians
by the Athenians, which in its turn succeeds the break-up of the great
invading army under Kleomenes and Demaratoes at Eleusis. Dealing
in decades it would apparently be safe to say that the alliance of
Thebs and Aigina against Athens originates in the last decade of the
sixth century, i.e. between the expulsion of Hippias and the visit of
Aristagoras to Athens. A chronological terminus ad quem for this war
appears to be suggested in cc. 89, 90, seeing that the projected restora-
tion of Hippias by the Spartans is alleged as the cause which arrested,
or prevented, the Athenians in their intended reprisals on the Aigin-
tans. The projected restoration of Hippias is certainly prior to the
visit of Aristagoras in 499 B.C., and it is possible that, in the record
of the ἀκήρυκτος πόλεμος, we reach the last lustre of the sixth century,
ATHENS AND AIGINA

without passing beyond it. But it must be admitted that this conclusion is very far from indisputable. The clearest chronological indications in the context are given in c. 89, but they suggest that Herodotus has here again, perhaps, committed himself to a fresh anachronism. According to the story, the Athenians (before the projected restoration of Hippias) are preparing to attack Aigina, when an oracle comes to warn them to postpone the attack "thirty years." The oracle, however, foretells likewise, in any case, the ultimate reduction of the island (τίλος μέν τοι καταστρέψσθαι). It is only reasonable to see in this oracle a reference to the reduction of Aigina in 458/7 B.C. It is hardly less reasonable to carry the period of "thirty years" back from that epoch in order to gain a date for the Athenian undertaking against Aigina, which was ex hypothesi the occasion of the oracle. This argument leads to a date about 488/7 B.C. or a little later, as the date at which the Athenians prepared to move against Aigina, and perhaps founded the τίμαιον to Aiakos, which in Herodotus' own days was in the Agora.1 But this date lands us in the decade after Marathon, not in the decade before the Ionian revolt. War between Athens and Aigina there certainly was during the interval between Marathon and Salamis, though Herodotus has nowhere explicitly described it; and if to that war the reported oracle refers, it is by an anachronism that the Athenian project against Aigina is transferred, in this passage, to a date before the close of the sixth century, or at least it is an error that the Pythian response is brought into connexion with the circumstances of that time. It manifestly squares far better with the general data and traditions to conclude that Athens did not undertake or project any conquest of Aigina until after Marathon, than to suppose that Athens was at war with Aigina just before the Ionian revolt. Some hostility and irregular warfars may of course date back to that period, but hardly the deliberate project of Athens, or the promise of Delphi, for the conquest of Aigina. Some items of tradition belonging to a date after Marathon, perhaps even after the battle of the Eurymedon, seem to have been thrown back in this passage into the last decade of the sixth century. That being the case, the question must arise whether any of the events recorded in this passage (5. 79-81, 89) belong to the sixth century? The question above stated recurs: How much time is covered by the narrative of cc. 79-81? How long after their defeat at the Euripos (c. 77) did the Thebans effect an alliance with the Aiginetans? How much time is to be allowed for the renewed attack on Athens by the Thebans in alliance with the Aiakids (c. 81) and their renewed disasters, and when precisely is this fresh Theban movement to be dated? How much time elapses, after the failure of the Heroes to

1 τῆς μαρκ. ἔτι τῆς ἁγίας Θηριάς 5. 89. was ‘restored.’ Cp. Introduction, vol. I. How it escaped the Persians in 480/79 pp. ix f., and note ad loc. n.c. Hdt. does not indicate: perhaps it
bring victory to the Thebans before the Aiginetans are persuaded to lend human assistance, and harry the coasts of Attica? Does any of this fighting belong to the time between 500 B.C. and 491 B.C.? Does any part of the affair fall not before 500 B.C. but after 490 B.C., the anachronism having been induced, or facilitated, by relations of the Thebans to the Chalkidian war before 500 B.C. on the one hand, and to the Aiginetan war after 490 B.C. on the other?

It is certainly difficult to understand how the Athenians could afford to despatch twenty ships to Ionia in 499 B.C. (5. 97), if they were at war with the Aiginetans at the time. On the other hand it is not easy to excuse or even understand the Athenian withdrawal from the Ionian revolt, unless Athens had some trouble nearer home, which tied her hands. If we might suppose that the Thebans or the Aiginetans, or both, took advantage of the absence of the Athenians in Ionia to reopen hostilities, or to harry the Attic seaboard, we have an easy explanation of the refusal of Athens to support Ionia after the first campaign (5. 103). But if the ἀκρωκτός πόλεμος fall into the decade after the Ionian revolt and before Marathon, then of course it was not the movement in Sparta for the restoration of Hippias which stayed Athenian preparations against Aigina, for there were no such preparations on foot, unless, before 500 B.C., Athens was contemplating an almost unprovoked attack on Aigina. It would be rash, indeed, to argue that the attempted rape of the ζώανα by the Athenians belongs to this date, and that the text, which represents that matter as ancient and almost forgotten history before the Thebano-Aiginetan alliance, is hugely out of its reckoning. It is more reasonable to emphasise the statements which imply that the old quarrel between Athens and Aigina was almost forgotten until Thebes (and Delphi) fanned it again into flame, and that in the first instance, or even in the second instance, Aigina did not lend very strong or formidable aid to Thebes for the destruction of Athens. In short, though Herodotus plainly dates the events narrated in cc. 79-81, 89, before the Ionian revolt, it is probable that they must be conceived in part, if not altogether, as subsequent to that date. It may be that the alliance of the Aiakids 5. 79, 80 belongs to the decade 510-500 B.C., while the ἀκρωκτός πόλεμος 5. 81, 89 may fall into the decade following.

b. On the sources from which this part of the narrative (5. 79-81, 89) is derived, it is not necessary to enlarge. Herodotus had given no specification. The prominence of the oracle (cc. 79, 80) is not a sufficient reason for inferring Delphic records or authority: what of amicus, of ethos, or of other intrinsic evidence is visible in the story suggests an Attic industry. Knowledge might, perhaps, have

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1 To this point might also be referred the loan of the twenty Corinthian ships, the crying need for which may have arisen from the action of the Aiginetans, in the absence of the twenty Attic ships in Ionia. Cp. 6. 88, and § 5 infra.
come to Herodotus from the close (τίμετος) of Aiakos in the Athenian Agora, the founding of which was ascribed to Delphic direction, and formed an excellent antidote, surely, to the alliance of the Aiakids, granted to Thebes. The superiority of Aiakos to his sons was, indeed, proved by the sequel, and is a further guarantee of the Attic tone of the whole story; the description of the Aiginetan warfare as ἀκριβότατος is hardly from a friendly source. The substance of c. 89 would in general be admitted to betray its Attic origin, and a comparatively recent origin: for the 'now' (νῦν) must be later, and a good while later, than the 'end' (τέλος) of the long struggle between Aigina and Athens (457 B.C.). But sources and authorities rarely limit the free play of the historian's judgment and art, and it passes the power of mere analysis to say where, in this case, the contamina
tion of the evidences begins and ends.

c. The significance of the story has been to some extent discounted, in the consideration of its chronology. The political and historical significance, the relation to the general history of Hellas, or the special interests of Athens, must obviously depend largely upon the date assigned to each event recorded. Our estimate must vary considerably according as we suppose the whole story to fall before the Ionian revolt, or before the battle of Marathon, or even partly before and partly after that battle; still more, if we suppose that at least three episodes, or stages, have here been 'telescoped' by the historian, one of which belongs to the last decade of the sixth century,1 another to the first decade of the fifth century,2 and a third to the period just after Marathon.3 In any case the movements and combination of Thebes and Aigina are testimony to the growing power and importance of Attica, and help to explain the policy of Athens towards Persia, towards Ionia, during these decades. The intervention of Delphi is also significant. The Theban response (c. 79) looks much less like a sa
cinium post eventum than the later advice to Athens (c. 89). In or about 458 B.C. Athenian interests may have been in the ascendant at Delphi,4 and to this period the oracle may well belong, which virtually reminds the Athenians that for thirty years they have endured the hostility of Aigina, and that it is now time to make an end of the business. Whether the earlier behest was hostile or friendly to Athens is not so clear: it might pass as simply ambiguous, and therefore genuine.

1 The alliance of the Aiakids ἡ συμμαχία τῶν Αιακίδων 5. 81.
2 πέλευς ἀκριβότατος 5. 81.
3 The movement of the Athenians about 487 B.C., implied in the oracle 5. 98, the true motivation of which must be sought in the later passages, 6. 85-93.
4 Thuc. 1. 108. The battle of Oenophyta made Athens supreme in central Greece: the same chapter records the re
duction of Aigina. Op. C. J. A. iv. 23, Duncker, Gesch. d. Alt. viii. 237, Busolt, Gr. Gesch. ii. 494 f. It is difficult to believe that Delphi (generally on the winning side) was anti-Athenian at this moment. But at any rate some years later, Athens was for a short time in favour (Thuc. 1. 112). This was not long before the Thirty Years' truce, a moment which has left some impression upon the Herodotean Histories. Op. notes to 5. 77, and Appendix VII. § 2, p. 95 supra.
It is not easy, or necessary, to assign limits, or motives, to the inspiration of the Delphic god; nor is it, of course, inconceivable that within ten years of the expulsion of Hippias Delphi might have reason to favour the enemies of Athenian liberties, and of the democratic constitution (ep. 5. 78, 90). But the oracle recorded in c. 79 can hardly be described as partisan in character: so that, even if its exact date could be determined, it would not justify any strong inference in regard to Delphic politics.

§ 4. III. Herodotus in the fifth Book places a war between Athens and Aigina before the Ionian revolt, before the final retirement of Hippias to Sigeion, before the end of the sixth century. The next episode in the story dates clearly to the year 491 B.C., so that for upwards of ten years, as Herodotus presents the facts, nothing was to be heard, or related, of the war: the relations of Athens and Aigina are a blank, so far as Herodotus' own mind is concerned. In the spring of the year before Marathon Aigina gave earth and water to Dareios, and Athens appealed to Sparta against the traitors (6. 49).

Is it conceivable that this blank conceals nothing? If the Aiginetans had been harrying the Attic seaboard, the prompt appeal of Athens against the medism of Aigina is none the less natural and intelligible. Herodotus, as a historian, is plainly open to the charges of inconsequence and of incompetence in setting the Athenians and Aiginetans by the ears, some time before 500 B.C. and never giving a hint as to their subsequent relations, until presto! in the year 491 B.C. the Athenians are crying to the Spartans against the traitor island. Of the subsequent events of the year¹ there need be little or no question, so far as this matter is concerned. Sparta responds to the appeal of Athens. Hostages are taken from Aigina, and handed over to the Athenians (cc. 50, 73). The fate of these hostages Herodotus leaves us to conjecture, as best we may: but if it be admitted that they were in Athenian custody during the invasion of Datis, the admission may help to explain the inactivity of Aigina in the Marathonian campaign.

§ 5. IV. The brief record of the medism of Aigina, and of the appeal by Athens to Sparta, with its immediate results, is presented by Herodotus less as a chapter in the history of the Atheno-Aiginetan quarrel than as a stage in the struggle between Kleomenes and Demaratos in Sparta, or at most as an episode in the course of the Persian wars. The personal or biographical interest and point of view are so strong for the moment that the story of the fearful end of Kleomenes, and the various accounts given to explain it, including the (Spartan) story of the Argive war, are put on record by Herodotus,² before he proceeds to unfold the sequel of the dealings in 491/0 B.C. between Sparta, Athens and Aigina.³ Nor is the sequel presented as connected,

¹ Exactly how many months these events occupied is not a burning question; they may very well have spread into the next year of our reckoning. Op. Appendix VII. §§ 5, 6. ² 6. 74-84. ³ 6. 85-98.
directly or indirectly, with the Mede question. On the contrary, the point of view changes, and after an extraordinary bit of story-telling, which for the most part has nothing to say to the matter in hand,¹ a fresh chapter or series of chapters in the history of the Atheno-Aiginetan wars is introduced, so to speak, upon its own merits.² Viewed as a single excursus upon the relations of Athens and Aigina this passage breaks up into four stages: i. The appeal of Aigina to Sparta, and the refusal of Athens to liberate the hostages cc. 85, 86. ii. The seizure of the Athenian Theoria by the Aiginetans [and the exchange of captives?] c. 87. iii. The conspiracy of Nikodromos, and its failure cc. 88-91. iv. The renewal of hostilities, and the account of three great engagements cc. 92, 93. It will be sufficient here to have distinguished these stages in the story, the details as presented in the text being taken for granted, before proceeding to elucidate the chronological and other problems involved in the passage, as a whole.

a. Chronological. Herodotus supplies an express and valuable chronological date in placing the appeal of the Aiginetans to Sparta for the recovery of the hostages “after the death of Kleomenes,” c. 85 ad init. From that point the narrative proceeds in chronological sequence, though without any clear indications of the duration of actions, or of intervals, down to the establishment of Nikodromos and the Aiginetan exiles on Sunion at some date not exactly specified (c. 90), nay, down apparently to the victories and the defeat of the Athenians in cc. 92, 93. The intervening account of the origin of the Aiginetan áyos (c. 91), which was only expiated in 431 b.c. as there explained, contains indeed a valuable date, but not one which is of use in determining the chronology of the events previously or just thereafter narrated. The primary problems must be to determine the dates, at least approximately, of (i) the appeal of Aigina to Sparta in c. 85, (ii) the seizure of the Theoria c. 87, (iii) the conspiracy of Nikodromos in cc. 88-90, and (iv) the hard fighting in cc. 92, 93. Incidentally the date of the Corinthian loan of twenty ships (c. 89) must be considered.

The point of departure is given in the death of Kleomenes, but unfortunately the date of this event is not exactly indicated, or ascertainable. To bring the matter to a broad but definite issue: was Kleomenes alive at the time of the battle of Marathon? An unprejudiced perusal of the sixth Book of Herodotus leads to the conclusion that Herodotus, so far as he clearly conceived the matter at all, thought of Kleomenes as dead at that time; and the acute and industrious Clinton adopted that view, and makes Leonidas succeed his brother “a little before the battle of Marathon.”³ Clinton might be right in regard to the accession of Leonidas, without being right in regard to the death of Kleomenes, which it is not so easy to “fix within a year” as he assumes. If the death of Kleomenes preceded

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¹ 6. 86, story of Glaukos.
² 6. 87-93. In the structure of the volume there is a sort of parallel between the excursus on the subject in Bk. 5, cc. 82-85, and in Bk. 6, cc. 85-93.
Marathon, there is nothing in the passage cc. 85-93 to prove, or even to suggest, any date subsequent to Marathon for any part of the story—save indeed the difficulty of compressing into a single year so much history as would be implied in dating the whole story, from the first appearance of the Persian heralds in Aigina, during the spring or summer of 491 B.C. c. 49, to the victory of the Aiginetans in c. 93, which is by Herodotus plainly dated before the coming of Datis and Artaphernes. But it is not easy to understand how the Athenians and Aiginetans could have been actually engaged in active hostilities, while Datis was making his way across the Aegean: nor what the Aiginetans were about, during the presence of their friend the Mede, if they had just defeated the Athenians before his arrival: nor, it may be added, how the Athenians could undertake an expedition to Paros with their whole available fleet, if their nearer neighbour, a more formidable enemy, had just scored a victory over them (c. 93). It may therefore be maintained that, having regard to the time requisite for the development of the story itself, having regard to the general course of events, and the relations of Athens to Persia and to Paros in or about the same date, it is well nigh impossible to defend the chronological assumption of Herodotus, or to believe that all the events in the Atheno-Aiginetan struggle narrated in Bk. 6, should be crowded into the period between the coming of the Persian heralds in 491 B.C. and the coming of Datis in 490 B.C. The case is not materially altered by the hypothesis that, where Herodotus speaks of the death of Kleomenes, he should speak merely of his deposition. It is, indeed, possible that Kleomenes had ceased to be king in Sparta, and had departed into exile, before the battle of Marathon, and that Leonidas had succeeded, as Clinton assumes. But, by this violation of the express text of Herodotus, little would be gained for the chronological reconstruction. The visit of Leotychides to Athens (cc. 85, 86) might then be dated before Marathon, but the Aiginetan hostages would still be left in Athenian hands during the coming and going of Datis, and the rest of the story, or the bulk of it, would still fall after Marathon and the Parian expedition. Moreover the mission of Leotychides to Athens involves a change of policy on the part of Sparta, which is intelligible enough after Marathon, and after the attack on Paros, but which is unintelligible and senseless if dated to the summer of 490 B.C. when the Persian was at the gate, when Athens and Sparta were in alliance against him, and the treachery of Aigina was still treachery to Sparta, as Prostates of Hellas. Whether Athens and Aigina were engaged in active hostilities shortly before Marathon (cc. 92, 93), or whether a less regular warfare was then in progress (5. 81), hostilities were terminated, or suspended, by the action of Sparta (cc. 49, 50, 73) and the extradition of the hostages. It would, however, appear that after the death of Kleomenes, after Marathon,

1 A. Kaege, Krit. Gesch. d. Sparta, Staaten, in Fleischens's Jahrhücker, Suppl. 6 (1872), p. 471, argues that there was only one king in Sparta (=monarchy), at the time of the battle of Marathon; a not very probable suggestion.
§ 5

ATHENS AND AIGINA

115

after Paros, the Aiginetans obtained a change of policy at Sparta: a mission was despatched to Athens to demand the surrender of the hostages, but proved abortive (cc. 86, 87). That the death of Kleomenes took place after Marathon, not before Marathon, cannot be directly proved: it can only be advocated as agreeable to the general course of events. Against it stands not the explicit but only the constructive testimony of Herodotus. The following hypothetical chronology of the events, as presented by Herodotus, has simply in its favour the consideration that it renders intelligible what is otherwise a chaos in his text, and in the reputed course of events. It has been argued above (§ 3) that some if not all the fighting recorded by Herodotus in Bk. 5 and placed, inferentially, by him before the Ionian revolt belongs to a later period. So here again in this case it is almost certain that some, if not all the fighting, placed by him before the battle of Marathon, belongs to a period after the battle of Marathon, after the Parian expedition, after the death of Kleomenes. The possession of the hostages was a guarantee for the good behaviour of Aigina, and probably set Athens free to make her attack on Paros, which, if successful, would have furnished another point of vantage against Aigina. After Marathon a change in the attitude of Sparta towards Athens is intelligible enough, and the Aiginetans might easily have persuaded their Dorian kinsfolk to demand the return of the sureties deposited in Athens. But, on the failure of Leotychides, the Aiginetans were left to help themselves. They succeeded in capturing the sacred ship of the state en route for Sunion full of Athenian princes. The fate of these Athenian captives Herodotus omits to specify: what, if they were exchanged for the Aiginetan hostages whom Herodotus, to all appearance, leaves to death, or oblivion in Attica? Before the Athenians proceeded to move heaven and earth against the Aiginetans (πῶν μηχανήσασθαι ἐπὶ Αἰγινήστροι), they would surely have disposed in some way of these hostages. The exchange of captives is an omitted passage, that would come in well between c. 87 and c. 88. It left the Athenians at a disadvantage, compared at least with their previous situation, and there was now obviously no use in an appeal to Sparta. If the story of the intrigue with Nikodromos is to be placed here, it takes rank as the first instance of the fatal policy, in pursuance of which the Athenian democracy sought to establish its own supremacy upon the good will of local partisans, supported by Athenian arms. Under what circumstances Nikodromos had been previously expelled the island, and at what date, Herodotus unfortunately omits to mention. It might amuse an historical fancy to suppose that this reputable man had been one of the hostages in Athens, and had there made friends with some leading statesman, peradventure a Themistokles, and been persuaded of the merits of Attikismos. The intrigue miscarried, the Athenians arriving a day too late. But this miscarriage cannot have been due to a delay caused by the necessity of borrowing ships from the Corinthians in order to raise the Attic fleet to seventy
ships. If the affair is rightly to be dated after the expedition to Paros, the Athenians already had seventy ships (6. 132), i.e. already had the twenty Corinthian bottoms, which they are recorded to have procured for this occasion. As the text of Herodotus stands, the seventy vessels, although Nikodromos and the Attic partisans were either exiled or involved in a still more grievous fate (cc. 90, 91), proceeded to engage and defeat the enemy, and to cut the Argive contingent to pieces (c. 92); advantages cancelled, or qualified, by a subsequent victory gained by the Aiginetans (c. 93). There is very little in the record of these three engagements to mark the duration of the action as a whole, or exactly to determine its period. Prima facie, this passage too is antecedent to Marathon. It may be observed that the narrative in cc. 92, 93 does not cohere very clearly or closely with the passage immediately preceding, and the text is a little confused. But assuming that c. 91 is wholly or in part a digression, perhaps even a late insertion, and that the narrative in cc. 92, 93 is consequent upon the coup d'état of Nikodromos, which has already been vindicated for a date subsequent to Marathon, it follows that the fighting recorded in cc. 92, 93 is also post-Marathonian, and that the date involved in the sequence of cc. 92, 93, 94 is anachronistic. Placed after Marathon these battles become the immediate antecedents, and justification, of the psophism of Themistocles in 483 B.C. which provided for the establishment of a fleet of 100 triremes within a year, with the prospect of further augmentation subsequently. This plan removes, indeed, the whole story told in cc. 92, 93, or the series of stories cc. 85-93, which are placed by Herodotus apparently before Marathon, to a period subsequent to Marathon, and—what is, perhaps, even more
§ 5

ATHENS AND AIGINA

objectionable—might seem to leave us completely in the dark as to the relations between Athens and Aigina during the decade preceding Marathon, until the appeal of Athens to Sparta against Aigina comes as ‘a bolt out of the blue.’ But the case is not so. We have already transferred the harrying of the Attic seaboard, the ἀπόμιστος ὥλαμος of Bk. 5. 81, to the period subsequent to the outbreak of the Ionian revolt: that warfare is enough to account for the Corinthian loan, and, surplussed with the medium of Aigina, is more than enough to explain the Athenian appeal. The warfare recorded in cc. 92, 93 is, therefore, from this point of view superfluous in the decade before Marathon, and almost inconceivable immediately before Marathon. It is difficult to believe that after the Persian capture of Miletos, after the Persian recovery of Thrace and Macedon, Athens and Aigina were engaging on the scale indicated by the passage in question. A subsidiary indication confirms the conclusion. The Aiginetans apply, according to the story, for assistance to Argos: they actually obtain the assistance of 1000 Argive volunteers. The immediate context proves that the situation is subsequent to the Argive war with Kleomenes. How soon after the loss of 6000 hoplites was Argos in a position or a mood to furnish 1000 volunteers to a state, against which, by the way, she had a special grievance? If the Argive war has been rightly dated 1 circa 495/4 B.C., this indication suits a date for the Argive assistance to Aigina subsequent to Marathon much better than a date previous, just previous, to Marathon. Even if the Argive war be dated some years earlier the same remark applies, though with diminishing force. Other indications support the conclusion. The removal of the fighting recorded in cc. 92, 93 to the decade after Marathon gives additional ground for the peopling of Themistokles, and for the description of the warfare composed in 481 B.C. as “the greatest war” 2—otherwise a doubtful designation for the affairs of the period. But, though Herodotus wrongly placed the battles recorded cc. 92, 93 before Marathon, yet he may be right in having placed them after the death of Kleomenes, after the seizure of the Theoris, after the conspiracy of Nikodromos: but these events, as already shown, must be referred to a date after Marathon. How much time is to be demanded for the action in these passages is not clearly indicated. The application of Aigina to Sparta, and of Sparta to Athens, may have preceded by some months the capture of the Athenian Theoris (c. 87). The exchange of captives, the coup d’état of Nikodromos, and the fighting in cc. 92, 93, may cover events of two or three years. The oracle in 5. 89 may be taken to fix 488/7 B.C. as the point of departure, while the peopling of Themistokles suggests 483 B.C. and the congress at the Isthmus 481 B.C. as the terminus ad quem. 3

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2 7. 145.
3 If it should still occur to any one to admit that cc. 86-90 refer to events after Marathon, yet to maintain that cc. 92, 93 must be referred to a date before Marathon, he must prefix this passage also to the story of the extradition of the
b. The sources for the traditions of Atheno-Aiginetan affairs in Bk. 6 are not so clearly indicated as the sources for the parallel excursus in Bk. 5; in particular, the share of the Aiginetans in the story-telling is less obvious, and the requirements of the case appear to be satisfied by a division of the honours between Spartan and Athenian authorities, with due allowance for the historian’s own literary co-operation. The elements in the story which belong to the general course of the history, and the actions or intrigues reported of the Spartan kings (6. 50, 61), may fairly be attributed to the Spartan source: the memories of actual warfare between Athens and Aigina in this Book, seem to betray a strong Attic flavour. To deal in order with the passages which have been comprised under this paragraph: to Spartan sources may surely be referred the story of Glaukos, c. 86, and probably the preliminaries, which usher it in, c. 85. The scene is, indeed, laid in Athens, but an Athenian authority would hardly have refrained from pointing out the fallacy and inconsequence in the argument put into the mouth of Leotychides: and for the substance of the story the Spartans are dramatically made responsible. The citation of the oracle, ipsissimis verbis, is far from disproving this localisation of the source. Whether the Spartan source, or the historian himself, be responsible for putting the story into the mouth of Leotychides, upon the given occasion, is another question. It may be that Herodotus has endowed Leotychides with a gift for story-telling which was not his heritage in Sparta itself. Herodotus was, indeed, quite capable of inventing an argumentative speech for a given situation, but it is not credible that he invented the story of Glaukos, any more than the stories of Kypselos, of Periandros, of Alkmaion, of Agariste. As, in any case, Leotychides certainly did not speak Ionic, a literary activity on the part of Herodotus must be admitted: to assign its exact limits is too much a matter of speculation to be here attempted.

The remaining passage, conceived by Herodotus as relating events previous to Marathon, but above transferred to the period between 488-483 B.C., may be taken to run continuously from c. 87 to the end of c. 93, and comprises three episodes: the seizure of the Theoris, the coup d’état of Nikodromos, the actual fighting between the Athenians and the hostages, and regard cc. 85-90 as alone concerned with the transactions of the years 488-481 B.C. He will then read the passages in the following order:—A. cc. 92, 93 (with the Corinthian details supplied by c. 89 supposing either that the ἀδικοτατον πόλεμος grew into more pronounced hostilities, or that it belongs to the previous decade, before the Ionian revolt). B. cc. 49, 50, 73, a record of the transactions of 491 B.C. including the appeal of Athens to Sparta, and the extradition of the hostages, which ex hypothesi reduced the Aiginetans to quiescence, during the years 491-488 B.C. C. cc. 85-90 (91), the record, imperfect and incorrect, of the relations of Athens and Aigina during the years between the death of Kleomenes (after Marathon) and the settlement of the exiles at Sunion, or rather the psephism of Themistokles.

1 Or. note ad L. 2 Λέγωμεν ημεῖς αἱ Σαμυρίται—φαμέν—Λέγωμεν.
and Aiginetans. The Attic provenience of this latter section, cc. 92, 93, is almost unmistakable, the items referring to Sikyon and to Argos included. Sikyon was a place in which the Athenians were not a little interested, nor would the heavy fines inflicted by Argos upon her symmachia be unwelcome precedents at Athens, where, moreover, it might be remembered with advantage that the Argives, who had fought against Athens in Aigina, were there without sanction of the Argive Commons. The fate of Eurybates is one of the ‘labours’ of Sophanes, a genuine Attic hero, about whom various tales were told,\textsuperscript{1} all doubtless of Attic origin. The observation that the Athenians were off their guard when attacked and defeated by the Aiginetans suggests the Attic apologist.\textsuperscript{2} From first to last there is nothing in this passage, or series of passages, to suggest any but an Athenian source, reinforced by the author’s own reflections, and apart from the inserted notice of the αὐγος\textsuperscript{3} nothing to carry the activity of that source below the epoch of the Thirty Years’ truce.\textsuperscript{4}

c. In order to mark the significance, and historic quality of the traditions in Bk. 6 concerning the quarrel between Athens and Aigina, little remains to be done save to draw into one focus observations made incidentally above. In regard to the story as a whole what is most remarkable is, perhaps, the comparatively clear consciousness of the difference between now and then evinced by the historian, and the distinct record of relations between Athens and Aigina,\textsuperscript{5} Athens and Sparta,\textsuperscript{6} Athens and Corinth,\textsuperscript{7} sharply contrasted with the relations subsisting at the time, or times, of the author’s composition. This consciousness does not, however, clear Herodotus from serious anachronisms,\textsuperscript{8} much less cure him of telling good stories at the expense of probability,\textsuperscript{9} or save him from presenting a whole obviously incomplete and incoherent.\textsuperscript{10} To say that the Greeks of the fifth century B.C. argued and acted as they are represented by Herodotus to have done; that Leotychides, for example, might fairly have expected to take in the Athenians (so easy to cajo! 5. 97) with the story of Glaukos, is

\textsuperscript{1} Cp. 9. 73, 75.
\textsuperscript{2} 6. 93 νοὴ ἐκτάσει.
\textsuperscript{3} 6. 91.
\textsuperscript{4} The formula which introduces the passage cc. 87-91 of Ἀιγινηταί πρὶς τῶν πρώτων διεισάγων δουλείας διὰ τῶν ἐκ Ἀθηναίων θρῆναι, though certainly Herodotean (cp. Introduction, vol. i. p. cxxxv.), might have been taken over in this case from the Attic version. The διαψ in question stands in no direct connexion with the final judgment on the Aiginetians (c. 91), the latter is connected solely with the ascrip. It need not therefore be argued that the whole passage cc. 87-91 was inserted after 431 B.C., the insertion may fairly be restricted to c. 91 ἀπὸ τεσσάρων ἰνατέου ἀγος εἶτα. The reference to the Corinthians, c. 99, would be entirely in point any time after the naval development of Athens.\textsuperscript{5} 6. 89 ὁ γὰρ ἔπεφει τάξις ἀπὸ σφαλμάτων ἀρχικοῦ ἔτεον ἰστικός ἀνθρώπων κατάταξις τῶν Ἀιγινητῶν.\textsuperscript{6} 6. 90.\textsuperscript{7} 6. 99.\textsuperscript{8} e.g. the pro-chronism of cc. 85-93.\textsuperscript{9} e.g. story of Glaukos, c. 95.\textsuperscript{10} e.g. omission to specify the fate of the hostages.\textsuperscript{11} The unmotivated change of policy at Sparta is, perhaps, the most conspicuous instance, but the political intrigue with Nikodromos is inadequately motivated, and even the conduct of actual hostilities (cc. 95, 92, 93) is somewhat confused.
just one of those remarks which look more profound than they are. After all, it must be remembered that the action takes place in the age of Themistokles, of Aristagoras, and that the writer is a contemporary of Anaxagoras, of Thucydidès. Theory is often behind practice, and literature, as represented by Herodotus, is, in its motivation of events, not merely behind the more scientific or politic judgment of its own day, but hardly less far behind the actual causality of the events and actions which it records.\(^1\) Those who marvel at the immorality of Homer’s gods may believe the irrationality of Herodotus’ men. But, if we desire to understand Greek history and politics in the sixth and fifth centuries B.C., we must substitute or supply, to far greater an extent than is done by Herodotus, for mere caprice or mere simplicity in the action of states, political, economic, military reasons, and motives. From this point of view, as above shown, there is no difficulty in understanding the wars between Athens and Aigina, the changes in the conduct of Sparta, the contrast between Corinth’s friendship at one date and Corinth’s hostility at another; and so on. But, it is due to Herodotus throughout to acknowledge that, notwithstanding the incompleteness, inconsequence, and anachronism of his record, virtually from that record itself by readjustment and reconstruction a reasonable perspective and account of the whole course of affairs may be obtained.

§ 6. Restoring the passages from Bk. 5, the whole story may be exhibited in reasonable sequence as follows: regard being had to the preceding discussion on the chronology and significance of the various passages—

| i. Origin of the enmity between Aigina and Athens | 5. 82-88 | 575-550 B.C. ? |
| ii. First application of the Thebans to Aigina for assistance: δη συμμαχία τῶν Ἀλκαΐδων | 5. 79, 80 | 506 B.C. |
| iii. Second application of the Thebans: πῶλαμοι ἄδημοι | 5. 81, 89 | 498/7 B.C. |
| The Corinthian gift to Athens | 6. 89 | 498 B.C. |
| iv. Medism of Aigina | 491 B.C. |
| The Aiginetan hostages deposited in Athens | 4. 9 f., 73 |
| v. Change of Spartan policy Seizure of the θέωρης [exchange of prisoners?] | 6. 85, 86 | 488 B.C. |
| vi. The coup d’état of Nikodromos | 6. 87 |
| vii. The great war | 6. 88-90 | 487 B.C. |
| viii. The policy of Themistokles | 6. 92, 93 | 486 B.C. |
| ix. The reduction of Aigina | 7. 144 | 484-481 B.C. |
| x. The expulsion of the Aiginetans | 5. 89 | 483/7 B.C. |
| 6. 91 | 481 B.C. |

APPENDIX IX

INNER ATHENIAN HISTORY: HERODOTUS AND THE

ATHENAION POAITEIA


§ 1. CONSIDERING the extent to which the materials contained in these Books are derived from Athenian sources, and coloured by Athenian interests, it may be held surprising that the domestic and constitutional history of Athens should seem to have fared, relatively speaking, rather badly in the hands of Herodotus. The first Book had left Athens under the tyranny of Peisistratos, just after his final restoration. When the account of the internal history of Athens is resumed in the fifth Book, Peisistratos has been dead some fourteen years, and yet there is practically nothing to show for that interval.

1 With a partial exception of the Libyan Logi, there is hardly any considerable section of these Books which does not betray some degree of Atticism. The main divisions of the connected narrative, the Thraco-Scythian expeditions, the Ionian revolt, the Triumvirates, the Marathonian campaign are all largely based on Attic and philo-Attic materials: see Notes passim, and Appendices III.-VI., X. That the same observation should hold good of such topics as the wars of Athens and Aigina (Appendix VIII.), or the story of the expedition to Paros (Appendix XI.), is only to be expected. It is more surprising that for an account of the foreign affairs of Sparta we should have to go, in the main, to Athenian sources (Appendix VII.). Even the story of Kyrene betrays the presence of Attic salt (Appendix X., § 10). The ethnological and anthropological excursus, especially those concerned with Thrac and Scyth, owe much Attic Hinterland in the days of Herodotus, may be traced, in part, to the same interest. Even his western sources are indirectly to a tribute, if not a debt, to the ubiquity of Athenian influences. Cp. Introduction, vol. I. §§ 17, 20, 21, and pp. lx., lxi.

2 1. 84.

3 5. 55. The death of Peisistratos is mentioned, incidentally, 6. 103.

4 The assassination of Kimon, 6. 103, the despatch of Miltiades Kimon to the Chersonese, 6. 39.
The story of the liberation of Athens¹ is recounted in a coherent series of brilliant episodes,² and the establishment of the Kleisthenean constitution is expressly recorded, with some indications of its leading features:³ the further history of Athens resolves itself into a record of foreign relations, to Sparta, Boeotia, Aigina, Ionia, Persia, and so forth: only two episodes are preserved to throw any light upon the condition of home-politics, the prosecution of Phrynichos,⁴ the prosecution of Miltiades,⁵ both apparently in the same year, both apparently political trials, the significance and bearing of which are most imperfectly indicated, or most ingeniously concealed, in Herodotus’ Athenian sources.⁶ The same remark applies to the story of the fall of Miltiades:⁷ and the notice of the birth of Perikles⁸ leaves almost everything to be understood. Thus, in regard to the period which seems to form the proper chronological frame-work for the connected narrative in these Books, the materials for the domestic history of Athens which the text of Herodotus presents, are unsatisfying, not to say disappointing: and their defect is only partially compensated by traditions preserving glimpses, or visions, of earlier times and episodes. Problematic but valuable contributions are made to the annals of the rule of Peisistratos in the notice of the voluntary exile of the Philaid Miltiades,⁹ and the compulsory exile of the Alkmaionids,¹⁰ as well as in the record of the acquisition, or recovery, of Sigeion.¹¹ The charming story of the wedding of Agariste carries the perspective back some ten years before the first usurpation of Peisistratos.¹² The poet Solon crosses the stage for a moment, with “a sonnet made to a tyrant’s eyebrow,”¹³ and the elaborate explanation of the origin of the Alkmaionid pollution opens up the last quarter of the seventh century.¹⁴ Sporadic glimpses may be caught of primitive Attica in the traditions of the Pelagic prime,¹⁵ in speculations upon Phoenician immigrants,¹⁶ in records of the Ionic settlements,¹⁷ and of the adoption of Ionian dress.¹⁸ Would it not be rash to say that we could have spared all that for a clear and connected account of the inner history of Athens from the death of Peisistratos to the death of Miltiades, or even for the period covered by the thirty and one Archons from 519-489 B.C.?¹⁹

It may be doubted, indeed, how far Herodotus could have

¹ τὸν λόγον, ὶς τυπάννων ἔλευθερώθην Ἀθήνα. It is its actual title, 5. 62.
³ Cp. §§ 8, 7 infra.
⁴ 6. 21.
⁵ 6. 104.
⁶ Cp. notes ad U. cit.
⁷ 6. 132-136, see Appendix XI.
⁸ 6. 131.
⁹ 6. 34 f.
¹⁰ 5. 62 πειρόμενοι Πεισιστρατίδας: but the exile dated from the restoration of Peisistratos, 1. 64; cp. 6. 125.
¹¹ 5. 94 f. The notice of Kallias 6. 121 involves the story in Bk. 1. 59-64 of the two expulsions of Peisistratos; on which cp. note to 6. 121.
¹² 6. 126-130.
¹³ 5. 113.
¹⁴ 5. 71.
¹⁵ 6. 137 f.
¹⁶ 5. 57 f.
¹⁷ 6. 66.
¹⁸ 5. 88.
discharged such an obligation: how far materials existed for this particular achievement. Such materials as were available for the eventful history of Athens, existed to a large extent in the form of conflicting family traditions preserved by the rival houses, which had struggled together generation after generation for supremacy in Athens. Herodotus apparently in great measure made up his text by a contaminination of Philaid stories and Alkmaionid stories, some of them preserved in connexion with monuments and buildings, some of them already enshrined in poetry, some of them, perhaps, fitting still from lip to lip. Prosewrights had already been busy upon the earlier stages of the story: and may have committed the later stages to writing. Their works have perished; Herodotus has survived. Such as the Herodotean record is, it is nearly all that is available for our purposes, and it rapidly acquired considerable authority in antiquity. Thucydides thought it worth contradicting and correcting: the authors of the fourth century treated it as authoritative. From among these the Athenian Constitution, ascribed to Aristotle, as a representative document, belonging to a period when the domestic history and antiquities of Attica had become a subject of special investigation and treatment, invites a minute comparison with the text of Herodotus, in respect at least of the matters common to the two works, for the period (519-489 B.C.) here immediately in view. The comparison will exhibit at once the strength and the weakness of both authorities respectively.

§ 2. In estimating the value of the contribution to Athenian history here in question, and in particular the bearing of that contribution upon the work of Herodotus, it is to be remembered that Herodotus must certainly be reckoned among the sources of the Aristotelian treatise. This consideration enhances the force of agreement between the earlier and the later text, for it implies that the later writer, with other sources at his command, preferred to follow Herodotus. The differences between the two, however, become all the more important from the observation that the later authority is deliberately dissenting from the earlier, and not merely preserving, by accident, a variant tradition. On the other hand differences cannot all be decided offhand in favour of the later authority. The con-

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1 Cp. 6. 103, and Appendix X.
2 5. 62.
3 Cp. 6. 126.
4 Cp. 5. 57 ὑπὸ αὐτοῦ λέγουσιν, of the Gephyraiai.
5 6. 137.
7 The debt of Thucydides to Herodotus has not yet, perhaps, been fully appreciated. It is not clear how far Thucydides had Herodotus in view, when writing 6. 54-56, but that Apologia for the tyrants is very different, in spirit, from the popular traditions of the day preserved by Herodotus.
9 Expressly nominated in c. 14, and visible passim: cp. infra.
stitutional historian may have *prima facie* a higher claim upon his own ground: it must, however, be conceded that he has sometimes built his conclusions on combinations and arguments rather than on direct evidences or traditions, and that his history of the past stages of the Athenian institutions is based, to a considerable extent, upon inferences from the stage open to his own observation. The method is sound, but not always soundly applied. Where we follow his representation in preference to the evidence afforded by Herodotus, it is mainly because he has rendered intelligible and coherent sundry points, or passages, in Athenian history, which are obscure and confused in the text of Herodotus. On the other hand, where not institutions but incidents are in question, an omission, or a discrepancy, in the later text as compared with the earlier, does not necessarily carry with it a condemnation of Herodotus. In short, no question can be finally settled by a mere appeal to the rival authorities; each case must be determined in view of other evidences and probabilities, including principles based upon the general system of Attic jurisprudence, and extending even, perhaps, to analogies derived from the constitutions of other states. Where epigraphic evidences are directly applicable, it is possible to advance with complete security: it is, however, but to a very small extent that such evidence is available for the period previous to the Mede wars. Results, however, obtained for later stages may be applicable to earlier stages, with due caution. Such methods for the correction of errors or shortcomings in the highly rationalised traditions of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. may seem like a 'casting out of Beelzebub by Beelzebub': but there is this much in favour of the modern practice, that it is hypothetical, that it is pursued with a clearer consciousness of the problems involved, and finally that it is our only resource. Ah! what might not an historian hope to effect, if he could nowadays have access to the stores of Attic tradition, to the official documents of Athens, to the monuments and the inscriptions, as they were in the time of Herodotus, or as they were in the time of Aristotle!

The portion of the Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία which comes into direct relation with the text of Herodotus in regard to the history of Athens from 519 B.C. to 489 B.C. comprises merely cc. 18 (17)-21, and virtually contains four articles: the conspiracy of Harmodios and Aristogeiton, with the murder of Hipparchos (c. 18), the expulsion of Hippias (c. 19), the struggle of Isagoras and Kleisthenes (c. 20), and the new Constitution (c. 21). It is preceded by a comparatively full account of the régime of Peisistratos, with which we are not here concerned. It will suffice for the present purpose to indicate the bearing of the newly-discovered treatise upon this volume of the work of Herodotus, in respect of the four items above specified as common to both.

§ 3. The assassination of Hipparchos. Nothing can be more meagre than the account given by Herodotus of this incident, its ante-

\[1\] *J.H.S.* xii. (1891), pp. 37 ff.  
\[2\] v. 55, 56.
cedents, and its sequel. Either he did not know, or he did not wish to relate, the story which we read in Thucydides, and with some variations and amplifications, in the Athenian Constitution. Herodotus omits to specify any motive, whether personal or political, for the assassination. He omits the antecedent relations of Hipparchos, or of Thessalos, to the murderers: he omits the whole story of the subsequent fates of Harmodios and Aristogeiton. He alone and characteristically records the marvellous dream which warned Hipparchos of his impending fate. It is apparently but an accident that he indicates the Panathenaia as the occasion of the tyrannicide. The bald notice of the episode is followed by a curious digression on the origin of the family of Gephyraei, of which the assassins, according to him, were both members. The contrast in the treatment of this episode is complete. It cannot arise simply from the Athenian Constitution having taken Thucydides instead of Herodotus as authority, for the Aristotelian text corrects and amplifies the story as told by Thucydides. It is obvious that the affair was described with many

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1 6. 54-58. 2 c. 18. 3 Thuc. 6. 54. 1-2. The emphatic contradiction of the tradition which made Hipparchos 'tyrant' cannot be aimed at the existing text of Herodotus: but see note to 5. 55.

4 The 'Αθένας πολ. makes Thessalos, not Hipparchos, the aggressor, and though inconsequential this in consequence should not be bocussed away. As with Thucydides, an affair which arises out of an insult by one brother develops into a conspiracy for the murder of the other, or of all three.

5 Narrated, with some differences, by both Thucydides and the Athenian Constitution.

6 5. 57-61, a passage specially important for the light it throws on Herodotus' biography, theories and sources; see notes ad loc.

7 The differences are instructive, and worth formulating. A. Before the Panathenaia: 1. Thessalos, not Hipparchos, is the original offender. See note 4 above. This brings all the brothers but Iphou (not mentioned by Thuc.) into the business.

2. The 'Αθένας πολ. says that the conspirators were numerous (μετεχότως πολλοί), Thucydides that they were few (διὰ τοῦτο πολλοί ἐξ ἡμών πολλοί). B. At the Panathenaia: 1. Thucydides places Hippias outside in the Kerameikos, the 'Αθένας πολ. places him on the Akropolis.

2. Thucydides represents Hippias as contriving to disarm the Hoplites, who were waiting to start in procession. The 'Αθένας πολ. expressly contradicts that account (ὁ λέγων λέγεται... αὐτῖν ἄλλης ἔτος). The two differences are closely connected. It may be that the reason given for contradicting Thucydides is inadequate, or unfortunate: it is in fact discounted in anticipation by Thucydides himself: περὶ τούτοις δὲ Παναθηναίοι τὰ μεγάλα, ἐν μέσῳ ἡμῶν οὓς ἔσκιντο ἀγωγὴ πολίτως τοῖς τοῦ πολέμου περιπλανάται ἄρθρους γενέσθαι. But this passage confirms the story of the ἔξωσια of Peisistratos, 'Αθ. πολ. c. 15, and makes the ἔξωσια said to have been effected by Hippias look rather like an echo. The Kerameikos is not a likely scene for an ἔξωσια, nor are the circumstances as reported by Thucydides plausible, or even clear: where were the Hoplites at the time of the murder, or when Hippias appeared on the scene? If the story told of Peisistratos in 'Αθ. πολ. c. 15 should have been told of Hippias on this occasion, it would still confirm the view that he was on the Akropolis. That view of the situation better explains his escape. The view that Hipparchos was in the inner Kerameikos conducting the procession agrees with Herodotus: ἔσκινα τὴν πολίτην ἐν τῇ δὴ τῆς πολεοδ. 5. 56 ad fin. The view that Hippias was on the Akropolis to receive it is no doubt strictly in accordance with the ritual: whether it is an inference, or a real tradition, it is hard to say; in either case it affords a sufficient ground for denying the story of the ἔξωσια, which in any case would have been a comparatively small affair. Ed. Meyer's view that this ἔξωσια was the only one (Gesch. d. Alterth. ii. p. 775), an Hoplite army of citizens being apparently
variations, and amplifications in Athenian traditions\(^1\) yet it would appear that Herodotus had simply heard the bare fact, the murder, the assassins' names, the time of the year.\(^2\)

\(^4\) § 4. The expulsion of Hippias. The authorities absolutely agree in the date for the death of Hipparchos,\(^3\) and virtually agree in the date for the expulsion of Hippias.\(^4\) In relating the circumstances the Athenian Constitution follows Herodotus, with details borrowed from other sources, and with discrepancies, which in some cases may be due to the 'higher criticism' of the age, and school, of Isokrates. The relation of the authorities is established not merely by the agreement of the two versions, in substance,\(^5\) and even in words,\(^6\) but also by the curious and parallel insertion, in each record, of a notice of the previous failure of the Alkmaionids at Leipsydron.\(^7\) All the more significant are the differences. The Constitution adds to our knowledge the fortification of Munychia,\(^8\) explains the wealth of the Alkmaionids by the profit on their Delphian contract, and insinuates that their wealth had something to say to the Spartan assistance.\(^9\) It adds the Argean connexion of the Peisistratids as a further explanation of the Lakedaimonian movement.\(^10\) It completes the chronological indications by the name of the Archon and other particulars.\(^11\) It preserves the Sokleon which had preserved the

in existence until after the death of Hipparchos, appears to me to conflict not merely with 'Αθ. πόλ. but with Thucydides, as above shown. C. After the Panathenaea: the rhetorical καὶ μάλιστα διερήσει of Thucydides expands, in the 'Αθ. πόλ., into an elaborate account of the fate of Aristogeiton, culminating in the grim trick he plays on Hippias, and his death by the tyrant's very hand: ben brave! If only Herodotus had known that!

\(^1\) The 'Αθ. πόλ. notices two streams of tradition, οἱ δημοσιοὶ contrasted with ὑπόπτοι, which should cover various tributaries.

\(^2\) One might suspect that Herodotus had little more to go upon than the Stele on the Akropolis near τὴν τῶν τεφρώνων ἀδελφίας (Thuc. 6. 56), or the statues of Harmodios and Aristogeiton by Kritios, erected c. 479/7, Marm. Par. (ed. Flach, pp. 24 f.) ad fin. The older ones by Antenor (Pansam. 1. 8, 5, Arrian, Anab. 3. 16, 7-8, 7. 19, 2) he cannot have seen; but he may have heard a 'Gephyrian' story (c. 57), perhaps in the temple of Demeter Achaia (c. 61 ad fin.).

\(^3\) 6. 55, with note ad l.

\(^4\) Herodotus i. c. μετὰ ταύτα (d. of Hipparchos) ἐπεράνωντο Ἀθηναίοι εὐτερα τέρσα. Κρ. Αθεν. Con. c. 19 ἐτεὶ δὲ τετέρα μαλάκτω μετὰ τὸν Ἱππάρχου διάκοσις κτλ.

\(^5\) Death of Hipparchos, four years

aggravated tyranny, influence of Delphi, intervention of Sparta, expedition under Archimolchos, expedition under Kleomenes, retirement of Hippias, succeed each other in each account step by step.

\(^4\) Ρρ. Αθ. πόλ. c. 19 (1) παρόης, (2) ἄλλοι ἀεὶ προσέτασαν, (3) ἐμπαθέων τῶν ἑν Νεαπόλεως νέων οἰκοδομέων, (4) πρόφερεν . . . οἰκετεροί τὰς 'Αθηναίας, (5) καθερ ἐστίν αὐτός τῶν Πειστράττων, with Rod. 5. 62 f. (1) ἐκπυραγομένου, (2) ἄλλα προσέτατο μεγαλεῖ, (3) τὸν πήν μεταβόντας τῶν ἑν Νεαπόλεως . . . ξεκοιμήσας, (4) πρόφερεν . . . τὰς 'Αθηναίας οἰκετεροί, (5) κατ' ξενίαν ἀν ἐστίν τὰ μαλακτά, etc.

\(^7\) If this is to be dated previous to 414 n.c., as seems probable, its insertion at this point in the two records is all the more remarkable, especially taken in connexion with the occurrence in 'Αθ. πόλ. c. 29, of the notice of Kedon's attempt. Ρρ. note 5, p. 128 τεθνα.

\(^8\) It was not, perhaps, completed: ἦν κακοὶ εἶχον τὰ ἐν τῷ δόστῳ (sic) τὴν Μοισιχιαν ἄπειρερον τεχνέα . . . ἐν τούτω καὶ ἦν ἐξέκοιμα.

\(^9\) ἂν εἰς ἐπίσκεψιν χρημάτων πρὶς τὴν τῶν Λακωνίων βοισθεῖν.

\(^10\) Ρρ. Appendix VII. § 10.

\(^11\) ἐφ' Ἀρσακίδιον ἄρχοντοι, adding "some sixteen years after the father's death, and forty-nine after his first accession to power."
memory of the failure at Leipsydron. It corrects the error in our Herodotean text respecting the locality of Leipsydron, it presents the variant 'Αγχύμολον and the better form Πελαργυκόν. The later writer has plainly local knowledge, and local authority, for these variants and additions, and serves partly to correct and partly to amplify the Herodotean record under this head: but the account of the actual fighting, and other details, are more fully given by Herodotus. It is also characteristic that the religious motive for the Spartan interference, so innocently recorded by Herodotus, disappears; also, with less reason, the recorded corruption of the Pythia; and that in the fourth-century tract the Athenians to a man join in the expulsion of the tyrants.

§ 5. The struggle between Isagoras and Kleisthenes is given by the Constitution much more concisely than by Herodotus, with some important discrepancies, and the comparison of the corresponding passages in the two texts is rendered the more difficult by the complication of the Herodotean record. From this record must be segregated the excursus on Kleisthenes of Sikyon, and on the origin of the Alcmionid pollution (ἀγος). The first of these is excused by the theory that the reforms of the Athenian Kleisthenes were dictated by anti-Ionian feeling. The author of the Constitution, even if he could in any sense have endorsed that view, might have felt the excursus in this place irrelevant. The second digression had been anticipated in an earlier passage of the constitutional treatise, not yet recovered. In one particular, judgment can hardly be given in favour of Herodotus. He apparently places the reforms of Kleisthenes at this point, before his retirement, and restoration: the Constitution postdates them, and may be preferred. A consequential difference arises in the representation of the action of Kleomenes in Athens, which can hardly be regarded as a separate discrepancy. For the rest, the account in Herodotus appears not merely the fuller but the better record. The description of Isagoras as “a friend of the tyrants,” is suspiciously like an unhappy afterthought, the introduction of the political clubs not less like an anachronism. The total omission of the projected invasion of Attica, which broke up at Eleusis, may be excused on the ground that the episode had no bearing on the constitutional or inner history of Athens, and the same plea justifies the
omission of the sacrilege of Kleomenes on the Akropolis,¹ and of the embassy to Sardes,² to say nothing of the alliance with Plataia,³ which it would be too much to expect the Constitution to have dated for us. The verbal agreement between the elements common to the two accounts⁴ proves again the direct use made by the later of the earlier: nor does there seem to be any clear indication, in this passage, of the employment of any other source: the differences might nearly all be explained by the simple reflection of the later writer upon the story told by the earlier.⁵

§ 6. The Kleisthenic Constitution. There are two or three passages in which Herodotus expressly describes the legislative work of Kleisthenes the Alkmionid. Once incidentally Kleisthenes is entitled the founder of the Athenian Phylos and of the democracy;⁶ in a previous passage, or brace of passages,⁷ the nature of the Phylos

¹ Hdt. 5. 72. ² 5. 73. ³ 6. 108. See note ad l.

⁴ 'Αθ. π. 20. (1) ἐσταισαί. (2) ταῖς ἐταρισίας. (3) προσπήργεστε τὸν δήμον. (4) ἐπιαλείποντος τῶν Κλεομένεων ἄνω αὐτοῦ ἔτους. (5) ἄγγευσε τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπικοινώνια οἶκοι. (6) τῷ μὲν βουλῆι τὸν ἑπειράτου κατάλογον. (7) τῷ δὲ βουλῆι ἀντιστάσθησαι. (8) Κλεισθένης δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους φημιδάς μετατρήσατο.

⁵ Slight verbal differences, where the order of events, and the general tone, are the same, only confirm the debt. The greater differences have been explained in the text above. There is a more 'popular' flavour in the narrative of the Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία than in the narrative of Herodotus (e.g. τῇ δὲ βουλῇ ἀντιστάσθησαι καὶ συναθροισθέντωσ τῶν πλήθους, and again δὲ δήμος δώ χίλια προσκαθέτασεν ἐπολιορκοῦσιν τοὺς αὐτοῦ ἡμέρας δώ. This difference is the more remarkable as according to Hdt. 'Ἀθηναίοι οὖν τῷ λαῷ ἄνα κρατεῖται ἔπολιν ἐπολιορκοῦσιν τοὺς αὐτοῦ ἡμέραις δώ. This difference is the more remarkable as according to the 'Αθ. πολ. his legislation was yet to come. But the later writer uses the popular phraseology of his time (cp. Aristoph. Lysistr. quoted in note to 5. 73). The introduction of the στοιχίον upon Keolon, at this point of the text, serves to obliterate the debt to Herodotus, and to emphasise the interval between the stasis of c. 20, and the Nomothetia of c. 21. The one point in which the 'Αθ. πολ. seems to be intentionally correcting Herodotus from another source is the statement that Kleomenes took all his men with him out of the Akropolis; τῇ δὲ τρίτῃ Κλεομένου μὲν καὶ τοῖς μετ' αὐτοῦ τότε δφώεν ἄνθρωποι ἐν τοῖς δος. Herodotus 5. 72 τῇ δὲ τρίτῃ ἐπολιορκοῦσιν ἐξέφρασεν ἐκ τῆς χώρης ὡς οWindowText: οἱ ἀντί σανόντος. Hdt. afterwards (c. 74) mentions that Isagoras accompanied Kleomenes; see further, notes ad l.⁶ 6. 131 ὐ τὰς φοιλᾶς καὶ τὴν δημοκρατίαν Ἀθηναίων κατάστησαι.⁷ 5. 66 τετραπλάθους ἔνοικας Ἀθηναίους ἐπολιορκεῖτο καὶ άνθρωποι πλεῖναι εἰς Ἐλασσάδας κατελθοῦσιν.
or phylo-demotic constitution is described partially, and in such a way as to suggest either that the text of Herodotus in loco is corrupt, or that the author had an imperfect grasp of the institutions which he was by way of describing. The three passages taken together may be held to show that, in the opinion of Herodotus, (1) Kleisthenes was the founder of the democracy, as it existed in his own day; for no substantive difference is recognised, in this passage, between the author's day and the time of Kleisthenes: (2) the establishment of the democracy (ἡ κατάστασις τῆς δημοκρατίας) consisted fundamentally in certain changes, to wit, in numbers and in names, effected in the tribal, or phylic, system of the Athenians. Further, (3) the words of Herodotus may fairly be taken to imply that the new Phyiaec were, in some way or other, local, not genetic, for he mentions the application of the Demes to the system, or of the system to the Demes, and the Demes were notoriously local divisions. Unfortunately his account of this fundamental change is incomplete and obscure, and he takes little pains to describe the consequential changes. His one remark upon the subject is demonstrably incorrect, and though he emphasises the increase in the number of the Phyiaec he says nothing about the increase in the number of the Phyiaec, or citizens. It may further be claimed for Herodotus that (4) he marks the new arrangements as democratic in a double reference: as against the tyranny, represented by the Peisistratida, or by Isagoras; as against the oligarchy, represented by the party of the Plain, whoever was its head. Finally, (5) Herodotus emphasises the anti-Ionian spirit of the legislator, but in such a way as rather to discredit his own argument. It appears that, in delivering judgment, Herodotus had in view rather the relations of the Athenians to the Ionians in his own day than the relation of Kleisthenes and his contemporaries to the Ionian institutions, or elements, in Athens. It is, indeed, remarkable to how small an extent Herodotus takes cognisance of the institutions, or laws, of Solon. To 'the father of history' Solon is the sage and moralist rather than the legislator and statesman. It is just possible that the political work of Solon was understated in the Athenian sources from which Herodotus mainly drew. He lays no direct stress on the aspects of the Kleisthenic legislation as an abrogation of Solonian institutions; but, in the exclusive recognition of the right of

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1 5. 69 ἡμείς . . . ὕπαρχον ἐν τῇ γενικῇ τῶν Ἀθηναίων. Cp. note ad l. and further ταύτα. 2 5. 97, he gives 30,000 as the number, ex hypothesi, for 488 B.C., but see note ad l. (The figure, by the way, might give 1000 to each ἱστημα.) 3 5. 74. 4 5. 69, with note ad l. 5 Cp. Introduction, vol. I. pp. Ixx ff. 6 The only law, or institution, expressly mentioned is the πῶλος ὕπαρχος, 2. 177. 7 1. 29-33. The fact of Solon's legislation is mentioned 1. 29, his reform of the calendar adumbrated 1. 82, but neither his policy nor his policy is anywhere sketched, or even indicated: though Herodotus was apparently acquainted with his poems: 5. 113. 8 The fact that the only reference to Solon's poetry is to specify his panegyric on a tyrant (Philokypres, τὸν Σέλωνον ὁ Αθηναίοις ἀπεκδήκασαν τὸ πόρισμα τῆς τυραννίδος μὴ μάλαν, i.e.), may be an accident, but has an unfortunate appearance. Cp. p. 122 supra.
Kleisthenes to the title of Founder of the Democracy, the claims of Solon are incidentally expunged.

§ 7. The express but imperfect description of the Kleisthenic legislation is supplemented by a number of passages, which may be taken, on general grounds, to describe the Kleisthenic institutions per operationem. It seems that, except where Herodotus in the later history of Athens expressly notes a change, or innovation, he may be held to refer all the institutions, which he has occasion to mention, to Kleisthenes. Anyway the post-Kleisthenian 

Ekklesia is exhibited as making alliances, war, and peace: 1 as holding elections, 2 as exercising judicial functions, 3 and so on. 4 If Herodotus has correctly dated the legislation of Kleisthenes, it must have been the reformed Bute of Kleisthenes which Kleomenes attempted unsuccessfully to overthrow. 5 Jury-courts were in existence, or Miltiades could not have been brought before one in 493 B.C. 6 No ancient author mentions a military reorganisation by Kleisthenes, but the description of the battle of Marathon by Herodotus seems to imply one. The notices of the fleet, before the Act of Themistokles, may be said to suggest only that the normal number was fifty vessels—a number which obviously might be related to the new phyllic system. 7 In regard to Athenian officers, or magistrates, under the Kleisthenic constitution, Herodotus’ incidental utterances by themselves lead naturally to the conclusion that the ten Strategi had been instituted by Kleisthenes, 8 though the exact method of appointment, and the relation of Strategi to Polemarch, were matters of endless dispute, before the discovery of the "Αθηναίων πολεμίων.

Prima facie, this incidental evidence might be regarded as good evidence, 9 and it was generally so regarded: 10 the rather as Herodotus, in describing the Marathonian campaign, had emphasised a distinction between Athenian institutions in 490 B.C. and in his own day. Nevertheless, as is elsewhere shown in this volume, 11 the difference was not fully or clearly apprehended by Herodotus even in this case; and in other cases his evidence is not less suspicious. His remark on the

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1 5. 73 (Persian); 5. 97 (Ionian); 6. 108 (Plataian); 6. 132 (Thracian).
3 6. 136. If the procedure is correctly described the case is an instance of the 

εἰσαγγελία. In 8. 79 the διστρακοφυῖα is implied.
4 Cp. notes to 6. 73.
5 5. 72. See note ad i. In any case the Kleisthenic Bute is concerned in the 

fate of Lykidas, 479 B.C., 5. 5, and is presupposed in all the acts of the 

Ekklesia.
6 6. 104. The same remark is involved in the other cause célèbre of the year, the 

prosecution of Phrynichos, 6. 21. The 

prohibition of the drama was presumably an act of the 

Ekklesia.
7 That it was so, is anything but certain, for the old idea, that Kleisthenes raised the 

Naukrates to fifty, is now exploded. Cp. § 11 infra.
8 6. 104 f. One Strategos had been 

sent to Ionia in 498 B.C., 5. 97. One was 

sent to Paros in 489 B.C., 6. 132. Cp. 

notes ad ii. and on the election of the 

Strategi, note to 6. 104, and § 13 infra.
10 M. Hauvette-Beaumal’s Les Strateges 

Athéniens (1885) may be taken to 

represent the best results down to its date.
11 Appendix X. § 5, cp. notes to 6. 104, 

109-111.
 Phyliarche is enough in itself to excite general distrust. His report on the position of Miltiades is probably affected by the constitutional practice of his own day. External evidences and considerations suggest that his account of earlier judicial proceedings are given in language which has been coloured by the great judicial reforms of Ephialtes cir. 462 B.C. Historians no longer have the right to quote such incidents as related by Herodotus for illustrations of the actual practice of the Athenian constitution before the Mede wars, until they have removed the strong suspicion that the record is saturated in such unconscious anachronism. 1

§ 8. It is under this same rubric, naturally enough, that the author of the Athenian Constitution compares, to the greatest advantage, with Herodotus. The account of the Kleisthenic legislation given by Herodotus, as above shown, is confused and unsatisfactory. The account given in the Athenian Constitution, though certainly not complete, is much clearer and more consistent. 2 In one respect, as the new text serves to convince us, Herodotus may be said to have had 'the root of the matter' in him: he perceived that the main stress in the reforms of Kleisthenes rested on the new phylo-demotic system. The system itself he understood imperfectly: but in associating it with the name of Kleisthenes, and leaving nearly all the other reforms, independent or consequential, to be inferred, he emphasised the Kleisthenic basis of the democracy of his own day. Previous to the discovery of the Athenian Constitution modern knowledge or ideas on the subject of the particular reforms of Kleisthenes, apart from the one clear indication in Herodotus, 3 were extracted by 'the method of residues.' Something was known of the institutions of Solon: something was known of direct reforms and enactments after the Persian war: Kleisthenes was recognised as author of the intervening residuum. The Athenian Constitution has gone some way towards amplifying and clarifying the direct evidence previously available in regard to the acts of Kleisthenes. Its results under this head were drawn from good sources, including the careful researches of some of the earlier Atlidographers. 4 At the same time it must be observed that the author, probably following their example, allowed himself some licence of conjecture and inference, that clear distinction

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2 Only three institutions are explicitly ascribed to Kleisthenes, viz. the new phylo-demotic organisation, a reform of the Bule, and Ostrakism. They were all, ex hypotheri, permanent, and operative in the writer's own day, which may explain their treatment. But see further infra.
3 The addenda from other sources were practically trifling: Aristot. Pol. 3. 2, 5, 1270b, 7. 4, 18 f., 1319b threw some light on the Phylae. Aelian, Var. Hist. 13. 24, ascribed the Ostrakism to him (and made him the first sufferer!); so too Harakleides Pont. cp. Diels, s. a. Berliner Fragm. p. 30.
4 Cp. Ath. tóc. ed. Sandys, Introduction, § 8. How far it may be possible to determine the exact stratification of the sources, as von Wissowicz-Moellendorff, op. cit. note 8, p. 128 supra, has attempted to do, is a problem which cannot here be discussed. The argument in the text remains virtually unaffected, whether the writer of the Athenian Constitution used Hdt. directly, or indirectly, or both. Cp. p. 128 infra.
should be drawn between his facts and his theories, in respect to motive, policy, and so forth, and that even his statement in regard to matters of fact are not all equally acceptable. He is far, indeed, from proposing to describe the constitution of Kleisthenes’ day, or creation, exhaustively: such description he reserves for a condition of things ex hypothesi open to his own observation: the constitution of the Alkmaionid legislator is but one of eleven epoch-making reforms which preceded the existing constitution.\textsuperscript{1} Yet it may be doubted whether the perspective of the constitutional history of Athens is correctly rendered in all the reported details; and a blind acceptance of the authority of the new text is prohibited by the presence of inconsistencies and incoherencies in it.\textsuperscript{2}

§ 9. The Athenian Constitution seems to distinguish very clearly that which Kleisthenes instituted, from that which he abolished.\textsuperscript{3} He abolished the four Phylae (the names of which are nowhere mentioned in the treatise); he abolished the existing Trityges, he abolished the Naukraries. In place of the four Phylae he instituted ten new Phylae, in place of the twelve existing Trityges he instituted thirty new Trityges, in place of the Naukraries he established the Demes. In this account of the reform, as compared with that of Herodotus, the Trityges is a new factor, and is become the clue which explains the chief riddles in regard to the phylo-demotic system. With the clear indication of the place of the Trityges in the Kleisthenic scheme some old problems are rendered soluble, or antiquated, some new ones present themselves. The problem of the number of the Demes, the problem of the method by which the localisation of the Phylae was accomplished, have entered on a new phase. The exact number of Demes is still an open question, but it was probably nearer the hundred and seventy-four of Grote than the hundred of Schömann.\textsuperscript{4} The expression of the author might, perhaps, be taken to mean that Kleisthenes invented, or instituted, the Deme as such.\textsuperscript{5} That interpretation is inconsistent with other indications in the same text,\textsuperscript{6} and still more inconsistent with probability. It is, therefore,

\textsuperscript{1} c. 41.
\textsuperscript{2} The history of the Archoniate, especially of the Lot in relation thereto, is one instance of several: cp. further, insta. The author should not have left us to reconcile the statement in c. 13 with that of the τῶν τυράννων κατάλοις ἐποίησαν διαφοραμοῦ ὡς πολλὰς κοινωνίων τῆς πολιτείας ὠς προσφήνων, with the description of the first measure of Kleisthenes, c. 21 (ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστὶν) μετὰ τῶν τυράννων κατάλοις . . . συνεσπείρας τὸν κατὰ καθήμενον κατὰ δήμους κτλ. καὶ δημόταις ἐποίησαν ἀλλιώς τοὺς ἐκείνους ἐν ἀκείστῳ τῶν δήμων . . . κατέστησε δὲ καὶ δημάρχους κτλ. καὶ τῶν ἀκείστων ἀντὶ τῶν ναυ-κρατίων ἐποίησαν.
\textsuperscript{3} Phyge was of the deme of the Peisistratos, cp. as some said, from Kollytos c. 14. Peisistratos established the δικασταὶ κατὰ δήμους c. 18. These indications are supported by similar terminology in Herodotus, 1. 60 ἐν τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Παιανίε, and again ἐν τῶν δήμων φόροι ἐπικέκτοσα κτλ. cp. 1. 176, and 5. 74, with note. The terminology might be explained away as anachronistic: but the primitive meaning and use of the word δήμος (e.g. in Homer), and, one might say, the obvious circumstances of the case would prove that the Deme was
only reasonable to explain the passage as meaning that Kleisthenes organised, or reorganised and developed, the existing Demes, natural and historical units in the Attic landscape, and used them in place of the Naukraries, which he abolished. How far the Deme really corresponded to the Naukrary, how far the organisation of the Deme was carried on this occasion, might be disputable points. Some development is to be allowed in the century and a half dividing Aristotle, or his amanuensis, from Kleisthenes, and we should hardly be justified in pushing wholesale the details of Attic municipal life in the fourth century back to the end of the sixth century; but the institution of the Demarchs and the recognition of the Deme as a political institution may be conceded to Kleisthenes without misgiving. The Kleisthenic Trittyes subsumed a number of Demes, and effected their union with one another, and with the Demes of two other Trittyes, located in two other different districts of Attica, in one of the ten Phylae, which were thus localised, yet not each, nor any one, locally concentrated. While the Demes in each Tritty were contiguous, no two Trittyes of one Phyle were in juxtaposition. Every Phyle was thus represented in each of the three natural divisions of Attica, and every region of Attica was represented in each Phyle, by a constant number of Trittyes, and a varying number of Demes. The denominations of the Demes were in the majority of cases already forthcoming: where new Demes were organised, or delimited, names were provided on good analogy. The Trittyes was titulary a mere numerical unit: we happen to know from the very best evidence that the Trittyes took names from the principal Deme in each. For the new Phylae names were provided, by a method which combined human proposition with divine disposition, and gave august sanction to the new polity and the new patriotism.


2 For which see B. Housonoller, La vie municipale en Attique (Paris, 1884).

3 New ‘natural’ divisions suddenly make their appearance at this point, an inconsequence: cp. note 2, p. 140 εἰς/η.

4 The demotic map of Attica has been long a-making. The modern advance leads from Leake, Topography of Athens, vol. II. (1841), through Ross, Die Demen von Attika (1846), to Milchhofer, Untersuchungen über die Demenordnung des Kleisthenes (Berlin, 1892). Inscriptions have, of course, thrown a great deal of light upon the problem. Even before the discovery of the Ἀθηναίων τόπος, the existence of the Trittyes was proved for the fifth century, though its significance was not understood (see further below); and it was known by many examples that contiguous Demes belonged sometimes to different Phylae and sometimes to one and the same Phyle.

5 ΑΘ. τοι. c. 21 προστηρβάρας δι τῶν δήμων τούτων μὲν ἀκό τῶν τόπων, τῶν δὲ ἀκό τῶν κυκλίων, κτλ. Cp. Sandys’ note ad l.

6 The Tritty occurs on inscriptions before Enkleides, see O. Gilbert, Handbuch, i. 198 f., i. 232. The following names are known: Κεραμική, Δακικία, Θεσπούσια, Παρακλία, Παθία, Μυροκόλια, Θράδσα, Εγκεκριμένη. In each case the Tritty takes its name from a Deme—doubtless from the principal Deme included in it.

7 ΑΘ. τοι. c. 21 ad s. ταῦτα δὲ φιλατεύονται ἐνώπιον κυκλίων ἐκ τῶν προκρότεσθαι εκατὸν ἀρχηγίων οὐ ἀκόλουθον ἡ Ποιήσις δέκα. Cp. Hdt. 5. 66 ad fin. Neither
§ 10. According to the Athenian Constitution, neither Phyle nor Trittys was, strictly speaking, a brand-new term or a brand-new institution: for whereas, in the legislation of Kleisthenes, the Deme swept the Naukrar, with its officials, clean out of existence, the thirty new local Thirds, or Trittys, but took in relation to ten new Phylae the place which had been previously occupied by twelve old Trittys, or Thirds, in relation to the four old Phylae. But the statement that the prae-Kleisthenic, or Ionian, Phylae in Attica were subdivided into Thirds, known and named as such, raises some perplexing problems in regard to Solonian, and even prae-Solonian, Athens. The primary subdivision of the old Phyle was notoriously into Phratries. The Phratri was de facto a third of the Phyle: there were twelve Phratries in all. What, then, was the relation of the prae-Kleisthenic Trittys, so named, to the Phratrie? Were there two official names for one and the same thing? The Kleisthenic Trittys was localised: was the prae-Kleisthenic Phratry-trittys a local unit? Were the Ionian Phylae thereby localised? Did each of the Ionian Phylae consist of three Phratries strictly localised? Were the three local Phratries of each Phyle dispersed, or contiguous? As the Phratrie was the natural subdivision of the Phyle so, notoriously, was the Gens (γήνος) the natural subdivision of the Phratry. Had each Phratry the same number of Gentes? If three Phratries went to each Phyle, how many Gentes should go to each Phratry? Three times three, or five times three, or ten times three? As a matter of fact—or of theory—the last notion prevailed! The Genos is not essentially a local unit, but it admits of being localised, it tends to localise itself, it is, indeed, potentially equivalent to the village-community (κώμη), the Deme: as such, it might lend itself indirectly to the localisation of the genetic groups, it might tend to attach the genetic society to a given territory: but the early and systematic localisation of the whole genetic series of concentric circles under a new set of arithmetical titles is a hard nut to crack! Moreover, there was another early classification of the Athenians by 'nations' (ὥμη), based, like the Trittys and the Phratrie, upon the principle of tripartition, into Eupatridae, Geomori, Demiurgi. In what relation, if any, did this tripartition stand to the others? Was the Ethnos identical with the Phratry, as the Phratrie was identical with the Trittys? Was each local Trittys a Phratry of Eupatrids, or a Phratry of Geomori, or a Phratry of Demiurgi? The ethnic classification was associated, in Attic tradition, with the name of Theseus, the reputed author of the Synoikismos, the unification of Attica. The synoikism of Theseus was believed to have destroyed twelve separate political unions in Attica, in order to substitute one single centre and union: in what relation, if any, did the twelve Phratries, the twelve

author enumerates the Phylae by name, but the names and official order are fully ascertained: Ἐπεχρήσ, Αἰγής, Πανδοκώς, Αεώτες, Ακαματίας, Οἰνής, Κεφανές, Ἰτ.ScrollBars, Αίδρης, Ἀριστός. G. Gilbert, Hauexact. i. 222, and similar authorities.
Trittyes stand to the twelve City-states! Were the Poleis the Trittyes, as the Phratries, under another name? If so, how did the four Ionian Phylae relate themselves to the twelve City-states? Could one Phrarty make a City-state? Could a Poleis have consisted wholly of Eupatrides, or of Geomori, or of Demiurgi, until Theseus broke them up? Or, did the Thesean Thirds, Trittyes too, of the old Ionian Phylae, supersede pre-existing Phrarty-thirds, and so redistribute the members of each Phyle into new Trittyes, based not upon descent, or upon the genetic Trittyes, now localised into a separate union, hostile to the eleven other genetic Trittyes, similarly localised; but upon some new principle, according to which political rights and duties followed occupation and employment? This series of speculative questions, starting from the Kleisthenic Trittyes and its supposed equivalence, *mutatis mutandis*, to an older Trittyes, and perhaps a still older Trittyes, admits of being converted into a series of pseudo-historical propositions; and the extent to which this conversion was effected will be apparent from the following citations, read in the given order: (1) *Athen. Const.* c. 21 διὰ τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ εἰς δώδεκα φυλὰς συνέταξαν ὅπως αὐτὴ μὴ συμβαίνῃ μερίζειν κατὰ τὰς πρωταρχούσις τριττοὺς. ἦσαν γὰρ ἐκ τετράων φυλῶν δώδεκα τριττῶν. (2) *Cp. ib. c. 8* φυλαὶ δ’ ἦσαν τέταρται καθαρέρ πρότερον (before Solon) καὶ φιλοφασίας τέταρται. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς φυλῆς ἐκάστης ἦσαν νεκρομανοὶ (N. B. teneb. τριττῶν μὲν τρεῖς. (3) *Pollux, Onomast. 7. 111* (Bekker, p. 348) διὰ μέντοι τέταρται ἦσαν αἱ φυλαὶ εἰς τριὰ μέρη ἐκάστης δημοτο καὶ τὸ μέρος τοῦτο ἐκαλεῖτο τριττῶν καὶ ἰθνος καὶ φρατρία. ἐκάστος δὲ ἰθνος γενή τρίακοντα εἰς ἄνδρων τρεῖσαν ἡ ἐκάστη τριμικάδες. τριὰ δ’ ἦν τὰ ἰθνα πάλαι εὐπατρίδας, γεωμόροι, δημαρχοὶ. This is, perhaps, in part taken from the portion of the Ἀθην. πολ. ad init. not yet recovered, as also doubtless the next passage (4) *Plutarch, Theseus 25 πρῶτος αὐτοκράτας χωρίς Εὐπατρίδας καὶ Γεωμόρους καὶ Δημαρχοὺς, Εὐπατρίδας δὲ γνώσκειν τὰ θεῖα καὶ παράξενοι ἀρχαῖοι εἰς τὸ φωτοῦν καὶ μεγίσταις ἐπιθέσεις καὶ κάθεν διδάσκαλοι εἰς καὶ διὰς καὶ ἱερῶν ἐξήγητος, τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας διέστη εἰς ἱσημένα κατόντας, διές μὲν Εὐπατρίδας, κρέας δὲ Γεωμόροις, πλῆθες δὲ Δημαρχοῖς ἀναφέρεις δεηκόντων. (5) *Philochores apud Strabon. 397 Κύρσετα πρῶτον εἰς δώδεκα πόλεις συνοικίσατο τὸ πλῆθος, διὰ νόματα Κερκοπίας, Τετράπολες, Ἐπαρχίας, Δικαίωσις, Ἐλευθερίας, Ἀφίδια (λέγουσι δὲ καὶ πτηνούκων Ἀφίδια), Θόρικας, Βραυρόν, Κύθνος, Σφητός, Κήρυσσα < Φάληρος >.1 πάλιν δ’ ἦστερον εἰς μίαν πόλιν συναγαγεῖν λέγεται τὴν νῦν τὰς δώδεκα Θρησείς. (6) *Cicero* apparently identified the πόλεις and the φρατρίας, but the reading is doubtful: *De legibus, 2. 2 ita, quum ortu Tusculanus esset, civitate Romanus, habuit alteram loci patriam, alteram iuris; ut vestri Attici, priusquam Theseus eos

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1 One MS. Mainka, ii. 562, leaves a blank. The names, except Tetrapolis, are all demotic, and some trittysitic. *Cp. note 6 p. 193 supra. The Tetrapolis was an organised unit ranking with the Ἐπαρχίας and Κερκοπίας. *Cp. Gilbert, Handbook 1.9 235 (=1. 201).*
demigrare ex agris et in astu, quod appellatur, omnes se conferre iussit, et simul ἕφαρσε ἑδὲ ἑπὶ Αττικῷ: sic nos et eam patriam dicimus, ubi nati, et iliam, qua exceptī sumus. But the history, or theory, underlying all these passages, that the Trityssys existed before Kleisthenes as a local unit in Attica, identical with the Phratry, has great difficulties to encounter. Apart from the two problems of the existence of the twelve City-states, and of the relation of the ethnic to the genetophratric classification, there remain the following objections: the Athenian Constitution distinctly asserts that Kleisthenes left the Phratries and Gentes (γένης) as they were: ¹ but if the Phratry was the Trityssys how could that have been? It is difficult to avoid a suspicion that the prae-Kleisthenic Trityssys is an unhappy anachronism. As the Trityssys was identified with the Phratry, so naturally the Τρίκας was identified with the Gens. But these numerical equivalents belong to an order of ideas very different to that embodied in the words γένος, φρατρία, φυλή. In later times the substitution of numerical for genetic appellations became common, but only when ideas of consanguinity had lost political force: ² to ascribe its introduction to a period when, ex hypothesi, the genetic bond was still efficient, is open to grave objection.³ Moreover, though the maintenance of a small fixed number of Phylae, or Phratries, be easy or automatic, the notion that 360 Gentes, and even 10,800 Heads of families (γεννώτας), could be maintained from generation to generation is palpably artificial, and marks the late and pragmatic character of the whole speculation. Conversely, let Kleisthenes be recognised as the author of the local Trityssys, and his new classification co-ordinates itself intelligibly over against the classification which it is said to have superseded. On the one side there is a system of organisation by the Gens, Phratry and (Ionian) Phyle: on the other side there is a system of organisation by the Deme, the Trityssys, and the (Attic) Phyle. The one is a strictly genetic system of classifying the citizen population, the other is a purely local system. A genetic system is independent of locality: it is potentially as moveable as the regiments of an army, or the divisions of a fleet. If it becomes localised, the event is an accident, from the point of view of the system as such. The result of such localisation is in the first instance to alter, and subsequently to destroy, the essential principles and institutions of a genetic society.⁴

³ It may be admitted that ἑπονήσου comes near to tribus, especially in the Aiolic form ἑπανή, cp. L. & S. sub vocab. Whether tribus has anything to say to φυλή, φολίθ is a problem for etymologists. The subdivision into Thirds might be relatively early, but hardly the substitution of numerical for genetic titles. If the Trityssys-phratry is a stumbling-block the Trikas-genos is a greater.
⁴ Something is here taken for granted, which cannot here be elaborated; to wit, that anthropologists (Bachofen, M'Clenan, Lewis Morgan, Robertson Smith, Taylor and others) have established the reality of the
Kleisthenic organisation is essentially based upon locality: not race but place, not community of blood but community of settlement, not the genetic but the demotic tie form the key-stone of the system. Contiguous Demes were built into Trittyes; the extent of territory embraced by the scheme, the increased number of citizens brought in by wholesale enfranchisement, determined the large number of enchorial Phyleae. A new phylo-demotic system took the place of the old phylo-phractic system. The author asserts that Kleisthenes left the Phratries and Gentes as he found them. Phratries, indeed, existed in Athens after Kleisthenes in name and substance: this is but a fresh reason to doubt that Trittyes existed before Kleisthenes in name as well as in substance: for, if the old Phratries had been known officially as Trittyes, and if the old Phratries continued to exist, it is doubly difficult to understand how the new Trittyes managed completely to usurp the name. Nor is it easy to understand how the old Phyleae could have been abolished, if the old Phratries had been left κατὰ τὰ πάρθημα, nach wie vor. In the fifth and fourth centuries every Athenian citizen was of necessity a member of a Phratría, just as he was a member of a Deme and of a Phyle: it is not, perhaps, equally clear whether every citizen was member of a Gena. The post-Kleisthenic Phratries do not appear as subdivisions of the ten Phyleae, but as an independent or cross division: it is, however, difficult to believe that they are the Ionian Phratries, subdivisions of the old Ionian Phyleae. Three possibilities present themselves. Kleisthenes left the old Phratries alone, but made new Phratries in addition to them, in which new citizens were enrolled, and the citizens in these new Phratries...
would have Phrators, though they might not have Gentiles: or Kleisthenes may have insisted on the admission of the new citizens to the old Phratries, so that the post-Kleisthenic Phratries became as different from the prae-Kleisthenic Phratries as the new Phyle from the old: or Kleisthenes may have made new Phratries, and included all citizens new and old alike in them. But in any case it is difficult to see how he can properly be said to have left the Phratries and Gentes in status quo ante. Perhaps it was the Gentes, the worshipful Gentes, which he left untouched. The Gentes were, indeed, unassailable, though in the nature of things disappearing occasionally, or being exterminated, or breaking up into new Houses. Anyway, it seems reasonable to conclude that the Tritys, as an institution, was a new name for a new thing, when Kleisthenes organised Attica into thirty Thirds. Its ascription to a period before Kleisthenes, before Solon, nay before Theseus himself, might be due to the observation that the old genetic Phraty had been a third of the old genetic Phyle, just as the Kleisthenic local Tritys was a third of the new local Phyle, and called so.

§ 11. Whether or not Kleisthenes invented the Tritys, and abolished the Phraty, there can be very little doubt about the effect of his action upon the Naukrya. The Naukrya is, indeed, the one institution which it is clear that Kleisthenes destroyed root and branch. After Kleisthenes the Naukrya, with its officials, disappeared: its name had already for Herodotus a strictly historical interest, and it is not mentioned in any other text previous to the Αθηναίων πολιτεία. It may be doubted whether the writers of the fourth and succeeding centuries were at all fully or accurately informed in regard to this institution. It was known that the Naukrya had been a topographical division of Attica, for cadastral and military purposes: but is the Athenian Constitution right in representing the Naukrya as a subdivision of the Phraty, and in representing the Naukrya in prae-Kleisthenic Attica as equivalent to the Deme of later times? The Deme, as above shown, is one of the oldest institutions in Attica: if Attica before Kleisthenes was

1 Aristot. Pol. 7. 4, 18 f., 1919 cannot be quoted as decisive of these alternatives. It is hardly conceivable, however, that Hdt. could have represented the work of Kleisthenes as designed τω μη σφαέα αι αδεραι ήν ηνοι φελα αι Ιππσ. 5. 69, if the Attic Phratries of his day could still have been regarded as fractions of the Ionic Phyla.

2 In what relation to this fact stands the (Alkmionid) story in Herodotus 5. 71, according to which not the Alkmionids, but the Prytanæas of the Naukrya were responsible for the Kydonian Agos? Cp. notes ad l. Did the story represent the Naukrya as guilty, because they were destroyed? Or were they destroyed, to expiate the Agos, with which they had been connected?

2 o. 21 κατέστησε δι και δημάρχους την αυτήν ἔχωσαν ἐπιμέλειας τῶν πρότερον ναυκραύγων· και γὰρ τοῖς δήμοις αὐτοῖς τῶν ναυκραύγων ἔσοδος. With this must be read o. 8 καὶ πόλεις ἐκκαθάρισε καὶ τοὺς ναυκράγους ἔκηκε καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην τίνα γενεὰν. The next words help to show how the memory of the Naukrya was preserved: θὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς νόμοις τοῦ Σόλωνος οἱ δικαιοὶ χρώνας πολλαχίαι (!) γέγορτοι: τοὺς ναυκράγους εἰσπράττειν καὶ ἀναλίσκειν ἐκ
divided into forty-eight Naukraries, each Naukrary must as a matter of fact have included several Demes, just as the Kleisthenic Trittys did. The numbers of Demes and Naukraries make the equivalence of the two suspicious. To replace forty-eight Naukraries by 150-170 Demes, and to expect the Deme to discharge the functions, or be taken as the equivalent of the Naukrary, would have been somewhat inconsequent. The thirty Kleisthenic Trittys offer a nearer analogy to the forty-eight prae-Kleisthenic Naukraries, and it is reasonable to suggest that it was not the Deme but the Trittys which superseded the old Naukrary. The true equivalence may have been obscured by the real, or supposed, existence of Trittys before Kleisthenes. If a Trittys existed, or was supposed to have existed, in the days of Theseus, or for that matter in the days of Kekrops, what more natural than to represent the Kleisthenic Trittys as taking the place of the prae-Kleisthenic Trittys, the Kleisthenic Phyle the place of the prae-Kleisthenic Phyle? It would follow that the Deme was taken or created by Kleisthenes as an equivalent for the Naukrary. If functions had counted for more than names, the ten Kleisthenic Phylae might have been co-ordinated with the twelve old Trittys-Phratries, and the thirty Kleisthenic Trittys with the old Naukraries: it would then have been perceived that the Kleisthenic Phyle was the really new institution which its demotic composition made it to be. Whether the local Naukrary was, indeed, a subdivision of the Phratri, and so of the Phyle, is another question. If so, then a method by which the Ionian Phylae and Phratries might have been localised in Attica is not far to seek. The Phratri was not directly localised, still less the Phyle: each Phratri has, ex hypothesi, four territorial subdivisions, each Phyle no less than twelve, whereby it might have been attached to the soil. A further question would, indeed, arise: whether the Naukraries of each Phratri and of each Phyle were continuous, or disposed in different parts of the land? By the latter arrangement, the Kleisthenic συγμίμης, intermixture, would have been anticipated. But the relation of the Naukrary to the Phratri is itself in doubt. It is at least conceivable that the introduction of the Naukrary into the old Ionian Phratri and Phyle is a product of theory, like the numerical systematisation of the whole gentile system, and that it starts from the supposed identity or equivalence of Trittys and Phratria, Deme and Naukrary. The number of Naukraries (forty-eight) lends itself to the hypothesis that in each Phratri there were four Naukraries, but it conflicts with another figure in the gentile system. Each Phratri was composed of

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τοῦ παυκρατικοῦ ἄργυρου. Pollux, Ὀνομασία, 8. 108 (Bekker, p. 847), has improved on this: παυκρατία δ' ἐν τοῖς φιλί του διδασκόντων μέροι καὶ παυκρατικοὶ οὖν διδάσκα τέτταρες κατὰ τρίτων ἑκάστην, τὰς δ' εὐφρατί τὰς κατὰ δήμους (τοις) διεξερευ-νότοιν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀναληματιν. παυκρατία δὲ ἑκάστῃ δύο ἑπτά ταρ্পειες καὶ τριῶν μείον, ἀφ' ἓν τοις ὑπόμαστον. Ἡρακλέατος, ἐν Ῥ. ἑρακλεατεῖ, attempted to harmonise 'Aristotle,' Thucydides and Herodotus on the subject. Op. note to δ. 71 supra.
thirty Gentes, or Triekades: what is the relation of the four Naukraries to the thirty Gentes? They have no relation: they belong to different social and political systems. The supposition that the Naukraries stood in no direct or systematic relation to the old Phyle and Phratries, but were parts of a local organisation already superseding the Ionian phyllo-phratic system, gives a double significance to the Alkmaionid legislator’s work. His constitution made an end of a former local organisation, as well as of a former social system, for political purposes. He superseded the genetic Phyle: he abolished the local Naukraries: but he combined the two ideas, through the medium of the Trittye, which displaced the old Naukrary, in his phyllo-demotic constitution.

§ 12. The motives and results of this immense reform, which Herodotus was content at ascribe to anti-Ionism, are, as just indicated, not fully displayed even in the Athenian Constitution. The abrogation of the old phyllo-phratic system, which limited the Athenian franchise to members born or adopted into one of the (Ionic) Phyle or Phratries, enabled the legislator to multiply enormously the actual number of citizens, and thus indefinitely to strengthen the state.1 The redistribution of the population of Attica into new territorial units, whether large or small, helped to abolish the old party or stasisastic connexions, to the general benefit of peace and unity.2 The greatest of its constitutional results is left to be understood. The concentration of the new divisions and subdivisions of Attica upon Athens as the focus, where alone members of the same Phyle from three different Trittyes met for common purposes, must have tended to aggravate and elevate the city in the eyes of all its citizens, new or old. Both the concentration, and the distribution of the Phyle throughout Attica, made Kleisthenes the last and greatest of the Synoikists of Athens. It may be that the way had been prepared by the Peisistratid régime for this development;3 it may be that the legend and person of Theseus had been already exploited in this direction.4 But the legislation and work of Kleisthenes involved something of a breach with Ionian heroes and Ionian statesmen, and the later revival of the fame of Theseus seems to mark a temporary

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1 Ath. Const. c. 21, Aristot. Pol. 3. 2. 2, 1275 b. If Kleisthenes purposed to abolish the use of the Patronymic (Ath. π. l. c.), his intentions were afterwards frustrated.

2 ἀνασχηματικός χωματικός. The parties of the Mountain, Plain, and Shore disappeared, though differences between the rural and city-population, the city and Petrasconserved and re-asserted themselves. These later differences may in part underlie the substitution of the Paralic, Periastic and Mesogaeans classification in Ath. C. c. 21 for the Paralic, Pedias, and Diakr (Hyperbokri, Edt. 1. 59, op. 6. 20) of c. 14, but it is a fresh in consequence on the author’s part to have silently substituted a new territorial division for the old without notice of change or relation between the two. That any one should think the two identical is surprising. The Periastic might arguably be held to represent the Pedias, but the Mesogaeas cannot possibly represent the Diakr.”

3 The notion that Peisistratos discouraged the people from coming into the city is pragmatic (Ath. C. c. 16); but in any case his government and administration made for unity.

reaction, favoured by the Philaid clan, against the claims of the Alkmaeonid statesman to have united Attica, and thereby established the Democracy upon its native soil.

§ 13. The measures consequential upon the new phylo-demitic policy are but meagrely indicated in the Athenian Constitution. Foremost among them must surely have been the organisation of the Ekklesia. This reform may be taken as implied in the bare notice of the Boulê, and in the ascription to Kleisthenes of the institution of Ostracism, of which more anon. The new policy involved a reorganisation of the militia, at a date when every citizen was still a soldier; but we search the second part of the treatise in vain for any account of the Athenian forces in the author’s own day, and are the less surprised that he ignores the tactics of the fifth century. Of new magistrates or officials, or of new powers conferred upon old ones, we read nothing except the note upon the Demarchs: an omission the more surprising as the author subsequently notices a change in the method of appointing the Strategi, and the Kleisthenic reform of the army must have involved provisions for general and subordinate command. From a later passage it seems to follow that Kleisthenes left the Polemarch as commander-in-chief. He probably provided for the appointment of ten Strategi, one to command each Phyle,
perhaps elected not merely out of the Phyle, but by the Phyletai. It might be argued from the Athenian Constitution that Kleisthenes restored election, in both stages, as the method of appointing Archons: for it is expressly stated that, under the Solonian arrangement, sortition had been introduced, while after Kleisthenes, in the year 487/6 B.C., the Solonian method of appointment was apparently restored. Election at every stage, though of course under conditions, would be thoroughly consonant with the spirit of the Kleisthenic policy, but the history of the lot at Athens is just one of those subjects which a critical reader will not allow to be decided by an authority late, incomplete, and even inconsequent on the subject.

§ 14. The ascription of Ostrakism to Kleisthenes is explicit: the rationale of the institution is given, but surely somewhat imperfectly. The passage is a welcome addition to our resources upon the subject, but can it be accepted as definitive and above criticism? The last case of Ostrakism took place at Athens nearly a century before the date at which the Athenian Constitution was written. The second part of the treatise contains a valuable record of an Order of the day for the Ostrakophoria, but, if we desire a sketch of the actual procedure, we have to turn elsewhere. It would appear that the practice mentioned by the author was a mere survival, comparable with the Spartan king's claim to make war at his own discretion, or the Roman lex curiata or our own congé d'élire. According to our author Ostrakism was instituted by Kleisthenes expressly for the purpose of getting rid of Hipparchos, yet was not employed until three years after the battle of Marathon, some twenty years after its institution, and presumably long after Kleisthenes had been gathered to his fathers. It is possible...
that Kleisthenes instituted Ostrakism, and that it was first employed in 487/6 B.C., and that the first victim was Hipparchos: but if so, can we believe that Kleisthenes had Hipparchos in view in establishing the institution? Could any statement be more derogatory to the great legislator? It is, however, possible that the institution of Ostrakism may be wrongly ascribed to Kleisthenes, and that the date of the first recorded ostrakism may be immediately consequent upon the date of the original institution, which would thus fall out after the battle of Marathon, and after the disgrace of Miltiades, and have been not unconnected with that double event. Anyway, the immediate juxtaposition of a notice of the first Ostrakophoria with the record of a reform in the Archonate is, perhaps, of more significance than has been perceived by the author of the Αθηναϊων πολιτεία himself. So long as the Archons were appointed by election (αισζείς), the office must have remained a special object of ambition: so long as the Polemarch was commander-in-chief his office might have seemed, at least potentially, a menace to the constitution, an invitation to a coup d'état. The secret of Caesarism lay in the union of the leadership of the people, or popular party, with supreme military power. The revival and increase of the citizen militia might indirectly render a popular Polemarch only more formidable than he could have been under the old system. Hence Ostrakism may have been instituted distinctly with the purpose of making a way of escape, in case the prospect arose of the election, as Polemarch, if Kleisthenes was its author, or as leading Strategos, if the institution was post-Kleisthenic, of a man who was already leading Demagogue, or προστάτης τοῦ δήμου. The introduction of the lot, for either stage in the appointment of Archons, the Αθηναϊων πολιτεία lends no support to the notion that he was "boist with his own petard," Aslian, V. H. 13. 24. As Kleisthenes was the offspring of a marriage contracted circa 570 B.C. (see note to 6. 181) he was no chicken in 508 B.C. c. 22 βίαν Πολιτειαν δημαρχεύει καὶ στρατηγεύει ὥσπερ καισαρία. Op. Aristot. Pol. 8. 5, 6-7, 1305 εἰς τὸν δραχμὸν, δὴ γένους δὲ αὐτὸν δημαρχεύει καὶ στρατηγεύει, εἰς τυπανία μετεβαλεντικήν κλ. It was an error in Grote to represent the chief Demagogue for the time being in democratic Athens as "the Leader of the Opposition," and the Strategi as a sort of Cabinet government: the Demagogue, if any one, was prime minister (cp. Aristophanes, Κυρίκια); but if the leading Demagogue was also Strategos year by year, not to say commander-in-chief (Perikles), his influence would doubtless be all the greater. Swoboda has elucidated the position of the Strategi in a valuable paper, Rhein. Mus. 45, pp. 288 ff. (1890). The texts proving the power of the Boul over the Strategi might be added Plutarch, Kimon 17. It had been a function of the Areiopagos to guard against a coup d'état, Αθηναϊων πολιτεία c. 8. The connexion of the Ostrakophoria with the strategic Archairesia was suggested by Koehler. Monatenber. d. Berlin. Akad. 1866, 347 (cp. G. Gilbert, Beiträge z. i. Gesch. Athens, p. 281). The Αθηναϊων πολιτεία has in part confirmed, and in part corrected, the very ingenious combinations which Gilbert, op. cit. pp. 229 ff., adopted and applied to the case of Hyperbolos. It is now clear that annually there was a Procheiriotonia on the question, εἰ δοξεὶ παύειν (τὴν δεμαρχι- φορίαν) ἣ μή, in the sixth Prytany Αθηναϊων πολιτεία c. 43: the actual voting took place subsequently—a necessity, indeed, seeing that the vote was taken under special arrangements and in a different place: Philochores, l.c. The problrema for the Archairesia was moved in the Ηκτίστεια in the seventh Prytany, and acted on, provided there was nothing against it.
would tend to diminish the importance of the Polemarchia, and the probability of its falling into the right, or into the wrong, hands. The displacement of the Polemarch as commander-in-chief may, with considerable confidence, be associated with the introduction of the lot in 487 B.C. for the nine Archons. Meanwhile, however, the exigencies of practical warfare and politics had begun to throw power into the hands of the Strategi. The despatch of a force to Ionia in 498 B.C. had called for a separate command. We can hardly suppose that in all the battles with the Boeotians and Aiginetans, to say nothing of Peloponnesians, between 510-487 B.C., the Polemarchs had been in sole command. The co-operation, or separate employment, of army and fleet involved distinct responsibility, as the expedition to Paros proved.

The year 487 B.C. coincides with the date, independently reached, for the resumption of active hostilities by the Athenians against the Aiginetans. The change in the appointment and powers of the Polemarch may have been connected with the external situation of the moment. But for the efficient conduct of larger operations, by sea or land, unity of command is essential. The collapse of the Peloponnesian invasions, the example of the Ionians in their revolt, the Persian failure at Naxos, the Athenian success at Marathon, all taught the same lesson. The fiaschi in Aigina may have presently enforced it. Elsewhere it will be shown that the story of Marathon as told by Herodotus, still more as told by Nepos, tends not merely to obscure the true position and authority of the Polemarch at the time, but to anticipate the later development of the Strategia: yet the stories of Artemision, Salamis, Mykale and Plataia can hardly be charged with a similar anachronism. Sometime between Marathon and Salamis provision was made that one of the Strategi should, at least upon occasion, exercise the Hegemonia formerly vested in the Polemarch. Whether this change was introduced in 487 B.C. or in some year subsequent thereto and previous to 480 B.C. is not so clear. It is, however, tempting to conjecture that one or other of the ostrakisms, recorded for the period between Marathon and Salamis, was associated with this question. If the ostrakisms of Hipparchos and Megakles are rightly dated, and rightly motivated, the ostrakism of Xanthippos may be provisionally associated with the (unrecorded) reform of the Strategia, as the ostrakism of Aristeides may certainly.

Thus the elections were clearly held at least one prytany after the question of Ostrakism had been raised, and presumably some time after the actual Ostrakophoria had taken place, whenever it did take place, which after all was but seldom. The elections might be postponed, but it does not appear likely that they occurred often so late as in the penultimate prytany of the year. Philochoros i.e. represents the question of the Ostrakophoria as raised, not "in the sixth" but "before the eighth" prytany. This hardly amounts to a contradiction of the 'Αθηνος ἔμνησα, and leaves room for the Ostrakophoria before the Achosainai.

1 Cp. Appendix VIII. § 5.
2 Appendix X. §§ 5, 26.
3 Themistocles is de facto, and probably de iure, the commander-in-chief in 480 B.C. and Aristeides appears in the same capacity in the following year.
be associated with his opposition to the pepshem of Themistokles creating the fleet.¹ Neither Aristotle in the Politics² nor the writer of the Athenian Constitution³ has fully apprehended the practical working of Ostrakism. They may be right in the view that the institution was originated in order to safeguard the Republic from monarchy,⁴ to prevent the reunion of military and popular power in one pair of hands⁵: but, in some cases at least, the institution was used with exactly the opposite result, and removed a rival and competitor from the path of the Demagogue-strategos.⁶ The Athenian Constitution dimly apprehends that there were two classes of cases at least: Xanthippos was the first man ostrakised unconnected with the question of the Peisistratid restoration.⁷ His opposition to tyranny went, perhaps, beyond the point suggested: he may have objected to some new arrangement, which was to render the reunion of the Demagogos and the Strategos possible, and to earn in time for his own son and his friends the nickname of "the new Peisistratida."⁸ Xanthippos, like Aristides, must afterwards have recognised the practical justification of the restoration of the office of commander-in-chief (στρατηγός ἕγκυμος), and have accepted the enlarged powers of the Ekklesia and Dikasteries, or the vigilance of the Areopagos, as adequate guarantees against the overthrow of the Kleisthenic Democracy.⁹

§ 15. The date of the legislation of Kleisthenes is marked in the Athenian Constitution precisely to the Archontate of Isagoras, the year 508/7 B.C., two or three years later than the date given by Herodotus, and after, not before, the retirement and recall of the Alkmaeonid statesman. There is, however, any indication that the sweeping and fundamental reform of the constitution occupied more than one

¹ So clearly 'Αθ. χολ. c. 22. It is natural to suppose that the need for a single supreme command was patent to Themistokles, and he may have been the author of the institution, or the custom, which invested one of the Strategi with the lead. The ἕγκυμον within the college of Strategi must not be confounded with the grant of ἀνδρικάριον by the Ekklesia, for a particular commission: but the ἕγκυμον would be the most obvious recipient of ἀνδρικάριον upon occasion. Cp. Xenoph. Hell. 1. 4, 20. Moreover, command in field, or fleet, may have been distinguished from lead in the city: cp. note 9 infra.
² 3. 18, 15-25, 1284ab.
³ 5. 8, 405α.
⁴ So clearly in the cases of Aristides, Klimon, Thukydidès, son of Mæcles, cp. Plutarch, Pericles 15, 16.
⁵ Pericles 15 ad init.
⁶ If there were times in which the chief command circulated day by day among the Strategi, one such time might coincide with the period between the abolition of the Polemarchia as supreme military command in 487 B.C. and the revival of chief command by the Hegemonia of one Strategos within the college. That period would cover the occasion wherein the Athenian forces, according to the story, came one day late to Alginæ, 6. 28. Another such time may have succeeded the Hegemonia of Alkibiades (Xenoph. Hell. 1. 4, 20), and would cover the cases of Argusanae and Aligopotaæ (Diodor. 19. 87 and 106): but Konon was perhaps ἕγκυμον at that time (cp. Diod. 13. 74). Cp. further Appendix X. § 5.
year. From the legislation of Kleisthenes are plainly distinguished three subsequent reforms: the introduction of the Buleutic oath in 504 B.C., a reform of the Strategia in 501 B.C., and an alteration in the Archontate in 487 B.C. These are distinctly conceived as post-Kleisthenic developments. The mention of the ostrakism of Hipparchos in the previous year is without prejudice to the date of the institution, which, if Kleisthenic, must be carried back, in the conception of the writer, to the same year as the rest of the legislation. Whether the enormous changes effected by Kleisthenes can reasonably be restricted to one official year is another question. A wholesale reorganisation of the polity, more fundamental and complete than ever before, or after, achieved by one man, can hardly have been brought into operation all at once.

The Archontate of Isagoras might be the official epoch of the inception, or of the completion, of the undertaking. The authority of Herodotus, who dates the new phylo-demotic system previous to the expulsion and restoration of Kleisthenes, supports the latter alternative. Due allowance for the period of struggle between Kleisthenes and Isagoras, and other considerations, make for the former.

In either case we are left to conjecture the constitutional position of the legislator, and the exact process as well as the whole extent of the legislation. The Isagoras whose name served in the archontic annals of Athens to date the event, can hardly be other than the legislator's great rival. The year might still bear his name, even if he had retired into exile during his tenure of office. To treat the archontic lists, previous to the Persian wars, as adequate authority for a dogmatic chronology, is perhaps more than the condition of the material warrants: nor can we, in view of the silence and the alternative in Herodotus, feel assured that the

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1 c. 28 εν Πέιπρε. As the Archon's name is disputable for 504 B.C. the editors alter πέιπρες into σπηλαίω, but see note infra: the representation above follows the actual facts of the Αθηναίοι πολιτείαι.

2 "In the eleventh year before Marathon": i.e. ταύτα need not include the reference to the Buleutic oath, but may be confined to the reform of the Strategia.

3 Two years after Marathon, Hipparchos was ostrakised: εἶδε δὲ τῷ ὀστρακείῳ έγένετο τῇ Τειθιέων ἕχοντες κ.ά. A further change is recorded for 467/6 B.C., op. cit. c. 26.

4 The true perspective is destroyed, in a similar fashion, in the case of Solon. What the correct chronology for Solon's work may be, need not here be discussed; but that the Scissstheia, the Politheia, and the Nomoi of Solon were all accomplished in one year, or even in three years, is hardly credible. Op. note 1, p. 147 infra.

5 What can be the meaning of the statement that in 504 B.C. (or 501 B.C.) τῷ βουλῆ τοῖς πεντακοσίοιο τῶν δρακον ἐποίησαν, ἐν έρι καὶ νῦν ἄμφωσιν, Ath. Const. c. 22? Did the Bule previously act unworn? Incredible! Does the author deem it worth while to record that for four (or seven) years the oath was, in some unspecified way, different from its later and permanent form? Absurd! Does not the passage dimly indicate that the Kleisthenic Bule of 500 first took the oath, and came into actual operation, in the given year? For the terms of the Buleutic oath see Tilly, Corpus Juris Atticæ, §§ 78-79. That the oath made in 504 (1) B.C. was the same τῷ έρι καὶ νῦν ἄμφωσιν, is one of those fatal remarks which show how inaccurate in details the history in the Athenian Constitution must be.

6 The notion that Kleisthenes must have succeeded Isagoras as Archon in 508/7 B.C. in order to legislate (Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Arist. u. Athen, 1, p. 6) is gratuitous: and, had the legislator been Archon, 'Aristotle' would hardly have dated one Archon's work by another Archon's name.
association of the legislation of Kleisthenes with the name of Isagoras, as archon, is older than the learned but conjectural reconstructions of the fourth century. That the year assigned to Isagoras corresponds to the figures 508/7 B.C. in our notation there is no reason to doubt, although that admission does not carry with it the conclusion that the whole work of Kleisthenes was begun, continued, and ended between the two midsummers indicated.\footnote{1 Von Willemsitz-Moellendorff, *Aristoteles u. Athen*, i. pp. 4 ff. (1898), discusses the chronology of the *Athenian Constitution*. He observes that the writer ('Aristoteles') used the list of Attic Archons as the chronological framework for the history of the Athenian constitution: an observation already made, J. H. N. xii. 29 (1891). To the list so used, at least from Solon onward, he ascribes the highest authority; so viel ist fest zu halten dass alle daten nach attischen archonen auf das vorwürfe sowol des höheren alters wie der ganz besonders zuverlässigkeit anspruch haben, p. 5. But he does not attempt to settle when the first list of Archons was drawn up for historical purposes. It can hardly have been before Hellanikos; we have Thucydides' opinion (1. 97) adverse to his chronology, in a part of Athenian history for which the Archons were easily ascertainable. It is not, moreover, sufficient to have an *Epomen* for every year of the fifth and sixth centuries; that was a very simple business for the *Athetidographes* of the fourth century to arrange; two other results had also to be ascertained: first, the correctness and authenticity of the list had and have to be guaranteed. This is, indeed, a comparatively trifling matter. If there was a complete list of names, one hundred to the century, it would not matter in the first instance whether the names were authentic: any list of *Epomen* would do, provided it were constant. It looks as if during the fourth century such a list was attained: the *Athetidographes* (328 B.C.) implies it; the *marmor Parium* (epoch 264/3 B.C.) exhibits it. But, secondly, for historical purposes it is necessary that the innumerable acts and events which go to make up the history of Athens, should each and every one be attached, or attachable, to one particular *Epomen*. Is it not obvious that this result could only have been attained after a large amount of inference, combination, conjecture, and dogmatism? Certain great events and acts in the sixth and fifth centuries may have had authentic *Epomen* associated with them, in document or inscription; and intervals, distances may have been remembered in some cases; but in how many was the chronology artificial? It would be very rash to assume that in most cases which have come down to us, the date and chronology of events were inferred from the Archon's name; the reverse is more and more likely, the farther back we go: the Archon's names were supplied, from the abstract list, in accordance with the inferred intervals. The *Archomai* of Isagoras—Ol. 68, 508/7 B.C. (cp. Clinton, *Foots*, H. 135). Dionysios of Halikarnassos, to whom this identification is due, makes Themistokles Archon in 493/2 B.C. Taken in connection with Thuc. 1. 93, that would involve the conclusion that the fortification of the Peiraieus was begun two or three years before Marathon, though it was not completed until after Salamin. From 480 B.C. to 305 B.C. or even to 292 B.C. there is an unbroken and probably authentic list of Archons (Clinton, op. c. p. xiv) but can we treat the fragmentary list from Kallikes to Solon as equally binding? The immediate context in the *Athenian Constitution*, c. 22, exhibits a chronological breakdown, and it is difficult to believe that where the history is certainly confused, as in c. 13, the chronology is either clear or accurate. The two *diasporas*—what are they but afterthoughts, on the analogy of 404/3 B.C.? The 'telescoping' of three instants—is it not due to metachronism and undue compression in the history of Solon's legislation? The Athenians in the fourth century were not in one at regard to the date of Solon's legislation, and it is almost inconceivable that Herodotus 1. 29 should have placed it as early as 594 B.C., or even 491 B.C. He but once uses an Archon's name as a date, 8. 51, though the Attic *Epomen* may have helped him, directly or indirectly, to his chronology for short and recent periods: cp. Appendix V, § 5 supra. For the period here chiefly in view (619-489 B.C.) the first ten years were a blank, until the *Ae. wok. supplied the name of Harpakeides for the year of the
tyrannicides. The next ten years were represented by three names, Isagoras = Ol. 65, 508/7 B.C., Akestorides = Ol. 69, 504/3 B.C., Mytios = Ol. 70, 500/499 B.C. It looks in these cases as if the Olympiad had saved the Archon! The 'Α. ω. confirms Isokrates, but dates 504/3 B.C. by the name of Hermokleon. The editors, indeed, change this into eight because the year was already appropriated to Akestorides τὸ δέκατον, and because the battle of Marathon occurred twelve years μετὰ ναῦσα: but a second Archonate is flat anarchy, and the ναῦσα may refer to something else. (See note 2 p. 146 supra.) The 'Α. ω. may be right and Dionys. Halik. wrong. For the next ten years 499-490 B.C. the 'Α. ω. adds no fresh name. Phainippos = 490 B.C. was already known as the immediate predecessor of Aristides. The 'Α. ω. mentions neither the Archonate of Aristides nor that of Themistokles, but could not have dated the latter to 481/0 B.C. for it has a new name for that year, Hypsipile: its chronology of the decade between Marathon and Salamis is, however, far from lucid: to what year e.g. is the ostrakism of Aristides dated by the words ἐν ταῦται τοῖς καμοῖ? The events of the generation that witnessed the Ionian revolt and the Persian wars might have been recovered by memory, in Hdt.'s time: there were old men in the Athens of Perikles who could remember to have seen Pelasgrates: but about the Archon's names there may have been a difficulty, and the Mede's occupation of 480/79 B.C. must have wrought almost as great confusion in Athens as the Gaulish occupation of 390 B.C. wrought in Rome. The Athenians had two advantages over the Romans: they had nearly a century more of undestroyed material to work upon, and they were several centuries ahead of the Romans in science and history! For the fifth century the Archon lists are practically authentic, though the dates of particular events may remain to be established (e.g. ostrakism of Hyperbolos). For the first half of the sixth century they must have been compiled from fragmentary evidences and from tradition. Probably every Athenian could recite in order the names of from forty to fifty Archons without error (cp. 'Α. ω. c. 58), and perhaps lists were soon recovered, or revived, after the Persian war: but it was another matter to distribute the res gestae year by year correctly. Beyond "the age of Pelasgrates"—it was a far cry to the Archonate of Solon, the laws of Drakon, the coup d'etat of Kyion, and so on.
APPENDIX X

MARATHON


§ 1. The legend of Marathon has entered too long and too deeply into the literature and acts of Europe ever to be displaced, or seriously diminished. Whatever may have been the effect and magnitude of the action at the time, however judicial may be the verdict of the philosophic historian, or critical, to-day, an halo of renown for ever hovers over the scene at Marathon, an undying interest belongs to the traditions associated with the name. Among the literary sources of our knowledge, the first place belongs to the record, all too brief, preserved by Herodotus. There is now, strictly speaking, nothing older or more primary for the purpose of reconstructing the story of Marathon, unless it be the material theatre of the very action itself. To revive a vision of the event to-day the modern historian's necromancy must, indeed, lay every source of information under contribution, even though the results be inconsistent, fugitive, problematic. No critical effort can establish an harmony between all the varying traditions, and afterthoughts in the form of traditions,
which have come down to us. But an examination of the nature and state of the evidences is, in itself of interest, and tends to clarify opinion respecting the objective order of events. In regard to the battle of Marathon the process of imaginative and critical reproduction has been attempted times innumerable. Such a duty faces every historian of Greece and of antiquity; such a problem must be encountered by every commentator on Herodotus. A slight access of evidence, or even a variety in method, justifies a fresh presentation and discussion of the issues. The first concern of a student of Herodotus is with the Herodotean version: its priority claims especial regard from the historian working at large. It is proposed in this appendix to envisage the Herodotean version in the first instance upon its own merits, to mark its characteristics, and to formulate the obvious questions to which it gives rise (§§ 2-10). Next follows a fairly complete survey of the later or ancillary sources, including some which are, in one sense, prior to Herodotus himself; and the contribution made by each to our knowledge, or our perplexity, is to be duly registered (§§ 11-30). Finally, from the whole mass of tradition, evidence, and argument an attempt is made to establish some definite views and probabilities in regard to the facts (§§ 31-end).

§ 2. The story of Marathon, told by Herodotus, might here be taken as red: yet it may be worth while, for the sake of clearness and completeness, to present his evidence reduced to quasi-consistency with itself, and shorn of obviously problematic features. All these can then be more conveniently restored in the subsequent discussion.

The bare facts of the case are stated by Herodotus as follows (6. 94-120, cp. Introduction, vol. I. pp. xlvii f.): i. A fleet of 600 ships, bearing a large force of infantry and cavalry, under command of Datis, a Mede, and Artaphernes, son of Artaphernes, a Persian, advanced from Kilikia, the Aleian plain, by sea, to Samos, thence across the Ikarian through the islands. Naxos surrenders, Delos is spared; hostages and reinforcements are taken of the Kyklades generally (cc. 94-99). ii. At Karystos in Euboea the armada first meets with resistance: the Karystians are reduced by force, and compelled to join the Persian army (c. 99). The Persians advanced along the Eubeanean coast, and stayed their ships on the Eretrian shore, disembarked their forces, and offered battle. As no man came out to meet them, they laid siege to the city, and assaulted it six days: on the seventh day traitors admitted them, the city was destroyed by fire, the inhabitants taken captive (c. 101). iii. After a few days' delay the Persians, guided by Hippias, crossed to Attica, and put in at Marathon (after depositing the captive Eretrians in Aigleia, c. 107). The ships were left at anchor, the forces disembarked (c. 102). iv. Meanwhile the Athenians, under their elected Strategos, Miltiades, and nine colleagues, marched to Marathon, and drew up in a temenos of Herakles, where they were joined by the Plataians in full force. Moreover, before leaving Athens, the Strategi had sent to summon the Spartans (c. 103)
v. After some days’ delay, Miltiades put his forces in battle array, Kallimachos the polemarch leading the right, then the Phylae in order towards the left, where the Plataians were posted: but, from the fact that the Athenian line was extended so as to equal the Persian front, the depth of the Greek centre had to be reduced, that of the wings being maintained. vi. A distance of eight stades divided the two armies (c. 112). Over this intervening space the Athenians advanced at a rapid pace, without breaking rank. The battle thus joined lasted a considerable time (c. 113). In the centre, where the Persians proper and the Sakae were posted, the Barbarians got the upper hand, brake through the Athenian line, and pursued inland. On the right wing the Athenians, on the left the Plataians, routed the Barbarians. Leaving the routed Barbarians to fly unmolested for the moment, the Greek wings turned upon the victorious Persians and Sakae, engaged them, and were again victorious. The Persians fled, the Greeks pursued, cutting them down, and coming to the sea, entered it, and were laying hold of the ships. Seven ships the Athenians succeeded in capturing; all the rest put off (c. 113). vii. A shield was seen, raised as a signal (c. 114). viii. The Persian fleet stayed to take up the prisoners from Aiglea, and then was making round Sunion (cc. 115, 116). ix. The Athenian army returned rapidly from Marathon, and arrived in good time at the city, where they camped in a temenos of Heralles in Kynosargos (c. 116). The armada seemed for a while to be intending a descent upon Phaleron, at that time still the port and arsenal of Athens: but after a pause the Persians vanished in the direction of the Asiatic main (c. 116). x. On the field at Marathon 6400 Barbarians, 192 Athenians had been left dead (c. 117). xi. 2000 Lakedaimonians appeared upon the scene, too late to take any part in the action; they went to Marathon to see the corpses of the Medes, and before going home lauded the Athenians for what they had done (c. 120). xii. Meanwhile the Barbarians were making back to Asia. They touched at Mykonos, they revisited Delos, they reached Asia, and sent their prisoners up to Susa; and these Eretrians were located by the king at Arderikka, a village in Kissa, 210 stades distant from Susa, hard by a petroleum well. There they remained in the writer’s time, still speaking their mother tongue (cc. 118, 119).

§ 3. Such is the bare narrative of Herodotus, reduced to something like consistency with itself, and freed from features or shortcomings which have been inevitably challenged by modern criticism, or are obviously problematic in themselves. From a critical point of view it is self-evident that the narrative comes short by reason of omissions. A modern historian would give the exact day and hour, the exact forces engaged, the exact orientation of the positions, and a host of further particulars before he considered a description of a battle satisfactory. Some further particulars beyond those taken up in the analysis above, Herodotus does give: but they are
either of an immaterial kind, e.g. the death of Stesilaos one of the Strategi, the misadventure of Kyngeiros son of Euphionion (c. 114), or so questionable as to belong to the obvious Cruces of the story. Of these cruces there are a round dozen, six major and six minor, patent in the narrative itself. i. The part played by the marvellous, which manifests itself at various points, twice in visions (Philippides c. 105, Epizelos c. 117), twice in dreams (Hippias c. 107, Datis c. 118) and once in a divine coincidence (ec. 108, 116), is conspicuous. Not one of these supernormal items is in itself impossible; but the prominence of such details in a narrative which leaves so much of humbler matter of fact to be desired, might suggest an adverse verdict upon the mind of the historian, and the temper of his sources: nor can the sting of this criticism be entirely drawn. Yet it is no less pertinent to observe that the supernatural element is after all slight, compared with what might have been expected, or what is elsewhere found, in the work of Herodotus himself: nay, its presence is even an additional guarantee of the bona fides of Herodotus and of his sources. The legend of such a victory, with the gods and heroes all left out, would stand self-condemned as a rationalistic fable. The Herakleia in Kynosargos and at or near Marathon were no doubt realities, and the site of the latter must be a decisive indication for the topography of the battle-field. The fact that the Athenians marched from the one to the other, may clearly be distinguished from the inference to be drawn from the fact. The coincidence was neither more nor less divine than the parallel instance in 479 B.C. Such things have in all times and places been divinely symptomatic to pious minds. Whether all the reported dreams and visions actually took place, is a further problem open to discussion. If it could be shown that any or all of them had not taken place as recorded, but were afterthoughts imported into the record, not episodes or events duly remembered, then such discredited items would illustrate the process of transfiguration and glorification on a small scale in regard to Marathon, which is visible on a much larger scale in the traditions of the war with Xerxes. It would be strange, indeed, if all such items in the story were above suspicion. Herodotus is unusually explicit in regard to the wonder (θώμα) that blinded Epizelos (c. 117), and, though he does not name his informant, there is no need for doubting that the son of Kuphagors lost his eyesight in the battle of Marathon, without any apparent reason, and was reported to have ascribed, and actually had ascribed, his misfortune to a vision such as the historian records. Herodotus apparently expresses some scepticism in regard to the cause as distinguished from the fact, by his double reference to the authority of Epizelos himself for the apparition (φασμα), and the somewhat qualified terms (τοιδονε τινα λογον) in which he reports the account of the miraculous incident as reputedly given by Epizelos. But the Herodotean precision in this

1 Cp. 9. 101.
§ 3

MARATHON

153

case, perhaps, arises from anxiety to establish rather than from a wish
to invalidate the story, and on the whole it will be safe to conclude that
Herodotus believed the story, and the wonder and the story which explained
it, and is not to be charged with undue credulity in this particular.
The authentic occurrence of one such episode would make other items
in the traditions about Marathon the more comprehensible; while in
the occurrence itself there is really nothing which transgresses our
canons of credibility.

The vision of Philippides (c. 105) is a degree less possible. As in
the former case, the story is referred by Herodotus to Athenian
tradition; the authority of the visionary himself (δε αυτός τε ἠπειρο
Φιλιππίδης καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι εὐθυγελλε), and the exact location of the
vision (περὶ τοῦ Παρθένου ὅρος τῷ ὑπὲρ Τεγέης) add verisimilitude to the
story. Moreover, the establishment of a shrine of Pan under the
Akropolis, and the institution of the annual festival in honour of Pan,
celebrated in the writer’s day (ἐλάκρονται), are associated with the
vision of Philippides, and may be taken to confirm it. On the other
hand, the date of this institution is but vaguely indicated in the words
καταστάσεις σφρα ἐν ἴδια τῶν πρωτοτομῶν: probably they should be taken
to imply a date not merely subsequent to Marathon, but subsequent
to the destruction of Athens by Xerxes (cp. 7. 132). It would be at
least some 12-15 years after the battle that the grotto of Pan was con-
sacrated: meanwhile many events had occurred which pious or politic
Athenians might have put down to the intervention of Pan. The
association of Pan with the memories of Marathon looks suspiciously
like a reflection of the days of Kimon’s power and popularity. It
seems unlikely that the Pelasgian deity had enjoyed no honour in
Attica till such comparatively recent times: and there was a hill and
grotto of Pan above Marathon, which may have been as old as the
cult on the Akropolis itself (cp. Pausan. 1. 36, 6, Duncker, viii.8
p. 127). Still, the vision of Philippides would be as good for a
‘restoration’ as for an original institution, and cannot be pronounced
impossible. Doubtless it was in connexion with the grotto, perhaps
in the grotto itself, that Herodotus heard the story, in the very
presence of the statue of Pan erected in the name of Miltiades, and
inscribed by Simonides in honour of Marathon. Its association with
a shrine and a festival, its pragmatic bearing on the ‘Marathonian
memories,’ including the service of Miltiades, its relation to the policy
and works of Kimon, tend somewhat to discredit this vision-episode.
If Pan was already at home in Attica, at Marathon, on the Akropolis,
the story told of Philippides breaks down in its most important
particular.1 That Philippides himself had told the story might be no
more than a natural inference on the part of one who believed the

1 Curtius, Stadtpchoschte v. Athen, p.
184, represents the institution of the cult
of Peloponnesian Pan as belonging to the
circle of Marathonian memories: yet on
p. 43 he recognizes rural Pan with the
Nymphs among the oldest inhabitants of
the north side of the Akropolis, away
from the old Ionian or Thessan city.
story true: for who but Philippides could have originated it? On the whole, it seems not improbable that the introduction of Pan into the Marathonian legend is afterthought, not genuine memory, and that Philippides was already out of the way, when the vision in Arkady was fathered upon him. The good faith of Herodotus is in no way impugned by such a theory: he but reports what has been conveyed to him.1

What authority Herodotus had for the anecdote of Hippias, his dream and its fulfilment (c. 107), he neither expressly nor implicitly reveals, unless the bystanders, ol παραστάτα, might include Greeks, and the story be traceable to them. It contains nothing incredible, except, indeed, the reductio ad absurdum of Hippias’ hopes and ambitions. Hippias belonged to a desidaitomonastic family (ep. 5. 55 and note ad l.); dreams and omens were probably his portion. In a fit of peevish superstition, or of trivial disappointment, he might have given vent to the exclamation reported. The comic and satirical side of the story renders it doubly open to suspicion; the fact that the anecdote represents Hippias as giving up all hope of recovering Athens before a blow is struck in Attica, does not make for its credibility. The incestuous dream implies a grim verdict on tyranny, ranking it with the foulest crimes: while the fulfilment explodes the tyrant in a fit of laughter. Yet this view is haply too ‘modern’; no smile crosses the face of Herodotus as he relates the anecdote: to him it is a serious history. It may be that this excellent humorist sometimes failed to see the humour that was not his own; and on this occasion mistook the flavour of the Attic salt.2

The story of the Dream of Datis (c. 118) must be admitted to contain at least one point of historic interest. The restoration of the gilded statue to the Boeotian Delion some twenty years after, i.e. circa 470 B.C., was doubtless an actual event not devoid of political significance, in view of the relations of Athens and Thebes (Delos and Delphi) at the moment. Whether all the other items are likewise historic is not equally clear. That the statue had been deposited in Delos by Datis may be true, without compelling us to believe that Datis enjoined on the Delians its restoration to the Boeotian shrine, much less that he was moved to this injunction by a vision in his sleep. The moderation which forbore to describe the dream in detail, may be due rather to a lack of imagination than to a sense of veracity among the Boeotians. It is on the face of things more probable that Herodotus heard this story, and perhaps saw the statue, in Boeotian Delion, than at Delos itself. The nameless dream may be no more than a Boeotian invention, which serves at once to justify the restoration, and to condemn the islanders, who had failed to effect it sponte sua. Anyway, the return of the statue was many years previous

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2 Hippias dreams that he suffers the fate of Oedipus: the waking scene is a fulfilment pour vire. Oedipus is tragic with the loss of his eyes: Hippias searching for his tooth in the sand is a laughing-stock.
to Herodotus' visit to Delos (cp. 6. 98 and note, Introduction, vol. I. p. ci), and no doubt years before he ever set foot in Boeotia (5. 59). There was time and occasion for the afterthought, which might have inferred a dream as the motive for the real or reported action of the Mede, without violation of the canon that a hypothesis should contain a vera causa. This incident, it should be observed, is no part of the Athenian story of Marathon, and one fatal objection to the story, as it stands in Herodotus, lies in the fact that Datis was past dreaming, when this dream visits him in the pages of Herodotus:—at least, if we can believe that his body was lying a corpse on the plain of Marathon. The death and the dream of Datis are alternatives: it is by no means clear that Herodotus is seized of the right one.\footnote{1}§ 4. ii. The story of Marathon, as told by Herodotus, contains an exaggeration, which has often been pointed out, and seldom, if ever, defended. The particulars lie in the words: πρῶτοι μὲν γὰρ Ἑλληνοὶ πάνω τῶν ἡμαῖς τοιού ὀρώμεν ἐς πολεμίους ἐχρήσαντο (ἐκ. Ἀθηναῖοι), πρῶτοι δὲ άναγχοντο ἐσθητὰ τὰ Μυκηνῶν ὀρέωντες καὶ τοῦτο ἄνδρον τάυτην ἡθημένοις· τίς δὲ ἦν τοῖς Ἑλληνικαὶ καὶ τὸ οἴνουμα τὸ Μυκηνῶν φόβος ἀκούοντα, c. 112. There are three distinct statements in this passage:
1. The Athenians of all Hellenes were the first who charged an enemy at a run. 2. The Athenians were the first who sustained the sight of the Median dress and the men clad therewith. 3. Down to that date even the name 'Medes' was a terror to Hellenic ears. In regard to the first statement: if the Athenian hoplites at Marathon ran against the enemy, it was perhaps not merely the first but the only occasion of such a performance: the implication that they ran all but a mile is hardly credible. If they advanced a mile, they advanced probably seven-eighths of the distance at little more than the normal pace: otherwise in what condition would an army have arrived at the end of such a mile-race? If they charged at something like full speed, it would only be when they were within bow-shot of the enemy. The context suggests the remark that Herodotus, or his source, did not realise the purpose and significance of the charge at the double: the Persians are represented as astonished to see a few men, without cavalry or archers, charging at speed: the smallness of the force, the absence of cavalry and archery on the Athenian side, the presence at least of archers in the Persian ranks, were reasons for the dash. In Herodotus' view it is apparently a mere act of unreasoned heroism: to the Persians an act of suicidal madness. His authority for reporting the Persian conjectures on the occasion Herodotus does not indicate: the report is probably itself conjectural. That the Athenians advanced some eight stades rapidly, and actually charged at the double (to avoid the arrows), is probably a genuine memory of Marathon: the rest is distortion, exaggeration, inconsequence, glorification.\footnote{2}  

\footnote{1}{Cp. § 30 infra.}
\footnote{2}{For a possible source of the misunderstanding see note to 6. 112, and p. 224 infra.
The third article in the passage hardly admits of discussion: it is true, and it is false: true in the letter, false in the spirit, obviously exaggerated in tone and suggestion. The name of the Mede did not wholly cease to be a terror to the Hellenes after Marathon, nor had it entirely overawed them before. The statement is traceable to influences which in course of time made the true story of Marathon an absurd legend. The Athenians had an authentic copyright in the story of Marathon; they put their own interpretations on the facts. Grote, who decided that "the combat of Marathon was by no means a very decisive defeat" (iv. p. 43), still admits the purely Athenian estimate of Athenian heroism. Grote even cites the division of opinion among the ten Strategi as proof of "the extreme effort of courage required in the Athenians to encounter such invaders"; as though many other considerations might not explain that division of opinion, even accepting the facts as recorded by Herodotus. Grote might almost as well have cited the hesitation of Miltiades as evidence of the terror, seeing that the reason suggested by Herodotus for the inaction of Miltiades (vide § 6 infra) is obviously inconsequential. The formula πάντων τῶν ἡμέρας ἔδωκα, a standing one with Herodotus,¹ does not prove that he is primarily and solely responsible for the panegyric in question: but he makes it his own, and becomes responsible for it. The Laconic land (c. 120) would have been expressed in more measured terms. Herodotus has taken the Athenian achievement at the popular Athenian valuation. The central statement is refuted or heavily discounted by his own previous record. Nigh ten years before Marathon the Athenians had had a description of 'the Mede dress and the men therewith yclad' well calculated to assuage their fears (5. 49, 97, with notes ad ill.). They had themselves gone to Sardes, and the Ionians, the servile Ionians, had shown fight. What truth there was in the stories of the Scythian expedition of Dareios, of the Libyan expedition of Aryandes, was surely known to the Athenians by this time: at any rate, the earlier stories should have given Herodotus pause, before committing himself to this threefold Athenian exaggeration. Yet the 'noble lie' is not without its uses. It serves to mark the exaltation of sentiment in Athens which followed on success, it even marks the distinctively Athenian reply to pan-Hellenic ideas, the Kimonian protest against the laurels of Themistokles, the moderate reaction against the extremer democracy. It indicates the character of the sources from which the earliest story of Marathon was derived. A danger lies, that in thus discovering the secret of the exaggeration, the critic should be led unduly to depreciate the importance of Marathon.

§ 5. iii. The anachronism, which is chargeable on Herodotus in respect of the story of Marathon, lies first in the alleged sortition of the Polemarchy, secondly in the relations described, or implied, as sub-

sitting between the Polemarch and the Strategi, and between one
Strategos and his colleagues, in the year 490 B.C. Until the discovery
of the Ἀθηναϊῶν πολιτεία there was no text which could be regarded
as authoritative upon these points; but, from the time of Grote onward,
there have not been wanting critics who preferred to credit Her-
dotus with a venial anachronism rather than to disfigure the Athenian
constitution with a mortal anomaly. The arguments were briefly
as follows: (1) that so long as the Polemarch exercised the important
functions which Kallimachos exercised at Marathon, it is unlikely
that he was appointed by lot; (2) that the introduction of the
lot was universally regarded as a mark of extreme democracy
(cp. Hdt. 3. 80), but the Kleisthenic democracy was moderate;
(3) that the occurrence of eminent names in the list of Archons
after 490 B.C. makes it probable that they were elected not ap-
pointed by lot; (4) that an appropriate place could be found for the
introduction of the lot after the Persian wars in the extension of the
democracy under Aristeides (Plutarch, Arist. 22), and the diminu-
tion of the powers of the Areiopagos. It is needless to discuss here at
length the ingenious arguments by which it was sought to save the
credibility of Herodotus in this particular: as for example, that the
duties of a military officer were so simple that any Athenian citizen
in 490 B.C. was good enough to discharge the duties of Polemarch
(Schömann); that the lot was only called in to decide the distribution
of functions among the nine Archons who were elected (Oncken).
Still less is it worth while here to revive the preposterous theory of
Müller-Strübing, which represented the lot as an aristocratic device to
stem the tide of democratic progress, though this theory unfortunately
overcame the too reconstructive Duncker;¹ or to defend the precise
association of the lot with the reforms of Ephialtes, as suggested by
Grote.² It is more important for the present purpose to observe that
Herodotus, in the passage in question, is not so much concerned with
the sortition of the Polemarchia as with the co-ordination of the Pole-
maroch and the Strategi. What he is obviously emphasising is not
that the Polemarchia was an ‘allotted’ office, but that in the time of
the battle of Marathon the Polemarch ‘voted with the Strategi as
one of themselves’ (ἐμόψηφος τοῖς στρατηγοῖς). Herodotus may be
off guard against one anachronism, while carefully avoiding another.
A second observation is even more important. The representation
of the Polemarchy as ‘allotted,’ though the most obvious is the least mis-
chievous of the errors in the context. The representation of Miltiades
as commander-in-chief is a still graver anachronism. This representa-
tion is not effected without some confusion between various stages,
actual or potential, in Athenian constitutional history. On the one
hand, the supreme command is assumed to circulate day by day

² On the question of the lot cp. note to § 109, and Appendix IX. § 13 supra.
within the Strategic college, and Miltiades is for several days supreme, first by grace of his colleagues, and secondly, on the actual day of battle, in his own right, c. 110. This representation of the facts is doubly wrong: probably in 490 B.C. the Strategi were still mere officers of the Phyleae, each commanding his own phyleae, while the real and titular commander-in-chief was the Polemarch. There was no circulation of the chief command such as is implied by Herodotus.¹ This opinion was and is independent of the evidence or authority of the Aristotelian treatise on the Athenian Constitution, but has been verified and confirmed by it.² On the other hand, Miltiades is implicitly represented as in supreme command, partly by the general tone of the story, and partly by express terminology, proper to a later time, when one Strategos was, or might be, invested with superior authority. The belated and casual introduction of the Polemarch seems only to betray a consciousness that there is something wrong in the story; it neither redresses the error, nor harmonises the double representations of the στρατηγία of Miltiades. There are two phrases in particular applied to Miltiades which involve a constitutional anachronism: (α) ἦγον δὲ σφακα στρατηγοὶ δέκα, τῶν ὁ δέκατος ἦν Μιλτιάδης, c. 103. This phrase can hardly be taken to mean that Miltiades was last and least of the ten Strategi, but rather that he was chief and foremost.³ (β) A second phrase used of the στρατηγία of Miltiades seems most naturally explicable as referring to a special position in the Strategic college; ἀντωνυόν δὲ καὶ τοῖτος στρατηγοὺς αὐτῷ Ἀθηναίων ἀπάκτηθη, αἰρεθεῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ δῆμου, c. 104. Were the other nine Strategi then not elected ὑπὸ τοῦ δῆμου? Was Miltiades really elected ὑπὸ τῆς φυλῆς? Was there any difference in the way of electing one Strategos and the way of electing the others? Was there indeed anything peculiar in the Strategia of Miltiades? Here again the critique was complete before the revelations of the Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία. It was held that originally the Strategi had been elected ἐκ τῆς φυλῆς and ὑπὸ τῆς φυλῆς. It was further held that at least in Periklean Athens the election ἐκ τῆς φυλῆς was maintained, except in the case of the ἱγμών. How far such arrangements were standing arrangements was doubtful: but that they obtained at least upon occasion was indubitable. The ἱγμῶν (πρωταρχής, c. 110) is represented as circulating among the ten Strategi in 490 B.C. But this view is hardly tenable if the Polemarch was commander-in-chief. It conflicts likewise with the general presentation of Miltiades, and with the particular phrases above quoted, which go to show that he was in chief command. The double confusion only makes the anachronism the clearer. But for the presence of the Polemarch it might have been argued that in 490 B.C. the Athenians first instituted the ἱγμῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ κρατία for the Strategi: the case of Melanthios in 498 B.C. (5.

§§ 5, 6

MARATHON

159

97) being apparently a special commission. But the statement in c. 110 would conflict with that hypothesis, even if the Polemarch were out of the way. Whether the statement in question describes an arrangement that ever obtained or not, may be open to discussion. It might be a mere bit of rationalism, to make the position of Miltiades intelligible; yet its introduction would be more plausible, if the command-in-chief ever circulated among the Strategi, or circulated failing the special appointment of one of the number as ἤγεμων. Yet on the other hand, assuming that the ten Strategi at Marathon each commanded his own phyledas, while the Polemarch was in command supreme, it is possible that a misunderstanding and confusion underlie the statement in c. 110, the elucidation of which would go far to disperse the next difficulty to be noticed in the Herodotean story of the battle.1

§ 6. iv. The narrative given by Herodotus presents another difficulty in the incoherence attributed to Miltiades. The fact that this difficulty is eliminated by one or other of the rival versions of the story serves to accentuate its prominence in the Herodotean version; the modern apologist may modify or explain it away, but in so doing he emphasises the defect and oversight. The rock of offence may be marked as follows: Miltiades, convinced that the interests of Athens demand instant battle, πρὶν τι καὶ σαθρῶν Ἀθηναίων μεταξέρρων ἔγινε, ὁποίος (c. 109), obtains early opportunity of delivering the attack, and yet delays for some days, determined not to order an advance until he himself was Prytanis for the day (πρὶν γε ἄρτι ἀυτοῦ πρυτανείη ἔγινε, c. 110). It might, perhaps, be urged that this criticism bears hardly upon Herodotus in two particulars: (a) Miltiades advocates not so much a battle then and there, as a battle sooner or later, instead of a purely defensive plan of action, the exact day being left to circumstances or other considerations. (b) It might be argued that Herodotus intentionally supplies the cause which determined the day of battle in the 'prytany of Miltiades,' c. 110. But, without going beyond the text, and considerations arising legitimately out of it,2 the doubt revives whether the casus fugae is adequately reported by Herodotus. Assuming that the decision rested with Miltiades, did he determine a question of such high moment on a point of official punctilio? Even if the 'prytany' means at once more and less than the command-in-chief,3 if it imply that the Strateges with his phyledas

1 With this section cp. § 23 ἵσαν, and Appendix IX. §§ 13, 14 supra. In the army of Alexander the Great there was, apparently, a daily change in the ἤγεμων of the divisions, as well of cavalry as of infantry, without its in any way affecting the chief command. See Arrian, Anabasis, I. 14, 6 ἢ θά καὶ ἐστοχασα τῷ ἤγεμων τοῦ ἱππεύς παρά ἤγεμον ἐκείνῳ τῷ ἡμέρᾳ. 1. 28, 3 ἢ ἐκεῖνος τῶν στρατηγῶν ἢ ἤγεμων τῷ τάξει ἐν τῷ τότε ἡμέρᾳ. Ιπ. 5. 18, 4 ἤχεν τοῖς τούτων ἄλλων ἕστασισ, ὡς ἐκεῖνος αἱ ἤγεμοι ἐν τῷ τότε ἐνεπάλλον. 2 The previous decision, not to stand a siege, may be taken as involved in the (erroneous) Persian anticipation ταῦτα τῶν Ἀθηναίων πολέμου τὰ καὶ τῶν Ελλήνων τοῖς ἔστιν, c. 102. 3 Cp. note to 6. 110.
moved to the place of honour on the right wing, and was thus brought directly into touch with the Polemarch, even then, is the determination to attack the Persians on the given day adequately ‘motivated,’ without any reference to circumstances outside the Athenian ranks! Was the word to advance given without reference to the aspect and condition of the opposing forces, and simply and solely upon the double ground put forward by Herodotus (a) to anticipate the action of traitors, (b) because on the day of battle the ‘prytany’ was with Miltiades? The form of this *aporia* may be altered, but the difficulty remains, if, instead of charging Miltiades with inconsequence, the text of Herodotus be accused of supplying inadequate motives for the determination of the Athenian to give battle: and the difficulty remains the same, whether Miltiades is to be considered the commander-in-chief, as Herodotus implies, or whether Kallimachos is to be invested with real, or titular command, as rational criticism did in fact demand, without recourse to any ancillary source of information, outside the Herodotean text, with its suggestive inconsistencies.

Two events, or considerations, are supplied by the record itself, which might be called in to explain the act of Miltiades (or of Kallimachos), though not without violence to other elements in the same record: (1) the arrival of the Plataians, c. 108. (2) The expected advent of the Spartans, cc. 106, 120. (1) But the first of these events is inadmissible on chronological grounds, as it is placed by Herodotus distinctly before the discussion among the Strategi, the appeal of Miltiades to Kallimachos, and consequently several days before the actual battle: moreover, even if the chronological indication were sacrificed, on the assumption that the Plataians were not summoned until the Athenians had reached Marathon, or, at least, did not arrive at Marathon until the day, or the eve of the day, upon which the battle was actually fought, yet the appearance of the Plataians even πανάριοι could hardly in itself be sufficient to determine the delay of the Athenian commander-in-chief. (2) The expected advent of the Spartans would be a reason for further delaying not for precipitating the attack, unless it were to be supposed that the Athenians felt so confident of victory that they wanted to keep the glory (and the spoil) all to themselves! Such a confidence does, indeed, inspire Miltiades (θεῖον τὰ ἔσα νεμόντων οἷοι τε εἰμῖν περισσότεροι τῇ συμβολῇ, c. 109), but this very confidence, that supposition, make havoc of the extravagant glory claimed for the Athenians (c. 112) in the battle, and involve a fresh gravamen against the story in Herodotus. However, the authenticity of the speech put into the mouth of Miltiades in c. 109 must be guaranteed before its contents are admitted as evidence of the true state of facts, or of feelings, on the eve of the battle. The speech is itself an anachronism.¹ Rather

¹ Cp. notes to 6. 109.
is it to be argued that the expected advent of the Spartans did weigh with the Athenians in favour of postponing the battle, than that the Athenians were determined to gather the laurels of Marathon without the Spartan aid, which they had a few days earlier invoked (c. 105). Thus everything here considered points to some circumstance or consideration beyond the ranks of the Athenian army, over and above the state of the Athenian city, beside the arrival of the Plataians, without the aid of the Spartans, which led the Athenian commander to the decision to engage the Persians forthwith. What was that circumstance? The text of Herodotus contains no positive indication of any such fresh fact in the situation; but the consideration of the next cursus or aporia in his narrative may help to supply the omission.

§ 7. v. The least critical reader can hardly fail to observe one conspicuous cursus in the Herodotean account of the battle, to wit, the total absence of any reference to the Persian cavalry. This omission is all the more frappant, because the presence of cavalry on the Persian side has been somewhat carefully noticed earlier in the narrative (cc. 95, 101), and because the supreme suitability of Marathon for cavalry manœuvre has been alleged as a reason why Hippias selected Marathon as the landing-place for the Persians (ἡ γὰρ ὁ Μαραθῶν ἐπιτηδεύτατον χώραν τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἐντεύκνα, c. 102). From the point of landing onwards the Persian cavalry disappears from the narrative: what part it took, or whether it took any part at all, in the action, is not specified. It has been argued that the cavalry disappears from the narrative of Herodotus because it took no part in the actual battle. But this explanation, if it does not duplicate the difficulty, merely removes it one step backward, and the problem recurs in the form of the question: Why did the Persian cavalry take no part in the actual battle of Marathon? Moreover, the apology recoils to the further discredit of the historian, who, on the supposition that the cavalry was absent, should surely have notified the fact expressly, and given some explanation thereof. But it is far from evident that Herodotus conceived the action as fought without cavalry. He makes, or follows a source which makes, the Persians observe the absence of cavalry upon the Athenian side (c. 112), but this very observation implies an assumption that the Persians were well off for cavalry, or at any rate shows that the historian had no idea of any similar disadvantage on the Persian side. Still, it is remarkable that nothing is recorded of the cavalry in the action: this omission remains an omission, and amounts to an inconsequence, however it be explained. One point is obvious: Herodotus overlooked the problem. So far as his silence goes it suggests that the Persian cavalry was present and taking part in the action. Apparently he did not give the matter a conscious thought. But can it be maintained that, if the Persian cavalry had been present and active upon the occasion, there would have been nothing reported of them, especially seeing that the Greek centre was ex hypothesi routed? Among the moderns various views have prevailed, and various hypo-
theses have been devised, to eliminate this difficulty, perhaps the most obvious of all the difficulties in Herodotus' account of the battle. Creasy, in his somewhat uncritical account of the affair,\(^1\) supposes that the Persian cavalry was present at Marathon, but owing to the rapidity of the Greek advance had not time to prepare their horses and mount, before the onset: Grote (who had not enjoyed, like Gibbon, a little military experience) apparently agrees.\(^2\) But this view is eminently unsatisfactory. (1) There is nothing in the Herodotean story to justify the notion that the Persian cavalry had not time to mount. The battle is a regular set piece: the two armies are drawn up in battle array; the Persians have time and presence of mind enough to criticise the Athenian attack, from the point of view of men well supplied with cavalry; the battle lasted a good while (χρόνος ἐγένετο πολλάς, c. 118): even if the Persian cavalry had been caught napping, it might have put in an appearance before the end. In short, if we may manipulate the Herodotean account until it becomes consistent with this notion, we may as well get rid of the Persian cavalry altogether. (2) To be rid of the cavalry altogether cancels what must otherwise be a serious difficulty in the sequel. It is hard enough to arrange the departure of the Persians from Marathon, the re-embarkation and retreat, even if the cavalry have not to take part in that complicated operation: but how the defeated Persians effect the re-embarkation of the cavalry, and all the rest of the army, in the presence of the victorious Athenians, it well nigh passes the wit of man to conceive: moreover, the total omission of all mention of the cavalry at this point in the story is doubly perplexing on the assumption that the men and horses were there on the strand to be re-embarked. (3) If it is assumed that the cavalry was present on the occasion, then, over and above the difficulty just stated, we forfeit, at least in part, the best hypothesis which has been devised to explain the determination of the Athenians to exchange, at a given moment, the defensive for the offensive. The bare absence of the cavalry will not in itself supply that hypothesis; but the actual removal of the cavalry would go some way to account for the determination taken by the Athenian commander to deliver an attack. A distinction must therefore be drawn between hypotheses, like Leake's\(^3\) and Blakesley's, which merely remove the Persian cavalry from the scene of action, and hypotheses, like those of Rawlinson, Curtius and Busolt,\(^4\) which find in the withdrawal of the Persian cavalry the motive for the sudden change

\(^{1}\) _Sixteen decisive Battles of the World_, 15th ed. (1866), pp. 1 ff.
\(^{2}\) _ibid._ p. 38.
\(^{3}\) _Op. cit._ § 31 _infra._ On Delbrück's theory, _op._ § _infra._
\(^{4}\) _Die Lakedaimonier_, i. 361 ff. (1876). In his _Gr. Gesch._ ii. 77 (1888), he has preferred to err with Duncker, and keeps the cavalry on the field of battle. Curtius, _Gr._ ii. 24, believes that the fleet was manned and the cavalry on board: yet on p. 22 he gives as the reason for the battle that Miltiades was in command on that day. He was, however, the father of the "absent cavalry" hypothesis. _Op._ _Weck- lein, U. d. Tradition_, p. 35 (1876).
or development of plan on the Athenian side. Thus Leake supposed that the Persian cavalry was placed in some neighbouring plain, and on the day of action was not even within sight of the battle. But this hypothesis leaves it to be explained why the Persians did not summon the cavalry, assumes that the Persians had lost touch of an important arm of their forces, and ignores the question of what became of the cavalry afterwards, or how it was got off. Blakeley's hypothesis is, like much in his criticism, extremely ingenious, but its ingenuity will not save it. The cavalry, he supposes, was not landed in Attika at all. "They had been debarked at Eretria (6. 101) little more than a week before, and there they still remained." The words in c. 102 καὶ ἄγρατα τῆς Ἐρετρίας lend some colour to this hypothesis, until it is pointed out that Eretria is 35-40 miles distant from Marathon (Rawlinson). Moreover the Persians had effected the landing at Marathon with special view to cavalry action, and had several days during which to bring the cavalry across. Again, it is an objection to Blakeley's view that Herodotus in c. 115 makes the Persians after leaving Marathon call at 'the island' (i.e. Aiglea, c. 107) for their prisoners from Eretria, but gives no hint of their re-embarking their horses and men from Euboea. But the strongest objection to Blakeley's view is to be found in the consideration that it supplies no explanation of the change from inaction to action on the Athenian side. If the Persian cavalry was not brought to Marathon, the sooner the Athenians attacked the Persians the better: but why they attacked them at all, after waiting so long, or why they did not wait a little longer, for the coming of the Spartans, there is nothing in this hypothesis of Blakeley's to indicate. Rawlinson in suggesting that the absence, i.e. despatch and withdrawal of the cavalry, was the motive for the Athenian attack seems to have lighted on a vera causa: but he spoils the theory by an inadequate explanation for the disappearance of the cavalry. The Persian cavalry, he supposes, had been disembarked, but had been despatched from the field, "either procuring forage or employed on some special service" and so took no part in the action, for which indeed the withdrawal of the cavalry was the sufficient reason. But would the whole force have been away procuring forage, or on that nameless special service, mayhap consulting oracles, or robbing temples (cp. c. 118)? Anyway Rawlinson's rationalism is here wrecked upon the same shoal as Leake's, as Grote's, as Creasy's: what became of the cavalry afterwards? Why do we hear nothing of their re-embarkation? What room is there in the story for that lengthy and elaborate operation, after the battle? How were they got off? Curtius' suggestion lets in some light on this dark place. The cavalry was brought as might be supposed to Marathon, and there put on shore. The cavalry was re-embarked; and its re-embarkation was the reason for the Athenian attack. This suggestion does not leave the cavalry to be accounted for after the battle, as do all the other suggestions previously
noticed; it explains as well as the suggestions of Leake, of Blakesley, of Rawlinson the absence of all notice of the cavalry in the description of the battle; and it explains better than any other hypothesis the determination of the moment of attack. All these suggestions, indeed, agree in marking a serious short-coming or inconvenience in the Herodotean narrative: but unless that shortcoming be fairly recognised, no beginning can be made of a sound or probable reconstruction. In any case Herodotus fails to remove the cavalry from the scene in any intelligible fashion; and this failure is as serious under the circumstances, if they were present, as the omission to specify their re-embarkation or absence, if the men and horses were away. As will subsequently appear there is some bad evidence in support of the view that the Persian cavalry was present and took part in the action: and there is some evidence, perhaps not quite so bad, in favour of the view that the cavalry was away and took no part in the action. The disappearance of the cavalry in the narrative of Herodotus was enough to suggest the idea that the cavalry took no part in the action; and from that to the idea that it had been sent away "on some special service," or had been re-embarked, decidedly the alternative preferable, was a short step. Why the cavalry was thus handled still remains to be seen or discussed; all the more so, since the 'forage' hypothesis has been ruled out. An adequate motive for the re-embarkation of the cavalry can only be found in the complete reconstruction of the story of Marathon to be attempted further on: that reconstruction may however involve the recognition that the cavalry-motiv has been overdone, and cannot in itself explain the assumption of the offensive by the Athenians, or the probable circumstances of the actual fight. Meanwhile the examination of the last of the greater cruces in the narrative of Herodotus may put the inquirer within sight of a group of considerations which, though suggested by Herodotus, seems hardly to have adequate prominence in his representations.

§ 8. vi. The difficulty created by what may be called the Shield-episode, or the problem of treachery, differs from the five other aporiae, so far discussed, in one important particular, to wit, that the problem is definitely stated by Herodotus himself, the difficulty is one as patent to him as to us. From this point of view the objection does not properly lie against Herodotus, but goes behind his authorship, and is transferred to his sources and, ultimately, even to the objective order of events itself. The very existence of a difficulty in this particular form has an important bearing upon the question of the materials at the disposal of Herodotus. If, notwithstanding his interest and good will in the matter, Herodotus failed to obtain satisfactory evidence on this subject, and was put off, or led away, by sophistic apologies and fallacious anecdotes, devised and reported in the interest of the suspected Alkmaionids and their belongings, what is to be thought of the quality of Athenian memories dealing with
Marathon I. Blakeley has indeed proposed to omit the whole passage cc. 121-124, as work of a later hand, but he goes in this proposal much too far. Against Blakeley it may be urged (1) that the omission of c. 122 Καλλέω ... ἀνδρὶ by ABC (vide notes ad l.) makes for the authenticity of the remainder. (2) That the passage following (cc. 125-131) is indubitably Herodotean, but would have no raison d’être without the introduction supplied by cc. 121, 123, 124. (3) The argument which Blakeley derived from the silence of Pausanias is not worth much, for it involves the assumption that Pausanias, writing about another topic, should of necessity have remembered this passage, and have referred to it. But the difficulty is in the main independent of the authenticity of the questioned passage, cc. 121-124. This passage, if genuine, or if in good part genuine,1 is especially interesting as evidence that this problem exercised the mind of Herodotus, and that the suspicion attaching to the Alkmaionidae was inerete, and still required refutation in his day; but in any case the difficulty remains, as an unresolved aoría in his account of the battle, and as an element to be reckoned with in any attempt to reconstruct the real course of events; for this difficulty is provided in the words (οἱ βἀρβαροι) περίπλοκον Σοῦνον, βουλόμανοι φήμαι τοις Ἀθηναίοις ἄπαντοκόμοις ἐκ τοῦ ἀττυ. αἰτίην δὲ ἅγκε ς ἐν Ἀθηναίοις ἐξ Ἀλκμαίνιδων μνημεία αὐτοῖς πατη τενορημένης τούτοις γὰρ συνθέμινοι τοις Πάροις ἀδελφὸς αὐτῶν ἠδὲ ἦν ἐν πρώτῃ μνείᾳ, c. 115. In this passage the shield-episode is contained, and the suspicion attached to the Alkmaionidae guaranteed.2 Any attempt at a rational reconstruction of the story of Marathon must reckon with this episode, involving a great many particular items. Thus it is to be observed that (1) the spot on which the signal shield was displayed is not specified, but (2) the time is approximately marked. (3) The purpose for which the signal was raised is suggested, and the return of the Athenians to the city is directly connected with the signal, but (4) the exact information conveyed by the signal is not reported. (5) The persons who were held responsible for the treacherous signal are explicitly named: but though the Alkmaionidae are acquitted, no alternative name is suggested, either here or elsewhere, the conclusion of the argument in cc. 121-124 being purely negative. Each of these five points requires further elucidation. It may be premised that no objection can lie to a shield having been used for the purpose of signalling. The arts of war were sufficiently developed in the fifth century for such devices to be in practice. The signal presumably was effected not by a dull but by a bright shield, and signs made perhaps in a fashion anticipating

1 c. 122 is spurious, but has no bearing on the question; c. 124 is suspicious on internal grounds, but superficial for the case.
2 It might be argued that the statement in the text is a single statement, every article of which stands and falls together; so that if the Alkmomion did not raise the shield, no shield was raised at all. The writer of c. 124 carefully distinguishes the two points; and in so doing probably gives the full and fair interpretation of the text in c. 115.
the modern helio-telegraphy by flashing mirrors. Nay, the bright Attic full moon of a September night might, perhaps, have sufficed for such a purpose.

(1) In regard to the spot upon which the shield was raised: as, according to the conception of Herodotus, the ‘Barbarians’ are evidently still on the water by Marathon, the shield must have been raised on some spot visible from the bay. No place answers the requirements better than the summit of Pentelikon, or the neighbouring height of Agrigluki. But, whether only a single shield was used, and how the intelligence required was conveyed from Athens, or from the point of departure, to the signal station, are items on which we are left to conjecture. If one and only one shield was in use, and that one flashed in sunshine or in moonlight from Pentelikon, the necessity of sending a shield-bearer up the mountain, or of sending word to the man stationed up there, might help to account for the apparent retardation of the signal, if a retardation is to be inferred from the Herodotean account.

(2) The time-index is not, however, upon examination so precise after all. The Persians are ‘already in their ships,’ when the shield-signal is flashed on them. But what sort of temporal indication is this? The Persians are all aboard: how long the embarkation lasted is not hinted: at what hour of the day, or night, the enshipment was accomplished is left to conjecture.\(^1\) If the action has gone forward on the scale implied in the previous narrative, if the two lines of battle have been drawn up in good order, the religious preliminaries duly observed (c. 112), a lengthy combat ensuing with dubious fortune, until the masterly manoeuvre of the Greek wings secured victory, and the Persians were driven into the sea; how much time still remains on the day of Miltiades, his prytany, for the embarkation of the Persian forces? Could it all have been accomplished ere the sun set beyond Kotroni and the moon arose over Euboea? The discussion of a previous cruze has made it probable that the Persian cavalry was already re-shipped: of the tens of thousands \textit{ex hypothesi} led to Marathon by Hippias, were the cavalry alone aboard, when the Athenians advanced to the charge? The fewer barbarians left on land by the time the Athenians rushed down upon the foe, the easier it becomes to understand the sequel: the complete omission of any sufficient account of how the barbarians were embarked, the comparatively small number of prizes which fell into the hands of the Athenians, the insignificant number at least of the Athenians slain, the apparent rapidity of the subsequent movements of the Barbarians, the total absence of all consciousness in Athenian traditions that the embarkation of a large and defeated army would be a work of considerable difficulty and require a good long time, the express statement that the signal was given when the Barbarians were already

\(^1\) Contrast the divisions of the day and night in 4. 181, with note \textit{ad l.}
aboard, all suggest the hypothesis that not merely were the Persians aboard before the signal shied was seen, but that the shield was shown or ever the battle was fought.

(3) The extremely explicit statement, that the Persians were already on board when the shield was raised, is of a kind not to be easily cancelled or denied, and virtually makes it idle to argue that the signal betokened merely that the moment had come to embark. The purpose of the signal was assuredly that the time was come to sail (or row) round Sunion, for Phaleron and Athens. If the cavalry, still more if a good part of the infantry to boat, were already on board when the signal was given, there would be enough hard fact to account for the datum of Athenian tradition, preserved by Herodotus, that the Persians were already aboard when the signal was given. As to the implication that, in consequence of the signal, the Athenians returned to the city, it may be remarked that, even if the signal was so obviously belated as not to have been raised until after the battle and there was not a live Barbarian left on the strand to hold the Athenians to their post at Marathon, the immediate return of the Athenians to the city is unintelligible. They would, indeed, have needed to be very sure they had just inflicted a crushing blow upon the King's armament, and won a decisive victory, to turn their backs on Marathon, in confidence that no Persian would set foot upon that strand again! Could the Athenians all have departed from Marathon while a single Persian craft remained in the offing? Whatever the moment at which the shield was raised, the Athenians cannot have returned from Marathon until the Persians were, not merely aboard, but plainly making away. If the shield was only shown when the Persians were all aboard, the signal may have been very soon followed by the rapid return of the Athenian forces from Marathon to Athens. If the shield was showing when a great part of the army was (ex hypothesis) already afoist, and if the signal was followed by the movement of the advanced portions of the fleet southward as for Athens; a sufficient portion of the Barbarians might still have remained on land to hold the Athenian hoplites to their post, and to make a good fight. Hence the need for instant decision, and action: hence the need after the victory for a rapid return to the city.

(4) A closely related question inevitably suggests itself, as to the exact situation, or fact, which the signal signified, or was intended to signify. To argue with Wecklein¹ that the shield was raised to mark the departure of the Athenian forces from Athens for Marathon in the first instance does, indeed, supply an adequate occasion, and fit in with a rationalised scheme for the conception of events in question: but it involves a very wide departure from the traditions,² and it creates

¹ Uber die Tradition der Perserkriege, p. 33. Wecklein's hypothesis was made on the assumption that Athens might have stood a siege.

² Including the time-index, just above discussed; and still more essentially, the long delay at Marathon.
some considerable difficulties in regard to the actual course of events, which make it unacceptable. Failing this explanation, we are thrown back upon a wide field of conjecture. The shield might have notified the approach of the Spartans, or some unrecorded movement of Athenian ships, which play no part whatsoever in the story of this campaign, or some unrecorded occurrence or arrangement in the city. But with the exception of the first alternative, none of these suggestions can be said to have any real ground in the traditions; and the author of c. 124 might well have added to his conclusion that the exact reason for the signal, or what it exactly signified, was even more disputable and obscure than the problem, who the man was who gave it.

To conclude, however, that no shield was raised at all with treacherous intent, no signal given, and to rationalise away the episode into pure fiction dictated by malignity, or to see no more historic basis for the anecdote than an unintended flash of shield, or other shining surface, in sight of Greeks and Barbarians at Marathon, misinterpreted by the suspicions and heated imagination of a political partisan; to reduce, in short, the shield-episode to the level of the vision of Epizelos, is to be too benevolently sceptical in regard to Athenian disaffection, and defeats the very object which the sceptic may be supposed to have at heart. The presence of traitors in Athens exalts not diminishes the heroism of the patriotic majority. The splendour and the wonder of the victory at Marathon were enhanced by the magnitude, not of the battle, but of the danger; a danger more than doubled by the presence of traitors within.

(5) It is hardly necessary to discuss at length the question, whether the Alkmiaionidae were at this time the traitors, except to observe the inconsequence and fallacy of which Herodotus is guilty in this connexion. To establish their ‘miso-tyranny’ it is asserted that the Alkmiaionids had opposed Peisistratos and driven out his son. The elenchus which is here ignored is supplied by Herodotus himself elsewhere, in the story of the compact and alliance between Megakles and Peisistratos, which resulted in the first restoration of the usurper (1. 60): while the chapters from the family records which follow (6. 125-130) mainly prove that the Alkmiaionids were on good terms with tyrants, whether Barbarian (Kroisos) or Hellenic (Kleisthenes). Prima facie, it might be more natural to look for the traitors on this occasion among the ranks of the Peisistratid faction or family, which was not extirpated at Athens, and to ascribe the scandal against the Alkmiaionids to afterthought perverted by jealousy and prejudice; but it is not easy to understand how such prejudice hit upon the ‘shield-episode,’ and exploited it, unless there was something unfortunate, if not unpatriotic, in the conduct of the Alkmiaionidae at

1 As H. Delbrück, Die Perserkriege, p. 60.
2 The ostrakism of Hipparchos in 467 B.C. is succeeded (in the next year) by that of Megakles, son of Hippokrates, as Αδρα. πολ. c. 22. Σπ. Appendix IX. § 14 subeet, and p. 178 infra.
this juncture. It cannot be shown that they played an honourable part at the time; they were never celebrated among the heroes of Marathon. The successes and prominence of Miltiades and the Philaid in the story of Marathon is a mark of the eclipse or depression of Alkmaionid, as the excursus on Alkmaionid glories, which follows the story of Marathon in the pages of Herodotus, is plainly a more or less conscious attempt to redress the balance between the maternal ancestors of Perikles and the paternal ancestors of Kimon. The point against 'the Alkmaionid' at Marathon might of course be simply due to the Philaid tradition, and be the retort and revenge for the two prosecutions of Miltiades (6. 104, 136). But enemies do not always swear falsely of each other; and the very rivalries and feuds, which help to explain the evil report, likewise help to render it more probable. On the whole, there is no adequate ground to dissent from the conclusion of Blakesley in this matter, except, indeed, so far as he argues that miso-tyrannism was a later and genuine trait of the Alkmaionids, and that the whole passage (cc. 121-124) is a later interpolation. The Thucydidean Alkibiades suggests a commentary on the first point (6. 89); while the Herodotean authorship of cc. 121, 123, 124, or at least of 121, 123, must stand with the authenticity of cc. 125 ff.

§ 9. Beside the six great cruces, or aporiae, which suggest themselves on a critical perusal of the Herodotean story of Marathon, there are as many lacunae, or faults of omission, in his record of the battle, judged by a modern standard. In regard to (1) the exact date, (2) the exact numbers engaged, (3) the names of the commanders, and their behaviour; on the one side as on the other, (4) the topography of the battle-field, (5) the circumstances, to speak generally, of the battle, and even (6) how or why the battle was fought at Marathon, or fought at all, Herodotus supplies either no data, or data so slight and unsatisfactory as to leave endless room for speculation, or for blank scepticism. On two of these points, viz. (5), (6), something has already been said in discussing the more positive cruces which his narrative suggests: for the cruces arise in part from the omissions. In regard to (1) it is expecting, perhaps, too much of 'the Father of History' to demand calendrical dates; and Herodotus does supply material for inferring the date of the battle approximately, the examination of which will be more conveniently taken in connexion with later and more precise evidence. Suffice it to say that he implies a date about full moon, of a late summer month, and even possibly to his Greek contemporaries the Spartan month Karneios. In regard to (4), the poverty of even the incidental implications in the Herodotean account are enough to raise a doubt whether he ever visited, or viewed, the scene of the battle; (a) he thinks it was nearer than any other place in Attika to Eretria (c. 102). This is a hard saying, but

2 Cp. § 27 isy/nu.
may be overruled by its adjunct ἐπὶ τὸ ἐπίπεδον χωρίον ἐπιπεδοῦμαι: it was the nearest place well fitted for cavalry evolutions. (i) He knows that at Marathon plain and sea met, but the mountains which "look on Marathon" find no place in his narrative. (c) He mentions the right, left, and centre of the Greek army, and asserts that the line was extended so as to equal the Persian; but he gives no indication of the points of the compass. (d) He gives the distance separating the Greek and Persian armies as eight stades, but he gives no hint of the general character of the ground, except that the Persians are surprised to see the Athenians charging without cavalry. (e) Of the natural details of the place, the streams or watercourses, the marshes, the long promontory which shelters the bay, and so on, there is nothing to be gleaned from his narrative.¹ The suspicious phrase ἐς τὴν μαρτυρίαν, c. 113, must be taken to mean simply 'inland.' (f) The one fixed point, the 'Herakleion in Marathon,' c. 116, is not really localised, or used by Herodotus as a topographical point: its specification has another interest (vide § 3 supra). His omission of all reference to the Mound and Monuments is certainly not suggestive of autopsy. In regard to (3) Herodotus does, indeed, furnish some materials respecting Hippias on the one side, respecting Kallimachos, Miltiades, Stesilaos (c. 114), Kyngeiros (ibid.), Epizelos (c. 117), in connexion with the battle, and respecting Datis and Artaphrenes thereafter (c. 118, 119): but these scanty anecdotes leave much to be desired, and are, as already pointed out, far from satisfactory in themselves. (2) That he omits the number of the living combatants is made all the more significant by his specifying the numbers of the slain (c. 117). On the numbers actually engaged his sources were silent: or "something sealed" his lips: and even all the dead are not reckoned: or did no Plataians, did none but Athenian citizens die for Hellas on that day?  

§ 10. On these points of omission, on all the obvious difficulties, shortcomings, cruces, problems, which suggest themselves to a critical reader of the Herodotean accounts of the battle, other sources still available have something to say. Before reviewing and evaluating these other sources, it may be well to pause in order to form a provisional estimate of the character and value of the story told by Herodotus, not in comparison with other sources, but as estimated solely in reference to what may be called the Herodotean standard. Tried simply by the historic standard of to-day its faults have been sufficiently accentuated. Tried by the standard of his own work the verdict may be somewhat different.

Compared with the traditions of the second Persian war, as narrated in Bks. 7, 8, 9, the story of the first will seem thin and poor. In all the respects just above indicated, dates, numbers, names, causes,

¹ The sand (ψάμμοι), which covers the tophet of Hippias, c. 107, is due not to Herodotean autopsy, but to Athenian verisimilitude.
or motives, local and topographical details, circumstances or events, the story of the second Persian war is relatively full. Directly, or indirectly, Herodotus supplies fairly copious materials under these heads for the story of the invasion of Xerxes. To carry the comparison one step farther: the accounts of the battles of Thermopylae, Salamis, Plataia, not to speak of Artemision and Mykale, are far fuller, more coherent and intelligible than the story of Marathon. Beyond this point it is not necessary, or desirable, to push the comparison at this stage. The traditions of the second Persian war bristle with anomalies and apories of their own: this is not the place to discuss or even to indicate them, since the broad conclusion above formulated can scarcely be challenged, and it will generally be admitted, at least provisionally, that as a story the account of Marathon compares with them to its disadvantage. Still less is it necessary to enlarge upon the contrast between the story of Marathon and war-stories in the first three Books of Herodotus. The comparative completeness and coherence of some of the records concerned with persons and events remoter in time, place, and circumstance from the author, such as the stories of the wars of Kyros and of Kambyse, or the account of the siege of Babylon by Daries, are not strong arguments for the truth and authenticity of those narratives. But for obvious reasons, concerned with the necessary differences in the Sources, and in conditions of time, place, and persons, a minute comparison between the story of Marathon and stories in the first three Books, even those concerned with purely Hellenic battles, would be less profitable than a comparison with stories which belong professedly to the same period, and go to make up the same catena of events, the same group of Books: the story of the Scythian campaign, the story of the Ionian Revolt. These two stories, or sets of stories, deal with events which are historically and naturally related to the events of the Marathonian campaign. It is obvious that the traditions of Marathon compare favourably with the story of the Scythian expedition. Each set of traditions may show, especially in the elements traceable to a common source, the tendencies of the Philaid family traditions, of which Miltiades was the hero, to magnify his services, and belittle or damnify the memory of his rivals: but the story of Marathon steers clear of the palpable fictions, exaggerations, absurdities, and inconsequence, which prove the story of the Scythian campaign, for all its circumstantiality, a fable. On the other hand, the story of Marathon does not in all respects compare favourably with the traditions of the Ionian Revolt. When it is remembered that the Ionian Revolt not merely extended to several campaigns, by sea and land, in several successive years, and was all over before the invasion of European Hellas; while in the other case the historian was concerned with a more recent campaign, of far

1 An exception might be made in favour of the story of an earlier Marathonian campaign, I. 62, which offers points of contact, not wholly fortuitous, with the story in Bk. 6, but the suggestion may here suffice.
simpler character; extending over a single season, and involving but a small number of Greek states: it is remarkable that the story of Marathon should not come off better in competition with the story of the Ionian Revolt. In the latter the difficulties, apart from omissions, are mainly chronological: and although the details of acts and events, such as the performances of Artybios, or the battle of Lade, may be largely tinctured by poetic fancy, or dominated by political interests, or even partially dittographed from later and better known situations, still, if the chronological difficulties could be solved, order and coherence might be imparted to a narrative which moves for the most part within the region of the possible, and has suffered perhaps less of romantic transfiguration than the memories of Marathon. Small wonder this, perhaps, after all, considering the date of Herodotus’ composition, and the fact that the one story was the record of Ionian failure, the other of Athenian success. In the story of Marathon the cruces are more obvious, and considering the nature of the subject, the omissions, the shortcomings are perhaps more surprising. Differences in the sources may partly account for the different character in the result. It may well be doubted whether Herodotus had any documentary information about Marathon, or used many of the monumental and archaeological evidence available in his time, or ever visited or beheld the battle-field. In these respects he stood perhaps in a better relation to the story of Miletos than to the story of Marathon. The deliberations of Aristagoras and Hekataios are probably at least as authentic as the deliberations of Miltiades and Kallimachos, the defeat of Lade is at least as intelligible in the pages of Herodotus as the victory of Marathon. Not but what both stories have probably been affected by the lights and shadows of later events, and the balance of historic probability may incline in favour of Marathon rather than of Lade—in favour of the story which had been outshone, rather than in favour of the story which had been blackened, by the glories of the second Persian war. A less obvious but more remarkable parallel suggests itself between the story of the Marathonian campaign and the story of the Libyan campaign. Chronologically an interval separates the two series of events, and the Libyan story ranges in the historian’s thoughts with the Scythian story and not with the story of Marathon. In other respects the analogies seem stronger between the cases that were not synchronous. In each there is distinctly a Greek ‘objective’ to the Persian expedition, and the objective is twofold, in the one case Barka—Kyrene, in the other Eretria—Athens. In each the Persian force is a double one, fleet and army, under double command: there Badres—Amasis, here Artaphernes—Datis. In each case medism, tyranny, and treachery are at work among the Hellenes, there incorporated in Pheretima, here in Hippias: in each case very different are the fates and fortunes of the

3 Cp. however Appendix V. supra.
two Hellenic cities chiefly involved, and as is the fate of Barksa such is
the fate of Eretria, the analogy extending even to the subsequent
fates of the captives (4. 202 cpd. w. 6. 119). The escape of Kyrene,
the deliverance of Athens are at first sight less conspicuously parallel,
yet the substantial ratio remains: as the deliverance of Athens to the
destruction of Eretria so the escape of Kyrene to the doom of Barke.
The intervention of Arkadian Pan, of Zeus Lykaios, remains a point not
so much of comparison as of identity in the rationales of the two stories.
If, neglecting smaller points of agreement and of difference, other than
those involved in the obvious conditions of time, place, and circum-
stance, the critics ask how far the coincidences are independent and
accidental, how far designed or at least pragmatic, the answer may be
less obvious than the facts of the parallelism. If the story in the fourth
Book were in itself coherent or probable, if it were not saturated by
obvious signs of afterthought (see Appendix XII), it might be argued
with some plausibility that the essential similarities in the attitude
and policy of the Persian power to this and to that Hellenic
community, or group of states, would of necessity have entailed somewhat
similar action, and have tended to make history, mutatis mutandis, repeat
itself. But such essential facts would also make it easy to repeat
‘motives’ or transfer elements from one story to another.† The con-
spicuous pragmatism of the Kyrenean traditions in this particular case
render them doubly suspicious. It is obviously more likely that the
Kyrenean story has been retouched in the light of facts and fancies
from Marathon, than that the Marathonian legend is to any appreciable
extent a plagiarism from the historiography of Kyrene. The sug-
gestion that Herodotus is largely responsible for either the one story
or the other, or for the latent analogies between them, is to be
strenuously avoided. In this case at least the synchronism, real or
supposed, between the expedition in Scythia and the expedition in
Libya has determined his view; and the attack on Barke is inconti-
nently enlarged into an undertaking for the conquest of all Libya‡
by a special hypothesis of the historian’s own devising (4. 167), in patent
conflict with facts and points in the story itself (4. 203), in order to

† Other stories in these Books offer fruitful points for comparison with the
story of Marathon, to wit: the story of
the expedition of Mardonios, 6. 43–45
(c.p. Appendix VI. § 8), the story of
the Spartan war with Argos, (cp. Appendix
VII. § 10), the stories of the Atheno-
Aiginetan wars (cp. Appendix VIII).
Without pursuing the subject farther here
in detail it may safely be said that the
Herodotean account of the Marathonian
campaign compares to advantage with each
and all these other stories. It is less
pragmatic than the first, it is less one-
sided than the second, it is less ex parte
than the third. It has points of agree-
ment with the various stories specified,
and those are the main grounds of objec-
tion to it. While we cannot doubt that
a much better account of the battle of
Marathon might have been obtainable in
Herodotus’ day than the account he gives
us, it is very obvious that, judged by the
varying and composite standards of the
histories, even in immediate juxtaposition,
if the story of Marathon might have been
somewhat better, it might also have been
very much worse, than it is.
‡ The commission issued to Datis and Ata-
phrenes, 6. 94, is more limited than that
ascribed to Mardonios 6. 44. The difference
of route may have something to say to this.
make the Libyan adventure, the Libyan λόγοι, square with the Scythian. It is beside the mark to impugn the good faith of Herodotus in these matters. The mischief had been done, in the main, before the stories came to him. It is his critical acumen which was fortunately at fault. Fortunately, for it is hardly to be maintained that the materials and conditions for a scientific history of the Persian wars existed in his day; and Herodotus performed a higher service to scientific history, as now conceived, by the ingenious reproduction of current traditions, than if he had undertaken to rationalise the transparent ‘solipsism’ of the local legends of Hellas, and had thus substituted a consistent untruth for the tell-tale pragmatism of his manifold and mutually corrective sources. That in this particular instance he ended by overlooking the tempting analogies and contrasts between the story of Kyrene and the story of Athens is not to be hastily inferred from the mere fact that he has not expressly specified them. Herodotus is a literary artist of almost inexhaustible resource: his method is not confined to the presentation of particular stories, nor has he simply threaded pearls upon a string. He is neither so ill-natured nor so simple as you might sometimes think; and he may now and then have charmed his readers into supposing that they understand his creative methods better than he did himself.

§ 11. In presenting a large mass of evidence a dispute will always be possible as to the order in which authorities are to be summoned. The chronological order suggests itself: but it is traversed by two objections. First, priority may be in dispute between two or more authors. Secondly, the later author may preserve the earlier tradition or evidence. A logical grouping of the authorities is not easily carried through. The authority for a point in topography, or of archaeology, may be a manuscript, not a monument, or a memory: where in our present series are we to introduce the statue of Pan, or the painting in the Stoa; where the primitive proverb which our latest Lexicographer may have happened to note? The simplest plan in the present case will be to present the materials with a general regard to the chronological succession in which the authorities have come down to us, specifying upon occasion the characteristic contribution made by each. Where the strictly historical order is disturbed, in the following review of the secondary sources, there will be found some consideration in the context to justify a disturbance of the literary perspective. On the whole the chronological sequence of authorities exhibits, as might be expected, the phases of good and evil repute through which the victors moved from age to age. It is more of an accident that, in some degree, the chronological order corresponds to other differences in the quality and character of the sources. A caveat must be entered in regard to the authoritative relation of the sources to each other, and to the Herodotean rule. Among professed historians, who have recorded the affair, Herodotus is admittedly the earliest extant authority. His record is therefore primary and paramount. But it by no means
follows that never an item of genuine tradition and evidence has come
down in the ancillary sources. Modern scholars, who treat
the traditions preserved in Herodotus as the full, or even as the final,
canon of Greek history for the period covered by his work, or by any
portion of it, are uncritical twice over. In the first place they ignore
the fictitious element in the Herodotean record: in the second place
they ignore the historical quality of other evidences and tradition.
These hard and fast lines and classifications have been the curse of
Greek history. The dualism between legend and history, legendary
and historic Greece, one set of legends and another set of legends, one
historian and another, are all misleading, when taken as canonical.
One historian is doubtless a better authority, just as he may be a
better artist, than another; but no single authority is beyond criticism
or appeal, and the modern lover, or recreator, of antiquity cannot
afford to dispense with any shred of tradition, or evidence, merely
because it conflicts with the higher authority. Every particular case
must be tried and judged on its own merits. In general, the earlier
tradition is to be preferred to the later; but the earlier tradition may
sometimes be found in the later book. In general, the natural canons
of probability must govern a reconstruction; but an entirely consistent
witness, or story, may be suspected of being a product of criticism or
reflection. In general, the later authority, at least in a literary age,
may be considered to have used the earlier authority; agreement
cannot be cited as independent witness, but disagreement is not neces-
sarily refutation: it may proceed from carelessness, or from bad faith.
In general, the isolated fact or statement, which serves no visible
interest, but happens to survive, a fossil in an alien stratum, is the
most unsuspicious and serviceable of all our building materials.

§ 12. Pindar. Among those authors contemporary with the
Persian wars, who might have been expected to bear witness to the
facts and feelings of the age, Pindar, the most Hellenic of Hellenic
poets, holds a place second to none. The considerations which
explain the almost complete lack of reference in the extant works
of Pindar to the most glorious victories of his time, are obvious and
generally recognised: the Boeotian parentage, the fragmentary state
of the record, the kinds of composition in which Pindar excelled, and
so forth. Not but what Pindar was prepared to celebrate the victories
over the barbarian, occasione data, and with due regard to local sus-
cceptibilities: δρομαὶ | πάρ μὲν Σαλαμίνος Ἀθαναίων χάριν | μορθόν, ἐν
Σπάρτῃ δὲ ἔρως πρὸ Κεκαιρίων μάχαι, | ταῦτα Μῆδειοι κάμον ἀγκυλότοιοι
(Pyth. 1. 75 ff.). But this reference exhausts the express mention of
the Medes and Persians in our actual extant heritage from Pindar.
It is not, however, even as it stands devoid of significance. The
first Pythian is dated Pyth. 29 = Ol. 76. 3 (474 B.C.). The more
recent and significant splendours of Salamis and Plataia still eclipse the
action of Marathon; or, conversely, the memory of Marathon has not
revived and grown at Athens to rival the realities of the current
generation. There are, indeed, three passages in which Marathon is named in the Pindaric Epinikia (Ol. 9. 89; 13. 110; Pyth. 8. 79); reference, however, is nowhere to the victory over the Medes, but in each case to the honour of Herakles; nor is there any suggestion of a connexion between the celebration of the Marathonian Herakleia and the commemoration of the famous victory. This silence may be taken as hardly less significant than speech: nor is this silence all. The seventh Pythian is an ode, or part of an ode, in honour of a victory at Pytho won by Megakles the Alkmionid in the very year 490 B.C., yet this ode makes no mention of Marathon, or of the Medes. Is there here any confirmation of the suspicions against the Alkmionidae and their patriotism at this very crisis? (Hdt. 6. 115). The argument from silence is seldom conclusive; but, in this case, if the ode is complete, and was composed after the battle, the omission of all reference to that event would certainly seem to require explanation. Touching the date of the ode, it cannot be regarded as proven that the Pythiad 25 was celebrated before the battle, or even that the two data (victory of Megakles at Delphi and of his fellow-citizens at Marathon) were about synchronous (etwa gleichzeitig: Metzger). Even if the date of the battle be fixed to Metageitnion 17 = Sept. 12 (see below, § 27), and if the Pythia be placed in the same month, and in the first half of the month, to explain the silence of the poet, it would still have to be proved that the ode was composed and performed before the battle. Even granting all that, the omission of any reference to the Medes is difficult to explain, on any hypothesis creditable to Megakles and the Alkmionidae. Datis, Artaphernes, Hippias were close at hand; surely their doings at Naxos, Delos, perhaps in Euboea, had been already noised abroad: the destination of the Armada, the fate impending over Athens were plain enough. If it is not inexplicable that a loyal Athenian should just at this moment have leisure and resources to be sending a chariot to the Pythian games, and to be hiring a poet to celebrate his victory, it is all the more remarkable that the Epinikion should make no reference to the peril of Athens, though it seeks to deprecate the jealousy of certain Athenians. Two alternatives seem possible: either the ode is incomplete, or the victor was—unpatriotic. There are only two reasons for regarding the ode as incomplete: its brevity, and the omission of all reference to Marathon. The latter argument is the very point in question. The brevity of the ode can be otherwise explained: inter alia, the difficulty of writing more without reference to Marathon might help to account for its curtness. In itself it is, indeed, complete; and the advocates of this alternative have modified their hypothesis to this effect: the ode is complete, but was to be supplemented by a second and larger one, in which doubtless

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Marathon would have come in for a fair share of praise. That second ode is unfortunately a mere hypothesis. Meanwhile the strong tradition of Alkmaionid treachery stares us in the face, and fully explains the whole problem.

§ 13. Herodotus himself stands next on the list of witnesses to the sources and character of the Marathonian memories, not because no others precede him chronologically, but because, accepting the express indications in his work, he records evidence upon this point earlier than the group of contemporary witnesses which have come down to us (Aischylos, Simonides, and so forth). There are two passages in the work of Herodotus which discover the legend of Marathon at an earlier stage than the author's own narrative.

(1) The ‘many memorials’ of the battle at Marathon, of which his ‘friends’ made use in their defence of Miltiades, what time he was brought to trial by Xanthippos son of Ariphron, and others, on a charge of high treason 6. 136. The date is probably within one or two years of the battle: the scene is apparently laid in the Athenian Ekklesia: the bed-ridden Miltiades is present but voiceless, his friends urge every plea available on his behalf. One fiction has already done good service upon such an occasion (see Appendix III. § 14), and its place is taken by two other stories, in which the services of Miltiades to Athens are enshrined: the story of the capture of Lemnos, the story of the victory of Marathon. It cannot reasonably be doubted that Miltiades had indeed performed some notable service to Athens; and the victory was, perhaps, as much his doing as any man’s: but as little can it be doubted that the story of his services lost nothing in the telling, as his apologists sought to make good their pleading with the Athenian people on this great occasion. In the speeches then delivered Miltiades was, we may feel tolerably certain, put forward as the protagonist of the Marathonian campaign, and assumed the rôle, doubtless ever after preserved to him in the Philaid tradition, whence it passed, to a greater or less extent, into the general current of Athenian memories, and thence into the pages of Herodotus. But the Athenians, to whom Marathon was a thing of yesterday, were apparently in a position to discount the exaggerations of Miltiades his partizans; were perhaps a little incensed at the pretensions advanced on his behalf; felt that everything had not been done at Marathon, and that for what had been done there were many to share the credit. Had the Ekklesiastes, or Dikasts, been slow to distinguish the elements of truth and ‘poetry,’ which were being palmed off upon them as the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth about Marathon, much of it till then perhaps a secret, there were the ‘pursuers,’ able and ready to put another colour on the story. Anyway, the verdict proved that the Athenians at the time appraised the services of Miltiades neither so meanly as his enemies, nor so highly as his friends. Much of the talk of popular ingratitude is thus a fallacy; albeit weight has been given to it by the prevalence of the
Philaid version of the story of Marathon and especially by the protagonist or supreme responsibility and initiative assigned to Miltiades: a misconception rendered easier by the later developments of the Strategia (§ 5 supra), and by the incorporation, in the pages of Herodotus as the primary authority, of the leading items in the story of Marathon, as current in the ‘moderate’ not to say reactionary circles of Athens in his day.  

(2) A second passage shows, could it be admitted as good evidence, another stage or epoch in the making of the Marathonian legend, long before the days when Herodotus himself set to work to recover it. The scene is laid on the battle-field of Plataia in 479 B.C. almost on the eve of the combat: the occasion is the dispute between the Tegeatae and the Athenians for the post of honour, second only to that accorded of right to the Spartans. The speeches in support of these rival claims are preserved by Herodotus 9. 26, 27. The speaker’s names are not recorded (by Herodotus): Aristides was ‘the Strategos.’ The Athenian speech is, in little, an anticipation of similar harangues in the fourth century; but Herodotus and his source significantly enough make no appeal to the recent services of the Athenians at Salamis; the strongest plea, apparently carrying the verdict, is the work at Marathon, which is described in terms that might seem to imply the army-list of Xerxes, rather than the more modest muster under Datis and Artaphernes: ἴμιν δὲ εἰ μυρίων ἁλλο ἄτι ἄποδεσθεμένοι, ἄσπερ ἄτι πολλά τε καὶ εὖ ἑγεματα εἰ τίοι καὶ άλλους Ελλήνων, ἁλλά καὶ ἄρε τοῦ ἐν Μαραθῶν ἔργον δεξίοι εμέν τούτο το γέμας ἔχει καὶ ἁλλα πρὸς τούτον οἵτινες μοῦνοι Ἑλλήνους δὴ μουσομαχήσαντες 2 το Πέρυγ καὶ ἄργω τοσοῦτο ἐπιχειρήσαντες περιεγένεσθαι καὶ ἐνυψημαν ἑθεα καὶ τε καὶ πεντεράκοντα.—The Marathonian legend is accumulating and discarding: the Plataians have disappeared; six-and-forty nations are drawn up in battle array. It is a little difficult to believe that Aristides, or the Athenian spokesman, whoever he may have been, upon this occasion, within sight of Plataia, and within twelve years of the event, made so ungrateful, so unseemly, so absurd an oration as is thus ascribed to him, and, omitting the strong pleas, which the immediately preceding services and sufferings of Athens might have furnished, harked back to an event, the victorious issue of which, by the way, the Arkadians might have claimed for themselves, had they been but better acquainted with the Marathonian legend that was to be, on the principle that quod fecisset per ilium (Deum scilicet suum), fecisse per se. 3 It is not, indeed, altogether easy on other grounds quietly to accept the story of the dispute at Plataia in 479 B.C. Yet the tradition is given in all seriousness by Herodotus; the situation cannot be pronounced an impossible one; if it had arisen speeches would probably have been

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2 For μουσομαχήσαντες one might venture to suggest προμαχήσαντες. Cp. § 15 infra.  
3 It was on Parthenion ἐν τῇ Τεχνῇ that Philippides fell in with Pan, 8. 106.
delivered; and the Athenian speech would certainly have contained some reference to Marathon, even if the orator would scarcely have disowned the Plataean assistance, made no reference to the Spartan alliance, and estimated the army defeated at Marathon in terms which might have laid the Athenians open to an invitation to settle the business with Mardonios by themselves. We can therefore hardly accept the exact terms of the reference to Marathon, placed in the mouth of the Athenian speaker in 479 B.C., as accurately dated. It more probably represents an Athenian source, the tendency of which was to exalt the day of Marathon at the expense of the day of Plataea, and even of Salamis itself: but it was an old story in the time of Herodotus.

§ 14. Aischylus. (a) The Persae contains some references to Marathon, as full perhaps as could be expected considering the hypothetical situation. The play itself was produced within eight years of the battle of Salamis, within eighteen of the battle of Marathon, but the action is ex hypothesi synchronous with the defeat of Xerxes, and the drama is a celebration of the naval victory. The references to Marathon cannot be pronounced immodest, and if Aischylus was himself a Μαραθώνιος, like his brother (cp. Hdt. 6. 114), their modesty is the more remarkable. It was not perhaps in the hearing of the very men who had defeated Xerxes in the straits below, that the older deed of their fathers, at the other end of Attica, was likely to obtain full appreciation. Anyway, the three passages in which the battle of Marathon is introduced, are not calculated to dim the glories of Salamis: (1) in the scene between the Choros and Atossa, immediately preceding the entrance of the Messenger who brings to Susa the dire news of Salamis, a reference to Marathon serves to suggest the possibility of further disaster, and thus performs a dramatic function irrespective of any political or historical purpose which might be served by exciting that reminiscence in the theatre. That Atossa (Persae, 231-245) should ask for information as to the site of Athens, the number of its inhabitants, the nature of its political constitution, may seem somewhat a stage trick: but the allusions to Marathon introduced in reply are dramatically forcible and sombre enough; while the reference to the Athenian weapons of victory (ὑπέρ οἰκείων καὶ φερότων σφυᾶς) were doubtless especially acceptable to the Hoplites in the auditorium. (2) The second passage (286-289) may be taken to cover the case of Marathon, but scarcely with an explicit reference, and only in subordination to Salamis. (3) The third passage is more remarkable (472-476) as implying that the invasion of Xerxes was to exact vengeance for the defeat of Marathon, and as showing, by the use of the word βάρβαρος, that the poet has lapsed a moment from dramatic propriety, and is speaking pure Attic.

(b) Tradition has it that Aischylus composed a prize Elegy on the Marathonian dead, and was defeated by Simonides (via Aeschyl. cp. Bergk, Poet. Lyr. ii. 4 p. 240), and the citation (apud Plutarchum, cp. § 28 below) seems to suggest that the elegy might have furnished some
real items towards the reconstruction of the true story of the battle. Is it possible that the anecdote told by Herodotus the son of Euphorion was preserved in his brother’s lines? In his own epitaph (assuming its authenticity) Aischylos commemorates his own service at Marathon (Bergk, iv. p. 241):

\[
\text{άλκη\textsuperscript{τ}}ν \deltaον \text{ειδίκυμον \textit{Marathónον} \textit{άλγος} \textit{άν} \textit{είποι}}
\text{καί \textit{βαθύχαρτης \textit{Míðos} \textit{ἐπιστάμενος}},}
\]

and preserves a detail in the topography, which might be of service to the strategist. Another epigram, if rightly ascribed to him, in addition to the Elegy, or even as a substitute for it (ep. Bergk, l.c.), would be valuable as showing that the early literary tradition did not ignore the services of the Plataians. In this particular, Aischylos was more just than Simonides, but perhaps less worldly-wise.

§ 15. The Keian poet, as even the pages of Herodotus testify, was busily employed in celebrating the Hellenic triumph upon the Persians, but his muse was chiefly vocal over and after the second invasion. In a note of great subtility Bergk (iii. p. 449) has vindicated for Simonides two, if not three, epigrams connected with Marathon, and its monuments—(1) The epigram in the \textit{Poikile Stoa}, given on the authority of Lykurgos—

\[
\text{Ἐλλήνων προμαχοῦτες Ἀθηναῖοί \textit{Marathóni}}
\text{χρυσοφόρων \textit{Míðon} ἀστόριστον δύναμιν.}
\]

If this is the whole epigram it is obvious that in it the Athenians were credited with (i) winning a great victory, (ii) without assistance, (iii) on behalf of the Hellenes at large. But could the epigram be earlier than the painting in the Stoa? (cp. § 28 infra).

(2) As this epigram apparently occurs again (apud Aristid. ii. 511) with a variant for the second line:

\[
\text{ἐκτεινα\textit{ν} \textit{Míðon} \textit{ἐνία} \textit{μυριάδας},}
\]

and Bergk cannot admit an error in the case, either with Lykurgos or with Aristeides, he argues that the two citations are from different epigrams, in which Simonides allowed himself to repeat the first line. But a textual error he does admit in the word \textit{ἐκτεινα\textsuperscript{ν}}, holding it absurd to suppose that Simonides would have claimed for the Athenians at Marathon the slaughter of 90,000 Medes. He therefore suggests \textit{ἐκλίναν} for \textit{ἐκτεινα\textsuperscript{ν}}, and turns the slaughter into a rout. In either case we should have 90,000 as a round number for the Barbarians at Marathon, on the authority of a contemporary poet, and the figure of the slain as given by Herodotus would represent about 1 in 14. The variation in the Scholiast, \textit{εἰκοσι} for \textit{ἐνία}, raises the figure of the slain (\textit{ἐκτεινα\textsuperscript{ν}}) or of the routed (\textit{ἐκλίναν}) to 200,000. This total is apparently regarded by Bergk as a mere exaggeration, or, so to say, a ‘sport’: yet it is not in itself a figure incredible for the forces,
all reckoned, and the ἐννέα might be a rationalistic reduction from the ἔκων. But the larger the total the more the proportions of the Athenian victory, as estimated by the Herodotean figure, are reduced; the more reduced the proportions, the more difficult it becomes to understand the retreat of the Persians after the engagement.

(3) Another distich, prima facta another epigram, is ascribed to Simonides, though its authenticity is doubtful (Bergk, iii. p. 479):

τὸν τραγῳδούν ἐμὲ Πάνα, τὸν Ἀρκάδα, τὸν κατὰ Μήδων,
τὸν μετ' Ἀθηναίων στῆσατο Μιλτιάδης.

This is no doubt the inscription, or part of the inscription, upon the base of a statue of Pan. The first line may seem to take for granted and confirms the story of the epiphany of Pan to Philippides as told by Herodotus: the second ascribes the offering to Miltiades. Such a statue was erected apparently in the Grotto on the Akropolis, and the inscription may have been by Simonides: but neither the offering nor the inscription can be taken to confirm the story told by Herodotus, until it is shown that they did not help to originate it. As it stands the epigram shows only that Miltiades, or some one on his behalf, ascribed the defeat of the Mede to the influence of Pan. We cannot even argue that Miltiades held Pan as from Arkady: that item might be all due to the poet. But, if Arkadian Pan came to Marathon, on the poet's showing, a nucleus or start was therein supplied for the story of the epiphany of Pan to Philippides as he sped through Arkadia on his memorable mission. If Philippides had erected the statue it would have formed a stronger confirmation of the Herodotean story. But was it even Miltiades who erected the statue, upon the base of which this inscription was cut? It is difficult to believe that Xerxes left such a memorial of his father's shame standing in 480 B.C. It is difficult to believe that Mardonios and his troops, some of them perhaps veterans from the former war (9. 15), made no effort in 479 B.C. to destroy the evidences which might exist in Athens, or on the spot of the Persian defeat ten years before. At best the statue of Pan, with its inscription, was surely a restoration at a much later date (cp. 5. 77), probably under the prostaty of Kimon. But what security have we that the 'restoration' was not the first 'institution' of the Pan-cult, by the Demagogue who 'brought back' the bones of Theseus from Skyros to Athens, piously associating his father's name with the anathema, as he had once paid the penalty for the Parian disaster in his father's behalf? These lines attributed to Simonides lend little weight to the story of the vision in Arkady. Neither is the argument affected by the conjecture of Bergk (op. c. p. 449) that the inscription was a quatrain, which may be restored by combining and emending the two couplets here cited as (1) and (3); nor by his other suggestion (p. 480) that Sozomenus and Nicephorus are wrong in asserting

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that the statue of Pan, carried by Constantine to his new city, was an offering made by Pausanias (at Delphi). ¹

If, however, the epigram be not the work of Simonides, but of a much later author and age, it must be taken to contain a direct reference to the story in Herodotus. In this case, however, the ascription to Miltiades would be rather more far-fetched and hard to explain, and one might admire the moderation of the epigrammatist, who refrained from ascribing the offering to the visionary; save that neither could a *Hemerodromos* have afforded an offering so costly, nor was his name adapted to the metre. On the whole it is probable that the lines under discussion are at least as old as the time of Kimon’s prostasy, and therefore superior in antiquity to the work of Herodotus, and the stories herein enshrined. Herodotus may even have heard the story of Pan’s epiphany in presence of this very statue. One quality, therefore, all the authorities so far mentioned have in common. They represent the story of Marathon in the making: they might all have served, directly or indirectly, as sources or channels for the traditions which meet us in the work of Herodotus. To the silence of Pindar, the allusions of Aischylos, the scanty and perhaps spurious memoranda of Simonides, succeeds the fairly coherent and comparatively full record of Herodotus. But the gap visible between Herodotus and the independent sources which preceded him and have come down to us, must have been filled by a great mass of evidences, testimonies, memories, reflections, afterthoughts, in verse and prose, in monument and speech, which goes to account for the difference between him and them. Though much has doubtless perished, some of that material has been preserved by his successors, whose testimony is not all dependent on him, nor all mere inference and combination, nor all devoid of weight and colour, even where it may be largely a criticism of antecedent tradition, or even little more than a rational argument.

§ 16. Among the immediate successors, nay, almost contemporaries, of Herodotus, must be reckoned the Comedians. The priority in importance, and for the most part in time, belongs to the Aristophanic references; the key-note struck in them is fully maintained in the few fragments of his contemporary rivals, bearing upon the same subject. As might be expected by any one acquainted with the spirit and tendency of the Comic poets, the moral of all their references to Marathon is to exalt old Athens at the expense of new Athens, the hoplites at the expense of the marines, the Kleisthenic democracy at the expense of the more developed democracy and demagogy of the ‘empire,’ the victors of Marathon at the expense of the victors of Salamis, still more, the men of those latter days. This moral is more or less a new one, as compared with the tone of the previous sources (Herodotus included), in all of which the second Persian war is the chief theme of patriotic celebration. It marks rather a change in the domestic and social

¹ Cp. note to 6. 105.
condition of Athens than any 'higher criticism,' due to sophists or rhetors; albeit it anticipates the dominant chord in the reactionary and pragmatic writings of the fourth century. In the extant remains of Aristophanes there are some ten express references to Marathon and its associations; who will say how many have perished with the bulk of his works, or survive, if at all, unacknowledged and probably 'translated' in the after authorities? 1) No wonder the men of Acharnæ are against peace with Sparta, 'old fellows who had fought at Marathon, hard as nuts, and tough as oak, or maple.' 2) Is this satire from the poet, who was in favour of peace? By no means! Who were with him in favour of peace, if not the elder generation, the country folk, the Acharnians among the rest? If the heroes of Marathon are won over for peace (cp. ll. 971 ff.) who could impeach the poet's courage? 2) A second reference in the same play to what was due towards the veterans of Marathon, is even clearer evidence of the poet's feeling, and of the 'reaction' in favour of the soil against the sea. 2) How many of the men that had pursued the Mede at Marathon were alive, when that play was played sixty-five years later, to tell the tale, or grumble at the change of times? The Laudator temporis acti is the poet himself, and he praises a time long before his own boyhood, a time there were few in Athens that could recall. But the plea stands, doubtless, for a revival, a development, especially among the modern democrats. (3) A third passage 3) proves how completely, how skilfully, the poet identifies the glory of Marathon with the Demos as a whole, and would thus recall Demos to—its better self. It would here again be a radical mistake to argue, from ἔγγλωτ-τοντος ἕνα, for example, that the poet is writing satirically on the 'Marathonian memories'; comedy is comedy, fun is free; but if there is any satire in the passage, it is aimed, surely, at the ναυτικὸς δύνας and its τὴν ἐν Σαλαμίν. In three other passages, (4) one from the Knights, 4) (5) one from the Wasps, 5) and (6) a fragment of the Holkadas, 6) we hear for the first time of the trophy at Marathon (τὸ Μαραθῶνι τροπαίον), a memorial which, we may be sure, if erected before the invasion of Xerxes, would have required restoration, and the 'restoration' of which must plausibly be dated synchronously with the other similar restorations of Kimonian Athens. In none of these passages is any tone of persiflage to be detected, any more than in

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1) Αχαρναίοι στόχοι γέρωντες τὰ ναυτικά ἄρεισιν Μαραθωνικά χαίη σφυράμ-


2) Acharnians 692 ff.::—


3) Knights 781 ff.::—


4) Knights 1333 f. On the reference in


5) Wasps 711.


6) Athen. III. 111.
(7) that passage of the *Clouds*,¹ in praise of the good old education, wherein were nurtured the heroes of Marathon. Again (8) in the rather clumsy jesting of the *Thesmophoriazusae*² the battle at Marathon is the first as in time so in merit, even if Salamis gets honourable mention, in comparison with the men of that day. (9) Nor could the *Birds* be summoned ‘from marsh, and glen, and places wet with dew, and the lovely mead of Marathon’³ to flit across the Dionysiac stage, without the climax of invocation sending a thrill of glorious associations through the Attic theatre, though the birds were but gulping down shrilling gnats, where the men of Athens had devoted swarms of barbarians! (10) Last and least, though not least paradoxical, comes the query of Dionysos to Euriptides in the *Frogs*⁴ when as the modern poet had consummated his travesty of the antique style of Aischylos. What has Marathon to do with ‘philanthrothrat’? Is it merely *(a la Scholiast)* that Marathon was marshy and *phléos* grew there, and there is a *phil*—in both! Or, with some moderns, that Aischylos had fought at Marathon, and had besung Marathon, and that the wanton weary wine-god makes light of the best memories, the poet, sick now of war and politics, jests with his own better self of twenty years ago? The first suggestion is insufferably tame: the second somewhat far-fetched; but anyway it leaves the deed at Marathon unassailed: the jest is purely at the expense of Aischylos: there is indignity not into the great action, but only to the pump-handle style of poetry, in which the drawer of water had celebrated it.

Three fragments from the other Comedians may be added to complete the tale from this source: (11) the first serves but to show the general esteem in which the memory of Marathon was held, and to add another leaf to its florn.⁵ (12, 13) The two others are both from Eupolis, and must be dated before 414 B.C.⁶ Both illustrate the revival and development of the fame of Miltiades, and his establishment as chief hero and protagonist in the glorious victory.⁷

§ 17. *Thucydidès.* Granted that Thucydidès was acquainted with the work of Herodotus, few exercises in this palaestra could be more

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¹ *Clouds* 884 ff.
² *Thesmophoriazusae* 606 ff.
³ *Birds* 242 ff.
⁴ *Frogs* 1296 ff.
⁵ *Iliad* 65 ff.
⁶ *Demi* 2:
profitable, or significant, than a comparison of the utterances, upon the battle of Marathon, of the prince of Attic historiography with those of the Father of History itself. Even treating the question as open, whether Thucydides was, or was not, acquainted with the work of his great predecessor, the remarks of the first Athenian historian upon the famous Athenian victory must rank as all-important. There are at most some half-dozen passages in the work of Thucydides referring to the battle of Marathon. Whichever among the various possible views of the date, or dates, for the composition and publication of the work of Thucydides may be taken, matters little or nothing to the use of these particular references. On any tenable theory they would all, with one possible exception, be subsequent, in publication, and even in composition, to the bulk of the citations, if not all the citations, just made from the Comediana. Four of the references in Thucydides are to be found in the first Book, and in passages which belong, almost certainly, to the first draft of that Book. A reference occurs in the sixth Book, and another in an excursus, or digression, in the sixth Book: but whatever may be the true secret in regard to the original composition and intention of the dramatic story in Books VI, VII, and its incorporation in the annals of the 'Peloponnesian' war, this passage was written, or incorporated in the author's main work, at a comparatively late period in his life, and may rightly be considered to represent opinion, so far as it represents any common opinion, at a later stage than the majority of the Comic references above given. The one case in which Thucydides might be taken to be reporting Athenian views at an earlier stage than Aristophanes, is in the allusion to Marathon made by the Athenian orator speaking at Sparta, ex hypothesis in the year 432 B.C. If the speeches in the pages of Thucydides could be regarded as authentic reports of actual speeches ever actually delivered by word of mouth, we should have in this passage an illustration, nay a record, of Athenian pride and glorification in the memories of Marathon, that might take rank with other illustrations already given and to come. But of all the speeches assigned by Thucydides to various speakers there is hardly any other so obviously unauthentic as the one here in question. It might, indeed, merely pass as illustrating what Thucydides, undoubtedly on this point a first-rate authority, surmised at some time or other, and inserted in his work, as said, or likely to have been said, by an Athenian orator at the given time and place. Yet a little farther than this conclusion

1 τὰ Μαραθῶν ὁ Μ. πάλαιος, τὸ Μ. ἐγγενὲς et sim. as a rule refer primarily, not to say exclusively, to 'the great Armada' (480/79 B.C.). So, on the lips of Perikles, l. 142, 144. For complete ref. see von Essen, Ινδεξ Θουκυδίδου, p. 254β.
2 1. 78, 4 φασιν γὰρ Μαραθοῖς τε μόνον προστασίαν τῷ βασιλεῷ κτλ. This is one of the very few passages in which τὰ Μαραθῶν as used by Thucydides must be taken to include the expedition of 490 B.C., and the speakers are made to apologise for boring their audience with this toujours perdrix: τὰ καὶ τὰ χρόνια μᾶλλον ἐτοί μὲν προσβαλλόμενοι. But even Thucydides little knew what was coming: cp. §§ 21, 22 infra.
we may venture in this case. The passage continues in a strain which is on the whole Thucydidean, though not perhaps purely Thucydidean. For the personal views of Thucydides upon the Persian wars were plainly as follows. The importance of the Persian wars as a whole had been not a little overrated, but of the two wars the repulse of Xerxes was vastly the greater achievement. The first of these two propositions is a direct and adverse criticism upon the views which partly inspired and partly were in turn promoted by the work of Herodotus. The second proposition was presumably a protest against the view current in the anti-imperial, anti-Peloponnesian, anti-democratic or at least anti-nautical sections or strata of Athenian society. Thucydides magnifies his own subject at the expense of the wars of Hellenic and Barbarian, ludicrously missing the ecumenical significance and wantonly compressing the duration and magnitude of the Herodotean theme. But it cannot be said that, upon the low level to which he proposes to reduce the duel with the Barbarians (and consequently the great work in which its memory and raisons d’être were enshrined for ever), Thucydides misconceives the proportionate importance of the two Persian wars. Once, indeed, he goes so far as to treat the affair with the Medes to the total exclusion of Marathon: 1 while of the battles Salamis is the most important, and Themistocles is the hero of Salamis, and the hero of the war, in the judgment of Thucydides. 2 In all this Thucydides reiterates, mutatis mutandis, the Herodotean analogy; but the mutation involves the diminution of Marathon almost to a vanishing point. For Thucydides himself the battle of Marathon is little more than a chronological expression. 3 How completely, or at least how coldly, Thucydides separates himself from the apologist of the Marathonomachae which had long been consummated at Athens, is shown in his remark, presumably for the benefit of non-Attic readers, upon the Athenian custom in regard to citizens slain in battle, and the exception made in favour of the men in Marathon. 4 The passage is important as certifying the sepulchre at Marathon, but it betrays no great warmth in the historian’s own heart at mention of the name which Aristophanes was wont to send thrilling through the theatre, sure of his effect. The critical attitude of Thucydides towards the memories of Marathon is the more remarkable, 5

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1 1. 23, 1. The battles referred to being presumably Artemision, Salamis, Thermopylae, Plataea. Mykale too is absent. But cp. the passage cited from Demo- sthenes, § 30, p. 192 sqq.

2 1. 74; 93, 7, cp. 135, and 1. 18, 2 τὸ μεγάλον στόμα. The Syracusan speaker in 6. 33 ad fin. refers not to Marathon, but to the expedition of 480 B.C. The Athenian τόλμη ἐν τῶν Μυκενῶν σῶλον 1. 90, 1 must be similarly interpreted.

3 2. 34, 5 τὸδας εὖν ἐκ τοῦ δημόσιου σήμα δ ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τοῦ καλλίστου προκατολομητοῦ τῆς τόλμης καὶ δέ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡπτοὺς τοῖς ἐκ τῶν πολεμῶν πολὺν γε τοῖς ἐν Μαραθῶν ἐκείνων ἐδιδαγμένη τῆν ἀρετὴν κατανέμει ἀυτῶν καὶ τῶν τάφων ἐκολοθέν.
granted that he was himself related to the house of Kimon and Miltiades, and was buried, as to his mortal elements, in their family tomb. But the political sympathies of Thucydides were almost as little with Kimon and his own namesake, the son of Melesias, as with Kleon and the bourgeois demagogues of the decadence. He had, it seems, caught something of an enthusiasm for Perikles, and the Periklean principatum, for the aristocratic demagogue, and the democracy of the best men; and he judged the men and actions of the past in the light of the Periklean policy and régime. The work of Thucydides from beginning to end is a superb apology for Perikles, both in what it records, and in what it omits; and wherever the Thucydidean standpoint is adopted, Perikles at least needs no advocates.

§ 18. It is thus inferentially the Periklean view of the Persian wars which is dominant in the work of Thucydides: a view proper enough to the statesman who practically abandoned the 'eastern question' in order to develop Athens at the expense of Hellas: the abortive 'peace of Kallias,' passed over by Thucydides in discreet silence, being the chief contribution of Perikles to the solution of that question, which at any rate he succeeded in shelving. From this standpoint the war which was to decide the question of primacy, hegemony, prostaty in Hellas, was far the most important war which ever had been, or well could be: and that is exactly the view taken by Thucydides of the war which he deliberately chose as the subject for an everlasting memorial. But, when the bitterness of that deadly struggle was over, when the 'tyrant city' had been overthrown, and Sparta, unable to maintain the prize which she had wrested from Athens, had called in the Barbarian to dictate terms of peace and autonomy to Hellas: above all, when Thebes had dethroned Sparta, without maintaining a usurper's right, and the possible rivals for hegemony, roughly speaking, had their liberty secured by their mutual exhaustion; then the interests of the past re-asserted themselves in new proportions, and the second thoughts of the fourth century revised the balance of fame in favour of the more glorious memories of the fifth. If the separate Republics of Hellas were too weak, or too weary, to continue the internecine struggle which had ruined, one after another, the possible candidates for empire, or hegemony, during the century between the battle of the Eurymedon and the battle of Mantinea (465-362 b.c.), the impotence and the vulnerability of Persia had also been more and more fully revealed. It was an age of reflection, of afterthought. At Athens, in especial, philosophy, oratory, prose literature flourished

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1 Vita Anonym. § 10.
2 ἰδρεύῃ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἄλφατος, 2. 65, 9.
3 2. 37.
4 The clearest passage is 2. 65 written obviously after the war, but the work from first to last is in much the same vein, s.p.
5 the proof in Bk. 1 that the war was not of Perikles' making but inevitable; cp. Plutarch, Perikles c. 31: Thuc. S. 91, 2 need not be quoted against all that.
and abounded. The better philosophy turned away from the latter-day democracy, if not to Sparta, at least to old Athens, before the antithesis to Sparta had been accentuated by Perikles, and his influence; before even the fortification of Peiraeus and the building of the Fleet had forged the weapons of the inspired but ill-disciplined democracy. The orators, too, for the most part sought to galvanize into energy the grand memories of pre-Periklean Athens. Their domestic ideal was the constitution of Kleisthenes, the laws of Solon, the πατρία πολιτεία: their ideal solution of foreign policy was to revive the Panhellenic league against the Barbarian. The consequence, the absurdities of this solution, in itself, and in the given circumstances, need not be discussed in this connexion. One good effect the reaction generated: it emancipated the age from a part of the Thucydidean prejudice, and may have helped to reconcile some Hellenes to the historic mission of Macedonia. The records of the Persian wars were in those days revolved, but with an ethical and political intention, rather than in the pure interests of antiquarian science. Historiography, indeed, was also the order of the day, an historiography in many kinds. What could be more landed, legitimate, or in accordance with sound method, than such preliminaries as the work of Krateros, or the treasuries of historic fact compiled under the authority of Aristotle? Historians, who treated history as an art, were also working in the spirit of the time: and with them, as indeed with their masters, Isokrates and Aristotele, reflection often took the place of memory, and rhetoric transfigured reflection. There was, no doubt, a considerable amount of positive evidence, of oral tradition, still available, which these scholars used in their reconstruction of the history of the sixth and fifth centuries. Little of this matter, whether in its original forms, or in its transfigured images, has come down to us. Yet something remains to illustrate both kinds, in the works of Plato and of Aristotle, in the extant remains of the Orators. The later authorities of the Roman period have preserved elements which go back to the highly-rationalised scriptures of the fourth century, and even to more primary sources. It is, of course, matter of boundless regret that the work of Ephoros exists but in fragmentary form, at second or third hand. We may conveniently consider the version of Ephoros in connexion with the authorities still extant, which are thought to preserve it, and confine our attention in the first instance to the evidences of fourth-century opinion, tradition, memory, combination, sympathy, reaction, and revivalism, afforded by the actual deposit of fourth-century literature still available to-day.

§ 19. Plato. The Menexenos contains a funeral oration ascribed, by the Sokrates of the dialogue, to Aspasia, in which the Athenians living more and more upon past reputations, are, in accord with the usage of the time, hidden praise famous men of old, and the fathers that begat them. The Persian wars are the chief theme of panegyric,
more especially the first war, and therein the battle of Marathon. It is reasonable to affirm, both on general and on internal grounds, that the author has the Herodotean story before him; but he takes considerable liberties therewith, albeit in this case, where the later departs from the earlier authority, it is with very little appearance of real evidence, or even of reasonable inference. Thus, as with Herodotus, the immediate objective of the expedition includes Eretria as well as Athens, and the immediate casus belli is the 'plot' against Sardes. But the figures given for the forces (500,000 men, 300 ships of war, beside transports); the report that Dareios threatened to have Datis' head off, if he failed to bring the men of Eretria and Athens into his presence; the statements that Datis reduced Eretria in three days and applied the Sagene to the territory; the assertion that no other Greeks came to the help of the Athenians save the Lakedaimonians, who arrived 'the day after the battle,' are all highly suspicious improvements upon the Herodotean record, and to be fully accounted for, without supposing that the author had any independent source. From another point of view the passage is more reputable. The moral significance of the deed at Marathon is set in striking relief, by reference to its antecedents. The demand that the hearer should bethink himself the time when as all Asia served the third Persian Sovran, Dareios, who had made the Danube his frontier, the sea and the isles his dominion, the minds of all men bowing down before the greatness of the king, is a thoroughly critical demand made in language somewhat uncritical. Nor can it be fairly said that the after-effects of Marathon are grossly exaggerated when the speaker, as reported, maintains that Marathon taught the Hellenes at large the Persians' weakness by land, and Salamis afterwards the same lesson by sea. Admitting this observation, it is hard to exclude the further position that the Athenians at Marathon were not merely fighting their own battle but serving the Greeks one and all, yea, that the victors of Marathon were the parents of European liberties!

The authenticity of the Menexenos has been called in question: and again, its Platonic authorship has been supposed to consort better with a satirical intention, of which the rhetorical methods and topics of the day may have been the object. But the same theme is handled in the Laws in two passages, the first of which substantially repeats, with trifling variations, the facts as stated in the Menexenos, though it adds appropriately a new and very significant moral. As to the facts: Datis is sent expressly, 'under pain of death,' to fetch the men of Athens and Eretria; the three days spent in reducing the latter city become 'a short time'; the exact figures of the forces are dissolved into a vague multitude, but the Sagene is retained; a threatening message from Datis to the Athenians is added, after receiving which they sent hither and thither for allies, without any result, though the Lakedaimonians again arrive 'the day after' the battle. 'A Messenian war, or something else' is suggested (perhaps satirically) as reason for
this delay: the date of Marathon, ‘nearly ten years before Salamis,’ is supplied earlier in the passage. So far the Laws, though written in a somewhat more sober vein, adds little to the Menezenos. But the moral aspects of the affair receive a new turn. The victory of the Athenians is traced to the excellence of their Polity, the excellence of the Polity is ascribed to its moderate, ‘timocratic’ character, and the reverence, the loyalty proper to such institutions, enhanced and augmented by the dread inspired by great and common danger, which put an end to all enmity and strife in the city.\(^1\) Marathon was the glory and the justification of the old Democracy before the days when the lowest class had been made eligible for office: a privilege which could not long be withheld after Salamis. In the same spirit the second passage\(^2\) distinctly depreciates Salamis and the sea-fights generally, in order to exalt Marathon and the land-battles: for ‘sea-battles did not make Hellenes better citizens’: nor, as is elsewhere shown, the men who were the heroes of the nautical mob.\(^3\) Miltiades, indeed, is pilloried in the Gorgias with Themistokles, Kimon, and Perikles for certain purposes: but he drops out of the list in the final censure,\(^4\) though his fate is cited (with a remarkable embellishment)\(^5\) as proof of the ingratitude of the mob. To Plato apparently Miltiades and none other is the hero of Marathon: that is to say, the Phileiad tradition, with whatever justification, has been accepted by Plato. But, for the purpose of this investigation, the special interest of the Platonic references lies in the fact that they illustrate the return to the praec-Perklean and the anti-Perklean standpoint, the revival of the point of view, the best illustration of which in the fifth century is to be found in the Comedians. This position is clearer, is more consistently outlined with Plato, than with the Orators, who naturally come next under review: for, while Plato anticipates or endorses their general preference for the good old constitution of praec-Persian Athens, the democracy of Solon, the democracy of Kleisthenes, he never commits himself to the programme of an aggressive war upon Asia and the Barbarians, which could not possibly be undertaken or conducted, least of all to a successful event, upon such constitutional bases.

\(\S\) 20. The Orators. There are five of the Orators in whose extant remains may be found the traditions of the Persian wars, especially the story of Marathon, regenerated and exploited for purposes of the moment, with a remarkable difference. An earlier group (Lysias, Isokrates), writing before the ‘Macedonian question’ became the

\(^1\) Laws 3. 698 \(\varepsilon \mu \iota \nu \gamma \tau \rho \kappa \alpha \tau \) \(\epsilon \kappa \epsilon i \delta o\) των χρόνων ὅτε ἡ Περσαίς ἐπίθεσιν ταῖς Εὔληπποι λέοι ὑπὲρ τῶν τινων Ἐλλήνων αἰσθάνετο ἐγκράτεια, πολεμεῖα τε ὢν παλαί καὶ ἐκ τιμημάτων ἄρχαι τινες τετάρτους, καὶ δεσπότεις ἔννοι τις αἴσθησι, δε ὢν θυσιοσκευάζεται τοῖς τοῖς νομίσα τῷ ἑλέοιμον κτλ. The finale virtually contradicts the shield-episode.

\(^2\) 4. 707.

\(^3\) Gorg. 505-516.

\(^4\) Ib. 519.

\(^5\) Ib. 516 (c. 72) Ἔπειτα ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐν Μαραθῶν ἔτει τὸ βάραθρον ἐμβάλετον ἐφαύλισε καὶ εἰ μὴ ἀμφοῦ τοῦ προταίρου ἐντέκτει σκ. Ορ. Αἰσχον, 368.
main issue in Athenian policy, glorify and moralise the victories over Persia, with a view to a Panhellenic crusade against the Great King. The interest of the later group (Aischines, Demosthenes) is absorbed by the Macedonian power and its advances: and these orators, taking the traditions of the Persian wars as they find them, use them to point, or to poison, the weapons of their personal antagonism over the Macedonian question. An exception must be made in favour of Lykurgos, one of whose extant speeches, a 'private' oration, has already augmented the older Sources; while the argument based on the terms of the epigram illustrates, and to some extent justifies, the oratorical amplifications by the contemporary authority of the fifth century. On the lips of Lykurgos the claim of those Athenians, who fought and died at Marathon, to be the proto-martyrs of Pan-hellenism is fully established; all that followed Marathon was a legitimate result of that day's work, and every result was foreseen and intended by the heroes of that day. This double fallacy rules to a greater or less extent the historiography of the fourth century B.C. as it has subsequently ruled historiography in other ages, and in other interests: nor is it, perhaps, a form of fallacy wholly unknown to advocates or apologists in the present day. Owing to the difference above indicated it will be convenient here to dismiss shortly the testimony of the later pair of Attic orators, in order to clear the way for a review of the more important contributions made by their predecessors to the matter in hand. Aischines, who had to pose upon the occasion as a man of peace, still admits in the speech de f. Legatione (344 B.C.) that the battle of Marathon was a thing to imitate; this admission would be a reply to the heroics of Demosthenes, in which appeal had been made to the memories of Marathon and Salamis. Fourteen years later (330 B.C.) when it is the turn of Aischines to attack, and of Demosthenes to defend, Aischines knows well enough how to exploit the great legend to his rival's disadvantage. It is proposed to crown Demosthenes: no such honour was conferred on the victor of Marathon. Miltiades, indeed, had not asked for a crown, though he did ask to have his name inscribed on the picture in the painted Porch. Even that request the people refused, only allowing the Strategos to be painted in front of the battle, cheering on the hoplites to victory. And shall Demosthenes have a crown? A man not to be named on the same day with Miltiades. The references to the Porch, the painting, the position of Miltiades in the picture are valuable, and might seem to carry us back, at a single bound, to the authentic and monumental evidences of the fifth

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1 See § 15 supra.
2 c. Leon. § 104 ὡστιν ἔρχον πρὸς ἀρχέτος καὶ ὀδόν ἐκ μένος ὑπὸ τῆς αὐτῶν πατρίδος ἀλλὰ καὶ κάθεν τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὑπὸ κοινῆς ἡδύνων ἀνθρόποις. οἱ γὰρ ἐν Μαραθῶν παραταξάμενοι τοῖς μακρὸσ τοῦ ἐξ ἀπάτης τῆς Ασίας στόλον ἑρχόμενον.
3 c. Leon. § 15.
4 c. Leon. §§ 311, 312.
5 c. Clearch. § 131.
6 c. Clearch. §§ 181-186.
century. But the statement italicised above is of very little weight, for it might very easily have been an inference, an hypothesis, to explain the fact, otherwise and better explicable, that the name of Miltiades was not ascribed upon the fresco. And the actual date of the painting is not a foregone conclusion.¹ A further reference in the same speech to the same memories is serious enough, granted the animistic beliefs of the average Athenian. The mighty dead who fell at Marathon would groan, if Demosthenes were crowned.² The retorts of Demosthenes on his rival’s character need not be quoted here; but the skilful use he makes of the memories and examples from the Persian war become doubly significant in the light of his opponent’s taunts.³ “Never, men of Athens, never can it be said that you erred when you took upon you that peril for the freedom and safety of all! No, by our fathers who met the danger at Marathon; no, by our fathers who stood in the ranks at Plataeae; no, by our fathers who did battle on the waters of Salamis and Artemision; no, by all the brave who sleep in tombs at which their country paid them last honours, which she had awarded, Aischines, to all of them alike, not alone to the successful or the victorious. And her award was just. The part of brave men had been done by all. The fortune experienced by the individual among them had been allotted by a ‘Power above man.’”⁴

The point here to be observed is the prominence given to Marathon, its association with the great land victory of the second Persian war. The term προκινδονείστατος Demosthenes may have borrowed from Thucydides as already quoted above,⁵ but the term is virtually a paraphrase of the epigram by Simonides,⁶ and had been previously used by Isokrates;⁷ the phrase was by this time common property. Demosthenes was a diligent student of the work of Thucydides, but he obviously did not accept or endorse the Thucydidean verdict on the Persian wars. In his earliest political (‘symbuletic’) oration he makes a passing reference to Marathon and Salamis,⁸ and in a forensic (‘dicatic’) speech, two years later (352 B.C.), he bases an argument on precedents from the time of the Persian wars, which would have been afterwards fatal to the proposal of Ktesiphon in his own favour. What, he asks, was the custom of the men of yore in regard to the award of gifts and honours for public service? There were no statues erected to Themistokles the victor at Salamis, nor to Miltiades the

¹ cp. § 15 supra, § 28 infra. It may conveniently be added here that the pseudo-Demosthenes, c. Neaerem, § 94, has an important remark on this picture, σπερεος the service of the Plataeans, cp. § 28 infra, where the date of this picture is discussed. The passage contains also these points: (1) Datæ landed at Marathon, and was ravaging the district; (2) the Plataeans joined the Athenians at Marathon. (3) No other Greeks did so.⁵ c. Chrestoph. § 859.⁶ de Corona 208 ἄλλ’ αὖ πρεσα, αὖ πρεσα ἔτη ἡμέρας, ἄριστα Ἀθηναίοι, τῶν ὑνέρ τῆς ἀπάτους ελευθερίας καὶ σωτηρίας κινούσιν δράμακα μετὰ τοῦ Μαραθῶν προκινδονείστατος τῶν προφήτων κτλ.⁷ Jebb, Attic Orators, ii. 414.⁸ 1. 73, cp. Arnold’s note ad l. § 17 supra.⁹ § 15 supra. ¹cp. § 21 infra. ²de Symmor. § 30.
leader at Marathon, nor would any one describe the battle of Salamis as the work of Themistokes, or the victory of Marathon as the work of Miltiades: for the whole state was concerned in those doings, and every citizen claimed a share in the honour.  

There is, indeed, one reference in Demosthenes obscure in itself, but if interpreted in the light of later authorities, suggesting an historical fact, worth, for the present purpose, bushels of rhetoric. It is the incidental record of the peiphism of Miltiades, evidently cited as a proof of heroic patriotism, and explained by the scholiast to have embodied the proposal to go forthwith to meet the Persians. So much is evident, assuming the record to be correct, that this peiphism must have been proposed in the Ekklesia, and in Athens: and it may be assumed that the peiphism was carried, and was the act which decided the march to Marathon. A notice of this peiphism might have been inserted by Herodotus in 6. 103. His silence is, however, no valid argument against accepting the evidence of the orator and the scholiast, for the record of Herodotus is presented, as shown above and below, in language borrowed from later constitutional practice, and assigns to Miltiades the position of leading Strategos, not in virtue of his moral ascendancy or even of his motion in the Ekklesia, but in virtue of his ‘autocracy’ or at least his ‘hegemony’ in the strategic college. The suggestion lies very near the surface, that the anachronistic rôle assigned to Miltiades in the Herodotean record is a spontaneous equivalent, in terms ‘understood of the people’ at the time, for the more elaborate explanations which had to be undertaken, if it was to be made plain that Miltiades was really the author and hero of the battle, that it was por excellente ‘his victory,’ because it was his peiphism, his act, that carried the citizen army to Marathon.

§ 21. Demosthenes, however, though he recurs in the spirit of his age to the glories of the Persian wars, does so for the purpose of justifying his war-cries or his acts against the man of Macedon, not with a view to moving the Athenians to undertake fresh conquests in Asia. For this more consequential yet premature appeal we return to the predecessors or elder contemporaries of Demosthenes, and find in them, or at least in the greatest of them, Isokrates, authentic evidence.

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1 c. Aristocrat. §§ 196 ff. The passage is imitated in the spurious oration περὶ συντάξ. 21, 22. The expression θεμεστακλά τον την Σαλαμίνα πανωικιν στρατηγουσα και Μιλτιάδην των ἡγούμενων Μαραθωνίσσα is noticeable. § 205 contains some matter not calculated to exalt our opinion of Demosthenes as a historical authority, but the reading Παρατήρησις is doubtful.

2 de j. Leg. § 303 τις ὁ τῶν μαρτυρῶν καὶ καλοῦν λόγον ἐκείνον ἰδιερωμένῳ, καὶ τὸ Μιλτιάδου καὶ θεμεστακλάνος ὕψωσεν ἀναγγελὴν καὶ τὸν ἐν τῇ Ἀγριάριν τῶν ἐβαθμίσθη ἄριστος; οἷς οὕτως; Demo-

athenæes refers to appeals to Athenian patriotic memories made by Aischines in former days. The Scholiast (Balter and Orelli, Orat. Att. ii. p. 95) has: οἱ δὲ τῶν ἐγγραφῶν, ἄλλοι ἐκατέρω αὐτῶν προφηθέντων τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις πρὸς ἀρετήν καὶ ἐλεοθερίαν. ἦς μία τῆς Μιλτιάδης, ἢτε ἐκάθεν τοῖς Περσαῖς ἐγγραφέν, διὸ τὸ θάνατον τοῖς πολίμασις: θεμεστακλάνος δὲ καταλείπε τῇ ἐμφάνισι τῆς τότε καὶ εἰς τὰς πρήκες μεταβασθεῖσα, ἤτο τὰ τῶν Σαλαμίνα καὶ ἐκτὸς Ἀριστομίθη.

3 p. 157 εφιάλτης.

4 p. 199 ἐνέτα.

5 οὐ. p. 200 ἐνέτα.

VOL II
of the condition of the Marathonian legend, in the hands of one who was primarily neither historian, nor orator, but "an artist in rhetorical prose." 1

The most considerable passage in the works of Isokrates bearing upon the subject is also the earliest in time, and carries the evidence back within one generation of the Peloponnesian war. That is a date, however, by which the inherent weakness of the Persian power had been already revealed; 2 and Isokrates, neglecting the sound canon for the historical imagination formulated in the Menexenos, 3 allows himself extravagant licence in his conception as well of the psychological conditions as of the objective course of events proper to the story of the Persian wars. The purpose of the work is, in sooth, not historical but practical: not to ascertain the facts of the past, but to suggest, as a policy for the moment, that Sparta should make common cause with Athens against the ancient and common foe. The right to the lead in this war of revenge, Isokrates vindicates for his native city. Appeal is naturally made to the splendid memories of the past, which are set in higher relief by the division and oppression of Hellas, 4 which redounds to the present profit of Persia. That advantage is an accidental not a legitimate one, and can be terminated the moment Hellas is re-united for the war of vengeance, as once for common self-defence.

With this moral in view, in his treatment of the Marathonian campaign, Isokrates departs far and wide from the simpler historical sobriety of Herodotus, and virtually destroys the merits of the case by the falsity of his perspective. According to Isokrates it was a race between the Athenians and the Spartans, which should be first to sweep the barbarian from the soil of Hellas. The charge at Marathon, sufficiently extraordinary in the pages of Herodotus, where it barely covers a mile, passes from the sublime to the ridiculous when Isokrates reports with approval a tradition that on one and the same day the Athenians heard of the landing of the barbarians at Marathon, hastened to the spot, fought and won the victory, and set up their trophy—all that they might secure to themselves the sole glory of this affair, in which a handful of men defeated many myriads. 5 Forty years later, in his final work (342-339 B.C.), Isokrates touches in passing the same theme in no less rhetorical a spirit, 6 and takes for granted the decisive character of the

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1 Jebb, Attic Orators, ii. p. 54.
2 Panegyr. §§ 138-149.
3 See p. 189 supra.
4 The peace of Antalkidas had been concluded in 387 B.C.
5 Panegyr. §§ 85-87, esp. ἐπειδή καὶ μὲν ἔτη τὰς αἰχμάς ἠρράτας πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἐν τῷ Δαρείῳ νεμοθείαις, ἀποβάλλον τῷ ἄρα ἁγήνων κτλ. §§ 88-99 enlarge in a similar vein upon the services of Athens in the second war, and it only concerns us here to observe the use of the terms ἢδη προκειμενοσανταὶ προτεκθέντας ὑπὲρ ἀναταρχεῖν in § 99.
6 Panath. § 195 μετὰ δὲ τῶν τοιῶν ἐγενομένων πεμφθέντως ὑπὸ Δαρείου τῆς Ἑλλάδος προθύμησεν ἄρα τινὰς τῇ Ἑλλάδε πλῆθος κακοῖς καὶ μείζοις συμφόροις περιενόθεντος διὸ ἔκουσεν τῆς τοῖς ἑμῶν πάθεσιν ἁμαρτία φησίν τοῖς φαγεῖν εἰς ἀνάσῃ τῆς Ἑλλάδος. Salamin and the services of Athens in the second war are omitted in
battle of Marathon, a point which it is important to bear in mind. Other references by Isokrates are less full or significant. In the "pamphlet" On the Peace (355 B.C.), Isokrates contrasts the example of the men of Marathon and other heroes of the Persian wars, who fought for Hellas against Asia, with the conduct of their degenerate sons, who refused to make peace between Helenes and Hellene. In the Philippus (346 B.C.) it is remarked that the whole world sings the praise of Athens, but not for her acts of violence towards the Greeks; the battle of Marathon, the sea-fight at Salamis, and above all the sacrifice of home and land made for the common cause, are the occasions of that encomium. Some years before (353 B.C.) in the oration περὶ δεινωτότων (15), Isokrates, writing in praise of the good education and habits of old Athens, instances without expressly naming some of the great men produced under the ancien régime—Kleisthenes, Miltiades, and perhaps greatest of all Themistokles. And it is hardly to be doubted that Isokrates was moved to his glorification of the generation that fought at Marathon and at Plataia not merely by his desire to see Hellas once more united against the barbarian, but by his admiration for the moderate constitution, the πατρία δημοκρατία, the laws of Solon and Kleisthenes, which had been the political school in which the victors were educated. That he does not, with the author of the Menexenos, wholly discard the glories of Salamis, and the work of Themistokles, may be better understood when the Panhellenic and anti-Persian articles in his programme are taken into account.

§ 22. That the Epitaphios preserved among the remains of Lysias is of doubtful authenticity, nay, certainly spurious, hardly detracts so much from its importance or application to the matter in hand as the uncertainty of its date. Internal evidence would place it within a century of the battle of Marathon; external evidence at least makes it probable that it was in existence before Aristotle wrote the Rhetorik, even if neither Plato (in the Menexenos) nor Isokrates (in the Panegyrikos) can be proved to have known it. The inclusion of the work in the MS. of Lysias might count for something in

1 Jebb, ii. 183.
2 § 88.
3 §§ 146, 147.
4 Ιβιδ. οι τοις βασιλείσσον Ἐλληνεσ τὴν δῆμον καταγάγων καὶ Τὴν δημοκρατιαν καταστῆσαι.
5 See Jebb, Attic Orators, i. 207, 210. Professor Jebb himself apparently cannot vindicate an earlier origin for the pseudepigraphon than a date soon after 150 B.C. ("In any case, considering the general character of the Greek, it can scarcely be put much below the first half of the second century B.C.").
6 Aristot. Rhetor. 3. 10, 1411a. Blass, Att. Bereds. i. 2 483, accepts the reference as genuine.
regard to the date: Lysias cannot be shown to have lived after 380 B.C.¹ The inscription to Lysias might indeed be due to the internal evidence of date: but in any case the absence of anachronisms² makes an early date more probable than a late date for the composition: and all things considered, the speech may be put before rather than after 350 B.C. Whoever the author, the oration casts even the Menexenos into the shade by the prominence assigned to the Marathonian record, and the freedom with which the record is treated. (1) The king of Asia hoping to impose his yoke upon Europe, sent an expedition of 500,000 to effect his purpose. (2) The barbarians decided to attack Athens, for two reasons: (a) if they succeeded in bringing over Athens voluntarily, or involuntarily, to their side they would easily dispose of the rest; (b) moreover they knew that the Athenians would assist any one else who was attacked, but that every one would not come to the assistance of Athens. (3) They landed at Marathon, because it was an unlikely place, and, the Greeks not knowing where to send support, Athens would be demurred to allies. (4) On their part the Athenians wanted no allies, but desired to reap all the glory for themselves alone. (5) Their movement was so rapid that the same messengers carried (to the rest of Hellas) the news of the arrival and of the defeat of the barbarians. (6) Thus the Athenians fought and won μόνοι ἑπὶ ἀπάθης τῆς Ἑλλάδος πρὸς πολλὰς μυρίας τῶν βαρβάρων, alone on behalf of Hellas against many myriads of the non-Hellenic world.³ It is worth while to compare at once this free-and-easy version of the affair with the statement of Herodotus, its component falsehoods being enumerated in order to facilitate the comparison—(1) The expedition has for its object the conquest of Europe: the forces are numerically proportionate to this undertaking. For the object it cannot be denied that there is some justification in Herodotus’ own statements (§ 10 supra). Even the number is not much worse than the 46 nations which figure in his pages (ibid.). In both particulars the historical perspective has probably been destroyed by the transfer of motives and materials from the expedition led by Xerxes to that sent by Dareios, against Hellas. (2) The special grievances and motives for the attack on Athens (the previous relations of Athens to Persia, the influence of Hippias) supplied by Herodotus, or at least recorded in his narrative, are cancelled in the interests of an outrageous rhetoric. Further, (a) might have been suggested by facts and views in the work of Herodotus from the second war; (b) virtually denies the desertion

¹ Jebb, i. 155.
² The blunder indicated by Jebb, op. c. p. 207, is not an anachronism, though it makes it difficult to believe that the speech was composed immediately or very soon after the event; unless, indeed, we suppose that “the deceased were on the winning side,” on the same principle as the Spartans at Thermopylae, antecore Isocrates: Panegyr. § 92 ταῦτα ψυχαί νεκώτες τοῖς σωφαίς ἀντίκειον, οὗ γὰρ ὤθη τούτῳ γε θέμα εἰπέν ὡς ἀρτιότητας; εὐθές γὰρ αὐτῶν φυγέων ἔξωσεν.
³ Euhemerios, §§ 20-26.
of Eretria by Athens, for which an explanation, of a sort, is offered in the story preserved by Herodotus. \(^1\) (3) utterly ignores the express reasons given by Herodotus for the selection of Marathon: it is also obvious that by omitting the previous attack upon Eretria, Marathon is converted from an obvious into an unlikely landing-place. (4) runs contrary not merely to the express testimony of Herodotus, and others, but is in itself ludicrous and absurd: doubly so, considering the scale upon which the Persian expedition is presented. (5) denies the statement in the Herodotean account of the delay of days before the battle; denies also the story of the mission of Philippides. (6) removes the Plateaens from the field of battle, and gives the Athenians credit for a Panhellenic intention, where at best there ensued a Panhellenic advantage. It may also be observed that this patriotic Panhellenism would have conflicted with the somewhat local patriotism, with which the Athenians are credited, in wishing to reap all the glory of the first victory over the barbarians alone and for themselves. Such an inconsequence in such a case is, indeed, a triviality, but it serves to accentuate the reckless disregard of tradition and of probabilities with which the whole passage is stamped.

§ 23. Aristotle. It may well be regretted that within the scope of one or other of Aristotle's works did not more directly fall an exhaustive report upon the Persian wars, and their effects in politics, literature and life; for the Macedonian philosopher in Athens, not being like your Englishman in Ireland *Hibernis ipsis Hibernior*, is in the main free from the exaggerations of the Attic rhetoricians. Not that Aristotle was wholly quit of Hellenic prejudice and historic fallacy. His account of the 'natural' relations of Greek and barbarian may serve as evidence of the one; his pseudo-history of the 'origin' of the city-state as illustration of the other.\(^2\) But even in such matters the difference between Aristotle and his contemporaries, especially his Attic contemporaries and predecessors, was considerable, and mostly in his favour. Aristotle had indubitably a greater respect for facts and for common-sense opinions than Plato, to say nothing of the typical rhetoricians of the century. Aristotle's own conception of the best practical or working model for a city-state is based, not upon Sparta, but upon Athens, the Athens of yore, before the later democratic developments: an old Athens, be it understood, reinforced and sublimated by the entrance of philosophy, and the more systematic provision for a liberal education. In this respect Aristotle endorses, with a difference, the ideal of Isokrates; and differs, but not wholly, from the ideal

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\(^1\) Cp. notes to 6. 100.
\(^2\) *Pol. 1. 2 ff.*, 1262 ff. In respect to both articles it is interesting to observe the superiority of the methods and results of Thucydides (1. 2-12), though the great Attic historian is committed to the fallacious pragmatism of the legend of the Thessian synoikism (2, 15): a fallacy, to which his admiration for the Pelisstratids, new and old, may have contributed. Cp. § 17 *supra.*
of Aristophanes. It is, perhaps, remarkable that Aristotle has not at least incidentally emphasised the distinction to be drawn, from his own point of view, in favour of the generation which fought at Marathon: for no one has more clearly specified the influence of the Salaminian victory upon the subsequent democratic development, or more strongly condemned the democratic and imperial tendencies of later Athens and its mob of marines.\footnote{Pol. 2, 12, 5, 1274\textsuperscript{s}, 8, 4, 8, 1204\textsuperscript{a}.} If the Ἀθηναίων πολεωτεία be accepted as a work at least composed under the inspiration of Aristotle, some authentic portions of the recovered text may be taken to represent the opinion of the master. Whether among such portions can be reckoned the passage comprised in ec. 23-27 in part or whole is an ambiguous question. Between the passage and the rather more authoritative utterances just cited from the Politics there is, however, a substantial agreement, and a superficial discrepancy: for whereas from the Politics, taken alone, it might appear that there “were two forces, not only distinct, but opposite and conflicting, both put into increased action at the same time,”\footnote{Grote, quoted in Congreve’s ed. of the Politics, p. 351.} to wit, the democratic seamen and the aristocratic Areiopagos, in the Athenian Constitution the aristocratic régime is instituted and maintained for seventeen years “after the Mede war,” and though it has been partially undermined before the attack of Ephialtes, it is not until the prososty of Perikles (c. 27) that the nautical power is fully established in its political predominance. It is thus but indirectly and inferentially and more by the acts and policy of successive demagogues, Themistocles, Aristides, Ephialtes, Kimon, Perikles, than by any immediate and direct virtue in the victory of Salamis that the zenith of democracy is reached.

The battle of Marathon is not mentioned in the Politics, nor is any very direct influence upon the constitution traced by the author of the Athenian Constitution to the primal victory, unless the courage which inspires the People two years after to make at last some use of the great weapon of ostrakism, which Kleisthenes had forged nearly twenty years before, is to be ascribed to the moral or political effects of the fight.\footnote{1 Αθ. π. c. 22 ἐτη δόο μετά τὴν νίκην ἀπροοτοῦν ἢν τῷ δήμῳ κτλ. But cp. Appendix IX. § 14 supra.} More valuable for the matter in hand is the writer’s statement in regard to the constitutional positions of the Strategi and the Polemarch at the date of the battle of Marathon.\footnote{4 The Archon’s name (Plainippos) for the year 490-489 B.C. which is given in the same chapter, was already known from Plutarch (Arist., 5), who may of course have taken it from this very passage, though he doubtless had independent Attic Antholog. Cp. § 27 infra.} At that time, says the author, the Strategi were elected phyle-wise, one out of each Phyle, the leader of the army as a whole being the Polemarch;\footnote{5 τοῖς στρατηγοῖς ἴσθαι κατὰ φυλὰς, ἐξ ἐκάστης φυλῆς ἕνα, τὸς δὲ ἄρατος στρατηγὸς ἐν τῷ πολιτιστῶν. This passage states very clearly that the Strategi were elected one out of each Phyle, but it is not equally clear by whom the Strategi were elected. The subject of ἴσθαι must be Ἀθηναίων συνάμελεται: but that subject to be taken collectively (πάντες...)}
Strategi at Marathon each commanded one Phyle, viz. that to which he himself belonged, and had hardly more constitutional or military importance than the taxarchs in later days, officers whose institution, together with that of the phylarchs, may be associated with the establishment of the cavalry force, and the abolition of the Polemarchy as a real military office, acts possibly consequential on the events and experiences of the Marathonian campaign. At the same time it is necessary to consider the authority and character of the statement here first encountered in an ancient text. It being quite certain that the author of the Athenian Constitution was acquainted with the work of Herodotus, how can the conclusion be here avoided that he is expressly and purposely correcting, or harmonising, the somewhat conflicting statements in Herodotus’ account of the battle of Marathon, so far as they concern the constitutional positions of Polemarch and Strategi? There need be no tittle or shadow of doubt that in this matter the fourth-century author is right and the fifth-century author is confused or wrong. But it is still a proper and right question to put: how the later author has come by this better knowledge, which is so much to his credit? Had he any real evidence for it? Or is it the result of an inference, of afterthought and combinations of his own? That he had any positive evidence for saying the Polemarch commanded at Marathon, Miltiades and his nine colleagues being merely in command, each of his own Phyle, appears improbable for the following reasons: (1) No other ancient author anterior, contemporary, or subsequent has represented the situation in this way: if there had been any positive evidence (whether

* ἐκ τιμῶν) or distributively (τιμῶν ἐκ τιμῶν)! Herodotus had said distinctly that Miltiades was elected ἐν τῶν δήμων 6.104; hence, perhaps, the ἔργωτο ἤ. c. supra. See, further, on the subject, Appendix IX. § 13 supra. The latter part of the phrase above quoted has been generally interpreted to mean that the Polemarch was commander-in-chief, cp. § 5 supra, Kenyon, Ἀθῆναι, π. 75. How far does this phrase go beyond the expression of Herodotus? (6.111). Ἡδ. confines the Polemarch’s lead to the right wing: τοῦ μὲν δεξιῶν εἶρει ἵππον ὁ πολλυμαχος κτλ. The man that ‘led’ the right wing might be said to lead the whole army, τὴν δὲ ἀνάξια στρατιά γεγονὼς ὁ πολλυμαχος. But, then, what did Ἡδ. mean by the expression that the Polemarch ‘had’ or ‘held’ the right wing, τὸν πολλυ- μαχον ἑξεσκε μετὰ τοῦ δεξιῶν? Could one man hold the right wing against all Plataea on the left, ἐκεῖνη τὸ εὐθὺς μετὰ πιλαρτος. As sometimes happens with Ἡδ., in obscure constitutional points, his language becomes ambiguous. Cp. note to 6.57 ad fin. The obscurity covers the intervening sentence, in which the Polemarch leads, and the Phylae (not the other Phylae, cp. note ad loc.) follow (i.e. each other from right to left, and the Polemarch forwards!). The author of the Ἀθῆναι, π. 75, has worked out the position more lucidly. He is speaking not of the line of battle, but of the Strategi, and the Strategic office. He evidently means that the Strategi were elected, one from each Phyle, to lead each his own Phylae, whilst the whole army was led by the Polemarch. ‘Lead’ is here equivalent to ‘command.’ It might be imagined that the right wing was occupied by the Phyle whose Strategos was Prytanais for the day (cp. note to 6.110), and that the Polemarch took the place of the Strategos of the Phyle, ‘leading’ a different Phyle each day! But why multiply speculative hypotheses defamatory of Athenian tactics and strategies, when the simple assumption that Ἡδ.’s language is obscure and inconsequent because his knowledge is imperfect and confused explains everything?  

1 Cp. notes on 5.69, 6.112, and Appendix IX. §§ 13, 14.  
2 Cp. Appendix IX. §§ 4, 5.  
3 §§ 5, 6 supra.
tradition, epigram, or what not) it would have left some mark, surely, somewhere else in the sources. It seems obvious that the ‘Philaid’ version very early established itself as the true story of Marathon. In that version Miltiades, the Strategos, on whose proposition the Athenians decided to go to Marathon,1 doubtless a man of strong will, who very probably took the moral lead, and may even have suggested the actual plan of battle, was represented as the technical στρατηγὸς ἡγεμόν, in terms proper to the Athenian Constitution a little later. The presence of the Polemarch at Marathon was not indeed forgotten, but his constitutional position was obscured, all the more easily, perhaps, in consequence of the death of Kallimachos, the last Polemarch that ever commanded Athenian soldiers in the field. How completely the Philaid tradition dominated the world, is shown by the fact that even Plutarch and the later authorities, with the Athenian Constitution in their hands, went on representing Miltiades as commander-in-chief, and the ‘war-lord’ as little more than a constitutional cypher in a special post of honour, with an extraordinary vote, perhaps a mere casting-vote, in the council of war! (2) A second argument points to the same conclusion. Given the circumstances of the case, the author of the Athenian Constitution was well-nigh bound, if he had real evidence on the points, to specify the date and occasion of the military reorganization which reduced the Polemarch to a purely civil functionary, raised the ten Strategi to be commanders of the forces, provided other officers for the phyletic regiments, and perhaps called the cavalry into existence. He has not dated any of these reforms: his sources contained no information on the points. Any conclusion could only be hypothetical, and the materials for a hypothesis are less obvious than in regard to the positive facts at Marathon: for there was the story told by Herodotus, with its obvious inconsequences, and, moreover, the earlier stages in the history of the Archai, including the Polemarchia, this author had carefully explored and noted by one means or another. (3) A very strong reason for believing that the statement in the Athenian Constitution is an inference, not a directly attested tradition, is the fact that it has been independently made in recent times, before the discovery of the text.2 If it could be made in the twenty-third century, why not in the second century after the event? That it was an inference does not prove it wrong, but may help to explain why we have had to wait so long for an authoritative confirmation.

Two other Aristotelian references remain to be noted: (1) If an orator, Aristotle remarks, desire to praise the Athenians, he must get up his facts, the sea-fight at Salamis, the battle of Marathon, the tradition of the services of Athens to the exiled Heracleids, and so on.3

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1 § 20 supra.
2 See note 6. 109, where this hypothesis should have been ascribed to Lugehl. 
3 Rhetor. 2. 22 (1871) τῶν δὲ δυνατέων μὲν ταῦτα ἐπανάλειψιν (sc. Ἀθηναίων) ἐν μὴ
The passage is not satirical, neither is it important, except as giving apparently the philosopher’s sanction to the practice of the rhetors, which so greatly corrupted history. (2) A second passage in the Rhetoric preserves a reference made by Kephisodotos to the peepism of Miltiades. This reference would not of necessity be earlier than the one above cited from Demosthenes. These references exhaust the direct contribution of Aristotle to the matter in hand; for a curious passage in the History of Animals though referring to Marathon and Salamis, and the tomb of Themistokles withal, refers to them only to remark that in such shady and marshy spots, after a glorious day, when the ground is well warmed, a sort of froth is produced, which breeds—mackerel-midges! Verily, a parable from nature, to discomfit the rhetors! an unintentional commentary on the Birds of Aristophanes!

§ 24. The empire of Alexander, the kingdoms into which his successors divided the spoil: the Roman conquest, the unification of the Mediterranean world under the Caesars, made the memories and traditions of free Hellas ancient history to the decadent Greeks themselves, much more to their Roman and Christian successors. Thus the breach between the literature and sources of the fourth century B.C. and those of the succeeding periods, Hellenistic, Roman, Christian, though augmented and exaggerated by facts which may be called accidental, is causally related to ecumenical changes in the external order of human history. It is, therefore, worth while here to pause, in order briefly to summarise the state of the evidence and traditions in regard to the battle of Marathon, so far reviewed, before advancing across the chasm of nearly three centuries, upon the further side of which the sources of Greek history again break up the ground, albeit, like the fabled Arethusa and Alpheios, in another land, and under alien skies.

All the additional matter which the extant sources, from Pindar to Aristotle, supply to complete or to correct the account given by Herodotus of the battle of Marathon, is, broadly speaking, of two different kinds: (1) There are statements which make real and solid additions to knowledge, or which are connected with genuine and early evidences, or, at least, are based on arguments which may be regarded as conclusive. Such elements include the peepism of Miltiades, mentioned by Demosthenes and Aristotle: the constitutional authority of the Polemarch at the time, asserted in the

1 ἐξωμεν τὴν ἐν Σαλαμίνι καμαχίαν ἢ τὴν ἐν Μαραθῶι μύχην ἢ τὰ ὕδατα τῶν Ἡρακλείων λεχθέντα ἢ ἀλοι τῶν τοσίων; ἐκ γὰρ τῶν οὐραφάστων ἢ δωκορίστων ὑπάρχουσιν αὐτοῖς ταύτης οὐκέτως εἴσαι εἰς τὸ Μιλτιάδον ψηφαρμα.
2 3. 10 (14114) παρακελῶν ποτὲ τοῖς Ἀθηναῖοι εἰς Ἐθραίαν ἐνστικεροῦσιν ἡγή δὲν ἔλειν τὸ Μιλτιάδον ψηφαρμα.
4 15 (589b) γίνονται δὲ τοις ἀνδράσι καὶ ἐλάδει τοις τούτοις εὐθομάσας γεγονοῦσιν ἀναθερέται ἡ γῆ ἀνάλαφος τὸ Ἀθηναῖα ἐν Σαλαμίνι καὶ πρὸς τὸν Θεσπρωτίον καὶ ἐν Μαραθῶι ἐν γάρ τούτων τοῖς τούτων γίνεται ἄφρατος.
5 l.cit. supr. p. 184.
Athenian Constitution. These two items stand apart, as the most certain and satisfactory contribution made by the later sources. There are further in this class the notices of the Marathonian trophy, chiefly in the Comedies, the reference to the memorials in the Poikile, and in connexion therewith, the citation of the epigram, or epigrams, ascribed to Simonides. These items may date only from a time when the Marathonian legend was already on its way from glory to glory. They are not trustworthy evidences in regard to the actual facts of 490 B.C. They are primarily evidence of views taken in later days, and taken by interested parties and persons, who had their own reasons for extolling the Marathonian heroes in general, and Miltiades in particular. The traditions preserved by Herodotus exhibit these tendencies, although his work does ample justice to the second Persian war, in comparison with the first, in part, perhaps, because he had compiled the story of the second war before he was led to consider the story of the earlier campaign, as a factor in his history.\(^1\)

(2) The later authors show the unscrupulous development of rhetorical tendencies, visible even in the pages of Herodotus. Thucydides, indeed, avoids one blunder to commit another: underestimates the magnitude and significance of the whole struggle with the Mede rather than allow it an importance comparable to his own chosen theme. The rhetors show a later but hardly more scientific or more just view. Broadly speaking the tendency is to revive the splendid memories of the Persian wars, with a preference for those episodes in which the Athenians could claim the lion’s share, Marathon, Salamis, and more especially the former, partly upon ‘patriotic’ grounds, partly owing to a bias in favour of the constitution founded on the land, as against the constitution floating on the sea. Under the influence of these laudable motives the Marathonian legend, almost uniformly, ignores the Plataians and their service: fixes the numbers of the Barbarians encountered at the highest possible figure: credits the Athenians with impossible rapidity of movement, drops all allusion to the chance or dread of treachery, expunges Eretria from the story, makes Athens the immediate, and all Hellas, nay, all Europe, the ultimate objective of the king’s forces: credits the Athenians with a mind to champion the common cause, and to champion it alone: in short, abandons all historical conscience and all sense of perspective and probability, in the torrent of partisan rhetoric. Compared with the ludicrous rhodomontade of the Epitaphios, or even the more guarded generalities of the Panegyrikos, the exaggerations and defects censured in the version of Herodotus may well seem but trivial slips of the historic Muse.

The breach in continuity above indicated is fortunately to a certain extent illusory, and there were even in the Athens of the fourth century others, as well as Aristotle, who took a rational view

of the Marathonian campaign, without falling back into Thucydidean
depreciation. It was, indeed, an age of afterthoughts, but the after-
thought was exercised by some schools in a scientific or historical
interest mainly. Two classes of writers have perished in their
original forms, the specialists, or writers of Attic monographs, such
as Kleidemos, Androton, Philochoros, and the writers of universal
history, of whom Ephoros and Theopompos 1 were the principals.
Both classes have been largely employed by the later writers, as
well literary as lexicographical, of Roman and Christian times. It is,
perhaps, not too much to say that, so far as a systematic alternative
to, or even a rationalised version of, the earlier historical tradition
can be detected in the later sources, it may be ascribed, with
some confidence, to Ephoros. His work probably exhibited the
systematic application to the history of Greece of the principles and
practices which are implied in the fine rhetoric of Isokrates, and the
rationalised synthesis of early traditions and evidences in regard to
the beginnings of Greek societies, of which the Aristotelian Constitu-
tion of Athens furnishes an example. There was not, indeed, any
actual breach between the historiography of the fourth and that of
the subsequent centuries, any more than between the work of the
fifth century and that of the fourth. The rhetorical tendencies, the
monographic methods and scientific interests, even the universalist
point of view are anticipated in the fifth century: and again, in the
afterglow of the Hellenistic decadence or revival, authors were de-
pendent upon the old sources, and inevitably accepted the rhetoric
and the prejudices of the sources as authentic history. Yet still,
historical research was to a larger and larger extent delivered from
immediate political interests, from party or local feeling: and was
conducted in a literary and ethical spirit, as by Plutarch, in a more
purely antiquarian interest, as by Pausanias, or even in a strictly
academic and scholastic spirit, as by the lexicographers from Pollux
to Suidas. The effects of the ecumenical changes above indicated
are reflected in the treatment of the story of Marathon—a story
almost as thoroughly antiquated then as now.

§ 25. Cicero, first of Roman witnesses, with the later Greek
authorities in hand, though presumably quoting from memory, con-
tributes two statements of fact which, if true, would be interesting
without involving any modification in the general view of the battle.

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1 The battle of Marathon did not fall
within the proper scope of the Chian's
original work; but "the most illustrious
of the disciples of Isokrates" apparently
wrote An Epitome of the Work of Hero-
doties (Suidas), in which the battle of
Marathon probably dwindled to very
small proportions, for in his own most
voluminous work, the Philippiaca (in 58
books), he appears incidentally to have
dealt very unkindly with the current
Athenian apotheosis of that achievement.
P. 107 ἐν δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐν Μαραθῶν
μάχην οὖς ἄκακαι δυναίς γενομέ
μάχες, καὶ δει ἀμα, φειδί, ἢ ἀθρα
νὸν πολιο ἀγανωτέρα καὶ παρακροται τούτον
'Ἐλληνων. (Ref. due to Wecklein, U. d.
Tradition, p. 55.)
Cicero apparently believed that Miltiades was wounded and that Hippias was actually killed at Marathon. The former statement is a lapsus memoriae, which may be put down to Cicero’s own account: for it is impossible to prefer it to the much better authenticated tradition that the wound of which Miltiades died was encountered at Paros: and it is superfluous to save Cicero’s credit by concluding that Miltiades had been wounded at Marathon as well as at Paros. The second case is a little more perplexing. The disappearance of Hippias from the historic scene after Marathon is decidedly curious. The first express mention of his fate by any ancient author is the statement made by Cicero. It is, however, repeated by Trogus Pompeius, a circumstance which renders it all the more likely that we are in the presence of an elder tradition or inference. The complete silence of Herodotus, and of Thucydides, on this point makes against the statement of Cicero and Trogus. If Hippias was slain at Marathon, Herodotus and Thucydides should have known it: if they knew it, what adequate reason had they for suppressing it? A third passage in Cicero’s works shows that he was acquainted with the anecdote, repeated by Plutarch, which, if true, would make it almost certain that Miltiades had erected a trophy at Marathon.

The passage in Pompeius Trogus (as epitomised by Justin 2. 9) supplies a concise and obviously rationalised version of the story of Marathon, which attempts to do justice both to the oratorical embellishments and to the Herodotean nucleus, while finding supplements from some third or fourth sources. In the text of Trogus (1) Hippias was restored to a prominence which the orators had somehow obscured; indeed, he is the one captain named on the Persian side. (2) The Lacedaemonians and Plateaeans recover their places in the story: the religious scruple of the former is respected. (3) The Athenians are in too great a hurry to wait ‘three days’ (quadriduum) for their allies, and go out to Marathon. (4) Miltiades is the commander-in-chief (dux bellii), and the chief adviser of the instant action (auctor non expectandi auxili). (5) The Athenians on coming a mile from the enemy charged ante jactum sagittarum. (6) The number of the forces were 10,000 Athenians with 1000 Plateaeans on the one side against 600,000 on the other. (7) The Greeks fought as heroes (viri), the barbarians as sheep (pecudes). (8) The Persians fled, many of their ships were sunk, many taken. (9) Themistocles specially distinguished himself, and gave promise of his future glory as commander-in-chief. (10) Cynegirus exhibited an extraordinary courage and tenacity.

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1 de Repub. 1. 5 Miltiades victor domitorque Persarum, nemendum sanatis vulneribus eis quae corpore adverso in clarissima victoria acceperat, vitam ex hostium tellis servatam in civium vinculis profudit.

2 Ep. ad Att. 9. 10, 3 nefarius Hippias, Pisistrati filius, qui in Marathonia pugna cecidit, arma contra patriam ferens.

3 Tusc. Q. 4. 44; Plutarch, Themist. 3.

4 After slaying innumerable enemies in the battle he pursued the fugitives to their ships, and laid hold of a heavily-laden vessel with his right hand: when his right
§ 25 MARATHON

(11) The Persians lost 200,000 men in the battle itself, or by a shipwreck. (12) Hippias was slain in the action.

Of the statements of Trogus as numbered above, (1) and (12) have been already discussed. They are worth something against the silence of the orators: worth less, beside Herodotus and Thucydides. The appearance of Hippias in sole command is as suspicious as his total cassation by the orators. (2) is doubtless due to a respect for Herodotus: (3) to a desire not to give up the rhetors: the quadrinum is presumably a mere calculation, perhaps an inference from Herodotus (τροπαίον 6. 120). (4) again combines the psephism of Miltiades (in Demoethenes et al.) with the position of commander-in-chief given him by Herodotus and the general tradition: but simply ignores the statement of the Ἀθηναίων πολεμίων. (5) also combines the rhetorical statement in the Epitaphios with the assertion by Herodotus in respect to the charge. The words ante jactum sagittarum seem to supply a motive for the rapid onset at the end; but they are, perhaps, only based on the words of Herodotus (μεταίχμιον . . . τοξικημάτων). (6) The figure for the barbarians is extracted from the orators. The figure for the Greeks is supplied here for the first time: but doubtless was found by Trogus in his authorities. (7) is a commonplace rhetorical touch. (8) omits details as given by Herodotus, in favour of the vague declamation of the orators: the account of the loss of ships is obviously exaggerated, and partly, perhaps, suggested from incidents in the second war. (9) The statement respecting Themistokles is vague, and might have been an outcome or application of the anecdote above cited; but Trogus may have found it to hand in a Greek authority. (10) The germ of the anecdote is in Herodotus, and it has been spoilt by the frigid declamation of a rhetorician. (11) The Persian loss is a patent exaggeration.—The most curious observation to be made upon the recital of Trogus is that it adds so very little to the data as given by Herodotus and the extant orators. Except the numbers on the Greek side, the mention of Themistokles, the death of Hippias, there is nothing that even simulates the appearance of a genuine or independent tradition. Surely Ephoros might have led to something better than this! The position assigned to Hippias, the complete silence in regard to Datis (and Artaphernes) suggest the possibility that only a part of the armada actually went to Marathon: an hypothesis which might lead far towards explaining the victory, while complicating the strategic problem. But, though Hippias is put prominently forward in Herodotus, the supposition that Hippias was in sole command of a relatively small force at Marathon, conflicts with too many other traditions to be made the governing canon for a rational reconstruction of the battle-piece.

hand was cut off, he grasped the vessel with his left; on losing the left hand likewise, he laid the ship a-while in his teeth (ad postremum morum naves dedit Isid) ! Unless it were borrowed from the chimerical sacrifice, p. 224 sqq. fn.
§ 26. Cornelius Nepos in his life of Miltiades (cc. 4, 5) for the
first time presents to us an account of the battle of Marathon, of a
style and character to be placed side by side with the story as
told by Herodotus. A comparison establishes two points obviously.
The story in Nepos is not absolutely independent of the story in
Herodotus: nor is it in the main borrowed from Herodotus. In
other words, Nepos has some other source or sources beside Her-
odotus. Whether the Herodotean elements enter into his narrative
directly, or indirectly, it is not easy to determine. Nepos may have
followed one source, and that source may have drawn in part upon
Herodotus. In any case it is generally admitted (1) that Nepos
used Ephoros, whether he also used Herodotus as well, or only
coincides with Herodotus through Ephoros: and (2) that we have
in Nepos the best exhibition of the version of this affair given by
Ephoros. It is a version from which the wilder extravagances of
the rhetoricians have been completely purged, to make way for a
highly reflective and rationalised account of events, in itself more
coherent and intelligible than the story told by Herodotus, but not
therefore, or of necessity, preferable. Such, however, being its
character, it is obviously necessary to scan its details narrowly.
Nepos may be taken to relate the story in twenty numbers:—

(1) Darius on his return from Europe to Asia was urged by his
‘friends’ to reduce Greece. (2) He accordingly got together a force
of 500 ships, 200,000 foot, 10,000 horse, appointing Datis and
Artaphrenes to command. (3) As casus belli he alleged the assistance
given by the Athenians to the Ionians at Sardes. (4) The royal
‘prefects’ touched at Euboea, ‘quickly’ reduced Eretria, and sent its
inhabitants prisoners to the king. (5) From Euboea the king’s forces
crossed to Attica, and disembarked at Marathon, a plain distant ten
Roman miles from the city. (6) The Athenians in this crisis (tumultu)
sought assistance from the Lacedaemonians, and from the Lacedae-
omians alone. (7) Philippides, a so-called Hemerodromus, was the
man that went to Lacedaemon, to ask assistance with all speed.
(8) At home ten ‘praetors’ are ‘created’ to command the army.
(9) A discussion ensues among the ten ‘praetors’ whether to stand a
siege or to march against the enemy and engage in battle (udrum
moenibus se defendereant an obviam irent hostibus acieque decernerent).
(10) Miltiades urged that they should with all speed make a camp,
seeing that to do so would encourage the citizens, and discourage
the enemy. (11) The arrival of the Plataeans to assist the Athenians
carried the point for Miltiades. (12) The Plataeans were 1000 in
number, raising the total on the Athenian side to 10,000. (13) The
Athenians, moved by the authority of Miltiades (ejus auctoritate
impusti), led their forces out of the city, and made a camp in a
suitable place. (14) On the next day, at the foot of the mountain,
they joined battle. (15) Their position was carefully chosen, with
a view to utilise the natural advantages of the place, and the natural
advantages were artificially enhanced. Trunks of trees were strewn freely, to impede the operations of the enemy's cavalry, and the Athenian army was protected by the mountain. (16) Datis perceived the disadvantage of the position, but trusted to his superior numbers, and was anxious to engage before the arrival of the Lacedaemonians. (17) He drew up in battle-line 100,000 foot, 10,000 horse. (18) The Athenians completely defeated ten times their own number. (19) The Persians fled, not to their camp, but to their ships. (20) Nothing nobler than this battle is on record: never before or since was a crushing defeat inflicted (profigarent—perturruerunt—prostravi) where the numbers were so disproportionate.

The coherence and verisimilitude of this story are doubly remarkable, coming after the absurdities of the orators. Taken by itself there is hardly anything to urge against it. Every action, every stage in the action, is accounted for and made intelligible. It might be said: the numbers are suspiciously large and round on the Persian side; the Persian camp seems to come in rather casually (19); the battle is very curiously described. The terminology throughout is technically Roman (prefecti, tumulus, creare, praetores, castra, acies): but what else was to be expected in a Latin writer?

Passing seriation through the items in the story numbered above, it will be observed that (1) brings the date of the action into immediate juxtaposition with the Scythic expedition, as had been done by Ktesias, though (3) seems to imply the story of the Ionian revolt as told by Herodotus. Moreover, in these items and throughout Hippias disappears, and with him all hint of treachery or medism in Athens. This omission is the more remarkable, seeing the prominence of Hippias in Cicero and Trogus (contemporaries of Nepos), and in the sources followed by them. (2) The figures are probably from Ephoros, and show the merit of historical rationalism when compared with the exaggerations of the rhetors. The names of the commanders may be from Herodotus through Ephoros. (3) Herodotus is certainly the ultimate authority for this item: but the emphasis laid on its fictitious character may be due to an harmonistic interest in Ephoros. (4) The order or sequence of events may seem to conflict with that of Herodotus: but the discrepancy might arise simply from literary considerations; Nepos or Ephoros having completed the story of the Eretrians before going on to the case of Athens. In any case, however, the celerity of the reduction of Eretria accords better with the three days of the Monaxemon than with the six days of Herodotus. The result is to diminish the resistance of Eretria, and to enhance the achievement of Athens. (5) The specification of the distance between Athens and Marathon is an improvement on Herodotus. The fact that the distance is under-estimated might suggest that the point was due to Nepos.

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1 The use of Ἑμεροδρόμω 'proves the rule.' On the form of the word cp. note to 6. 105.
2 § 30 τρακα.
not to Ephoros, who in any case would not have given the estimate in Roman miles. But the error might have arisen in the reduction by Nepos of the *stadia* of Ephoros. An under-estimate would have seemed to make the tradition that the Athenians marched from the city, fought the battle, and returned on the same day, more plausible: but that is not the view adopted by Nepos and his authority. (6) corrects the gross exaggeration of pseudo-Lysias, and follows the narrative of Herodotus (6. 105), as also (7). The term *Hemerodromus* comes probably from Herodotus (l.c.). The name Philippides is certainly right: but Ephoros might have had the form in his copy of the text of Herodotus (cp. note ad l.). The omission of the supranaturalistic items here and throughout the narrative—as also in the other Roman reporters—is significant, and may probably be put down to Ephoros in the first instance. (8) The Latin author's associations have probably coloured this item in more than the mere terminology. It is inconceivable that Ephoros represented the election of the ten Strategi as taking place at this point in the proceedings. It would be easy, if it were worth while, to rationalise the item so that it might represent the issue of a commission, or the determination to fight: but it is more important to observe that Nepos, that is, Ephoros, invested the ten Strategi with the command, and put the Polemarch altogether out of the account, thus falsely rationalising away the confused narrative of Herodotus, and leaving the sounder inference to be made by the author of the Athenian Constitution. The result is doubtless a self-consistent and easily comprehended narrative: but consistency is dearly purchased at the expense of historic facts and constitutional perspective! The author of the *'Athenaiow politeia* obtained that result by traversing the fifth-century traditions which represented Miltiades as commander-in-chief. Ephoros obtained a similar result by ignoring the fifth-century traditions which showed that the positions of the Strategi and Polemarch in 490 B.C. were something different, perhaps very different, from their positions later on, and nearer the time of his composition. On this point Ephoros is wrong. The error is important, suggesting, as it does, the means by which his very plausible account of the battle was worked up. (9) In this point Nepos, and possibly Ephoros, were both at once right and wrong. There is no item in the narrative where their authority more expressly runs counter to Herodotus. As is well known, Grote on this point preferred the authority and statement of Ephoros or Nepos: but in avoiding Scylla, Grote fell a victim to Charybdis. The narratives of Nepos and of Herodotus are not strict alternatives. We may safely argue that the questions whether the Athenians should go to Marathon, whether they should fight a battle at all, when and where they should fight, must have been raised, discussed, and determined in due season. But we may now also take it for certain that the decision of the first question, or of the first and second questions,
§ 26  MARATHON  209

lay not with the Strategi, nor with the Polemarch, nor even with
the Polemarch and Strategi combined into one council of war, and
sitting in Athens, but with the *Ekklesia*, the *Demos*, the army itself.
To the Polemarch, or to the Polemarch and Strategi may, nay we
might fairly argue must, have been left the decision, once the army
was at Marathon, whether to act on the defensive or on the offensive,
and in short the whole tactics in presence of the enemy: but the
question of marching from Athens to Marathon, which must have
been decided in Athens, was decided by the Athenians. We have
already found some evidence for the belief that the decision was
taken upon the motion of Miltiades. It is difficult to believe that
Ephoros can have been ignorant of the psephism of Miltiades, or
that he suppressed all mention of it (though it is quite possible that
he left the Polemarch out of the reckoning). It is possible that
in this case we should see not merely the influence of the later
constitution and powers of the *Strategia* on the narrative of Ephoros,
but also the influence of Roman associations derived from the
consular or praetorian *imperium* upon the narrative of Nepos, who,
be it remembered, has just ‘created’ ten ‘praetors’ to command the
Athenian forces. (10) The proposal assigned to Miltiades might be
a rider, or corollary, on his psephism; but this castratation is
rather Roman than Athenian. It is remarkable in this connexion
that the Persian *castra* first appear as an afterthought in (19). Even
if Nepos had authority for the Persian camp, it was a factor in the
narrative due probably to ingenious and legitimate inference, and not
to express witness or tradition; cp. § 36 infra. (11) traverses
the story told by Herodotus in a very important particular: according
to that story the Plataians joined the Athenians at Marathon.
Nothing in the narrative of Ephoros shows more clearly the rational
and coherent character of his account of Marathon than this point.
It may well have been that not the actual arrival of the Plataians
at Athens, but the assurance and pledge that they would join the
Athenians in presence of the foe, may have decided, or helped to
decide, the Athenians in voting the psephism of Miltiades. The
inference or combination by Ephoros, in fact, went beyond the
necessities of the case. Yet it is also not impossible that the
actual arrival of the Plataians at Marathon may have helped to
fortify the Athenian commander in assuming the offensive. It is
remarkable that the Plataian leader is given no voice at all in the
decision. This might be in accordance with Greek custom, which
left the command to the men in whose territory the fighting took
place: ¹ and for the Plataians the decision was taken when they left
their own city. (They may have been a little disappointed to find
themselves the only allies in Attica.) (12) These numbers are in

¹ Cp. Thuc. 5. 47, 7 ὡ δὲ πᾶς ἡ μεγανεμφαίου τῆς ἑρμονίας ἐκείνω διά 
ἀπὸ τῆς ἀκροπόλεως Ἡν.
themselves very probable. Trogus has given 10,000 as the total of the Athenians alone, a figure which suggests the inference, that each phyle sent 1000 men. But it is not likely that the city was absolutely and wholly denuded of hoplites, to say nothing of men serving on sea: if 1000 were left on guard, there might be 9000 Athenian hoplites at Marathon. There were probably a good many slaves andmetics to boot; whether they served in the ranks as hoplites is doubtful—nay, hardly doubtful. But the exact figures cannot be relied upon as giving more than plausible inferences. At Plataia Athens put 8000 hoplites into the field, according to Hdt. 9. 28, and some of their men were at Mykale. The figures doubtless go back to Ephoros: but whether his 10,000 included or excluded the Plataians may not have been clear: hence the discrepancy in the later authorities.

(13) The authority (uctoritas) of Miltiades is a poor substitute in Nepos for an express psephism: the substitution of the “Athenians” for “Miltiades and his colleagues” as “leaders of the forces” is paradoxical. Is there in this remarkable turn a lurking reminiscence of the view, propounded in the Ἀθηναίων πολεμεία, that the Polemarch was the leader (ἡγεμόν) of the whole army? If so, it might have to be put down rather to Ephoros than to Nepos. The camp in a suitable place, to which Nepos returns, is probably, at best, but an exaggeration of the trees cut down and strewn about, which he may have found in Ephoros.

(14) The time indication has been discussed above: the mountain, the natural advantages of the position, are true to fact, and doubtless to history: their introduction is a distinct advance, even if only an inferential advance, upon the Herodotean story, and a similar remark applies to the artificial means taken to improve the position.

(15) The feelings and motives of Datis can have been but matters of conjecture to Ephoros: but in the prospective arrival of the Spartans, as in the actual arrival of the Plataians, Ephoros hit upon a vera causa; and these rationalities lend great similitude to his narrative.

(17) Why, if Datis was trusting in the multitude of his host, he should have employed but one half his foot-soldiers in the battle, is an inconsequence in the narrative, which might be intelligible, if we had the original of Ephoros. He may, according to that authority, have relegated a moiste of the Persian forces to the ‘camp,’ or even, though less probably, have embarked them on the ships. Anyway, in this view but half of the Persian foot-soldiers took part in the fray. Perhaps the figure was only a proleptic inference from the coming trope that the Athenians had defeated a force outnumbering them as ten to one. The item which seems to clarify, if not to contradict, Herodotus, is the express statement which brings the 10,000 Persian cavalry into action. This is quite as it should be from the point of view which saw in Marathon a great pitched battle, and it does justice to the reasons for the selection of the battle-

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1 Cp. Pausanias, § 28 infra.
field, as given by Herodotus: yet, if there is one statement more untrustworthy than another in the narrative, it is this guarantee for the presence of the cavalry, 10,000 strong, even though Ephoros, or Nepos, has taken the precaution of neutralising their presence by strewing logs about the battle-field. (18) Nepos may have suppressed details of the actual engagement reported by Ephoros: but we shall remember with advantage that Polybios—no mean authority—much as he admired Ephoros in certain aspects,¹ had the very poorest opinion of him as an authority upon land-battles and their details.² (19) The Persian camp here appears for the first time in the narrative: yet, though there may not have been a tittle of real tradition or memory of a Persian τείχος at Marathon, it is in itself a not improbable suggestion; cp. (10), (13) supra. The Persians having made a camp, item (19) seems inserted to explain why there was no mention of it in the traditions of the battle, especially the Herodotean: the Persians fled to their ships. (20) contains a modest estimate, granting the facts as stated, of the magnitude and importance of the battle. The omission of all notice of operations or movements subsequent to the battle may be ascribed partly to the defect in Ephoros noted by Polybios, partly to the facts that his narrative deliberately followed the rhetorical fashion, in omitting all reference to Hippias or to medizing traitors in Athens, and further, that the Eretrian prisoners have already been sent to Αύση (4).

Diodoros. It is especially unfortunate that the tenth Book of Diodoros is extant only in fragments, as no doubt he gave a fairly full account of the battle of Marathon in the lost portion. Diodoros may here, as elsewhere, have drawn largely upon Ephoros; yet what of the Sicilian’s account remains, apparently flowing from another source, serves chiefly to illustrate the pragmatic licence of our Attic litterateurs in a new particular. Datis, commander of the Persians but himself a Mede, understanding by hereditary tradition that the Athenians were descendants of Medos, the founder of Media, sent a message to the Athenians demanding their surrender, on the ground that Medos, his forbear, had been King of Athens, before he founded Media. If they restore the authority to him, they shall be forgiven their part in the expedition to Sardes: if they refuse they shall be treated worse than Eretria. On behalf of the ten Strategi, Miltiades replies to Datis that, on his own showing, the government of Media belongs to the Athenians not the government of Athens to the Mede. On receiving this answer Datis made him ready to battle.—There is nothing new in this frag-

¹ Polyb. 12, 28 ἐ γὰρ Ἕφθοις παρ’ Ἁλβα τὴν πραγμάτειαν θαυμάσας ἔν τελει. ² Polyb. 12, 25. τῷ κατὰ γὰρ ἀντίθετον ἀνεφρ. τελείον . . ἐν τούτοις ἐκείνῃ ἑκάτερος τὰς ἑκάτερας καὶ μετατάξεις τὰς καὶ αὐτῶν τοῖς κυβόλοις γείλοις φανέρα καὶ παρ-
ment but the contents of the messages flying between Datis and Miltiades, though the passage shows that Diodoros omitted neither the 
_\textit{casus belli}_ supplied by the attack on Sardes, nor the story of the fate of Eretria; and also that, in this account again, Miltiades and the Strategi 
are the commanders on the Athenian side. There is not much room for 
Hippias and his claims in the anecdote; but it would hardly do to argue 
that Hippias was totally left out of the story of Marathon by Diodoros, 
even if he was unnamed by the particular source from which this 
new anecdote ultimately comes. What that source was is not obvious; 
but perhaps the suggestion may be permitted that this particular _motif_ 
may have come from a drama, or even from a dramatic discourse, having 
the Marathonian campaign as its chief interest. The dialectical contest 
between Miltiades and Datis, in which the argumentative victory is 
clearly on the side of the Greek, would not be out of keeping with the 
traditions of the Attic Muse. To what date such a drama, or such a 
disputation, might belong, is a further question. The earlier it could be 
put the better. The order of ideas which established these pragmatic 
relations between Greeks and barbarians, Persian, Mede, Egyptian, 
was familiar to the contemporaries of Herodotus; and the anecdote 
in Diodoros may go back to a fifth-century source. Or, might it even 
be traceable to the _Miltiades_ of Aischines, the Socratic, one of those 
long and elegant dialogues which he carried to Sicily, in the hopes of 
carrying favour with Dionysios? (cp. § 29 _infra_).

§ 27. Plutarch. It did not commend itself to Plutarch to take 
Miltiades as one of his heroes; either because the materials were not 
sufficiently attractive, or because Kimon, the son of Miltiades, was 
booked as a parallel to Lucullus. But Plutarch, the invaluable Plu-
tarch, whose extant works contain more not merely of the ethos and 
and essence of Hellenism, but of positive knowledge concerning acts, events, 
institutions, and history generally, than those of any other author of 
antiquity—Plutarch, as might be expected, makes some notable 
contributions to our materials for reconstructing the Marathonian 
legend, at various stages of its evolution. It is natural to look first 
into the _Life of Kimon_ for some news of his father. The most 
precise and remarkable item is the anecdote that Miltiades asked for 
a crown of olive-leaves, and Sophanes of Dekeleia arose in the Ekklesia 
and protested in the memorable phrase: ‘When you enter the lists 
alone, O Miltiades, and gain a victory over the Barbarians all by yourself, 
then it will be time enough for you to ask for honours for yourself 
alone.’

How does this anecdote stand in relation to the statement 
above quoted that the Athenians awarded no special honour to the 
Strategi of old, because victories were regarded as the work of the 
whole people? Was the anecdote a daring fiction reconstructed to

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1 Cp. 6. 53 f.

2 Plutarch, _Kimon_ 8 ὅταν γὰρ, ἐφί, 
μόνος ἀγωγασάμενος, ὁ Miltiades, πενήνθη 
τῶν βαρβάρων τότε καὶ τιμάθαι μόνοι 
ἐξεῖν. Cp. the words, _Aristeid._ 16, which 
denied the trophies of Marathon and _Salamis_ to Miltiades. On Sophanes, cp. 6. 92.

3 pp. 192 f.
illustrate the principle. Or was the vague rhetorical principle an extension of the authentic anecdote? Plutarch unfortunately does not indicate his authority for the story, but it seems by no means improbable that it goes back to a fifth-century source. Significant, too, is the record, preserved by Plutarch, that after Salamis many rallied round Kimon and exhorted him to emulate in thought and action the work at Marathon. The context shows that if the record can be trusted, the exhortation was part of the reaction against the political and constitutional results of the victory of Salamis: and even if the record be not strictly historical, it is hardly less significant, as showing the interpretation put, sooner or later, upon the career of Kimon. The most brilliant day, indubitably the most brilliant day, in that career witnessed the double victory, by sea and by land, at the Eurymedon; the rhetorical trope in which Plutarch celebrates it, was perhaps borrowed from a trallatian commentary. The acts and policy of Kimon revived the glories of the *Marathonomachae* with a difference. Perhaps no other episode lends itself better to this interpretation than the transfer of the relics of Theseus from Skyros to Athens. This event is recorded twice by Plutarch, with considerable circumstance, in the *Life of Kimon* and in the *Life of Theseus*. From that event dates the resurrection, if not the birth, of Theseus as the Hero of the Athenian Democracy, the Founder of the State, the author of the *Synoikismos*. The fifth-century legend, the tendency of which was to diminish and darken the originality and glory of Kleisthenes the Alkmaionid, had only a partial success with the orators of the fourth century, although the *Athidographers* probably found it useful as supplying a much needed background in Athenian constitutional history; but its political importance in the conservative programme of Kimon is not obscure. Nor can the connexion between Theseus and Marathon be accidental, whether it was revived, or invented, to suit the occasion. According to Plutarch not a few of the Athenians at Marathon had seen Theseus advancing at their head against the Barbarians, and this service is alleged as one of the grounds for the worship awarded the hero in Athens, directly connected by Plutarch, as doubtless by his authorities, with the Delphic behest to

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1 Perhaps Steaimbroton, referred to again and again in the *Life of Kimon*.  
2 *Kimon 5 ἀδραγμώμων πολλῶν πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ παρακλητῶν ἔστα τὸν Μαρα- 

θάνος ὑπὲρ δικαιώσεως καὶ τράπεζις*.  
3 *Θ. 13 Κιμών 5 ὀνειρήσεσθαι ἐνοπτὸ ἡμᾶς μὲν διὸ καθημερικά ἐγωνισματα, καὶ μὲν ἐν Σαλαμίν περιπηχεί, τὸ δὲ ἐν Πλαταϊᾷ κατ' εἰκόνα παρελθὸν ἐπιγραφα ἐνεπιγραφα ταῖς νίκαις εὐτ.  
4 C. 8.  
5 C. 86.  
6 *Cp. Thucyd. 2. 14, § 17 supra, and Appendix IX. § 32, p. 140 supra.*  
7 Plutarch’s *Life of Theseus* contains evidence of the freedom and assurance with which those antiquarians reconstructed the primitive history of the State, and the biography of its supposed Founder. Alas! that the opening of the *Athenian Constitution* is not forthcoming to illustrate their work more fully.  
8 *Theseus 35 Ἀθηναῖοι θεὰ τε παρά- 

στητον ὡς ἡμα τιμὰς Θηρα καὶ τῶν ἐν Μαράθων ὀρᾶν σαλαμίνικα, τῶν ἐν Μαράθων ἐν Θηρα καθ 

οπλῶν πρὸς αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους φαρα 

μενον.*
discover the relics of Theseus and preserve them with due honour.  

The precision with which the Oracle and the Return from Skyros are dated, the one by the archon Phaidon (Ol. 76. 1 = 476-5 B.C.), the other by the archon Apsephon (Ol. 77. 4 = 469-8 B.C.), lends verisimilitude to the whole story, and the dates, if accepted, show that the reaction in favour of the memories of Marathon, and of old Athens, had begun within a decade of the battle of Salamis, a circumstance which would suit sufficiently well with the seventeen years' supremacy of the Areiopagos asserted in the 'Αθηνων πολιτεία, for the period immediately succeeding the Persian wars. If the Thesean legend had been exploited in the interests of the Marathonomachiae as early as the archonship of Apsephon, it may surprise us to find no reference to Theseus in the Herodean account of Marathon. It will not do to say that Theseus is an alternative to Heracles, for the picture in the Pindar introduced both Theseus and Heracles among the divine presences at Marathon. In regard to Herodotus it is well to remember that his account of Marathon was certainly not redacted by him as early as the archonship of Apsephon, nor till a good while later. Or was Theseus too much of an 'Ionian' hero to be acceptable to Herodotus? Still, the connexion of 'Heracles' with Marathon was perhaps more authentic and primitive than the connexion of 'Theseus' (i.e. Heracles-Theseus) with Marathon, and the form of tradition implied by Herodotus may represent both an earlier and a later idea, than the tradition represented in the picture and in Plutarch which added the apperition of Theseus at Marathon, on the word of "a considerable number" of citizens, to the real presence of Heracles.

The ambition of Kimon had for its object not merely to eclipse the exploits of Salamis and of Plataia, but to equal the glorious memories of Marathon, with which his father's name was happily associated. The son could well afford, not merely to emulate, but to appreciate those memories; it was not Kimon who was made uneasy by the Trophies of Miltiades. A fairly well authenticated anecdote, dittoographed by Plutarch in two distinct Lives, associates that honourable 'insomnia' with the name of Themistocles. A second remark in the Life of Themistocles puts the author of the naval predominance of Athens in marked opposition to the hero of Marathon. Plutarch records, and records on the authority of a fifth-century writer, that Miltiades opposed the naval policy of Themistocles. If this statement be true, the opposition must date from before Marathon, and the trophy of Miltiades would have been not so much

1 ὁ. 38 τό Θεσσαλίαν ἀναλαμβάνει ισότα καὶ θεμήλων ἐνιόν παρ’ αὐτῶν φιλότεχνων.
2 Plutarch, l. c. cp. Clinton, Pindar.
3 cp. cit. 23-27 (a highly artificial passage).
4 Cp. 9. 73 ὁ Θεσσαλικός ἐδρα.
5 Θουκ. 8; Themist. 3 ὃν καθεῖσθιν

6 Roux (Plutarchs Themistocles, 1884) notes ad l. observes that this fragment is
a stimulus to the ambition of Themistokles as a bar and a discredit to his policy. This anecdote, however, probably puts the cart before the horse, and would require a better witness than Steсимbrotos to establish a verdict in its favour. But Themistokles at least was free from the illusion of the first moment of victory, and never mistook Marathon for a decisive victory, nor saw it in the end, but only the beginning, of the struggle. Of the active part which, upon every chronological scheme of his life, the future victor of Salamis must be supposed to have taken in the Marathonian campaign the Lives of Themistokles are silent. It is significant of the ethical pre-occupation of Plutarch, and of the curious stratification of our sources, that it is from the Life of Aristides we learn the presence of Themistokles at the battle of Marathon, with his Phyle, the Leontia; but from the character of the passage and the context it is hardly legitimate to conclude that he was in command of the regiment.

The passage of Plutarch last cited suggests a third sketch of the Marathonian campaign to be put into juxtaposition with the stories of Herodotus and of Nepos (Ephoros): it differs, however, from the two others cited in one important respect. By itself it would not furnish an intelligible account of the proceedings, it is allusive in its method, and takes some knowledge for granted. The difference is easily explained. Plutarch is repeating the story neither in the course of a general history—like Herodotus and Ephoros—but as the climax in the victor's career—like Nepos—but simply as an episode in the life of Aristides, an episode in which the characteristic virtues of Aristides were well illustrated. This ethical interest, while it renders the illustrative items open to suspicion, is an additional guarantee for the historical points that have no logical relation to the moral. It is plain that Plutarch's conception of the battle is largely determined by the authority of Herodotus, but that he adds, from one source or another, some important and apparently authentic items to the story. The passage as a whole may be conveniently sub-divided into five parts, as follows: (1) the antecedents of the battle; (2) the battle scene; (3) after the battle; (4) a digression; (5) chronological data. A few words upon each of these divisions are desirable. (1) Datis, despatched by Dareios nominally to punish the Athenians for the burning of Sardes, really to reduce the Hellenes at large, puts into Marathon in full force and lays waste the territory. The occa-

wanting in Müller's F. H. Gr. The anecdote would fit in well enough with the Archontate of Themistokles in 493 B.C., but that does not make it more probable, cp. Appendix IX. note ad finem.

1 Themist. 3 ος μεν γὰρ ἄλλος πέρα ψιστό τού τάξεων τὴν ἐν Μαραθωνί τῶν βαρβάρων ἣττον εἶναι, Θεμιστοκλῆς δὲ ἀρχὴν μετὰ πόλεως ἁγιών. Cp. Thuc. 1. 14. 2; 93, 7; 135, 3.

2 cp. 5 θημιστάτων λαμπρών τεταγμένα παρ' ἄλλοις δ' τε Θεμιστοκλῆς καὶ δ' Ἀρισταίου. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Λεωνίδας ἠν, δ' Ἀρισταίου. The context states expressly that Aristides was Strategos.

3 cp. note to 6. 109.

4 I.e. εἰς Μαραθῶνα κατά τὴν στόλον κατέχει.
sion and causes of war are from Herodotus; the obvious omissions are significant; the assertion that the full forces of the Persians were brought to Marathon is important. It makes against the hypothesis that the cavalry, or a part of the barbarian army, was never brought to Marathon at all: 1 yet it could hardly be quoted as an authoritative decision. The text goes on to relate the measures taken to cope with the invaders. It seems to be suggested, or implied, that ten Strategi had been appointed for the conduct of this particular campaign, 2 of whom two are expressly named, Miltiades and Aristeides, as first and second in dignity and power. 3 The terms used seem purposely vague, for, though the Polemarch is eliminated, Miltiades is not distinctly recognised as officially commander-in-chief, Plutarch following the (Herodotean) tradition that the supreme command circulated among the Strategi day by day. 4 At this point Aristeides becomes the great exemplar, supporting the plan of Miltiades, surrendering his own day's command to him, and persuading his colleagues to do the like. This passage may naturally be viewed with some suspicion, and certainly glides over the problem attaching to that stage in the general traditions 5 without making any contribution towards its solution: but that is no reason for refusing to add the name of Aristeides to the list of Strategi, or doubting his presence on the field.

(2) The brief reference to the actual conflict 6 suffices to fix the places of two of the Phylae, the Leontis and the Antiochis, in the centre, where the Barbarians longest resisted the charge and gave the Athenians most work to do, 7 and adds some details, not wholly void of offence, to the sequelae of the battle: for it is the roughness of wind and waters that carries the flying fleet of the Persians, whether they would not, towards the Attic coast; and it is this sight, suggesting a fear that the retreating foe may be drawn by the deserted aspect of the city to make an attack, which leads nine-tenths of the Athenians to hasten back the same day, leaving one Phyle behind them in possession of the battlefield. 8 (3) That Phyle was the Leontis, and Aristeides was with it, and by implication in command: chosen for the service of guarding the prisoners and the spoils, of which there was no end, obviously because 'his virtues were so rare,' discharging the service so well that only a very few men succeeded in stealing the common property—among whom the most notable was Kallias the

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1 See p. 163 supra.
2 τῶν δὲ καθεστῶν τοῦ Ἀθηναίων ἐπὶ τῶν πόλεων στρατηγῶν.
3 μεγίστου μὲν εἶχεν ἄξιωσα Μιλτιάδης, δέξῃ δὲ καὶ δυνάμεις δεύτερας ἡν Ἀριστείδης.
4 τὰς ἄμαρτον ἐκάστου στρατηγῶν τὸ κράτος ἐχάστην. Ω. c. 6. 110.
5 cp. § 6 supra.
6 ἐν δὲ τῷ μάχῃ κυλ.
7 ἀμβλύτας τῶν Ἀθηναίων τοῦ μέσου πωράσατο καὶ πλέωσαν ἐναιδία χρόνον τῶν βασιλέων ἀπερειπώσατο κατὰ τὴν Ἀθηναία καὶ τὴν Ἀριστείδη θελή.
8 τὰς μὲν ἐνεκα φολαὶς ἔμενεν ὡσεῦντο πρὸ τὸ δατυ καὶ κατήβισαν ἀθρόμοροι. Ω. c. 6. 25 supra.
Daiduchos. (4) Hence the anecdote to explain his nickname of Lakopoulos, a digression that undoubtedly carries us right back to the heart of the fifth century B.C., and sets us face to face with the Comedians and other scandal-mongers of the time. 1 (5) To the other items of value in the Marathonian legend, Plutarch here adds an express date for the year, giving the Archon’s name, Phainippos, from the Anagrapheis, compilations perhaps belonging to a date at least a century after the battle, but still credible as based upon authentic evidences and tradition. 2 It is in another Life, and another connexion, and in a manner purely fortuitous that Plutarch records an express day for the battle, the sixth of Boedromion, 3 a precise indication repeated in a passage shortly to be noticed. We have thus to wait until the age of Hadrian, for an express notification of the actual day.

In the Collection of parallel cases from Greek and Roman history 4 Plutarch has epitomised the story of Marathon, but with a particular purpose and case in view. This paragraph describes Datis as a satrap of the Persians, 5 gives the number of his forces as 300,000, 6 brings him direct to Marathon, 7 builds him, or at least pitches him, a camp there, and lets him make proclamation to the inhabitants. 8 The Athenians on their side think scorn of the multitude of barbarians, 9 despatch 9000 men to face them, 10 after making Kynaigeiros, Polyzelos, Kallimachos, Miltiades general. 11 A regular pitched battle ensued, 12 in the course of which Polyzelos beheld a vision superhuman, 13 lost his eyesight and became blind. 14 Kallimachos was so completelytrusted with spears that although dead his body did not fall to the ground, 15 while Kynaigeiros, who laid hold of a Persian ship, as it was putting off, had his hand severed from his arm. 16

The parallel case from Roman history, the loss of both hands by Lucius Glaucus in a similar situation, shows that the paragraph is written for the sake of its tail-piece. This observation reduces the antecedent statements to the rank of obiter dicta. This rank would not, however, in itself diminish their value for historical purposes: rather, perhaps, the reverse, if in themselves, or in comparison with the other authorities, they deserved high credit. But that is hardly

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1 Hdt. 6, 121 was written to controvert this scandal. Cp. note ad l.
2 Cp. Appendix IX. note ad finem. The word passed along the Athenian lines at Plataea, Aristotel. 18 ἐν οἷς δέ λαβέται λαβόντοι οὖν ψύχες ἄμεσον οἱ πολέμες τῶν ἐν Μαραθῶν προΐσαντι κτλ., would, if authentic, be remarkable Cp. note 2, p. 212 super.
3 Kamilos 19.
4 Moralia 305 (Didot, I. 375).
5 L.c. Δάτις ὁ Περσῶν στράτηγος.
6 ἀριθμὸς μετὰ μαράδων.
7 εἰς Μαραθῶνα παραγεγέρσετο, πεδίον τῇ Ἀκτήῃ.
8 καὶ στρατηγευομένων, πόλεα τοῖς ἐγχώμασι κατάγγελε.
9 Ἀθηναίοι δὲ τού βαρβαροῦ ἔλθος καταφρονήσαντες.
10 ἔνακτον εἰσίν θεμαρατούμενον. 11 στρατηγοὶ κοινωνεῖτο Κυναίγερος, Πολώνιος, Καλλίμαχος, Μιλιάδας.
12 συμβλέψαντες τῇ τῆς παρατάξεως.
13 Πολώνιος μὲν ὑπὲρ ἀθώους φαστασίας θεωροῦμεν.
14 τὴν ὁραίαν ἄρβαλην καὶ τυφλὸ τῇ ἀγώνα τῶν καταστάσεων ἐπιρροκονίστην.
the case. The description of Datis is not happy;¹ the figure for the forces, though not the maximum in rhetoric, is suspiciously high;² the proclamation of war is rather belated, though not devoid of a base in tradition;³ the temper of the Athenians is described in terms borrowed from the mere rhetoricians;⁴ the number of the Athenian force is, however, identical with that given by Nepos.⁵ The statement in regard to the commanders bears out the hypothesis that according to one tradition commanders were specially appointed for the war, but the inclusion of Kynaigeiros and Polyzelos among the Strategi is a doubtful gain. It is an obvious criticism to say that Kynaigeiros has been converted into a Strategos in the course of time owing to his prominence and persistence in the records: it is not less obvious that Plutarch here may be charged with transferring to one Polyzelos a vision which Herodotus has assigned to Epizelos, son of Kuphagoras, or endorsing the transfer: this transaction looking rather like a transformation of Epizelos into Polyzelos, and a promotion of the visionary to the rank of Strategos!⁶ The inclusion of Kallimachos among the Strategi may be due to a lapse of memory or to a lack of precision; in either case it damages the authority of the paragraph, which is certainly not restored by the grotesquely grim account of the standing corpse.⁷ Miltiades crowns the scala ascensoria of Strategi as commander-in-chief.—A passage in the Convivial Questions⁸ adds something to our knowledge of the Marathonian legend, if not to our knowledge of the battle itself. The following points emerge in the symposiac discussion of the title of the Aiuntis to fame and privilege: (1) Marathon was a Deme of that Phyle; a fact so notorious to Philopappos and his friends needed no authority or confirmation. (2) The Aiuntis occupied the right wing on the day of battle. For this statement the authority of Aischylos is quoted, and the authority is binding.⁹ (3) Kallimachos the Polemarch belonged to this Phyle. The further statement that the Polemarch was, next to Miltiades, the cause and author of the battle;¹⁰ conflicts superficially with the representation of what is due to Aristeides, just quoted from his Life;¹¹ but the discrepancy is more apparent than real. The speaker in the present case is one Glaukias a rhetor, and the apparent inconsistency might be explained by the dramatic conditions of the piece. But it may be taken as more probable that the author in this case holds the same view as his speaker, according, as it does, with the Herodotean story.

¹ Datis was a Mede, and was not a satrap: nor were the Persians governed by satraps until much later. (Cp. Arrian, Anab. 3. 17, 1. 18, 2.)
² Cp. §§ 19, 22, 25 supra.
³ Cp. § 26 supra. ⁴ Cp. § 21 supra.
⁵ § 26 supra. ⁶ Hdt. 6. 117.
⁷ It cannot be said that the item contradicts Herodotus 6. 114 ἐν τοὔῳ θῷ πῶς ὁ τολεμάρχου διαφθείρεται, ἀνὴρ γενόμενος ἄγαθος.
⁸ Mor. 628 f. (Quoted. Comm. 1. 3 Quare Athenis chorus Aemontis tribus munquam ultimo loco ponatur).
⁹ Cp. § 14 supra.
¹⁰ τῆς μάχης μετὰ τὴν Μυληταίου ἀττικῶν κατέκτη τὴν συνήθειαν ἐκείνη γενόμενον.
¹¹ p. 216 supra.
In the Life of Aristeides Plutarch has omitted Kallimachos, and placed Aristeides second only in importance to Miltiades, obviously in the interests of the argument, and innocently enough. (4) The author himself adds to the statement of Glaukias a further point: it was in the prytany of the Aiantis that the psephism was passed which authorised the march out.\(^1\) With the substance and authorship of this psephism we are already acquainted, thanks to the Orators;\(^2\) the detail now added lends little weight to its historic claims. But if this passage stood alone, it ought to be sufficient to convince any scholar, with a proper knowledge of Athenian institutions and a proper sense of Athenian procedure, that the army did not march out to Marathon without a psephism. Nor is it too much to say that, even if the record of this psephism were nothing but the intelligent inference of a late authority, still the enactment of such a psephism should not be gainsaid. The items added by orator or by author, that Miltiades proposed the psephism, in the prytany of the Aiantis, may be thought to make the existence of official or historical evidence in favour of the psephism all the stronger: but a very sceptic might perhaps see in these additional items only more exquisite and ingenious combinations by a pragmatizing historian, long after the event. In any case it may be granted more probable that such a psephism was passed than that Miltiades was the mover, more probable that Miltiades was the mover than that the Aiantis was in office: though having regard to the position of the Aiantis in the line of battle, Plutarch may have had some excuse for the addition he made to the remarks of Glaukias, even if that addition was based, not on positive evidence, but on historic speculations.\(^3\)

It would be strange if the \textit{de gloria Atheniensium}\(^4\) contained no reference to the deed of Marathon. The object of the essay is to exalt the masters of action at the expense of the masters of arts, the soldier at the expense of the politician. The author is somewhat scornful of Demosthenes, of Isokrates, and their appeals to the \textit{Marathonomachae}.\(^5\) With the names of Kynaigeiros and Kallimachos this tract also couples the name of Polyzelos,\(^6\) but the chief fame of the slaughter of the Medes on the day of deliverance rests upon Miltiades.\(^7\) Moreover, this tract also proves that, in the writer's

\(^1\) έγώ δὲ τῷ Γλαυκίῳ προστάτην ὅτι καὶ τὸ ψέφωσαν, καὶ θ' τὸν Ἀθηναίους ἐξήγαγεν, τῆς Αιαντίδος φολίδα προτάσσοντος γραφεῖν. As subject of ἐξήγαγε must be supplied ὁ Μιλτιάδης, yet the avoidance of an express name or title in what is, strictly speaking, an independent sentence, may perhaps proceed from a misgiving, or glimmer of the better tradition of the Ἀθηναίων τοιοῦτον, with which, of course, Plutarch was acquainted.

\(^2\) Cp. p. 195 συμφα.

\(^3\) But cp. note 6. 111, 5.

\(^4\) \textit{Moral.} 345 (Didot, vol. i. p. 422).

\(^5\) op. cit. \(8\). Whether the reference in c. 2 to the painter Pleistainetes (sic) brother of Phidias, is based on a belief that he was the artist of the Marathonomachy in the Poikile is not clear.

\(^6\) c. 3; cp. \textit{Moralia} 305.

\(^7\) op. cit. \(7\) Μαραθῶν τὴν Μιλτιάδου νίκην προτέμενοι. Cp. Μιλτιάδης ὁ μητα-φῶνος ib. and Μιλτιάδης ἀκερθρώσεν c. 5.
own day, Athens still celebrated the victory of Marathon upon the sixth day of the month Boedromion (inferentially the anniversary) and makes the important statement that Miltiades gained the victory and returned to the city on the day next after leaving the city, on the very day of battle. His triumphal return had been preceded by the news of the victory, carried full speed by an hoplite warm from the fray, who expired with the good news on his lips. Authorities differed as to the name of that evangelist: Herakleides Ponticus gave it as Thersippus, the majority preferred Euclides: in either case a name of good omen.

Whether Plutarch or some other wrote the tract περὶ τῆς Ἡροδότου κακοφθέας (de malignitate Herodoti) matters very little for the immediate purpose of this discussion. Its authenticity bears very directly upon the judgment to be formed of Plutarch as a writer and critic, but very slightly, if at all, upon the value of the tract as illustrating the genesis and growth of the Marathonian legend. If it be granted that the tract, whether a pseudopigraphon or not, might, as far as evidence and probability go, have been from Plutarch’s pen, the text remains an authentic source of information in regard to the state and contents of the Herodotean text at or about the end of the first century of our era, and affords evidence of the current criticism upon it, and of the materials existing, apart from the work of Herodotus, for the reconstruction of the Greek histories related by him. The author comes, in the course of his impeachment of Herodotus, to the instances of ‘malignity’ furnished in the sixth Book, and deals at some length with the account of the battle of Marathon. The criticism incidentally suggests, or confirms, two or three points of tradition external to Herodotus: and even where obviously unjust or even absurd is not devoid of value. There are four points in which the author directly censures the story as told by Herodotus: (1) the conduct ascribed to the Spartans; (2) the number of the slain; (3) the magnitude or importance of the battle; (4) the episode of the shield.

(1) The conduct ascribed to the Spartans. Herodotus represents the Spartans as refusing to march to the assistance of the Athenians before the full moon. This answer is dated the ninth day of the month. Now the battle was fought upon the sixth day of the month, to wit, Boedromion. The statement of Herodotus is therefore false, and moreover absurd, for the following reasons: (1) The

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2 op. cit. 8 Μιλτιάδης μὲν γὰρ ἔρασε ἐν Μαραθώνῃ τῇ ἐστρατείᾳ τὴν μάχην συναντακεν αὐτοὶ διὸς ἐν τῷ ἐν τῷ ἐστρατείᾳ νεκροὶ.
3 op. cit. 3 τὴν τοιούτον ἐν Μαραθῶι μάχην ἰσόγγαγες ὑπὸ μὲν Ἡρακλείδης ὁ Ποιωνίτης ἵστηκε Θερσίππος ὁ Εὐκλείδης. οἱ δὲ πλεῖστοι λέγουσι Εὐκλείδης, δραμάτῳ σὺν τοῖς δεκαίοις θερσίποι ἀντὶ τῆς μάχης καὶ τοῦ ἡρακλείδης ἐπετέλεσα τῶν πρῶτυς, τοσοῦτω μονοῖς εἰς τινὰς Χαλκεῖς καὶ χαλκοῦς εἰς τὸν ἔδαφος ἐκτίθενται. The brave man carried his shield and spear, we may suppose, lest his running should be misunderstood from afar off. Browning transfers the incident to 'Phedippides,' and lets him before starting fling down his shield! See Dramatic Idyls, Works, xv. 25 (1889).
4 Μοῦλλα 855 ff. (Didot, ii. 1941).
Spartans had no such law against marching in the first week (third) of the month, as their actions repeatedly show. (ii) According to Herodotus the Spartans after all nearly arrived in time for the battle: but how was that possible if their refusal to march before the full moon was given three days after the battle? Only by bedevilling the calendar, turning the world topsy-turvy, and moving the full moon from the middle to the beginning of the month.

This criticism obviously defines the month, and the day of the month, whereon the battle was fought, much more precisely than Herodotus had done, in whose record it does not appear in what month the battle was fought, nor on what day of the month, but only that it was fought about a full moon, it might be the very day of the full moon. The solution of the difficulty, the defence of Herodotus, are not to be sought in any supposition of a gross disturbance of the calendar of Athens at the time, which would make the sixth day of an Attic month coincide with the full moon. It was barely a hundred years, at most, since the Solonian reform, and the aberration, which Meton subsequently corrected by his tamekaidekasteris, was not so gross. The Lactic month was obviously, or ex hypothesis, correct; for the Spartans gave their answer on the ninth, and waited to start until the fourteenth. A simple and convincing solution lies in the hypothesis that the sixth day of Boedromion was the day not on which the battle was fought, but upon which the victory was celebrated. Such a day would necessarily come after an interval. This captivating hypothesis\(^2\) throws the date of the battle back to the full moon of Metageitinion, the second month of the Attic year, to which might be corresponding the Spartan Karneios. The remark of the Antonine critic that the Spartans marched freely in the first week, might hold good of every other month, and yet be invalid for the great Karneian month. If it was under the September full moon of the year 490 B.C. that the battle of Marathon was fought, the censure of the critic recoils upon his own pate.

(2) The number of the slain Herodotus had stated as about 6400 on the side of the barbarians, 192 Athenians. This critic tells an anecdote, on the authority of the majority of authors, to prove that the number of barbarians slain was innumerable. The anecdote itself\(^2\) is probably a fiction invented to explain a sacrificial celebration; in any case the precise and relatively modest estimates of Herodotus are more acceptable than the vague superlatives of the later majority. The figure for the barbarians was presumably based on a rough

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1 cp. εἰς 25, 3 άν δέ μεταφέρει τήν παρεκλήσει πάντας μόνον αὐτούς δικερμιπην καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ὅμοιο καὶ τὸν ἀνάφατον ἄμα καὶ τὰ ἱμάτια καὶ τὰ μέδα τρύγαμα συνάρθηκε καὶ τῶν τᾶς τῆς Ελλάδος ἐπαγγελμάτων γράφετε.


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\(^2\) Cp. pp. 229 l. infra.
computation, dating perhaps from the disposal of the bodies. The figure for the Athenians was probably derived from the inscribed Sileae on the tomb: 192 being the number of names recorded. One censure might have been passed on Herodotus, that he has omitted the Plataian and servile dead (recorded by Pansias) and so diminished in appearance the losses on the Greek side: but this criticism his censor omits.

(3) The third exception taken to the narrative of Herodotus is, if possible, still more to his credit: he has not, the sophist complains, painted the victory in sufficiently glowing terms, has not presented the discomfiture of the Barbarians upon a sufficiently gross scale, has reduced the achievement to inadequate proportions, and converted a glorious rout in the grand style into a slight skirmish with the Barbarians after their landing, thus playing into the hands of those who belittle and degrade such events in their histories. The faults of the story in Herodotus do not lie where this critic places them. The note of exaggeration is, indeed, already visible in the pages of Herodotus, but it has not reached the colossal and absurd dimensions exhibited in the rhetorical flights of the fourth century. By comparison with what came after his report seems temperate, and to this critic even malignantly modest. The criticism is valuable chiefly as evidence that the Attic glorification of the Marathonomachae was heavily discounted from time to time by candid friends or by critical rivals, from the days of Thucydides to those of Theopompos, from Theopompos to Plutarch.

(4) This adversus diaboli reproaches Herodotus for his account of the shield-episode, and the apology for the Alkmionidae connected therewith. The critique exhibits an odd mixture of shrewdness and shallowness, characteristic perhaps of such special pleading, where points are made without reference to their mutual bearings: (i) ‘If Herodotus disbelieved the report against the Alkmionidae, why does he put it on record?’—The question shows a fault on the critic’s side in regard to the function of history, the ordinary practice of Herodotus, and even the immediate circumstances or interests which might have influenced Herodotus at the time of writing. (ii) ‘The defence of the Alkmionidae is purposely hollow, for Herodotus in the first Book shows that the family had been in collusion with the tyrants before.’ This is a perfectly valid criticism up to a certain point; proving

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1 cp. cit. 27. 3 ἀναστέρασαι δὲ τῇ νίκῃ τὸ μέγαθεν καὶ τὸ τέλος εἰς οὐδὲν ἤσθε περιβολήν καταρθώματος, οἷόν ἄγων τις ἐκείνοι οὐδ’ ἔργον γεγονέται τοιοῦτων ἀλλὰ προσηκούμενα βραχύ τοῖς βαρβάροις ἀνθρώποις, ὡσπέρ αἱ διαφωται καὶ βοηθοῦσαι λέγομεν, εἰ μετὰ τὴν μέγχρι οἷς φεύγομεν κόψωμε τὰ πείραμα τῶν νεών, τῷ φεύροι προσωτάτῳ τῷ Αττικῆς ἀνήμων παραστάται αὐτῶις. The Latin version in Dübner (ed. Fırmin-Didas, Moralia, vol. 2, p. 1051) renders the words προσ-κόπωμα βραχύ τοῖς βαρβάροις ἀνθρώποις “barbaris abenteius levus quaedam offensio”: a mistranslation which might suit very well with some of the modern hypothetical reconstructions of the campaign, e.g. G. Busolt, Die Lokalkaiser, i. 363 (1878), but which Ducker justly describes in the words: “Kühner als richtig” (Gesch. d. Alt. vii. 159 n.).

2 Cp. note, p. 203 supra.
not the malignity of Herodotus, but only his inconsequence. (iii) 'The introduction of Kallias into the context is beside the point, but Hipponikos son of Kallias was rich: therefore Herodotus was servile.' It is certainly interesting to observe that Herodotus has not recorded the Marathonian anecdote of Kallias Lakkoplatos side by side with the story which accounted for the origin of the wealth of the Alkmaionidae: this point the sophist omits.

The remarks on the shield-episode proper are not less acute. The critic points out two reasons for disbelieving the story that a shield was displayed as narrated by Herodotus: (iv) The Athenians were already victorious, and no one would then have been giving such a signal. (v) Even if such a signal had been given, the routed and flying barbarians would not have seen it. But it might be replied: Herodotus does not say that the barbarians saw the signal. Again, a better theory of the battle might find room and significance for the signal, even if raised, when the barbarians were already in their ships. Further, for all Herodotus says, the shield signal may have been belated. Finally, Herodotus might be right as to the substantial fact, that a signal shield was raised, even if he had incorrectly dated the moment at which the signal was given. So much, instead of more, in reply to this criticism.

It may be thought that there is very little to be got out of the passage thus reviewed; but independently of the evidence it affords in regard to the state of the text,1 in regard to the maintenance of the tradition or theory that the magnitude and significance of the battle had been grossly exaggerated,2 and in regard to the precise date of the event,3 this late authority adds a new point in the notice of the Pomp and eucharistic festival to Hekate Agrotera, our Lady of Agra, still celebrated in honour of the victory of Marathon in the writer's own day,4 at which apparently five hundred kids were offered, that is, slain and eaten,5 in honour of the Moon-godhead:

Queen and Huntress, chaste and fair.

This passage goes far to explain the association between the sixth of Boedromion and the battle of Marathon, which has been already established in other passages cited above.6 In Plutarch's time there was undoubtedly a festival on that day held at Agra, beyond the

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1 Cf. the division into Books; the passage on the Alkmaionids and on Kallias; the verbal quotations; the reading Filisthe.
2 οτετρά διαστόροις καὶ βαισκάοντες λύροιν.
4 op. cit. 26, 4 ἐπιστολακαὶ δὲ περὶ τῶν Ἀθραίς διαφέροντων ὡδὴ τῆς προς Ἅγρας παμπὴν ἱστόρησιν, ἢ πεῖνασιν ἐν τῇ Ἐσάγχ χαρατήρια τῆς κίης ἐφορτάσοντες.
5 op. cit. 26, 7 εἰσαμάντων γὰρ, φασὶ, τῶν Ἀθραίων τῇ Ἀγροτήρᾳ θύσει χιμάρους δοσιν ἀν τῶν βαρβάρων καταβάλασιν, ἐπὶ μετὰ τὴν μάχην ἄναρήσιον πλῆθος τῶν νεκρῶν ἀπαραίτητα, νυμφηυσοδομάς τὴν θεῖα, δοσιν καὶ ἱκαναὶ ἐναντίων ἀποθέωσι πετακοῦν τῶν χιμάρων.
Ilissos, and the festival may be traced back through the ages to the time of Aristophanes. Two points in connexion with the festival may be regarded as certain. In the first place, there was an ancient festival to Artemis (and Apollo) on the sixth of Boedromion. In the second place at some later time the festival was enlarged and brought into special relation to the battle of Marathon, and the figure of the goddess eclipsed more or less completely the presence of her brother the sun-god in the festival of the sixth. The reference in Aristophanes virtually guarantees the existence of the sacrifice in the fifth century. The passage here under review and the scholiast on Aristophanes explain the connexion of the festival with Marathon; but the version of the anecdote here is superior to that of the scholiast in two particulars. The scholiion assumes that Kallimachos survived the battle, and does not indicate that the sacrifice was annual. This passage by substituting Miltiades for the polemarch, and establishing the perpetuity of the vow, may seem to deserve a preference. But whether or not there was any vow antecedent to the battle and victory is obviously doubtful in itself, and rendered additionally doubtful by the variants in the tradition. The mention of the psephism here is, however, an additional reason for believing that the solemnity was of public institution, and there is nothing improbable in assigning it to the actual year of the battle. Miltiades was already the chief surviving hero of the day, and it is more than possible that he was specially concerned in the institution of the pomp, may even have been the author of this psephism too, within a month of the battle, to honour Artemis, the Moon-goddess, on this the first occasion that offered. At worst, the Thank-offering might be traced to the Kinonian revival, to which other restorations in the Legend of Marathon have already been assigned: any way the festival on the traditional scale, and probably with the traditional features, was a well-established institution in 424 B.C. Hence the special point in the Knights, when the Sausage-seller offers a feast on twice the scale of the Marathonian Charisteria! It may well be, assuming the substantial identity of the ritual in the fifth century with its character as described or proved for a later date, that the festival was a source and seal of tradition; and its maintenance may help to explain the vitality and warmth of the Marathonian story. And thus A. Mommsen has argued that Herodotus witnessed the
Marathonian Commemoration, and in particular heard, or inferred, that the Boedromis, the warlike pomp of the procession, was to commemorate the δρόμος ἐς πολεμίων which he specifies as the chief feature of the fight.\(^1\) Whether Herodotus was present at such a festival or not, an inference from the ritual of the celebration, from its name and technical terminology, may have reached him;\(^2\) but to admit so much is not to deny any better foundation for the recorded charge of the hoplites at Marathon. (Cp. § 4 supra.) The sacrifice was conducted by the Polemarch,\(^3\) a fact which might account for the substitution of Kallimachos for Miltiades in the historic explanation cited above from the scholiast.

Other slighter and merely incidental references in the works ascribed to Plutarch need not be discussed, as adding nothing to the matter. It is plain that Plutarch, if so minded, could have given a very full account of Marathon, from the materials and authorities at his disposal. How far he would have preferred Herodotus to Ephors, how far he would have succeeded in reconciling Herodotus with the other sources is not equally clear. The two more extended accounts which Plutarch gives at different times, in the Life of Aristides and in the Parallels of Greek and Roman History, attain several consistency, but obviously by the wholesale sacrifice of details in his sources. Elsewhere, generally, Miltiades is the hero of the battle, though Plutarch does not exactly or explicitly make him commander-in-chief, perhaps governed by the authority of the Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία. Thanks to Plutarch of Chaeroneia some valuable anecdotes, names, particulars, have filtered through to us; and even if most of these items would be here without Plutarch's intervention, their occurrence in his writings serves to fix them in tradition, to show their prevalence, and thus to give us additional confidence in using them for our critique or reconstruction.

§ 28. Pausanias.\(^4\) The interesting chapter in which Pausanias comes to speak of Marathon,\(^5\) contains in a remarkable degree those good elements which students of Pausanias expect of him at his best: elements of topographical autopsy, elements of monumental or material significance, elements of local tradition and of genuine folklore. In regard to general tradition, it does not fall within the province of Pausanias to recount the story of the war, but with Pausanias the authority of Herodotus counted high, and the father of archaeology will probably have relied for the story of Marathon

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\(^1\) A. Mommsen, op. cit. p. 211.
\(^2\) Βοιδρομα πέρας, Dempoth. 3. 31. Κρ. εἰς εἰς εἰς εἰς, τε Αρείματα τε ἀγροτές καὶ ἀνθρώπους ἀκριβεία κατά τό ὕψος ἐπιστ. 4097. Κρ. 4098, 4104 (all quoted by A. Mommsen, op. cit. pp. 214 f.).
\(^3\) Pollux. Ὀμνοετά. 7. 91 ἐ τοῦ κόσμου δέκα μέτα μετὰ Ἀρείματα ἀγροτές κτλ.
\(^4\) The passage in Strabo 399 hardly requires discussion; it runs: Μάραθον ἐκείνος Μιλτιάδης τάν μετα δίκαια τού Περσῶν τεκμέρισε οὗ τούτων διήθειεν οὐκ εἰρημένας ἐνέπλην τοῦς τοῦ ταυτολογίων. Datis is made into a Persian, Miltiades is commander, the defeat is a crushing one.
\(^5\) 1. 32, 3-5, 7.
on the father of history rather than on the rhetoricians of the fourth century. Anyway, there is nothing in the brief summary of the story given by Pausanias, nor even in the details by him subsequently added in connexion with local facts, to conflict with the Herodotean version. Characteristic additions from the local sources are caught in the neighings of horses and the clashing of arms that were to be heard any night on the battle-field; in the cult of the dead, worshipped as heroes; in the story of the apparition of Echetlos, or Echetlaios, working havoc on the barbarians in the battle with his plough-share, and in the parts presumably assigned in local memory to Herakles and to Marathon, the enochial eponym. Pausanias went in person to Marathon, if he ever went anywhere, and his indications in regard to the local topography, and antiquities, are of supreme interest for the reconstruction of the story, and the critique of its origins. The periplus noted at Marathon the lake, more a marsh than a lake, into which the barbarians were driven, a misadventure which was locally held to explain the great slaughter; and a river from which the Persians might have obtained water, not to speak of the fountain Makaria. Pausanias doubtless saw the stone-troughs above the lake, which were regarded as the mangers from which the horses of Artaphernes had been fed; and the marks in the rock, which were explained as traces of his pavilion. Pausanias even went up Pan’s mountain, a little way off the plain, and creeping through the narrow entrance into the cave saw Pan’s flock of quaint, goat-like stones, which were certainly far older than the battle. More significant still for the present purpose, Pausanias noted carefully the four monuments extant at Marathon in his time: (1) The tomb of the Athenians, with the (ten) Stelas upon it, one for each Phyle, containing the names of the dead. Whether the epitaph was legible or not he does not say. (2) A second tomb, in which the Peltaian dead had been interred, and with them the slaves who fell in the battle: for slaves fought that day for freedom. Whether Pausanias learnt these details from inscriptions, still legible in his time, or from his guide, he does not say. (3) A monument of

1 Ι. τὰς τούτης ἔστη Ἀττικῆς ἰσχυός αἱ βαρβαροὶ καὶ μάχα τε ἐκφαντάσθησαν καὶ πυρὰς, ὡς καταγείροντο, ἀνάλεισαν τῶν νεών.
2 In the previous description of the battle, to be presently discussed, Pausanias may be thought to indicate the true position of the Polesarch, as commander-in-chief, and of Miltiades as merely one, though the most prominent, of the ten Strategoi.
3 As may be inferred from the pictorial evidence (p. 228 infra), which, however, did not apparently represent them as actually fighting.
4 § 7 ἣν τὰ πολλὰ ἐλάχιστος ἐν τούτῃ ἀπειραὶ τῶν ὀδῶν φανέρωσε ἑκάστουσιν οἱ βαρβαροὶ καὶ σφαιρὰς τῶν φώνων τῶν παιδῶν ἐπὶ τούτῳ συμβόλωσε λέγοντες. Pausanias no doubt meant the larger marsh.
5 § 6. Pausanias himself hardly suggests the inference.
6 § 7 ἑκὼ δὲ τῆς λίμνης φώτων ἐκεῖ ἐνδόθι τῶν ἑκατοντάρχων καὶ σημεῖα ἐν πέτραις σκηνῆς.
7 § 7 αὐτὸν.
8 § 3 τῶν δὲ ἐν τῷ τείχῳ Ἀθηναίων ἀντίθεν, ἐντὸς δὲ αὐτῶν στέκεται τὰ συνόμωμα τῶν ἀκουστών καθ’ ὀλίγας ἑκάστῳ ἐκάστων ἐχουσαι.
9 Ῥω. ἦτορος Πλαταίεως Βασιλέως καὶ βουλεύτης ἐκαθέναι τῷ γὰρ καὶ δοῦλοι τὸν πρώτον.
Miltiades, son of Kimon, erected there, though Pausanias knew (from Herodotus) that Miltiades had survived Marathon to be condemned for Paros. (4) A trophy of white marble, which he does not describe in detail. Pausanias puts it on record that there was no mound or monument to commemorate the burial place of the Medes, although the Athenians asserted that the Medes were duly buried: he infers that they were indiscriminately flung into some large trench. That the Medes were buried at all is plainly an inference, though a probable one. The disappearance of any sign of the burial place might be due to its destruction or visitation by the Persians ten years later. Whatever mounds or monuments may have been erected at Marathon immediately after the battle, the μνήμη Μιλτιάδου, the τρόπαιον λίθου λευκοῦ can hardly have been among them: and the στήλαι upon the Athenian tumulus would surely have been at least renewed, perhaps more than once, before the visit of Pausanias. Another work of art in the neighbourhood, described by Pausanias, illustrates clearly the date and the motives of the erection of such monuments of the victory. At Rhamnos, sixty stades from Marathon, was a shrine of Nemesis, a deity whose worship had visited the barbarians that landed at Marathon. For in the temple was a statue of the goddess, wrought by Phidias from a block of Parian marble, which the barbarians had brought with them for the making of a trophy, counting as they did too confidently on success. The traditions of Marathon were attached to the monuments of a later generation, and the generation which set up the monuments read its own ideas into the traditions, and moulded tradition in the light of experience. From the statue of Nemesis at Rhamnos virtue passed into the pages of Herodotus: from plastic and pictorial imaginings the story all along was more and more developed.

The greatest of these was the picture of the battle of Marathon, in the Poikile Sloa, first mentioned in our sources by Aischines (p. 191 supra), and no doubt seen by Pausanias before his visits to the scene of the battle. He describes the fresco apparently from left to

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1 § 4 ἀνδρῶν ἔστιν ἡ πέρα μνήμη Μιλτιάδου τοῦ Κιμωνοῦ, συμβάσας βοηθόν ὁ τῇ τελευτῇ Πάρου τῷ ἀκολούθει καὶ δὲ αὐτὸ ἐν θάνατι Ἀθηναίων καταστάτη.  
2 § 5 τεκτόνημα δὲ καὶ τρόπαιον λίθου λευκοῦ.  
3 ὅποι αὐτός ἡ Μάχη τῆς Ἀθηναίων μὲν θάφος λέγουσι τῷ πάλαι δεθεινόν νεκρῶν γὰρ κρῆσαι, τάφος δὲ οὐδέκα εἰρεῖν θυσίας—οὔτε γὰρ χώμα οὔτε ἄλλο σημεῖον ἢ δεῖν, ἢ δραματεία δὲ φοροῦσε σφαῖρα ὡς τόχους ἐσβάλασ.  
5 Pausan. 1. 33, 2. 3 μυχῶν δὲ αὑτὸ διαλέγασθαι διὰ Νεμέων ἐστὶν λεοντ. ἢ δεῖ τινα μάλιστα θρόφοτος ὑδρατέος ἐστίν ἀπαίτητος. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τοιοῦ ἄπυθαβίως ἐν Μαραθῶν τῶν βαρβάρων ἀπαίτητα μαρμάριν ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦτον καταφύγεισθαι γὰρ σφαῖρας ἐπικοινωνίας-οῦ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἔλθων τῆς ἐξ άλλων αὐτοῦ ἐξέπερασεν ἂν οὐδέκα μὲν ἑαυτῷ Νεμέων κατ᾽ τόν. The action of Afterthought is pretty clear in this case. The notion that the Persians brought from Paros a block of marble to make a trophy is, perhaps, a fiction; but there was a statue of Nemesis at Rhamnos, the work of Phidias, in Parian stone. Cp. Wordsworth's sonnet on The column intended by Buonaparte for a triumphal edifice in Milan, etc.  
6 On the question whether the paintings were in fresco or on wood, cp. Harrison.
right. It represented three different moments, or situations, in the engagement: (1) The Plataians and the Attic forces advancing to attack the Barbarians: the fortune of the day still in suspense. (2) In the centre of the picture the Barbarians in flight, and pressing each other into the marsh. (3) On the extreme right the ships of Phoenicia, and the Hellenes slaying the Barbarians who were trying to embark. Certain prominent figures were named or identified in the picture. Kallimachos the elected Polemarch was plain enough, and of the Strategi Miltiades, and the hero Echetlos taking part in the fray: while other divine persons were portrayed as present—Marathon the eponymous hero of the plain. Theseus represented as coming up out of the ground, Athena, Heracles. The elder Pliny describes the picture, apparently from hearsay, and enumerates among the portraits in the picture, which he ascribes to Panaenus the brother of Phidias, Miltiades, Callimachus, Cynaeogirus, Datis, and Artaphernes. Aelian records another item in the picture: a dog had taken part in the battle, and had been immortalised by the brush of Mikon, in company with Kyngeiros (kyngeirous), Epizeles, Kallimachos, and their company. Sopater even implies that Mikon was punished for representing the Barbarians of taller stature than the Hellenes. It may be observed that neither Pausanias in this place, nor any earlier Greek writer, names the artist or artists who painted the picture of Marathon; but the literary evidences carry back this picture to the date of Aischines and Demosthenes, while Aristophanes guarantees as the work of Mikon at least the picture of the Amazons, which Pausanias describes as the second of the four great pictures in the Poikile. It has therefore been usual to follow Pliny, Pausanias, and the later writers without hesitation and to carry back the date of the picture of Marathon also to the time of Mikon, Panainos, Polygnatos, whatever their respective parts in the decoration of the Porch may have been, or whatever restorations the painting may have undergone in the course

and Vernall, Mythology and Monuments, pp. 139 f.

1 1. 15. 3.

2 Pausan. 1. 21. 3 mentions an Eikon of Aischylus in such a way as to suggest that there was a likeness of the dramatist (as well as of his brother! cp. p. 230 infra) in the picture of Marathon. If so, the likeness in the Poikile differed from the Eikon in the Theatre. The text is unfortunately not quite certain: it now runs: τιν το δι άκιν ς την Αοχελου πολισ τι τιν το τελειος δοκι λογτημα
την γραφης την την ιρινην έλα ς την Μαραθών. The reading spreads the painting from first to last over a considerable time, and has an important bearing on the question of the authorship and date of the picture.

Op. p. 229 infra. But the words τοι . . . Μαραθών are suspicious. The cond. give τοι λα τι τ το αριστερον τη ν τελειοταν δε οι λογιν
την γραφης την την ιρινην έλα ς την Μαραθών. If τα was corrupted into το the kai was obviously inserted to correspond to the το.


3 Aelian, Nat. anim. 7. 38; Overbeck, op. c. 1083.

5 Overbeck, op. c. 1064.

6 Elsewhere, indeed, he ascribes it to Panainos, 5. 11, 6; Overbeck, op. c. 1095. Op. note 4, p. 229 infra.

7 Lysist. 678 τάς δ' Ἀμαζόνας σκότην, άν Μίκων άγγει ερ παρινα μαχιμέναν τοι: ἀθώθαν.
of the centuries. The historical picture of the battle of Oinoe, however, cannot have been painted before the year 388 B.C., the date of the battle in question. The historical picture of the battle of Marathon must be put back to at least the middle of the fifth century, if we accept the statements that Panainos and Mikon were its authors. It is, indeed, remarkable how many references there are to the picture, from the time of Aischines onwards. But the first author to name the painter is Plinius, who gives Panainos credit for the work. Arrian follows with an ascription of the work to Mikon, in a passage, however, open to various suspicions. Pausanias, not in Attica but in Elis, discovers, or remembers, that Panainos was the painter. Aelian gives Mikon a hand in the work, but reports that some persons ascribed the same parts to Polygnotos: the claims of Mikon are still more plausibly set out by later authorities. No ancient authority says, in so many words, that the painting was a joint composition by Panainos and Mikon. It may be a suggestion disagreeable to archaeologists, but the historical student is bound to remark that while the evidence for the authorship of the two mythical pictures, the Iliupersis by Polygnotos, and the Amazonomachy by Mikon, is satisfactory, the evidence for the existence and authorship of the battle of Marathon previous to the painting of the battle of Oinoe, is by no means convincing. Nearly six centuries after we find it put down, in whole or in part, to one, or to any, of three artists who might have painted it, assuming that it was painted about the time that the other monuments in commemoration of the battle were founded. But, if the painting was made in the fourth century, to match the other historical subject, at a time when the memories of Marathon were being sedulously revived and cultivated, it might easily have been antedated by the Roman writers 400 years later. One fact seems evident: the description of the battle in Herodotus is not taken from the painting nor has he gathered his information in the Poikile; as might have been expected of him if the painting was the work of Mikon, or of Panainos, or of Polygnotos, that is, anterior to or contemporary with Herodotus. In one point, indeed, the painting agrees with the story in Herodotus, the Persian cavalry is conspicuous by its absence. But Herodotus would hardly

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1 Harrison and Verrall, op. c. p. 138.
2 The literary references may be found complete in Overbeck, op. cit. pp. 201, 210, 211 (1054, 1059 ff.).
3 Ἀνακλῶσις 7. 13, 5 καὶ γραπται ἡ Ἀθηναίων καὶ Ἀμαζώνων μάχη πρὸς Μικώνος οὗ μειν ἡμερ ἡ Ἀθηναίων καὶ Περεσώ. Even if this passage means that Mikon was the artist of the Battle of Marathon, it is a mere obiter dictum, so far as the question of authorship of the picture is concerned.
4 5. 11, 6. How Abicht (Arrian, note ad l. c. a.) makes the passage mean that the painting was a joint work of Panainos and Polygnotos I do not understand. Aelian reports that some persons substituted Polygnotos for Mikon as painter of the dog and so on.
5 Nat. anim. 7, 38; Overbeck, op. c. 1083.
6 See Overbeck, op. c. 1084.
7 Plutarch, Kimon 4.
8 Aristophanes, I.e. supra.
have omitted the striking episode of Echetlos, thoroughly primitive and plausible in tone, or the telling anecdote of the dog, had he seen the painting. In other respects, it is true, there is considerable agreement, as in the names given of the portrait figures, Kallimachos, Miltiades, Kynaigeiros, Datis, and Artaphernes. But Hippias, but Pan are wanting in the picture, and the special description by Herodotus of the lines of battle, and the tactics of Miltiades, go far beyond anything suggested by the picture, while the picture represented the marsh, which Herodotus would surely have utilised had he ever seen either the picture itself, or the scene which it represented.\footnote{1}

\section{Suidas}

It may seem a far cry from Pausanias in the second century of our era, to Suidas in the tenth or eleventh, and it would be rash to assume that the literature intervening had no interest in the development, or the revival, of the Marathonian legend\footnote{2}: yet would an exhaustive research into the possible references reveal any fresh light or aspect of the matter? It is certainly remarkable that with the authority which is chronologically the end of the \textit{cateuma}, one new grain of gold is added to the circle of tradition. Suidas has two or three articles which throw some light upon the traditions of Marathon. One \textit{(s. voc. Ποικίλα)} adds nothing to our resources. Another passage \textit{(s. voc. δεισιφώρω)} is obviously a variant or recollection of the \textit{scholia} on Aristophanes,\footnote{4} \textit{Knights} 778. It might seem as if a special association had come to be established in tradition between the deed at Marathon and the long-sword (\textit{ξίφος}). Attic sources emphasised the hand-to-hand character of the engagement. It had been no mere question of bows and arrows, nor even of shield and spear: they had used their blades against the Mede! But whether this rider to tradition is older than the year 425/4 B.C. can scarcely be determined. What is a brilliant phrase with Aristophanes becomes a tactical history with the scholiast. The fact was probably true, but hardly so unprecedented or unique, as that ‘to use the sword’ should have become equivalent for ‘to be present at Marathon,’ or even, ‘to do battle for the land.’ Other items in the passages here under consideration recall the rhetorical traditions of the fourth century above examined, which were probably their source; for example, the Pataian complement of 1000 men, the authorship of Hellenic freedom, the Athenian prot-

\footnote{1} AElian, L. c. s.
\footnote{2} Cp. § 29 \textit{supra}, and notes to 6. 114, 117.
\footnote{3} Lucian, \textit{iv the Voltaire of antiquity,}, a contemporary of Pausanias, shows the \textit{Marathonian} legend in a somewhat ridiculous light, \textit{e.g.} the Pan-cult \textit{(Dial. Deor. 22)}; the rhetorical references to Marathon and Kynaigeiros, without which no speech (whatever its subject) is complete \textit{(Rhet. prooem. 18)}. Incidentally he bears witness to the picture in the \textit{Sken}, which Herakles must not destroy, just to be rid of a bad philosopher \textit{(Zeus tragoidus, 32)}, and in one place Miltiades is classed with Sokrates and Themistokles as a victim of unjust accusation, \textit{de Calum.} 29. Cp. also § 28 \textit{supra ad f.} Athenaeus, 694, preserves a \textit{Shelton} on Pan \textit{(απός Πάνας, Αρ-κασίας μεθίσιν ελευτηρία κτλ.)}, which might or might not be connected with Marathon.\footnote{4} (ed. Ovum. iv. ii. p. 270.) See next page.
\footnote{5} Aristophanes might have taken the word from \textit{Iliad.} 7. 234 of \textit{τοίς ἄνθης ἐνέπεργεν τούς Περαν.}
agonism and Panhellenism. The substitution of Artabazos for Artaphrenes as the associate of Datis is a careless error, which confounds the first and second invasions, but in itself would prove the identity of the passages, or their common source. One incidental statement remains, which might be fathered upon an early source: Marathon is described as a place in Attica where Datis and his colleague brought their ships to anchor. In Herodotus (6.107) Hippias is the man to cast anchor: but the passage implies that the vessels were not beached. The description of Datis and 'Artabazos' as 'Medic 'satrap' is probably no more than false local colour: 'satrap' having the proper barbaric ring about it.¹ The third passage from Suidas is altogether more remarkable, and if the tradition it contains were acceptable, it must have a decisive import upon the reconstruction of the story of Marathon. The article χωρίς ἵππεις² asserts that according to tradition (φασὶ) the Ionians [who were serving in the Persian army] after the invasion of Attica by Datis, took advantage of his absence, or retirement, to give a signal to the Athenians that the cavalry was away: Miltiades thereupon delivered the attack and gained the victory. Hence the proverb.

The immediate source of this article may be sought in the Paraenomographi: on what previous source one or other of them based the etymology of the particular proverb in question, it seems beyond our power to ascertain. We have in sooth no guarantee that the origin of the proverb is correctly given, and it would not be difficult to surmise some other origin, in older Attic history, or in constitutional usage, or even in the pomp of Athene, or of Artemis, for the saying. But the disproof of the connexion between the proverb and the event would not carry a refutation of the tradition respecting Marathon. Of that tradition there is no test external to the passage in question. Its existence, its survival, count for something in its favour. Over and

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¹ SUIDAS.

2 διεξήγοις: διερχόμενος περὶ τῆς γέρας. ἐν Μαραθῶι πολεμήσας πρὸς τοὺς Μαθῶι τοῖς ἑφεσί καὶ αὐτῶν ἔχασαν. Μαραθοῦ ἀδίκο τοῖς Ἕλληνης, ιδίατεροι εἰς τὸν Ἀθηναίους, πολεμεῖς μετὰ τὰς Μακεδονίας καταστάσεις τῆς Ἐλλάδος, ὥστε συμβαλλόντες αὐτοῖς οἱ Αθηναῖοι Μακεδόνας απεφοβότοντο, μᾶλλον Πλαταῖοι εἰς καθαρὰ πολεμεῖς καθαρὰν ἔχοντες, καὶ οὗτοι πληρωθέντος τοῦ ἀρμοῦ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς δυνάμεως, τοῖς Ἑλληνικοῖς οἰκισμοῖς, μᾶλλον εἰς ἀπάντησιν τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῶν πρῶτον τῶν Περσῶν διαφθείραντες.

² χωρίς ἵππεις. Ἅρτατος ἐμβαλόσας εἰς τὸν Ἑλλήνα οὐκ ἔχασε, διεσφερόμενοι αὐτοῖς, ἀπεφοβότοντο εἰς ἄδεια συμμετοχῆς τοῖς Ἑλληναῖοι, ὅτε εἷς χωρίς ἵππεις καὶ Μακεδόνας συνετόν ἡ ἀπο-

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778 διεξήγοις: ἐντόλησεν πρὸς τοὺς Μήδους τοῖς ἑφεσί καὶ αὐτῶν ἔχασαν. ἐν Μαραθῶι: τότε τὸς Ἀθηναίος εἰς ἐντόλης Ἔλληνας καὶ Ἀργάκαμος Μακεδόνας συμβαλλότας, περιβάλλεις εἰς τὸν Ἐλληνας βασιλέα καταστάσεις τῆς Ἐλλάδος, ἔθεα συμβαλλόντες αὐτοῖς οἱ Αθηναῖοι Μακεδόνας συμβαλλόντος, μᾶλλον Πλαταῖοι εἰς καθαρὰ πολεμεῖς καθαρὰν ἔχοντες, καὶ οὗτοι πληρωθέντος τοῦ ἀρμοῦ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς δυνάμεως τὸν Ἑλληνικὸν οἰκισμὸν, τοῖς Ἑλληνικοῖς οἰκισμοῖς, μᾶλλον εἰς ἀπάντησιν τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῶν πρῶτον τῶν Περσῶν διαφθείραντες.
above that, it can be judged only by its intrinsic credibility, its agreement or disagreement with the general probabilities of the case. Is it too much to say that it stands these tests, and comes out of the ordeal as a genuine tradition or a probable surmise? There is, indeed, hardly any item in the authorities external to Herodotus, unless it be the passage on the Polemarchia in the Athenian Constitution, which illumines so fully the points in his narrative. The attack of Miltiades is explained by the absence of the cavalry: the absence of the cavalry is connected with a movement of Datis away from Marathon: a signal is given by the Ionians to the Athenians, and the victory of Miltiades is rendered intelligible by the dissolution of the Persian ranks. The service of the Ionians is unrecorded by Herodotus—an omission not very surprising when the anti-Ionian bias of much of his work, or of his sources, is remembered. Instead of the Ionian signal to the Athenians he records an Athenian signal apparently intended for the Persians. The two signals are not of course mutually exclusive, but they are possible alternatives. The movement of Datis from Marathon is not, indeed, accounted for, it is the ultimate datum in the tradition here preserved; but an hypothetical explanation is not far to seek. Finally, that Miltiades is to all appearance in sole command even in this story, is but what might have been expected, seeing how early the true relations of the Strategi to the Polemarch, and of Miltiades to his colleagues at Marathon were forgotten.

It might of course be argued that this tradition also is a mere afterthought. Some moderns, apparently without reference to Suidas, have argued that the cavalry was absent from the field of battle, and that this absence supplied the motive of attack. So far mere reflection and argument might carry us. The introduction of the Ionians and their signal, perhaps the mention of the trees, seem to go beyond mere combination, and to rest on tradition. Not less authentic might be the memory that Datis was retiring. In other words, Datis and the cavalry were re-embarked (according to this tradition) presumably for the descent on Brauron or Phaleron: and Ionians, already in communication with the Athenians, signified that the re-embarkation was far advanced, and the moment arrived for an attack. Delay, if delay there was, attack when the attack was delivered, the victory that resulted, might all become more intelligible in the light of this hypothesis, or of this tradition.

§ 30. Ktesias. The record of Marathon preserved by Ktesias stands altogether apart from the direct chain of authorities, and betrays, if anything in our sources betrays, a contact with oriental and Persian authority. Let this, and the fact that we owe our knowledge of his text to Photios, the Patriarch of Constantinople, excuse its consideration out of its temporal sequence. Ktesias of all writers might lead us back, _e contrario_, to the benignity of Herodotus. In this would-be rival's

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1 Cp. §§ 8 supra, 33, 34 infra.  
2 Cp. § 26 supra.
record the Marathian campaign was treated as immediately consequent upon the Scythian expedition, and as accomplished before the return of Dareios to Susa. The Ionian revolt, and all its consequences, apparently were ignored in Persian archives, for sufficiently obvious reasons. The name of Miltiades was preserved in connexion with the victory, and Ktesias adds a double item all his own, that Datis fell in the battle, and that the Athenians refused to restore his body to the Persians.\footnote{Pep. 18 Δάτις δὲ έταξιν εκ Πόλ- τον, καὶ τού Μυρικού στάλεν ήγομένου, εύξει τέχνου καὶ τῆς Ελλάδος. ἦ Μαρα- θών. δὲ Μιλτιάδης διεπατηζε, καὶ παρα- καλεῖ τούτα δάυ. καὶ οὖς τὸ έψω. Πέρσαις αύταμεν αύτος Αθηναῖς έδώκε. Δα- ρίου δὲ έταξιν εκ Πέρσαις τυλ. (Ktesias ed. Beehr, p. 68; Gilmore, p. 152).} The two particularis do not stand on precisely the same level. It is more likely that Datis was killed, than that his body was demanded and refused. The demand would, on Hellenic principles, have been a confession of defeat, the refusal an act of impiety: the impiety does duty, a little later, as a part of the \textit{casus belli} in the second Persian war.\footnote{ibid. 21.} The former point implicitly contravene Herodotus, but only in a passage which is in itself suspicious. The death of Datis on the battle-field has nothing improbable about it: quite the reverse. It might be thought that, if Datis had fallen, the Athenians would have known and remembered it: but eleven years later Mardonios fell at Plataia and his body was never identified. If Datis had died at Marathon he could not afterwards have dreamed a dream at Delos: but does the dream-incident prove more than that Herodotus had not heard, or did not believe, that Datis had remained dead on the battle-field?\footnote{Hdt. 6. 136. Cp. § 13 supra.} Ktesias of Knidos was anxious to prove Herodotus of Halikarnassos a liar: but even Ktesias was not completely wrong in every particular. The Herodotean story of Marathon is far from complete or satisfactory: are there not many items in the authorities external to Herodotus less plausible, or acceptable, than this report of the death of Datis?\footnote{\textsection 31. The catena of literary authorities, here reviewed, from Herodotus to Suidas, may be taken to represent the tradition, testimonies, evidence, and arguments, which have come down from antiquity upon the subject of the battle of Marathon. The result is disappointing and perplexing. The traditional evidence upon close examination turns out to be fragmentary and incomplete; the fragments are to a great extent mutually exclusive; the element of afterthought has left its mark partly, indeed, in some plausible inferences and combinations, but for the most part in exaggerations and even absurdities. The state of the evidences is not inexplicable. It may be explained partly by a consideration of the extent to which the second Persian war eclipsed the memory, and actually destroyed the monuments, of the first. It may be explained more fully by having regard to special circumstances: the accident that a bias was almost immediately given to the story in the interests of Miltiades;\footnote{ibid. 21.} the accident that afterwards the story was
revived and developed in the interests of Kimon;¹ the accident that Herodotus had made the great war his subject first, and went back to the story of Marathon rather under the necessity of his general plan, as finally developed, than from any intrinsic or original impulse or interest;² the accident that later Athens, especially fourth-century Athens, had a political as well as an historic interest in magnifying the Marathonomachae.³ In the confused mass of traditions and speculations thus collected there have revealed themselves two more or less alternative accounts of the battle, the primary one given by Herodotus, another devised, originally perhaps by Ephorus, to some extent at least as a criticism of the account given by Herodotus, and very largely a product of reflection, some of it very late reflection, upon the story.⁴ A few grains of independent tradition need not, indeed, be denied to Ephorus, but his rationalistic réchauffé of the Herodotean and other traditions has come out badly in cross-examination. Beside this main alternative, amid the wreckage of history, a fair amount of valuable flotsam has been carried down the stream of time and letters, some of it as old as Aischylos and Simonides, by help of which recent historians have attempted to determine the outline, substance, and causation of the great events in question. The only fresh evidence which modern investigation has to offer upon the subject, is the fuller and more accurate delineation of the battle-field and its approaches. The rest is matter of a completer review of literary traditions, a more critical estimate of historical evidence, and a more competent grasp of military considerations. One point must be conceded before each and every fresh attempt at a final synthesis: there never has been, and there never can be, a theory which shall reconcile all the elements, even all the plausible elements, in the traditions, and hypotheses, of antiquity upon this subject. Probably entire agreement will never be attained in regard to the story as a whole, much less in regard to some of the subordinate problems involved: the legend of Marathon will remain for ever to delight and to perplex the generations of men. The prospect of any fresh and decisive addition to the evidences need hardly be taken into account. Each age is bound, every student of Hellenic letters is entitled, to exercise judgment and imagination upon this problem: and in the process of its solution may happily discover that there is a great reward to be gained, even though our theory be not convertible into a dogma, nor the immortal story into a positive creed.

The scene of the battle must have been familiar to hosts of Athenians, including some of the literary authorities whose works have come down to us: yet, until we reach Pausanias, there is little or no real evidence of any attempt to relate the event to the environment,

¹ Plutarch, Kimon 5. Cp. § 15 supra.
³ § 18 supra.
⁴ Cp. § 26 supra.
and it may be doubted whether any ancient authority went over the battle-field with a skilled eye to the strategic and tactical dispositions. The first move in this fruitful direction was made by Colonel Leake, who brought the training of a soldier and topographer to bear upon the problem. Not the least remarkable result of Leake's autopsy was his localisation of the Athenian Leaguer in the valley of Vraná instead of the valley of Marathon; but this error was a separable accident in the matter, and Leake's strategic conception of the (first) Athenian position has largely ruled subsequent theories of the battle, however much they have departed from his ruling in other particulars. Leake's topographical identifications were not, indeed, in all respects satisfactory, and his estimate and treatment of the traditions and whole legend of Marathon proved inadequate. Broadly speaking, the tendency of Leake's reconstruction was to reduce the actual engagement to very modest proportions, a result in part effected by diminishing the forces of the Persians, emphasising their defects in spirit, discipline, arms, and leading, while raising the estimate of the Athenian forces. It was this tendency in Leake's critique which evoked the careful protest of the Philhellenic Finlay, in a paper which has hardly received the recognition, in England, which it deserves. Finlay accepted from Leake the identity of the modern Vraná with the ancient Marathon, but he thought to detect the remains of the Herakleion on the slopes of Argaliki (sic) in proximity to the main pass to the Mesogeia, and he devoted greater attention to the various roads and passes leading to Marathon from the rest of Attica, and Athens, with the result of enlarging the strategic aspect of the whole operation. For the rest, though he considerably reduced the estimate of the actual Persian forces engaged at Marathon, yet Finlay involved himself in several obvious inconsequences, owing partly to an excessive homage to the authority of Herodotus, partly to an arbitrary selection from the accessory traditions, partly also, perhaps, to a remnant of Leake's influence. The problems connected with the place and the battle, of course, continued to exercise historians and students, but fresh material for a reconstruction was not won until Lolling placed the whole question upon a sounder basis by his topographical researches in 1876. Those researches appear to have vindicated the identity of the ancient and

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2 Notably, in regard to the Cave and Mountain of Pan, in regard to the demes of the Tetrapolis, in regard to the positions of the Persian leaguer and the Herakleion.
3 Transactions of R. Soc. of Litt. iii. 360 ff. (1839).
4 A good résumé of the state of the question down to 1866 is to be found in V. Campe's dissertation de pugna Marathomica (Gyphiaswaldiae, MDCCCLXVII). Cp. Busolt, Gr. G. ii. 47 for further literature.
modern Marathon (against Leake, Finlay, Ross, Bursian, et al.¹), to have restored the cave of Pan to Oinoe (Ninoi), against Leake, and most important of all, to have established the Herakleion in the valley of Avlonia.² Lolling also paid (like Finlay) especial attention to the roads to the Tetrapolis, and if his work left anything to be desired, that desideratum was supplied in the superb map produced by the Prussian staff.³ Stimulated, not indeed by autopsy of the field, but by privileged study of that cartographical chef d’œuvre, Duncker promptly reconstructed a theory of the battle from the ground upwards.⁴ That theory, endorsed in the main by Busolt,⁵ has put the whole discussion in an advanced stage, and must be recognised as now in possession of the field. For reasons to be given below, that theory is, however, here only admitted to a modified extent. The canons and the method of Duncker and Busolt appear to be substantiably sound, but the more stringent application of the method, the correction and amplification of the canons may, perhaps, give a better result. Their canons are two: I. The strategy, tactics, and so forth, recorded, or to be suggested, must be reconciled with and determined by the topography. II. The text of Herodotus must be taken as the primary and most authoritative description of the battle, and all the operations connected therewith. These canons are acceptable, subject to one correction. The Herodotean record is not the oldest evidence on all points, it is not the only evidence, and it is not consistent or clear in itself. As against the chief ancient alternative, Nepos (Ephoros), Herodotus must, on the whole, prevail: but not so, against all comers, at every point. Where Herodotus is clear and credible, we abandon him at our peril. So much by way of agreement and qualification in regard to the Herodotean canon.⁶ The other is indisputable. The theory formulated below has been developed by the more rigid enforcement of those very canons in several particulars. Thus, for example (1) the Charadra practically disappears from the theories of Duncker and Busolt, which do not explain how the Persians came to cross it before receiving the Athenian attack. (2) The orientation and position of

¹ Christoph. Wordsworth, Athens and Attica, p. 40 (4th ed. 1869), maintained the identity of the ancient and of the modern Marathon, on the strength of the coincidence of name. Lolling’s argument is, however, much more elaborate. Vrančić Lolling identifies with Probainthos.

² The remains on Agriki, in which Finlay saw the Herakleion, Lolling ascribes apparently to Herodes Atticus. It is unfortunate that the site in the Avlon has not been archaeologically, or epigraphically, established; but it stands good nevertheless. Op. § 12 supra.


⁶ This canon rules out H. Delbrück’s ingenious reconstruction, Die Perserkrieg, pp. 52 ff. (1857), which, inter alia, (1) cancels the shield-episode, (2) makes the Persians advance to attack the Greeks in the valley of Avlonia, and (3) takes the Athenians over the eight stades, not to attack, but to pursue the Persians.
the line of battle as conceived by Duncker (and Busolt) make two points in the narrative of Herodotus very difficult to understand, viz.: (i) whither the retreat of the Athenian centre took place, and where the final rally ensued. Duncker does not envisage the problem so clearly as Busolt. The latter locates the final rally in the valley of Aviona, a point which may be acceptable in itself, but is very difficult to reconcile with Duncker’s orientation of the line of battle, adopted by Busolt.1 (ii) On Duncker’s theory it is very difficult to understand how the Persians, when routed, were driven into the sea: they should have been driven into the marsh to the north, and were (he supposes) in part so driven, over the Charadra, and nearly two miles farther. As Busolt leaves the ships where Duncker put them,2 he gains nothing here by having moved the final rally and success of the Hellenes back into the valley of Aviona. In all these and other respects the theory below propounded adheres more closely both to the topographical facts and to the statements of Herodotus, and therefore fulfils better the two canons above laid down, than the theory propounded by Duncker and Busolt. To these two canons, however, two others may safely be added: III. No theory can be satisfactory which fails to account for the assumption of the offensive by the Athenians at a particular moment. IV. No theory can be satisfactory, which involves gross inconsequence, or improbability, from a military or strategic point of view. In regard to III., neither Duncker nor Busolt explains satisfactorily the determination of the Athenian commander-in-chief, whoever he was, to attack. Herodotus explains it by the prytany of Miltiades, an explanation the futility of which Duncker and Busolt see clearly.3 Duncker adopts the idea that the advent of the Plataians was the determining motive,4 a suggestion the futility of which Busolt sees. Busolt himself falls back on the need of action before treachery should do its work; but this is no reason for delivering an attack on a particular day, and moreover it makes the previous delay the more unaccountable. The theory adopted below is not open to any such objection. In regard to IV., Duncker and Busolt regard the battle as a regular pitched battle, in which the whole Persian force was engaged, including what cavalry there was, the engagement lasting a long time (Busolt seems to allow some four or five hours), and ending in a complete rout of the Persians: yet they treat it as consequential that the Athenians lose only 192 citizens, the Persians only 6400 men; that the routed Persians are able to re-embark in security and with the loss of but seven ships; while the ease and expedition with which the

1 With Duncker the Athenians occupy in succession two positions, at right angles to each other, the second facing north, towards the upper marsh, not towards the sea. Leake also placed the Athenians in two successive positions, the camp at Vrank, op. c. p. 211, the battle array at the foot of Mt. Argaliki (sic), p. 224.
2 All drawn up on the beach north of the mouth of the Charadra, under shelter of the fortified Persian camp, which Duncker places in the middle of the great swamp. Cp. § 36 infra.
3 Cp. notes to 6. 110.
4 Lolling, op. cit. p. 30.
routed army, including the cavalry, is all put on board and carried away, would be the despair of modern tacticians, if it were genuine history. The re-embarkation is, indeed, allowed to occupy a night or so, and the door seems left ajar, so to speak, for the entrance of a vaguer and larger estimate. But quite apart from considerations arising from the traditions, outside Herodotus, which bring the Athenians back hot haste from the battle-field: apart even from the indications in the text of Herodotus himself that the return was not long postponed: it should be remembered that, if the Persians had so little difficulty in getting away from Marathon, after their whole forces had been engaged and defeated on land, the defeat cannot have been a crushing one—as it was, if the battle was conducted on the scale and in the manner required by the theory of Duncker.

§ 32. The potential field of battle may be described as a rectangular plain some five miles long by two breadth, between the sea and the mountains, with a general orientation from the north-east to south-west. To the south-east the plain is open to the sea, and the coast has a continuous curve, which draws it round from a line almost due south to a line almost due east, terminating in the deep recess formed by the rocky spur of Kynossema, which projects southward from the hill of Drakonera. On the plain, thus delimited, three natural features strike the spectator’s eye and reappear upon the correct map. Across the middle, from the mountains to the sea, is drawn a gleaming white line, or rather double line, nearly bisecting the plain into two portions. It is the water-course of the Charadra, which may have varied somewhat through the ages, but must have crossed the field in 490 B.C. much as it crosses it to-day. To the north-east, (east-north-east), at the upper end of the plain, is a conspicuous marsh, extending all across the level from mountain to sea, or if names may be invoked, from the spring Makaria to the salt-lake Drakonera. At the other end of the plain, to the south (south-west), where the mountains draw round eastwards towards the sea, lies a smaller marsh, between which and the mountain (Agrieli), lies the main route to Athens. Sea, mountains, the plain between, a river-course, a larger and a smaller marsh—such is a rough inventory of the scene, which

1 Finlay, op. cit. p. 388, has a truly wonderful passage on this point: “The victorious Athenians rushed down to the ships, and even attempted to set them on fire. But the warlike genius of the Persians, and the excellence of their military arrangements, were now displayed. The disposition of the Persian generals relative to the embarkation of the defeated troops, and the order and discipline maintained on board, were so admirable that the Athenians were checked. Some assistance was probably afforded by the return of the cavalry from their foraging expedition, while the archers and slingers aboat protected the beach so effectually that the victors could only render themselves masters of seven vessels.”
2 Cp. § 27 supra.
3 6. 116.
4 If the channel had then been a single one, it would have been a more formidable obstacle to cavalry or other movements, than it is now; but in any case the actual engagement must have taken place on one or other side of this obstacle, however the lines of battle were orientated.
requires to be completed by a view of the exits through the mountain framework, and a notice of such other fixed points in the topography, as serve to determine the theory of the action.

One standing on a line bisecting the plain, at the mouth or on the course of the Charedra, with his back to the sea, would mark four principal outlets through the mountain rampart toward the country beyond. To the north opens, between Drakonera and Stavrokori, the vale at the nearer end of which lies the modern village of Kato Suli, hard by the ancient fountain of Makaria. But the roads through that valley, the one leading to Rhamnos, the other to the Diakria, hardly trouble the present question, for doubtless they were completely commanded by the Persians, to whom they may have ministered supplies, but were absolutely useless for operations against the rest of Attica, or Athens. 2. To the north-east fronting the imaginary spectator is the narrower and deeper cleft between Stavrokori and Kotroni, in which lay and lies the village of Marathon, and through which the Charedra has forced a passage on its way from distant Parnes to the sea. 2 Through that pass goes the longer and more difficult route to Athens, the road by Kephisia. 3. On the extreme left (south-south-west) between the end spur of Pentelikon, hight Agrieliki (Argaliiki), and the sea, or rather the lesser swamp, opens the main road to Athens via Hierozakuli (and farther, by the ancient Araphen and Pallene). One or other of these two passes, the route by Kephisia (Bei-Marathon-Kephisia) the route by Araphen-Pallene (Rhaifina-Perteimi-Charvali), the Persians were bound to take, if they would reach Athens over land. 4. But, between these two main routes, of which the latter was, and is, obviously the more practicable, lay a third pass, coming down by Vraná, a more difficult way, merging beyond the hills into the road by the modern Marathon, at some two hours behind Vraná, and somewhat farther from Marathon. This pass could have no attraction for the Persians in 490 B.C. even if the way had been open. But this way was closed, once the Athenians had sighted the enemy, for the localisation of the Herakleion in the valley of Avlona has determined the controversy as to the position to be assigned to the Athenian encampment on the authority of Herodotus.

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1 Finlay, op. cit. p. 386, describes five passes leading from the plain of Marathon; his first and second are amalgamated above. Lolling, op. cit. p. 68, by pursuing the passes into their ramifications obtains seven roads from Marathon to the rest of Attica. His account of the matter is more complete and accurate than Finlay’s, but, for the present purpose, it appears to be sufficient to enumerate the four terminal passages from the plain, marked by Kato Suli, Marathon, Vraná, and the main opening south.

2 As Lolling observes, Drakonera, Stavrokori, Kotroni belong to the Parnes complex, Aphorismo and Argaliiki to Pentelikon (Brilessos).

3 The position cannot have been occupied in force until the Athenians were assured that the Persians were landing at Marathon, cp. Hdt. 6. 102, 103. Of course a decision on the point must have been made in the city, either by the Ekklesia (by the pephism of Miltiades, cp. § 20 supra), or by the Polemarch and Strategi, invested with αὐτοκρατία, which would equally have required a pephism.

4 Cp. 6. 108.

5 It should be remembered that Leake virtually adopted this position, by locating
§ 33. The supreme strategic importance of this position has been well pointed out by Duncker, and by Busolt. The Athenians were practically unassailable, or only assailable at great disadvantage to the attacking force: right and left they were protected from cavalry by the slopes of Agritiki and Kotromi, while the narrow valley would deprive superior numbers of their main advantage in attack. On the other hand the position, viewed strategically, commanded the approach to both the passes practicable for the Persians. If the Persians approached either of the passes with a serious intention, they would expose in the one case the left flank, in the other case the right to attack, and their marching column would be cut in two, perhaps cut in pieces.

For several days the armies remained in their respective positions. It was presumably the design of the Persians to draw the Athenians down into the plain, towards the shore. Datis and Hippias (who knew every foot of the ground) were not likely to attack them in their almost impregnable position; a serious attempt to force either of the passes was at least not to be undertaken, until all hopes of an encounter in the open had been abandoned. Whether with a view to provoking a combat any challenges passed, or any movements were made, does not appear. Strategically the Athenians had everything to gain by delay; reinforcements, habit and nerve, the moral advantage of keeping the great force at bay. Why should they descend to jeopardise all at a disadvantage? On the Persian side the reverse was the case: for the Persians delay was discreditable and dangerous. Once assured that the Greeks were not to be lured into the open, or brought, without some clear necessity, to sacrifice their strategic advantage, it was for the Persians, who after all were the invading force, to create some such situation.

The Athenian leaguer at Vrana; but he put the Herakleion nearer the plain, and in this and other respects his theory of the battle-field, and of the battle, remained defective and erroneous. Cp. p. 255 supra.

That a considerable delay occurred in the position, is the clear inference from Herodotus, and also from Ephoros: but the view of Leake, Finlay and others that nine days elapsed because Miltiades was the 'tent' strategist, is inadmissible: cp. note to 6. 103. The exact position of the Persians is disputable. Herodotus throws no light on the point. Pausanias might be taken to imply that the tent of Datis was pitched on Drakona. Leake based the Persians on Kato Suli; Lolling discovered the 'mangers' on Stavrrokoraki. Duncker places two alternative camps for the Persians in the larger swamp. Cp. § 36 infra. The most legitimate inference from Herodotus is that the ships were kept riding at anchor, cp. 6. 12, where ships are expressly left for seven days óv' ἀγνηθεῖαν. But it is also necessary to infer from Hdt. that considerable forces were disembarked.

These elements in the later versions (cp. § 26 supra) might easily have been fictitious embellishments, but they confirm the tradition of the pause at Marathon.

Finlay, op. cit. supra p. 379, argues that the main pass must have been fortified against the Persians, otherwise they would have seized it, and pushed on. But how if (1) the Athenians were in position in time to prevent this, (2) the Persians designed to draw down the Athenians on to the plain, and even across the Charadra?  

Finlay, op. cit. p. 385, remarks that "delay seems to have caused no alarm to the Persians: command of the sea ensured the arrival of abundant supplies." Yet he follows Leake in sending the whole force of cavalry away foraging (p. 373), and he adds (p. 584) that the delay gave the Athenians "leisure to observe the arms..."
§ 34. It is here, then, that a suggestion is wanted, which shall supply such a motive. It is to be found in the hypothesis that the Persians at last decided to make a movement upon Athens, with fleet and with infantry at once, and to make it by the pass to the south, the main road to Athens. By this route navy and army would remain in touch, at least while in presence of the enemy—for it may be supposed that the fleet, or part of it, is to make way round the bay, as the army moves over the Charadra, along the plain, across the opening of the valley of Avlona, and towards the pass between the mountain and the lesser marsh (Brexias). Whether the Persians were convinced that the Greeks would in terror allow them to go by unmolested, or whether they were in ultrasque parati prepared to do battle, if the occasion arose, may be a question. The greater probability seems to incline to the view that the Persians were fully prepared. They had those with them who might remember the Athenians with respect; and when the shock came, the Barbarians were found in battle array. It must have been obvious to the Greeks that the Persians were about to break up and depart, the ships round Sunion, what remained of the forces on land, by the main route to Athens. There was stir, movement, on road and on sea. The Athenians might perceive, from vantage points on either hill, that a large remove was contemplated. Assurance may have been made doubly sure by messages from friendly Greeks in the enemy’s ranks. It may be that the Persians on their part received signal intelligence that the coast at Phaleron was clear. All this took time. Were not the Athenians already prepared for the crisis? Had not the Polemarch already decided, perhaps on the advice of Miltiades, what was to be done in such a situation? Or did the deliberation ensue when first the intention of the Persians became manifest? Then, if not before, the question arose: what was to be done? Were they to allow the Persians to move off unchallenged? Were they to retreat by the way they had come, and crossing the saddle behind them rapidly, attempt to bar the passage to Athens, in the more
open country round Pallene? Were they to descend and follow the Persians at a respectful distance to the gates of Athens?² There was need of a momentous decision, yet the right thing to be done was fairly clear. It was, however, in any case an immortal hour in the memory of Athens, of Hellas, of Europe, when the resolution was taken, and the word was given to advance against the Persians; to thwart the passage of the enemy under Pentelikon, to assume the offensive, and deliver the attack.²

§ 35. Nothing in the traditions concerning the actual mêlée would justify us in assuming that the Persians were taken in flank, or off guard.—Surprise is, indeed, experienced by the Persians, but it is at seeing men racing to attack them.³ The absence of the cavalry is better explained by the supposition that there were few, if any, of them still on land, than by the supposition that the advance of the Athenians was so rapid, the Persians had not time to deploy their horsemen.⁴ The intervention of Pan was probably at a later stage.⁵

The description of the obstinate resistance, the very clearly stated tradition of the tactical breach in the Athenian centre, and such details, point to the conclusion that the Persian infantry was in battle array, when the Athenian hoplites reached it. To resolve such traditions into mere re-echoes of the later war, and its experiences, would be difficult in the light of the specific character of the Greek tactics at Marathon. The scene of the actual battle on this theory (as with Duncker-Busolt), lies on the right (south) bank of the Charadra, on the portion of the plain, about two miles square, between the Charadra and Agrieliki, Kotroni and the sea. To this spot the battle is pinned, not merely by the general strategic considerations, but by the archaeological evidence, such as it is. This location suits the site of the Herakleion, which may now be regarded as fixed: it suits likewise the only two archaeological remains which can be actually surveyed in situ, the Soros, the Pyrgos.⁶ These monuments

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¹ Athens had gates, even if not walls! Cp. note to 5. 64, and Appendix IX. § 4. Three questions were successively decided by the Athenians: (1) Not to remain in the city, but to go to Marathon. (2) To risk a battle, if attacked. (3) To assume the offensive, and deliver the attack. The affirmatives were probably not all decided at once. Ephoros (Nepos) supplies (1), Herodotus distinguishes, after a fashion, (2) and (3).

² In Hdt. the council of war decides on battle days before the actual conflict. Cp. § 6 supra. The above hypothesis explains alike the decision, the delay and the final charge.

³ Hdt. 6. 112. Cp. § 4 supra.

⁴ Cp. § 7 supra. Delbrück, op. cit. p. 76, supposes that the Persians advanced into the valley of Arlona leaving their cavalry behind them on the plain.

⁵ It may fairly be suspected that the panic, in this case, is pure afterthought, facilitated by the association of Pan with the locality, and other motives. Hdt. only introduces it by anticipation, in the vision of Philippides. In the first instance Miltiades claimed the victory. The Athenians at large took the credit to themselves. Kimon ascribed the result to the deity. Cp. § 15 supra.

⁶ The Soros was partially excavated by Schliemann in Feb. 1884, and its connexion with the battle of 490 B.C. was thought to have been disproved; cp. Schuchhardt, Schliemann’s Excavations (tr. by E. Sellers), p. 14. More recent investigation has vindicated the traditional
of the battle were erected on the site of the battle. It is also possible that their orientation in regard to one another may have had some relation to the position of the army in battle, but as the exact purpose of the Pyrgos has not been ascertained, that position must be determined independently of these monuments.

Duncker (followed by Busolt) has represented the Athenian and Persian battle array as lying, roughly speaking, parallel to the Charadra, and at right angles to the sea. Duncker’s reason for this view is unconvincing: it suits, he says, the direction of the Persian flight into the marsh, overlooking the fact that there are two marshes to be reckoned with, and that his theory does not suit the direction of the Athenian pursuit into the sea.¹ Busolt observes the second marsh, but he pays small heed to it, for the reason that Pausanias, in describing the battle-field, thinks evidently that the marsh to the north is the one into which the Persians were driven. But Pausanias counts for little here; it is with Herodotus we have to deal, and Herodotus makes no mention at all of the marsh.² Busolt also performs the questionable feat of drawing up the Athenians parallel to the Charadra, with the entrance to the valley of Avlona on their left, and the sea upon their right flank, and yet bringing the flying centre round behind the left wing, pursued by the Persians, back into the valley of Avlona. It should also be remembered that there is not a hint afforded by Herodotus, or any other ancient authority, of the Athenians having occupied two successive positions, the one at right angles to the other (as afterwards on the battle-field of Plataia); and that with the Athenians in such a position, their right flank would have been exposed to an attack from the ships. According to the theory here advocated there is no such change in the orientation of the Athenian position. The Athenians advance from the Herakleion and Vraná, their base of operations in the field, upon the Persians, who are south of the Charadra, en route for the open pass, between Agrieli and Brezisa. The Persians have time to draw up in some sort of battle array; they have the sea, with their fleet close to land, immediately to their rear. They have the marsh (of Brezisa) on their left flank: they have the Charadra on their right. It is not a position in which they can use


¹ Duncker, in fact, here abandons canon ii., and prefers Pausanias to Herodotus. Leake and Finlay had previously drawn up the Athenians in battle line across the southern pass. Leake, though diminishing the engagement, thought the Persian right was driven back through the northern pass on to Suli (Trikorysthos).

² The marsh comes into Pausanias in the first instance from the Poikile Stoa. The picture there was probably painted long after the event. Cp. § 28 supra. The painter was bound to show a marsh at Marathon. No doubt Pausanias understood by the marsh the northern marsh (Drakonera); but the painter might have understood the southern, or again, the real tactics of the battle may have been forgotten long before his time. But it would be possible to find room for Drakonera in the flight of the Persians, without seriously modifying our main hypothesis. Cp. Wordsworth, op. cit. p. 38.
their cavalry, even if they have many horsemen still on land. As the Greek army quitted its position, and advanced over the interval of eight stades, it probably obeyed the impulse of all Greek armies, and edged away slightly towards the right; but it reached the enemy in unbroken order. How many minutes elapsed is a matter of opinion; but the history of humanity hung in the balance during those fateful seconds while pause, disorder or misgiving had meant ruin to Athens. The Soros may have been meant to mark the point where the shallow centre clashed, and then fell back, apparently defeated, leaving some men lying dead or wounded: on either wing the issue was more doubtful. The flying centre drew the Persians inland towards the valley, where for days the Athenians had watched the foeman: the Greek force was in three pieces, but the Persian likewise. The victorious Greek wings turn in, rather than back, upon the centre, and the day is won. The Barbarians flying make for the fleet, pushed in to support them: some are driven southward into the marsh, some may have fled northward towards the larger swamp: the Athenian pursuers reach the water and assail the foremost ships, securing, all told, but seven vessels. By noon the battle may well have been lost and won. Ere nightfall the Persian course was clear, they were continuing the move, begun perhaps the day before, southwards for Sunion, but now all aboard the ships. What could the victorious Athenians do, but make all speed for Athens and Phaleron, this time doubtless by way of Pallene?&nbsp;§ 36: In the previous discussion the view of Dunker has been allowed to pass pro tanto, that the Persians had a camp of some kind beyond the Charadra, between Stavrockoraki, Drakonera, and the sea. But whether it was just where Dunker puts it—right

1 Tacticians may debate whether the Charadra, in ancient or modern times, would be sufficient to protect an army from being taken by the enemy's cavalry in flank. The silence of Herodotus (§ 7 supra), positive tradition (§ 20 supra), and the speed with which the Persians got them away, all point to the conclusion that the Persian cavalry was not on the field of battle.

2 If these eight stades could be trusted, they might mark, measured from the Herakleion, the point of contact. This would place the point so far up the valley of Avlona as to make the Persians rather than the Greeks the attacking party. The Athenians must have advanced sufficiently out of the valley of Avlona to threaten in flank a force marching for the southern passage. The eight stades may represent an estimate of the distance intervening when the two armies were actually in battle array.

3 Thucyd. 5. 71. This would be towards Brexia; so far, good.

4 More probably the Soros is in advance of the point first reached by the centre, before its retreat. The position of the tomb may have been chosen purposely to obliterate, or obscure, the retreat. Cp. § 21 supra.

5 Perhaps this incident is somewhat too Homeric. Cp. Watkiss Lloyd, J. H. & S. ii. 386.

6 The exact day of the battle can hardly be determined with complete assurance, but it was about the full moon of Metageitinion, and September 12 may be regarded as a regulative date. Cp. § 27 supra. Wordsworth, op. cit. p. 39, on the strength of Aristophanes πρὸς ἄρα ἄργος places 2 the crisis of the victory in the evening," but translates the words, when first the day began to wane. There was no moon in the Poikile!

7 Finlay estimated the time from Athens to the plain by the main-road at 63 hours (26 miles), by Kephisia-Vrana at 5h. 26m. (22 miles). Perhaps the soldiers did not all return by one road.

8 Dunker makes two camps, one for the army, another for the fleet. The
in the middle of the marsh—may be doubted. Even if the pavilion of Datis was pitched on Drakonera—a doubtful datum— the mass of the soldiers may have been nearer the Charadra, with the water-course as a protection immediately in front. In any case the source Makaria, a name of good omen for Phoenicians in the fleet, would be completely commanded by the Persian lines. It may also be that the fleet was, wholly or partially, drawn up on the mile and a half of beach indicated just north of the mouth of the Charadra, though Herodotus says nothing of beaching the ships, and expressly leaves them riding at anchor. But all such points are matters of secondary importance, although, given Duncker’s hypothesis, it is not obvious why the Persians crossed the Charadra, or when, or how they come to find themselves engaging the Greeks at a distance of some four kilometres from their camp and ships. For the alternative theory proposed above it may be urged that, given the situation at Marathon, it fully explains the occurrence of the battle when and where it did ex hypothesi occur, with the least violence to the text of Herodotus, and to such other traditions as are in the main reconcilable with Herodotus.

§ 37. The battle of Marathon was primarily a general’s battle. It is a point fairly open to discussion whether the Persians were well advised in selecting their landing-place. It is possible that personal and political considerations may have weighed more than purely strategic or commissariat reasons. Yet it is obvious that had the Athenians been lured or led to fight under the conditions originally selected by the Persians, or by Hippias for them, the issue could hardly have been what it was. Had the Athenians crossed the Charadra and offered battle, with the water-course and four or five kilometres of plain-land behind them, Datis and Hippias would have worked their will on them. It was, perhaps, to have been a case of the

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1 § 28 supra. Lolling discloses the θαρσαρ not on Drakonera, but on Stavrokóral (op. cit. p. 80).
2 § 107. The Persian line of battle has generally been assumed to run north and south. Duncker makes it run east and west. His hypothesis makes the Athenians change front, not the Persians. Accepting his view of the line of Persian advance the hypothesis above defended involves a change of front on the part of the Persians, which might help to explain their defeat, with or without the intervention of Pan. But the hypothesis does not stand and fall with the fortified camp, and the Persian first position north of Charadra. The Persian movement for the pass between the lesser marsh and the mountain: the Athenian advance from Vraná: the Persian front, now based on the sea and the ships, are the essential points. The exact magnitude of the battle remains an open question. The battle-piece was probably exaggerated, to do justice to its results.
3 Leake (op. cit. p. 210) shows that Marathon was not a good place for the Persians to fight in.
4 Hippias had his happy associations with this route (1. 62). He had the Diakria to fall back on.
spider and the fly, and the ways on to the plain of Marathon, all well known to Hippias, had been left invitingly open. But the trappers were trapped. The first advantage was to the Athenians in the occupation of Vraná and the command of the passes by a single army. The second advantage was in the ‘masterly inactivity,’ which reduced the Persians to a stalemate. At this point the Persians might have done well to have divided their forces and made use of their numbers, on any showing vastly superior to the Greeks. They made instead a fatal error from a strategic and tactical point of view. They determined to move with fleet and army together on Athens, either giving the army at Vraná the go-by, or dislodging and compelling it to fight. They moved, probably in early morning, after due preparation, southwards, the fleet flanking the army through the bay. Then was put into force the momentous decision, perhaps previously reached, at least conditionally, and the Athenians delivered the attack. They fought now practically on their own terms, after neutralising every advantage on the Persian side, except the bare and probably not overwhelming superiority of numbers. The battle was now with the soldiers. But even there the strategic genius on the Athenian side had not played its last trump. Whether designed or at least foreseen, whether simply seized and utilised on the spur of the moment, when the Athenian centre paused and gave way, and the Persians and Sakae pursued, the masterly handling of the troops on the field completely outweighed the superiority of numbers and secured victory to the Greeks. If the Pyrgos once bore the memorial of Miltiades, it might mark the point in the field where he stood when the brilliant and decisive manoeuvre was executed: but if so, he must have been on the left not upon the right wing of the Athenians. That he claimed the credit of the victory, long

1 It is possible that Hippias hoped to get through the pass, and fight a second battle of Pellené, the Persian cavalry playing the part this time of the Thessalians: but the Boeotians and Marathon anticipated him. If, however, that was the object, he would have done better to have landed farther south. The precedent, the omens, misled him.

2 It might, perhaps, be argued that this is just what the Persians were doing, or about to do: the fleet moving off with a good portion of the forces, including the cavalry, the best foot-soldiers proceeding to march for Pellené. It is, of course, distressing to adopt any view which diminishes the magnitude of the actual engagement: but the argument, if admitted, would only confirm the position advocated above. That was Busolt’s first thought (Die Lekedaimonier, i. 361 f.).

3 The determination to move, and force a battle, could only be a question of time; cp. p. 240 supra. Hippias, or other traitors, could inform Datès that the Spartans might be expected after the full moon. The movement of the Persians is perfectly intelligible even without calling on the weather, commissariat, disease, superstition and what not, to explain it.

4 That Miltiades commanded the Oineis, and was posted on the extreme left, is a view formerly taken by Stein and others: cp. note to 6. 111. As the Foleamarch was on the right, and as Miltiades is brought into special relation with Kallimachos, it might be argued that Miltiades was on the right wing, but not the Oineis; that post was held by the Aintis, perhaps under Miltiades; cp. note to 6. 110. In any case, moderns ought not to omit the Plataians from the battle array.
before Herodotus awarded it to him, has been already proved. On
one point, however, it might even be suspected that Athenian tradition
did less than justice to the Marathonomachae and their commanders.
The retreat or flight of the centre is ascribable, on the authority
of Herodotus, to a positive and a negative cause. The centre was
opposed to the best troops of the enemy: it had been seriously
weakened, in order that the line of battle might not be out-flanked. But
this retreat turned out a god-send, owing to the mastery in which it was utilised by the Athenian commander. Was this
brilliant contraction of the two wings a movement ordered on the
spur of the moment? Had it not been foreseen, and intended? Was
the flight of the centre a rout, or a preconcerted arrangement? A
Greek commander deliberately thinning his centre, and that moreover to oppose the flower of the enemy’s forces, may be trusted
to have known what to expect. Could not the same strategic genius
which had posted the Athenians at Vrond, have devised this tactical
manoeuvre? Would such a movement have been more difficult than
the recorded charge at the double, as performed by the hoplites? If
the case had not been at least foreseen, could the co-operation of the
two wings have been so easily secured in the rupture and flight of the centre?

§ 38. Finally, the battle of Marathon, though not materially a
great slaughter, nor historically a decisive issue, was a battle the abiding
results of which is it not so much possible to exaggerate, as super-
fuous to estimate. Had the Mede been victorious——it is idle
to speculate upon the sequel. What is plainly and positively visible
in the story of Marathon and in the historic order of events, is the
moral effect by the victory wrought upon Athens and the Athenians,
upon Hellas and the Hellenes at large. Marathon lifted Athens
at one stroke into the position of Hellenic protagonist. Marathon

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1 The exact number of Phyleis, or of men, occupying the centre, the exact
depth, and so on, are matter of speculation. Finlay, op. cit. pp. 386 f., instituted
2 Mr. Watkiss Lloyd, op. cit. p. 388, puts this point very strongly. “It
appears certain from the small number of (Athenians) slain that the victorious
pursuit by the Persians here was chiefly
and at best a driving in of ranks which
obeyed instructions . . . and were prepared
to give ground rather than expose them-
selves to be uselessly crushed.” Such
evolutions would not be beyond the
ability of Greek hoplites; cp. the Spartan
tactics at Thermopylae, 7. 211, where the
Lakedaimonians μακρογόνα ἰόλος ἀγωγοι, as
did the Athenians at Marathon (6. 112).
Cp. § 29 supra. At Platea, on a vastly
larger scale, something like the evolution
was, perhaps, repeated (9. 46, 52 ff.).
3 Hitt. himself had just recorded greater
bloodshed (cp. Thuc. 1. 28) in the Argive
war, the Ionian revolt, the destruction of
Sybaris, to say naught of disasters among
the Barbarians. The figures of the slain,
6. 117, are doubtless authentic: probably
every Barbarian was counted (Finlay sug-
gests, op. cit. p. 389, by the jealous
Spartans!). The Athenian number is
confined to full citizens; the Plataians,
the slaves are not counted.
4 Finlay, op. cit. p. 392, briefly but
eloquently summarised the point: “There
is no battle in ancient or modern times
more deserving of applause for its military
conduct, none more worthy of admiration
for its immediate results on society, or
more beneficial in its permanent influence
on the fate of mankind.”
stimulated the genius and instructed the policy of Themistocles. The Spartan land was all too soon clouded with envy, the friendship of Sparta grew cold in the atmosphere created by the Atheno-Plataian victory,\(^1\) yet the soil of Marathon held the seed of Thermopylae and of Plataia as surely as that of Salamis and of Eurymedon. Even from the Persian point of view the effects of Marathon were by no means insignificant. It is, perhaps, difficult to explain fully the sensational disappearance of the Persians after an engagement which might have seemed to them indecisive: but if Datis,\(^2\) if Hippias,\(^3\) one or both, died in the action, the retreat of their forces is the more intelligible.\(^4\) In any case, the Persian forces departed that they might return, and that soon, upon a grander scale. Yet from Marathon, as it might seem, the Egyptian contingent carried home the spirit of disaffection, which the Ionian revolt had failed to propagate on the Nile; and if the rebellion in Egypt may be traced, even in part, to the Persian fiasco at Marathon, among the immediate results of that single day was a timeous gain, second only in magnitude to the opportune decease of Dareios,\(^5\) and not less profitable for the ultimate salvation of Hellas than the ten years gained by the struggle in Ionia had been, in the first instance, for the development of Athens.

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1 Cp. Appendices VII. § 11, VIII. § 5.
2 Cp. § 30 supra.
3 Cp. § 25 supra.
4 It is also well to remember that the season was advancing, that there were the Eretrian prisoners, that the Kyklades had been added to the empire, that Hippias, if not dead, was old and superstitious, that the Spartans were coming: to say nothing of more speculative reasons for the retreat.
5 Considering the state of Dareios' feelings against Athens (5. 105, 6. 94, 7. 1), one may marvel that the legend of Marathon never explicitly ascribed the king's death to his rage and disgust over the event.
APPENDIX XI

THE PARIAN EXPEDITION


§ 1. The passage (6. 132-136) on the expedition to Paros, and the fate of Miltiades, is a chapter eminently illustrative of the historian's method and materials, mind, and resources. It is short and compact, but not therefore simple and consequent. It is at first sight good history, and on further examination proves in the main to be only another good story. While it bristles with difficulties and problems, it also supplies many historical lights and leads to a critical reader. Taken as a sample of what history was at the time, or of what it became in the hands of Herodotus, the passage surely justifies, not indeed any charge of wilful falsification against the author, but a most vigilant and thorough scepticism in regard to his knowledge, even of comparatively notorious and recent events. It is the purpose of the following paragraphs to discuss, in detail, the character of the Herodotean story, with special reference to dates, sources, and significance, and in comparison with discrepant authorities. Such a discussion tends to determine a conception of the actual course of events, and may be found to throw some new light upon the much debated ethology of the Athenian people.

§ 2. The date of the expedition is not clearly stated, nor even indicated, by Herodotus. It is, however, only reasonable to suppose that some time elapsed after Marathon before this expedition to Paros was undertaken. Or is it to be credited that the Athenians followed hard upon the track of the vanished Persian Armada, or put themselves deliberately within reach of the swarm of Phoenician ships, virtually intact? The autumn of the year, even of the year of Marathon, was hardly the time when the Athenians would have despatched a large fleet, apparently their whole fleet, with soldiers and sailors on board, even to a region of boundless gold. The earliest
point at which it is reasonable to date this expedition, is the spring of the year following the battle of Marathon, i.e. 489 B.C.¹ The Athenians might by that time have been assured that the Persians were not intending an immediate re-invasion. Attica was probably secured, from the side of Aigina, by the possession of the hostages interned in the previous year (6. 73). The city, flushed with triumph, was perhaps in a mood to give carte blanche, or at least a roving commission, to the chief hero of Marathon still surviving, who should win them other islands, as he had previously won them Lemnos: or, at least, should purge the Kyklades of medism, and put Aigina completely at their mercy. The duration of the expedition, assuming it to have been confined to Paros, appears to be clearly marked as under thirty days, the actual siege, or blockade, lasting exactly six-and-twenty (c. 135). This last figure is a chronological datum which has all the appearance of a genuine historic tradition. But, apart from the personal motives of Miltiades, it is not easy to see, in the text of Herodotus, why the siege should have been abandoned so soon: and if there were not forthcoming, from other sources, a sufficient reason for the retirement of the Athenians, this easy and rapid abandonment of the undertaking would support the argument of those who have dated the expedition against Paros to the same year as Marathon: for there was certainly time enough in that year for an undertaking which lasted less than a month, whatever the time which it may have been expected to occupy. But the tradition preserved by Cornelius Nepos and Stephanus Byzantinus to be considered below (§ 5) disposes of this argument. How soon after the retirement of Miltiades the treachery of Timo was discovered, and the case referred to Delphi, or what the date of the Pythian response, does not appear (c. 135): presumably it was subsequent to the trial of Miltiades at Athens, and even to his death.² The trial may be placed provisionally soon after the return of Miltiades to Athens in 489 B.C., but there is nothing to determine how soon after his trial and condemnation Miltiades died, nor how soon after his death his son Kimon paid the fine inflicted upon the father. An interval thereafter gives the earliest date at which Herodotus could have gathered, or composed, the whole story, but the length of that interval there is little or nothing in the passage to indicate; though it may be argued that some considerable time must have elapsed before the story of what actually happened could have been so far metamorphosed with impunity as appears to have been done in this case. The tone and character of the story would, to say the least, be consistent with the hypothesis that Kimon too was dead and gone ere Herodotus was writing. This argument would

¹ So Petavius (D. Petav., Rationarium, i. 3, 2 haec proximo anno ab Marathonia victoria videntur accedisse. Cp. Duncker, vi. ² 152.
² The text, of course, dates the oracle before the trial and end of Miltiades, as the Parians apply to Delphi as soon as they are quit of the blockade. ὄς σφαιρή ἤμνης τῆς πολιορκίας ἐγχέει c. 135.
bring the composition down some time after 449 B.C., i.e. upwards of forty years after the event.

§ 3. The sources of the story are in part specified, at least in general terms, by Herodotus, and may in part be inferred from his text. A 'Pan-hellenic' authority is offered for one portion, a local Parian authority for the rest.¹ Such assertions, however, cannot be taken au pied de la lettre. Pan-hellenic tradition surely was not silent on the latter part of the story; the Parians surely had views on the earlier: indeed, πάντες Ἑλληνες, taken strictly, covers the Parian and every other 'source.' But the phrase cannot be taken strictly, nor can it mean much more than that no authority contradicted the story as told so far: while, conversely, the Parian account of the sequel contradicted some other account, or accounts, albeit Herodotus gives it preference. One or more Athenian reports there must have been of the affair, and the question arises whether 'Pan-hellenic' tradition in this case is anything more than uncontradicted Athenian tradition, or at most anything more than tradition common to Athenians and Parians.² It might be thought that there is some indication (especially in c. 135) of Delphic authority for parts of this story, and probably no authority would be more likely with Herodotus to stand for the common voice of Hellas.³ But the Delphic incident, the Delphic formula in the story are no conclusive proof of a Delphic source for the passage; Parians, even Athenians, would be interested in the preservation of the Response, Timo herself, or her friends not least of all. From first to last there is nothing to push the story's genesis beyond Athenian and Parian sources: but the 'contagmination' of these sources has created a problem not free from difficulty. At first sight, indeed, the question might appear to be settled by the formula above quoted, which goes to show that cc. 132, 133 give an uncontradicted Athenian story, while cc. 134-136 follow a special and divergent story told by Parians. But the distribution of responsibility cannot be effected so simply as on that wise. Admitting not merely c. 134 but even c. 135 to be in toto from Paros, it is obvious that the same cannot possibly be true of c. 136, which records the prosecution and fate of Miltiades, the expiation of Kimon, events which Herodotus, or his authorities, surely found in Attic tradition. The nature and genesis of this tradition may be to some extent detected in the passage. There had been speeches made at the trial,⁴ by the pursuer, Xanthippos son of Ariphron (and father of Pericles), who presumably gave one account of the affair, and of its antecedents, an account reflected, perhaps, in part into c. 132: speeches, too, by the friends of the accused (ὑπεραπτικόντο εἰς φίλοι c. 136), who told the story of the taking of Lemnos, and paid their contribution to the 'memories of Marathon,' which are here seen in the making.⁵ If his

¹ δ. 134 εἰ μὲν δὴ τοσάτο ναὶ λέγειν αἱ πάντες Ἑλληνες λέγως, τὸ ἐνδείξαν ἃτοι Πάροι γενέσθαι ὧδε λέγειν.
advocates did not parade the services of Miltiades on the Danube, it must have been because those services had already been done duty on a similar occasion; but is it conceivable that no account was given of the expedition to Paros itself? To the question why Miltiades had gone to Paros at all, they may have replied that it was to avenge and punish the Parians for their part in the Marathonian campaign—that, and something more: and in the somewhat inconsistent account of the antecedents of the expedition, given in cc. 132, 133, we may find reminiscences of the forensic debate held by the rival advocates at the trial of Miltiades, even if we discover in the far-fetched reference to Lysagoras, and his influence on the action, a jet from the Parian fountain-head. It will at least be granted that allusion at the trial must have been made to the antecedents of the expedition, and that reminiscences of those antecedents are found in cc. 132, 133. Not less certainly must the course of the expedition have been recounted, and in particular the abandonment of the siege justified, as well as might be, in the mouths of Miltiades his friends. The Herodotean version ascribes the fiasco, wholly and solely, to the (supernatural) fright of Miltiades, and the resultant injury to his person. This explanation is expressly a Parian account: it is the less remarkable that there was a variant report as to the situation of the injury, some locating it in the thigh, others in the knee. An injury to the knee is more probable than an injury to the thigh, if the injury was due simply to a leap, and a sprain. Herodotus prefers the thigh. How a sprain (σπασθήμα) could result in gangrene (σφακέλωταν το τού μυρίου και σαπέντος c. 136) is not obvious: those who reported that the knee was the seat of the injury appear to have provided an abrasion of the skin (προσπταύμα). The knee would have been bare, not the thigh. Taking the text of Herodotus strictly this variation might be regarded as a variation within the area of the Parian traditions. But, as already seen, Parian authorities are not followed to the end; and this variation may be due to the dialectic of afterthought, here or there, working very much on the lines of the criticism just above given. The truth, perhaps, was that Miltiades returned from Paros honourably wounded; but of that anon. In either case, if his friends could allege any colourable pretext for the abandonment of the siege, it was surely alleged on the trial; but no appeal could alter the cruel facts that Miltiades had disappointed expectations, involved the State in expense, failed to punish the Parians, and had nothing to show for his promises but his

1 See 6. 104, and Appendix III. § 14 supra.
2 Cfr. c. 133 πρόφασεν ἐξευν ὑπεκινεῖται ὅπου ἐκτούτο ἀπερίδεται λόγῳ ἄνω κτλ. Also, Nēsos, and Stephen sch. n. Πάρος.
3 Lysagoras son of Timias may have had something to say to the mediator of Paros, and so his name may have been mentioned at the trial; in which case, Herodotus has only used the (anti-Phailai) tradition, which substituted a personal for a public motive in the mind of Miltiades.
4 οδέ νήσων το γόνον προσπταύματα Μέλικου. Cfr. note ad l.
wound. The technical precision with which the procedure against Miltiades is recorded, affords some guarantee of the presence of the Attic source, or sources: as regards the Parian expedition, they cannot be thought favourable to Miltiades.¹ To call them 'Alkmidon,' however, would imply, first, more definite a theory respecting the heads, or channels, of Attic tradition than seems warranted by the case; secondly, more passive a relation to his sources, on the part of Herodotus, than the art and character of his work throughout suggest. In this case the 'Pan-hellenic' tradition is probably Attic tradition, which the writer found uncontradicted, though it is in itself composite tradition. Even the 'Parian' version of a part of the story might be located not at Paros, but at Delphi, were it not for the general probability and the intrinsic hint of a personal visit to Paros, and to “the enclosure of Demeter Thesmophoros on the hill in front of the city.” There, perhaps, Herodotus learned the local Parian version, which explained the failure of Miltiades in terms acceptable to local patriotism, and doubly acceptable to Herodotus from its connexion with things divine.

§ 4. Whatever its origin, the story is full of significance, and certainly not wholly devoid of truth, though to extract the historic action, even in outline, may be a forlorn hope, the most plausible reconstruction still leaving something unexplained. The most certain fact, or group of facts, is the prosecution, trial, and condemnation of Miltiades: the accuser's name may be regarded as known, so too the nature of the charge,² and the verdict. Whether Miltiades died “in prison”³ or in his own house, whether Kimon discharged the fine, or Kallias paid it for him,⁴ these and other such points are disputable. Again, that Miltiades led an Athenian expedition against Paros, that the expedition failed, after a siege of twenty-six days, that his trial and condemnation were in consequence of this failure, form a series of facts not less certain than the first group above mentioned. But here certainties end, and conjectures begin. The antecedents and the course of the expedition cannot be regarded as accurately ascertainable. It has been suggested above that the account given by Herodotus of the antecedents of the expedition goes back ultimately not so much to actual memory, or tradition, of the proceedings in question, as to the representations made, on one side or other, at the subsequent trial. The verdict might seem to attest the partial truth of the accuser's account of the affair: and the verdict may not have been a wild or indefensible perversion of justice.⁵ Miltiades may have been respon-

¹ In the heyday of the Athenian empire the memory of the Parian fiasco was not calculated to gratify the amour propre of the imperial democracy.
² See note 6. 136. ἀναφέρειν seems better attested than the προσδοκία (προσδοκία) of Nepos i.e., infra, or the peculium (ἀναφέρειν ἵππον βάτων) of Trogus, 5. Otherwise there would be a good deal to say in favour of peculium. As to the verdict, see p. 226 infra.
³ Aulus Gell. 17, 21 follows Nepos and Valer. Max. 5, 3; cp. Plutarch, Küm. 4.
⁴ Cp. Plutarch, i.e.
⁵ The Delphic formula which acquitted Miltiades. Cp. § 6 infra.
sible for undertakings and promises not essentially misrepresented in the account of his original speech, c. 132. It is, however, difficult to believe that he gave the Athenians, in the Bule, in the Ekklesia, no inkling, no suggestion of the destination of the fleet. Perhaps secrecy might have been advocated, and conceded, on grounds of policy, but Miltiades’ previous record, his connexion with Thrace, the words put into his mouth, the existing situation, would have made Thasos, rather than Paros, the natural bourne of the expedition, and it is even conceivable that such an idea was left to circulate, the better to cover the real purpose of the expedition. If the expedition was then, apparently diverted to Paros, a door would have been opened to such suspicions of purely personal motives as are suggested in the relations of Miltiades and Lysagoras.

But military and political grounds for the attack on the capital of the Kyklades at this time are not far to seek, and it was justifiable, as an act of policy, even more in view of the future relations of Athens to Persia, to Aigina, than in the light of the previous medism of Paros. The demand for 100 T. from the Parians was not overwhelming—a sum that might not have sufficed much more than to cover the expenses of the expedition, and no more than Sikyon had just paid to Argos, in a somewhat similar case.

It would be absurd to suppose that Miltiades sent his herald to demand this sum for himself: and it may be reasonably conjectured that his message to the Parians was not confined to this one article. The expedition was not a mere act of piracy, but a chapter in the war with the Mede and his subjects. So much might, perhaps, have been inferred by modern criticism from the text of Herodotus, even if ancient tradition, or criticism, had not justified, or anticipated, the inference.

§ 5. The more rational theory, or representation of the affair, in some respects an alternative to the Herodotean, has been preserved by Cornelius Nepos, and others. The immediate authority with Nepos was here probably Ephoros: but Ephoros had earlier authorities, some, perhaps, older than Herodotus himself, though not other than Herodotus might have used, if so minded. In regard to the course of the action Herodotus had deliberately turned away from the better, the ‘Pan-Hellenic,’ tradition to follow the local and ex parte Parian account, for a fairly obvious reason, to wit, that the Parian account substitutes a

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1 Grote, iv. p. 60, remarks that ‘No man except Miltiades ever dared to raise his voice in the Athenian Assembly and say—‘Give me a fleet of ships’” etc. But did Miltiades? Two stories of Themistocles (1. ‘Aσπηρ, vul. c. 22; 2. Plutarch, Them. 20) and the case of Pericles (Plutarch, Per. 23) seem to show that the use of ‘secret-service money’ was understood at Athens. The ανάρτας voted occasionally to Strategi, or a Strategos, concerned means not ends. It is hardly credible that the Athenians voted Miltiades ανάρτας in the dark, but the genesis of a statement to that effect may have been facilitated by the partial precedents quoted.

2 Op. case of Naxos, Hist. 5. 33.

3 Nepos (i.e. Ephoros), indeed, puts the expenses at half the sum: yet represents the expedition as issued with a larger commission.

4 6. 92.
supernatural for a natural explanation of the failure of Miltiades, and
tends therefore to point a moral more acceptable to the mind of
Herodotus. The whole account of the affair from first to last as given
by Nepos is so reasonable and coherent that the chief ground for
doubting it is to be found in these, its good qualities. This version
is so little open to criticism that it might be suspected of being a
product of criticism: it so completely avoids and abolishes the diffi-
culties in the Herodotean story that it might be suspected of a pur-
pose and design to supplant that version of the affair. This is a
doubt which cannot be wholly avoided: it is, however, only reason-
able to remember that the account given by Herodotus is confessedly
ex parte, and obviously pragmatic: that there were other traditions
and authorities in the fifth century: and that Ephoros may have used
them. The relation between the two extant accounts might provision-
ally be stated as follows. It is obvious that the story of the Parian
expedition as told by Herodotus is at once incomplete and doctrinaire;
but while as a whole it cannot stand criticism, some of the details may
be thoroughly sound. The account as told by Ephoros is as a whole
intelligible and probable; but it is not unlikely that some details may
have been due to afterthought, or art, rather than to tradition and
memory. The antecedents, course and sequel of the expedition are
related to the following effect. The Athenians commission Miltiades
in command of seventy ships to chastise the islands which had assisted
the Barbarians. The commission, to say the least of it, is wide: the
Kyklades presumably were intended, Samos, Chios, Lesbos, probably
even Thasos would be covered by its terms. Several islands he
reduced to their allegiance, some by persuasion, some by force. Paros
resisted persuasion, and was invested, with a proper siege train. These
machines are somewhat out of place in a fleet that has scoured the
Aegean. Paros is on the point of capitulating when a fire is seen
—upon the horizon, which was misinterpreted by the besieged and
besiegers alike as a signal of the approach of the Persians. The
Parians withdrew their capitulation and Miltiades burnt his engines
(sic), and made home. He is charged with treason in allowing Paros
to escape; and the explanation given by the accusers is that he was

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2 Miltiades, c. 7.
3 Ut insulas, quae barbaros adjuverant, bello persequeen tur.
4 Plebanque ad officium redire coegit, nonnullas vi expugnavit.
5 Vixi ac testudinibus (Nepos), μυτέ-
χαρισμα (Steph. B.),
6 Incontinenti (Nepos), πειραὶ τῶν Μῶκων
(Steph.), which at least is possible. Nepos,
however, has corrected the spontaneous
combustion of the wood in Ephoros (apud
Steph. f. ακροδώρος cp. Thuc. 2. 77) by
necio quo casu. Neither suggests a ruse.
7 Steph. only mentions the Parians, and
represents them as thinking the signal
given by Datis. Nepos has a double
correction 'ab oppidandis aut oppugnatoribus'
to explain the retirement of Miltiades; a
classceipta regis—probably to get rid of
Datis, who if not left dead at Marathon,
was at least not expected to reappear so
soon after.
8 Hence the proverb διακερδῆς
(Steph.). That the term was invented on
this occasion may fairly be doubted.
9 Puddius. Troops Pomp. apud
Justin. 2. 15 has 'peculator.'
Miltiades was incapacitated for conducting his own defence by wounds received in the siege: his brother 'Tisagoras' spoke on his behalf. To the sequel as told by Herodotus, Nepos adds that the fine of fifty talents represented the sum expended on the expedition, and that Miltiades, being unable to pay, was put into prison, or bonds, and there died. The first statement might be an argument from analogies, though a probable one. The inability to pay might be no more than an inference from the fact that it was not Miltiades who actually paid the fine, and the 'imprisonment' might be a further inference. Thus, particular details may have to be discounted or discredited, but can it be doubted that the account preserved in the later authorities, and based in them probably on Ephoros, but not therefore to be denied all earlier authority, gives, on the whole, a more probable and intelligible account of the proceedings in question, particularly of the purpose and course of the expedition, than the story told by Herodotus?

§ 6. One further question may here be appropriately discussed in brief. A controversy has existed in regard to the judgment to be passed on the Athenians for their treatment of Miltiades, and even the apology of Grote has not succeeded in clearing them of all suspicion of ingratitude, and fickleness. The attack and the apology have both been conducted in the twilight; the issue raised has been partly a false one. The more critical estimate of the sources, the recovery of the probable design and course of the expedition, the perception of the party bearings of the trial of Miltiades conduce to put the matter in another light, and in another plane. Last, and not least, the reduction of the figure of Miltiades to its proper proportions in the story of Marathon reduces the supposed case against Athens. Miltiades had deserved well of the state, but he had not deserved so well as the Marathonian legend, grossly developed in his favour, implied. The peripety in his fortunes was less, probably in both directions, than the art and moral of the story-tellers represent. Too much,
indeed, has been made of the fate of Miltiades and too little of the policy and action of Athens after Marathon. Such results are due in part to the preference accorded to biography over history, to art over science. In particular, the zeal of Xanthippos and his friends has hardly received due attention. The Athenian courts had upon a recent occasion held the balance fairly between these rival families and factions, whose mutual jealousies have deeply coloured the records of Attic history: what reason is there to expect a deliberate misjudgment, or a special ingratitude on this occasion? Xanthippos and his friends had presumably some case against Miltiades, and they succeeded in persuading the ‘people,’ but only to exact at most the bare costs of an expedition, for the success of which Miltiades had perhaps made himself surety, for the failure of which he was in any case admittedly responsible, even if the charges of bribery, treason, and so on were, in the eyes of the court, as the penalty assessed seems to show, untrue. The actual course of procedure was probably by an ἀκεραία, but the final stage of the trial was, perhaps, before a Dikastery. In any case, the mass of the people was not to be charged with any special degree of moral obliquity: personal feeling, political rivalry, lay rather at the door of the well-born opponents of Miltiades, who exploited the institutions of Athens for personal ends. The bulk of the citizens might well have cried: “A plague o’ both your houses.” It is little short of absurd to indict the Demos of 489 B.C., still far removed from the material and moral decadence of the Ekklesiastes in 406 B.C. on a special charge of political ingratitude, which, if it fits any one, should be saddled on Xanthippos and his friends. Quicquid delirant reges plecuntur Achivi. The masses are visited for the madness of their leaders. Even if there were any truth in the notion that Miltiades was condemned for fear he should establish a tyranny it must have been his personal enemies who raised the scare. But the statement looks more transparently like an afterthought than any other item in the story as told by Nepos. The wounds of Miltiades were not à la Pisistratos: he was dying. The tyrant-motif is perhaps borrowed from the former trial, in which Miltiades was acquitted. In fine, reduced to its proper proportions, the second trial of Miltiades is no very strong or special ground for an indictment of the Athenian people as a whole, or of the democratic institutions of the day, no, not even were it proved that under monarchy or oligarchy Miltiades might have gone scot-free. The fair presumption is that the accused was not wholly blameless, or at least that his personal opponents had a good case against him. The trial was not a symptom or result of democratic ingratitude, much less of wild revenge: it was, so far as it was ‘political,’ an advantage gained by one Eupatrid ring, or faction,

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1 Xen. Hell. 1. 7. Xenophon is, of course, a somewhat suspicious witness, but the execution of the victors of Arginusae is far harder to whitewash than the fine inflicted on the adventurer of Paros.

2 Milt. c. 8.

3 Hdt. 1. 59.
over another, and not meaner in its motives probably than the subsequent impeachment of Kimon by Perikles. The verdict was remarkable for its moderation; it looks like a compromise. But, in any case, the agent least to blame in the matter is probably the Demos of that time in its Assembly. The abuse of democratic institutions for political and party purposes shows, of course, that institutions cannot safeguard themselves, but is hardly a special ground for indicting the Commons. Noblesse oblige. The Commons were very much in the hands of their leaders, and the leaders at this time were still almost exclusively Eupatriots. The state of Athens was never perfect, but when was the ‘People’ in better case and spirit than in the thirty years, or generation, embracing the expulsion of the Peisistratids and the victory of Salamis? Holding no brief, whether for or against Democracy, but simply desirous to recover the true course of events and actions, or, failing that, at least to understand the given record, a modern student may well feel, after examination of the witnesses to the Parian expedition, that the action of the Athenians was not so immoral and irrational as the story in Herodotus would imply. Verily, the gods, who endorsed, after their own fashion, the popular judgment on Miltiades, had some better ground for interposition than the vague and personal ἐβρευ of the noble leader, which in the eyes of Herodotus plainly brought the fate of Miltiades into the same category as the fates of Skyles, Kandales, and other infatuated and guilty men. We can hardly share the pious philosophy, which enables the historian to satisfy his conscience over the miserable end of the reputed victor of Marathon, by tracing it to a divine judgment upon a comparatively venial sacrilege, even admitting that the reported act at Paros is to be taken as symbolical of the man’s nature and character, which in turn would justify his divinely-ordered doom. If the conception of his character be an inference from his fate, that were a further evidence how largely afterthought has taken the place of memory in the story, and how idle it is to argue constructively upon the slight and phantastic basis of fact supplied by the artificialised traditions of Herodotus, to the political programme or the judicial action of the Athenian state as exhibited in the treatment of Miltiades.

1 1L. & 27. The proceedings against Miltiades may have arisen out of his ἐθνική.
2 Plato, Gorg. 516 Μιλτιάδην δὲ τὸν ἐν Μαραθῶν ἐις τὸ βάραθρον ἐμβαλεῖν ἐφορίασεν, καὶ εἴ μὴ διά τὸν πρώτον ἐκέκουσαν αὐτός; The question, implying an affirmative, if it has any truth in it, might be referred to a ἀρχαῖα, or to proceedings in the Ekklesia antecedent to the trial proper. It cannot stand for the verdict, against Herodotus, et alia. Perhaps it was simply borrowed from the proposal of the prosecutors, cp. Grote, iv. 52.
3 Cp. Isokrates, Λεγων. §§ 20 ff. (7. 144, 145), and the list of Demagogues in the Αἰθρ. πολ. c. 28.
4 1L. πολ. c. 28 τὸν μὲν δύναν προσετήθη, καὶ Ζανόπης καὶ τῶν δὲ σωρίων Μιλτιάδης.
5 4. 79.
6 1. 8.
7 Cp. 6. 135 ἢ δὲ Περικλῆς ὥσπερ ἄρσεν ὑποκείμεν ἐν τῷ αὐχετώ τοῖς διὸς, διὰ δὲν ἔγαρ Μιλτιάδης τελευτᾷ μη εὖ, φαντάζει οἱ τῶν κακῶν κατηγορών.
8 Grote, l. cit., goes so far as to admit that Miltiades was "corrupted by success," without apparently perceiving that the argument which proves the corruption of Miltiades would prove the corruption of Athens.
APPENDIX XII

THE LIBYAN LOGI

§ 1. General character and contents of the Libyan Logi: purpose of this Appendix.

§ 1. There is no part, or section, of the work of Herodotus, with the possible exception of Bk. 2, more strongly endowed with a distinct character, and an obvious anatomy, than the Libyan Logi (Bk. 4, cc. 145-205).1 The analysis of the passage shows that it is made up of two different elements, the description of the land and native tribes of Libya, as they were in the historian's own day; the record of certain historical events, of which Libya had been the scene.2 This historical record is, in turn, subdivided into two sections, which are artificially separated, in the very structure of the whole passage, by the interposition of the geographical and ethnographical excursus just mentioned. The former section, thus constituted, relates the fortunes of the Hellenes in Libya, tracing the antecedents of Kyrene through Thera back to Lakedaimon, and bringing the story down to a point ex hypothesi synchronous with the expedition of Dareios into Europe, which forms the ostensible point of departure for the connected history in the second volume of Herodotus' work. The latter historical section narrates the story of a Persian expedition from Egypt, undertaken to re-establish the Battillad monarchy in the Kyrenaica, about the time when Dareios was making his way through Thrace into Scythia. The narrative, thus artificially divided in the literary opus, is really con-

1 The title is justified by 2. 161.
2 Cp. Introduction, vol. I, p. xxxii. So completely independent are these two elements that they are usually divorced in modern retractions, geographers dealing with the one, historians with the other.
tinuous in time and in causality. The story has complete historic unity in all its stages, though within the historic sequence more than one latent dramatic unit seems to suggest itself. A justification, however, for the separation of the continuous story into the two sections just indicated may be found in the observation that the earlier section is all purely Hellenic story, the scene of which is laid now at Sparta, now in Thera, now at Delphi, now in Libya, and has never anything to say to Persia, and the advance of the Persian power; while the later section brings the Persians into contact with the Greeks in Libya, and so potentially into touch with all Libya and its inhabitants, and thus introduces a new interest, which serves to relate the Libyan incidents to the major theme of the whole work. That this relation is artificially obtained, in this particular context, at the expense of some inconsequence, exaggeration, and improbability, is an observation not to be evaded by an attentive reader; the rather, seeing that the diminished scale upon which the actual operations of the Persians in Libya are conducted, or narrated, is proportionate neither to the historian’s theory of the purposes of the expedition, nor to the historical and the geographical introductions and excursus, of which it is the excuse, and should have been the climax. These observations, arising mainly out of the mere analysis of the whole passage, suggest that in the Libyan Logi are combined at least three elements, or groups of materials, of different orders, and coming from different sources: first, a story, or group of stories, preserving reminiscences of a Persian expedition into Libya, approximately synchronous with the adventures of Dareios in Europe: secondly, a story, or series of stories, largely if not wholly independent, which preserve the record of the Hellenic settlement in Libya, and its antecedents: thirdly, a mass of information, geographical and ethnographical, concerning the land and the native population of Libya, which probably formed no part of either historical context, until Herodotus brought this and that together into his one scheme. Thus was evolved, in the last instance, the highly complex and artificial unity, to be known as the Libyan Logi of Herodotus, only dove-tailed into the whole scheme of the work by a tour de force, yet admitting of very simple analysis in itself, and to be isolated, and separately considered, more easily and more reasonably than any other portion of the work, with exception of the Egyptian Logi (Bk. 2), to which it forms an obvious and not wholly accidental analogy, upon a smaller scale. The intrinsic insularity of the Libyan Logi makes it possible for the commentator to perform his proper task more completely in regard to them than in regard to any other portion of the work, always excepting Bk. 2, and the notes ad ut. in this edition may be taken as a tolerably full commentary on the primary aspects of the chapters in question. Still, the commentator is bound to follow the order of exposition determined by his authority, and must deal with each item as it presents itself in the text. It is convenient to liberate the discussion of a composite literary whole from
the sequence dictated by the author’s presentation of his materials; a more clearly reasoned critique, a fuller appreciation of the *ensemble*, are the rewards of such a method. This Appendix especially aims at supplementing the notes on the text, and the observations in the Introduction bearing upon the subject, first, in regard to the historical course of events, secondly, in regard to the problems of source and of value as well of the geographical as of the historical matters in question. It will be convenient to deal first with the portion of the narrative *ex hypothesi* co-ordinate with the general narrative and chronological scheme of these Books: secondly, with the legendary and historical preface thereto. The ethnography and geography, which have obviously an independent interest and are presumably drawn from a different source, or from different sources, will be most conveniently dealt with in the third place, as a separable complex.

§ 2. In regard to the expedition of the Persians into Libya, it is by no means easy to detach the actual course of events from the atmosphere of apology, of moral reflection, and of political pragmatism, with which it is enveloped, in the pages of Herodotus. The occasion of the expedition is probably correctly stated. The Battaiad king, or tyrant, of Kyrene, Arkesilas III., had been assassinated in Barke; his mother, Pheretime, applied to the Persian satrap, Aryandes of Egypt, to punish the assassins, and to maintain, or to restore, the medizing dynasty (cc. 165-167). A force was despatched to effect that object. Herodotus represents the force as consisting of the whole available army and navy in Egypt; but this representation agrees rather with his own theory, that the true purpose of the expedition was the conquest of Libya, than with the sequel of the story, as narrated by himself. The actual nomination of the Persian general and of the Persian admiral may be thought to indicate that the expedition was indeed a joint expedition by the two services; but it is neither in itself likely that Egypt was denuded of its garrison, nor consonant with the recorded sequel, that the expedition was conducted upon the scale reported by Herodotus. The fates of Barke and of Kyrene are very different in the story, and this difference must be accepted as historical, whatever may be thought of the alleged explanation. Barke, the scene of the tyrannicide, was taken, its inhabitants enslaved, or otherwise cruelly punished. Kyrene escaped scot-free. But the capture of Barke was not easily effected. For nine months the Barkaeans offered a stout and ingenious resistance: they were then circumvented by a trick, involving perjury on the part of their captors. The incidents, and even the duration of the siege, may perhaps be admitted as historical, though the latter point at least looks like an exaggeration; but the anecdote of the ruse is not merely more obviously suspicious in itself, but is further discredited by the existence of a variant, in which the Persian general has the more probable name Arsames, the Barkaeans make overtures for peace, the treachery, if not wholly absent, is considerably reduced, and the elaborate and picturesque items of the pit and the sham
surface are eliminated. In all such cases a later and more probable story may, of course, be only a product of reflection upon the earlier and genuine tradition: but the variant on the Persian commander's name, in this case, is some slight guarantee of the existence of a separate source, a guarantee reinforced by clearer evidence for other stages, or chapters, in the history of the Kyrenaica. The atrocious vengeance of Pheretim on the Barkaeans, and the transportation of the remnant to Baktria are items which have nothing intrinsically incredible about them, although if a Barka existed in Baktria, the nominal coincidence might have given rise to a supposed connexion, and the supposed connexion have generated an historical fable. If the Persian forces on the way back to Egypt were so roughly handled by the Libyans en route as Herodotus asserts, it was not many of their Barkaeans captives they could have sent up to King Dareios: unless, indeed, the prisoners had been conveyed by sea, a point unspecified in the story. In any case it is not easy to discover whence the population of the city was drawn, the government of which Pheretim confided to the innocent Battiai; or what these Battiai among the Barkaeans had been about all the nine months of the siege.

The account of the deliverance of Kyrene (cc. 203 f.) is a story still more extraordinary, still more transparently fabulous. It must be granted that Kyrene escaped the fate of Barke. It may be taken as fact that the Persians passed through the city of Kyrene, and also received from the Kyreneans supplies, at least for their return to Egypt. It may fairly be suspected that the understanding between Kyrene and the Persians at this time went much farther; that Kyrene preserved or recovered its loyalty to the Persian connexion, to the Battiai dynasty, and even viewed the fate of Barke without displeasure. That on second thoughts the Persians resolved to seize and sack Kyrene: that the Kyreneans shut their gates in time: that a divine panic befell the Persians, and wrought deliverance for Kyrene are almost indisputable fictions, with a transparently apologetic intention. What Badres the admiral is doing with the marching column, or why Amasis the general should hesitate to seize Kyrene, if he has been sent to conquer 'all Libya,' are questions which have not disturbed Herodotus, but must tend to the further discredit of his story at the bar of historical criticism.

The miserable end of Pheretim (c. 205) is, doubtless, an historical fact. Whether her vengeance on the Barkaeans has been exaggerated in order to justify the divine judgment upon her, attested in her horrible fate, might be questioned: but to regard the whole story of the Persian expedition as constructed, or even as preserved, simply and solely to point the moral of the fate of Pheretim is to underestimate the significance of the story and the constructive plan of the Herodotean work. The story of the expedition, the purpose of which has been

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1 Polyainos 7. 28, 1.
magnified, so as to co-ordinate it with the expedition of Dareios into Scythia, is introduced, not for the sake of the pious moral which forms, indeed, its characteristic climax, but for the sake of obtaining an excuse for the description of Libya and the Libyans, and for the history of the Greek settlement in Libya and its antecedents, two great chapters which form the bulk of the Libyan Logi, and swell them into something like an equivalent for the Scythian Logi, with which they were to be co-ordinate. The apologetic purpose of the story, especially as regards Kyrene, is obvious: and, as elsewhere pointed out, there is a curious parallel, surely not quite accidental, between the fates of Eretria and Athens on the one part, and the fates of Barke and Kyrene on the other, which makes it possible to believe that the story of the deliverance of Kyrene owed some of its ethos, some of its details, to the Marathonian legend. In regard to the source from which Herodotus derived the story, internal evidences might be taken to suggest that he had no written authority, but gathered the traditions in Kyrene itself, or in Egypt, to say nothing of the Barkaean remnant in Baktria. Such sources are not mutually exclusive alternatives; but there is no need, and little evidence, to carry Herodotus to Baktria, or even to Kyrene. There is nothing in the story which he might not have heard in Egypt, from men of Kyrene, or from other Greeks in Naukratia. As it is absolutely certain that Herodotus had been to Egypt, there is no objection to referring this portion of the Libyan Logi to exclusively Graeco-Egyptian sources. Had a visit to Kyrene been demonstrable, it would be natural to suppose that this story was, at least in part, from local sources.

The date of the expedition has been a matter of dispute. Herodotus makes it synchronous with the expedition of Dareios into Scythia, but the synchronism is suspicious, and probably pragmatic, though Duncker has accepted it, and made use of it to account for the apparent absence of the Phoenicians from the fleet serving in Scythia (cp. p. 34 supra). Wiedemann has dated the expedition despatched by Aryandes against Barke as early as 518 B.C. on the ground that Aryandes rebelled and was suppressed in 517 B.C. by Dareios in person, the date being determined by the record of the Apis-epiphanies (cp. Egypt. Gesch. ii. 676 ff.). Busolt (Gr. Gesch. ii. 21) disputes this argument, but in order to do so takes Dareios to Egypt about 493 B.C. If Polyainos (7. 11, 7) were to be trusted, and Busolt's date for Dareios' visit were correct, the rebellion of Aryandes would be brought down to about 494 B.C., and the expedition against Barke might date any time before that year. Whether Aryandes despatched the

1 Appendix X. § 10 supra.
2 On the Keramik evidence for a connexion between Naukratia and Kyrene, cp. Cecil Smith in Flinders Petrie's Naukratia, pt. 1, § 92, p. 58 (1888), and E. A. Gardiner, Ælct. ii. pp. 43 f. (1888). The earliest coinage of Kyrene was on the Euboic standard, cp. B. Head, Hist. Num. p. 726. Ionians (e.g. Samos) were on good terms with Kyrene, cp. p. 267 infra.
Persian forces into Libya, or recalled them, to facilitate his erection of Egypt into a separate kingdom, might be disputed:—as also, whether the Libyan expedition stood in any causal relation to the Egyptian rebellion. But whether the expedition to Barke stood in any causal relation to the rebellion of Aryandes or not, it must be assumed that Herodotus is right in dating it during the government of Aryandes in Egypt, and after the death of Cambyses. If Wiedemann be right in his date for the revolt and suppression of Aryandes, the Persian expedition to Barke would be one of the earliest events falling in the period comprised by the chronological framework of these Books (519-489 B.C.). In any case, the earlier history of Kyrene, still more the preface or antecedents thereto, as narrated by Herodotus, lie outside and before the explicit and continuous scheme of events in this volume: and the introduction of these matters is to be justified rather in view of the general purposes of the work of Herodotus, than in view of the immediate necessities of the special case. A proximate view displays some want of proportion between the subject proper and the prefatory matter: but, when the latter is balanced against the Scythian Logi, or viewed as a contribution to the growing scheme of a work which came to be an all but complete mirror of the world, as known to Herodotus, the disproportion is lost in a whole which has already digested the colossal excursus upon the history and antiquities of Egypt.

§ 3. The historical portion of the preface to the story of the Persian expedition falls into three obviously distinct sections. The antecedent history of Kyrene and its prineses is given from the foundation of the colony to the day when Pherecydes fled to Egypt to excite the pity, or to promote the policy, of Aryandes (cc. 159-164); various stories of the original occupation of Libya by the Greeks of Thera form a natural preface (cc. 150-158) to that history, while the story of the colonisation of Thera itself, from Lakedaimon (cc. 145-149), carries the perspective fairly back into the region of the mythical. It will be convenient to deal with these passages in the order in which they are presented by Herodotus. The first (cc. 145-149) breaks up into two sub-sections, (i) the story of the Minyae in Sparta (cc. 145, 146); (ii) the story of the colonisation of Kalliste (Thera) by Theras and the Minyae of Sparta (cc. 147-149). These two stories are obviously Lakanian stories: the first, a strictly Lakanian story, in which probably the Theraeans had no voice, but which the Theraean source did not contradict; the second, a story in which Thera may have had a voice, but still mainly a Lakanian story. These two stories were ancient history even to Herodotus, the second not carrying down much after the Dorian conquest, or rather the Dorian invasion, of Lkonia. The contents were obviously legendary, and even in part mythical: their pragmatic purpose is obvious, but as they have little or nothing to say to Libya, or even to the Greeks in Libya, they may be here summarily dismissed. That the incidents had been treated in poetry, if not in
prose, before Herodotus introduced them as a prior *aperçu* to the story of Hellenic colonisation in Libya, seems more than merely probable; in any case they are now detected examples of the generation of etiological legends, in which explanations of present facts and relations are given under the form of history, the fiction being largely an inversion and transfiguration of the facts. The purpose to be served in the main by these stories can hardly be doubtful. The former justified the Spartan supremacy in Lakonia, the second justified the Spartan claim to supremacy over Thera, at a time when the independence of Thera was probably threatened by the Athenian empire in the Aegean.¹

§ 4. The Lakono-Theraean story of the colonisation of Thera is succeeded by a passage upon the colonisation of Kyrene, giving two partially conflicting versions of the affair: the one professedly the Theraean (cc. 150-153), the other professedly a Kyrenaean account (cc. 154-158).

The discrepant traditions apparently concern only the actual foundation-story of the Libyan colony, the person of the founder, and the action of the first adventurers; and, even in regard to this portion of the story, the rival accounts do not conflict on every point. Thus, there is a general agreement in regard to the metropolitan claim of Thera, in regard to the intervention and direction of Delphi, in regard to the person of the oikist, and even, if Herodotus can be trusted on the point, in regard to his name. Some details, which occur only in the one or in the other story, are not mutually exclusive. Thus, the two accounts agree in the patronymic of Battos, while the ‘Kyrenaean’ story adds some romantic details in regard to his mother, which are omitted in the ‘Theraean,’ and the Theraean story, introducing Krette at a later stage in the proceedings, represents the Theraeans as hiring a guide in Krette for their voyage to Libya. Names and details, however, occur in the ‘Theraean’ story, which though not contradictory of the ‘Kyrenaean,’ show at least a different tendency. Further, both stories make Delphi once and again insist on the Theraean settlement of Libya, and visit Thera with calamity for its disobedience; both stories also represent two voyages to Libya, or Platea, before the effective occupation; but at this point some curious discrepancies begin, which are hardly capable of reconciliation. Thus,

¹ On the first story cp. Appendix VII, § 1 supra. K. O. Müller, *Oeconomia*, pp. 307 ff. (1844), presented the whole material in a light, then new. A recent and developed critique is to be found in F. Studniczka’s *Kyrene*, pp. 45-95 (1890). This critique approves the late derivation of Thera, ‘hellenises’ the Kadmeans, eliminates the Phoenician element in Thera, brings in the Minyans not from Sparta, or even Peloponnesus, but from Thessaly (where Kyrene was at home) via Boeotia, and even Attica, takes Theras as a fictitious eponym from the island to Sparta, there to become an Aigeis, denies the ‘Theban’ origin of the Aigeis, and finds in Aigeus himself ‘naught but a god.’ The argument is a somewhat extreme example of the length to which the detection of *pragmahtai* in Greek tradition has been carried; but cp. notes to 5. 57, 58.
according to the 'Theraean' story, the first expedition, led by Korobios, is sent merely to spy out the land, and returns, after leaving the Kretan in occupation of Platea, to report the success of its mission: whereupon Battos is despatched with 'two pentekonters' and occupies the island. According to the 'Kyrenaean' story the spies disappear: Battos with his 'two pentekonters' starts in the first instance, but reappears off Thera, to encounter a cruel reception, after which he returns and occupies Platea for two years. It is not perfectly clear at what point exactly the 'Kyrenaean' story is conceived by Herodotus as ceasing to contradict the 'Theraean'; but, as Battos and his company, after the two years' occupation of Platea, retire (to Delphi) leaving one of their number in possession, the alternative must be carried down at least as far as the abandonment of Platea for the mainland, a point on which the Theraean story had nothing, or at least nothing contentious, to say. From this point onward, the 'Kyrenaean' may be taken to be not contradictory, but simply supplementary to the 'Theraean' story, which admits of the occupation of Aziris, and the removal, six years later, to the fountain of Apollo (c. 158) by way of appendix.

On the elements of truth and significance in the two stories thus compared there is not much room for discussion. That Kyrene was a settlement from Thera, that its oikist and first king was 'Battos,' son of Polymnestos, a 'Minyan,' that Platea was occupied before a settlement was effected on the mainland, that Delphi was, according to common belief, specially interested in the colony, are all items acceptable enough. Whether the founder had a Kretan mother, whether the settlers had a Kretan guide, whether Kolais the Samian had anything to do in their galley, are points on the borderland. The lips of Battos is obviously metaphorical; its elimination gives a preference to the 'Theraean' version of the first theoria to Delphi, while the helplessness of Battos and his company on their first arrival off Libya may seem to discredit the 'Kyrenaean' account in another particular. The respective tendencies of the two stories are likewise patent, the 'Theraean' aiming at establishing a Delphic commission and authority for the metropolis, the 'Kyrenaean' liberating the oikist from all dependence on the metropolis, and representing the Theraeans as brutally hostile to the colonists. The Sources from which Herodotus derived the rival versions, which he denominates 'Theraean' and 'Kyrenaean,' are not so obvious as could be wished. To picture him, one time in Thera, another time in Kyrene, anxiously noting down these various particulars from the lips of men, will scarcely serve. In either place the founder's name must have been known; in Kyrene at least they would have required no stranger to infer for them that Battos was Libyan for 'king' (c. 155). The expressly asserted agreement between Theraeans and Kyrenaeans, that Battos was the proper name of the founder, hardly looks like genuine research. The passage described
by Herodotus as the 'Kyrenaean' account contains the first of the oracles, in which some scholars have seen evidence that the text is based upon a chresmological poem, which gave one version of the foundation-story: 1 that version may have omitted the founder’s name as unsuitable to the metre, and Herodotus may have had reason to regard it as based on Kyrenaean authority. The passage of ostensibly Theraean provenience is, perhaps, of more composite structure. A great part of it consists of a digression on Kolaioi the Samian, and his adventures—a story at home, surely, in the Heraion at Samos. The story of Kolaioi involves the person of Korobios, 2 and the explanation of the ‘great friendship’ between Samians, Theraeans, and Kyrenaeseans: an explanation involving in turn the origin of the settlement in Libya. It is by no means clear that Herodotus, who in the course of his life certainly visited Samos, Delphi, Sparta, Egypt, must have gone to Thera, to say nothing of Kretes, in order to recount what he has felt justified in calling the ‘Theraean’ version of the foundation-history of Kyrene, even if he was the first author who committed the matter to writing—surely a conclusion not to be lightly assumed.

The date of the foundation, and the chronology involved in the stories, remain to be noticed. The only serviceable data in the ‘Theraean’ story are the assertion that Kolaioi the Samian was making for Egypt, and that Tartessos was ‘at that time’ a virgin market, so far as the Hellenes were concerned. These indications would tend to fix the settlement in Libya after the settlement in Egypt under Psammetichos, and perhaps before the colonisation of Massalia by the Phokaioi, or, in round numbers, between 650 and 600 B.C. Other items in the story are obviously fictitious or useless: the seven years’ drought in Thera, the time during which Korobios was a castaway on Platea. The temporal indications in the ‘Kyrenaean’ story are of more significance: the two years’ occupation of Platea, the seven years’ occupation of Aziria, before the actual settlement round the fountain of Apollo, represent an effort to introduce chronological precision into the perspective of the colonial adventure, but the real value of the result it is beyond our resources to verify. The conventional date for the colonisation of Libya is not extracted from the stories of the occupation, but was and is an inference backward from the later stages of the history, leading with approximate certainty to the year 631 B.C. as a probable

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1 Cp. further § 5 infra.
2 Busolt, Gr. Gesch. i. 3 480, regards it as certain that Korobios is only an anthropomorphised sea-god (cp. Knapp in Philologus, N. F. ii. (1869) 492 ff.). This would give special point to the ‘divine influence’ which attended the voyage of Kolaioi after his ministry to Korobios.

In any case the latter name must stand for the recognition of a strong Kretan element and claim in Kyrene, further attested in the ‘Kyrenaean’ story by the Kretan mother of Battos—she too, perhaps, a divinity (cp. Studniczka, op. cit. p. 128), and by the position of the Kretans in the constitution of Demonax.
epoch for the foundation of Kyrene. If credit be given for the eight or nine years implied in the Therac-Kyrenean stories, preserved by Herodotus, the date of the first actual occupation of Platea might be raised to 640 B.C. or thereabouts.

§ 5. The remaining passage, cc. 159-164 (167), gives a sketch of the reigns of the six first Battiaid princes in Kyrene. Of the reigns of the first Battos and the first Arkesilaos our author has practically nothing to record but their exact duration, a chronological nicety not repeated in the case of any one of their successors. The statement that the numbers of the colony were unchanged during a period of fifty-six years seems absurd. Of the four succeeding reigns much fuller details are preserved by Herodotus. The record enables us to detect not merely particular events, but certain political tendencies in the history of the colony. The victory of Irassa, or Theste, over the Egyptians in the reign of the second Battos; the foundation of Barke, the ruinous defeat at Leukon by the Libyans in the reign of the second Arkesilaos, his murder, and the vengeance of his queen Eryxos; the legislation of Demonax in the reign of Battos the Lame; the expulsion, restoration, and death of Arkesilaos III, the son of Battos the Lame and Pheretimo, with many attendant circumstances, all pass easily into the historical order. The relations of the colonists to the native Libyans, to the neighbouring great power in Egypt, to other Greek centres (Delphi, Peloponnese, Samos, etc.); the internal difficulties among various elements in the colony itself, the rivalries and crimes of the reigning family, are features of the story which possess a high degree of verissimilitude. Tried by Herodotean standards the account of the first six Battiaid kings must be assigned a high place in the Herodotean historiography. The account is indeed slight and incomplete: evidence is available to show that variant versions existed in antiquity in regard to some of the episodes recounted by Herodotus, nor has the Father of History exercised any apparent criticism upon this portion of the records of Kyrene, as they came to him. But his result is at least

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1 See Clinton, Fasti, ad annum, Thrige, Res Cyren. § 23.
2 Herodotus gives only two rival stories of the foundation of Kyrene, a Theracian and a Kyrenean. Studniczka, op. cit. pp. 108 ff., argue that there was a third, accepted in Sparta, which Herodotus knew and passed over as incredible. But (i) the transition to the 'Theracian' story in c. 159, and its contrast with the 'Kyrenean' c. 154, seem rather to imply that Herodotus was not acquainted with a Spartan story on the subject of the foundation of Kyrene, as distinct from the foundation of Thera: (ii) the influx of 'Peloponneseians' under Battos II. would not have increased the Spartan interest in Kyrene. In the days of Herodotus the makers of history may have been already constructing the story, which later on represented the founders of Kyrene as coming direct from Peloponnese, and, finally, as genuine Dorians from Sparta (vid. Studniczka, i.c.); but there is no evidence to show that Herodotus was acquainted with that theory, or intended to suppress or to contradict it.
3 The fullest exhibition of the various authorities, lost and extant, upon the history of Kyrene is contained in the Prologenomena to Thrige's Res Cyrenensium (1st ed. 1819, 2nd ed. 1828).
as good as the record of the last native dynasty in Egypt, though the latter is more fully and more accurately chronologised, and the records of the Battidiæ in Kyrene compare, touching their historical and political elements, to advantage with the more remote traditions about the Kypseliæ in Corinth and the Orthagoridæ in Sikyon. The most remarkable omission is, perhaps, the absence of any reference to the last two Battidiæ, except incidentally in reporting the oracle ex hypothesi given to Arkesilæos III. This omission may in part be explicable by reference to the Sources from which Herodotus derived his information.

If the 'Kyrenaean' account of Battos the oikist has been rightly traced to a chrestomonical poem, the same source will naturally be detected underlying the sequel, at least in so far as the oracular materials plainly enter into its composition.1 The legislation of Demonax (c. 161) is, perhaps, less likely to have been recorded in the poetic source,2 but would certainly not have been forgotten in Delphi, or for that matter in Mantinea; and though the notice of the offering of the Kyprian Evelthon3 has nothing directly to say to the history of Kyrene, yet from its occurrence in this context it reinforces the suspicion of a Delphic provenience for much of the 'Kyrenaean' history.4 Some items in the account might have come to Herodotus in Egypt, if not originally, at least by way of confirmation: yet the express distinction drawn by him between the Egyptian account of the expedition sent by Après, and the account proper to be told 'in the Libyan Logi',5 suggests that the two were obtained, in the first instance, from independent sources. The existence of a fairly well attested variant on the story of Eryx,6 derived apparently from local Kyrenaean sources, reinforces the suspicion that the story in Herodotus is not drawn primarily from the local fountainhead, though undoubtedly one Kyrenaean story might contradict another. The rôle of Evelthon, the introduction of Samos as a basis of operations for the exiled Arkesilæos, the intervention of the Knidians, the reappearance of Thera, all suggest possible contributaries to the synthesis of traditions, and show how difficult it is, in this, as in other cases, to be content with a simple limitation of the historian's researches, or contaminations.

It is, however, characteristic of Herodotus' methods that the important facts of the connexion of Amasis with Kyrene, and the surrender of Arkesilæos III. to Kambyses, are mentioned elsewhere and without reference to the continuous narrative of the Battiad

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1 c. 159, the reinforcement of the colony; c. 168, the oracle to Arkesilæos III.
2 The words καταγερισθῇ ἀγάγεθαι, cp. c. 161, might have concluded an hexameter (Studniczka, Kyrene, p. 98).
3 c. 162.
4 The connexion of Kyrene and Kyrenaæans with Delphi, attested by Pindar's Episthæs (Pyth. 4. 5. 9), should be borne in mind in this context. The oracles in cc. 155, 157 are unmistakably Apolline.
5 4. 169, cp. 5. 161.
6 4. 169 and notes ad l.
dynasty; and it is no less significant that the adventure of Dori is in Libya, is left untouched in the express narrative of Kyrenaeian history. For Herodotus the tone of Kyrenaeian story remains oracular and fatal to the end, and that end appears to be marked by the fate of the third Arkesilaos. The story of Pherecydes, her application to Aryandes, the Persian expedition for the punishment of the Barkineans, the excessive vengeance of the queen-mother and her own doom, appear to belong throughout to a different stratum, and must in large part be ascribed to Graeco-Egyptian sources. The omission of every event in Kyrenaeian history after the death of Arkesilaos, or after the transparently pragmatised episode of the Persian expedition, not merely in these Books, but throughout the remainder of the work of Herodotus, might suggest the hypothesis that the main, or regulative, source followed by Herodotus in his account of the first six Battia and their fortunes, closed the story with the death of Arkesilaos III. The oracular reference to the seventh and eighth kings seems to prove that the written work, on which Herodotus was drawing, cannot have taken final shape much before the middle of the fifth century B.C., but it is conceivable that the writ, while adumbrating the final overthrow of the dynasty, only carried the actual record of the fulfilment of prophecy down to the death of the third Arkesilaos.  

§ 6. The passage on the geography, ethnography, flora and fauna of Libya (4: 168-199) is very obviously separable from the historical portions of the Libyan Logi, and hardly less obviously divisible into certain smaller sections, each treating a distinct subject. Four such subdivisions have been marked in the analysis of the Book, and further items, calling for comment, have been pointed out in the notes. It may, however, be worth while, in this place, to exhibit more fully the contents of the passage, to mark its characteristics and to discuss its sources, in order to attempt an approximate evaluation of the intrinsic merits of this, the earliest extant, sketch of the geography and history of North Africa.

1 2. 182, 4. 165.
2 5. 42, and Appendix VII. § 4.
3 'Αρκεσιλαος μήν των εστί έκών εστί τέραν ἀπαραξία τού χρυσοῦ έξίπλως μαρμάρα τῆς Εώρου, c. 161.
4 On a possible influence of Marathonian traditions upon the story of Kyrene cp. Appendix X. § 10, pp. 172 f. supra.
5 Schöll first suggested the hypothesis of the chrestological poem, which has subsequently found increasing favour.; cp. Introduction, vol. I. p. lxxxv. Studniczka endorses this hypothesis, speaking of the Kyrenaeian source as "an epic narrative of the foundation-history dressed up in oracle form," p. 97, and again, p. 100, as "a continuous poem" (eine im Wesen lichen einheitliche Dichtung). This view seems, however, traversed by his suggestion that there was a collection of apocryphal oracles of Mopsos ascribed to Battos I. (the stammerer!); though he observes that Herodotus consistently ascribes the oracles in question to Delphi, and he suggests that the Mopsian authorship was an hypothesis of a later and more critical time, which could not stomach Dori in the utterances of the Pythia (or of the redactors of her utterances). But cp. notes to 4. 157.
The materials for the Herodotean map of Libya are not wholly contained in the passage immediately under review. The general conception of the continent, and its circumambient seas, 1 the problenmatical position of Egypt, 2 the description of the course and ultimate source of the Nile, 3 are presupposed in the Libyan Logi. It is really impossible to represent cartographically the Europe or the Asia of Herodotus; but the attempt to delineate his ideal of Libya is by no means desperate. Though Herodotus raises a polemical question in regard to Egypt, yet the Nile and the land watered by the Nile are practically all included in his Libya. The historical circumnavigation of Libya had convinced him of its insularity. 4 The exact size, the actual shape of the continent, are problems which he had hardly envisaged; conclusions based upon the attempted synthesis of incidental data, taken from various connexions in his text, are results of a wrong method. But some observations are legitimate, and carry certain inferences. The Libya of Herodotus is a relatively small area, for it is very much less than his Europe, and it is presumably less than his Asia. 5 Its circumnavigation occupied, indeed, upwards of two years; but the period included long delays. 6 The measurements of the Nile voyage imply a considerable extension to the south, but the south coast of Libya still lies north of the tropic. 7 It is tolerably safe to argue that Herodotus conceived the diameter of Libya east and west as exceeding its diameter north and south. His conception of the course of the Nile accords with this inference; and although Herodotus has made some allowance apparently for the sinuosities of the coast, 8 and would hardly have described the physical contour of Libya in terms so geometrically precise as those he uses of Scythia, 9 we shall probably do him little injustice if we conceive his Libya as a large parallelogram, with a somewhat irregular boundary, of which the north and south coasts correspond to each other as the longer, and the east and west correspond to each other as the shorter sides.

§ 7. It is with the northern coast, its population and its Hinterland, that the passage in Bk. 4, immediately under review, expressly deals. The whole region lies between the sea and the desert; a ridge of sand which, in the conception of Herodotus, extends all across the continent, forming a sort of base to the south, the waters of the Mediterranean obviously washing the whole northern coast. To the east lies Egypt; to the west the waters outside the Pillars of Herakles. Whatever the general conception of Libya as a whole, the portion of Libya described in this passage obviously forms a great

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1 The 'Arabian gulf,' 'Erythraean sea,' 'Southern sea,' and Mediterranean (the 'Northern sea'), are given in 4. 37-48, and elsewhere: the 'Atlantic' I. 202.
3 2. 28-34.
4 4. 42.
5 4. 41.
6 4. 42.
7 Notes to 4. 42.
8 αφάνος το ἄρματον (Boloesia) 4. 43.
9 4. 101.
The geography of the Nile, as elsewhere described, implies that beyond the desert, and parallel to the sand-ridge and the coast, flows the mighty river through the greater length of Libya, until it turns northwards to find its way between the Libyan and Arabian mountains through Egypt into the sea 'in the meridian of Kilikia Trachea, Sinope, and the Danube.' But of the western course of the Nile Herodotus takes no account in the explicit geography of Libya, which is practically confined to the parallelogram north of the utter desert. The structure of the passage serves to emphasise a distinction which Herodotus draws or accepts, perhaps from Hekataios, between Libya east and Libya west of Tritonis. The description of the latter is separated from the description of the former, first, by an account of the desert and the chain of oases, which apparently extend all along behind the inhabited zone; secondly, by an account of the manners and customs of the 'nomad' Libyans. No corresponding anthropology is appended to the description of Libya west of Tritonis; its place is, perhaps, taken by the remarks on the fauna, climate, and population of the region generally. The composition of the passage points to some difference in the sources, and, perhaps, to a breach in the genesis, of the Herodotean work in this context.

The eastern portion of the inhabited belt is apportioned by Herodotus among native tribes of 'Libyans,' from nine to twelve in number. Definite areas and measurements are not given for the tribal territories, but, explicitly or incidentally, indications are afforded, which lead to an approximate delimitation of the tribal frontiers. Thus the Adyrmachidae are extended from Egypt to the harbour Plynos (c. 168). From Plynos to the island Aphrodisias the coast is assigned to the Giligamae, and three other places are named in their confines, the island Platea, the harbour of Menelaos, and Aziris (c. 169). The territory occupied by the Hellens here plainly supervenes, for the next two tribes, the Asbytai and the Auschisai, are placed respectively above or beyond (τρόπ), i.e. south of, Kyrene and Barka; the latter tribe is brought down to the sea at Euesperides, and a sixth native tribe, the Bakales, touches the sea at Tanchira (c. 171). Farther west the Nasamones cover their own ground, and that once occupied by the Psylli (c. 173). Augila, whither the Nasamones are reported to go for the date-harvest, might fairly be argued to supply a meridian for the Nasamones, as well in the conception of Herodotus as in the actual map of the region (cc. 172, 173), but for the fact that Herodotus expressly places the Nasamones north of the Garamantes (c. 174), and shortly afterwards describes the Garamantes as ten days' journey west of Augila (c. 182), apparently in the meridian of the Lophophyi, who, consistently enough, are placed on the coast, well to the west of the Nasamones (c. 177). It is

1 4. 181, 185. 2 2. 32-34. 3 ὑπερ. 4 Cp. 8 9 infra.
doubtful, however, whether under any circumstances we should be justified in attempting to locate the tribes on the coast from their suggested relations to the oases inland; and in this particular case, the initial error committed by Herodotus in regard to the chain of oases\(^1\) would vitiate such an inference, even if his utterances in regard to the Garamantes were self-consistent, or the Lotophagi, and their projecting promontory, could be surely identified.

Beyond the Nasamonnes Herodotus enumerates four or five native tribes in order from east to west, the Makae, Gindanes, Lotophagi, Machlyes, Ausees. In regard to the country occupied by each of these tribes respectively he mentions natural features, which might be expected to facilitate the identification of the territories. The Makae are on the river Kinype, which flows down from the Hill of the Graces to the sea: the Lotophagi inhabit a promontory in the land of the Gindanes: the territory of the Machlyes extends to the great river Triton, which empties into a great lake, Tritonis, in which is an island named Phla. On the further borders of the lake, divided from the Machlyes by the river, dwell the Ausees, with whom we might expect to pass into the western division of Libya, the frontier of which is explicitly marked by the river and the lake; but, by an apparent inconsequence, the tribe beyond the river is classed with the eastern Libyans, and is not even dittographed when Herodotus, after a break, takes up the description of the western side.

Western Libya (cc. 191-196) holds for Herodotus but three tribes, the Maxyes, in their war-paint (c. 191), the Zaukees, with their Amazonian wives (c. 193), and the Gyantae, with their honey or sugar-factories (c. 194). It may, nay must, be assumed that Herodotus would have located Carthage in the territory of one or other of these three tribes; his omission to do so, his silence in regard to the Carthaginian territory, the city, and the relations of the Phoenicians to the natives, among whom they were settled, suggest a problem not easy of solution. Those who think that Herodotus omitted to describe Egyptian Thebes, because Hakataioi had previously described it, might take refuge in a similar non sequitur for the case of Carthage. Others may be glad to have the Zaukees and Gyantae in addition to the Maxyes, as representing tribes within the Carthaginian radius. There is an inequality, almost amounting to an inconsequence, in the apparent interposition of a passage on the fauna of eastern Libya (c. 191) in the description of western Libya and its inhabitants. The anomaly is explicable on the supposition that the geographical excursus originally terminated with the formula which closes c. 192,\(^2\) the following passage, cc. 193-197, being a later insertion, somewhat clumsily tacked on. It

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\(^1\) Cp. § 8 infra.
\(^2\) δεδω καθελοδοτες ετι μακροτατον ολι το εγκατασταθη ημερων.
agrees well with this suggestion that the supposed addition contains evidence of Herodotus’ voyage towards *Magna Graecia*, and of contact with ‘Carthaginian’ sources.\(^1\) It is also remarkable that the Maxyes may, perhaps, be found on one of the Achaemenid inscriptions as representative of the western Libyans, in close proximity to Carthage.\(^2\) The two additional names may represent somewhat fuller and later knowledge on the part of Herodotus. Whether the two or three tribes named are conceived as extending over all the remaining coast of western Libya is not quite clear: beyond the Pillars, Herodotus plainly makes room for other, albeit anonymous, inhabitants.\(^3\)

In an apparently distinct passage (cc. 186-190) Herodotus proposes to describe the manners and customs of the nomads, as a whole, from Egypt to Tritonis. The passage is now separated in the text from the geographical description of nomad Libya by the chapters on the cases, the occupants of which can hardly be accounted nomads: it is also remarkable to what an extent the professed description of nomad customs is a vehicle for expressions of personal opinion and theory: moreover, the customs of the various tribes, wherein they differ and wherein they agree, have been previously noted in the geographical review. Yet little if any inconvenience is to be detected between the general description of the manners and customs of the nomad Libyans as a whole, and the particular descriptions of the customs or fashions of the tribes severally, and here, if anywhere, we are justified in combining two passages giving complementary results. From such a combination it results that, according to Herodotus, the Libyan nomads between Egypt and Tritonis abstained from the flesh of cow and pig, but ate other flesh and drank milk, dwelt in tents, or moveable huts, wore some clothing of skins or leather, drove four-horsed chariots, and decorated their persons, the men by hair-dressing, the women with leg-rings. Their domestic institutions were characterised by a truly savage laxity. The common religion was a worship of sun and moon, but the Machlyes and Ausees, in the west, added a special cult of ‘Athena’ and ‘Poseidon,’ while the Nasamones are reported as worshipping their ancestors, and practising a special form of divination, as well as a peculiar style of burial.\(^4\)

Contrasted with the description of nomad customs, but not perhaps quite free from inner inconvenience, are notes on customs of the two or three tribes of *Arotieres*, or Husbandmen, in western Libya.\(^5\) These tribes have all settled houses, presumably built of stone or earth; they all use vermillion, wherewith to paint themselves, which

\(^1\) cc. 195, 196. Autopsy in Zakynthos; Carthaginians twice cited.
\(^2\) Sepulchral inscription of Dareios at Nakah-l-Rastam, op. *Records of the Past*, ix, p. 76. But the name might stand for Libyans generally, op. § 12 supra.
\(^3\) 4. 196.
\(^4\) Op. notes passim, 4. 168-181, 186-190, and § 10 infra.
\(^5\) cc. 191, 193, 194. There is no separate appendix on the customs of the Husbandmen, cp. p. 273 supra.
may seem to imply but little clothing; they all eat the flesh of apes: the Maxyes dress their hair to the right, the women of the Zauekes drive the chariots: the Gyzantes are capable of making artificial honey.\footnote{1 \ The Egyptian monuments represent the Libyans as 'tattooed'; a fashion which Herodotus (1) does not ascribe to the Libyans, (2) can describe, if he has need to describe it, e.g. 6. 6.}

§ 8. Behind the inhabited zone, behind the wild but not wholly uninhabited zone, north of the desert, along a ridge or belt of sand, at regular intervals of ten days' journey, from Egypt to the Atlantic, Herodotus has arranged a string of salt hills, each with a spring of pure water atop, the centre of an isolated group of men.\footnote{2 \ Cp. Steph. Byz. l.c. note 8, p. 277 infra.} The first five names of these oases are given in order from Egypt, as the Ammonion, Augila, the Garamantes, the Atarantes, the Atlantisa. There are few passages which exhibit more completely the characteristic merits and defects of Herodotus as a geographer than the one now in view, and exposition here passes naturally and at once into criticism. The passage is distinct and separable in the text, and little connexion exists between it and other geographical data, even those in the immediate context. The passage undoubtedly describes the African oases, and it is the earliest description of them which has come down to us. Herodotus elsewhere uses the word Oasis as a proper name,\footnote{3 \ cc. 181-185, with notes ad I.} which it probably never was, but omits it here, as a generic term for the series of stations which he is describing, and for which it was presumably already in use at the time. The description of the oases is erroneous, exaggerated, and defective. The chief error is the apparent displacement of the Ammonion, and consequently the whole series of oases, from the parallel of Memphis to the parallel of Thebes.\footnote{4 \ 3. 26.} The stations have been worked into a system, which amounts almost to a caricature of nature; in particular, the vague extension of the scheme beyond the stations actually nominated, shows reflection taking the place of real knowledge. The difference, however, between the named and unnamed oases corresponds approximately to the distinction between the eastern and western geography of Libya. The five names given are not all equally acceptable. The first two, the Ammonion, Augila, are undoubtedly genuine and easy to identify. The last two, Atarantes, Atlantisa, look suspiciously like a dittograph, and it is not easy to identify either with an actual oasis. The locality of the Garamantes is more easily identified than the double use of the name justified.

\footnote{1 \ The Egyptian monuments represent the Libyans as 'tattooed'; a fashion which Herodotus (1) does not ascribe to the Libyans, (2) can describe, if he has need to describe it, e.g. 6. 6.}

\footnote{2 \ Cp. Steph. Byz. l.c. note 8, p. 277 infra.}

\footnote{3 \ cc. 181-185, with notes ad I.}

\footnote{4 \ 3. 26.}

\footnote{Cp. notes ad l.c. A chain of seven oases may connect Thebes with Siweh (the Ammonion), but it runs from south to north, not from east to west. Cp. Dumichen, \textit{Die Oasen der libyschen Wüste} (1877). Is it extravagant to suggest that Hist.'s great chain of oases may be the product of a combination between Egyptian data on the oases from Charga to Siweh, and western ideas in regard to Augila and other stations behind the Syrtis? The route of Alexander to and from Siweh is described, not without mythical decoration, by Arrian, \textit{Anab.} 3. 3.}
The situations and measured distances in this passage are but little related by Herodotus himself to his geography of northern Libya, but he seems to place Angila south of the Nasamonies, and the Garamantes south of the Lotophagi. If his geography of northern Libya were to be rationalised with reference to the theory of the oases the result would be a gross distortion of the map. In the first place, the distance from Egypt to Atlas would be reduced to fifty days’ caravan journey; which, applying Herodotus’ estimate for a journey even on a royal highway, would amount to only 900 miles. Secondly, inexplicable confusion would be wrought in eastern Libya by the start from Thebes to Ammon, and by the reduction of the distances to equal journeys of ten days (170-180 miles) each. Such combinations, however, which Herodotus himself has not anticipated, would result in greater distortions than need be accepted as present in his consciousness; their legitimate purpose is to show that different and varying passages must each be considered on its own merits, and that the geography of Herodotus, even in its most highly articulate departments, was far from being systematic or self-consistent.

§ 9. The composite character revealed by the analysis of the geographical and ethnographical excursus, even apart from more than one inconsequence or anomaly detected in them by mere inspection, would suggest that the passage as a whole was derived from more than one source. That its source and origin are not identical with the source and origin of the historical portions of the Libyan Logi is almost self-evident. How far the different sections are each of single and independent provenance, how far it is possible to assign to each its source, or sources, are more disputable problems. One element of doubt may be eliminated presently: the range of autopsy is to be reduced to a vanishing point. In the Libyan Logi there is no distinct or convincing evidence to justify a belief that Herodotus travelled in Libya west of Egypt. There is nothing more accurate, full, or graphic than can reasonably be accounted for by fairly good sources. The critique of cc. 181-185 proves that Herodotus cannot have visited any of the oases. Nothing can be more precise than the description of the Kinyps district (c. 198), yet it is irreconcilable with autopsy. The same passage which proves that Herodotus had seen a curious well in Zante is clear evidence that he had not seen the well which he describes in Kyra (c. 195). The large element of personal opinion expressed makes the absence of any express indication of autopsy the more evidential. The controversy can only turn on the question of a visit to Kyrene. The only strong argument is derived not from the Libyan Logi, but from a passage in Bk. 2,

1 From Memphis (say Cairo) to the Ammonion (Siweh) must be nearly 300 miles; from the Ammonion to Aujileh not very much less; from Aujileh to Sochna, or one of the oases of Fozan, another 300. The estimate in Herodotus would not carry the traveller even from Memphis beyond the meridian of Tripoli.

and it is inconclusive. The descriptions of the Kyrenaica in no way involve autopsy, and may even be said to conflict therewith. Had Herodotus been in Kyrene, it still would not follow that his geography and ethnography of Libya were to any great extent compiled in Kyrene, even if some of his data were derived from Kyrenaecans, at the first or second hand. His geography does not proceed from Kyrene as a base, but from Egypt. Libyans he cites generally to mark his disbelief in their reputed statements; the nominal citation carries no conclusion as to his own presence in Libya or Kyrene: if any personal interviews took place with Libyans, they might have taken place in Egypt, or elsewhere. A similar case applies to the citation of the Carthaginians as authorities. Autopsy and oral information are both practically to be ruled out of account in the evaluation of the sources for the *Libyan Logi*, so far as Herodotus himself is concerned. But the living voice in Egypt, in the west, and elsewhere, has doubtless reinforced his scriptural authorities to a considerable extent.

Herodotus was certainly not the first author who treated of Libyan geography and ethnography; but, owing to his method of composition, to extract from his text clear evidence of the extent to which any passage is based on previous writings is not possible. The remains of Hekataios are too scanty to enable us to determine in detail in what degree Herodotus was indebted to the Milesian geographer. The existing fragments are remarkable rather for contrast than for agreement with Herodotus, the comparison not being wholly in his favour. Hekataios appears to have included Libya in his survey of Asia, a theory which Herodotus in one place justifies, and in his general practice abandons. Hekataios had mentioned the Psylli, and had apparently located them on the Greater Syrtis, naming it “the Psyllic gulf,” and describing it more accurately than Herodotus described it: the latter, in his notice of the extermination of the Psylli, may be intentionally supplementing his predecessor. Hekataios had mentioned the “Mazyees,” the Zeueces, the Zygantes; the variations in the text of Herodotus can scarcely be regarded as intentional corrections on his part. Several islands appear off the coast of Hekataios’ Libya, which do not reappear in the text of Herodotus: as they have not been identified, their absence

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1 4. 178, 184, 187, etc.
2 Introduction, vol. i. pp. lxxvii ff. It cannot be proved by c. 189 κάρα γὰρ ταῦτα χρέωται καὶ ἅπαξ αἱ Αἰλινοεὶα that Herodotus had heard the Alleu-crey of the Libyan women, much less that he had heard it in the parts about Kyrene.
3 Müller, F.H.G. i. 1 ff. A new and more complete edition of the remains of Hekataios is an urgent desideratum.
4 4. 41 ή δὲ Λιβυὶ ἐν τῇ ἀντὶ τῆς ἑκατοντάτῃ
5 Steph. B. Ψῆλλος καὶ Ψυλλικὸς κύκλος (Müller, F. 308).
6 F. 304.
7 F. 307.
8 F. 306. Steph. B. continues: ἀντὶς τᾶς ἀνδρᾶς συλλέγοντα μὲν ἡμῖν, δυνα τῆς λειτουργίας τοῦ ἔχει τῶν μελετῶν Γηρωμᾶτος, ὡς θεραπεύειν τοῖς διευθ. ἐν τῆς Ἐνδοκος ἐν ἑσυγ. υπὲρ ἐκκ. 
10 F.F. 914-917.
is the less discredit. Hekataios seems to have had more knowledge of the far west than Herodotus; if at least he named the river Lixos,\textsuperscript{1} and a city Thrinike,\textsuperscript{2} near the Pillars. A large number of city-names appear in the \textit{Fragments} of Hekataios, a result which may be due to the accident of their preservation by Stephen of Byzantion, but which none the less offers a point of contrast, not of agreement, with Herodotus.\textsuperscript{3} However strong may be the suspicion that here too, as more certainly in Egypt, and probably in Asia, and in Europe, Herodotus had scriptural authority for much of his geography, the ruins of early prose literature do not enable us to verify the suspicion in the concrete. Even the attempt to determine, from the inner character of his composition, the portions to be assigned to such a source is necessarily precarious and arbitrary. Yet the illusory nature of Herodotean formulae, and the absence of materials for direct comparison, throw the student back upon some such tentative process, which, so far as applied, can only be applied for lack of a better way.

Though it is not unreasonable to suppose that, for the main passage descriptive of the land and its inhabitants, Herodotus follows scriptural authorities (cc. 168-180, and perhaps 186-190, 191-192), it is obvious that he does not follow his predecessors slavishly: observations, remarks, even deliberate corrections, are inserted, not perhaps as the result of travels in Libya, but at least on the strength of information gained in Egypt, in the west, perhaps elsewhere. Men of Kyrene, wherever they might be met, could tell as much as it pleased them about their surroundings. In Egypt something would surely be known of the coast between the Nile and the Syrtis. The western elements seem especially prominent in the items given upon ‘Carthaginian’ authority. It is conceivable that the passage upon the animals of Libya was a later insertion, and that the Maxyes, Zaqueke, Gyzzante, were originally mentioned continuously together. The concluding notes on the ethnology (c. 197), on the climate and productivity of the land (cc. 198, 199), though the former contains the contrast between ‘then and now,’ and the latter comes near suggesting an actual visit to the Kyrenaica, can hardly be assigned an exact date in composition, or an exact source in derivation. It may be difficult to understand how Herodotus could have given two different meanings to one word (\textit{βωτός}) in two passages now so closely juxtaposed as cc. 192 and 199, but the difficulty remains on any theory of composition or of provenience, if the text be accepted as authentic.

The description of the oases (cc. 181-185) is obviously of distinct origin. No previous writer, so far as is known, had made the subject

\textsuperscript{1} \textit{F.} 328 (\textit{Αλκαρ}.
\textsuperscript{2} \textit{F.} 325.
\textsuperscript{3} This observation does not enhance the bibliographical authority of Stephen, who, by the way, cites Herodotus, after Hekataios, as giving Kanthília near Carthage (\textit{συν τ. ΚΑΝΟΗΑΙΑ}).
his own. It is certain that the nearer oases had long been known in Egypt, and Greeks from Egypt may occasionally have visited one or other of the seven, but Herodotus had plainly never seen an oasis, and misunderstood what he heard in Egypt on the subject. The passage shows signs of having been composed after his migration westwards, and partly under western influences. Were it based on Graeco-Egyptian sources, pure and simple, Herodotus could hardly have fallen into the double and initial error above noticed. The in consequence involved in its insertion into the midst of the description of eastern Libya betokens a variation in the sources. The indication of the caravan-route running north and south from Tripoli through Fezzan (c. 185), suggests western information. The three zones, or belts, make their appearance in immediate connexion with the chain of oases: the justification of the zone-theory is supplied by western rather than by eastern Libya. That Herodotus has no names to give for his oases west of Atlas is not surprising: the number and names from Egypt to Atlas are but partially satisfactory. Augila is perhaps correctly placed to the south of the Nasamones: the oasis of the Garamantes appears in an approximately correct meridian: the real lines of knowledge seem to point to communications running north and south: the great chain of stations all across Libya from east to west on the imaginary sand-ridge at convenient distances of ten days (say 150 miles) looks much like a product of reflection and fancy on the historian’s own part, based upon information partly remembered from his Egyptian researches, partly acquired afterwards, and systematised in the west, where he might have heard something of oases in the Sahara, as he had heard something in Egypt of oases in the Libyan desert.

§ 10. To determine exactly the value of the geographical, ethnographical, and historical elements (other than the story of the Hellenic colony) contained in the Libyan Logi is not a simple problem. The physical geography of Libya, as conceived by Herodotus, cannot be said to have intrinsic or permanent authority. Such data as he supplies for the construction of the physical map of Africa are obviously insufficient, and where they conflict with the results of modern observation could only hold their place on the supposition of physical movement and changes on a large scale, between the days of Herodotus and our own. Such a supposition will not be entertained, or even demanded, in the present case. The shape and size of the continent have not altered within the historic period. Herodotus’ theory of the course of the Nile is as irreconcilable with the facts of his own time

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1 Cp. Dumichen, op. c. note 5, p. 276 supra.
2 If the smaller zone-theory in Libya had anything to say to the larger zone-theory of Parmenides, applicable to the whole earth (ἤκουσαντος), it might further attest, by that connexion, the influence of the west upon Herodotus. (Cp. Berger, Geach. d. wissensch. Erdkunde, I. pp. 11 ff., 48, according to whom the zone-theory of Parmenides was unknown to the Ionian geographers.)
as with the facts of the present.\textsuperscript{1} His account of the zones, or belts, in northern Libya was never less an exaggeration than to-day.\textsuperscript{2} The number and arrangement of the oases\textsuperscript{3} have never corresponded to his scheme. He had no clear or accurate conception of the contour of the north coast. The great projection of Barka (Kyrenaiica) is implied after a fashion by his remarks on the situation of the tribes in that region,\textsuperscript{4} but is nowhere clearly described by him. The (greater) Syrtis is named, but his conception of it is, to say the least, problematic.\textsuperscript{5} No one need imagine any physical convulsions in the region of the Wady Mghr-Grin in order to make it square with the description and measurements given by Herodotus for the Kinyp's.\textsuperscript{6} In the neighbourhood of the Lesser Syrtis some physiographical alteration has probably taken place; but the statements of Herodotus in regard to the river Triton, and the lake Tritonis,\textsuperscript{7} would need to be reconciled with each other before they could be accepted as evidence for the physiography of Africa in the fifth century B.C. The true orography of the Atlas region was then what it is now; but confusion and error clouded that portion of Libya from the eyes of Herodotus.\textsuperscript{8} By a happy accident Herodotus carries the contour of Libya well beyond the Pillars of Herakles,\textsuperscript{9} but it is characteristic of the independence and casual quality of his materials, in various passages, that in one breath he makes his ridge of sand, with its oases, stay its course at the Pillars, or in the meridian of the Pillars,\textsuperscript{10} and in another carries it farther,\textsuperscript{11} while in an entirely different context he preserves a name for the western extremity of Libya.\textsuperscript{12} The Libyan geography of Herodotus has now what is called 'a purely historical interest.'\textsuperscript{7} It supplies, not materials for a real knowledge of the continent in the present or in the past tense, but materials for a chapter in the history of geographical science, or for a paragraph in a literary appreciation of Herodotus and his work. It was probably but to a very small extent a result of personal exploration or adventure: it is not certain that it was in all respects an advance on the best knowledge of his own day, and it fell far short of the knowledge subsequently attained and recorded in antiquity, as well in regard to the size and shape as in regard to the features and occupants of the continent. It depends very much on the temper and point of view of the reader, whether he shall feel amusement or admiration at sight of the Herodotean map of Libya: albeit neither feeling is in keeping with the historical mind, which will be content to trace the alternations of light and shade, under which knowledge has improved, without prejudice or partiality.

\textsuperscript{1} It is better, however, than Alexander's identification of the Indus with the upper Nile, Arrian, \textit{Anab.} \textit{6.} \textit{1, 2.}
\textsuperscript{2} 4. 181, etc.
\textsuperscript{3} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{4} 4. 170, 171.
\textsuperscript{5} 4. 169, 173.
\textsuperscript{6} 4. 175, 198.
\textsuperscript{7} 4. 178, 179, 180, 186, 187, 188, 191.
\textsuperscript{8} 4. 184.
\textsuperscript{9} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{10} 4. 43, 185, 196.
\textsuperscript{11} 4. 185.
\textsuperscript{12} 4. 43.
In regard to the distribution of animals and plants in Libya, and to all that may be called political geography, the work of Herodotus attains a more positive authority. Below the strictly human level his contribution to the historical geography of Libya begins with notes on the flora and fauna. Particular items may be obscure or erroneous, but the high value of his record under this head is indisputable. The area of the silphium cultivation, the spread of the Lotos, the production of cereals, the importance of the date, and other trees, are all acceptable items for the historical flora of Libya. This author's express or incidental contribution to the zoology of the region will be treated with respect by the man of science, who may hesitate in regard to the identification of this or that creature, but in general will have no reason to deny its existence in nature or in that locality.

Tribal names and their incidence over a given area, cities and their sites, are historical facts of the objective order, sometimes, indeed, verifiable by material evidence open to inspection to-day, but often in the nature of the case only ascertainable by testimony. For this class of problems, in this kind of evidence, the work of Herodotus possesses great authority. This is in a stricter sense historical material, obtainable in an approximately sound condition, by the resources open to Herodotus. It is also material, from the nature of the case, less open to verification, or refutation, by means available for us. The principal city-sites may be identified by archaeological exploration, but for the geography of the native tribes we are, so to speak, more completely at Herodotus' mercy. Herodotus classifies the known inhabitants of Libya under four ethnical heads, Libyan, Athiopian, Phoenician, Hellenic: the two last may be set aside for the present purpose. The distribution, classification, and description of the Libyan population are problems somewhat complicated by the occasional inconsequence of the text, and the obscurity or contangination of source and source. Given the three divisions into which the Mediterranean coast of Africa obviously falls, it is plain that the portion from Egypt to the Syrtis is by Herodotus apportioned among five or seven native tribes, in order from east to west, named the Adyrmachidae, Giligamae, Asbystae, Aushissae (Bakales), Nasamones, (Psyli). There may be some doubt whether this list exhausts the native nomenclature for the region: that it is authentic and acceptable, as far as it goes, there is no reason to doubt. The coast region

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of the Syrtis is occupied in the map of Herodotus by some four
or five names, but the specifications, conformably with the obvious
seclusion of this region, are unsatisfactory and vague.\(^1\) The frontier
at neither end is clearly indicated, and it might fairly be argued that,
in occupying the land of the Psylli, the Nasamones had advanced
into the region of the Greater Syrtis; while, at the other extremity,
the Triton and Tritonis being taken as the boundary between the
Machlyes and Ausaca, the frontier between the Ausaca and the
Maxyes, \(i.e.\) between nomad and agricultural Libya, is ill-defined.
The Kinyps serves to mark the region of the Makae, eastward towards
the Greater Syrtis: the promontory of the Lotophagi carries the
Gindanes westward towards the Lesser Syrtis, unnamed and un-
identified by Herodotus. While the Lotophagi may be but the
Gindanes masquerading under an epithet, the other names for this
district are acceptable, and the chief doubt again will be whether the
list is exhaustive even for Herodotus’ day. The three names which
remain in his catalogue,\(^2\) Maxyes, Zanuckes, Gyzyantes, otherwise well
attested, and similarly located, can hardly be taken to spread over the
whole region remaining to the Pillars, and beyond: a door is left
ajar by the story of the silent traffic with the west (c. 196), for the
invasion of one or more tribes unnamable. The character of the
passage on the oases (cc. 181-185), already sufficiently discussed, does
not lend itself to lucid or consistent ethnography: the positions of
the ‘Ammonii,’ of Augila, ‘of the ‘Garamantes,’ even perhaps of
the ‘Atlantes,’ may be regarded as fixed; but, if this were all, the
fixedness would rather hinder than help the completion of the map.
If the Garamantes have been correctly placed, the ‘Troglydyte
Ethiopians’ might lie farther to the south;\(^3\) but it can hardly be
said that Herodotus indicates any exact direction in which their
habitation should be limited.

In regard to the reported culture of the Libyans, thus enumerated,
named, and located by Herodotus, the modern ethnologist is in a
position to exercise a larger discretion. Herodotus sharply contrasts
the culture of eastern and of western Libya:\(^4\) the tribes from Egypt
to Tritonis are nomad; the tribes west of the Ausaca are agricultural.
Several doubts arise in regard to this classification: (i) it is traversed
by indications in the text itself. Thus the dwellers in the oases are
presumably and explicitly to some extent cultivators: some of the
so-called ‘nomads’ are credited with fixed habitations. (ii) It is a
point obviously likely in itself, and supported by other testimony,
that natives under the influence of the Hellenes in the Kyreniaica
were to a greater or less extent tillers of the soil, both for the
cultivation of the silphium and for the production of cereals. (iii)
It is inconceivable that western Libya was wholly given up to

\(^{1}\) 4. 175-180.  \(^{2}\) 4. 191, 193, 194.  \(^{3}\) cc. 174, 183, with notes \(ad\) II.  \(^{4}\) cc. 186, 191, etc.
§ 10  THE LIBYAN LOGI  283

tillage. Herodotus' own description of the region somewhat makes against such a notion, and the fuller knowledge of a later period demonstrates the fact that the west was at least as 'nomadic' as the east. (iv) The origin of the misconception is not far to seek. The tribes named by Herodotus as cultivators are clearly natives subject to Carthage, or within the sphere of Carthaginian influence, which no doubt produced a systematic cultivation at a time when the eastern natives, even in the Kyrenaica, were more independent. It is, however, obvious that the sharp and unqualified contrast drawn between the eastern and western Libyans is an exaggeration. There were probably Libyans both east and west engaged in various stages of cultivation and tillage, others in various stages of pastoral, nomad, or even wilder forms of life: the description of other elements in Libyan culture, the reported variation between tribe and tribe in regard to other institutions, might confirm the belief that the initial distinction is somewhat crudely drawn. But a critical student will hardly be able to accept the specific items in the Libyan anthropology just as he finds them presented. He will have to distinguish between the fact and the reason given for the fact: between a reported institution, custom, or fashion, as an historical reality, and its limitation, or its extension, to any particular tribe: he will be prepared to allow some margin for exaggeration or misconception. If the women among the Adymachidae wear bronze rings for no given reason, the reason given for the wearing of leather rings by the Gindanissae is none the more probable. It is strange to find the practice of painting the body red reported of those Libyan tribes, who have the most settled life and habits. The various fashions in hairdressing have the note of actuality upon them, but it is possible that they may not be attached to the right names, though this were a trifling matter. The marriage customs have the marks of misunderstanding and exaggeration upon them, characteristics which seem to cling to such matters still. The religion is probably described rather inadequately than incorrectly, though false analogies and syncretism, or positive misunderstanding, may be responsible for a part of the report. The chatter of the Troglydotes can but rest upon an ignorance of their language, the anonymity of the Atarantes on the misunderstanding of a custom, perhaps not confined to them, and the unsocial quietism of the Garamantes in one passage may perhaps be set against their belligerency in another. Where material and negotiable objects come into his ken, the modern anthropologist will be inclined to think he is dealing with realities, whether their original owners are correctly named or not. The Libyan tabernacle, if not the houses

1 cc. 168, 176 (Hdt. himself suggests a doubt: ἄν λήγειν).
2 c. 191.
3 cc. 168, 175, 180, 191.
4 cc. 165, etc., with notes ad šč.
5 cc. 172, 180, 186, 188.
6 c. 183.
7 c. 184.
8 cc. 174, 183.
9 c. 191.
of salt-blocks, the Libyan leather or skin dress, the leg-rings of leather, or of bronze, the ostrich-shields, the war-chariots would be at home in our museums. The inventory of Libyan paraphernalia is, however, obviously far from exhaustive, and the geographical, or ethnographical, distribution of the articles, as of the institutions, evokes more than a passing suspicion. The tribes in the vicinity of Kyrene are the most ill-described of any. The Adyrmachidae in the vicinity of Egypt, and the Nasamones, who must be regarded as the most considerable of the Libyan tribes known to Herodotus, are more generously treated. The fact that Herodotus ascribes, even in general terms, some influence to Egypt and to Kyrene, respectively, over the Libyans in their immediate neighbourhood, makes it the more remarkable that he should leave the influence of the Carthaginians in the west to be understood. On the whole, however, the student of primitive culture, of early institutions, of ancient law and ancient lore, will be justified, subject to the caveats above entered, in citing the Libyan Logi as evidence good for his purpose, even though the commentator may be unable to guarantee particular time, place, and people, as owning the several properties in question.

§ 11. Beside the history of the Hellenes in Libya, which Herodotus relates, and the history of the Phoenicians in Libya, which Herodotus assumes, the Libyan Logi pass beyond mere geography, or ethnography, in several particulars. Yet a few quasi-historical statements, made or preserved by Herodotus, are obviously far from constituting a Libyan history, and he closes the door on the problem of the origin of the Libyans by making them autochthonous. Some chapters or episodes of Libyan history have, however, been recovered from the Egyptian monuments, and it is plain that neither Herodotus, nor his Greek contemporaries, had an adequate conception of the past relations between Egypt and Libya, any more than of the relations between Egypt and Babylon or Assyria. There are four stages, or rather categories, in the dealings between Egypt and the Libyans, in regard to the evidence for which Egyptologists seem pretty well agreed. There were moments when the Egyptian power extended over the peoples to the west of the Delta, and a sovranity was claimed by Pharaoh, and perhaps acknowledged by some of the ‘Libyan’ tribes. There were moments

1 c. 185. 2 c. 168, 189. 3 c. 176. 4 c. 168. 5 c. 175. 6 cc. 170, 183. 7 e.g. in regard to weapons of war. 8 On the primitive culture of the Libyans Meltzer, Gesch. d. Karthager, ii. 68 ff., is especially worth consulting, although the description of the culture as ‘national’ implies a disputable theory, and the attempt to establish monogamy, as the normal form of marriage-tie among the Libyan tribes, is somewhat of a tour de force. 9 An inscription in the temple of Medinet-Habu apparently records a victory of Rameses III, in the fifth year of his reign, over Lebu, Temlu, and Kehak, i.e. Libyan tribes (Wiedemann, Handbuch, p. 498) ; and another inscription records a second victory six years later (ib. p. 499). Ed. Meyer, Gesch. d. Alterth., § 316). There is little probability, and no evidence, that the Pharaohs ever advanced beyond the Greater Syritis ; cp. Meltzer, Gesch. der Karthager, i. 63.
when the Libyan tribes swept into Egypt, and, either by themselves, or in combination with men of other stocks and origin, plundered and devastated the land. A more permanent relation was established when the Libyans, in ever-growing number, took service as mercenaries in Egypt, and finally came to compose the warrior class, under their own native captains, or generals. The natural climax was reached when the Libyan captain, or general, made himself master of Egypt, and set the double crown upon his own head. Of these long and stirring relations between Libya and Egypt

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1 There are two now celebrated monuments to which the attention of students of Greco-Italic antiquity has been called, owing to the supposed occurrence of Greek tribe-names upon them. The earlier one records an invasion of Egypt by an apparent league of tribes in the time of Merenptah, son (14th) and successor of Ramesses II., and a great victory over the invaders. The names are somewhat variously transliterated. Wiedemann, op. c. p. 478, gives the following list: Lebu, Koabah, Maschusasch, Akasaasch, Thuleasa (Turischka), Leku, Scharten, Schekelascha. In this list Wiedemann himself sees only names of various Libyan tribes. Ed. Meyer, op. c. § 260, denies the Libyan origin of the majority, on the ground that the attack came from the islands and coasts north of the Mediterranean, that it was directed in the first instance against the Syrian coast, and that the Libyan hypothesis is geographically unsatisfactory; but he admits that Libyans used the opportunity to ally themselves with the invaders of Egypt. In the Turusa (Turischka) he sees the ‘Tyrenian’ bucaniers, but he shows reason for doubting the Achian claim of the ‘Aquai-wassa,’ and declares the ‘Sardana’ and ‘Sarakusa’ beyond identification. The second record is an inscription of Ramesses III. (at Medinet-Abu), recording a great victory by sea and land over a league of invaders, made up of various tribes, the names as given by Wiedemann, p. 499, being Purosat, Tanu, Schakalscha, Takkar, Uschusasch, Leku. (Ed. Meyer, op. c. § 263, names the maritime Sardana, Turusa, Sakuras, and as new names in Egyptian records, Sakkara, Pursta, Dananna, and maritime Usascha.) Wiedemann sees in the list only Asiatic tribes, notwithstanding the resemblance of the name Schakalscha with the (Libyan) Schekelascha of the inscription of Merenptah. Meyer (op. c. § 264) regards it as indubitable that the invading barbarians came “from Asia Minor and Greece.” Freeman, Scity, i. pp. 505 ff., has a characteristic, not to say crushing, note on these records, and the theories built on them. Certainly, if the old Egyptian script is innocent of vowel-signs, and the values of its consonants are not all exactly ascertained, no wonder that transliterations vary, that theories are facile, and that ‘Greco-Italian’ historians smile in mockery, or impatience. But the last word has not yet been said on the ethnological problem. The course of the second band of invaders, or emigrants, seems to have followed that of the previous swarm; but perhaps the Libyans fought against them this time. The battle is remarkable as the only one in which ships are represented on the monuments as taking part (Wiedemann, c. c.). Anyway, three years later (in the eleventh of his reign), Ramesses III. had a second war with the Libyans (Meyer, p. 316, Wiedemann, p. 499), in which Libyan met Libyan. The Egyptian army was already largely recruited from Libya.

3 From the times of the 18th Dynasty onward, it is agreed that Libyan mercenaries were employed by the Pharaohs in ever-increasing number. Amenhotep I. is fighting against the Qubaq, and Seti I. against the Tehenu, but a little later the Qubaq and Masauasa are fighting on the Egyptian side (Ed. Meyer, op. c. §§ 258, 316, etc.). As the Ramesseid monarchy declined under the growing influence of the priesthood (so Meyer, § 298, p. 324), the Libyan mercenaries gained more and more power. Before the rise of the 22nd Dynasty the mercenaries had been centurions in Egypt, perpetually recruited from Libya, and forming at last an hereditary army of ‘mamelukes’ (Ed. Meyer, op. c. pp. 332 ff.).

7 It appears to be now agreed that the 22nd Dynasty was Libyan, and founded by a general of the Libyan forces, in the service of the Egyptian king. The names occurring in this dynasty are not Egyptian; members of the royal family are generals of the mercenaries, who are Libyans; the caesal familias is one Teben-Buiuna, a
Herodotus apparently knows practically nothing. The Egyptian army with him is a native army; Libyan invasions are unrecorded; the only Libyan Pharaoh, or even pretender, of whom he has anything to relate, is Inaros, son of Psammetichos, a Libyan contemporary. The historic relations of Egypt with him dwindle to an influence, mainly religious, exercised by Egypt upon the Libyans in their nomad condition.

§ 12. With the statement that four nations or races were to be found in Libya, two immigrant, Phoenicians and Hellenes, two autochthonous, Libyans and Aithiopians, Herodotus touches the initial problem of North African history. The simple dualism of his classification of the native population corresponds to a fundamental distinction fully recognised to-day between the negro (Aithiopian) and North-African, or Berber, races. The former is probably to be regarded as the African stock par excellence. The problem of North-African ethnology has been complicated by successive invasions and intermixture, since the days of Phoenician, Hellenic, and Roman to the days of Vandal, Gothic, and Arab, but it is possible that in this, as in other similar cases, the ethnology of ancient Africa must be based upon the description of the existing type, or types.¹

It is obvious that Herodotus (and those he represents) regarded the whole population of North Africa, from Egypt to the Atlantic, from the Mediterranean to the desert, as a racial or ethnic unit. The tendency of the modern ethnologist, or anthropologist, the tendency of the antiquarian, are in the same direction. We are, indeed, little prepared to endorse any autochthonous claim. Such claims are, in most cases, mainly questions of time and degree. Every people will, forsooth, be indigenous, whose immigration is forgotten. The ultimate affinities of the Libyan, or Berber, race are, however, a matter of dispute. The type is sometimes described as 'Caucasian'; nay more, the Libyans of the Egyptian monuments are apparently a blond, blue-eyed race; yet no one as yet has claimed for them 'Aryan' parentage. It is held in some quarters that the whole stock is of Asiatic origin, and not unrelated to the Egyptians, who are in turn derived from Asia, and even brought into connexion, at least so far as their language goes, with the Semitic peoples.² But from another point of view a plea might be made out for the 'European' origin of the Libyan stock. Geograp—

¹ This paragraph is entirely without prejudice to the ethnological problems of Central and South Africa.
cally Libya, specially western Libya, belongs to Europe; historically Libya must always have been accessible from Europe; it is difficult to believe that Europeans left it unoccupied. If 'Caucasians' ever reached Libya they might have travelled via Europe. The distinction between white Libyans and red Egyptians may be thought to point to a consciousness of racial difference; but, though it is credible that, in a long-civilised land like Egypt, there might be, or come to be, little or no consciousness of inner racial difference, it is less easy to admit a similar unconscionability for the tribes spread through North Africa, even in the fifth century B.C. Western Libya was practically unknown land to Herodotus, to the Greeks, to the Egyptians; it is in western Africa at the present day that the supposed characteristics of the Libyan stock are now to be found;¹ but these characteristics might have originated within the historic period. It is difficult to believe that the multiplicity of races in North Africa is wholly of modern origin. It is difficult to believe that, if there were Asiatic immigrants into Libya, they found the land wholly unoccupied. An appearance of racial or ethnic unity is easily generated in the absence of full and scientifically sifted evidences. Natural anticipations are curiously defeated when, within the historical period, the Semites of Kanaan find a new home in western Libya, and leave eastern Libya to be occupied by the Aryans of Hellas; who will guarantee that to have been the first shuffling of the cards?² In theoretical investigations, the *origines* of races are perhaps started a stage too late; it may be that the problems are illusory, at best merely regulative; racial beginnings may be unattainable by inductive methods. The name for the whole North African stock, *ex hypothesi* one and indivisible, is admittedly drawn from the name of one single tribe Lebu, in the vicinity, yet not the immediate vicinity, of Egypt;³ who will demonstrate the absence of ethnological fallacy in the subsequent extension of the name to the whole population of a region *vis-a-vis* to the three Mediterranean peninsulas, and almost within sight of Crete?⁴ Who can deny the possibility that primitive occupants of 'Libya' passed over into the land dry-shod, but not by the isthmus of Suez? In fine, while modern ethnology does not appear, for the moment, disposed to advance beyond the simple intuition of Herodotus in regard to the unity of the Libyan race, the question whether the arguments produced in its favour can support a positive verdict of so uncompromising a character has hardly received sufficient attention. With Herodotus the simple ethno-

² Meltzer, *op. cit.* p. 52, regards Malakas and its variants (including the Egyptian *Maschuach*) as the primitive and proper name of the whole group of peoples *(wohnheimsicher Name der ganzen Volkergruppe)*. The Lebu, ait Marcus, are supposed to have been a small tribe in the vicinity of 'Kyrene' (Ed. Meyer, *op. cit.* § 43), albeit unknown, as a separate tribe, to the Greek writers. But for the apparent occurrence of Lebu, ait Marcus, on the Egyptian monuments, one might be tempted to conjecture that the 'Libyans' were simply the inhabitants of the land of the wet, S.-W. wind (*Alj, melha, nilbeir*).
logy of the Libyans presumably betokens but an absence of the consciousness of a problem. By the time of Sallust the whole North African coast had been brought under one survey, and a more complex theory to account for the origin of its various occupants was apparently desired. The response which Sallust makes to this requirement may be rightly dismissed as merely fabulous, but the fable is at least a homage to the existence of the problem.\(^1\) 


\(^{2}\) The mere Hellenist cannot be expected to solve this problem, but the student of Herodotus is bound to state it. The ‘dualism’ of N. Africa, E. and W., might suggest a possible solution. Anyway, the denial of racial differences between (1) Egyptians and Libyans, (2) one and another tribe of N. Africans, can hardly be admitted, without further challenge.
APPENDIX XIII

THE ROYAL ROAD FROM Susa TO Sardis


§ 1. In regard to the Royal Road\(^1\) from Susa to Sardis there are three distinct problems which must be carefully distinguished:

I. To ascertain exactly what Herodotus says in the passage (5. 52) on the subject.

II. To determine how far his remarks in that passage agree with his remarks elsewhere on the geography of the regions traversed.

III. To determine the relation between his account of the road, and the actual facts: or, in other words, to determine the true course of the road.

Doubtless these three problems are closely related to one another, and the solution of each contributes to the solution of the others; all the more necessary is it to distinguish them carefully. The failure to do so has resulted in confusion and inconsequence, the casual citation of authorities, and a general lack of precision. It is not, however, possible to discuss one of the problems without some assumptions in regard to the others, at least as working hypotheses. Herodotus assumes, in his description of the road, a great deal, but he assumes it apparently without consciousness; any examination of his description must also assume something, but should assume it provisionally, subject to verification. From the separate discussion of each of the three problems, regulated by the ideas of the other two, the best results may be obtained.

§ 2. I. The first problem, owing to the state of the vulgate, is not so simple as might be expected. The fact that the totals do not agree

\(^1\) ἡ ἴδος τῆς βασιλείας 5. 53.
with the items for the numbers of Stations\(^1\) and of Parasangs, proves
the text to be corrupt. But where does the corruption lie? How
far does it extend? The discrepancy amounts to 30 stations, 137
parasangs: have these been lost in one passage, or is the loss to be
distributed? M. de la Barre long ago suggested as a remedy the inser-
tion of καὶ τρεῖσινα, παρασάγγα δὲ ἐπὶ καὶ τρεῖσινα καὶ ἐκατόν in the
passage on Matiæne, in which there were previously four stations, but
no number of parasangs at all; yet this emendation was not generally
accepted until Kiepert (op. cit. § 5 infra) declared it verified by reference
to the geographical necessities of the case. But de la Barre and Kiepert still left
Herodotus involved in an enormous blunder, viz. the transference of at least three great rivers to Armenia, which
have no business in Armenia, as generally conceived. Of that blunder
Stein has cleared the text of Herodotus by a further suggestion: the
passage was not merely corrupt but displaced, and should be restored
to a more convenient context, some lines higher up, so as to read the
rivers out of Armenia into Matiæne. For this change Stein\(^2\) gives
two reasons: (1) the words τὶς Ἀρμενίας are obviously a gloss; (2)
the four rivers (Tigris, the two Zabs, the Gyndes) cannot be placed
in Armenia, but must belong to Matiæne (after Kiepert). In regard
to these reasons it may be observed that the words τὶς Ἀρμενίας might
be equally a gloss, if the passage remained in its original context:
the second argument assumes that Herodotus must be consistent with
himself, and with the facts. But what was his view, what are the
facts about Armenia, about Matiæne?

It will appear below that the Kilikia of Herodotus is vastly more
extended than the region generally known under that name: it will
appear that his utterances on Matiæne are unsystematic, not to say
contradictory. If his Kilikia can be so much extended, why not
Armenia? Why should Matiæne include the four rivers any more
than Armenia? The apparent omission of Assyria, as generally
understood, through which the road certainly ran, is not the least
extraordinary inconsequence in the passage, viewed in the light of
other passages in Herodotus, or of ‘the facts.’ It is for those who
think that Herodotus had a geographical system, that passages taken
from various contexts in his work should all be reconcilable, to explain
these contradictions, which will offer practically little or no difficulty
to any one who accepts the conditions of the Herodotean historiography,
eucidated in the Introduction to these Books.

It were tempting to suggest that the corruption of the text extends
even farther than has yet been supposed, and that originally Assyria
did appear in this account of the Royal Road. But this hypothesis
must be ruled out when we observe that Assyria has no place in the

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\(^1\) There is an ambiguity in the word σταθμος, as in the English stage, post. Op.
L. & S. sub v. I, 5, and Hdt.'s use of the
terms σταθμοι τεινοντες, σταθμοι κατα-

\(^2\) Ann. Ed. iii. p. 51 (Bk. 5, note
ad l.).
§ 2.4 THE ROYAL ROAD FROM SUSA TO SARDIS

speech of Aristagoras, and that the speech of Aristagoras is strictly modelled upon the Itinerary (cp. § 4 in RA). We are, therefore, not at liberty to supply the missing stations and parasangs by inserting Assyria, or to suppose that the title of Assyria has dropped out of the Itinerary. We are thus brought back to de la Barre’s emendation, approved by Kiepert. Are we at liberty, are we bound to follow Stein, in transferring the four rivers from Armenia to Matiene in the text of Herodotus? If the origin of the corruptela had been traced, the restoration would be more indubitable, but, in any case, the number of stations and parasangs certainly favours the proposed transfer. Accepting it, we are now in a position to determine what Herodotus actually says.

§ 3. The text, as amended, gives the following result, in regard to the first problem: Herodotus enumerates seven regions between Sardis and Susa, or, more strictly speaking, six, Lydia and Phrygia being taken together. For each of these regions he specifies the exact number of stations and parasangs, and he mentions the (principal) rivers to be crossed—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stations</th>
<th>Parasangs</th>
<th>Stades</th>
<th>Days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lydia and Phrygia</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>94½</td>
<td>2835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kappadokia</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>3120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kilikia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15½</td>
<td>465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>56½</td>
<td>1695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matiene</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>4110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kissia</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>42½</td>
<td>1275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>13,500</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There may be little doubt that this result, so far as it goes, is very nearly what Herodotus wrote: ¹ but it does not go very far. When the seven specified rivers have been added, viz. the Halys, the Euphrates, the Tigris, the two Zabati, the Gyndes, the Choaspes, we are practically at the end of the data. Not a single town is named on the route between Sardis and Susa; not the slightest indication is given in regard to the orientation of the route in its various stages. These observations should convince everybody that Herodotus never traversed this Royal Road.

§ 4. Problem II. How far are the data in this passage consistent with data elsewhere in Herodotus: in other words, how far can this very bald account of the road be enriched by other passages in Herodotus without involving any inconsistencies?

The principal passages which come into question, are of four kinds: (1) the speech of Aristagoras. This may be at once dismissed. It

¹ Adding 3 days, 540 Stades (sic) (= 18 Parasangs) for the march from Ephesus to Sardis, Herodotus (5. 54) obtains a total of 14,940 Stades for the whole distance from Ephesus to Susa. The items and totals look somewhat artificial. Revising the fractions in the last column, 19 + 21 + 8 + 11 + 28 + 8 = 90.
is in immediate juxtaposition with the Itinerary. It is quite consistent with the Itinerary. Herodotus probably constructed it out of the Itinerary. Unless we were prepared to introduce Assyria into the Itinerary the speech (so far as descriptive of the route) and the Itinerary are one (cp. notes ad loc.). (2) The Royal Road runs over ground, and through peoples, included in the list of Nomex, Bk. 3, cc. 89 ff, and in (3) the army-list of Xerxes, Bk. 7, cc. 61 ff. These passages invite comparison with the Itinerary, all the more as they are obviously drawn from other and independent sources. (4) There are detached and incidental passages, which serve to enrich the Herodotean account of the districts through which the road passed; such passages may indirectly conflict with, or confirm, the data of the Itinerary.

It may be here assumed that, until the Halys is reached, there are no difficulties arising out of the comparison of the Itinerary with other passages in Herodotus.

The course of the Halys presents some difficulty. It cannot be said that the Herodotean geography of the Halys is clear, or self-consistent: that it is incomplete, goes almost without saying.

Thus in 5. 52, 7. 26, the Halys divides Phrygia from Kappadokia. In 1. 72 the Halys divides Phrygia from Matiene, and Paphlagonia from Kappadokia.

That the bridge, or bridges, on the Halys are not clearly specified in the Itinerary, but incidentally mentioned in an anecdote 1. 75, is characteristic.

That the road, if it crossed the Halys once, must have crossed the Halys twice, apparently never occurred to Herodotus. The immense curve in the Halys on its upper and middle course is not clearly envisaged by Herodotus. He seems to think of the river as flowing across Asia Minor almost from sea to sea.1

Beyond the Halys lies Kappadokia. The various passages on Kappadokia, or the 'Syrians,' in Herodotus, do not appear to contain any inconsistency, unless, as just above specified, we grant that, in one passage, the Halys divides the Kappadokians from Paphlagonia, in another from Phrygia.2

It cannot be said, however, that Herodotus' utterances on Kappadokia furnish a map of the country. The 104 parasangs of road do not enable us to project the size or shape of the region traversed. Accidentally, and elsewhere, we learn that Pteria was, or had been, a chief town in Kappadokia.3 The association of the 'Syrians' with

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1 Hdt. orientates the lower Halys as flowing northwards, βόων ἰν οὐ τὰ χαὶ βορέων ἄνεμος 1. 72, cp. 1. 8 ἐφ᾽ ἑκάτεροι ἐπὶ μεσοβρῆς . . . ἐξελ αὔτας βορέων ἄνεμος, but he never orientates its upper course, and he summarises its whole course, as above stated: 1. 72 οὖν ἐν Ἀλικ ποταμὸς ἀνατάμως σχίζων πάντα τῇ ἀκτίᾳ τὰ κάτω ἐκ θαλάσσης τῇ ἀντιον Κύπρου ἐς τὸν Ἑλ- ξέανον πάνων.

2 The 'harmony' is obvious, viz. that Kappadokia lies opposite, partly to Phrygia, partly to Paphlagonia. But Herodotus does not effect this composition himself.

3 1. 76.
five other large districts paying together only 360 talents in the 3rd Nomos, the combination of the "Syrians" with two other tribes in the army-list of Xerxes, would suggest that the Syrians in Kappadokia were neither very wealthy nor very numerous, at least as compared with the Kilikians. From Kappadokia the road passed into Kilikia. The various utterances of Herodotus in regard to Kilikia present a great contrast with Kilikia as generally conceived from later authorities: but it cannot be said that, taken by themselves, they involve any patent inconsistency. It might be argued from one passage (2.17) that Herodotus himself betrays a consciousness of the Kilikian problem. In the Itinerary Kilikia intervenes between Kappadokia and the Euphrates; the Euphrates plainly marks the farther boundary of Kilikia. But the frontier towards Kappadokia is not specified. It might be assumed, speaking broadly, that Kappadokia is west and Euphrates east of Kilikia on the road. The speech of Aristagoras carries Kilikia down to the Kyprian Sea. This agrees with the fact that the Kilikians supply no less than 100 ships to the navy of Xerxes. Kilikia montana is described as in a line with Egypt and Sinope (as also with the Danube): the title implies a division of the district into mountain and plain, or valley. Through Kilikia flows the Halys, so that some Kilikians at any rate are ἐν Ἡλυσία καὶ Ἡλωσίαν. Kilikia is evidently a large region. No wonder it forms a Nomos by itself and pays 500 talents to the King, to say nothing of the 360 white horses, which Aristagoras might as well have mentioned! In old days the King of Kilikia had been a great power ranking with Babylon and Lydia: in after days the governorship was no mean prize. A Halikarnassian held it once; a fact which must have made Kilikia a subject of special interest in Herodotus' native city. In the light of all this, it is surprising that the traveller by the Royal Road should get him through Kilikia in three stages, 15 parasangs. Did the road cut through but a corner of this great country? Or is the Kilikia of the Itinerary not the Kilikia of the other passages? Did Herodotus, more or less clearly, conceive the road as passing through

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1 3. 90.  2 7. 72.  3 7. 91, cp. 3. 91 (the position of Posideion).  4 2. 34. This probably means that the Ἰλιᾶς Κιλίκιας were in the meridian of Sinope—which is correct—and points to a very ancient trade-route between Egypt, Kypros, Sinope, and the North. Herodotus seems to think that from sea to sea is only five days' journey. Wiedemann, Herodot's Zweites Buch, p. 146, has shown that Mahaffy's ingenious emendation, which would substitute fifteen for five, is inadmissible. It occurs again in Hist. 1. 72, and in ps.-Skylax, and it was censured by Skymnos. This erroneous reduction of the isthmus of Anatolia is consistent enough with the transit of Kilikia in 15 parasangs, which might suffice for the distance from the sea to the Gates.  5 i.e. as much as the whole of the 3rd Nomos which comprised Phrygia, Kappadokia, Paphlagonia, Bithynia and Asiatic Hallespon! Perhaps commerce had something to say to this.  6 1. 74, circa 885 B.C.  7 9. 107, in Hist.'s lifetime.
the Pylae Kilikiae: and are the three days’ journey in Kilikia transferred from the route between the Kyrian and the Euxine seas to the Royal Road? Or how is the apparent anomaly to be explained?

The Euphrates crossed, the traveller finds himself in Armenia: though the river was navigable, and boats procurable, the traveller kept to land for 15 stations, 56 \( \frac{1}{2} \) parasangs. Armenia was a land watered by rivers, the Halys, the Euphrates itself, the Tigris: Stein’s emendation of the text has justly banished three others. Aristogoras, who has not specified the wealth of Kilikia, mentions the flocks of Armenia; but the combination of Armenians with a number of neighbours in the 12th Nomos throws no light on the details of their contribution. Two points are however remarkable: (1) in the army-list of Xerxes the Armenians are combined with the Phrygians; (2) though Armenia is elsewhere described as above (north of) Assyria, Assyria disappears absolutely from the Itinerary. Assyria with Herodotus means primarily the land of Babylon, and the road from Susa to the Euphrates had no need to pass through the land of Babylon: is it, however, certain (as Kiepert appears to think) that Assyria is used by Herodotus only for the land of Babylon? In the older and in the later geography it admittedly stands for the land of Nineveh; and Herodotus uses the term Assyria for the land of Nineveh as well as for the land of Babylon. Herodotus describes Nineveh as a city of the Assyrians, lets Pharaohs make war on the Assyrians of Nineveh, and Kyaxares defeat them, and conquer them, promises to relate the fall of Nineveh, presumably in the Assyrian’ Logi, and places Armenia north of Assyria. This description either involves bringing Armenia down to the frontiers of Babylonia, or admitting that Assyria is used by Herodotus in that passage for the land of Nineveh. Yet it is not into Assyria, but into Matiene, that the road passes on leaving Armenia. Matiene is after Kilikia the chief crouz on the road. If the Halys reached the Matieni after flowing through Kilikia, it is quite easy to understand why the Matieni are combined with the Paphagonians under one command in

\[ \text{Cp. note 5, p. 293 supra. That in the words 5, 55 ἕτε ἐν τοῖς τούτων ὄντωσι διὰ πολλῶν διεζέλον καὶ διὰ φωλαθήματα παραμείφθη: Herodotus is referring to the 'Cilician Gates,' the great Pass between Tyana and Tarse, so accurately described by Sir Charles Wilson in his Notes on the Geography of Asia Minor, R. G. S. Proceedings, vi. (1884), pp. 318 ff., is a suggestion for which I may cite the authority of Prof. W. G. Ramsay, who writes to me that Herodotus not impossibly 'mixed up the Cilician Gates with the Gates on the Royal Road at the frontier of Cilicia.' This suggestion is, however, difficult to reconcile with the view that Herodotus had a official and correct Itinerary as the source of his measurements. In any case, ἔτε πολλα cannot mean "one Gate on entering and another on leaving Kilikia"; for with Herodotus you only enter Kilikia after passing both Gates.} \]
the army-list of Xerxes,¹ but it is not very easy to understand how the traveller reaches Matiene after crossing the Euphrates, and journeying 56¾ parasang through Armenia.² Herodotus apparently is quite unconscious of this inconsequence. Certain passages are consistent with a Matiene east of Armenia: the Saspeires, Alarodii and Matieni form the 18th Nomos, paying 200 talents (3. 94): the Gyndes, which empties itself into the Tigris (1. 189), and the Araxes, which empties itself into the Kaspian Sea (1. 202), have their sources in the mountains of Matiene. But that cannot be the Matiene, which fills the whole space on the road between Armenia and Kissia! There are in fact three Matienes with Herodotus: a Matiene on the Halys, a Matiene montana, and a Matiene plumosa—accepting the text as amended above—by the Tigris, the two rivers Zab, and the Gyndes. But what Matiene is this? An immense district, with 34 stations and 130 parasangs on the king’s highway. In a word, a name for the historian’s ignorance, under which lurk concealed partly old Assyria, partly perhaps Media.³

The end of the journey calls for as little comment as the beginning. Once through Matiene the traveller’s way is clear, as far as Herodotus’ text is concerned: though it would follow from the number of stations, 11, and parasangs, 42¾, that Kissia was a large district.

§ 5. III. The question of the actual course of the road and its history remains. This problem could never be determined from Herodotus alone. Waiving the textual problems (cured by the emendation of de la Barre, the transposition of Stein), the material omissions in his account, the absence of all place-names and of all orientations, to say nothing of the difficulty of reconciling his Itinerary with some other passages in his text, would render that method desperate.

The determination of the actual course and history of the road, or roads, is of course not limited by the text of Herodotus. Other ancient authorities, especially Strabo, come into account. Even more important than any ancient text are the actual observations and researches of modern travellers, the scientific cartography of that portion of the earth’s surface, and the localization of monumental remains, which may be taken to mark old roads. The first systematic and notable effort to reconstruct the actual course of the road was made by Kiepert (Monatsberichte d. Berlin. Akadem. 1857). This was followed up (in 1882) by Prof. W. M. Ramsay, whose results involved in some respects a departure from Kiepert’s views, especially in regard to the part of the road lying between the Halys and the Euphrates; but I am privileged to say that later knowledge,

¹ 7. 72.
² 5. 52.
³ Why Herodotus uses the word Matiene for the region is a question. He may simply have found it in his source (Hyakatios?). This supposition only puts the problem one step back: how did the name come into the sources? That the whole district was ever officially known under the name appears very doubtful, cp. p. 297 infra.
and particularly the results of Mr. Hogarth’s first journeys in the Euphrates’ region, have led Prof. Ramsay to revise his theory on the subject: and the passage in his *Historical Geography of Asia Minor* no longer represents his opinion in regard to the course of the road east of the Halys, i.e. between the Halys and the Euphrates. On this section of the road I am fortunate enough to be able to allow Mr. Hogarth to speak for himself.¹ His results will be found to differ alike from Kiepert’s and from Ramsay’s.

In regard to the geographical reconstruction of the Royal Road it must be remembered that we are dealing with a specific and particular route, to sections of which there were, doubtless, alternative loops, short cuts, and so forth; but which, in the period of the Achaemenid régime, was officially maintained as the great trunk line of communication between Susa, the capital of the Empire, and Sardis, the old capital of Lydia, which was further connected with Ephesus, and so with the whole of the Aegean region. This result must be granted to the authority of Herodotus. To what extent this route adopted pre-existing lines, and roads, to what extent it diverged from any previous trunk lines, or combined them, how long it was maintained, and how far it was superseded by alternative routes, are questions of historical geography which would in no way affect the empirical description of the road for the time of Herodotus, if only Herodotus’ Itinerary had been practically complete. It is obvious that the terminus Susa involves a change in the upper course followed by an imperial system of roads, of which Babylon, or Nineveh, or Ecbatana may have been, at previous epochs, the head centre. It is no less obvious that later courses would be likely to adopt as far as possible existing arrangements. Thus historical speculation may be called in to supplement deficiencies, as well as to explain anomalies, in the Itinerary, on his account of which Herodotus plumbs himself, perhaps, somewhat unduly.

The Royal Road described by Herodotus is bisected by the Euphrates into two nearly equal stages: from Susa to the Euphrates 60 stations, 236 parasangs; from Euphrates to Sardis 51 stations, 214 parasangs, to which latter may be added the stretch of three days (540 stadia = 15 parasangs) to Ephesus, which will very nearly redress the balance. But the state of the argument will make it convenient to disregard this simple bisection, and to divide the road into three main stages: from Susa to the Euphrates, from Sardis (Ephesus) to the Halys, from the middle Halys to the Euphrates again: and to treat these stages in the order of problematical difficulty, just indicated.

§ 6. The farthest section of the road, from Susa to the Euphrates, may be shortly dismissed. The road in this section after leaving

¹ § 9 infra, based on materials ascertained by a journey in 1884, and therefore supplementing the R. G. S. *S. Supp.*

Papers, iii. v. (1893), Modern and ancient roads in Eastern Asia Minor, by D. G. Hogarth and J. A. R. Munro.
Susa ascended the valley of the Choaspes (Kerkha) and crossed a pass (not mentioned by Herodotus) in the mountains, no doubt strongly fortified. From Susa to the Kissan frontier 11 stations, 42½ parasangs are to be reckoned, on the authority of Herodotus.1

The pass (between the upper valley of the Kerkha and the upper valley of the Diala) led over into the Matiene of Herodotus, an immense region which covers, under a name the origin of which is very obscure, portions at least of the historic Media and Assyria. It would be reasonable to suppose that the Royal Road passed under the rock of Bagistan (Behistun), but Kiepert apparently has not taken it so far east. Three towns are, however, inserted by Kiepert en route: Kallone (Holwân, old Assy. Kalna, Xάλα, Xαλώνη, Κάλωνα), Suleimania (not shown on his map), and with most certainty Arbela, which after the destruction of Nineveh was the chief entrepôt of that region. Four rivers were crossed: the Gyndes (Diala), the two rivers Zab, and the upper Tigris. Another considerable pass had to be scaled in the land of the Karduchi, before Armenia could be entered. The passage through ‘Matiene’ is marked by 34 stations, 137 parasangs. After the amendment of the text and the elimination of three superfluous rivers, the transit of Armenia offers fewer difficulties. The road must, Kiepert argues, have kept north of the mountains, and not gone into the desert towards Nisibis (against Rennell 2). This observation shows that we are approaching the debatable area, for the course of the road through Armenia must depend on the point of the Euphrates at which the road is to cross. There are three or four points at which the road might cross, but the point chosen would be determined by the course to be followed through Kilikia. If the road was going through the Kilikian Gates, it might be expected to cross at Zeugma, or at Samosata, but not higher up than the latter. If the road was making for Mazaka, it might cross at Samosata or at Melitene (Tomissa), but not higher up than the latter. If the road was making for Komana Pontica, or Amasia, or Sinope, it might cross Euphrates at Melitene, or at a higher point, say Keban Maden.3 Kiepert unhesitatingly places the crossing at Melitene. It would be difficult to take the road to that point on Prof. Ramsay’s theory in the Hist. Geogr., where, however, he has not specified the crossing. Mr. Hogarth places the crossing at Samosata. But the point may better be approached from the other side.

§ 7. In regard to the line of the road from Sardis to the Halys, Ramsay and Kiepert are practically agreed: but, as might be expected, from his practical observations, Ramsay has entered more fully into detail. Absolute certainty is not, Ramsay states, attainable; approximate and relatively full results are forthcoming. The

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1 The royal Stathmos Ardefikka, 210 stadii from Susa, may, perhaps, have been on the Royal Road, op. 6. 119.
2 The Geo. System of Herod. xiii (1.427 ff.).
3 An alternative due to Mr. Hogarth’s suggestion.
great point to be gained is the bridge over the Halys, and that bridge is placed by Ramsay, as by Kiepert, on a line between Ankyra and Tavium. This fixture carries the road in a north-easterly direction, a course which avoids the great central salt desert, but involves crossing the Halys twice: had the road taken a line to the south of the desert it would not have crossed the Halys at all.\footnote{\textit{i.e.} the route followed later by a main road which superseded the Royal Road, op. Ramsay, \textit{op. cit.} pp. 36 ff.} Between Sardis and the Halys, through Lydia and Phrygia, the following places are named by Kiepert: Kastrupedion (= Synnada), Pessinus, Ankyra. Ramsay's list is fuller: Satala (\textit{op. Dict. Geogr. ii. p. 922}), Akmonia, Orkistos, Pessinus, Gordion, Ankyra, Tavium (beyond the Halys).\footnote{\textit{op. cit.} p. 29. On p. 30 Keramon Agora is inserted after Satala, and an alternative loop (on the south) to Pessinus mentioned. From Pessinus to Ankyra, the Roman road seems to indicate another possible alternative to the north. Kiepert presumably approved this, as he speaks of the Roman road in this part indicating the general line of the king's highway.} The city of unknown name, which lay above the tomb of Midas, must be inserted between Akmonia and Orkistos.\footnote{\textit{op. cit.} p. 31.} If we have not absolute certainty, we have 'all probability' in regard to the route from Sardis to the Halys, and Tavium, and that is saying a good deal.

§ 8. Beyond the Halys, between the Halys and the Euphrates, we are in greater difficulties. For this confusion Herodotus is, so to speak, largely responsible. He gives the names of two regions, Kappadokia and Kilikia, traversed by the road between the Halys and the Euphrates: he gives, no doubt accurately, the distance (119½ parasangs), but he names no town, he gives no orientation, he is apparently quite ignorant that the road must have crossed the Halys a second time. The theories of Kiepert and of Ramsay diverge widely in regard to the course of the road in this district. It is hardly possible that Ramsay's published theory should be altogether right, for the lower part of the course must be affected by the 'Kilikian' question: but neither is it certain that Kiepert is altogether right, though whether, if he is wrong, the error lies on the Euphrates or on the upper Halys, or on both, is disputable. Kiepert observes that 119½ parasangs\footnote{i.e. 15½ for Kilikia, 104 for Kappadokia.} are too much for anything like a direct road from Melitene, or the Euphrates crossing approved by him, to the Halys bridge. He therefore argues that the road made a considerable angle, he points that angle to the north, and he carries the road from the Euphrates to the Halys \textit{via} Sebasteia on the upper Halys, Komana Pontica, Zela and Tavia (Tavium). The reason for this detour Kiepert sees in the historical supposition that the road followed the course of an old Assyrian route to the Pontos, especially to Sinope. The reason is admirable, but the cartographical result is not absolutely convincing. An equally satisfactory result might be attained by dropping (with Prof. Ramsay) from Tavium as far as Mazaka, and then going east to Melitene, or south-east to Samosata.
In no case did the road take the shortest line from the Euphrates-ferry to the Halys-bridge. The question is whether the road through Kappadokia-Kilikia made an angle south (or west), to tap the line from Tarsos by Tyana to Sinope, which figures prominently in the pages of Herodotus¹ or made an angle north to Komana Pontika, to tap a route, which at the time was probably less important than the former. There is, in short, a question as to the crossing of the upper Halys (entirely omitted by Herodotus) as well as a question as to the crossing of the Euphrates. Two points are clear in Herodotus' account of Kilikia: first, the road to the Euphrates crosses Kilikia in 15½ parasangs; secondly, the road apparently passes through the Kilikian Gates. These two data are irreconcilable with 'the facts.' Prof. Ramsay, presumably from observing that Herodotus may fairly be taken to carry the road through the Kilikian Pylaie, and persuaded, from his own knowledge, that through the Kilikian Gates passed "the main road from all parts of the plateau of Asia Minor to Cilicia in all periods of history" (op. cit. p. 350), drops the Royal Road down from 'Pteria' (or from the Halys Bridge) by Mazaka to the Kilikian Gates, making it coincide with an old trade-route from Sinope and Pteria to Tyana and Tarsos. Of the reality of that old route there can be little doubt; but as little, that the Royal Road avoided the Kilikian Gates. No road through the Kilikian Gates could reach the Euphrates in 15½ parasangs, or by three days' journey: and a road coming from the historic Kilikia to the Euphrates would not cross the river into Armenia, as generally defined. A Kilikia divided from Armenia by the Euphrates, must be very much extended eastwards: if so extended, a line of 15½ parasangs, measured from Samosata, or from Melitene, might perhaps carry back across a portion of 'Kilikia' to the frontier of the Kappadokians, but would leave the Kilikian Gates far to the west. It may be taken as demonstrated that the Royal Road did not go through the Kilikian Gates or cross the Euphrates at Zeugma: but the discussion of the problem of the actual passes and crossings I hand over to Mr. Hogarth, merely repeating the observations that Ramsay may be right in having brought the road down to Mazaka (Caesarea), instead of crossing the upper Halys at Sebasteia with Kiepert: and that from Mazaka to the Euphrates there are still alternative routes open, which Mr. Hogarth clearly describes in the following paragraph.

§ 9. "If no alteration is to be made in the text, it is manifest that 'Herodotus' estimate of three days and 15½ parasangs through a Cilicia, bordered by Euphrates, cannot be reconciled with the route by

¹ Op. § 4 supra, note.
² From the gates to Zeugma, the nearest crossing, might be upwards of 200 miles, to judge by the maps. Op. Mr. Hogarth's estimate, p. 300 infra.
³ It is obvious that in the Kilikian section the three stations, or stages, correspond to three days' journey. It is also obvious that the distance is traversed at unusual speed. Op. 5. 53, and the table § 3 supra. [R. W. M.]
the Pylae Ciliciae usually assigned to the Royal Road (e.g. by Ramsay, Hist. Geog. of Asia Minor, p. 27). The distance from the Pylae Ciliciae to the nearest notable crossing of Euphrates, that at Zeugma (Birejik), is nearly 200 miles, and to the nearest point of the river-bank not 20 miles less. We can hardly put the Pylae Ciliciae in Cappadocia, and Cilicia east of Amanus, and, even so, the distance would be still too great to Euphrates. Nor can we suppose that Herodotus has erred in making Euphrates bound his Cilicia, without rejecting his authority wholesale for the eastern part of the route.

Commagene is unknown to Herodotus and it seems clear that it is included in his land of the Cilicians (cp. iii. 91, where Poseideon being placed on the frontier of the Cilicians and Syrians, the Cyrrhestica and all north as far as Taurus fall to the former). ¹

There is no more positive reason for the inclusion of the Pylae Ciliciae in the route of the Royal Road than the after notoriety of the pass.² It lies far to the west of the direct line between Pteria and Susa, and, if Cilicia be allowed to include Commagene, we are at liberty to take one of the important passes crossing Taurus from Cappadocia east of the Pylae Ciliciae and nearer the Euphrates.

These passes are:

A. Hajin—Kiraz Bel—Sia, debouching in Cilicia west of Amanus, and therefore at too great a distance from Euphrates.

B. A group starting from Geuksun (Ocusus) and Albistan and debouching at or near Marash.

The distance from Marash to Zeugma is nearly 100 miles. If we draw the Cappadocian frontier line on the spine of Taurus, we must add a day’s march north of Marash, making in all at least 120 miles. I fear therefore that the famous Pyramus Pass, so often traversed by armies marching between Arabissus and Germanica, and probably destined to carry a trans-Tauric railway, cannot claim the Royal Road.

C. A group starting near Malatia (Melitene) and debouching near Adiaman (Perre), which is distant only 18 miles from the crossing of Euphrates at Samsat (Samosata). I feel sure that one of this group carried the Royal Road.

I. The best known caravan-route now is that leading S.S.W. from Malatia up the Sultan Su and crossing to the head-waters of

¹ Commagene approximately corresponds to the Kasch of the Assyrian records of the ninth and eighth centuries B.C. (cp. Kiepert, Manual, § 94), and of Egyptian records of a still earlier date (cp. Ed. Meyer, Ges. d. Alt. i. § 265). [R. W. M.]

² This assertion traverses the suggestion above made, §§ 4, 7, that Herodotus, more or less clearly, carried the Royal Road through the Kilikian Gates. The true course of the road is one thing; the conception of Herodotus is another. Granting that the Kilikian Gates had been for ages the natural highway of traffic from Babylon, Egypt, Phoenicia, Kypros to the Anatolian plateau and the Euxine sea, it is difficult to be sure that the ‘Gates,’ by which a Kilikia, traversed in three days, was entered, were not, in the conception of Herodotus, the great historic Pass. Cp. note 5, p. 293; note 1, p. 294 supra. [R. W. M.]
"the Geok Su, where it forks S.W. to Marash, S.E. to Adiaman. Hafiz Pacha dragged guns over this pass in 1840. Placing the Cappadocian frontier on the divide between the Sultan Su and the "Geok Su, we have a very easy three days' journey to Samsat, reckoned now at about 18 hours, or 56 miles.

2. The existence, however, of a magnificent Roman bridge over the Bolam Su about 21 miles N.E. of Adiaman proves that the "main Roman trans-Tauric highway took a more easterly line, either:

(a) Up the Bolam Su and across between Belian Dagh and Bei Dagh, to a tributary of Sultan Su.

(b) By Kiahkta, up the basin of the Gerger Chai and across to a point near Isoli on the Euphrates.

In either case after the route has crossed the Bridge, going south, it would run directly over easy country in ten hours (30 miles) to Samsat, leaving Adiaman some distance to the right.

Route (a) coincides north of Bolam with the summer horse-road from Adiaman. It is not in much favour as a caravan-route, and not used in winter.

Route (b) is the ordinary caravan-route from Kiahkta and Gerger, reputed distinctly easier than (a) and open all the year round.

Both routes descend from the spine of Taurus to Samsat in about eighteen native hours. There are no other routes, much better than goat-tracks. Now route (b) is mentioned by Strabo (p. 663) in an important connection. Having described, on the authority of Artemidorus, the great caravan-route from Ephesus to the east (κοινή δόδις . . . τέχτων ἀπάσι τούς ἐκ τής ανατολής δόδις πορείαν ἐκ Ἰφέσου) as far as Euphrates at Tomis, he says nothing about a crossing of the river there, but, stating that the Indian route begins at Samosata (ἡ πρὸς τήν διαβάσει καὶ τήν Ζεύγματι κεῖται), proceeds at once to link this Indian road to the κοινή δόδις by a road across Taurus—εἰς δὲ Σαμωσατα ἀπὸ τῶν ὄρων τῆς Καππαδοκίας τῶν περὶ Τίμωρα ὑπερβῆντι τὸν Ταύρον σταδίους ἐίρηκε (Eratosthenes) 450. Tomis was on the left bank opposite Isoli, Samosata is on the right bank due south: a glance at the map will show that the direct road from one to the other must lie on the right bank, subtending the large eastward arc made at this point by the river. This road, therefore, crossed by route (b). But the distance from Tomis to Samosata is much more like 650 than 450 stades: Strabo, however, reckons not from Tomis but ἀπὸ τῶν ὄρων τῆς Καππαδοκίας τῶν περὶ Τίμωρα, i.e. from the spine of Taurus on the right bank lower down than Tomis, which latter place is not in Cappadocia at all.
"but in Sophene. I take it, therefore, that Strabo means that the κούργιος touched Euphrates opposite to Tomsa, but did not cross the river: turning slightly more S. from Isoli it ran by route (b) to Kialkhta and Samosata, where the Euphrates was crossed and the Indian road taken up.

"Route (b) is, therefore, in all probability not only that of the Imperial highway on which Vespasian built and Septimius Severus restored the splendid bridge which is still in use, but also that of the κούργιος to the far East at least as early as Artemidorus’ epoch, i.e. the end of the second century B.C. Why not also that of the Royal Road in the fifth century B.C.? Strabo’s 450 stades from the Cappadocian frontier to Samosata is exactly equivalent to Herodotus’ three days of 18 miles each from the Cappadocian frontier through ‘Cilicia’ to the Euphrates.1 The change of starting-point from Sardis to Ephesus made the western course of the κούργιος diverge from that of the Royal Road, but at Mazaca, or a little east of it, the two would meet. It is more probable that one line was followed thence in the fifth and second centuries than two. Eastern traffic is prone, where possible, stare super antiquas vias.

"Finally, a direct line from Pteria to the head of the Tokhma Su (to which line nature interposes no serious obstacle), thence to the Euphrates at Isoli and across Taurus to Samosata, stands to the route by the Pylae Ciliciae much as the base of a triangle to the two sides. A détour by Mazaca, if that be preferred, involves but a slight curve in the base.

"From the Tokhma Su to Samosata a singular succession of monuments of all periods follows the line of the road. At Gurun, Palanga and Arsalan Tash near Derende, and at Arsalan Tepe, the site of the oldest Melitene, ‘Pterian’ (sometimes called ‘Hittite’) inscriptions and reliefs mark the course of a very old route down the Tokhma Su (see an article in Recueil de travaux relatifs à la Philologie etc. vol. xv. p. 29). At Isoli is a rock-cut inscription in ‘Vannic’ cuneiform. As soon as the spine of Taurus is left behind the colossal monument of Antiochus I. of Commagene looks down on the road from the topmost peak of the Nimrud Dag. Crossing Vespasian’s Bridge we pass under the tumulus and columns at Karakush dedicated to three Commagenian princesses, and reach Samat, where a ‘Pterian’ stèle lies on the left as we enter the village. If Samosata really stood at the crossing of Euphrates by the great Eastern road, it is easy to understand its pre-Hellenic importance; its selection as the capital city by the Commagenian kings, although removed on the extreme limit of their realm; and its constitution by Vespasian as the prefecture of a legion.

"I believe it to have been the point at which the Royal Road crossed Euphrates. Herodotus’ three days through Cilicia are the

1 To be quite exact Hdt. puts the distance at 465 stades (15½ parasangs), cp. § 3 supra.
three days to the spine of Taurus above Kiakhta; the twenty-
eight days thence through Cappadocia are a fair estimate for the
route up the Tokhma Su to Mazaca, across the Halys and past
Pteria to the Halys again.

After crossing Euphrates the Royal Road passes for 15 stages
through Armenia. This country south of Mt. Masius was not known
to later geographers as Armenia (cp. Strabo, p. 522), but what was
Herodotus to call it? Mesopotamia meant for him the country
south of the desert. For that on the north he did not know the
names Osroene, or Sophene, and included it with the great tract
north, as the land of the Armenians.”

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1 The Rev. E. M. Walker, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Queen’s College, Oxford, has favoured me with some notes upon the section of the road between the Halys and the Euphrates. He gives the following reasons for preferring the Pteria—Mazaka —Malatia—Isoli—Semsaat route: i. It explains the three stations across Cilicia: the agreement with Strabo can hardly be accidental. Kiepert’s alternative (cp. § 8 supra) involves an improbable extension of Cilicia to the north of Taurus: Hogarth’s extension is justified by the inclusion of Posideium in Cilicia. ii. The character of the country opposite Malatia renders it improbable that the road should in early times have crossed to Tumisa. iii. Artemidorus (opusd Strabon.) shows that the route from Mazaka to the Euphrates was the usual road in the 2nd cent. a.c. Hogarth has proved that it was a road of importance in early times as well. iv. The route agrees in point of distance very nearly with the figures given by Hdt. Mr. Walker bases his statement on the following calculation, in stades: Mazaka to Tomisa (Isoli) 1440, Halys reo Pteria to Mazaka 1640, Isoli to Cilician frontier (the ‘missing link,’ note on p. 301 supra) 150: total 3130 against Hdt.’s 3120. The first item is taken from Strabo 668. The second is estimated by a comparison of the maps in Ramsay’s Hist. Geogr. with Smith and Grove’s Atlas. The third is based on Hogarth’s implication that the distance is less than 200 stades. If the calculation is an underestimate, the Herodotean figures would be so much the more inadequate.
APPENDIX XIV

HIPPOKLEIDES—THE PEACOCK


§ 1. A Pali scholar, Mr. Arnold C. Taylor, has provided me, from an Oriental source, with a remarkable parallel to the Herodotean story of the misconduct of Hippokleides, son of Teisandros, at the court of Kleisthenes (6. 126-130). The parallel is contained in a fable: the fable is accessible to English readers in Mr. T. W. Rhys Davids’ Buddhist Birth-Stories, vol. i. pp. 291 ff. (London, Trübner & Co., 1880), from which the following translation is borrowed.

THE DANCING PEACOCK.

Long ago, in the first age of the world, the quadrupeds chose the Lion as their King, the fishes the Lenathan, and the birds the Golden Goose.

Now the royal Golden Goose had a daughter, a young goose most beautiful to see; and he gave her her choice of a husband. And she chose the one she liked the best.

For, having given her the right to choose, he called together all the birds in the Himalaya region. And crowds of geese, and peacocks, and other birds of various kinds, met together on a great flat piece of rock.

The king sent for his daughter, saying, “Come and choose the husband you like best!” On looking over the assembly of the birds, she caught sight of the peacock, with a neck as bright as gems, and a many-coloured tail; and she made the choice with the words, “Let this one be my husband!”

So the assembly of the birds went up to the peacock, and said, “Friend Peacock! this king’s daughter having to choose her husband from amongst so many birds, has fixed her choice upon you.”

“Up to to-day you would not see my greatness,” said the peacock; so
overflowing with delight that in breach of all modesty he began to spread his wings and dance in the midst of the vast assembly,—and in dancing he exposed himself.

Then the royal Golden Goose was shocked. And he said, "This fellow has neither modesty in his heart, nor decency in his outward behaviour! I shall not give my daughter to him. He has broken loose from all sense of shame!" And he uttered this verse to all the assembly:—

"Pleasant is your cry, brilliant is your back,
Almost like the opal in its colour is your neck,
The feathers in your tail reach about a fathom's length,
But to such a dancer I can give no daughter, sir, of mine."

Then the king in the midst of the whole assembly bestowed his daughter on a young goose, his nephew. And the peacock was covered with shame at not getting the fair gosling, and rose straight up from the place and flew away.

But the king of the Golden Geese went back to the place where he dwelt.

§ 2. In a note (op. cit. p. 294) Mr. Rhys Davids observes that "this fable forms one of those, illustrations of which were carved in bas relief round the great Tope at Bharhut. There the fair gosling is represented just choosing the peacock for her husband; so this tale must be at least sixteen hundred years old." But to the sixteen centuries thus guaranteed for the life of this fable must be added at least seven centuries more, in order to explain the presence of the same motive in the pages of Herodotus: for, that the fable of The Dancing Peacock and the story of The Wedding of Agariste have a large element in common, is evident on simple inspection. How many years, generations, or centuries might still have to be added to the childhood of the story before the date of its actual birth were reached, is a further problem depending for its solution, in part at least, upon the relation established between the story in Herodotus and the fable in the Jatakathavamana.

§ 3. For the benefit of those who may consult this critique, yet not fully command the Greek, I insert an English rendering of the story in question.

The Wedding of Agariste.

Kleisthenes son of Aristonymos, son of Myron, son of Andreas had a daughter, whose name was Agariste; and he wished to discover the best man in all Hellas, on whom to bestow her in marriage.

So, at an Olympian festival, when his chariot won the prize, Kleisthenes had proclamation made, that what Hellenic soever esteemed himself worthy of such a match should come to Sikyon, on or before the sixtieth day, seeing that Kleisthenes will celebrate his daughter's marriage in a year, beginning from the said day.
Thereupon all Hellenes that were high and mighty in themselves and in their homes thronged to the wooing: and for them Kleisthenes made a running-track and a wrestling-ring, and had them to this very purpose.

Now there were the suitors of Agariste.

From Italy came Smerdis, son of Hippokrates, the Sybarite, a man unique for the pitch of luxury he reached, his native city just then being at the very core of its prosperity; and Damasos from Siris, son of Amyris hight ‘the Sage’; these two from Italy.

From the Ionian gulf came Amphimines, son of Epistrophos, of Epidamnos: he alone from out the Ionian gulf.

Came an Attolian, Males, brother of that Titmonos who surpassed all Greeks in native strength, and fled into the uttermost parts of Aiolia to be rid of human kind.

From Peloponnesse, Leokeles, son of Pheidon tyrant of Argos, that Pheidon who ordained for Peloponnesians the measures they use, and of all Hellenes worked greatest wickedness, for he drove out the Eleian stewards and held the Festival in Olympia on his own account.

Amiantos son of Lycurgos, an Arkadian out of Trapezus, and an Aesnian from Paioi-city Laphanes son of Euphorion: Euphorion, who, as goes the story in Arkadia, received and housed the great twin Brethren, and from that day forward keeps open house for all comers.

An Eleian too came, Onomastos son of Agaios.

These came from Peloponnesse itself.

From Athens came two men: Megabes son of that Alkmamon who had been a guest at the court of Kroisos; and another, Hippokleides son of Teisandros, in riches and beauty excelling his countrymen.

From Eretria, at that time in its flower, came Lysanias, he and he alone from Euboea.

Out of Thessaly there came of the House of Skopus Diaktorides from Kranon, and out of Molossia Alkon.

These were the suitors, neither more nor less. When they were come to the appointed day Kleisthenes first inquired each man’s land and lineage, and then, detaining them a year, he made thorough trial of their prowess, temperament, breeding, and manners, associating with each severally and with them altogether, and marshalling the younger men to feats of strength, and, to crown all, he put them to the proof over their cups: so long as he kept them leaving nothing undone and withal entertaining right splendidly.

Now, sooth to say, of all the suitors those come from Athens were finding most favour, and, of these, the preference was going to Hippokleides son of Teisandros, both for prowess, and for that he was kin of yore to the House of Kyypeilos in Korinth.

So, when the day appointed for the celebration of the marriage-feast and the declaration by Kleisthenes in person of the man of his choice, was come, he offered an hundred oxen to the gods, and made a feast for the suitors and for all the men of Sikyon. And, when they were done eating, the suitors competed one against another in the arts of song and speech.

Now, whenas the drinking was forward, Hippokleides, having the rest
well in hand, bade the piper pipe him a solemn measure: the piper obeyed, and Hippokleides danced the while.

Beisike he pleased himself with his dancing, but Kleisthenes, seeing him, viewed the whole matter askance.

By and by, Hippokleides after a pause bade them carry in a table: and when the table was come in, upon it first he danced a Spartan war-dance, then other and Attic figures, last of all he rested his head upon the table, and flung about with his legs in the air!

Now Kleisthenes, at the first and at the second dance, though disgusted and resolving that Hippokleides, by reason of his dancing and shamelessness, was no husband for his daughter, restrained himself, for he did not want to burst out against the man.

But, when he saw him fling his legs about in the air, he could keep still no longer and said: "O son of Teisandros, it's your dancing has lost you the wedding." But Hippokleides took him up and said: "No matter that, to Hippokleides!"

This is the origin of the well-known saying.

Presently Kleisthenes caused silence to be made, and said in the hearing of all: "Sirs! Suitors for the hand of my child! ye are all welcome here, and I would fain, as it were possible, gratify each and all of you, not selecting one for special favour, and not disqualifying the rest. But, where there is only one damsel in debate, it is impossible to please everybody. To each man of you, therefore, departing without the bride, I present a talent of silver, in return for the honour he has done me in wishing to take a wife of my House, and to compensate his absence from home: but to Alkmaion's son, Megacles, I plight my daughter Agarist's troth, in accordance with the law of Athens."

Whereupon Megacles announced his acceptance of the contract, and the wedding was a thing accomplished.

§ 4. The notion that the two stories have absolutely no historical connexion with each other at all, being dismissed as not worth discussing, there are, logically speaking, but three possible alternatives in regard to the relation between the similar elements of the pair. The Indian story may have been derived from the Greek, or the Greek story may have been derived from the Indian, or the two may be independent derivatives from a common source. To render the first alternative acceptable, it might be imagined that the Greek story, told by Herodotus, was carried to India, in the days of Alexander the Great, and there, in course of time, transformed and degraded into a beast- (or bird-)fable, to be again, in course of time, moralised into a Buddhist birth-story (according to which the soul of the peacock was re-incarnate in the person of a luxurious monk, one that disgraced himself in the presence of the Master, whose soul had formerly inhabited the body of that same royal Golden Goose). But any such hypothesis will obviously place a severe strain upon the conscience of historian and mythologist. It is infinitely more probable that an Indian fable had reached Hellas and been historicised before the days
of Herodotus, than that a page of Herodotean history, so to speak, was torn out and carried to India in the train of Alexander, and there dissolved and desiccated into a bird-fable. The fable wears upon its very face and front the more primitive stamp: the Herodotean story is transparently imaginative, poetical, pragmatic. The supposition that ideas, as well as commodities, had been carried from East to West, from India to Hellas, long before the days of Herodotus, is likely to take its place among historical common-places. The work of Herodotus itself contains not a little evidence to illustrate the ways and means by which such communications were, or might have been, mediated. Whatever the epoch of the Buddha, whatever the date of the Collection of Buddhist Birth-stories, in which this fable is preserved, to the fable itself may be assigned an indefinite antiquity, at least sufficient to render its percolation into Hellenic souls and Hellenic letters before the middle of the fifth century B.C. easily conceivable.

§ 5. To determine a more precise limit for the advent of this fable within the European area the most obvious hint is supplied by the date assigned for the introduction of the peacock to the West. That the gorgeous fowl is a native of the Indian peninsula, and must have been brought to Europe from thence, are propositions apparently indisputable. A finer issue lies in determining the exact date of the peacock's advent. The earliest evidence supplied by Greek literature can hardly be pressed much higher than the age of Herodotus himself.

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1 That Greeks encountered or adopted any complete system of oriental philosophy it would be absurd to suppose: that ideas had reached Hellas from India before the days of Pythagoras, it is hardly less absurd to deny. The method of explaining all resemblances, even in relatively far-advanced ideas, as parallel developments of independent but analogous germs, is likely to give way to the accumulating evidences of a wide-spread commerce, even in the ages of Bronze and of Stone. The statement of Herodotus, 2. 129, that the Greeks learnt the doctrine of Metampsychosis in Egypt might be true, by the way, even if the doctrine was not Egyptian.


3 The death of the Buddha is the point of departure for Indian chronology (der Anhaltpunkt der älteren Geschichte von Indien, see P. Wurr, Gesch. d. indischen Religion, 1874, p. 141). The Singhalese date, the lowest given by Buddhist authority, is 549 B.C. Eminent scholars in the west have lowered this still further to the hasty era 481-477 B.C.; cp. Wurr, op. c., p. 142.

4 The orthodox Buddhist belief dates the Collection immediately after Gotama's death, doubles a prochronism. Mr. Rhys Davids appears to assign the origin of "Our Jataka Book" to the third or fourth century B.C. (op. cit. Introduction, p. 1xxxii), but also recognises that there were older collections, and that the fables are, of course, much older than their Buddhist setting.

5 Bergk, Gr. Lit. Gesch. i. 373 (1872), admits that the Indian Thierenge may have affected the Hellenic through the mediation of other peoples: the majority of Indian fables resembling Greek fables he regards as of later origin, and copied from the Greek originals. But ep. Flach, Gesch. d. gr. Lyr., 245 ff. (1885).

6 (1) The bird is, or was, found wild in India, as by Alexander (Aelian, N. H. 5. 21). (2) The western names for the peacock are derived from the Indian, so Heb. ūbēkē, Gk. ταύρις (ταῦς cp. L. & S.), or taurus, Lat. pavo, are the Tamil tegei, Sanskr. pikkū.
Notwithstanding his interest in strange and wonderful objects, from the ends of the earth,\(^1\) Herodotus nowhere mentions the peacock: but the bird is known to his Athenian contemporaries,\(^2\) and was undoubtedly to be seen at Athens in the time of Perikles.\(^3\) An ingenious conjecture has dated the epiphany of the peacock in Athens to the close of the Samian War, 439 B.C.,\(^4\) and explained the introduction of the bird to the knowledge of the Greeks by an hypothetical \textit{ex voto} dedicated in the Heraion of his native island by some pious Samian trader, who had dealings with Egypt or with the further East.\(^5\) But, if the peacock was an unheard-of wonder till after the days of Polykrates and Amasia,\(^6\) and confined to the temple of the Samian Hera till Perikles \textit{ex hypothesi} carried a pair of birds, or an egg, to Athens in 439 B.C.,\(^7\) the silence of Herodotus, who was certainly no stranger in the Samian Heraion or in Periklean Athens,\(^8\) is all the less intelligible. A rare bird the peacock was and remained for the most part throughout antiquity, but that it was an absolute novelty until the fifth century to the Mediterranean public and to Hellenic connoisseurs, need not be inferred from the state of the evidences. The bird was admittedly known at the court of Solomon at the beginning of the tenth century B.C.,\(^9\) and although that epoch may fall into a period when the far-reaching commerce and relations of the ‘Mykenae-an’ civilisation had given way, in the Aegean region, under the stress and barbarity of the Dorian irruption, yet it is dangerous to infer non-existence or ignorance simply a \textit{silence}, whether in the historical or in the archaeological evidences. In any case, the fable of \textit{The Dancing Peacock} may have been transmitted to the Hellenic region, with or without the bird, long before Aristophanes and his contemporaries made use, or made fun, of the bird in Athens for their own purposes. The late introduction or re-introduction of the peacock to the Greek world would not of necessity carry with it the conclusion that the \textit{Nacca Ialaka} had not, in one form or other, percolated into the Mediterranean region long before the days when the Wedding of Agariste was made a theme of song and speech. That Herodotus, or even that his authorities for the wedding-tale,

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\(^1\) 8. 106.
\(^2\) Eupolis, \textit{op. cit} Athen. Lc. infra, Aristophanes, \textit{Acharn.} 53, \textit{Birds} 102, 269, 888; \textit{op. cit} Athen. Lc.
\(^3\) Plutarch, \textit{Perikl.} 13, \textit{op. cit} Athenaeus, p. 397. R. Hamerling, in his romance \textit{Aspasia} (1878), has utilised the incident (chapter v., \textit{Die Ifsaue des Pyrleampes}).
\(^6\) Hahn, \textit{op. cit} p. 309, argues that, had the peacock been known in Samos, in the time of Polykrates, Ibykos and Anakreon would have mentioned it.
\(^7\) For the date \textit{op. cit} Dunker, ix. 197, 211.
\(^9\) 1 Kings 10. 22, 2 Chron. 9. 21. The \textit{tekbētēm} are brought from Ophir. On the etymology of the Hebrew word \textit{op. cit} note 6, p. 308 supra.
knowing the peacock-fable, deliberately moulded the human story upon the bird-fable is more than need be suspected for the solution of the problem. The complete anthropomorphism of the story as compared with the fable may be taken to imply more than one intermediary. The beast-fable had already made itself at home in Greek letters long before the time of Herodotus. If this fable, in some form or other, reached Hellas before the peacock was introduced; or if the fable survived the original introduction of the bird, and had been detached from its original setting or vehicle before the age of Peisistratos, it is all the easier to understand the pliability with which it adapted itself to a new purpose, when annexed to the historical tradition of the great Alkmæonian wedding.

§ 6. The recognition of a fabulous element in the wedding-tale leaves the historic substance unaffected. There is no sufficient reason to doubt that Hippokleides and Megakles were the chief, perhaps the only, suitors for the hand of Agariste. The relations of Sikyon under Kleisthenes to Athens in the time of Solon may have made the preference of an Athenian suitor almost a foregone conclusion. How far the rejection of the son of Teisandros was due to the personal considerations adumbrated in the story of Agariste’s wedding and anticipated in the Naccà Jatala, must be matter of conjecture. The anapaestic tag from Hermippos (ὦ φρονίς Ἰπποκλείδη) might have been consequence, or cause, in relation to the metamorphosis of the dancing Indian peacock into the dancing Athenian Eupatriad. On any possible supposition it is evident that the memory of the wedding of Agariste, an historic event fraught with manifold political significance, was obscured, or glorified, by adventitious influences from various quarters, among which may be detected not merely the obvious matter derived from native epic sources, but the remoter workings of oriental fable, transmitted, and transmuted, by long and subtle processes, from Hindustan to Hellas, until what had been a palpable creation of primitive Indian folk-lore came to pass muster as a serious item in the Hellenic history of the sixth century B.C.

§ 7. The above argument points to the conclusion that the fabulous element in the Herodotean story is derived neither directly nor indirectly from the Jatala-thavangada, but from an earlier and remoter source. The particular Birth-stories making up the collection so-named may be regarded as older than the collection itself: and the fable of the dancing Peacock is presumably far older than the Buddhist Birth-story, in which it is incorporated. But the close resemblance between the Indian fable and the Athenian story seems to

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show that the fable must originally have reached the Greek world in very much the same form as that in which it is now to be read sandwiched, after the method of the Book of Birth-Stories (or transmigrations), between the Buddhist fore-word and the Buddhist after-word, which explain the occasion and the moral of this lesson on the virtue of modesty, in terms almost unintelligible, save to an audience of Theosophists. In that respect the contrast between the Indian and the Hellenic humour could hardly be more complete. A bird-fable, commending a modest behaviour to man, becomes in Buddhist hands an illustration of the abstract doctrine of soul-migration, but remains withal a mere fable. The same material by the magic of Hellenic wisdom is melted and transfigured into a natural and intelligible human episode. The dancing peacock has disappeared, but the frivolous and immodest soul of the splendid bird inhabits for ever the body of Hippokleides, son of Teisandros, in the enchanted pages of Herodotean story.
INDICES

I LECTIONUM
II VERBORUM
III AUCTORUM
IV NOMINUM ET RERUM
The references in Index I. are to Book, Chapter, and Line. In the other Indices the Roman figures denote pages of the Introduction. Arabic figures, with an a or b added, denote the right and left columns respectively of the Commentary in Vol. I.; without any addition, the pages of Vol. II. [ ] denote that the word does not occur in l.c. or in Herodotus.
INDEX I

LECTIONUM

Liber iv.
1. 1 astra Δαρελο
2. 9 κερατίστατε
2. 12 ο... κομμα
4. 4 τοῦ βουλεῖον
7. 3 Ταρσινᾶν
8. 11 τὰς del. Κρίγερ

ναι quid perit velut ψάλμων.

Stein
11. 9 ρὸς ἱεροῦ
11. 10 μετονομα
15. 3 δικοσιας
17. 4 Ἀλαβάτη
17. 6 Βουρουθενᾶς
22. 10 παῦξιν
23. 6 γένεια
28. 4 ηλίον Soc. Stein
28. 14 τὰ τῆς Σωτηρίαν
38. 3 λέγων del. Heslak

λέγωνα conl. Schweig. Stein
38. 3 δικτών... συνλέγεον
38. 6 ἀναπέμπτων
38. 7 Πατροῦ
42. 5 ἑκάστη Soc. Stein
45. 7 τῶν Μάρκην
45. 10 γνωσιᾶς
47. 6 ὁμολογῶν
48. 4 μὴν οἶκος
49. 4 μεγάλοι
49. 7 Κίος
53. 6 εἰσαμετάσας
55. 13 Γερρέων
55. 13 γενεαλεωτα
58. 23 Δημοσίωτος
59. 9 Γεωργόφου
62. 11 τοιοῦτος εἰναὶ πλευρ
63. 1 ὅτι ἐδοθέν
65. 3 εὐαγγελοῖς
67. 3 οὐκ ἐκάστῳ
67. 6 ἀκατάφρονον

Liber iv.
71. 1 et... κρυσταλλώτος
72. 2 μήτε τεων
72. 12 διερεχτέων
81. 16 ἐν τῷ διδώτω Soc.

Stein
85. 5 ἐπὶ μῆλῳ
85. 10 ὁ ἀρχήν
85. 2 μακρομερῆ
85. 2 καὶ Πλάτων om.

ABC (a)
96. 1 τοῦτον καὶ om.

ABC (a)
97. 3 ἀρχὴ
99. 16 τῶν δικαίων Soc.

Κρίγερ
103. 3 εἰσαχθέντες
103. 10 καταστος del. Nitzach
106. 4 γλῶσσαν
106. 4 ἀνδροφαγεῖν
107. 2 τῶν εὐαγγελίας
119. 16 οὐ δεισίμεθα
127. 17 ἢ ἀνδρ Σωτῆρος ῥηθεί
cap.
129. 2 τῶν... εἰδότοι, cap.
130. 1
129. 6 ὁμολογήσεις
129. 7 τολλαίες et al. cap.
130. 1
138. 1 διαφάρωσθε τὴν
ψῆφον
189. 6 καὶ... λέγων
142. 5 Δαμασκώνια μάλατα
145. 5 τῶν εἰς Βραυμών
148. 8 ἀκομαίνοι... τοιοῦτο
150. 4 θῆμα
150. 6 Βοφόρωμα
152. 15 δεσπαστόντα
153. 5 ἀκομαίνοι...
164. 4 ὁμοί
165. 15 διδώτω... ψάλμων
159. 18 διδώτωρ
161. 4 εὐαγγελισμένον
162. 14 τοῦτο εἰς et cap.

Liber iv.
167. 14 Δαρελο soc. St.
169. 1 Γαλατίας
169. 2 χύρων soc. Stein
169. 3 χύρων soc. Stein
171. 3 Βάκαλες
172. 6 εὐκατάστατες
172. 9 εὐελ μεγετωτάται
181. 10 τά
184. 3 Ἀραχαίες
187. 13 σταυρός
191. 14 οἰ ἄγιοι... ἄγιοι
191. 16 δικαιάκηστα
192. 2 ἱνακάκος
192. 6 δικαίων
192. 9 καὶ τὰ περ τῇ ἀληθεία
193. 1 Ζαυγείς
194. 1 Γερμαίες
195. 12 αὐθεῖοι
199. 4 τῶν καρπῶν del.

Gomperz

Liber v.
6. 3 τῶν γνωσίας soc.

Stein
9. 2 αὐθεῖοι
9. 2 τὰ... Ἰωσώ
13. 13 Σαρμάνης
16. 2 καὶ Δῆλος et al.
16. 5 ἡμιχρήσται
18. 10 Δαυίδ
20. 16 εὐδοκιμολογοῦσα
23. 3 ἀνταλητη
23. 4 δωρεὰν
27. 1 οὐ μὴ... τελευτή
28. 1 μετά... οὖν τολμᾶν
... ἄνωθεν καθὼς ὦν
30. 27 τῶν Κυνάδων
34. 3 ἀπόθεν
35. 2 ἄρακτο
39. 1 ἔρχον
41. 3 ἀκομαίνοι
Liber vici. 8. 2 δοσί την Δαβίδον
9. 14 αὐγοθῆκος
11. 5 ἄγεται
13. 5 ὀδόκοος τούς λέγοντας
13. 7 δὲ
13. 8 τοῦ Δαβίδον
18. 10 ὡς ἀνακαλέσουσιν
18. 10 ἐπιμεθάνησον
19. 10 πολλῶν
22. 4 φῦ
22. 5 Αἴδεα
23. 14 Ιουκα
23. 1 ἐν τῷ Ζαγχαλίῳ μοιχαρχῶν
25. 8 προσηγγάγοντο
29. 2 Μαλήνη
31. 4 δεῖ τά ἀρχαῖα
35. 10 Μεσομαχίαν ὀλιγορροιαν
39. 5 Κήμας
40. 2 τῶν καταλαβόντων
40. 3 τρίτην μὲν γὰρ ἦτε ἐπὶ τῶν ἐστὶν
42. 7 μετρήσας σφένην
42. 8 τῶν τῶν... στάθη
52. 12 ὀμοιός καὶ ἑαυτῷ
52. 12 ἐπὶ τῶν τῶν
52. 14 βασιλεύετε
53. 2 γράφων τούτων
54. 5 αὐτῶν
57. 1 τὰ εἶρημένα
57. 11 ἐπὶ Δαβίδον
57. 12 μὴ ἔλθησιν δὲ
57. 18 καταρκόμενον
58. 19 ὃς ἢ τισταῖ σφί τοι... ἀρχιμεσίτῃ
60. 5 κατὰ λαμπροφωσίαν
61. 4 δύση
61. 18 ἵππων
64. 5 δὲ... ταῖς
71. 6 πώλης πρώτους ἐστὶν
74. 8 τῶν ἐπηγάζειν θάρσην
75. 17 γεγονόντα
85. 12 εἰμαλάων
86. 9 παρακαθάθηκεν
86. 21 διέρρησαν
86. 28 παρακαθάθηκεν
86. 56 παρακαθήθηκεν
87. 6 εὐτετεῖθαι
87. 7 άν
92. 14 διηρ. ψ. οὐσίων
92. 14 ἄνωθεν

Liber vii. 98. 2 τούς
94. 3 μεμορφιάθη με τῶν... λαβοῦσαν
94. 10 δὲ
96. 13 τῷ προτέρῳ ἦταν
96. 3 τῶν πρότερων...
98. 12 καὶ ἐν χρησμῷ... ἑτοίμων
98. 15 ἡ δύναμιν εἰπέτε
100. 6 βοήθουσα
101. 3 Τόμας
101. 4 τοῖς
102. 2 κατέργασε
105. 2 Φαίτερες
105. 4 Φαίτερες
106. 5 Φαίτερες
106. 7 Φαίτερες
107. 8 Αὐγαστος
107. 13 τῶν ἀδελφῶν
107. 13 βῆκες
107. 14 αὐτῶς
109. 3 συμβάλλεις
110. 11 οἰκτοῦσιν
110. 5 δικαίους
111. 5 αἰεί
111. 7 γὰρ
112. 12 καὶ τοῦ ἀδελφα ταύτων... Ἑβραῖον
113. 8 ἀμφίλεπτος
113. 10 αἴσθος
116. 2 τάξεις
117. 1 ὁ Μαραθέως
119. 13 ταΐς ἐν ἄλλο
119. 15 τὸ δὲ θησαύριον
121. 1 θώμα δὲ μακελείον
121. 2 Καλλίνων δὲ κτλ.
123. 1 οὐκ Ἀλεξεωσίδα
123. 9 τούς λατρείας
123. 12 καὶ τὸν κρυστάλλον
123. 21 ἑτέρα ωραίτερα
124. 2 τάχανον
127. 11 καῦς
127. 11 Φείδων δὲ τούς τὰ μέτρα
128. 7 ἐν τῇ συμπτωσθῇ
128. 8 γειτνία
128. 9 ἡρόεσσον
129. 1 κατακλίσεις
130. 2 κοιμηθέντες
132. 8 παρασκευάζειν
132. 2 πρότερον
137. 14 τοῖς... κατῆκας
INDEX II

319

Διος εξι, 8 b, 53 a, 177 a, 238 b, 223 b, 390 a Διος 336 b
Δικής 107 a, 223 a
Δέκατο 385 a
[Δίδυμος] 86 a
Διόκτητα 172 a
Δεξίω 215 b
Δευτεραίοι 361 b
Δευτερος 80 b
Δευοθή 294 b
Δέκας 9 a
[Δημοκράτεια] 95 b
[Δημοκράτη] 303 a
Δήμος 116 a, 206 a, 219 b, 227 b, 235 a, 238 b, 246 a, 139 a
Δήμος 311 b, 317 a, 377 b
Δημοτική 316 a
Διά 131 a
Διαβάστεια 15 a, 64 a
Διαβάσιμος 177 a, 178 b, 179 a, 246 a, 247 a, 257 a, 309 a
[Διαβασμα] 354 b
Διαβάστα 145 b
Διαλογικής 335 b
Διαλογις 108 b
Διαλόγισμον 189 a
Διαλόγισμα 86 a
Διαλεγμένη 245 b
Διαλέξεις 37 a
Διαλείμματα 45 b, 67 b
[Διαλέξεις] 183, 230, 231
Διαλογισμός 380 a
Διαλογισμούς 258 b
Διαλογιστικός 55 a
Διαλογιστικός 382 b, 389 b
Διαλογιστής 95 b
Διαλυτικός 339 a
Διάλογος 312 a
Διάλογος 285 b
Διάλεκτος 314 a, 329 b
Διάλεκτος 278 a, 289 a
Διάλεξη 165 b
Διαλογισμός 20 a
Διάλεξη 135 a
Διάλεξη 67 a, 95 a, 100 a, 220 a
Διάλεξη 238 b
Διαλεξή 330 a, 342 a, 360 a
Διάλεξης 302 a, 394 b
Διάλεγμα 143 a
Διάλεγμα 222 b
[Διάλεκτος] x
Διάγος 294
Διάγραμμα 136 a
Διαγραμματικής 58 b
Διαγραμματικής 143 b
Διαγραμματικής 25 b, 356 a
[Διαγραμματικής] 198 b
8 364 b

[Δίωξη] 294 b
Διώξης 28 a, 39 a
Διώξης lxxviii, 69 b, 139 a, 207 b, 211 a, 362 b
Διώξης 358 b, 201 b, 202 a
Διώξης 137 b
Διώξης 285 b
Διώξης 246 b, 340 a, 75
Διώξης 90 a
Διώξης 200 b
Διώξης 276 a
Διώξης 287 a, 328 a
Διώξης 39 a, 370 a, 381 a
[225]
Διώξης 306 a
Διώξης 345 a, 354 b
[Διώξης] 286 b, 287 b, 375 b
Διώξης 296 a, 325 a
Διώξης 18 b
Διώξης 380 a
Διώξης 385 b
Διώξης 388 b
[Διώξης] 388 b
Διώξης 286 b
Διώξης 224 b
Διώξης 28 b, 154 a, 266 a, 75, 154
Διώξης 274 b
Διώξης 92 a
Διώξης 28 b
Διώξης 76 b
[Διώξης] 380 a, 390 a, 257
Διώξης 145 b, 175 b, [224 a], 309 a
Διώξης 208 b, 213 a, 215 b
Διώξης 255 b
Διώξης 288 b
Διώξης 287 a
Διώξης 347 b
Διώξης 278 b
Διώξης 44 a
Διώξης 10 a, 221 a, 356 b
Διώξης 356 b
Διώξης 285 b
Διώξης 270
Διώξης (κατεστραμμένος) 148 b
Διώξης 203 b, 248 a
[Διώξης] 211
Διώξης 145 b, 315 a, 368 b
[Διώξης] 389 b
Διώξης 300 a
Διώξης 1 a
Διώξης 359 b

[Διώξης] 261 b
Διώξης 248 b
Διώξης 96 a
Διώξης 201 a
Διώξης 142 a
Διώξης 92 b, 176 b, 129 b, 243 b, 307 b, 361 b
Διώξης 366 b, 386 b, 394 b
[Διώξης] 116 b, 118 a, 221 b, 322 b, 381 a
[Διώξης] 393 a
Διώξης 393 a
Διώξης 38 a
Διώξης 385 a
Διώξης 150 a
Διώξης 251 a
Διώξης 43 a
Διώξης 12 b, 13 b
Διώξης 36 b, 351 b
Διώξης 213 b
Διώξης 235 b, 376 a
Διώξης 316 a
Διώξης 48 a, 381 a
Διώξης 161
Διώξης 30 a
Διώξης 28 b, 350 a
Διώξης 32 b, 124 b, 252 a, 304 b, 78, 293
Διώξης 134 b, 195 b
Διώξης 186 b
Διώξης 17 b
Διώξης 86 b
Διώξης 79 a, 217 a
Διώξης 124 b
Διώξης 106 b
Διώξης 346 b
Διώξης 246 a
Διώξης 164 b
Διώξης 64 b
Διώξης 389 b
[Διώξης] 1 x
Διώξης 3 a
Διώξης 143 a
Διώξης 149 a
Διώξης (κατεστραμμένος) 226 a, 387 b
Διώξης 75 b
Διώξης 384 a
Διώξης 394 b
Διώξης 248 a
Διώξης 367 a
Διώξης 200 b
[Διώξης] (cum gen.) 31 a, 103 a, 114 a, 205 a, 211 a, 218 b, 249 b, 276 b, 323 b, 353 b
Διώξης (cum dat.) 116 b, 118 a, 221 b, 322 b, 381 a
Διώξης (cum dat.) 389 b
HERODOTUS

320

εὐπροσώπως 40 a
[εὐπρόσωπος] 169 b
θρόπως 192 a, 193 a, 388 b, 391 b
δρόμος 192 a, 183 a, 388 b, 391 b
μέχρι 385 a: ἐν 228 b, λόγος 205 b: τι 225 b, φαινόμενος 388 b: —να, 182 a, 183 a, 213 a, 217 b, 215 b, 225 b, 226 b, 229 b, 230 b, 282 b, 284 a, 287 b, 278 b, 283 b, 286 b, 303 b, 391 a, κτλ.
ἐκείνου 22 b, 276 a, κτλ.
ἐξηρέτης 300 a
[ἐξηρέτης] 68 b
διὸ 131 b
ζυγοθυσια 59 a
δυνάμις 112 b
ζυγοθυσία 365 a
ἐξάγωνος 112 b
ἐξαναλήψις 215 b
ἐξωτερικός 215 b
ἐξωτερικός ἡλικίας 215 b
ἐξωτερικός ἡλικίας 215 b
ἐξωτερικός 164 b, 161
ἐξηρέτης 269 b
ἐξηρέτης 149 b
ἐξηρέτης 39 b
ἔχον 112 b
κακία 112 b
κακός 261 b, 344 b
κακομεία 208 b
κακότητα 160 a
κακοσκόπια 118 a
κακοσκόπια 107 b, 281 a, 291 a
κακοσκόπια 87 b, 38 a
κακοσκόπια 199 a
κακοσκόπια 8
κακοσκόπια (σε) 9 a, 77 a, 88 b
κακοσκόπια 385 a
κακοσκόπια 328 b
κακοσκόπια 49 a
κακοσκόπια 386 b
κακοσκόπια 176 b
κακοσκόπια 90 b
κακοσκόπια 121 a, 138 b, 370 b
κακοσκόπια 206 a, 255 b, 348 b
κακοσκόπια 292 b
κακοσκόπια 206 a, 214 a
κακοσκόπια 207 b
κακοσκόπια 175 b
κακοσκόπια 301 b
κακοσκόπια 156 a
κακοσκόπια 155 b, 171 a, 226 a
κακοσκόπια 157 a
κακοσκόπια 74 b
κακοσκόπια 37 a
κακοσκόπια 364 a
κακοσκόπια 189 b, 292 a, 358 b
κακοσκόπια 59 b
κακοσκόπια 40 a
κακοσκόπια 4 a
κακοσκόπια 4 a
κακοσκόπια 4 a
κακοσκόπια 4 a
κακοσκόπια 4 a
κακοσκόπια 4 a
κακοσκόπια 4 a
κακοσκόπια 4 a
κακοσκόπια 4 a
κακοσκόπια 4 a
κακοσκόπια 4 a
κακοσκόπια 4 a
κακοσκόπια 4 a
κακοσκόπια 4 a
κακοσκόπια 4 a
κακοσκόπια 4 a
HERODOTUS

322

[εἰκόνα 264 a
[εἴρον [230]
[δῖσον 227 b, 230 a, 327 a
[δῖλον 70 b, 87 a
[ἀπόφοι 276 a

[δαβίς 275
[δῶρα 132 b, 280, [302]
[δοστὸ 31 b
[οἰκεῖον 120 a, 288 b
[οἰκομονή 192 b, [279]
[οἰκήμη 322 b, 392 b
[οἰκία πίναξ 168 a, 185 a,
[οἰκία πίναξ 187 a
[οἰκία 140 a
[οἰκία 297 b
[οἰκείους κρι
[οἰκείος 44 a, 46 b, 126 b
[οἰκείος 137 a
[οἰκείος 137 a
[οἰκείος 24 b, 91 b
[οἰκείοις 137 a
[δήμος 255 b, 276 b, 342 b:
[δῆμος 249 a, 377 a
[δῆμος 221 a
[δῆμος 370 a
[αἰειθαλής 237 b
[αἰειθαλής 37 b
[αἰειθαλής 185 a
[αἰειθαλής 156 a
[Οἰκύπτων 358 b
[Οἰκύπτων 214 a
[οἰκύπτων 214 a
[οἰκύπτων 156 a
[οἰκύπτων 214 a
[οἰκύπτων 319 b
[οἰκύπτων 310 b, [319 b
[οἰκύπτων 284 a, 310 b, [319 b
[οἰκύπτων 378 a
[οἰκύπτων 348 a
[οἰκύπτων 213 b
[οἰκύπτων 365 b, 157
[οἰκόμοι 142 a
[δίδου γράφει 210 b
[δίδου γράφει 210 b
[διερεύνσις 63 a
[διερεύνσις 260 a
[διερεύνσις 68 b
[διερεύνσις 132 b
[διερεύνσις 45 a, 47 a, 24 a
[διερεύνσις 123 b
[διερεύνσις 140 b
[διερεύνσις 177 b
[διερεύνσις 364 b
[διερεύνσις 37 b]
[στρατηγήσιμοι] 215 b
[δερματοφορία] 144
[δερματοφορία] 321 b, 329 b
[δερματοφορία] 385 b
[δερματοφορία] 158 b
[δερματοφορία] 335 b
[δερματοφορία] 39 b
[δερματοφορία] 149 a, 186 b, 340 b
[δερματοφορία] 150 b
[δερματοφορία] 335 a
[δερματοφορία] 96 a, 195 b,
[δερματοφορία] 382 b, 387 a
[δήμος 370 a

[καθός 195 b, 209 b
[καθός 158 b
[καθός 384 a
[καθός 153 b
[καθός 217 a
[καθός 307 a
[καθός 37 b
[καθός 327 a
[καθός 281 a
[καθός 40 b
[καθός 87 a
[καθός 142 a
[καθός 40 b, 91 a, 313 a
[καθός 132 a
[καθός 63 b
[καθός 124 a
[καθός 108 b, 331 b
[καθός 268 a, 281 a
[καθός 362 b
[καθός 92 a
[καθός 145 a
[καθός 126 b
[καθός 393 a
[καθός 79 b
[καθός 146 b
[καθός 20 b
[καθός 215 b
[καθός 321 b, 329 b
[καθός 385 b
[καθός 158 b
[καθός 123 b
[καθός 145 a, 386 b, 340 b
[καθός 130 b, 135 a
[καθός 235 a
[καθός 112 a, 215 b, 382 b, 387 a

πάντως 370 a
πάντως 195 b, 209 b
πάντως 384 a
πάντως 153 b
πάντως 217 a
πάντως 307 a
πάντως 51 a
πάντως 15 a, 281 a
πάντως 40 b
πάντως 87 a
πάντως 142 a
πάντως 40 b, 91 a, 313 a
πάντως 132 a
πάντως 63 b
πάντως 124 a
πάντως 108 b, 331 b
πάντως 268 a, 281 a
πάντως 362 b
πάντως 92 a
πάντως 145 a
πάντως 126 b
πάντως 393 a
πάντως 79 b
πάντως 146 b
πάντως 20 b
πάντως 215 b
πάντως 321 b, 329 b
πάντως 385 b
πάντως 158 b
πάντως 215 b, 382 b, 387 a
πάντως 195 b, 209 b
πάντως 384 a
πάντως 153 b
πάντως 217 a
πάντως 307 a
πάντως 51 a
τέρας 352 b, 196
tετραγωνοτήτων 79 b
tετράγωνος 73 b
tετράδες 112 a
tεφέροις 243 a
tεφέρων 269 b
τείχος 870 a
tείχος 287 a
tετέρων 382 b
tετέρων 220 b
tετέρων 327 b
tείχον 811 a, 378 b
[τρύμα] 141
τρέτας 210 a, [152 a],
[307 a]. 320 a
tρόμος 226 b
tρύμα 870 b
tροφίμων 112 b
[τραγάνους] 881 a
tραχύς 109 a
τράχηλος 311 b
τράχηλος 306 a
tραχπότους 108 a
tραχπότους 279 a
tράχηλος 178 a
τραχύς 229 b
τρίχα 47 a
tριζίδι 143 b
τρίπτην 136
τριφύλλων 115 b
τριπτον, τριπτάμων 227
[τρυπτιζόμενος] 361 a
τρύπων 297 a, 332 b, 384 a
[τρυφή] 239 b
τρυφία 337 b
tό 111 a
τριχέρων 346 b
τρίχητες 81 a
τρικαλών 239 b
[τρυπτιζόμενος γραφή] 360 a
τρύπων 176 b, 204 a, 219 b,
236 a, 258 a, 286 a
τρύπων 3 b
tρύχη εξι
τῶν ἡμεῖς διαμείζων
tρυφής 90 b
[τρόμος] 93 b, 119, [258]
tρυφητός (τε) 137 a
τρύφης 355 b
[τρόμων, τρόμων 97 a, 135 a]
tρόμων, τρόμων 35 b, 105 a,
148
τρομή 13 b, 38 a
τρομή 10 a
υπόγειος 890 b
υπογείως 229 a
υπογείως 105 b, 170 a, 218 b
υπογείως 68 a
έκτας 46 b
[εύγειας] 214 b
[εύκολον] 204 b
υπέρ 155 b, 201 a, 288 a,
272
υπεραυξάνεται 76 a, 373 a
υπεραυξάνεται 251
υπερβάλλεται 133 b
υπερβάλλεται 276 a
[υπερθύμονος] 338 b
ύπο 154 a, 395 a
ύποδειγμάτων (τε) 309 a
ύπονομες 269 b
υποθέλοντος 389 b
υποθέλονται 90 b, 93 a
υποθέλονται 389 b
[υπομείωσες, οί] 319 b
υπομονές 262 a, 281 b
υπομείωσε 178 b
υπομείωσε 255 a
ύπεροχές 17 b
δι 45 a
[δάπεδος] 143 a
φαλέας [361 b]
φαλέας 390 a
φαλέας 16 a
φαξίδ 2 a, 321 b
φασια 327 a, 390 a, 152
(φάσις) 245
φέρεις ἐν 73 b, 301 b-347 b
φερουκές 82 b
φερομαις 92 a
φέρουν 50 a, 201 a, 300 a,
355 b, 378 a
φέρων 216 b
φάθαις 348 a
φέρων [79 a]
φεριστικές 79 a
φίλους [76 b]
φίλους εξιν, 76 b, 320 b,
[376 b]
[φιλοτύποι] 319 b
φιλεῖς 289 a
φίλος 107 a
φιλοποιεῖται 291 a
[φιλοκατά] 372 a
φιλορροιον 350 a, 389 b
φιλοσέβας 335 a
φιλοσέβας 30 a
φίλος 143 a
φοβεῖται 232 a
φοβεί 24 a, 319 b
ψευδόμαχοι cx
ψώπος 158 b, 119
[ψώπο] 103 b, 212 a,
136
ψρσι 85 a
[ψρσι] 183 b
ψρσι 154 b, 216 a
ψφρσις 314 a
ψφρσις 148 a
[ψφρσις] 361 b
ψφρσις 158 b
ψφρσις 314 b
ψφρσις 212 b
INDEX II

ψίλη 100 b, 102 b, 108 b, 136

[ψιλοθείστη] 212 b

φπεσ 264 a

φυτεύει 89 a

φωτείνω 81 a, 87 b

ψωσ 82 a, 83 a, 89 b, 90 b, 94 a, 196 a

χαλέκωυ 57 b, 107 a

χαλάρζεσαι 345 b

χάριμα 284 a, 249 b, [284 a]

χειμερίζω 291 b

χειρ 250 a

χειροποιεῖ 162 a

χέρως 87 a

χονδρίας 339 a

χοίριν 317 a

χοροθάντοις 229 a

χοροτάοι 209 a, 229 a, [811 a]

χρήμα 58 a, 175 a, 201 a, 297 b, 304 a

χρησίμες 184 b, 234 a

χρηστήρας 281 b, 385 b

χρηστοί 278 a

χρώμα 79 b

χώρα 115 a

χωρίζων 200 a

[χωρίς ιστορίαν] 231

χώρος 111 b

ψάμμα (είκ) 130 b

ψάμμα 170 (a. 182)

ψηφίζεσθαι lxxvii

ψηφος 95 b, 317 b

[άλκυονα] 24 a

[άμα τούτον] 24 a

[άνέστημ] 377 b

[άρι] 132 a, 148 b

[άρσεν] 49 b

[άρτ] 52 a

[ότε ... ούτε] 58 a
# INDEX III

## AUCTORUM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abich</td>
<td>4 b, 42 b, 171 a, 287 a, 229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ada App.</td>
<td>573 b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aelian</td>
<td>124 b, 215 b, 222 b, 239 b, 275a, 373 b, 351 b, 131, 143, 225, 225, 308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aeneas Silvius</td>
<td>149 b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aeschylus (Aeschylus)</td>
<td>18 b, 21 b, 66 b, 111 b, 154 b, 159 b, 144 a, 197 b, 209 a, 227 b, 255 b, 312 b, 313 b, 350 b, 365 a, 179 ff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agathemerus</td>
<td>189 a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aisachi (the Socratic)</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aischioc (the Orator)</td>
<td>61 b, 191 ff., 227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aiopos (Aesop)</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Album Inacutre)</td>
<td>162 a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alford</td>
<td>142 b, 177 b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alger</td>
<td>155 b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allen, Grant</td>
<td>140 b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Journ. of Archaeology</td>
<td>357 a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Journ. of Philology</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammianus Marcellus</td>
<td>41 b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Androuneon</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Androcles</td>
<td>212 b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anaeotia (Bekker)</td>
<td>90 a, 112 a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anastasida</td>
<td>61 b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthologia</td>
<td>105 a, 326 a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antiphanes</td>
<td>37 b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antiqu. de Rasse meid.</td>
<td>47 b, 53 b, 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antiqu. du Bosph. Cimmenien</td>
<td>32 b, 47 b, 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antoninus Liberalis</td>
<td>384 b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apollo</td>
<td>99 a, 190 b, 200 a, 225 b, 226 a, 237 b, 261 a, 394 a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apollonius Rh.</td>
<td>127 b, 128 b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archilochos</td>
<td>111 b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aristaeus</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aristophanes</td>
<td>35 a, 40 a, 45 a, 45 b, 51 a, 63 a, 89 b, 122 a, 137 a b, 146 a, 172 a, 190 a, 212 b, 214 a, 217 b, 247 b, 280 b, 314 b, 382 a, 377 a, 387 a, 128, 145, 152 b, 224, 225, 229, 230, 308, 310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aristotle</td>
<td>8 a, 19 a, 24 a, 30 b, 32 b, 33 a, 35 a, 46 a, 81 a, 105 a, 115 b, 118 a, 129 b, 142 b, 154 b, 155 b, 161 a b, 162 b, 184 a, 185 a, 199 a, 205 a, 211 b, 240 a b, 241 b, 245 a, 250 a, 275 b, 307 b, 312 a, 314 b, 317 b, 340 a b, 360 a, 386 a, 12, 131, 133, 135, 140, 142, 143, 145, 145, 197 ff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arnold, T.</td>
<td>158 a, 222 b, 294 a, 319 b, 122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrian</td>
<td>xxviii, 8 b, 65 a, 79 a, 123 b, 244 a, 281 a, 367 b, 370 a b, 44, 159, 218, 229, 230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athenaeus (Athenaeus)</td>
<td>48 b, 57 b, 126 b, 148 a, 171 b, 230 a b, 241 a, 381 b, 309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athenian Constitution, (Athenian Sources)</td>
<td>195 b, 201 a b, 202 a, 205 a, 206 a, 207 b, 212 a b, 213 a b, 215 a b, 216 a b, 217 a b, 219 b, 220 a, 227 a, 246 b, 248 a, 317 a b, 330 a, 346 a, 349 a, 358 a, 360 a b, 365 b, 386 a, 387 a, Appendix IX passim, 103, 105, 198 ff., 214, 232, 254, 258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athlidiographes</td>
<td>131, 203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attisger</td>
<td>22 a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aulus Gellius</td>
<td>179 a, 299 a, 258, 256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachofen</td>
<td>101 b, 136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baedeker</td>
<td>199 b, 257 a, 338 a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beae</td>
<td>2 a, 13 a b, 22 b, 25 a b, 28 b, 31 a b, 37 b, 38 a, 42 b, 44 b, 50 a, 51 a, 52 a, 57 b, 66 a, 89 a b, 115 a, 118 a, 121 b, 122 b, 126 b, 129 a b, 129 b, 135 b, 135 a, 137 a, 142 a b, 148 a b, 144 a b, 146 b, 148 b, 152 a, 157 a, 192 b, 228 b, 310 a, 356 b, 377 b, 381 a b, 385 b, 390 b, 8, 35, 34, 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barde, de la 170 b, 103 b, 290</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barthélémy</td>
<td>50 a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauer</td>
<td>xci, xcii, cii, 113 b, 212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baumeister</td>
<td>32 b, 51 a, 55 a b, 54 a, 138 b, 231 a, 232 a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Becker</td>
<td>49 b, 121 a, 318 b, 385 a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beilis</td>
<td>31 a, 92 a b, 165 a, 169 a b, 298 a, 352 a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INDEX III

(Bekker) 128 a, 147 a, 384 b
Beloch 245 a, 247 b, 340 a, 377 a, 382 a b
Bent 103 a b, 105 a, 175 a, 306 b, 388 a, 389 a
Bentley 24 b, 199 b
Berger ixxix, 25 a, 31 b, 189 a, 279
Bergh 10 a b, 21 a, 24 b, 111 b, 172 a, 199 a b, 209 b, 210 a, 224 a, 245 a, 252 b, 281 b, 314 a, 11, 127, 179, 308
Bethe 208 a, 209 a, 314 a
Billitbeck 195 a
Birx 198 b
Blaesley xxxv, ixxxi, xcii, 1 a, 13 b, 19 a, 21 a, 25 a b, 28 b, 48 a, 55 a b, 70 a, 100 a, 105 b, 104 a b, 106 a, 113 a, 116 a, 119 a, 120 b, 125 a, 127 b, 135 a, 141 b, 143 b, 146 b, 149 b, 152 a, 155 b, 157 a b, 163 b, 164 a, 167 b, 169 b, 170 a, 183 b, 203 a, 217 a, 227 b, 247 a, 275 b, 282 a, 284 b, 294 a b, 300 b, 312 a, 355 a, 361 a, 374 b, 376 b, 380 a, 389 b, 391 b, 394 a, 395 a, 162 f, 165
Blase 195
Blütscher 231 a, 232 a b
(Bobrik) 194 a
Boeckh 13 b, 247 b, 375 b, 376 b, 221
Boehler 323 b
Bouhier 45 b, 152 b
Bredow (Bredovius) 8 b
Brexler 815 b
Bretan 361 a
Browning, R. 220
Büchenschütz 18 b, 111 b, 319 a
Bunbury xcvii, xcvi, 25 b, 29 a b, 189 a, 17
Burnet 69 b, 289 b
Busarian 145 b, 146 a, 175 a, 184 b, 332 a, 384 b, 385 a, 387 a b
Burton 19 b, 42 a
Bury 139 b, 208 b, 209 a, 383 b
Busolt 10 b, 103 a, 115 a, 115 a, 196 b, 215 a, 221 b, 222 b, 237 a, 240 a, 250 a, 253 a b, 259 b, 261 b, 264 a, 284 a b, 286 a, 310 a, 314 a, 330 a b, 334 a, 336 b, 338 a, 340 a b, 365 b, 380 b, 382 a b, 383 a b, 35, 70, 94, 99, 111, 142, 162, 222, 225, 236 f f, 240, 242, 246, 256, 267
(Buttman) 8 b

CAmp 235, 241
Capes 136 b, 140 a
Camer 104 b, 108 b, 111 a
Chandler 251 a, 227
Charax 295 a
Charon of Lampamakos 252 b, 297 a
Choirilos 40
Chronicles 309
Cicero 23 b a, 78 b, 184 a, 322 b, 375 b, 376 a, 387 a, 183, 203 f
Clemens Alex. 65 a
Clinton 69 b, 112 a, 139 b, 170 b, 195 b, 206 a, 218 a, 215 a, 240 a, 247 b, 268 a, 285 a, 295 a b, 298 a, 307 a, 319 b, 323 b, 336 a, 340 a, 356 b, 377 a, 383 a b, 69, 78, 79, 113, 147, 214, 268
Cobet cxix, cxx, 1 a, 104 a b, 107 b, 115 a, 170 a, 185 a, 248 b, 270 a, 277 a, 300 b, 311 a, 355 b, 383 a
Conington 140 a, 159 b
(Corippus) 123 a b, 128 b
C. J. A. 24 a, 171 a, 223 b, 276 b, 283 b, 295 a, 302 b, 306 b, 385 a, 388 a, 111, 127, 136
C. J. G. 13 a, 38 b, 61 b, 67 a, 104 b, 207 a, 225 a, 318 b, 5
Cox, Sir G. 302 b
Cramer Anneg. Oxon. 61 b
Crease 162 f
Cruxina 10 a, 22 b, 24 a
Cuno 3, 8, 12
Curtius, E. 109 b, 169 a, 203 a, 304 a b, 217 a, 223 b, 228 a, 223 a, 321 a, 323 a, 333 b, 359 a, 373 a, 383 a b, 392 b, 42 f f, 45, 106, 108, 162 f f, 181, 254, 1 z
Curtius, G. 23 b
Cwikklnski xci

Dahlmann xo
Davida, Rhv 304, 305, 308
Deeke 261 a
De Joinville 30 a
Delbrück, E. 370 a, 372 a, 379 a, 162, 168, 236, 242
Demosthenes 51 a, 149 a, 172 b, 369 b, 191 f f, 225
Didymus 146 a
Diels ixxxv, 212 a, 215 a, 131
Dietrich 90 a, 367 b
Dienstoy (M. et Mde.) 185 a
Dio Chrys. 27 b, 78 a, 282 a
Diodorus i, ixxvi, 6 b, 21 b, 70 b, 111 a, 127 b, 128 a, 142 a, 148 b, 144 a, 165 b, 186 a b, 237 b, 243 b, 264 a, 284 a b, 385 a, 145, 211 f
DioGenes Laertius xi, 50 a b, 52 a, 59 b, 240 b, 242 a, 294 a, 277
Dionysios of Halikarnassos cxxvii, 37 a, 65 b, 123, 147
Dittenberger 61 b, 340 b, 377 a, 127
Dobree 2 b, 25 a, 77 b, 167 b, 361 a
Dörpfeld 216 b, 392 b
Drummond 184 a, 142 a
Dum 95
Dünichen 275, 279
Dunker xxxv, xcviii, 168 b, 167 b, 168 a, 177 b, 182 b, 184 b, 185 b, 188 a, 206 b, 284 a, 285 a, 286 a b, 302 b, 308 b, 309 b, 329 b, 380 a b, 384 a, 386 a, 388 a, 340 a b, 354 a, 358 a, 358 b, 375 a, 376 a, 383 a, 386 b, 387 a, 34, 35, 37 f f, 44, 60, 88, 96, 111, 167, 162, 187, 222, 236 f f, 240, 242, 248, 244, 245, 247, 250, 309
HERODOTUS

Eorda, The 5 b
Encyclopedia Britannica 144 a, 161 b
Ephainia 177 b
Ephorus 240 a, 282 b, 380 b, 106, 203, 206 ff., 240, 254, 256
Essen 185
Euhymologian Magnum 22 b, 61 b, 65 b, 196 b, 200 a
Endoxes of Knidos 277
Eupolis 184, 309
Herapides 50 a, 139 a, 155 a, 287 a, 322 a, 386 b, 393 a b
Euhelios 123 a, 139 a, 307 a
Eustathios 18 b, 31 b, 125 b, 143 b
Evans, Lady 282 b
Exodus 134 b

Fabricius, B. 199 b, 209 a
Finlay 222 b, 235, 238, 299, 240, 243, 244, 247
Fitzgerald 155 b
(Fitzroy) 46 b
Flach 10 b, 209 b, 245 a, 252 b, 126, 308
Forbiger 65 b, 72 b, 83 a, 87 a, 159 a, 245 b, 244 a, 298 b, 15
Förstemann 260 a
Förster 167 a, 329 a
Fouqué 102 a
F. H. G. 110 a: et passim, sub nom. pr.
Fränkel 247 b
Frazer 18 a, 41 b, 43 a, 217 a, 321 b, 393 b
Freeman 92 b, 184 b, 185 a b, 187 a b, 207 b, 247 a, 250 a, 256 b, 285 b, 286 b, 287 a b, 288 a, 285
Frezel 3, 12
Fried 89 a
Furtwängler 54 a b
Fyfe 68 b

Gæhringen 155 a
Gaspar 29 a
Gaisford cxx, 91 a, 210 b
Gardner, E. 392 b, 243, 285
Gardner, P. 54 a b, 119 b, 122 a, 144 a, 259 a, 313 b, 306. Cp. Preface
Gekie 17
Gellius; vid. Aulus
Genesia 112 b
Geograph. Journal 35 b, 65 a, 58
Geographia minores 29 a, 30 b, 38 a, 114 a, 121 a, 130 b, 142 a, 145 a, 146 b, 189 a
Gibbon 160 a
Gilbert 172 b, 184 a, 287 a, 318 b, 324 b, 325 b, 385 b, 87, 135, 134, 136, 142, 143
Giseke 155 a, 161 a b, 249 a, 294 a, 305 a
Goddard 281
Goethe 46 a
Gomperz (sic) 92 b, 84 b

Goodwin 105 a, 127 b, 217 b, 225 a, 238 a, 239 b, 258 b, 274 a, 275 a, 276 b, 281 a, 287 a, 348 a, 349 a
Gower 105 b
Graberger 109 b, 196 b, 210 b, 306 a
Gresswell, Ed. 79 a, 82 a
Grimm 41 b, 43 a, 67 a b
Grote lxxvii, lxxxv, 6 a, 10 b, 127 b, 162 b, 169 a, 170 b, 189 a, 220 b, 221 b, 222 b, 245 a, 246 a, 258 a, 258 b, 275 b, 277 b, 278 b, 284 b, 312 b, 314 a, 334 a, 336 a, 362 a, 363 b, 375 a, 380 b, 383 a b, 391 a, 2, 33, 35 f, 44, 65, 68, 91, 143, 157, 162, 168, 308, 254, 256, 268
Guest 1 b, 35 a
Guhl 385 b
Guthrie 86 a
Gutsmid 58 a, 363 b, 2, 8, 11, 12, 14. Cp. Preface

Hamberling 309
Hamilton 123 b, 132 b
Hanno 29 a, 180 b, 142 a, 145 a, 146 b
Hansen 2 b, 84 b, 41 b, 45 b, 82 b, 87 a
Harropkration 24 b, 184 a, 214 a, 189
Harrison, Jane 204 a, 216 b, 223 b, 228 b, 375 a, 392 b, 393 b, 225, 229
Hausseulier 296 a, 183
Haym 144 a
Head, B. 18 b, 36 a, 38 b, 54 a b, 108 b, 119 b, 144 a, 155 a b, 160 b, 165 b, 167 b, 241 b, 264 b, 261 a, 264 a, 306 b, 336 b, 357 a, 374 b, 263, 309
Headlam, J. W. 105 b, 365 b
Heeren 16 b, 130 b
Heng 309
Heinigennståd 249 a, 264 b
Hekataios of Abdera 21 b
Hekataios of Miletos lxxvii, lxxxv, lxxxv, cxxvii, 6 b, (25 a), (25 a), 39 b, 77 b, 79 b, 80 a, 99 b, 125 a, 136 b, 140 a, 144 a, 157 b, 171 b, 173 a, 175 a, 179 a b, 180 a, 189 a, 196 b, 197 a, 267 b, 301 b, 312 a, 391 a b, 394 a b, 29, 79, 277, 295
Helbig 232 b
Hellenikos 147
Heracleides Pontic. 171 b
Herrmann, K. F. (Lahrback) 101 a, 207 a, 211 a, 220 a, 222 b, 252 b, 285 a, 310 a, 326 b, 355 a, 356 b
Hermippos 335 b, 194
Hermogenes cxxv
Herwerden (van) cxx, 2 b, 5 a, 8 b, 31 a, 37 b, 50 a b, 61 a b, 77 b, 84 b, 90 b, 98 a, 99 b, 107 b, 109 b, 115 a, 137 b, 142 b, 148 a, 144 a, 167 b, 179 a, 173 a, 173 a, 193 b, 229 a, 235 b, 244 b, 246 b, 248 a, 265 a, 370 b, 271 a b, 272 a, 276 a, 278 a, 282 b, 285 a, 287 a b, 288 b, 292 a, 293 b, 295 a, 299 b, 310 a, 314 a, 315 b, 317 a b, 319 a, 320 a, 321 b, 323 b, 332 a, 343 a b
INDEX III

331

117 a, 127 b, 185 b, 201 b, 225 b, 226 a, 244 a, 376 b, 380 a, 168, 175 ff., 269
Plass 238 a
Plato 8 b, 23 b, 50 a, 51 a, 78 a, 82 b, 156 b, 225 a, 247 b, 319 b, 375 b, 391 a, 392 a, 188 ff., 224, 256, 258
Playfair, Sir H. L. 321
Pliny 61 b, 78 a, 122 a, 125 b, 124 a, 125 a, 126 a, 146 a, 238 a, 291 a, 307 a, 380 b, 381 b, 371 b, 228
Plutarch lxiviii, 9 b, 20 a b, 37 a, 52 b, 74 b, 101 b, 108 b, 111 b, 114 a, 115 a, 162 a, 163 a, 164 a, 167 a, 171 a, 177 b, 181 b, 207 a, 208 b, 210 b, 213 a, 239 b, 242 a b, 244 a, 250 b, 259 b, 281 b, 277 b, 284 b, 285 a, 298 a, 299 a, 321 a, 321 b, 318 a, 318 b, 319 a, 324 a, 325 b, 328 a, 328 a, 336 a, 327 a, 339 b, 340 a b, 355 b, 362 a, 366 a, 367 a, 368 a b, 369 a, 371 a, 372 b, 375 b, 377 b, 379 b, 382 a, 387 a, 389 a, 65, 86, 91, 96, 101, 127, 135, 141, 143, 145, 157, 187, 205, 212 ff., 258, 256, 306, 310
Pollux 153 b, 301 b, 382 a, 135, 139, 205, 225
Polio, Marco 126 a
Polybios 115 a, 120 a, 150 a, 151 a, 162 a, 169 a, 179 a, 240 b, 252 b
Polybios 31 b, 51 a, 61 b, 126 b, 143 b, 224 b, 347 b, 211
Pomponius Mela 31 b, 37 a b, 121 a, 124 a, 125 a
Porphyry 66 b
Pomponas 208 a b
Prelzer 40 b, 50 b, 61 b, 63 a b, 265 a, 314 b, 315 a, 326 b
Pussera 40 a
Ptolemy 111 b, 114 a, 121 a b, 128 a, 127 b, 307 a
Ramsay 43 a, 180 b, 193 a, 194 a b, 195 a, 210 a, 250 b, 280 b, 353 b, 294, 297 f., 299
Rawlinson xvii, xo, xciv, 2 a b, 4 b, 6 a, 8 a b, 10 a, 18 a b, 15 b, 16 a b, 17 b, 18 a, 19 a b, 20 a, 21 a, 22 a, 24 a, 25 a, 26 a b, 27 b, 28 b (W.), 29 a (W.), 29 b (W.), 30 a b, 31 a, 34 a, 36 b, 37 a, 38 a b, 40 a b, 42 b, 43 b, 44 a, 45 b, 47 b, 49 a, 50 a, 52 a, 53 a, 58 a, 60 a b, 61 a, 65 b, 64 b, 66 b, 70 a b, 71 a, 72 b, 77 b, 78 b, 79 a, 83 a, 85 b, 86 a, 87 b, 91 a, 98 b, 102 b, 107 a b, 115 b, 116 a, 117 a, 118 a, 119 a, 121 b, 122 a, 123 a, 124 a, 126 a, 127 a b, 128 a b, 129 a, 130 a b, 131 a b, 132 a b, 133 a b, 135 b a, 137 a, 139 a, 140 a, 141 b, 142 b, 148 b, 144 a, 145 b, 146 b b, 148 b, 149 b, 150 b, 152 a, 154 a b, 156 b, 157 a, 158 b, 159 a b, 160 a, 162 a, 163 b, 167 a b, 168 a, 169 b
170 b, 171 b, 199 a, 200 a, 203 a, 205 b, 258 b, 260 b, 227 a, 230 a, 257 b, 285 b, 286 a, 282 a, 238 a, 244 a, 289 a b, 294 a, 299 b, 302 b, 312 a, 320 a, 325 b, 237 b, 330 a, 332 a, 334 a, 335 a, 352 a, 354 b, 355 b, 362 a, 367 b, 368 b, 370 b, 371 a, 373 b, 375 a, 391 a, 392 a, 396 b, 390 a, 394 a, 395 a, 2 ff., 15, 30, 34, 45, 163

Records of the Past 11, 38, 37, 274
Reinsch, S. 47 b, 4, 10
Reiske 8 b, 77 b, 137 b
Reis 78 a, 142 b
Rennell 29 b, 31 a, 126 b, 127 a, 15, 297
Rhiannon 133 a
Rhomaides 139 a
Rhodes David 304 f.
Ridgway 107 a, 119 a, 317 a, 352 b, 352 b, 352 b, 333 b
Ritter, C. 78 b, 79 a
Ritter (and Pfeiler) 66 a
Roberts 197 b, 198 a, 245 a
Roby 105 b
Roecher's Lexikon 10 b, 22 a, 54 a b, 62 b, 80 b, 99 a, 139 a, 208 a, 227 a, 321 a, et sub nom. pr.
Rose, V. 115 b, 184 a, 278 b, 307 b
Rosenbaum 46 b
Roe 207 a, 133
Rutherford 144 a

SAINT-MARTIN 121 a b, 122 a b, 123 a, 125 a, 126 a, 127 a, 128 b, 131 a b, 132 a, 133 a b, 140 a, 144 b, 288
Sallust 111 b, 136 b, 140 a b, 288
Salmastius 138 a
Samuel 52 b
Sands 201 a, 212 a, 317 a, 346 a, 387 a, 123, 131, 176
Saxe xvi, xix, 29 b, 30 b, 40
Schaefer 182 a, 392 b
Schenkli 34 a
Schiemann 249
Schmidt, J. H. H. 78 a, 236 a
Schmidt, L. 150 a, 156 b, 318 b, 222 b
Schöll lxxx, xcii, cvii, 208 b, 209 b, 270
Schömann 79 a, 346 a, 360 a, 364 a, 390 a, 591 a
Schollastas 2 b, 18 b, 39 a, 40 a, 43 b, 63 b, 81 b, 99 b, 110 a, 122 a, 208 b, 294 b, 362 a, 367 b, 378 a, 380 b, 193, 224, 230 f.
Schrader (ed. Jevons) 4 b, 42 b, 47 b, 10
Schroiber 34 b, 62 b, 65 a
Schubart 22 b
Schubring lxxxv
Schultz 334 b
Schraxc 256
Schweigrauer lxxx, 1 a, 18 a, 25 a, 44 b, 75 b, 91 a, 170 a, 175 a, 202 a, 255 a, 276 b, 377 b, 380 a
Seeliger 99 a
Septuagint 143 b
INDEX III

Valerius Maximus 253, 256
Valkenauer 8 b, 44 b, 90 a, 109 b, 111 a, 199 b, 320 b, 356 b, 373 a, 395 b
Valla 152 b, 368 b
Vergil 78 a, 108 a, 140 a, 142 a, 152 b, [204 a]

Waldmann 22 a
Waldstein 53 b, 383 a
Walker, E. M. 301, 303
Weber 225 a, 274 b
Wecklein xiii, 355 b, 99, 162, 167, 203
Wehrmann cxix
Weissenborn 193 a
Wesseling 4 b, 42 b, 61 a, 78 a, 91 b, 144 a, 152 b, 234 b, 278 a, 290 b, 345 b, 376 b
Westermarck 76 a, 82 a, 121 b, 124 a, 138 b, 156 a, 393 a
Wide 315 a, 321 b, 327 b
Wiedemann x, xvii, lix, 57 b, 113 a, 140 b, 141 a, 193 a, 320 a, 283, 284, 285, 286, 293

Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, U. von 195 b, 204 a, 370 b, 123, 131, 146 ff.
Wilkinson apud Rawl. 28 b, 29 a, 131 b, 138 b, 143 a
Wilson, Sir C. 294
Wise, F. 108 b
Wolf 21 a
Wordsworth, Chr. 332 a, 361 a, 236, 243, 244
Wordsworth, W. [223], 227
Wright 215 a
Wurm 303

Xenophanes 68 a
Xenophon x, 66 b, 75 b, 116 a, 156 a b, 162 a b, 165 a, 169 a, 172 b, 183 b, 187 b, 203 b, 212 b, 220 b, 243 b, 281 a, 296 a, 298 b, 309 a, 310 b, 314 b, 316 a b, 317 a, 319 a, 325 b, 326 a, 328 b, 337 a, 355 b, 357 a, 361 b, 364 b, 377 b, 379 b, 393 a, 87, 94, 145, 224, 257

Zeller 289 b
Zeus 8 ff.
Zühlke 380 b, 381 a b
INDEX IV

NOMINUM ET RERUM

ABARIS 24 b
Abdera 306 a
Abbeard ies 112 b, 230 b, 43
Achilles 32 a, 244 a
Adrasteia 209 b
Adrastos cxxiv, 208 a, 209 b
Adria, Adrius 157 b, 158 a
Africa lxxv, 26 b, 28 b, 29 a, App. XII
Afterthought xxix, lxvi, lxviii, cii, 83 b, 95 a, 157 b, 168 b, 270 b, 275 a, 277 b, 281 b, 386 a b, 46, 79, 104, 178, 187, 233
Agariste 380 a
Agathyrse 76 a, 18, 29; 47
Agelomachos 118 a
Agrigentum 65 b
Agriculture 14 a, 70 b, 136 b, 156 b, 172 a
Alaes 278 a
Alakos 295 b
Alas 296 b
Aigis, Aigesidae 103 b
Aigialides 211 a
Aigileia 362 b
Aigua 225 b, 226 a b, App. VIII
Ainos 65 b
Aiolans 94 a, 296 b, 273 a
Alaezir 115 a
Alazon 13 b, 37 a, 13, 22, 32
Alexander 165 a, 304 b
Alexander the Great 119 a, 164 a, 367 b, 201
Alkaios 244 b
Alkmases 200 a, 201 a b, 207 b, 376 b, 379 a, 165, 176, 222
Allegory 108 b, 115 a
Alphabet 197 a b, 261 a
Amathus 262 a
Amber 22 a, 157 b
Ampe 283 a
Amphiktyonies 103 a, 201 b, 227 b, 330 a, 331 b, 332 a
Amphipolis 158 b, 268 a
Amphitryon 199 b

Amyntas 165 a
Amyris 381 b
Anacharesis 50 a, 52 a, 54 b
Anachronisms xxxiv, lxxi, lxv, 167 b, 151 b, 227 b, 244 b, 276 b, 304 b, 347 a, 355 a, 392 a, 393 b, 91, 103, 156
Anaxandrides 181 a
Anaxilas 288 b
Ancestor-worship 89 a, 156 b, 345 a b.
Cp. Dead-men
Androphiagis 77 a, 18, 29
Andros 22 b
Animism 15 a, 49 a, 49 a, 51 b, 208 b, 221 a, 241 a, 242 a
Anthropology 17 b, 156 a, 241 b, 58, 136, 282-284, 286. Cp. Animism, Dead-men, Marriage, Matriarchate, Patriarchate, Quipu, Taboo, Totems, etc.
Anthicus 243 b
Antiquity of Races 4 a
Aphrodite 40 b, [45 a], 320 b
Apollo 10 a, 22 b, 24 a, 40 b, 153 b, 316 b
Apoplexy 1xxvi, 50 b, 54 b, 98 b, 354 b, 91, 100
Apries 115 a
Apsinthius 294 b
Arabian Gulf 28 b
Araxes 27 a
Arbitration 172 b, 245 b, 344 a, 364 b
Archaeology lviii, 47 b, 53 b, 64 a, 87 b, 119 b, 138 a, 139 a, 161 b, 157 b, 197 a b, 204 a b, 216 b, 222 b, 222 a b, 222 b, 239 a, 245 a, 261 a, 313 b, 352 a, 359 a, 361 a, 4, 12, 133, 125 ff, 242, 281, 302
Archidamus 329 a
Arderikka 375 a, 297
Areopagus, the 143
Ares 40 b, 156 b
Arge 23 b
Argia 310 b
Argive tradition 336 a, 339 a b, 341 a, 107
Argonautae 99 a, 127 b
Argos 308 a, 333 a et seqq., 340 a b, 96 f.
DANCING 385 a, b, App. XIV
Danube 33 b, 26
Daresios 1 a, 59 b, 83 b, 159 a, 169 a, 255 a, 267 a, 305 a, 352 a, 39-48, 248
Datis 350 a, 374 a
Dauniae 262 b, 266 a
Dead-men 30 a, 40 a, 45 b, 47 b, 51 b, 69 b, 88 a, 97 b, 124 a, 156 b, 187 b, 262 a, 296 a, 297 a, 345 a
Death 67 a, 155 b, 156 a, 260 a
Debt, Debtors 319 b
Defects 130 a. Cp. Errors, etc.
Delfion 374 a
Delos xxv, c, 22 b, 351 b, 374 b
Delphi 95 b, 109 a, 184 a, 201 a, 238 b, 240 b, 283 a, 239 a, 294 b, 394 b, 111, 126, 253, 265
Demaratos 309 a, 85
Deme, the 132
Demeter 38 a, 200 a, 227 b, 341 a, 348 b, 380 a
Democracy 67 b, 95 b, 171 a, 224 a, 236 a, 304 a, 340 b, 129 b, 258
Demonax 115 b
Despotism 59 b, 69. Cp. Tyranny
Didyma 262 b
Dionysios 275 b
Dionysios 153 b, 209 b, 289 b, 327 b
Dioskuri 384 a
Divination exii, 45 a, 262 a, 341 a. Cp. Mantic
Dodona 22 b
Dolonkos 294 a
Dorians 96 a, 98 a, 102 b, 115 b, 183 b, 210 a, 211 a, 217 a, 278 a, 290 a, 302 b, 307 b, 314 a
Dorians 183 b, 187 b, 83
Doriskos 249 a, 60
Drakon 215 a
Drama, dramatic 94 b, 97 a, 114 a, 235 a, 285 a, 320 b, 46, 150, 179, 182, 212
Dramas 134 b, 196 b, 362 b, 387 a, 154
Dress 49 a, 53 a, 77 b, 121 a, 138 a, 157 b, 190 a, 231 a, 232 a, 370 b, 9, 106, 274
Earth (conception of) IV, cxli, 17 b, 25 a, 28 b, 31 a, 112 a, 134 b, 158 b, 188 b, 189 a, 235 b, 236 a
Echekrates 237 a
Egesta 187 b
Egypt xxii, cxv, 119 a, 121 a, 129 a, 136 a, 198 b, 241 b, 312 a, 313 b, 61, 245, 284
Eleusis 333 a
Elis 103 b, 328 a
Embalming 47 a
Enet 157 b
Ephesians 280 b
Epidauros 228 b, 231 a
Epigraphic evidences 124. Cp. Inscriptions
Epizolos 373 b
Epos, epic cx, 101 b, 208 a, 248 a, 261 b, 344 b, 380 b, 384 a
Erochthens 228 a
Eretria 250 a, 304 b, 357 a, 375 b
Errors 38 a, b, 60 a, 61 b, 121 a, 125 b, 126 a, 131 b, 138 b, 141 b, 152 b, 212 a, 317 b, 351 a, 352 b, 380 a
Eryx 114 a
Ethnic exii, 196 a, 252 a, 313 b, 348 a, 344 b, 345 a
Etymology 18 b, 354 a, 3, 5, 308
Euhemerism ex, 68 a
Euphemides 104 b
Europe 28 a, 32 a
Evangoras 359 b
EvaKikas 252 b
Exaggerations 99 a, 130 a, 273 b, 283 b, 285 a, 303 a, 72, 74, 155
Examples 36 b
Excommunication xxi, 298 a
Eye-witnesses 49 a, 50 a. Cp. Autopsy
Farles 304
Father-right, see Patriarchate
Food 123 b, 135 a
Formulae lixiv, 53 a, 77 a, 106 b, 107 a, 147 b, 157 a, 177 a, 190 a, 200 b, 228 a, 230 b, 262 a, 278 b, 290 a, 291 a, 296 a, 310 a, 390 a
Freedom 96 a, 224 b, 271 b
Friends xxi, 173 b, 202 b, 284 a
Gades 6 b
Garamantes 125 b, 132 b, 133 a, 272 etc.
Gela 286 b
Gelos 78 a, 9, 32
Genealogies 5 a, 6 a, 31 b, 102 a, 200 b, 207 a, 307 a, 312 a, 313 a, 324 a, 354 a, 380 a, 386 b
Gephyrae 197 a, 200 a
Gorgitis 306 a
Gerrhos 39 a
Gesture-language 81 b
Getas 66 b, 56
Gilgamesh 121 b, 272, 281
Gindanes 128 a, 278, 282
Glaucus, 344 b
Gobryas 92 a, 304 a
Goitosyros 40 b
Gold 4 a, 5 a, 20 b, 101 a, 145 b, 161 a, 242 a, 290 a, 41, 61
Gorgo 128 b, 192 a
Gorgos 292 a
Grammar 50 a, 86 a, 92 b, 115 a, 147 a, 152 b, 204 a, 205 a, 217 b, 238 b, 249 a, 254 a, 255 b, 257 a, 258 b, 264 a, 274 a, 276 b, 277 a, 278 a, 281 a, 287 a, 298 b, 311 a, 292 a, 295 b, 301 b, 307 b, 310 b, 320 a, 392 a, 342 b, 344 a, 346 b, 355 b
Griffin, gryphon 53 b
Grinnos 104 b
INDEX IV

Gryphis 155 b
Gymnopaidaceae 325 a, 87

Haimos 34 b
Hair 48 b, 47 a, 49 a, 121 a, 214 a, 274
Halys 193 a, 292
Harpagia 279 a, 290 a
Hoar-say 44 a, 75 a, 77 a, 373 b
Hekataios lvii, 179 a b, 267 b, 391 a b, 73, 77, 276. Cp. Index III
Helena 321 a
Hellas xxvi, xI, 166 b. Cp. Index II
Hellespont 50 b, 96 a, 158 b, 253 b, 258 b, 265 a, 293 b
Hephaistos 396 b
Hera 241 b, 335 b
Heraion 65 b, 107 a, 241 b, 335 a
Herklesina 184 b
Herkleides 180 a, 265 b
Herkleides, return of the 314 a
Hermes 156 b
Herodotus :
Estimates 27 b, 58 a, 60 a, 61 a, 107 b, 247 b, 257 b, 264 b, 304 a, 305 a, 350 b, 373 b, 129, 221
‘Father of History’ xv, xxvii, lxiii
Genius xII, lxxiii
Geography xxv, lv, 3 b, 8 a, 12 a, 14 a, 16 a, 25 a b, 27 a b, 31 a, 32 a, 33 a, 39 a, 66 b, 121 b, 127 a b, 130 a, 136 c, 148 a, App. III (Scythia), App. XII (Libya), etc.
Ignorance of foreign languages lxix
Judgments lxx, 9 b, 25 a, 27 a, 28 a, 60 a, 126 a, 154 b, 166 a, 197 a, 207 b, 211 a b, 247 a
his Logic 2 a, 129 a, 146 a b, 224 a, 333 b, 345 a, 376 b
Methods 10 a, 58 a, 64 a b, 70 b, 71 a, 72 a, 74 b, 94 b, 96 b, 97 b, 98 b, 99 a, 137 a, 169 b, 160 b, 269 a, 305 a, 307 b, 326 b, 366 a, 384 a, 56, 258, 269
Motivation cvi, 4 a, 158 b, 174 a, 248 b, 39
Natural philosophy 19 a, 20 b, 31 a, 35 b, 37 a, 146 a b, 158 a, 337 a.
Cp. Earth, etc.
Hdt.’s public 20 b, 208 a, 283 a, 292 b, 308 b
as a story-teller lxiii, cix, 162 b, 242 b, 279 a, 343 a, 396 a.
- Travels xc, 36 b, 57 b, 75 a, 87 b, 144 a, 151 b, 187 a, 198 b, 208 a, 306 b, 375 a
Sources, and so on, sub vocab.
Hero-worship xxvi, 262 a, 297 b. Cp. Dead-men
Hestia 40 a, 89 b
Himera 237 a
Hipparcios 195 a, 124

HIPPIAS 155 b, 243 a, 804 b, 351 b, 357 b, 356 b, 126, 154, 204
Hippokleides 334 a, App. XIV
Hippokrates a. of Pantareus 286 b
Hippolaisa 38 a
Histiakes 96 b, 158 b, 167 b, 179 a, 256 a, 269 a, 270 a, 290 b
Hiatiaios son of Tymnes 180 b
Horner cx, 21 a. Cp. Index III
Home-sickness 179 a
Honey xxiv, 145 a, 319 a, 277
Humour 95 a, 98 a, 176 b, 258 b, 264 b, 291 a, 323 a, 311
Hydarmis 388 b
Hydia 18 b, 38 b
Hyemos 263 a, 266 a
Hypankrya 39 a
Hypanis 36 a
Hyperboroens 21 b
Hyvig 39 a, 87 a

IBANOLIS 265 b
Idanthyrmos 52 a, 89 a
‘Ideal Savage,’ the 88 b
Idioms 51 b, 203 b
Idolatry 221 a, 226 a, 229 b, 230 a b, 237 b
Istraegoras 180 a b
Ikarian sea 351 a
Imbros 301 a
Improbabilities 177 b, 178 a, 192 a b, 373 b
Inconsequence 97 a, 104 b, 141 b, 180 b, 182 b, 279 b, 296 b, 305 b, 348 b, 387 a, 48, 159, 168
Inconsistencies 2 b, 3 a, 76 a, 77 a b, 104 b, 111 a, 163 a, 279 b, 324 a, 43
Incredibilities 42 b, 118 a, 183 b, 271 b, 280 b, 292 a b, 328 a, 348 b, 353 a, 376 a, 43
India, Indi 81 a, 154 a
Inscriptions lxx, lxiii, 82 a, 64 a, 86 b, 199 a, 223 b, 276 a. Cp. Index III
Intoxication 50 a, 54 b, 341 a
Inyx 286 b
Iolokos 244 a
Ionia 172 a, 175 a b, 206 a b, 272 b, 283 b
Ionians xix, xxv, lxxvi, 68 b, 95 a, 98 b, 171 a, 173 a b, 191 b, 197 a, 198 a, 206 a b, 211 b, 234 b, 248 a, 250 a, 257 b, 258 b, 263 a, 270 b, 277 a b, 302 a b, 344 a, 129
Ionic lxiii
Iphigenia 75 b
Iras 113 b
Isagoras 206 a, 213 a, 219 b
Island-theory 31 b
Isodones 9 b, 17 a b
Istria 52 b
Itonos 105 b

KADMEIANS 196 b
Kadmos 197 b
Kalchidon 60 a, 96 a, 169 b, 293 b
HERODOTUS

Kale Akte 286 b
Kallias 376 b
Kallimachos 366 a
Kappadokia 190 b, 193 a
Karlsa 294 a, 298 a
Kariana 259 b, 260 b, 263 b, 283 b
Karkinitis 39 a, 72 b
Karyesto 355 a
Kasamos 331 a
Kepheys 30 b
Kaukaia 177 a
Kynos 254 a
Koltza 35 a
Kilikia 190 b, 193 a, 303 b, 350 b, 295, 296
Kimmerion 1 b, 8 a, 9 a, 8, 11
Kinyara 125 b, 184 b
Kios 34 b, 266 a
Kissia 190 b, 194 a, 295, 297
Kleandros 341 a
Kleisthenes of Athens 206 a, 127 ff.
Kleisthenes of Sikyon 207 b, 380 b, 305
Kleomenes xxxvi, 181 a, 183 b, 188 a,
213 a, 217 a b, 308 b, 325 a, 322 b, 82
Kleruchies 207 b, 222 b, 283 b, 296 a
Kobon 325 a
Kos 70 b
Kolchians 25 b
Koribos 105 b, 267
Kotys 31 b
Kouni 2 a
Kremni 80 b
Krestos 155 b
Krete 105 a
Krios 321 a
Kroisos 17 b, 201 b, 205 b, 296 b, 379 b
Kurion 261 a
Kyanese 60 a
Kybebe 252 a
Kybele 38 a, 252 a
Kyklaides 174 b
Kylon 213 b, 215 b
Kynegeiros 371 b
Kynetes 35 a
Kyniskos 329 a
Kyriaks 272 a
Kypros 117 b, 190 b, 254 a b, 259 a b
Kypros, the Keys of 258 a
Kypselos 299 a
Kyros 194 a
Kyzikos 50 b, 294 a
LAND 237 a
Labraunda 265 a
Lade 273 a
Lake-dwelling 161 b
Lake-theory 53 a, 36 a, 39 a b, 62 a, 127 a
Lampsakos 296 b
Lapithae 237 b
Leipsydron 201 a, 127
Leonnas 231 b, 391 b, 61, 80
Le-keades 382 a
Lochyrides 234 a, 239 b, 380 a, 342 a
Lepceus 103 a
Lesbos 70 b, 169 b, 278 a, 279 b, 288 b
Leukas Stelas 263 b
Leukon 114 a
Libya 27 b, 99 a, 120 a, 125 a, 184 b, 271
Libyan Logi, App. X, 11, etc.
Libyanus 113 a, 120 a, 141 a, 147 a b, 272 ff.
Lokri Epizephyri 285 a
Lotos 128 a
Lydia 192 b, 292 b
Lysagoras 355 b
Macedon 102 b, 183 b, 304 b, 305 a, 74 ff.
Mallone 290 b
Malignitas Herodoti 69 b, 220
Manlio 44 b, 124 a, 186 b
Cp. Divination
Mantinea 115 a
Mars 34 b
Marriage (celebrated) 62 b, 165 b, 181 b,
244 a, 299 a, 324 a, 329 a, 386 b
Marriage-customs 76 a, 81 b, 82 a, 101 a,
109 a, 121 b, 123 b, 126 a, 129 b, 155 b,
156 a, 152 b, 324 a, 386 b, 393 a
Maryst 263 b
Massalia 155 a
Mati 190 a, 193 b, 290 ff.
Matriarchate 18 a
See Mother-right
Medicine 79 b, 122 a, 137 a b, 182 a,
300 b, 8, 252
Medium orii, 188 b, 180 b, 201 a, 246 a,
285 b, 304 a, 306 b, 350 a, 112
Mediterranean, the 60 a
Megabates 177 b, 178 b
Megabozo 99 b, 168 b
Megakies 387 a, 176
Melarchaei 77 b
Melanippus 209 a
Melanippanthes 248 b
Melissa 241 a
Membranes 122 a
Mennon 125
Menias 329 b
Mesambria 67 a
Mesopotamia 191 a
Metaphor 97 b, 257 a, 269 b, 277 a, 290 a,
297 a, 373 a, 47
Metapontion 10 b
Miletos 246 b, 283 b
Milites 95 a, 154 a, 294 b, 358 a, 387 b
Miltiades 295 b
Minyas 100 a, 103 a, 129 b, 79 ff.
Miracles 65 a
Monarchy 154 a, 237 b
Mongolians 16 a, 2 ff.
Monochrome, 67 b, 289 b
Cp. Theology
Mother, the 50 b, 252 a
Mother-right 92 a, 55 b, 101 b, 287 b,
385 a, 137
Motivation 60, 120
Cp. Herodotus
Mountain-theory 38 a
Mouse, mice 92 a
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