ARISTOTLE

POLITICS
ARISTOTLE

POLITICS

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY

H. RACKHAM, M.A.

FELLOW OF CHRIST'S COLLEGE AND LATE UNIVERSITY LECTURER, CAMBRIDGE

LONDON

WILLIAM HEINEMANN LTD

CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS

MCMLIX
# CONTENTS

## INTRODUCTION:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Practical Prolegomena</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Mss. and Text of <em>Politics</em></td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Editions</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Life of Aristotle</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Aristotle's Writings</td>
<td>xi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Politics and Ethics</td>
<td>xii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Other Aristotelian Works on Politics</td>
<td>xiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Date of Composition of <em>Politics</em></td>
<td>xiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Structure of the Work</td>
<td>xv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Outline of Contents</td>
<td>xvi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Book I</th>
<th></th>
<th>2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Book II</td>
<td></td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book III</td>
<td></td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book IV</td>
<td></td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book V</td>
<td></td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Book VI</th>
<th>1-3,5</th>
<th>484</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Book VII</td>
<td>passion</td>
<td>532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book VIII</td>
<td>passion</td>
<td>634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index I. — Subjects</td>
<td></td>
<td>677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index II. — Persons and Places</td>
<td></td>
<td>681</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"It is an amazing book. It seems to me to show a Shakespearean understanding of human beings and their ways, together with a sublime good sense."—Henry Jackson, *Letters*. 
INTRODUCTION

1. Practical Prolegomena

In this edition of Politics the Books are in the ms. order; the division into chapters and sections is that of Schneider (1809); also, to facilitate reference, there are indicated in the margin the pages, columns and lines of Bekker’s Berlin text (1831), which with its volumes of scholia (1836) and Bonitz’s index (1870) has rendered invaluable service to students (its lines are numbered, and its two columns denoted by later editors by a and b, so that it affords a reference to every line of the extant works of Aristotle except The Athenian Constitution, only rediscovered in 1890).

Some modern editors have rearranged the Books, placing the 7th and 8th as 4th and 5th, and the 4th, 5th and 6th either as 6th, 7th and 8th, or as 6th, 8th and 7th. Also some number them by the Greek alphabet, but others by the Greek numerals, using σ, ζ, η instead of Z, H, Θ to denote 6, 7, 8. Moreover, two modes of dividing the Books into chapters are in vogue, and with one of these two different divisions of the chapters into sections have been used. The result is that such a reference as ‘Politics, Z, v. 6’ might denote twelve different passages in twelve different editions.

The arguments for the two different rearrangements of the order of the Books are based on their contents, and editors have made conjectural alterations of the cross-references in the text to suit these
INTRODUCTION

rearrangements; but the reasons, based on these cross-references and on the general contents, in favour of retaining the traditional order seem to me almost or quite as strong, while the reasons of convenience (vigorously stated by Immisch in his edition, pp. vi f.) are overwhelming.

It also seems desirable to explain that this translation is designed primarily to serve as an assistance to readers of the Greek, not as a substitute for it; it aims at being explanatory, so far as is possible without expanding into mere paraphrase. A version intended to be read instead of the Greek might well be on different lines. It might be quite literal and non-committal, keeping as close as possible to the form of the Greek and reproducing even its gaps of expression and what are or seem to our ignorance to be its ambiguities, and leaving the student to go for explanation to the commentators; or, on the other hand, it might render the meaning but ignore the form, and substitute terse and finished English for Aristotle's great variety of styles—for he ranges from mere jottings and notes to passages of ample discourse, not devoid of eloquence, though hardly models of Attic distinction and grace.

A rendering on the latter lines was provided for English readers once and for all by Jowett, whose translation with notes and essays (1885) is an English classic. This version, revised by Ross (1921), is of the greatest service to the student who wants to know the things that Aristotle said, but not the way he had of saying them.

2. Mss. and Text of Politics

The mss. are not very old nor very good. The viii
INTRODUCTION

oldest evidence for the text is a translation in barbarous Latin by a Dominican monk of the thirteenth century, William of Moerbeke in Flanders. It is occasionally quoted here as Guil., and when the readings of its lost Greek original can be inferred from it, they are given as L. The five best extant Greek copies are of the fifteenth century: one at Berlin, Hamiltonianus (H), one at Milan (M), and three at Paris (P¹, P², P³). Of these H represents an older text than any other; M and P¹ form a family with L; P² and P³ group with various inferior mss., and are usually considered less reliable than the other family. The text of Politics is thus very uncertain in detail, although uncertainties affecting the meaning are fortunately not very numerous. Some inaccuracies of expression attested by all the mss. are precisely similar to inaccuracies in other places attested by some mss. and avoided by others; but as to how far the former inaccuracies are to be accredited to the author and how far to his transmitters, no two scholars will agree.

In this edition room has only been found for the most interesting variant readings.

3. Editions

The commentary of Newman on the whole work (4 vols., 1887–1902) and that of Susemihl and Hicks on five Books (1894) are most valuable collections of information. The Teubner edition of Susemihl revised by Immisch (2nd ed., 1929) gives a useful brief presentation of the evidence for the text.

a Also the version of Aretinus (Leonardo Bruno of Arezzo). 1438, is once or twice cited as Ar.

b Codd. cet. in the critical notes of this edition.
INTRODUCTION

4. Life of Aristotle

Diogenes Laertius's *Lives of the Philosophers*, supplemented from other sources, gives us a fairly detailed knowledge of Aristotle's life. His father was an hereditary member of the medical profession, and physician to the king of Macedon, Amyntas II. Aristotle was born in 384 B.C. at the little colonial city of Stagirus, on the Gulf of the Strymon, of which he remained a citizen all his life, although he passed half of it at Athens. Perhaps it is possible to find some trace of his northern origin in his writings; if in some details of his thought he is more Athenian than the Athenians, his style has little Attic neatness, fluency or grace, even though his vocabulary has no definitely non-Attic features. He came to Athens at the age of seventeen to pursue his education, and became a pupil of Plato, remaining a member of the Academy for twenty years, till Plato's death. Speusippus then became head of the school, and Aristotle left Athens for Atarneus in Asia Minor, where his former fellow-pupil Hermias was now 'tyrant.' He entertained Aristotle for three years, and gave him his niece as wife; but then he fell into the hands of the Persians. Aristotle fled to the neighbouring island of Lesbos, and in 342 was invited by King Philip to return to Macedon and become the tutor of Alexander, now thirteen years old. At sixteen the prince became regent, Philip being engaged in war with Byzantium. His tutor retired to Stagirus, which had been destroyed by Philip in the Olynthian war, but which Aristotle had been allowed to restore. But he returned to Athens when Alexander succeeded to his father's
INTRODUCTION

throne in 336 B.C., and set up as a professor of philosophy, breaking away from the Academy and establishing a kind of college in the Lyceum. This was a precinct of Apollo and the Muses just outside the city, and its περίπατος or walks, in which Aristotle taught, gave the new school its name of Peripatetic; he equipped it with a large library and a natural history museum.

Aristotle's professorship lasted till 322 B.C., when on Alexander's death Athens led a Greek revolt against Macedon. Aristotle, an alien, a protégé of the court and friend of the viceroy Antipater, and a critic of democracy, fell a victim to anti-Macedonian feeling; like Socrates before him, he was prosecuted for impiety. Saying that he would not let Athens 'sin twice against philosophy,' he withdrew to his estate at Chalcis in Euboea, and died in the same year.

His body was taken to Stagirus for burial, and his memory was honoured there by a yearly festival. He left his library and the originals of his own writings to his pupil Theophrastus, who succeeded him as head of the Lyceum.

5. ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS

Aristotle's writings were partly more or less popular works on philosophical subjects, and partly scientific treatises. The former were published (ἐκδοθέντων λόγων), and are doubtless included among the 'exoteric discourses' referred to in his extant works (e.g. Pol. 1323 a 32), though that term seems to cover the writings of other philosophers also. They are all lost, unless The Athenian Constitution
INTRODUCTION

is held to belong to this group. No doubt they had the charm and flow of style which Cicero and Quintilian praise in Aristotle. To the latter group belong the extant works, and these are for the most part singularly devoid of those qualities of style. They are called ‘lectures’ (ἀκροατικοὶ λόγοι), and in fact each consists of a collection of separate discourses on different parts of a subject, loosely put together to form a treatise on the whole, with transitional passages of summary and preface, and cross-references, often untraceable. Some passages are mere outlines of the argument, others set it out fully but baldly, and others are copious and even eloquent, as if written to be read by the professor to his class. Doubtless they are actual drafts for courses of lectures, put together by Aristotle or his pupils to form treatises, and kept in the library of the school as an encyclopaedia for the use of students. It is to them that Cicero refers when in another passage he speaks of Aristotle’s writings as ‘notes’ (commentarii).

6. Politics and Ethics

For Aristotle Political Science is the second half of a subject of which Ethics is the first half; indeed in the opening chapters of The Nicomachean Ethics the term Politiké is applied to the whole subject. It is the science of human affairs, of man’s happiness or good. This consists in a certain mode of life, and man’s life is shaped for him by his social environment, the laws, customs and institutions of the community to which he belongs. Aristotle describes man in biological terms as ‘by nature a political animal’; he only develops his capacities in society, rightly organ-
ized for his welfare. The aim of Politiké is to discover first in what mode of life man’s happiness consists, then by what form of government and what social institutions that mode of life can be secured. The former question requires the study of man’s ἕθος or character, which occupies The Nicomachean Ethics; the latter is the subject of the constitution of the state, which is treated in Politics. Politics is a sequel to Ethics, the second half of a single treatise, although it bears the title that in the preface has been given to the whole subject; this subject is covered by Plato in the single dialogue of The Republic.

In Aristotle’s whole scheme of science, Politiké belongs to the group of Practical Sciences, which seek knowledge as a means to action, whereas the Theoretic Sciences (such as theology, metaphysics, pure mathematics and astronomy) seek knowledge for its own sake. The Practical Sciences fall into two groups again; the ‘Poietic’ or Productive Sciences, which tell us how to make things, and the Practical Sciences in the narrower sense of the term, which tell us how to do things: the former aim at some product or result, of the latter the actual practice of the art is itself the end. The former include the professions and the handicrafts, the latter the fine arts, like dancing and music, which are pursued for their own sake (though in Greek the term τέχνη, ‘art’ or craft, is sometimes confined to the former group—compare the English word ‘technology’).

The supreme Practical Science is Politiké; it is the science of man’s welfare or happiness as a whole. It is practical in the wider sense of the term, because it studies not only what happiness is (the topic of
INTRODUCTION

Ethics), but also how it is to be secured (that of Politics); and it is also practical in the narrower sense, because happiness is found (in Ethics) not to be a product of action but itself to consist in action of a certain sort.

7. Other Aristotelian Works on Politics

The short essay Oeconomicus included among the works of Aristotle is certainly by one or more Peripatetics of a later date. Other political works of Aristotle recorded are Πολιτικός (a dialogue), Περί Ρήτορος ὡς Πολιτικοῖ, Περί Βασιλείας, Ἀλέξανδρος ὦ "Ὑπερ Ἀποικιῶν (a dialogue on colonization), Δικαιώματα Πόλεων (formal pleadings on points of difference submitted by the Greek states to the arbitration of Philip), Νόμιμα or Νόμιμα Βαρβαρικά (an account of the institutions of non-Hellenic peoples, including the Etruscans), and most important of all, Πολιτείαι (a series of accounts of the constitutions of a large number of Greek states, enlivened with legends, local proverbs, and even anecdotes). This last work, until the discovery of The Athenian Constitution in 1890, was only known to us from a number of quotations and references in later writers. It was a collection of materials upon which Politics was based, and is referred to as such at the conclusion of The Nicomachean Ethics.

8. Date of Composition of Politics

The latest event mentioned in Politics (V. viii. 10, 1311 b 2) is the death of Philip of Macedon, 336 B.C. The work is not finished, and Aristotle died in 322 B.C.
INTRODUCTION

9. Structure of the Work

Most of Aristotle's extant works look like compilations of several logoi or discourses dealing with different parts of the subject, and somewhat loosely put together to form a treatise on the whole. This applies to Politics more than to any other; it seems to consist of three sets of lectures, not completely finished, not systematically connected, and partly overlapping: viz. (1) Books I.-III., Prolegomena—the theory of the state in general and a classification of the varieties of constitution; (2) Books IV., V., VI., Practical Politics—the nature of existing constitutions, and principles for their good government; (3) Books VII., VIII., Ideal Politics—the structure of the best state (unfinished).

A probable view is that the work was begun on one plan and later finished on another. Book I., a prefatory treatise on domestic economy, was probably written for the first plan; it is unfinished, and clumsily fitted on to its present sequel. Book II. also looks like part of the first plan, kept to form part of the second one; the same applies to Book III., perhaps the oldest part of all, which shows signs of incomplete revision to fit the new plan. Books IV., V., VI. are the newer work, and contemporary with the conclusion of The Nicomachean Ethics. Books VII., VIII., the Best State, are the earlier work, put aside unfinished when the plan was changed, and their substitute was never written.

INTRODUCTION

10. Outline of Contents

(1) Prolegomena, Books I., II., III.

Book I. The Family.—The state (c. i.) is not merely a large family (a retort to Plato's communism), but different in kind, yet it is a natural outgrowth from an aggregation of villages, as the village is from an aggregation of families. The family (c. ii.) is a partnership of master and slave, husband and wife, father and children; it involves the business of provision. Mastership (c. ii. continued): the slave is a live tool, and slavery is natural—the division into ruler and ruled permeates nature (soul and body, reason and appetites, man and animals, male and female), and some men have only bodily capacities. Criticism really hits 'legal slavery'; 'natural slavery' is recognized by common sense, and there is community of interest and friendship between master and slave. But the acquisition of slaves and the direction of their tasks are not part of mastership proper. The business of provision (c. iii.)—is it part of family economy, or subsidiary? Nature supplies food for animals, and animals for the food and service of man; so one kind of acquisition—the supply of the limited wealth needed for the good life—does belong to family economy. But another kind uses goods for exchange, aided by the invention of money, which led to commerce; hence the mistaken beliefs that money is the sole wealth and that the good life is bodily enjoyment. The natural and necessary art of provision is subsidiary to family economy; the other kind is justly disliked, especially usury—money breeding money. The branches of natural and unnatural provision are xvi
INTRODUCTION

outlined (c. iv.), with a third intermediate kind, the appropriation of the uncultivated gifts of the soil; and reference is made to former treatises, dealing in particular with monopoly. The relation of the head of the family (c. v.) to the wife resembles republican government, and that to the children royalty. All three classes of household subjects have their virtues, the slaves' imparted by the master's admonition, the women's and children's by education directed in the interest of the state.

Book II., The best Constitutions known, theoretical and actual (c. i.)—Plato's Republic aims at unity by communism; but complete unity of the state is not desirable, his system (c. ii.) will not produce it, his account is incomplete, and there are other minor objections. The communism of Laws (c. iii.) is less thorough-going. The equalitarian constitution of Phaleas and that of Hippodamus (cc. iv., v.) are criticized, with a short essay on the dangers of political innovation; then the constitution of Sparta (c. vi.), that of Crete, said to have been its model (c. vii.), and that of Carthage (c. viii.). There follow notes on Solon and a few other law-givers (c. ix.).

Book III., The Nature of the State.—Political Science (cc. i.-iii.) asks 'What is a citizen?' and 'Is the goodness of a citizen the same as the goodness of a man?' (in other words, What share in government constitutes citizenship and what classes should possess it? and in order to perform its duties, must one possess all the moral virtues or only special political abilities?). Citizenship means at least membership of the judiciary and the assembly, and therefore requires some property and leisure; and manual work and trade are incompatible with the necessary mental
INTRODUCTION

qualities. On this basis the forms of government are classified (cc. iv., v.). They vary according as the sovereign is one man or a few or the many, and according as these govern for the common good or for their own; this gives three Correct Constitutions—Royalty, Aristocracy, Constitutional Government; and three Deviations—Tyranny, Oligarchy, Democracy (i.e., essentially, the rule of the poor and un- leisured, not the rule of the many). The distribution of power (c. vi.): the state is a partnership for the good life, and in principle those who contribute most to this have most right to power. In practice, perhaps, the laws should be sovereign; but they may be bad. The rule of the many is a simple solution—they have at least collective wisdom and wealth; but they should not share the highest offices, only elect to and control them. The subject is treated afresh (cc. vii., viii.): education and virtue are the best claims to power—wealth, birth and numbers have relative but not absolute claims. Supereminence puts a man or group of men above the law: hence the value of ostracism, for even in the ideal state supereminence would be dangerous—except supereminence in virtue, which should make a man monarch. Royalty (c. ix.)—Spartan, oriental, elective (the aesymnete), that of heroic times, and (c. x.) absolute monarchy. It calls for supreme virtue in an individual; but royalty passed into aristocracy as virtue spread, and aristocracy degenerated into oligarchy; this was overthrown by tyrants, and these put down by democracy. Truly (c. xi.) the law should rule, i.e. reason; and the monarch must have helpers, which points to aristocracy. But surpassing individual excellence does occur, and then absolute
monarchy is justified. Recapitulation on Royalty (c. xii.).

(Of the other five constitutions, four are treated, though not on a symmetrical plan, in Books IV., V., VI. Aristocracy was touched on as a variant to Royalty in III. x., xi., and actual cases of it are alluded to in IV. vii., but it is replaced by the Best Constitution, the unfinished essay on which forms Books VII. and VIII. The substitution of ἀριστή τολιτεία as an equivalent for ἀριστοκρατία and βασιλεία is justified in IV. iii. 1 (1289 a 31 ff.): is this an interpolation?)

(2) Practical Politics, Books IV., V., VI.

Book IV. Existing Constitutions.—Science (c. i.) must study not only the ideally best form of state but the best under given conditions. Monarchy and Aristocracy (c. ii.) have been dealt with; there remain Constitutional Government, and the Deviations (in descending order of merit), Democracy, Oligarchy, Tyranny—their varieties and their suitability to various peoples, their establishment and their preservation against revolution (the contents of Books IV., V., VI). Constitutions (c. iii.) vary in the distribution of power according to rank and wealth. Democracy and Oligarchy are usually thought the chief forms; they really differ (c. iv.) not merely as the rule of the free and of the wealthy, but as that of the free majority and the wealthy minority. The necessary classes are farmers, artisans, shopkeepers, labourers, soldiers, councillors and judges, rich men, magistrates (Plato wrongly omitted the last three). Some may overlap, but rich and poor are distinct, so that Oligarchy and
INTRODUCTION

Democracy are the normal forms of government. Democracy (c. iv.) has four varieties, according as the qualifications of property and citizen-birth, and the supremacy of law over decrees of the assembly, are in force or are not. Oligarchy (c. v.) also has four varieties, according as power goes by a moderate or a high property-qualification, or by heredity, or is the arbitrary rule of powerful families called a Dynasty. The normal historical succession of the four varieties of Democracy and of Oligarchy are traced. Aristocracy, in a secondary sense, is a blend of these two, based on merit and numbers, or on merit, numbers and wealth. Constitutional Government (cc. vi., vii.) is also a blend of Oligarchy and Democracy (approximating more to the latter), being based on numbers and wealth; it is brought about by the institution of pay for service in the courts, and of either a moderate property-qualification for the assembly or else election without property-qualification of magistrates; it brings contentment, and so is stable. Tyranny (c. viii.) is monarchy based on force, irresponsible and selfish. Constitutional Government (c. ix.), based on the virtues of the middle class, is best on the average. But (c. x.) the best constitution for a given state depends on the relative numbers of the free, the middle class and the wealthy. Citizenship should be limited to those who bear arms, with a property-qualification admitting a majority. Classification of constitutions (cc. xi., xii.) is based on the distribution of deliberative, judicial and executive functions, the tenure and numbers of the executive, and their mode of election (fourteen modes are enumerated). The functions of the judiciary
INTRODUCTION

(c. xiii.), eight in number, are stated, and various modes of its appointment.

Book V. Revolutions—*their causes and their prevention.*—Revolution (c. i.) springs from a desire of the many or the rich for more power (though democracy is less liable to it than oligarchy). The various motives and circumstances that lead to it are set out (c. ii.), with historical instances of its arising from quite petty events (c. iii.); and special causes that operate in democracies, oligarchies and aristocracies (cc. iv., v., vi.). It is prevented (c. vii.) by the opposite causes and measures, which are discussed in general, and for oligarchy and democracy in particular, as well as (c. viii.) for monarchies, royalty and tyranny being contrasted: a variety of personal motives cause attacks on tyrants, but the monarchy of old days was only endangered by discord in the reigning house or by excessively harsh rule. Royalty is preserved (c. ix.) by moderation; tyranny by two opposite methods, harsh repression or conciliatory public spirit (historical examples). Criticism (c. x.) of Plato's treatment of revolution in *The Republic*, with his theory of a regular cycle of constitutional changes.

Book VI. (a) Democracy and Oligarchy.—Democracy (c. i.) varies in form with the prevalent industries of the people, its basis being liberty and equality (not 'proportional equality,' balancing wealth against numbers). Agricultural democracy (c. ii.) is the best, pastoral next; traders and labourers are too fond of politics and a field for demagogy. Devices to safeguard democracy (c. iii.), especially colonization. Oligarchy (c. iv.)—the more tyrannical its form the more protection it needs, an elaborate
INTRODUCTION

military system and placation of the people by public benefactions. (b) The various Offices of Government are enumerated and discussed (c. v.).

(3) Ideal Politics, Books VII., VIII.

Book VII. The Best Constitution: external conditions, population.—The writer begins (cc. i.-iii.) with a résumé of Ethics: the best life for the state as for the man is the life of virtue with enough external goods for virtuous action; the highest form of this for a man is the inner life of thought, and similarly for the state external dominion is inferior to the internal activity of politics. The necessary conditions of the ideal but practicable state (iv., v.) are a population not too small nor too large for the best common life, a country large enough for the temperate maintenance of this population and easily defensible, a suitable city site (the advantages and disadvantages of a sea-port are set out). The citizens (c. vi.) should be of a race like the Greek, at once spirited and intelligent. Of the necessary classes (c. vii.), the artisans and farmers (c. viii.) are unfit for citizenship, which must carry military, political, judicial and priestly functions; they should be slaves or alien serfs. The history of the caste-system (c. ix.) is discussed. The land must be partly public, to support religion and the public meals, partly private; each citizen is to have one farm near the city and another near the frontier. The site and plan of the city (cc. x., xi.), water-supply, fortifications, temples, state agora, market agora, and guard-posts and shrines in the country. The discipline and education of the citizens...
INTRODUCTION

(c. xii.); to natural gifts must be added training of habit and reason (c. xiii.), the psychology and objects of which are discussed; and the life of leisure is the ultimate aim. To produce the finest human material (c. xiv.) the state must regulate marriage, and the training of infancy and childhood. Education proper (c. xv.) falls into two parts, for the ages 7 to 14 and 14 to 21.

Book VIII. The Best Constitution continued.—Education must be systematic, universal and public (c. i.). Studies (c. ii.) should be edifying, and useful studies should be pursued with a liberal tone. Gymnastics (c. iii.) are to train spirit; for children (cc. iv., v.) they should be gentle, then three years of study should follow, then a period of rigorous bodily training. Music is not merely a harmless amusement or a rational pastime; it is morally educative—it exercises and refines the emotions. Moderate skill in performance on the lyre (c. vi.) should be acquired, but the flute and cithara are too professional, and the flute too emotional; and so (c. vii.) is the Phrygian mode—the ethical Dorian mode is more suited for education.

(The treatise here breaks off.)
Το γαρ ειναι δοκουντος αγαθοιρ χαριν παντα πραττουσι παντεσ, δηλον ως πασαι
μεν αγαθοι των στοχαζονται μαλιστα δε και
των κυριωτατων παντων η πασων κυριωτατη και
πασας περιεχουσα τας άλλας ουτη δε εστιν η
καλουμενη πολις και η κοινωνια η πολιτικη.
οσοι μεν ουν οιονται πολιτικων και βασιλικων και
οικονομικων και δεσποτικων ειναι των αυτων, ου
καλως λεγουσι πληθει γαρ και ολυγοτητι νομι-
ξουσι διαφερειν άλλα ουκ ειδει τοισι εκαστων,
οιν αν μεν ολην, δεσποτην, αν δε πλειονων,
οικονομουν, αν δε ετη πλειονων, πολιτικον η βασι-
λικον, ως ουδεν διαφερουσι μεγαλην οικιαν η
μικραν πολιν και πολιτικων δε και βασιλικων,
οταν μεν αυτος εφεστηκη, βασιλικων, οταν δε

a The Greek word had not acquired a specially political connotation as the English word 'community' has.
b Socrates and Plato.
I. Every state is as we see a sort of partnership, and every partnership is formed with a view to some good (since all the actions of all mankind are done with a view to what they think to be good). It is therefore evident that, while all partnerships aim at some good, the partnership that is the most supreme of all and includes all the others does so most of all, and aims at the most supreme of all goods; and this is the partnership entitled the state, the political association. Those then who think that the natures of the statesman, the royal ruler, the head of an estate and the master of a family are the same, are mistaken; they imagine that the difference between these various forms of authority is one of greater and smaller numbers, not a difference in kind—that is, that the ruler over a few people is a master, over more the head of an estate, over more still a statesman or royal ruler, as if there were no difference between a large household and a small city; and also as to the statesman and the royal ruler, they think that one who governs as sole head is royal, and one who,

\[ oikov\theta\mu os \] denoting a higher grade than \[ δεσποτης \] is unusual. For their ordinary use see c. ii. § 1 fin.
κατὰ λόγους τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῆς τοιαύτης κατὰ μέρος ἀρχαῖν καὶ ἀρχόμενοι, πολιτικῶν· ταῦτα δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθῆ. δῆλον δὲ ἔσται τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπισκοποῦσι κατὰ τὴν ὕφηγημένην μέθοδον· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ συνθετὸν μέχρι τῶν ἀσυνθετῶν ἀνάγκη διαίρειν (ταῦτα γὰρ ἐλάχιστα μόρια τοῦ παντὸς), οὕτω καὶ πόλιν ἔξ ὧν σύγκειται σκοποῦντες ὁφόμεθα καὶ περὶ τούτων μᾶλλον τί τε διαφέρουσιν ἄλληλων καὶ εἰ τι τεχνικὸν ἐνδέχεται λαβεῖν περὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ῥηθέντων.

Εἰ δὴ τις ἔξ ἀρχής¹ τὰ πράγματα φυόμενα βλέπει, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ ἐν τούτοις κάλλιστ' ἄν οὕτω θεωρήσεις. ἀνάγκη δὴ πρῶτον συν-δυάζεσθαι τοὺς ἀνευ ἄλληλων μὴ δυναμένους εἶναι, οἷον θῆλυ μὲν καὶ ἄρρεν τῆς γενέσεως² ἔνεκεν (καὶ τούτῳ οὐκ ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἄλλα ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ξύλοις καὶ φυτοῖς φυσικὸν τὸ ἐφίεσθαι οἶον αὐτὸ τοιοῦτον καταλυπεῖν ἐτεροῦ), ἀρχὸν δὲ καὶ ἀρχόμενον φύσει,³ διὰ τὴν σωτηρίαν (τὸ μὲν γάρ δυνάμενον τῇ διανοίᾳ προοράν ἀρχὸν φύσει καὶ δεσπόζοντος φύσει, τὸ δὲ δυνάμενον τῷ σώματι ταῦτα ποιεῖν⁴ ἀρχόμενον καὶ φύσει δούλων· διὸ δεσπότη καὶ δούλω ταῦτο συμφέρει). φύσει ⁵ μὲν οὖν διώρισται τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ δούλων (οὔθεν γὰρ ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ τοιοῦτον οἶον χαλκοτύποι τῇ Δελφικῆι μάχαιρᾳ πενιχρῶς, ἀλλ' ἐν πρὸς ἐν·

---

¹ ἀρχής <εἰς> Richards. ² γενέσεως Stobaeus. ³ φύσει ante καὶ codd. cet. et Ald. ⁴ ταῦτα ποιεῖν (ταῦτα ante τῷ σώματi MP¹): διαπονεῖν Gomperz.

---

ᵃ A probable emendation gives 'that can carry out labour.' ᵇ A dagger and carving-knife or knife and spoon in one?
POLITICS, I. r. 2–5

while the government follows the principles of the science of royalty, takes turns to govern and be governed is a statesman; but these views are not true. And a proof of what we assert will appear if we examine the question in accordance with our regular method of investigation. In every other matter it is necessary to analyse the composite whole down to its uncompounded elements (for these are the smallest parts of the whole); so too with the state, by examining the elements of which it is composed we shall better discern in relation to these different kinds of rulers what is the difference between them, and whether it is possible to obtain any scientific precision in regard to the various statements made above.

In this subject as in others the best method of investigation is to study things in the process of development from the beginning. The first coupling together of persons then to which necessity gives rise is that between those who are unable to exist without one another, namely the union of female and male for the continuance of the species (and this not of deliberate purpose, but with man as with the other animals and with plants there is a natural instinct to desire to leave behind one another being of the same sort as oneself), and the union of natural ruler and natural subject for the sake of security (for one that can foresee with his mind is naturally ruler and naturally master, and one that can do these things with his body is subject and naturally a slave; so that master and slave have the same interest). Thus the female and the slave are by nature distinct (for nature makes nothing as the cutlers make the Delphic knife, in a niggardly way, but one thing for one
oùτω γὰρ ἂν ἀποτελεῖτο κάλλιστα τῶν ὀργάνων
5 ἐκαστον, μὴ πολλοῖς ἔργοις ἀλλ' ἐνὶ δούλευον). ἐν
de τοῖς βαρβάροις τὸ δὴν καὶ τὸν δούλον τὴν αὐτήν
ἐχει τάξιν ἅπιον δ' ὅτι τὸ φύσει ἄρχον οὐκ ἔχου-
σιν, ἀλλὰ γίνεται ἣ κοινωνία αὐτῶν δούλης καὶ
dούλου. διὸ φασιν οἱ ποιηταί

βαρβάρων δ' Ἐλλήνας ἄρχειν εἰκός,
ός ταῦτα φύσει βάρβαρον καὶ δούλον οὖν. ἐκ μὲν θ
10 οὖν τούτων τῶν δύο κοινωνίων οἰκίᾳ πρώτη, καὶ
ὁρθῶς Ἡσίοδος εἶπε ποιήσας

οἰκον μὲν πρώτιστα γυναικά τε βοῶν τ' ἀροτῆρα·
ὁ γὰρ βοῶς ἀντ' οἰκέτου τοῖς πένησιν ἔστιν. ἣ
μὲν οὖν εἰς πᾶσαν ἡμέραν συνεστηκμὰ κοινωνία
κατὰ φύσιν οἰκός ἔστιν, οὕς Χαρώνδας μὲν καλεῖ
15 ὁμοσυπόνυς, Ἐπιμενίδης δὲ ὁ Κρῆς ὀμοκάπτους. 2

'Η δ' ἐκ πλειώνων οἰκίων κοινωνία πρώτῃ
7 χρήσεως ἑνεκεν μὴ ἐφημέρον κώμῃ, μάλιστα δὲ
κατὰ φύσιν ἑοικεν ἡ κώμῃ ἀποικία 3 οἰκίας εἶναι,
οὕς καλοῦσι τινες ὀμογάλακτας [παῖδας τε καὶ
παῖδων παῖδας]. 4 διὸ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐβασιλεύοντο
20 αἱ πόλεισ καὶ νῦν ἐτὶ τὰ ἐθνῆ· ἐκ βασιλευόμενων

1 τὸ add. edd. 2 ὀμοκάπτους ΓΜΡ1.
3 ἀποικία? ed. 4 [παῦδας τε—παῖδας] Susemihl.

[a] Euripides, I.A. 1400.  
[b] Works and Days 405.  
[c] A lawgiver of Catana in Sicily, 6th century B.C. or earlier.  
[d] A poet and prophet invited to Athens 596 B.C. to purify it of plague.  
[e] Or Doric, 'with a joint holding.' The variant ὀμοκάπτου, 'smoke-sharers,' seems to mean 'hearth-fellows.'  
[f] Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give 'consists of colonies from.'
POLITICS, I. i. 5–7

purpose; for so each tool will be turned out in the finest perfection, if it serves not many uses but one). Yet among barbarians the female and the slave have the same rank; and the cause of this is that barbarians have no class of natural rulers, but with them the conjugal partnership is a partnership of female slave and male slave. Hence the saying of the poets—

'Tis meet that Greeks should rule barbarians, a—

implying that barbarian and slave are the same in nature. From these two partnerships then is first composed the household, and Hesiod b was right when he wrote:

First and foremost a house and a wife and an ox for the ploughing—

for the ox serves instead of a servant for the poor. The partnership therefore that comes about in the course of nature for everyday purposes is the ‘house,’ the persons whom Charondas c speaks of as ‘meal-tub-fellows’ and the Cretan Epimenides d as ‘manger-fellows.’ e

On the other hand the primary partnership made up of several households for the satisfaction of not mere daily needs is the village. The village according to the most natural account seems to be a colony from f a household, formed of those whom some people speak of as ‘fellow-nurslings,’ sons and sons’ sons. g It is owing to this that our cities were at first under royal sway and that foreign races are so still, because they were made up of parts that were

The words ‘sons and sons’ sons’ are probably an interpolated note.
ARISTOTLE

1252 b

γάρ συνήλθον, πάσα γὰρ οἰκία βασιλεύεται ὑπὸ τοῦ πρεσβυτάτου, ὡστε καὶ αἱ ἀποικίαι διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν. καὶ τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν ὁ λέγει Ὁμήρος,
θεμιστεὺει δὲ ἐκαστὸς παῖδων ἥδ’ ἀλόχων.

σποράδες γάρ: καὶ οὗτο τὸ ἀρχαῖον οἶκον. καὶ
tous theous δὲ διὰ τοῦτο πάντες φασὶ βασιλεύεσθαι,
ὁτι καὶ αυτοὶ οἱ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν οἱ δὲ τὸ ἀρχαῖον
ἐβασιλεύοντο: ὡσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ εἰδὴ ἐαυτοῖς ἀφ-
ομοιοῦσι οἱ ἀνθρώποι, οὗτο καὶ τοὺς βίους τῶν
θεῶν.

‘Ἡ δ’ ἐκ πλειόνων κωμῶν κοινωνία τέλειος 8
πόλις, ἡ δ’ πάσης ἔχουσα πέρας τῆς αὐταρκείας
ὡς ἐπος εἰπεῖν, γνωμένη μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἔθνη ἔνεκεν,
οὺσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ἔθνο. διὸ πάσα πόλις φύσει ἔστιν,
εἴπερ καὶ αἱ πρώται κοινωνίαι τέλος γὰρ αὐτὴ
ἐκεῖνων, ἥ δ’ φύσις τέλος ἔστιν, οὖν γὰρ ἐκαστὸν
ἔστι τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθείσης, ταύτην φαμέν
τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἐκάστου, ὡσπερ ἀνθρώπου, ἵππου,
1253 a οἰκίας. ἐτι τὸ οὐ ἐνεκα καὶ τὸ τέλος βέλτιστον;
ἡ δ’ αὐτάρκεια τέλος καὶ βέλτιστον. ἐκ τούτων 9
οὖν φανερὸν ὅτι τῶν φύσει ἡ πόλις ἔστι, καὶ ὅτι ὁ
ἀνθρώπος φύσει πολιτικόν ἔστω, καὶ ὁ ἀπολὶς διὰ
φύσιν καὶ οὖ διὰ τύχην ἦτοι φαῦλος ἔστων ἥ
κρείττων ἡ ἀνθρώπος (ὡσπερ καὶ ὁ ὕφ’ Ὀμήρου
λοιδορθείς

αφρήτωρ, ἀθέμιστος, ἀνέστιος,

1 γενουένη? ed.

a Odyssey, ix, 114 f. of the Cyclopes: the passage goes on: ἐστὶν ἔκεινος | δς πολέμου ἔραται.

b A reminiscence of Xenophanes fr. 14.

Iliad ix. 63. 8
under royal rule; for every household is under the royal rule of its eldest member, so that the colonies from the household were so too, because of the kinship of their members. And this is what Homer means:

And each one giveth law
To sons and eke to spouses—
for his Cyclopes live in scattered families; and that is the way in which people used to live in early times. Also this explains why all races speak of the gods as ruled by a king, because they themselves too are some of them actually now so ruled and in other cases used to be of old; and as men imagine the gods in human form, so also they suppose their manner of life to be like their own.

8 The partnership finally composed of several villages is the city-state; it has at last attained the limit of virtually complete self-sufficiency, and thus, while it comes into existence for the sake of life, it exists for the good life. Hence every city-state exists by nature, inasmuch as the first partnerships so exist; for the city-state is the end of the other partnerships, and nature is an end, since that which each thing is when its growth is completed we speak of as being the nature of each thing, for instance of a man, a horse, a household. Again, the object for which a thing exists, its end, is its chief good; and self-sufficiency is an end, and a chief good. From these things therefore it is clear that the city-state is a natural growth, and that man is by nature a political animal, and a man that is by nature and not merely by fortune citiless is either low in the scale of humanity or above it (like the 'clanless, lawless, hearthless' man reviled by Homer, for he is by nature citiless
1253 a

άμα γὰρ φύσει τοιούτος καὶ πολέμου ἐπιθυμη-
τῆς) ἀτε ὦν ὤσπερ ἄνασις1 ἐν πεττοῖς. διότι δὲ 10
πολιτικὸν ὁ ἀνθρώπος ἵππον2 πάσης μελίττης καὶ
παντὸς ἀγελαίον ἵππον μάλλον, δήλον. οὐθὲν γὰρ,
10 ὡς φαμέν, μάτην ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ· λόγον δὲ μόνον
ἀνθρώπος ἔχει τῶν ἵππων. ἡ μὲν οὖν φωνῇ τοῦ
λυπηροῦ καὶ ἧδεος ἐστὶ σημείον, διὸ καὶ τοῖς
ἀλλοις ὑπάρχει ἵππος (μέχρι γὰρ τούτου ἡ φύσις
αὐτῶν ἑλήλυθεν, τοῦ ἔχειν αἰσθησιν λυπηροῦ καὶ
ηδεος καὶ ταῦτα σημαίνειν ἄλλοις), ὃ δὲ λόγος
15 ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν ἐστὶ τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ βλαβερὸν,
ὠστε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἀδίκον· τοῦτο γὰρ 11
πρὸς τὰλλα ἵππα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἔδινον, τὸ μόνον3
ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ τῶν
ἀλλων αἰσθησιν ἔχειν, ἡ δὲ τούτων κοινωνία ποιεῖ
οἰκίαν καὶ πόλιν.

Καὶ πρότερον δὴ τῇ φύσει πόλις ἡ οἰκία καὶ
20 ἐκαστὸς ἡμῶν ἐστίν. τὸ γὰρ ὄλον πρότερον
ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ μέρους· ἀναρρομένον γὰρ τοῦ
ὄλου οὐκ ἔσται ποὺς οὐδὲ χείρ εἰ μὴ ὄμωνύμως,
ราวπερ εἰ τις λέγει τὴν λυθήνην· διαφθαρεῖσα γὰρ4
ἔσται τοιαύτη, πάντα δὲ τῷ ἔργῳ ὑρισταὶ καὶ
τῇ δυνάμει, ὡστε μηκέτι τοιαύτα δόντα οὐ λεκτέον
25 τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι ἄλλῳ ὁμώνυμα. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ πόλις 12
καὶ φύσει5 πρότερον ἡ ἐκαστος, ἰδίλλον· εἰ γὰρ
μὴ αὐτάρκης ἐκαστος χωρισθείς, ὁμοίως τοῖς
ἀλλοις μέρεσιν ἔξει πρὸς τὸ ὄλον, ὃ δὲ μὴ δυνά-

1 sic? Richards: ἀτε περ ἄνασις ὦν ὤσπερ.
4 γὰρ οὐκ Schöll. 5 καὶ φύσει καὶ codd. plurimi.

* Or ' a hand thus spoiled will not be a hand at all.'
and also a lover of war) inasmuch as he resembles an isolated piece at draughts. And why man is a political animal in a greater measure than any bee or any gregarious animal is clear. For nature, as we declare, does nothing without purpose; and man alone of the animals possesses speech. The mere voice, it is true, can indicate pain and pleasure, and therefore is possessed by the other animals as well (for their nature has been developed so far as to have sensations of what is painful and pleasant and to signify those sensations to one another), but speech is designed to indicate the advantageous and the harmful, and therefore also the right and the wrong; for it is the special property of man in distinction from the other animals that he alone has perception of good and bad and right and wrong and the other moral qualities, and it is partnership in these things that makes a household and a city-state.

Thus also the city-state is prior in nature to the household and to each of us individually. For the whole must necessarily be prior to the part; since when the whole body is destroyed, foot or hand will not exist except in an equivocal sense, like the sense in which one speaks of a hand sculptured in stone as a hand; because a hand in those circumstances will be a hand spoiled, and all things are defined by their function and capacity, so that when they are no longer such as to perform their function they must not be said to be the same things, but to bear their names in an equivocal sense. It is clear therefore that the state is also prior by nature to the individual; for if each individual when separate is not self-sufficient, he must be related to the whole state as other parts are to their whole, while a man who is
μενος κοινωνεῖν ἡ μηθέν δεόμενος δι’ αὐτάρκειαν ὁμοθέν μέρος πόλεως, ὅστε ἡ θηρίων ἡ θεός.

30. Φύσει μὲν οὖν ἡ ὁμόθεν ἐν πάσιν ἐπὶ τὴν τοιαύτην κοινωνίαν. ὁ δὲ πρῶτος συστήσας μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν αἰτίος, ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τελεωθὲνβ δέλτιτον τῶν ζωῆς ὁ ἀνθρωπός ἔστιν, οὕτω καὶ χωρίσθεν νόμον καὶ δίκης3 χείριστον πάντων. χαλεπωτάτη γὰρ ἀδικία ἐξουσα ὅπλα, ὁ δ’ ἀνθρωπός ὅπλα ἐχων φύεται φρονήσει καὶ ἁρετὴ4 οἷς ἐπὶ τάναντι ἐστὶ χρήσθαι μάλιστα. διὸ ἀνοσίωτατον καὶ ἄγριωτατον ἄνευ ἁρετῆς καὶ πρὸς ἀφροδίσια καὶ ἐδωδὴν χείριστον. ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη πολιτικῆς. ἡ γὰρ δίκη5 πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας τάξις ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ δίκη τοῦ δικαίου κρίσις.

1253 b. Ἕπειρ δὲ φανερῶν ἐξ ὧν μορίων ἡ πόλις συν-έστηκεν, ἀναγκαῖον πρῶτον περὶ οἰκονομίας εἰ-πεῖν. πᾶσα γὰρ σύγκειται πόλις ἐξ οἰκίων. οἰκο-νομίας δὲ μέρη ἐξ ὧν πάλιν οἰκία συνέστηκεν. οἰκία δὲ τελείοις ἐκ δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων. Ἕπει δ’ ἐν τοῖς ἐλαχίστοις πρῶτον ἐκαστὸν ζητητέον, πρῶτα δὲ καὶ ἐλάχιστα μέρη οἰκίας δεσπότης καὶ δούλων, καὶ πόσις καὶ ἀλοχος, καὶ πατὴρ καὶ τέκνα, περὶ τρῶν ὧν τούτων σκεπτέον εἰς τὰ ἐκαστὸν καὶ ποῖον δεῖ εἶναι, ταύτα δ’ ἐστὶ δεσποτικὴ καὶ γαμική.2

1 τελεωθέν secl. Jackson.
2 ὁ om. codd. cet. et Ald.
3 χωρισθέν—δίκης secl. Jackson.
4 ἁρετὴ <ἐπιτήδεια> ? Pearson.
5 τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον Richards.

12

ap The Greek word properly denotes the marriage ceremony, not the married state.
incapable of entering into partnership, or who is so self-sufficing that he has no need to do so, is no part of a state, so that he must be either a lower animal or a god.

Therefore the impulse to form a partnership of this kind is present in all men by nature; but the man who first united people in such a partnership was the greatest of benefactors. For as man is the best of the animals when perfected, so he is the worst of all when sundered from law and justice. For unrighteousness is most pernicious when possessed of weapons, and man is born possessing weapons for the use of wisdom and virtue, which it is possible to employ entirely for the opposite ends. Hence when devoid of virtue man is the most unscrupulous and savage of animals, and the worst in regard to sexual indulgence and gluttony. Justice on the other hand is an element of the state; for judicial procedure, which means the decision of what is just, is the regulation of the political partnership.

II. And now that it is clear what are the component parts of the state, we have first of all to discuss household management; for every state is composed of households. Household management falls into departments corresponding to the parts of which the household in its turn is composed; and the household in its perfect form consists of slaves and freemen. The investigation of everything should begin with its smallest parts, and the primary and smallest parts of the household are master and slave, husband and wife, father and children; we ought therefore to examine the proper constitution and character of each of these three relationships, I mean that of mastership, that of marriage (there is no exact
ARISTOTLE

10 (ἀνώνυμον γὰρ ἡ γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρὸς σύζευξις) καὶ τρίτον τεκνοποιητικήν\(^1\) (καὶ γὰρ αὐτὴ οὐκ ἦν ὁμόμασται ἴδιω ὀνόματι): ἐστώσαν δὴ\(^2\) αὐτῷ τρεῖς ὡς εἴπομεν. ἐστὶ δὲ τι \(\delta\) μέρος ὃ δοκεῖ τοῖς μὲν εἶναι οἰκονομία τοῖς δὲ μέγιστον μέρος αὐτῆς, ὅπως δὴ ἔχει, θεωρητέον: λέγω δὲ περὶ τῆς καλουμένης χρηματιστικῆς.

15 Πρῶτον δὲ περὶ δεσπότου καὶ δούλου εἴπωμεν, ἢν τὰ τε πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαῖαν χρείαν ἱδώμεν, κἂν εἰ τι πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι περὶ αὐτῶν δυναμεθα λαβεῖν βέλτιον τῶν νῦν ὑπολαμβανομένων. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ \(\delta\) δοκεῖ ἐπιστήμη τὲ τῖς εἶναι ἡ δεσποτεία, καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ οἰκονομία καὶ δεσποτεία καὶ πολιτικὴ καὶ βασιλικὴ, καθάπερ εἴπομεν ἂρχόμενοι: τοῖς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν ἐπὶ δεσπόζειν, νόμῳ γὰρ τὸν μὲν δούλου εἶναι τὸν \(\delta\) ἑλεύθερον, φύσει \(\delta\) οὐθέν διαφέρειν, διότερο οὐδὲ δίκαιον, βίαιον γὰρ.

'Επεὶ οὖν ἡ κτήσις μέρος τῆς οἰκίας ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ κτητικὴ μέρος τῆς οἰκονομίας\(^4\) (ἀνευ γὰρ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀδύνατον καὶ ἦν καὶ εὐ ἦν\(^5\)), \(\odot\)περ 4 δὲ \(\odot\) ταῖς ὁρμομέναις τέχναις ἀναγκαίων ἃν εἰ ὑπάρχειν τὰ οἰκεία ὀργάνα εἰ μέλλει ἀποτελεσθῆσεται τὸ ἔργον, οὐτώ καὶ τῷ οἰκονομικῷ, τῶν \(\odot\) ὀργάνων τὰ μὲν ἀψυχα τὰ \(\odot\) ἐμψυχα (οἵν

---

1 τεκνοποιητικὴ: πατρικὴ Ar.
2 ὅ Susemihl: ὅ codd.
3 ἔστι δὲ ἔτι τέστατον τι (ι.ε., δὲ τι) Schmidt.
4 καὶ—οἰκονομίας secl. Susemihl.
5 [καὶ εὐ ἦν] ? ed.: om. ΓΜΡ\(^{1}\).
6 ὅ ὅ Susemihl.

\(^{a}\) No English word covers all the associations of the Greeks, which means 'dealing in χρήματα,' 'things,'—goods, property, money—and so 'business.'
term denoting the relation uniting wife and husband), and thirdly the progenitive relationship (this too has not been designated by a special name). Let us then accept these three relationships that we have mentioned. There is also a department which some people consider the same as household management and others the most important part of it, and the true position of which we shall have to consider: I mean what is called the art of getting wealth.\(^a\)

Let us begin by discussing the relation of master and slave, in order to observe the facts that have a bearing on practical utility, and also in the hope that we may be able to obtain something better than the notions at present entertained, with a view to a theoretic knowledge of the subject. For some thinkers hold the function of the master to be a definite science, and moreover think that household management, mastership, statesmanship and monarchy are the same thing, as we said at the beginning of the treatise; others however maintain that for one man to be another man's master is contrary to nature, because it is only convention that makes the one a slave and the other a freeman and there is no difference between them by nature, and that therefore it is unjust, for it is based on force.

Since therefore property is a part of a household and the art of acquiring property a part of household management (for without the necessaries even life, as well as the good life,\(^b\) is impossible), and since, just as for the definite arts it would be necessary for the proper tools to be forthcoming if their work is to be accomplished, so also the manager of a household must have his tools, and of tools some are lifeless and

\(^a\) 'As well as the good life' is probably an interpolation.

\(^b\) And as man of business.
1253 b
tω κυβερνήτη τῷ μὲν οἷάξ ἄφυχον ὦ δὲ πρωρεύσ
ἐμψυχον, ὦ γὰρ ὑπηρέτης ἐν ὀργάνον εἰδε ταῖς
tέχναις εὐτώ, οὕτω καὶ τὸ κτήμα ὀργανον πρὸς
ζωῆν ἐστὶ, καὶ ἡ κτήσις πλήθος ὀργάνων ἐστὶ,
καὶ ὥσπερ ὄργανον πρὸ ὀργάνων πᾶς ὑπηρέτης: εἰ γὰρ 5
ὑδύνατο ἔκαστο τῶν ὀργάνων κελευσθεῖν ἡ προ-
αυσθανόμενον ἀποτελεῖν τὸ αὐτοῦ ἔργον, ὥσπερ τὰ
Δαιδάλου φασίν ἡ τοὺς τοῦ Ἥφαιστου τρίτοδας,
οὕς φησιν ὁ ποιητὴς αὐτομάτους θείον δύσθαι
ἀγώνα, οὕτως αἱ κερκίδες ἐκερκίζον αὐταὶ καὶ τὰ
πλήκτρα ἐκισθάριζεν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει οὕτε τοῖς
ἀρχιτέκτοσιν ὑπηρετῶν οὕτε τοῖς δεσπόταις δοῦλων.
τα μὲν οἷς λεγόμενα ὀργάνα ποιητικὰ ὀργάνα ἐστὶ,
τὸ δὲ κτήμα πρακτικών ἀπὸ μὲν γὰρ τῆς κερκίδος
ἐτερὸν τι γίνεται παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν αὐτῆς, ἀπὸ δὲ
5 τῆς ἐσθήτου καὶ τῆς κλίνης ἡ χρῆσις μόνον. ἔτι 6
δ’ ἐπεὶ διαφέρει ἡ ποιήσις εἰδει καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις,
δέονται δ’ ἀμφότεραι ὀργάνων, ἀνάγκη καὶ ταύτα
τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν διαφοράν. ὁ δὲ βίος πρᾶξις, οὐ
ποιήσις ἐστὶν διὸ καὶ ὃ δούλος ὑπηρέτης τῶν
πρὸς τὴν πρᾶξιν.
Τὸ δὲ κτήμα λέγεται ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μόριον: τὸ
10 γὰρ μόριον οὐ μόνον ἄλλον ἐστὶ μόριον, ἄλλα
καὶ ἀπλῶς ἄλλου, ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ τὸ κτήμα. διὸ
ὁ μὲν δεσπότης τοῦ δούλου δεσπότης μόνον,

2 τὸ ed.: τὸ τε codd. 3 ἀπλῶς Γ, ἀπλῶς ὀλως Μ1, ὀλως cet.

This legendary sculptor first represented the eyes as open and the limbs as in motion, so his statues had to be
others living (for example, for a helmsman the rudder is a lifeless tool and the look-out man a live tool—for an assistant in the arts belongs to the class of tools), so also an article of property is a tool for the purpose of life, and property generally is a collection of tools, and a slave is a live article of property. And every assistant as if it were a tool that serves for several tools; for if every tool could perform its own work when ordered, or by seeing what to do in advance, like the statues of Daedalus in the story, or the tripods of Hephaestus which the poet says 'enter self-moving the company divine,'—if thus shuttles wove and quills played harps of themselves, masters would have no need of assistants and masters no need of slaves. Now the tools mentioned are instruments of production, whereas an article of property is an instrument of action; for from a shuttle we get something else beside the mere use of the shuttle, but from a garment or a bed we get only their use. And also inasmuch as there is a difference in kind between production and action, and both need tools, it follows that those tools also must possess the same difference. But life is doing things, not making things; hence the slave is an assistant in the class of instruments of action.

And the term 'article of property' is used in the same way as the term 'part': a thing that is a part is not only a part of another thing but absolutely belongs to another thing, and so also does an article of property. Hence whereas the master is merely the slave's master and does not belong to the slave, chained to prevent them from running away (Plato, _Meno_ 97 d).

* Iliad, xviii. 369.

*e i.e. with it we do not make something but do something (e.g. wear a dress, lie in a bed).
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΗΛΕΩΣ

1254α

ἐκείνου δ' οὖκ ἐστιν. ο δὲ δούλος οὐ μόνον δεσπότου
dούλος ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλως ἐκείνου.

Τίς μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις τοῦ δούλου καὶ τίς ἡ δύναμις, 7
15 ἐκ τούτων δήλου· ο γὰρ μὴ αὐτοῦ φύσει ἄλλ' ἄλλου
ἀνθρώπος ὡν, οὗτος φύσει δούλος ἐστιν, ἄλλου δ' ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος ὃς ἂν κτήμα ἡ ἁνθρώπος ὡν, κτήμα
dε ὄργανον πρακτικὸν καὶ χωριστὸν;/ πότερον δ' ἐστὶ τις φύσει τοιούτος ἡ οὖ, καὶ πότερον βέλτιον
καὶ δύκαιον τινὶ δουλεύειν ἡ οὖ, ἀλλὰ πᾶσα δουλεία
20 παρὰ φύσιν ἐστὶ, μετὰ ταῦτα σκέπτεσθαι. οὐ 8
χαλεποῦν δὲ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ θεωρῆσαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν
γυνομένων καταμαθεῖν. τὸ γὰρ ἄρχειν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι
οὐ μόνον τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἄλλα καὶ τῶν συμφερόντων
ἐστὶ, καὶ εὔθυς ἐκ γενετῆς ἕνα διέστηκε τὰ μὲν
ἐπὶ τὸ ἀρχεσθαι τὰ δ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχειν. καὶ εἶδη
25 πολλὰ καὶ ἀρχόντων καὶ ἀρχομένων ἐστὶν (καὶ
ἀεὶ βελτίων ἡ ἀρχὴ ἡ τῶν βελτίων ἀρχομένων,
οἷον ἁνθρώπου ἡ θηρίου, τὸ γὰρ ἀποτελοῦμενον
ἀπὸ τῶν βελτίων βέλτιον ἔργον, ὅπου δὲ τὸ μὲν
ἀρχεῖ τὸ δ' ἀρχεται, ἐστὶ τι τούτων ἔργον). ὡσα 9
γὰρ ἐκ πλειόνων συνέστηκε καὶ γίνεται ἐν τι
30 κοινῶν, εἴτε ἐκ συνεχῶν εἴτε ἐκ διηρημένων, ἐν
ἀπασὶν ἐμφαίνεται τὸ ἄρχον καὶ τὸ ἄρχομενον,
καὶ τούτο ἐκ τῆς ἀπάσης φύσεως ἐνυπάρχει τοῖς
ἐμψίχους· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μὴ μετέχουσι ζωῆς ἐστὶ
the slave is not merely the slave of the master but wholly belongs to the master.

These considerations therefore make clear the nature of the slave and his essential quality: one who is a human being belonging by nature not to himself but to another is by nature a slave, and a person is a human being belonging to another if being a man he is an article of property, and an article of property is an instrument for action separable from its owner. But we must next consider whether or not anyone exists who is by nature of this character, and whether it is advantageous and just for anyone to be a slave, or whether on the contrary all slavery is against nature. And it is not difficult either to discern the answer by theory or to learn it empirically. Authority and subordination are conditions not only inevitable but also expedient; in some cases things are marked out from the moment of birth to rule or to be ruled. And there are many varieties both of rulers and of subjects (and the higher the type of the subjects, the loftier is the nature of the authority exercised over them, for example to control a human being is a higher thing than to tame a wild beast; for the higher the type of the parties to the performance of a function, the higher is the function, and when one party rules and another is ruled, there is a function performed between them)—because in every composite thing, where a plurality of parts, whether continuous or discrete, is combined to make a single common whole, there is always found a ruling and a subject factor, and this characteristic of living things is present in them as an outcome of the whole of nature, since even in things that do not partake of life there

19


ARISTOTLE

1254 a

τις ἀρχή, οἷον ἀρμονίας. 1 ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἵσως ἐξωτερικωτέρας ἐστὶ σκέψεως. τὸ δὲ ζῷον πρῶτον 10 ἔπειτα τὸ μὲν ἄρχον ἐστὶ φύσει τὸ δ’ ἄρχόμενον. δεὶ δὲ σκοπεῖν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσι μᾶλλον τὸ φύσει, καὶ μὴ ἐν τοῖς διεφθαρμένοις. διὸ καὶ τὸν βέλτιστα διακείμενον καὶ κατὰ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ ψυχὴν ἀνθρωπὸν θεωρητέον, ἐν ὧν τούτο δήλον. τῶν γὰρ μοχθηρῶν ἢ μοχθηρῶς 2 ἑχοντων δόξειν ἄν ἄρχειν πολλάκις τὸ σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς διὰ τὸ φαύλως καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ἐχειν. ἐστὶ δ’ οὖν, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, 11 πρῶτον ἐν ζῴῳ θεωρήσαι καὶ δεσποτικὴν ἄρχην καὶ πολιτικὴν. ἢ μὲν γὰρ ψυχὴ τοῦ σώματος ἄρχει δεσποτικὴν ἄρχην, ὥς δὲ νοῦς τῆς ὀρέξεως πολιτικὴν καὶ βασιλικὴν. ἐν οἷς θανερών ἐστὶν ὅτι κατὰ φύσιν καὶ 4 συμφέρον τὸ ἀρχεῖαι τῷ σώματι ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τῷ παθητικῷ μορίῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ νου καὶ τοῦ μορίου τοῦ λόγου ἑχοντος, τὸ δ’ ἐξ ἰσον ἢ ἀνάπαλιν βλαβερὸν πᾶσιν. πάλιν ἐν 12 ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις ὑσάυτως. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἦμερα τῶν ἀγρίων βελτίων τῆν φύσιν, τοῦτοις δὲ πᾶσι βέλτιον ἀρχεῖαι ὑπ’ ἀνθρώπων, τυγχάνει γὰρ σωτηρίας σύντος. ἔτι δὲ τὸ ἄρρεν πρὸς τὸ ἡλίον καὶ μὲν κρεῖττον τὸ δὲ χεῖρον, τὸ μὲν ἄρχον τὸ δ’ ἄρχόμενον. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων ἀνθρώπων. ὅσοι 13 μὲν οὖν τοσοῦτον διεστὰσιν ὅσον ψυχὴ σώματος

1 ἀρμονίας vel ἐν ἀρμονίαις Richards. 2 μοχθηρῶς: φαύλως (Γ ?) Buecheler. 3 φαύλως καὶ secl. idem. 4 ἢ ? Richards.

a Each ‘ mode ’ (Dorian, the modern minor scale, Phrygian and Lydian, two forms of major) was ruled by its key-note.

20
is a ruling principle, as in the case of a musical scale. However, this matter perhaps belongs to an investigation lying somewhat outside our subject. But in the first place an animal consists of soul and body, of which the former is by nature the ruling and the latter the subject factor. And to discover what is natural we must study it preferably in things that are in a natural state, and not in specimens that are degenerate. Hence in studying man we must consider a man that is in the best possible condition in regard to both body and soul, and in him the principle stated will clearly appear,—since in those that are bad or in a bad condition it might be thought that the body often rules the soul because of its vicious and unnatural condition. But to resume—it is in a living creature, as we say, that it is first possible to discern the rule both of master and of statesman: the soul rules the body with the sway of a master, the intelligence the appetites with constitutional or royal rule; and in these examples it is manifest that it is natural and expedient for the body to be governed by the soul and for the emotional part to be governed by the intellect, the part possessing reason, whereas for the two parties to be on an equal footing or in the contrary positions is harmful in all cases. Again, the same holds good between man and the other animals: tame animals are superior in their nature to wild animals, yet for all the former it is advantageous to be ruled by man, since this gives them security. Also, as between the sexes, the male is by nature superior and the female inferior, the male ruler and the female subject. And the same must also necessarily apply in the case of mankind generally; therefore all men that differ as widely as the soul
καὶ ἄνθρωπος θηρίον (διάκεινται δὲ τούτον τὸν τρόπον ὄσων ἐστὶν ἔργον ή τοῦ σώματος χρῆσις καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν βελτιστοῦ), οὐτοὶ μὲν εἰσὶ
20 φύσει δοῦλοι, οῖς βελτιών ἐστὶν ἀρχεσθαι ταύτην τὴν ἄρχην, εἴπερ καὶ τοῖς εἰρημένοις. ἐστὶ γὰρ
φύσει δοῦλος ὁ δυνάμενος ἄλλου εἶναι (διὸ καὶ ἄλλου ἐστὶν) καὶ ὁ κοινωνῶν λόγου τοσοῦτον ὅσον
αισθάνεσθαι ἄλλα μὴ ἔχειν· τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα ζῶα
οὐ λόγῳ αἰσθανόμενα¹ ἄλλα παθήμασιν ὑπηρετεῖ.

οἱ καὶ ἡ χρεία δὲ παραλλάττει μικρὸν· ἡ γὰρ πρὸς
tάναγκαια τῷ σώματι βοήθεια γίνεται παρ' ἀμφοῖν, παρὰ τε τῶν δούλων καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἡμέρων ζῶων. βούλεται μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις καὶ τὰ σώματα διαφέροντα ποιεῖν τὰ τῶν ἐλευθέρων καὶ τῶν δούλων, τὰ μὲν ἱσχυρὰ πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαῖαν

χρήσιν, τὰ δὲ ὀρθὰ καὶ ἀχρηστὰ πρὸς τὰς τοιαύτας ἐργασίας, ἀλλὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς πολιτικὸν βίον (οὕτος
de καὶ γίνεται διηρημένος εἰς τε τὴν πολεμικὴν
χρείαν καὶ τὴν εἰρηνικὴν), συμβαίνει δὲ πολλὰς καὶ τοιναντίων, τοὺς μὲν τὰ σώματ' ἔχειν ἐλευθέρων
tουσ δὲ τὰς ψυχὰς μόνον². ἐπεὶ τούτῳ γε φανεροῖν.

οὐ εἰ τοιούτον γένοιτο διάφοροι τὸ σῶμα ὅσον
αἱ τῶν θεῶν εἰκόνες, τοὺς ὑπολειπομένους πάντες

φαίνειν ἄν αξίους εἶναι τούτοις δουλεύειν. εἰ δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος τοῦτ' ἄληθες, πολὺ δικαιο-
terōν ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τούτο διωρίσθαι· ἀλλ' οὖν όμοιος ράδιον ἱδεῖν τὸ τε τῆς ψυχῆς κάλλος καὶ

τὸ τοῦ σώματος. ὅτι μὲν τοῖνυν εἰσὶ φύσει τινὲς

¹ τειθόμενα Richards.
² μόνον hic ed.; post σῶμα codd.
does from the body and the human being from the
lower animal (and this is the condition of those
whose function is the use of the body and from whom
this is the best that is forthcoming)—these are by
nature slaves, for whom to be governed by this kind
of authority is advantageous, inasmuch as it is ad-
vantageous to the subject things already mentioned.
For he is by nature a slave who is capable of belonging
to another (and that is why he does so belong), and
who participates in reason so far as to apprehend it
but not to possess it; for the animals other than man
are subservient not to reason, by apprehending it,
but to feelings. And also the usefulness of slaves
diverges little from that of animals; bodily service
for the necessities of life is forthcoming from both,
from slaves and from domestic animals alike. The
intention of nature therefore is to make the bodies
also of freemen and of slaves different—the latter
strong for necessary service, the former erect and
unserviceable for such occupations, but serviceable
for a life of citizenship (and that again divides into the
employments of war and those of peace); though as a
matter of fact often the very opposite comes about—
slaves have the bodies of freemen and freemen the
souls only; since this is certainly clear, that if free-
men were born as distinguished in body as are the
statues of the gods, everyone would say that those
who were inferior deserved to be these men's slaves;
and if this is true in the case of the body, there is
far juster reason for this rule being laid down in the
case of the soul, but beauty of soul is not so easy
to see as beauty of body. It is manifest therefore
that there are cases of people of whom some are
The difficulty turns on the ambiguity of ἀρετή, (a) moral goodness, virtue, (b) goodness of any kind, e.g. strength.

24
freemen and the others slaves by nature, and for these slavery is an institution both expedient and just.

16 But at the same time it is not difficult to see that those who assert the opposite are also right in a manner. The fact is that the terms 'slavery' and 'slave' are ambiguous; for there is also such a thing as a slave or a man that is in slavery by law, for the law is a sort of agreement under which the things conquered in war are said to belong to their conquerors. Now this conventional right is arraigned by many jurists just as a statesman is impeached for proposing an unconstitutional measure; they say that it is monstrous if the person powerful enough to use force, and superior in power, is to have the victim of his force as his slave and subject; and even among the learned some hold this view, though others hold the other. But the reason of this dispute and what makes the theories overlap is the fact that in a certain manner virtue when it obtains resources has in fact very great power to use force, and the stronger party always possesses superiority in something that is good, so that it is thought that force cannot be devoid of goodness, but that the dispute is merely about the justice of the matter (for it is due to the one party holding that the justification of authority is good-will, while the other identifies justice with the mere rule of the stronger); because obviously if these theories be separated apart, the other theories have no force or plausibility at all, implying that the superior in goodness has no claim to rule and be master. But some persons, doing their best to cling to some principle of justice (for the law is a principle of justice), assert that the
τὴν κατὰ πόλεμον δουλείαν τιθέασι δικαίαν· ἀμα
d' οὐ φασιν, τὴν τε γὰρ ἀρχὴν ἐνδέχεται μὴ δι-
25 καίαν εἴναι τῶν πολέμων καὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον δου-
λεύειν οὐδαμῶς αὖν φαίη τις δοῦλον εἰναι· εἰ δὲ
μὴ, συμβῆσεται τοὺς εὐγενεστάτους εἶναι δοκοῦντας
dούλους εἶναι καὶ ἐκ δούλων ἐὰν συμβῇ πραθῆναι
ληφθέντας. διόπερ αὐτοὺς οὐ βούλονται λέγειν
dούλους, ἄλλα τοὺς βαρβάρους. καίτοι οταν τοῦτο
80 λέγωσιν, οὐθέν ἀλλο ξητοῦσιν ἡ τὸ φύσει δοῦλον
διπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἴπομεν· ἀνάγκη γὰρ εἰναι τινας
φάναι τοὺς μὲν πανταχοῦ δούλους τοὺς δ' οὐδαμοῦ.
tὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ εὐγενείας· αὐτοὺς μὲν 19
γὰρ οὐ μόνον παρ' αὐτοῖς εὐγενεῖς ἄλλα πανταχοῦ
νομίζουσιν, τοὺς δὲ βαρβάρους οἳκοι μόνον, ὡς
ὄν το τὸ μὲν ἀπλῶς εὐγενεῖς καὶ ἐλεύθερον τὸ δ' οὐχ ἀπλῶς, ὥσπερ ἡ Θεοδέκτον Ἐλένη φησὶν
θείων δ' ἀπ' ἁμφοῖν ἐκγονον ῥιξωμάτων
tίς ἀν προσεπεῖν ἁξιώσειν λάτρην;
οταν δὲ τοῦτο λέγωσιν, οὐθενὶ ἄλλ' ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ
40 κακία διορίζουσι τὸ δοῦλον καὶ ἐλεύθερον καὶ τοὺς
1255 b εὐγενεῖς καὶ τοὺς δυσγενεῖς· ἁξιώσοι γὰρ, ὥσπερ
ἐξ ἀνθρώπου ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἐκ θηρίων γίνεσθαι
θηρίων, οὕτω καὶ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθῶν· ἡ δὲ φύσις
βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο ποιεῖν πολλάκις, οὐ μὲντοι
dύναται.
“Οτι μὲν οὖν ἔχει τινὰ λόγον ἡ ἁμφισβήτησις,

a A tragic poet, a friend of Aristotle.
enslavement of prisoners of war is just; yet at the same time they deny the assertion, for there is the possibility that wars may be unjust in their origin and one would by no means admit that a man that does not deserve slavery can be really a slave—otherwise we shall have the result that persons reputed of the highest nobility are slaves and the descendants of slaves if they happen to be taken prisoners of war and sold. Therefore they do not mean to assert that Greeks themselves if taken prisoners are slaves, but that barbarians are. Yet when they say this, they are merely seeking for the principles of natural slavery of which we spoke at the outset; for they are compelled to say that there exist certain persons who are essentially slaves everywhere and certain others who are so nowhere. And the same applies also about nobility: our nobles consider themselves noble not only in their own country but everywhere, but they think that barbarian noblemen are only noble in their own country—which implies that there are two kinds of nobility and of freedom, one absolute and the other relative, as Helen says in Theodectes:

But who would dare to call me menial,
The scion of a twofold stock divine?

Yet in so speaking they make nothing but virtue and vice the distinction between slave and free, the noble and the base-born; for they assume that just as from a man springs a man and from brutes a brute, so also from good parents comes a good son; but as a matter of fact nature frequently while intending to do this is unable to bring it about.

It is clear therefore that there is some reason for
καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶ τίνες ὁι μὲν φύσει δοῦλοι οἱ δ' ἐλευθεροὶ, δὴ λοιπὸν καὶ ὅτι ἐν τοῖς διάωρισται τὸ 20 τοιοῦτον, ὥσπερ συμφέρει τῷ μὲν τὸ δουλεύειν τῷ δὲ τὸ δεσπόζειν, καὶ δίκαιον καὶ δεῖ τὸ μὲν ἀρχεῖαι τὸ δ' ἀρχεῖν ἢν πεφύκασιν ἀρχὴν ἀρχεῖν, ὡστε καὶ δεσπόζειν τὸ δὲ κακῶς ἀσυμφόρως ἐστὶν

10 ἀμφοῖν (τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ συμφέρει τῷ μέρει καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ καὶ σῶματι καὶ ψυχῇ, δὲ δοῦλος μέρος τὶ τοῦ δεσπότου, οἶνον ἐμψυχόν τι τοῦ σῶματος κεχωρισμένον δὲ μέρος· διὸ καὶ συμφέρον ἐστὶ 21 τὶ καὶ φιλία δούλω καὶ δεσπότη πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοῖς φύσει τοῦτων ἡξιωμένοις, τοῖς δὲ μὴ τοῦτον 15 τὸν τρόπον ἄλλα κατὰ νόμον καὶ βιασθείσι τοῦναντίον).

Φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦτων ὅτι οὐ ταύτων ἐστὶ δεσποτεία καὶ πολιτικὴ οὐδὲ πᾶσαι ἀλλήλαις αἱ ἀρχαί, ὡστερ τινὲς φασιν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευθέρων φύσει ἡ δὲ δούλων ἐστὶν, καὶ ἡ μὲν οἰκονομικὴ 20 μοναρχία (μοναρχεῖται γὰρ πᾶς οἶκος), ἡ δὲ πολιτικὴ ἐλευθέρων καὶ ἵσων ἀρχή. ὁ μὲν οὖν δεσπό- 22 της οὐ λέγεται κατ' ἐπιστήμην ἄλλα τῶ τοιόσοδ' εἶναι, ὡμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος καὶ ὁ ἐλευθερος. ἐπιστήμη δ' ἂν εἰη καὶ δεσποτικὴ καὶ δουλικὴ,
this dispute, and that in some instances it is not the case that one set are slaves and the other freemen by nature; and also that in some instances such a distinction does exist, when slavery for the one and mastership for the other are advantageous, and it is just and proper for the one party to be governed and for the other to govern by the form of government for which they are by nature fitted, and therefore by the exercise of mastership, while to govern badly is to govern disadvantageously for both parties (for the same thing is advantageous for a part and for the whole body or the whole soul, and the slave is a part of the master—he is, as it were, a part of the body, alive but yet separated from it; hence there is a certain community of interest and friendship between slave and master in cases when they have been qualified by nature for those positions, although when they do not hold them in that way but by law and by constraint of force the opposite is the case).

And even from these considerations it is clear that the authority of a master over slaves is not the same as the authority of a magistrate in a republic, nor are all forms of government the same, as some assert. Republican government controls men who are by nature free, the master's authority men who are by nature slaves; and the government of a household is monarchy (since every house is governed by a single ruler), whereas statesmanship is the government of men free and equal. The term 'master' therefore denotes the possession not of a certain branch of knowledge but of a certain character, and similarly also the terms 'slave' and 'freeman.' Yet there might be a science of mastership and a slave's science—the latter being the sort of knowledge that
ARISTOTLE

1255 b δουλική μὲν οἶαν περ ὁ ἐν Συρακούσαις ἐπαιδευεν
25 (ἐκεῖ γὰρ λαμβάνων τις μισθὸν ἐδίδασκε τὰ ἐγκύκλια διακονήματα τοὺς παιδας). εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ ἐπὶ πλείον τῶν τοιούτων μάθησις, οἶον ὀφθαλμωκή καὶ τάλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα γένη τῆς διακοσίας. ἔστι γὰρ ἔτερα ἔτερων τὰ μὲν ἐντιμότερα ἔργα τὰ δ' ἀναγκαιότερα, καὶ κατὰ τὴν παρομίαν

80 δοῦλος πρὸ δούλου, δεσπότης πρὸ δεσπότου.

αἱ μὲν οὖν τοιαῦτα πᾶσαι δουλικαὶ ἐπιστήματει ἐστι, 23 δεσποτικὴ δ' ἐπιστήμη ἔστιν ἡ χρηστική δούλων. ὁ γὰρ δεσπότης οὐκ ἐν τῷ κτάσθαι τοὺς δούλους, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι δούλους. ἔστι δ' αὐτὴ ἡ ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲν μέγα ἔχουσα οὐδὲ σεμνὸν· ὁ γὰρ τὸν δοῦλον ἐπίστασθαι δεῖ ποιεῖν, ἐκεῖνον δὲ ταῦτα ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιτάττειν. διὸ δοσὶς ἐξουσία μὴ αὐτοῦς κακοπαθεῖν, ἐπίτροπος λαμβάνει ταύτην τὴν τιμῆν, αὐτοὶ δὲ πολιτεύονται ἡ φιλοσοφοῦσιν. ἡ δὲ κτητικὴ ἐτέρα ἀμφότερων τοῦτων ἡ δικαία, οἷον ἡ πολεμικὴ τις οὕσα ἡ θηρευτική. περὶ μὲν οὖν δοῦλου καὶ δεσπότου τοῦτον διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον.

1256 a III. Ὅλως δὲ περὶ πάσης κτήσεως καὶ χρη-1 ματικῆς θεωρήσωμεν κατὰ τὸν ὑψηλήμενον τρόπον, ἐπείπερ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος τῆς κτήσεως μέρος τι ἦν. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἀπορήσειν ἂν τις πότερον 5 ἡ χρηματικὴ ἡ αὐτὴ τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἐστὶν ἡ μέρος τι ἡ ὑπηρετική, καὶ εἰ ὑπηρετική, πότερον

1 Richards: οἷον ἡ δικαια codd.

a Probably from a comedy of Aristotle’s contemporary Philemon.

30
used to be imparted by the professor at Syracuse (for there used to be a man there who for a fee gave lessons to servants in their ordinary duties); and indeed there might be more advanced scientific study of such matters, for instance a science of cookery and the other such kinds of domestic service—for different servants have different functions, some more honourable and some more menial, and as the proverb says,

Slave before slave and master before master.*

23 The slave's sciences then are all the various branches of domestic work; the master's science is the science of employing slaves—for the master's function consists not in acquiring slaves but in employing them. This science however is one of no particular importance or dignity: the master must know how to direct the tasks which the slave must know how to execute. Therefore all people rich enough to be able to avoid personal trouble have a steward who takes this office, while they themselves engage in politics or philosophy. The science of acquiring slaves is different both from their ownership and their direction—that is, the just acquiring of slaves, being like a sort of warfare or hunting. Let this then stand as our definition of slave and master.

III. But let us follow our normal method and investigate generally the nature of all kinds of property and the art of getting wealth, inasmuch as we saw the slave to be one division of property. In the first place therefore one might raise the question whether the art of getting wealth is the same as that of household management, or a part of it, or subsidiary to it; and if subsidiary, whether it is so in the sense in which

Business, or the supply of goods: its relation to household management.

31
ARISTOTLE

1256 a ὡς ἡ κερκιδοποική τῇ ὕφαντικῇ ἡ ὡς ἡ χαλκουργικῇ τῇ ἀνδριαντοποια (οὐ γὰρ ὡσαύτως ὑπηρετοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ὄργανα παρέχει, ἢ δὲ τὴν ὕλην· λέγω δὲ ὑλὴν τὸ ὑποκείμενον εἴς οὔ τι ἀποτελεῖται ἔργον, οἶον ὕφαντη μὲν ἔρια, ἀνδριαντοποιοῦ δὲ χαλκοῦ).

"Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐχ ἡ αὕτη ἡ οἰκονομική τῇ χρη- 2 ματιστικῇ, δήλον, τῆς μὲν γὰρ τὸ πορίσασθαι, τῆς δὲ τὸ χρῆσασθαί—τις γὰρ ἔσται ἡ χρησμομένη τοῖς κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν παρὰ τὴν οἰκονομικήν; πότερον δὲ μέρος αὕτης ἔστι τι ἡ ἐτέρων εἴδος, ἑχει διαμ- 15 φιασβήτησιν. εἰ γὰρ ἐστι τοῦ χρηματιστικοῦ θεωρήσαι πόθεν χρήματα καὶ κτήσεως ἔσται, . . . . ἡ δὲ κτήσις πολλὰ περείληφε μέρη καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος, ὡστε πρῶτον ἡ γεωργική πότερον μέρος τι τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἡ ἐτέρων τι γένος; καὶ καθόλου ἡ περὶ τὴν τροφήν ἐπιμέλεια καὶ κτήσεως.

20 Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴδη γε πολλὰ τροφῆς, διὸ καὶ βίοι 3 πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν ζῴων καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰσίν· οὐ γὰρ οἶον τε ζήν ἀνευ τροφῆς, ὡστε αἰ διαφοραι τῆς τροφῆς τοὺς βίους πεποιήκασι διαφέροντας τῶν ζῴων. τῶν τε γὰρ θηρίων τὰ μὲν ἁγελαία τὰ δὲ σποραδικά ἔστων, ὀποτέρως συμφέρει πρὸς 25 τὴν τροφήν αὐτοῖς διὰ τὸ τὰ μὲν ζωοφάγα τὰ δὲ καρποφάγα τὰ δὲ παμφάγα αὐτῶν εἶναι· ὡστε

1 lacunam ? Susemihl.
2 οἰκονομικῆς Garvey: χρηματιστικῆς codd.

* Some words seem to have fallen out in the Greek.
the art of making shuttles is subsidiary to the art of weaving or in that in which the art of casting bronze is subsidiary to the making of statues (for the two are not subsidiary in the same way, but shuttle-making supplies tools whereas bronze-founding supplies material—and by material I mean the substance out of which certain work is produced, for example fleeces are material for a weaver and bronze for a statuary).

Now it is clear that wealth-getting is not the same art as household management, for the function of the former is to provide and that of the latter to use—for what will be the art that will use the contents of the house if not the art of household management? but whether wealth-getting is a part of the art of household management, or a different sort of science, is open to debate. For if it is the function of the getter of wealth to study the source from which money and property are to be procured, . . . . But property and riches comprise many divisions; hence first of all is husbandry a division of the household art, or is it a different kind of science? and so in general of the superintendence and acquisition of articles of food.

But furthermore, there are many sorts of food, owing to which both animals and men have many modes of life; for it is impossible to live without food, so that the differences of food have made the lives of animals different. Among wild animals some are nomadic and others solitary, according to whichever habit is advantageous for their supply of food, because some of them are carnivorous, others graminivorous, and others eat all kinds of food; so that nature has differentiated
Perhaps ‘slave-raiding,’ cf. § 9, the appropriation of the ‘live tools’ that are a part of nature’s supplies; but Thucydides (i. 5) speaks of brigandage and piracy as common in earlier times, and as still deemed respectable professions in Northern Greece.
their modes of life to suit their facilities and their predilection for those articles of food. And as different kinds of animals by nature relish different sorts of food, and not each kind the same, even within the classes of carnivorous and graminivorous animals their modes of life differ from one another.

And similarly in the human race also, for there are wide differences of life among mankind. The idlest men are nomads (for to procure food from domesticated animals involves no toil or industry, but as it is necessary for the herds to move from place to place because of the pastures, the people themselves are forced to follow along with them, as though they were farming a live farm). Other men live from hunting, and different people from different kinds of hunting, for instance some from brigandage, others from fishing—these are those that dwell on the banks of lakes, marshes and rivers or of a sea suitable for fishing,—and others live on wild birds and animals. But the largest class of men live from the land and the fruits of cultivation. This then virtually completes the list of the various modes of life, those at least that have their industry sprung from themselves and do not procure their food by barter and trade—the lives of the herdsman, the husbandman, the brigand, the fisherman, the hunter. Others also live pleasantly by combining some of these pursuits, supplementing the more deficient life where it happens to fall short in regard to being self-sufficing: for instance, some combine a pastoral life and brigandage, others husbandry and hunting, and similarly with the others—they pass their time in such a combination of pursuits as their need compels. Property of this sort then seems to be
ARISTOTLE

1256 b

οὖν τοιαύτη κτήσις ὑπ’ αὐτῆς φαίνεται τῆς φύσεως διδομένη πᾶσιν, ἡσπέρ κατὰ τὴν πρῶτην γένεσιν 10 εἰθ’ός, οὕτω καὶ τελειωθεῖσιν. καὶ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γένεσιν τὰ μὲν συνεκτίκτει τῶν ζῴων τοσαύτην τροφὴν ὡς ἰκανὴν εἶναι μέχρις οὗ ἂν δύνηται αὐτὸ αὐτῷ πορίζειν τὸ γεννηθὲν, οἰον ὁσα σκωληκοτοκεῖ ὄσοι ζωοτοκεῖ, τοῖς γεννωμένοις ἔχει τροφὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς μέχρι των, 15 τῆς τοῦ καλομένου γάλακτος φύσιν. ὡστε ὅμως ἐν δήλον ὅτι καὶ γενομένως οὐήτευν τὰ τε φυτὰ τῶν ζῴων ἐνεκεν εἶναι καὶ τῆλα ζῷα τῶν ἀνθρώπων χάριν, τὰ μὲν ἡμερα καὶ διὰ τὴν χρήσιν καὶ διὰ τὴν τροφὴν, τῶν δ’ ἀγρίων εἰ μὴ πάντα ἄλλα τὰ γε πλέιστα τῆς τροφῆς καὶ ἄλλης βοηθείας ἐνεκεν, ἵνα καὶ ἔσθης καὶ ἄλλα ὀργάνα γίνηται εἷς αὐτῶν. εἰ δὲν ἡ φύσις μηθὲν μήτε ἀτελές ποιεῖ μήτε μάτην, ἀναγκαῖον τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐνεκεν αὐτὰ πάντα πεποιηκέναι τὴν φύσιν. διὸ καὶ ἡ πολεμικὴ φύσει 8 κτητικὴ πως ἐσται (ἡ γὰρ θηρευτικὴ μέρος αὐτῆς) ἢ δεῖ χρῆσθαι πρὸς τε τὰ θηρία καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὅσοι πεφυκότες ἀρχησθαι μὴ θέλουσιν, ὡς φύσει δικαίον τοῦτον ὀντα τῶν πόλεμων.

“Ἐν μὲν οὖν εἴδος κτητικῆς κατὰ φύσιν τῆς οἰκονομικῆς μέρος ἐστὶν, καθὸ2 δεῖ ἦτοι υπάρχειν ἡ πορίζειν αὐτὴν ὅπως υπάρχῃ ἄν ἐστὶ θησαυρισμὸς

1 γενομένως codd. cet.
2 καθὸ Bernays: δ codd., ὅτι (quia) Richards, ἀ (et ἄ δεί—ὑπάρχειν post 30 oikias tr.) Rassow.

* Rassow would transpose the clause (with a slight alteration) to give ἕ of the household art, that is, the acquisition of those goods capable of accumulation that are necessary for life and useful for the community of city and household, a
bestowed by nature herself upon all, as immediately upon their first coming into existence, so also when they have reached maturity. For even at the original coming into existence of the young some kinds of animals bring forth with them at birth enough sustenance to suffice until the offspring can provide for itself, for example all the species that bear their young in the form of larvae or in eggs. The viviparous species have sustenance for their offspring inside themselves for a certain period, the substance called milk. So that clearly we must suppose that nature also provides for them in a similar way when grown up, and that plants exist for the sake of animals and the other animals for the good of man, the domestic species both for his service and for his food, and if not all at all events most of the wild ones for the sake of his food and of his supplies of other kinds, in order that they may furnish him both with clothing and with other appliances. If therefore nature makes nothing without purpose or in vain, it follows that nature has made all the animals for the sake of men. Hence even the art of war will by nature be in a manner an art of acquisition (for the art of hunting is a part of it) that is properly employed both against wild animals and against such of mankind as though designed by nature for subjection refuse to submit to it, inasmuch as this warfare is by nature just.

One kind of acquisition therefore in the order of nature is a part of the household art, in accordance with which either there must be forthcoming or else that art must procure to be forthcoming a supply of which must be forthcoming or else the art must procure it to be forthcoming.
χρημάτων πρὸς ζωὴν ἀναγκαῖων καὶ χρησίμων
eis kouwniaw pòlewsw h oikías. kai eoukev o y' 9
álhovnos ploutos ek tou'ton eínav. h gar tῆs
touautēs kthēsews autárkeia pròs agathēn zōuh
ouk àpeiropos èstiv, wosteper Solonw fhesi pouíasas
ploutou h' oudèn térma pefasaménon vàndrasi keitai:

keitai gar wosteper kai taís ãllaí tékhnaí: oudèn
gar ðrganon àpeiropon oudeumàs èstè tékhnè ou'te
plhthei ou'te megeíthei, dè ploutos ðrganwv plhthòs
èstiv oikonomikaw kai politikàw. òti mév toíwv
èstì tîs kthikì kата fúson toîs oikonomoîs kai
toîs politikoîs, kai di' h' autiav, dhlav.

"Èstì de gévovs ãlllo kthikís òn maìstà kaloúsi, 10
kai dikaiou autò kàleiv, chrhmatiástikìn, di' hìn
oudèn dokei péras eìnav ploutou kai kthēsews: òn
ôs mia'n kai tîn autih tî lexeíseì polloi noimi-
çouvi diá tîn geiavnas: èstì d' ou'te h' autih tî
eirhmeÌnh ou'te pórrw èkeính. èstì ò' h' mév fûseî
h' ò' ou' fûseì autòv, allà di' èmpeirias tîwos kai
tèkhna gàíetai mállôn. lâbwmev de peri autîs
tîn árhìn èntedhèn: ekastou gar kthìmatos dîttî 11
h' chrhísis èstiv, àmfóterai de kath autò mév all'
oúx ðmoiws kath autò, all' h' mév oikeia h' d'
oúk oikeia toû prâgmatos, òdon ùpodeîmatos h'

* Fragment 13 l. 71.
of those goods, capable of accumulation, which are necessary for life and useful for the community of city or household. And it is of these goods that riches in the true sense at all events seem to consist. For the amount of such property sufficient in itself for a good life is not unlimited, as Solon says that it is in the verse.

But of riches no bound has been fixed or revealed to men; for a limit has been fixed, as with the other arts, since no tool belonging to any art is without a limit whether in number or in size, and riches are a collection of tools for the householder and the statesman. Therefore that there is a certain art of acquisition belonging in the order of nature to householders and to statesmen, and for what reason this is so, is clear.

But there is another kind of acquisition that is specially called wealth-getting, and that is so called with justice; and to this kind it is due that there is thought to be no limit to riches and property. Owing to its affinity to the art of acquisition of which we spoke, it is supposed by many people to be one and the same as that; and as a matter of fact, while it is not the same as the acquisition spoken of, it is not far removed from it. One of them is natural, the other is not natural, but carried on rather by means of a certain acquired skill or art. We may take our starting-point for its study from the following consideration: with every article of property there is a double way of using it; both uses are related to the article itself, but not related to it in the same manner—one is peculiar to the thing and the other is not peculiar to it. Take for example a shoe—there is its wear as a shoe and there is its use.
10 τε ὑπόδεις καὶ ἡ μεταβλητική · ἀμφότεραι γὰρ ὑποδήματος χρήσεις, καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἀλλαττόμενος τῷ δεομένῳ ὑποδήματος ἀντὶ νομίσματος ἢ τροφῆς χρήται τῷ ὑποδήματι ἢ ὑπόδημα, ἀλλ' οὗ τὴν οἰκείαν χρήσιν, οὐ γὰρ ἄλλαν ἐνεκεν γέγονεν. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων
15 κτημάτων· ἔτι γὰρ ἡ μεταβλητικὴ πάντων, ἀρξαμένη τὸ μὲν πρώτον ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν, τῷ τὰ μὲν πλείω τὰ δὲ ἐλάττω τῶν ἰκανῶν ἔχειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. ἢ καὶ δηλον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι φύσει τῆς 12 χρηματιστικῆς ἡ καπηλική· ὅσον γὰρ ἰκανὸν αὐτοῖς, ἀναγκαῖον ἢν ποιεῖσθαι τῇ ἄλλῃ ἐν μὲν οὖν
20 τῇ πρώτῃ κοινωνίᾳ (τούτῳ δ' ἐστὶν οἰκία) φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἔργον αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' ἑδή πλειόνων τῆς κοινωνίας οὐσίας. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐκοινώνουν πάντων, οἱ δὲ κεχωρισμένοι πολλῶν πάλιν καὶ ἔτέρων, ὃν κατὰ τὰς δεήσεις ἀναγκαίον ποιεῖσθαι τὰς μεταδόσεις, καθάπερ ἔτι πολλὰ
25 ποιεῖ καὶ τῶν βαρβαρικῶν ἑθῶν, κατὰ τὴν ἄλλα-
γήν· αὐτὰ γὰρ τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς αὐτὰ καταλλάτ-
tονται, ἐπὶ πλείων δ' οὕτων, οἶνον οἶνον πρὸς οἶτον διδόντες καὶ λαμβάνοντες, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων ἔκαστον. ἢ μὲν οὖν τοιαύτη μεταβλη-
13 τικὴ οὕτε παρὰ φύσιν οὕτε χρηματιστικῆς ἐστὶν
30 εἴδος οὐδέν, εἰς ἀναπληρώσιν γὰρ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν αὐταρκείας ἢν· ἐκ μὲν οὖν ταύτης ἐγένετ' ἐκείνη

1 χρηματιστικῆς | μεταβλητικῆς Bernays.
2 πλειόνων Richards: πλειόνων codd.
3 αὐτῶν Immisch: αὐτῶν codd.
4 κεχωρισμένων Immisch.
5 ἀναγκαῖον <ἡ> Coraes.
as an article of exchange; for both are ways of using a shoe, inasmuch as even he that barters a shoe for money or food with the customer that wants a shoe uses it as a shoe, though not for the use proper to a shoe, since shoes have not come into existence for the purpose of barter. And the same also holds good about the other articles of property; for all of them have a use in exchange related to them, which began in the first instance from the natural order of things, because men had more than enough of some things and less than enough of others. This consideration also shows that the art of trade is not by nature a part of the art of wealth-getting; for the practice of barter was necessary only so far as to satisfy men’s own needs. In the primary association therefore (I mean the household) there is no function for trade, but it only arises after the association has become more numerous. For the members of the primitive household used to share commodities that were all their own, whereas on the contrary a group divided into several households participated also in a number of commodities belonging to their neighbours, according to their needs for which they were forced to make their interchanges by way of barter, as also many barbarian tribes do still; for such tribes do not go beyond exchanging actual commodities for actual commodities, for example giving and taking wine for corn, and so with the various other things of the sort. Exchange on these lines therefore is not contrary to nature, nor is it any branch of the art of wealth-getting, for it existed for the replenishment of natural self-sufficiency; yet out of it the art of business

perhaps Aristotle wrote ‘of the art of exchange’: see note 1 on opposite page.
κατὰ λόγον, ξενικωτέρας γὰρ γενομένης τῆς
βοηθείας τῷ εἰσάγεσθαι ὃν ἐνδεείς καὶ ἐκπέμπειν
ὡν ἐπλεόναζον, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ή τοῦ νομίματος
ἐπορίσθη χρῆσις. οὐ γὰρ εὐβάστακτον ἐκαστὸν
τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἀναγκαίων. διὸ πρὸς τὰς ἀλλαγὰς
τοιούτοις τι συνέθεντο πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς διδόναι
καὶ λαμβάνειν ὃ τῶν χρησίμων αὐτὸ ὃν εἰχὲ τὴν
χρείαν εὑρετείριστον πρὸς τὸ ζῆν, ὅιον σώθηρος
καὶ ἄργυρος καὶ εἶ τοιοῦτον ἔτερον, τὸ μὲν πρῶ-
τον ἀπλῶς ὄρισθεν μεγέθει καὶ σταθμῷ, τὸ δὲ
τελευταῖον καὶ χαρακτῆρα ἐπιβαλλόντων ἵνα ἀπο-
λύση τῆς μετρήσεως αὐτοῦ· ο γὰρ χαρακτῆρ
ἐτέθη τοῦ ποσοῦ σημείου. πορισθέντος οὖν ἦδη
νομίσματος ἐκ τῆς ἀναγκαίας ἀλλαγῆς θάτερον
εἰδος τῆς χρηματιστικῆς ἐγένετο, τὸ καπηλικόν,
τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀπλῶς ὕσως γινόμενον, εἰτὰ δι’
ἐμπειρίας ἦδη τεχνικῶτερον, πόθεν καὶ πώς μετα-
βάλλομενον πλείστον πονησοὶ κέρδος. διὸ δοκεῖ
ἡ χρηματιστικὴ μάλιστα περὶ τὸ νόμισμα εἶναι,
καὶ ἔργον αὐτῆς τὸ δυνασθαι θεωρῆσαι πόθεν
ἔσται πλήθος,2 ποιητικὴ γὰρ3 εἶναι πλούτου4 καὶ
χρημάτων· καὶ γὰρ τὸν πλούτον πολλάκις τιθέασι
νομίσματος πλήθος, διὰ τὸ περὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν
χρηματιστικὴν καὶ τὴν καπηλικὴν. ὅτε δὲ πάλιν
λήρος εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ νόμισμα, καὶ νόμος παντάπασι
φύσει δ’ οὐθέν, ὅτι μεταθεμένων τε τῶν χρωμένων
οὐθένος ἄξιον, οὔτε χρήσιμον πρὸς οὐθέν τῶν

1 γενομένης Coraes: γινομένης codd.
2 πλήθος χρημάτων codd.: gloss. excisit Gifanius: πλήθος
αὐτοῦ? Richards.
3 γὰρ: δ’ Bernays.
4 πλούτου M, τοῦ πλούτου cet.
in due course arose. For when they had come to supply themselves more from abroad by importing things in which they were deficient and exporting those of which they had a surplus, the employment of money necessarily came to be devised. For the natural necessaries are not in every case readily portable; hence for the purpose of barter men made a mutual compact to give and accept some substance of such a sort as being itself a useful commodity was easy to handle in use for general life, iron for instance, silver and other metals, at the first stage defined merely by size and weight, but finally also by impressing on it a stamp in order that this might relieve them of having to measure it; for the stamp was put on as a token of the amount. So when currency had been now invented as an outcome of the necessary interchange of goods, there came into existence the other form of wealth-getting, trade, which at first no doubt went on in a simple form, but later became more highly organized as experience discovered the sources and methods of exchange that would cause most profit. Hence arises the idea that the art of wealth-getting deals specially with money, and that its function is to be able to discern from what source a large supply can be procured, as this art is supposed to be creative of wealth and riches; indeed wealth is often assumed to consist of a quantity of money, because money is the thing with which business and trade are employed. But at other times, on the contrary, it is thought that money is nonsense, and entirely a convention but by nature nothing, because when those who use it have changed the currency it is worth nothing, and because it is of no use for any of the necessary needs of life.
ARISTOTLE

1257 b

ἀναγκαίων ἐστὶ καὶ νομίσματος πλούτων πολλάκις ἀπορήσει τῆς ἀναγκαίας τροφῆς, καίτοι
15 ἀτοπον τοιοῦτον εἶναι πλούτον οὐ εὐπορῶν λιμῷ ἀπολεῖται, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν Μίδαν ἐκείνον μυθο-

λογοῦσι διὰ τῆν ἀπληστίαν τῆς εὐχῆς πάντων αὐτῶν γιγνομένων τῶν παρατιθεμένων χρυσῶν. διὸ ζη-
17 τούσιν ἑτερόν τι τῶν πλούτων καὶ τῆς χρηματιστικῆς, ὀρθῶς ζητοῦντες. ἐστὶ γὰρ ἑτέρα ἡ χρηματιστική
20 καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος ὁ κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ αὕτη μὲν οἰκονομική, ἡ δὲ κατηλκυκὴ, ποιητικὴ πλούτου

οὐ πάντως ἄλλα διὰ χρημάτων μεταβολῆς. καὶ δοκεῖ περὶ τὸ νόμισμα αὕτη εἶναι, τὸ γὰρ νόμισμα

στοιχεῖον καὶ πέρας τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἐστίν. καὶ ἀπειρος δὴ οὗτος ὁ πλοῦτος ὁ ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς
25 χρηματιστικῆς. ὃςπερ γὰρ ἡ ἰατρικὴ τοῦ ύμαίνειν εἰς ἀπειρον ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκάστη τῶν τεχνῶν τοῦ τέλους

εἰς ἀπειρον (ὅτι μάλιστα γὰρ ἐκεῖνο βουλοῦνται ποιεῖν), τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὸ τέλος οὐκ εἰς ἀπειρον

(πέρας γὰρ τὸ τέλος πάσαις), οὗτω καὶ ταύτης τῆς χρηματιστικῆς οὐκ ἐστὶ τοῦ τέλους πέρας,

30 τέλος δὲ ὁ τοιοῦτος πλοῦτος καὶ χρημάτων κτήσις. τῆς δὲ οἰκονομικῆς χρηματιστικῆς ἐστὶ πέρας. οὐ 18

γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἔργον. διὸ τῇ μὲν

φαίνεται ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάντως πλούτου πέρας, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν γιγνομένων ὄρωμεν ὁμοθείνων τοῦ-


a e.g. on a desert island.  b i.e. a trader cannot get too much of his goods, any more than a doctor can make his patient too healthy.
and a man well supplied with money may often be destitute of the bare necessities of subsistence, yet it is absurd that wealth should be of such a kind that a man may be well supplied with it and yet die of hunger, like the famous Midas in the story, when owing to the insatiable covetousness of his prayer all the viands served up to him turned into gold. Hence people seek for a different definition of riches and the art of getting wealth, and rightly; for natural wealth-getting and natural riches are different: natural wealth-getting belongs to household management, whereas the other kind belongs to trade, producing wealth not indiscriminately but by the method of exchanging goods. It is this art of wealth-getting that is thought to be concerned with money, for money is the first element and limit of commerce. And these riches, that are derived from this art of wealth-getting, are truly unlimited; for just as the art of medicine is without limit in respect of health, and each of the arts is without limit in respect of its end (for they desire to produce that in the highest degree possible), whereas they are not without limit as regards the means to their end (for with all of them the end is a limit to the means), so also this wealth-getting has no limit in respect of its end, and its end is riches and the acquisition of goods in the commercial sense. But the household branch of wealth-getting has a limit, inasmuch as the acquisition of money is not the function of household management. Hence from this point of view it appears necessary that there should be a limit to all riches, yet in actual fact we observe that the opposite takes place; for all
1257b ναντίον· πάντες γὰρ εἰς ἀπειρον αὐξουσιν οἱ χρηματιζόμενοι τὸ νόμισμα. αὐτίον δὲ τὸ σύνεγγυς αὐτῶν. ἐπαλλάττει γὰρ ἡ χρήσις τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὀφθα ἐκατέρας τῆς χρηματιστικῆς· τῆς γὰρ αὐτῆς ἐστὶ κτήσεως χρήσις, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ ταύτην, ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν ἔτερον τέλος, τῆς δ' ἡ αὐξήσις. ὥστε δοκεῖ τοιοῦτ' εἶναι τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἔργου, καὶ διατελοῦσιν ἡ σώζειν οἰόμενοι δειν ἡ αὐξὴν τὴν τοῦ νομίσματος οὐσίαν εἰς ἀπειρον. αὐτίον δὲ ταύτης τῆς διαβέσεως τό σπουδάζειν περὶ τοῦ ζήν ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸ εὐ ζήν' εἰς ἀπειρον οὖν ἐκείνης τῆς ἐπιθυμίας οὐσίας, καὶ τῶν ποιητικῶν ἀπειρῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν. ὅσοι δὲ καὶ τοῦ εὐ ζήν ἐπιβάλλονται, τὸ πρὸς τὰς ἀπολαῦσεις τὰς σωματικὰς ζητοῦσιν, ὥστ' ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτ' ἐν τῇ κτήσει φαίνεται ὑπάρχειν, πάσα ἡ διατριβὴ περὶ τῶν χρηματισμῶν ἐστὶ, καὶ τὸ ἐτερον εἶδος τῆς χρηματιστικῆς διὰ τοῦτ' ἐλήλυθεν. ἐν ὑπερβολῇ γὰρ οὕσης τῆς ἀπολαύσεως, τῆς τῆς ἀπολαυστικῆς ὑπερβολῆς ποιητικῆς ζητοῦσιν· κἂν μὴ διὰ τῆς χρηματιστικῆς δύνανται πορίζειν, δι' ἀλλὰς αὐτίας τοῦτο πειρώνται, ἐκάστη χρώμενοι τῶν δυνάμεων οὐ κατὰ φύσιν. ἀνδρείας γὰρ οὐ 20 χρήματα ποιεῖν ἑστὶν ἀλλὰ θάρρος, οὐδὲ στρατηγικῆς καὶ ἱστρικῆς, ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν νίκην τῆς δ' ύγίειαν. οἱ δὲ πάσας ποιοῦσι χρηματιστικῶς, ὥσ

1 ἐκατέρας Ar.: -τέρα cett.
2 κτήσεως χρήσις Goettling: χρήσεως κτήσις codd.
3 ὑπάρχον Coraes.
men engaged in wealth-getting try to increase their money to an unlimited amount. The reason of this is the close affinity of the two branches of the art of business. Their common ground is that the thing that each makes use of is the same; they use the same property, although not in the same way—the one has another end in view, the aim of the other is the increase of the property. Consequently some people suppose that it is the function of household management to increase property, and they are continually under the idea that it is their duty to be either safeguarding their substance in money or increasing it to an unlimited amount. The cause of this state of mind is that their interests are set upon life but not upon the good life; as therefore the desire for life is unlimited, they also desire without limit the means productive of life. And even those who fix their aim on the good life seek the good life as measured by bodily enjoyments, so that inasmuch as this also seems to be found in the possession of property, all their energies are occupied in the business of getting wealth; and owing to this the second kind of the art of wealth-getting has arisen. For as their enjoyment is in excess, they try to discover the art that is productive of enjoyable excess; and if they cannot procure it by the art of wealth-getting, they try to do so by some other means, employing each of the faculties in an unnatural way. For it is not the function of courage to produce wealth, but to inspire daring; nor is it the function of the military art nor of the medical art, but it belongs to the former to bring victory and to the latter to cause health. Yet these people make all these faculties means for the business of providing wealth, in the
τούτο τέλος ὅν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ τέλος ἀπαντα δέον ἀπαντᾶν.

15 Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς τε μὴ ἀναγκαίας χρηματιστικῆς, καὶ τίς καὶ δι' αὐτίαν τίνα ἐν χρεία ἐσμέν αὐτῆς, εἰρῆται, καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀναγκαίας, ὅτι ἔτερα μὲν αὐτῆς οἰκονομικῆ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἢ περὶ τὴν τροφῆν, οὖχ ὥσπερ αὐτὴ ἀπειρο ἀλλ' ἔχουσα ὀρον.

Δήλον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀποροφυνον ἐξ ἀρχῆς, πότερον 21 τοῦ οἰκονομικοῦ καὶ πολιτικοῦ ἐστίν ἡ χρηματιστικῆ ἡ οὐ, ἀλλὰ δεῖ τούτο μὲν ὑπάρχειν (ὡσπερ γὰρ καὶ ἀνθρώπως οὐ ποιεῖ ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀλλὰ λαβοῦσα παρὰ τῆς φύσεως χρῆται αὐτοῖς, οὔτω καὶ τροφῆν 2 τῆς φύσιν νεὶ παραδοῦναι γῆς ἡ θάλατ-25 ταν ἡ ἄλλο τι), ἐκ δὲ τοὺτων ὡς δεῖ ταῦτα διαθείναι προσήκει τοῖς οἰκονόμοις. οὖ γὰρ τῆς υφαντικῆς ἐρια ποιήσαι ἀλλὰ χρήσασθαι αὐτοῖς, καὶ γνώναι δὲ τὸ ποιὸν χρῆστον καὶ ἐπιτηδεῖον ἡ φαύλου καὶ ἀνεπιτηδεῖον. καὶ γὰρ ἀπορήσεων ἢν τις διὰ τι 22 ἡ μὲν χρηματιστικὴ μόριον τῆς οἰκονομίας ἡ δ' ιατρικῆ ὡς μόριον, καίτοι δεῖ ὑγιαίνειν τοὺς κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν, ὥσπερ ζῆν ἡ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἀναγκαῖων. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστι μὲν ὡς τοῦ οἰκονόμου καὶ τοῦ ἄρχοντος καὶ περὶ υγείας ιδεῖν, ἔστι δ' ὡς ὦ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ιατροῦ, οὔτω καὶ περὶ τῶν χρημάτων ἐστι μὲν ὡς

1 αὐτὴ Welldon: αὐτὴ codd.
2 <πρὸς> τροφῆν ? Richards.
3 <ἐστίν,> ἐστι Welldon.

a See c. iii. § 1.
belief that wealth is the end and that everything must conspire to the end.

We have therefore discussed both the unnecessary branch of wealth-getting, defining it and also explaining the cause why we require it, and the necessary branch, showing that this branch which has to do with food is different from the unnecessary branch and is by nature a part of household management, not being like that branch unlimited but having a limit.

21 And we can also see the answer to the question raised at the beginning, a whether the art of wealth-getting belongs to the householder and the statesman, or whether on the contrary supplies ought to be provided already, since just as statesmanship does not create human beings but having received them from nature makes use of them, so also it is the business of nature to bestow food by bestowing land or sea or something else, while the task of the householder is, starting with these supplies given, to dispose of them in the proper way. For it does not belong to the art of weaving to make fleeces, but to use them, and also to know what sort of fleece is good and suitable or bad and unsuitable. Otherwise the question might be raised, why the getting of wealth is a part of the household art whereas the art of medicine is not a part of it, although the members of the household ought to be healthy, just as they must be alive or fulfil any of the other essential conditions. But inasmuch as although in a way it does belong to the householder and the ruler to see even to health, yet in a way it does not belong to them but to the physician, so also with regard to wealth, although in a way it is the affair of the house-
ARISTOTLE

1258 a
tou oikonomía, esti\textsuperscript{1} δ' ὡς οὖ, ἄλλα τῆς ὑπηρετικῆς.
85 μάλιστα δὲ, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, δεῖ φύσει
toúto ὑπάρχειν. φύσεως γάρ ἔστιν ἔργον τροφῆν
τῷ γεννηθέντι παρέχειν. παντὶ γάρ, ἐξ οὗ γίνεται,
tροφὴ τῷ λειπόμενον ἐστίν. διὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶν
ἡ χρηματιστικὴ πάσων ἀπὸ τῶν καρπῶν καὶ τῶν
ζῴων.

Διπλῆς δ' οὕσης αὐτῆς, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, καὶ τῆς 23
40 μὲν κατηλυκῆς τῆς δ' οἰκονομικῆς, καὶ ταύτης μὲν
1258 b ἀναγκαίας καὶ ἐπαυνομένης, τῆς δὲ μεταβλητικῆς
ψευγομένης δικαίως (οὐ γάρ κατὰ φύσιν ἄλλο ἀπ'
ἄλληλων ἐστίν), εὐλογώτατα μισεῖται ἡ ἀβολο-
στατικὴ διὰ τὸ ἀπ'\textsuperscript{2} αὐτοῦ τοῦ νομίσματος εἶναι
τὴν κτήσιν καὶ οὐκ ἐφ' ὅπερ ἐπορίσθη· μεταβολῆς
5 γὰρ ἐγένετο χάριν, δὲ τὸκος αὐτῷ ποιεῖ πλέον
(ὅθεν καὶ τούνομα τούτῳ εἰληφεν· ὅμως γὰρ τὰ
tικτόμενα τοῖς γεννῶσιν αὐτὰ ἐστὶν, δὲ τὸκος
γίνεται νόμισμα ἐκ νομίσματος): ὡστε καὶ μά-
λιστα παρὰ φύσιν οὕτως τῶν χρηματισμῶν ἐστίν.

IV. Ἔστε ὑπὸ τὸ πρὸς τὴν γνώσιν διωρίκαμεν 1
10 ἰκανῶς, τὰ πρὸς τὴν χρήσιν δεῖ διελθεῖν· πάντα δὲ
τὰ τοιαῦτα τὴν μὲν θεωρίαν ἐλεύθερον ἔχει, τὴν δ' ἐμπειρίαν ἀναγκαίαν. ἔστι δὲ τῆς χρηματιστικῆς
μέρης χρήσιμα τὸ περὶ τὰ κτήματα\textsuperscript{3} ἐμπειρον εἶναι,
ποῖα λυσιτελεστάτα καὶ ποῦ καὶ πῶς, οἶον ἢππων
κτῆσις ποία τις ἢ βοῶν ἢ προβάτων, ὅμως δὲ

\textsuperscript{1} <ἐστὶν>, ἐστι Welldon.
\textsuperscript{2} ὑπ' Bekker: ἐπ' Jackson.
\textsuperscript{3} κτήσι Bernays.

\textsuperscript{a} i.e. animals are made of earth and water and live on the
products of earth and water.

50
HOLDER, in a way it is not, but is a matter for the subsidiary art. But best of all, as has been said before, this provision ought to be made in advance by nature. For it is the work of nature to supply nourishment for her offspring, since every creature has for nourishment the residue of the substance from which it springs. Hence the business of drawing provision from the fruits of the soil and from animals is natural to all.

23 But, as we said, this art is twofold, one branch being of the nature of trade while the other belongs to the household art; and the latter branch is necessary and in good esteem, but the branch connected with exchange is justly discredited (for it is not in accordance with nature, but involves men's taking things from one another). As this is so, usury is most reasonably hated, because its gain comes from money itself and not from that for the sake of which money was invented. For money was brought into existence for the purpose of exchange, but interest increases the amount of the money itself (and this is the actual origin of the Greek word: offspring resembles parent, and interest is money born of money); consequently this form of the business of getting wealth is of all forms the most contrary to nature.

IV. And since we have adequately defined the scientific side of the subject, we ought to discuss it from the point of view of practice; although, whereas the theory of such matters is a liberal study, the practical pursuit of them is narrowing. The practically useful branches of the art of wealth-getting are first, an expert knowledge of stock, what breeds are most profitable and in what localities and under what conditions, for instance what particular stock in


ARISTOTLE

1258 b 15 καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ζωῆς (δεῖ γὰρ ἐμπειρον ϝίναι πρὸς ἀλληλά τε τοῦτων τίνα λυσιτελέστατα, καὶ ποῦ ἐν ποῖοις τόποις, ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐν ἀλλαίς εὑδηνεὶ χώραις). εἶτα περὶ γεωργίας, καὶ ταύτης ἦδη ψυλῆς τε καὶ πεφυτευμένης, καὶ μελιτουργίας, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
20 ζωῶν τῶν πλωτῶν ἢ πτηνῶν ἢ δρ σων ἐστὶν τυγχάνειν θεοθείας. τῆς μὲν οὖν οἰκειότατης χρη- 2 ματιστικῆς ταῦτα μόρια καὶ πρῶτα1 τῆς δὲ μετα-
βλητικῆς μέγιστον μὲν ἐμπορία (καὶ ταύτης μέρη τρία, ναυκληρία φορτηγία παράστασις. διαφέρει δὲ
toútwν ἐτερα ἐτέρων τῷ τὰ μὲν ἀσφαλέστερα εἶναι
ta δὲ πλείων πορίζειν τὴν ἐπικαρπίαν), δεύτερον δὲ
tοκισμός, τρίτον δὲ μισθαρία (ταύτης δ’ ἡ μὲν
tῶν βαναύσων τεχνῶν,2 ἢ δ’ τῶν ἀτέχνων καὶ τῷ
σώματι μόνῳ χρησίμων) | τρίτον δὲ εἰδος χρημα-
tιστικῆς μεταξύ ταύτης καί τῆς πρώτης (ἐχει γὰρ
καὶ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν τι μέρος καὶ τῆς μεταβλητικῆς),
30 οὐσα3 ἀπὸ γῆς καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ γῆς γινομένων ἀκάρτων
μὲν χρησίμων δὲ, οἷον υλοτομία4 τε καὶ πάσα
μεταλλευτικῆ. αὕτη δὲ πολλὰ ἣδη περιείληφε γένη,
pολλὰ γὰρ εἰδή τῶν ἐκ γῆς μεταλλευμένων ἐστίν.
εἰσὶ δὲ5 τεχνικῶταται μὲν τῶν ἐργασίων ὅπου 3
ἐλάχιστον τῆς τύχης, βαναυσόταται δ’ ἐν αἷς τὰ

1 πρώτης (cf. 25) ? Richards. 2 τεχνιτῶν Vermehren.
3 οὐσα Bernays. 4 ἡ λατομία Thomas Aquinas.
5 εἰσὶ δὲ—ἄρετῆς post 39 ἐνδιατριβέν codd. : tr. (et 33 δὴ pro δὲ) Montecatino auctore Susemihl.

ἀ βαναυσός (said to be from βαῖνως ‘furnace,’ ἀσω ‘to dry’),
‘artisan’ (ranged with farmers, traders, and labourers, as
forming the common people 1321 a 6); it acquires the senses
of ‘cramped in body’ (1341 a 7) and ‘vulgar in taste’
(1337 b 8).

b A very probable variant gives ‘the quarrying of stone.’

52
horses or cattle or sheep, and similarly of the other animals also (for the farmer must be an expert as to which of these animals are most profitable compared with one another, and also as to what breeds are most profitable on what sorts of land, since different breeds thrive in different places); secondly, the subject of agriculture, and this again is divided into corn-growing and fruit-farming; also bee-keeping, and the breeding of the other creatures finned and feathered which can be used to furnish supplies.

2 These then are the branches and primary parts of wealth-getting in the most proper sense. Of the kind that deals with exchange, the largest branch is commerce (which has three departments, ship-owning, transport and marketing: these departments differ from each other in the fact that some are safer and others carry larger profits); the second branch is money-lending, and the third labour for hire, one department of which is that of the mechanic arts and the other that of unskilled labourers who are useful only for bodily service. And there is a third form of wealth-getting that lies between the latter and the one placed first, since it possesses an element both of natural wealth-getting and of the sort that employs exchange; it deals with all the commodities that are obtained from the earth and from those fruitless but useful things that come from the earth—examples are the felling of timber and all sorts of mining; and of mining itself there are many classes, since there are many sorts of metals obtained out of the earth. The most scientific of these industries are those which involve the smallest element of chance, the most mechanic those in which

\[\text{\^{c}}\] In the mss. this sentence follows the next one.
Otherwise unknown.

b Also mentioned by Varro and Pliny.

c The author of the Second Book of the pseudo-Aristotelian Oeconomica seems to have taken this hint.

d The founder of Greek philosophy and mathematics, and one of the Seven Sages, 6th-5th cent. B.C.
the operatives undergo the greatest amount of bodily degradation, the most servile those in which the most uses are made of the body, and the most ignoble those in which there is the least requirement of virtue as an accessory. But while we have even now given a general description of these various branches, yet a detailed and particular account of them, though useful for the practice of the industries, would be illiberal as a subject of prolonged study. There are books on these subjects by certain authors, for example Charetides a of Paros and Apollodorus b of Lemnos have written about both agriculture and fruit-farming, and similarly others also on other topics, so these subjects may be studied from these authors by anybody concerned to do so; but in addition a collection ought also to be made c of the scattered accounts of methods that have brought success in business to certain individuals. All these methods are serviceable for those who value wealth-getting, for example the plan of Thales d of Miletus, which is a device for the business of getting wealth, but which, though it is attributed to him because of his wisdom, is really of universal application. Thales, so the story goes, because of his poverty was taunted with the uselessness of philosophy; but from his knowledge of astronomy he had observed while it was still winter that there was going to be a large crop of olives, so he raised a small sum of money and paid round deposits for the whole of the olive-presses in Miletus and Chios, which he hired at a low rent as nobody was running him up; and when the season arrived, there was a sudden demand for a number of presses at the same time, and by letting them out on what terms he liked he realized a large sum of
The talent was about £240.

Dionysius the elder, tyrant of Syracuse 405–367 B.C.

Cf. Thucydides οἱ δ’ οὐκέτι ξεμεινὰν ἄλλα ...
money, so proving that it is easy for philosophers to be rich if they choose, but this is not what they care about. Thales then is reported to have thus displayed his wisdom, but as a matter of fact this device of taking an opportunity to secure a monopoly is a universal principle of business; hence even some states have recourse to this plan as a method of raising revenue when short of funds: they introduce a monopoly of marketable goods. There was a man in Sicily who used a sum of money deposited with him to buy up all the iron from the iron foundries, and afterwards when the dealers came from the trading-centres he was the only seller, though he did not greatly raise the price, but all the same he made a profit of a hundred talents on his capital of fifty. When Dionysius came to know of it he ordered the man to take his money with him but clear out of Syracuse on the spot, since he was inventing means of profit detrimental to the tyrant's own affairs. Yet really this device is the same as the discovery of Thales, for both men alike contrived to secure themselves a monopoly. An acquaintance with these devices is also serviceable for statesmen, for many states need financial aid and modes of revenue like those described, just as a household may, but in greater degree; hence some statesmen even devote their political activity exclusively to finance.

V. And since, as we saw, the science of household management has three divisions, one the relation of master to slave, of which we have spoken before, one the paternal relation, and the third the conjugal—

a C. ii. init.  
b C. iii. fin., iv.  
c C. iii. init.  
1 The construction of the sentence is interrupted, and never completed.
ARISTOTLE

1259 a

40 ἀρχεῖν καὶ τέκνων (ὡς ἐλευθέρων μὲν ἀμφοῖν, οὐ 2
1259 b τόν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἀλλὰ γυναικὸς μὲν
πολιτικῶς, τέκνων δὲ βασιλικῶς). τὸ τε γὰρ ἄρρεν
φύσει τοῦ θήλεος ἡγεμονικῶτερον (εἰ μή που συν-
έστηκε παρὰ φύσιν) καὶ τὸ πρεσβύτερον καὶ τέλειον
tοῦ νεωτέρου καὶ ἄτελοῦς. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς πολι-
tικαῖς ἁρχαῖς ταῖς πλείσταις μεταβάλλει τὸ ἁρχὸν
καὶ τὸ ἁρχόμενον (ἕξ ίσον γὰρ εἶναι βούλεται τῇ
φύσιν καὶ διαφέρειν μηθεῖν), ὅμως δὲ ὅταν τὸ μὲν
ἀρχῆ τὸ δ᾿ ἁρχήταί ξητεὶ διαφορᾶν εἶναι καὶ
σχήμασαι καὶ λόγοις καὶ τιμαῖς, ὁσπερ καὶ Ἡμ. Ἄμασις
eἰπε τὸν περὶ τοῦ ποδανιπτήρος λόγον: ὃ δ᾿ ἄρρεν
10 ἤεὶ πρὸς τὸ θῆλυ τούτων ἔχει τὸν τρόπον. ἥ δὲ
τῶν τέκνων ἁρχὴ βασιλικὴ: τὸ γὰρ γεννήσαν καὶ
κατὰ φιλίαν ἁρχὸν καὶ κατὰ πρεσβείαν ἐστὶν, ὁπερ
ἔστι βασιλικῆς εἴδος ἁρχῆς (διὸ καλῶς Ὡμηρος
tὸν Δία προσηγόρευσεν εἰπὼν

πατὴρ ἄνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε

15 τὸν βασιλέα τούτων ἄπαντων). φύσει γὰρ τὸν
βασιλέα διαφέρειν μὲν δὲ, τῷ γένει δ᾿ εἶναι τὸν
αὐτὸν· ὁπερ πέτονθε τὸ πρεσβύτερον πρὸς τὸ
νεωτέρον καὶ δ᾿ γεννήσας πρὸς τὸ τέκνον.

Φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι πλείων ἡ σπουδὴ τῆς οἰκο-
νομίας περὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἡ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἁγιῶν
20 κτήσεως καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς τούτων ἡ περὶ τῆν
τῆς κτήσεως, ὅν καλοῦμεν πλοῦτον, καὶ τῶν
ἐλευθέρων μᾶλλον ἡ δοῦλων.

---
a i.e. of the free and equal, 1255 b 20.
b Herodotus ii. 172. Amasis king of Egypt was despised
by his subjects for his low birth, so he had a statue made out
of a gold foot-bath and set it up for them to worship, after-
wards explaining to them its lowly origin.
c Il. i. 544.
for it is a part of the household science to rule over wife and children (over both as over freemen, yet not with the same mode of government, but over the wife to exercise republican government and over the children monarchical); for the male is by nature better fitted to command than the female (except in some cases where their union has been formed contrary to nature) and the older and fully developed person than the younger and immature. It is true that in most cases of republican government the ruler and the ruled interchange in turn (for they tend to be on an equal level in their nature and to have no difference at all), although nevertheless during the period when one is ruler and the other ruled they seek to have a distinction by means of insignia and titles and honours, just as Amasis made his speech about the foot-bath; but the male stands in this relationship to the female continuously. The rule of the father over the children on the other hand is that of a king; for the male parent is the ruler in virtue both of affection and of seniority, which is characteristic of royal government (and therefore Homer finely designated Zeus by the words ‘father of men and gods,’ as the king of them all). For though in nature the king must be superior, in race he should be the same as his subjects, and this is the position of the elder in relation to the younger and of the father in relation to the child.

It is clear then that household management takes more interest in the human members of the household than in its inanimate property, and in the excellence of these than in that of its property, which we style riches, and more in that of its free members than in that of slaves.
Πρώτον μὲν οὖν περὶ δούλων ἀπορήσειν ἃς τις, πότερον ἐστὶν ἁρετή τις δούλου παρὰ τὰς ὀργανικὰς καὶ διακονικὰς ἀλλή τιμωσέρα τοῦτων, οἷον σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ δυκαίοσύνη καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν τῶν τοιούτων ἔξεσθο, ἢ οὐκ ἐστὶν οὐδεμία παρὰ τὰς σωματικὰς ὑπηρεσίας. ἔχει γὰρ ἀπορίαν ἀμφοτέρως. εἰτε γὰρ ἐστὶ, τί διοίσουσι τῶν ἔλευ-θέρων; εἰτε μὴ ἐστὶν, ὅτεν ἁνθρώπων καὶ λόγου κοινωνούντων ἀτοπον. σχεδὸν δὲ ταύτὸν ἐστὶ τὸ 4

ζητοῦμενον καὶ περὶ γυναικὸς καὶ παιδός, πότερα καὶ τοιούτων εἰῶν ἁρεταί, καὶ δεὶ τὴν γυναίκα εἶναι σωφρόνα καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ δικαιαίαν, καὶ παῖς ἐστὶ καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ σώφρων, ὥστε καὶ καθόλου δὴ τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν ἐπισκεπτέον περὶ ἄρχομένου φύσει καὶ ἄρχοντος, πότερον ἡ αὐτὴ ἁρετὴ ἡ ἐτέρα. εἰ μὲν γὰρ δεὶ ἀμφοτέρους μετέχειν καλοκαγάθιας, διὰ τὶ τὸν μὲν ἁρχεῖν δέοι ἂν τὸν δὲ ἁρχεσθαι καθάπαξ; οὔδε γὰρ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἦττον οἷον τε διαφέρειν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἁρχεσθαι καὶ ἁρχεῖν εἶδει διαφέρει, τὸ δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ ἦττον οὐδέν. εἰ δὲ τὸν 5 μὲν δεὶ τὸν δὲ μὴ, θαυμαστόν· εἰτε γὰρ ὁ ἁρχων μὴ ἐσται σώφρων καὶ δίκαιος, πῶς ἁρξεί καλῶς;

1260 a εἶθ’ ὁ ἁρχόμενος, πῶς ἁρχ吆σται καλῶς; ἀκόλαστος γὰρ ὡν καὶ δειλὸς οὐθὲν ποιῆσαι τῶν προσηκόντων. φανερὸν τοῖνυν ὅτι ἀνάγκη μὲν μετέχειν ἀμφοτέρους ἁρετῆς, ταύτης δὲ εἶναι διαφοράς (ὡσπερ καὶ τῶν φύσει ἁρχομένων). 2

1 καὶ ἑκάστῃ? Spengel.
2 ὡσπερ—ἁρχομένων interpolatum ed. (φύσει ἁρχόντων καὶ ἁρχομένων cod. Oxon. marg.).

a Καλοκαγάθος, ‘fine gentleman,’ connotes social as well as moral distinction.
60
First of all then as to slaves the difficulty might be raised, does a slave possess any other excellence, besides his merits as a tool and a servant, more valuable than these, for instance temperance, courage, justice and any of the other moral virtues, or has he no excellence beside his bodily service? For either way there is difficulty; if slaves do possess moral virtue, wherein will they differ from freemen? or if they do not, this is strange, as they are human beings and participate in reason. And nearly the same is the question also raised about the woman and the child: have they too virtues, and ought a woman to be temperate, brave and just, and can a child be intemperate or temperate, or not? This point therefore requires general consideration in relation to natural ruler and subject: is virtue the same for ruler and ruled, or different? If it is proper for both to partake in nobility of character, how could it be proper for the one to rule and the other to be ruled unconditionally? we cannot say that the difference is to be one of degree, for ruling and being ruled differ in kind, and difference of degree is not a difference in kind at all. Whereas if on the contrary it is proper for the one to have moral nobility but not for the other, this is surprising. For if the ruler is not temperate and just, how will he rule well? And if the ruled, how will he obey well? If intemperate and cowardly he will not perform any of the duties of his position. It is evident therefore that both must possess virtue, but that there are differences in their virtue (as also there are differences between those who are by nature ruled). And of this we

6 This clause seems to have been interpolated; one ms. has a marginal correction, ‘by nature rulers and ruled.’
5 καὶ τοῦτο εὐθὺς ὑφήγηται περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς· ἐν
tαύτῃ γάρ ἐστὶ φύσει τὸ μὲν ἄρχον τὸ δὲ ἄρχο-
μενον, ὅπειραν φαμὲν εἶναι ἄρετήν, ὅπως τοῦ
λόγου ἔχοντος καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου. δὴ λοιπὸν τοῖς ὦτὶ 6
τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπον ἐχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ὥστε
φύσει πλείστω τὰ ἄρχοντα καὶ ἄρχομενα. ἄλλον γὰρ
τρόπον τὸ ἑλεύθερον τοῦ δούλου ἄρχει καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν
τοῦ θῆλεος καὶ ἀνήρ παιδός. καὶ πᾶσιν ἐνυπάρχει
μὲν τὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλ’ ἐνυπάρχει δια-
φερόντως: ὁ μὲν γὰρ δούλος ὅλως οὐκ ἔχει τὸ
βουλευτικόν, τὸ δὲ θήλη ἔχει μὲν, ἀλλ’ ἀκυρον, ὃ
dὲ παῖς ἔχει μὲν, ἀλλ’ ἀτελέσ. διὸ 7 τὸν μὲν 7
ἀρχοντα τελέαν ἐχεῖν δεὶ τὴν διανοητικὴν ἀρετήν
(τὸ γὰρ ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς τοῦ ἀρχιτέκτων, ὅ δὲ
λόγος ἄρχιτέκτων), τῶν δ’ ἄλλων ἐκαστὸν οὖν
ἐπιβάλλει αὐτοῖς. ὁμοίως τοῖς ἀναγκαίως ἔχειν
καὶ περὶ τὰς ἥθικὰς ἀρετὰς ὑποληπτέον, δεῖν μὲν
μετέχειν πάντας, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀλλ’
οὖν ἐκάστω πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ ἔργον. ὥστε φανε-
ρον ὅτι ἐστὶν ἥθικὴ ἀρετή τῶν εἰρημένων πάντων,
καὶ οὐχ ἂν αὐτή σωφροσύνη γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρός
οὐδ’ ἄνδρεια καὶ δικαίωσιν, καθάπερ ὅτε Σω-
κράτης, ἀλλ’ ἂν μὲν ἄρχικὴ ἄνδρεια, ἢ δ’ ὑπηρετική,
ὁμοίως δ’ ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας. δὴ λοιπὸν ἐν τούτῳ
20 καὶ κατὰ μέρος μᾶλλον ἐπισκοποῦσιν· καθόλου γὰρ
οἱ λέγοντες ἐξαπατῶσιν εἰσύνετο ὅτι τὸ εἰ ἔχειν

1 πλείω τὰ Ramus: τὰ πλείω codd.
2 διὸ—αὐτοῖς hic Thurot, infra post τὸ αὐτόν ἔργον codd.
3 διανοητικὴ Thurot: ἥθικη codd.
4 αὐτοῖς <ἰκανῶν> ? Richards.

* In the mss. this sentence follows the next one, 'We must suppose—function,' and begins 'Hence the ruler must possess moral virtue.'
straightway find an indication in connexion with the soul; for the soul by nature contains a part that rules and a part that is ruled, to which we assign different virtues, that is, the virtue of the rational and that of the irrational. It is clear then that the case is the same also with the other instances of ruler and ruled. Hence there are by nature various classes of rulers and ruled. For the free rules the slave, the male the female, and the man the child in a different way. And all possess the various parts of the soul, but possess them in different ways; for the slave has not got the deliberative part at all, and the female has it, but without full authority, while the child has it, but in an undeveloped form. Hence the ruler must possess intellectual virtue in completeness (for any work, taken absolutely, belongs to the master-craftsman, and rational principle is a master-craftsman); while each of the other parties must have that share of this virtue which is appropriate to them. We must suppose therefore that the same necessarily holds good of the moral virtues: all must partake of them, but not in the same way, but in such measure as is proper to each in relation to his own function. Hence it is manifest that all the persons mentioned have a moral virtue of their own, and that the temperance of a woman and that of a man are not the same, nor their courage and justice, as Socrates thought, but the one is the courage of command, and the other that of subordination, and the case is similar with the other virtues. And this is also clear when we examine the matter more in detail, for it is misleading to give a general definition of virtue, as some do, who say that virtue is being in good condition as regards the

* Plato, *Meno* 74 b ff.*
1260 a 
tην ψυχήν ἀρετή ἡ τὸ ὀρθοπραγεῖν ἡ τι τῶν
tοιούτων· πολὺ γὰρ ἁμενὼν λέγουσιν οἱ ἔξαριθ-
μοῦντες τὰς ἀρετὰς, ὑσπερ Γοργίας, τῶν οὕτως
ὄριζομένων. διὸ δὲι, ὑσπερ ὁ σοικῆς ἐἰρηκε περὶ
30 γυναίκος, οὕτω νομίζειν ἕχειν περὶ πάντων·

γυναῖκι κόσμον ἡ σιγῇ φέρει—

ἀλλ' ἄνδρι οὐκέτι τοῦτο. ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ παῖς ἄτελής, 9
δῆλον ὅτι τούτω μὲν καὶ ἡ ἀρετή οὐκ αὐτοῦ πρὸς
αὐτὸν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν τέλεον καὶ τὸν ἠγού-
μενον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δούλου πρὸς δεσπότην.

"Εθεμεν δὲ πρὸς τάναγκαια χρήσμον εἴναι τὸν
35 δούλουν, ὡστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἀρετῆς δεῖται μικράς,
καὶ τοσαύτης ὅπως μήτε δι' ἀκολασίαν μήτε διὰ
δειλίαν ἐλλεῖψει τῶν ἔργων. (ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις, 10
tὸ νῦν εἰρημένον εἰ ἄλληθες, ἀρα καὶ τοὺς τεχνίτας
δεῖσει ἔχειν ἀρετήν· πολλάκις γὰρ δι' ἀκολασίαν
ἐλλεῖπονοι τῶν ἔργων. ἡ διαφέρει τοῦτο πλεῖότων;

40 ὁ μὲν γὰρ δούλος κοινωνὸς ζωῆς, ὁ δὲ πορρώτερον,
καὶ τοσοῦτον ἐπιβάλλει ἀρετῆς ὅσον περ καὶ

1260 b δούλειας: ὁ γὰρ βάναυσος τεχνίτης ἀφωρισμένην
tινὰ ἔχει δούλειαν, καὶ ὁ μὲν δούλος τῶν φύσει,
σκυτοτόμος δ' οὐθεὶς οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνιτῶν.]

5 φανερὸν τοῖς ὅτι τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς αὐτόν εἶναι 11
dei τῷ δούλῳ τὸν δεσπότην, ἀλλ' οὐ' τὴν θήδαι-

5 σκαλικὴν ἔχοντα τῶν ἔργων δεσποτικὴν. διὸ

1 oὐχ <ή> Richards.

a i.e. in Ἐμνο (vide § 7 above), where this sophist
figures as a character in the dialogue; see also p. 178, note b.
b Sophocles, Ajax 293.
c i.e. his excellences as an artisan are the qualities of a
subordinate (his virtues as a human being, apart from his
trade, are not considered).
soul or acting uprightly or the like; those who enumerate the virtues of different persons separately, as Gorgias does, are much more correct than those who define virtue in that way. Hence we must hold that all of these persons have their appropriate virtues, as the poet said of woman:

Silence gives grace to woman—though that is not the case likewise with a man.

Also the child is not completely developed, so that manifestly his virtue also is not personal to himself, but relative to the fully developed being, that is, the person in authority over him. And similarly the slave's virtue also is in relation to the master.

And we laid it down that the slave is serviceable for the mere necessaries of life, so that clearly he needs only a small amount of virtue, in fact just enough to prevent him from failing in his tasks owing to intemperance and cowardice. (But the question might be raised, supposing that what has just been said is true, will artisans also need to have virtue? for they frequently fall short in their tasks owing to intemperance. Or is their case entirely different? For the slave is a partner in his master's life, but the artisan is more remote, and only so much of virtue falls to his share as of slavery—for the mechanic artisan is under a sort of limited slavery, and whereas the slave is one of the natural classes, no shoemaker or other craftsman belongs—his trade by nature.) It is manifest therefore the master ought to be the cause to the slave of the virtue proper to a slave, but not as possessing that art of mastership which teaches a slave his tasks. Hence
ARISTOTLE

1260 b

λέγουσιν οὐ καλῶς οἱ λόγοι τοὺς δούλους ἀποστεροῦντες καὶ φάσκοντες ἐπιτάξει χρήσθαι μόνον νομοθετήτευν γαρ μᾶλλον τοὺς δούλους ἢ τοὺς παῖδας.

'Αλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τούτον· περὶ δὲ ἄνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς καὶ τέκνων καὶ πατρός, τῆς τε περὶ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἀρετῆς, καὶ τῆς πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ὀμιλίας, τὶ τὸ καλῶς καὶ μὴ καλῶς ἔστι καὶ τῶς δὲ τὸ μὲν εὖ διώκειν τὸ δὲ κακῶς φεύγειν, ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἀναγκαίον ἐπελθεῖν, ἐπεὶ γὰρ οἰκία μὲν πᾶσα μέρος πόλεως, ταύτα δ' οἰκίας, τὴν δὲ τοῦ μέρους πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου δὲι βλέπειν ἀρετὴν, ἀναγκαίον πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν βλέποντας παιδείαν καὶ τοὺς παῖδας καὶ τὰς γυναίκας, εἴπερ τὶ διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ τὴν πόλιν εἶναι σπουδαίαν καὶ τοὺς παῖδας εἶναι σπουδαίους καὶ τὰς γυναίκας σπουδαίας. ἀναγκαίον δὲ διαφέρειν· αἳ μὲν γὰρ γυναίκες ἢμου

66

10 καὶ τὰς γυναίκας, ἐκ δὲ τῶν παῖδων οἱ κοινωνοὶ γίνονται τῆς πολιτείας. ὥστε ἐπεὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων διώρισται, περὶ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐν ἄλλωσ λεκτέον, ἄφεντες ὡς τέλος ἔχοντας τοὺς νῦν λόγους, ἄλλην ἀρχὴν ποιησαμένοι λέγωμεν, καὶ πρῶτον ἐπισκεψόμεθα περὶ τῶν ἀποφημαμένων περὶ τῆς πολιτείας τῆς ἀριστησ.

1 οἱ κοινωνοὶ: οἰκονόμοι Susemihl (dispensatores Guil.).
those persons are mistaken who deprive the slave of reasoning and tell us to use command only; for admonition is more properly employed with slaves than with children.

But on these subjects let us conclude our decisions in this manner; while the question of the virtue severally belonging to man and woman and children and father, and of the right and wrong mode of conducting their mutual intercourse and the proper way of pursuing the good mode and avoiding the bad one, are matters that it will be necessary to follow up in the part of our treatise dealing with the various forms of constitution. For since every household is part of a state, and these relationships are part of the household, and the excellence of the part must have regard to that of the whole, it is necessary that the education both of the children and of the women should be carried on with a regard to the form of the constitution, if it makes any difference as regards the goodness of the state for the children and the women to be good. And it must necessarily make a difference; for the women are a half of the free population, and the children grow up to be the partners in the government of the state. So that as these questions have been decided, and those that remain must be discussed elsewhere, let us relinquish the present subjects as completed, and make a fresh start in our discourse, and first let us consider those thinkers who have advanced views about the Ideal State.
I. Ἡ ἐπεὶ δὲ προαιρούμεθα θεωρῆσαι περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τῆς πολιτικῆς ἡ κρατίστη πασῶν τοῖς δυναμένοις ζῆν ὅτι μάλιστα κατ’ εὐχήν, δεῖ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπισκέψεως πολιτείας αἰς τε χρωνταῖς τίνες τῶν πόλεων τῶν εὐνομεῖσθαι λεγομένων κἂν εἰ τίνες ἔτεραι τυχηκόντωσιν ὑπὸ τινῶν εἰρημέναι καὶ δοκοῦσαν καλῶς ἔχειν, ἢν τὸ τ’ ὄρθως ἔχον ὀφθή καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον, ἐτε δὲ τὸ ζητεῖν τι παρ’ αὐτὰς ἔτερον μὴ δοκῆ πάντως εἶναι σοφίζεσθαι βουλομένων, ἄλλα διὰ τὸ μὴ καλῶς ἔχειν ταύτας τὰς ὑπάρχουσας, διὰ τοῦτο ταύτην δοκῶμεν ἐπιβαλέσθαι τὴν μέθοδον.

Ἀρχὴν δὲ πρῶτον ποιητέον ἢπερ πέφυκεν ἀρχή 2 ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως. ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἦτοι πάντας πάντων κοινωνεῖν τοὺς πολίτας, ἢ μηδενός, ἢ τινῶν μὲν τινῶν δὲ μὴ. τὸ μὲν οὖν μηδενός κοινωνεῖν φανερὸν ως ἄδυνατον (ἡ γὰρ πολιτεία κοινωνία τῆς ἐστι, καὶ πρῶτον ἀνάγκη τοῦ τόπου κοινωνεῖν, ὁ μὲν γὰρ τόπος εἰς ὁ τῆς μᾶς πόλεως, οἱ δὲ πολίται ΚΟΩΝΟΝ ΤΗΣ ΜΙΑΣ ΠΟΛΕΩΣ). ἄλλα πότερον οὖσων 68
I. And since we take for our special consideration the study of the form of political community that is the best of all the forms for a people able to pursue the most ideal mode of life, we must also examine the other constitutions actually employed by certain of the states said to be well governed, as well as any others propounded by certain thinkers and reputed to be of merit, in order that we may discern what there is in them that is right and expedient, and also in order that it may not be thought that to seek for something different from them springs entirely from a desire to display ingenuity, but that we may be thought to enter upon this inquiry because these forms of constitution that already exist are not satisfactory.

2. We must first adopt as a starting-point that which is the natural point of departure for this inquiry. There are three possible systems of property: either all the citizens must own everything in common, or they must own nothing in common, or some things must be common property and others not. To have nothing in common is clearly impossible; for the state is essentially a form of community, and it must at any rate have a common locality: a single city occupies a single site, and the single city belongs to its citizens in common. But is it better for a city
ARISTOTLE

1261 a ἐνδεχεται κοινωνήσαι πάντων βέλτιον κοινωνεῖν τήν μέλλουσαν οἰκήσεσθαι πόλιν καλῶς, ἢ τινῶν μὲν τινῶν δὲ οὐ βέλτιον; ἐνδεχεται γάρ καὶ τέκνων ὑποτετλαμακικῶν καὶ κτημάτων κοινωνεῖν τοὺς πολίτας ἀλλήλους, ὡσπερ ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνος. ἔκει γάρ ὁ Σωκράτης φησὶ δεῖν κοινὰ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναικάς εἶναι καὶ τὰς κτήσεις. τούτῳ δὲ πότερον ὡς νῦν οὕτω βέλτιον ἔχειν, ἢ κατὰ τὸν ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ γεγραμμένον νόμον;

10 Ἡχεὶ δὲ δυσχερείας ἄλλας τε πολλὰς τὸ πάντων ἂν εἶναι τὰς γυναῖκας κοινᾶς, καὶ δὲ ἢν αὐτίκαν φησὶ δεῖν νεομοδητήσαι τὸν τρόπον τούτον ὁ Σωκράτης οὐ φαίνεται συμβαίνουν ἐκ τῶν λόγων. ἐτί δὲ πρὸς τὸ τέλος ὁ φησὶ τῇ πόλει δεῖν ὑπάρχειν, ὡς μὲν εὑρήται νῦν, ἄδυνατον, πῶς δὲ δεῖ διελεῖν, ὅτι οὐδὲν διωρίσται· λέγῳ δὲ τὸ μίαν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν πᾶσαν ὡς ἀριστον ὅτι μάλιστα, λαμβάνει γάρ ταύτην ὑπόθεσιν ὁ Σωκράτης.

Κατοι φανερόν ἐστιν ὡς προϊόνσα καὶ γινομένη μιὰ μᾶλλον οὐδὲ πόλις ἐσται· πλήθος γάρ τι τὴν φύσιν ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις, γινομένη τε μιὰ μᾶλλον οἰκία μὲν ἐκ πόλεως, ἀνθρώπος δὲ ἐξ οἰκίας ἐσται, μᾶλλον γάρ μία τὴν οἰκίαν τῆς πόλεως φαίμεν ἀν καὶ τὸν ἑνα τῆς οἰκίας· ὡςτε εἰ καὶ δυνατὸς τις εἰ τοῦτο δρᾶν, οὐ ποιητέοι, ἀναιρῆσαι γάρ τὴν πόλιν. οὐ μόνον δὲ ἐκ πλειώνων ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις, ἄλλα καὶ ἐξ εἰδεὶ διαφερόντων. οὐ

1 δεῖ διελθεῖν MP²: διελεῖν Γ.

a On the following criticisms see Grote, Plato, iii. pp. 211-223.

b (1) §§ 3-7; (2) § 8-c. ii. § 11; (3) c. ii. §§ 11 mid.-13; also (4) other objections e. ii. §§ 15-16.

70
that is to be well ordered to have community in everything which can possibly be made common property, or is it better to have some things in common and others not? For example, it is possible for the citizens to have children, wives and possessions in common with each other, as in Plato's Republic, in which Socrates says that there must be community of children, women and possessions. Well then, which is preferable, the system that now obtains, or one conforming with the regulation described in The Republic? Now for all the citizens to have their wives in common involves a variety of difficulties; in particular, (1) the object which Socrates advances as the reason why this enactment should be made clearly does not follow from his arguments; also (2) as a means to the end which he asserts should be the fundamental object of the city, the scheme as actually set forth in the dialogue is not practicable; yet (3) how it is to be further worked out has been nowhere definitely stated. I refer to the ideal of the fullest possible unity of the entire state, which Socrates takes as his fundamental principle.

Yet it is clear that if the process of unification advances beyond a certain point, the city will not be a city at all; for a state essentially consists of a multitude of persons, and if its unification is carried beyond a certain point, city will be reduced to family and family to individual, for we should pronounce the family to be a more complete unity than the city, and the single person than the family; so that even if any lawgiver were able to unify the state, he must not do so, for he will destroy it in the process. And not only does a city consist of a multitude of human beings, it consists of human beings...
γάρ γίνεται πόλις εξ ὁμοίων. ἔτερον γάρ συμ- μαχία καὶ πόλις· τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῷ ποσῷ χρήσιμον, κἂν ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ εἴδει (βοηθείας γὰρ χάριν ἢ συμμαχία πέφυκεν), ὦσπερ ᾧν εἰ σταθμὸς πλεῖον ἐλκύσει,1 εὗ2 ὥν δὲ δεὶ ἐν γενέσθαι εἴδει δεὶ διαφέρειν3 (διοίσει δὲ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ καὶ πόλις ἐθνος ὅταν μὴ κατὰ κώμας ὅσι κεχωρισμένοι τὸ πλῆθος 5 ἀλλ’ οἶον Ἀρκάδες). διόπερ τὸ ἱσον4 τὸ ἀντι- πεπονθὸς σώζει τὰς πόλεις, ὦσπερ ὑπὸ τοῖς Ἱθυκοῖς εὔρηται πρότερον. ἔπει καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐλευθέροις καὶ ἱσοῖς ἀνάγκη τοῦτ’ εἶναι: ἀμα γὰρ ὦχι ὦτον τε πάντας ἄρχειν, ἀλλ’ ἢ κατ’ ἐνιαυτὸν ἢ κατὰ τινα ἀλλήν τάξιν ἡ χρόνον· καὶ συμβαίνει δὴ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ὡστε πάντας ἄρχειν, ὦσπερ ᾧν εἰ μετέβαλ- λον οἱ σκυτείς καὶ οἱ τέκτονες καὶ μὴ οἱ αὐτοὶ αἰεὶ σκυτοτόμοι καὶ τέκτονες ἢσαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ βελτιων οὖτως ἔχειν καὶ τα περὶ τὴν κοινωνίαν τὴν πολι- 6 τικήν, δῆλον ὡς τοὺς αὐτοὺς αἰεὶ βελτιων ἄρχειν, εἰ δυνατόν· ἐν οἷς δὲ μὴ δυνατὸν διὰ τὸ τὴν φύσιν ἱσοὺς εἶναι πάντας, ἀμα δὲ5 καὶ δικαῖον, εἰτ᾿ ἀγαθὸν εἰτε φαύλον τὸ ἄρχειν, πάντας αὐτοῦ μετέχειν, τοῦτο δὲ μιμεῖται τὸ ἐν μέρει τοὺς ἱσοὺς εἰκεῖν τὸ ἀν- ὀμοίους6 εἶναι εξ ἄρχης· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄρχουσιν οἱ δ’

1 ἐλκύσειε Coraes: ἐλκύσει, ἐλκύσῃ codd.
2 εὗ—διαφέρειν infra post Ἀρκάδες codd.: tr. ed.
3 εἴδει δεὶ διαφέρειν Bucheler: εἴδει διαφέρει codd. (δια- φέρειν M).
4 [τὸ ἱσον]? (cf. N.E. 1132 b 33) ed.
5 δὴ Susemihl.
6 τὸ ἄνωμοιον Susemihl: τὸ δ’ ὡς ὁμοίους, ὁμοίους τοῖς, ὁμοίως τοῖς codd. Locum desperatissimum rescripsit Richards μιμεῖται τὸ ἐν μέρει ἄρχειν τὸ μὴ ἱσοὺς καὶ ὁμοίους εἶναι εξ ἄρχης.

72
differing in kind. A collection of persons all alike does not constitute a state. For a city is not the same thing as a league; a league is of value by its quantity, even though it is all the same in kind (since the essential object of the league is military strength), just as a weight would be worth more if it weighed more, whereas components which are to make up a unity must differ in kind (and it is by this characteristic that a city will also surpass a tribe of which the population is not scattered among villages but organized like the Arcadians). Hence reciprocal equality \(^b\) is the preservative of states, as has been said before in *Ethics*. For even among the free and equal this principle must necessarily obtain, since all cannot govern at once: they must hold office for a year at a time or by some other arrangement or period; and in this manner it does actually come about that all govern, just as all shoemakers would be also carpenters if the shoemakers and the carpenters kept on changing trades instead of the same persons being shoemakers and carpenters always. But since such permanence of function is better for the political community also, it is clear that it is better for the same persons to govern always, if possible; and among peoples where it is impossible because all the citizens are equal in their nature, yet at the same time it is only just, whether governing is a good thing or a bad, that all should partake in it, then for equals thus to submit to authority in turn imitates their being originally dissimilar \(^c\); for some govern and others are governed

\(^a\) In the mss. of the Greek 'whereas—kind' comes below after 'Arcadian.'

\(^b\) See Additional Note, p. 170.

\(^c\) See Additional Note, p. 171.
The reference is to Plato, Republic 462 c. Unity is secured when everyone thinks that everything belongs equally to him and to everybody else, i.e. everything is common property.
by turn, as though becoming other persons; and also when they hold office in the same way different persons hold different offices. It is clear then from these considerations that it is not an outcome of nature for the state to be a unity in the manner in which certain persons say that it is, and that what has been said to be the greatest good in states really destroys states; yet surely a thing's particular good acts as its preservative.—Another line of consideration also shows that to seek to unify the state excessively is not beneficial. In point of self-sufficiency the individual is surpassed by the family and the family by the state, and in principle a state is fully realized only when it comes to pass that the community of numbers is self-sufficing; if therefore the more self-sufficing a community is, the more desirable is its condition, then a less degree of unity is more desirable than a greater.

8 Again, even granting that it is best for the community to be as complete a unity as possible, complete unity does not seem to be proved by the formula 'if all the citizens say "Mine" and "Not mine" at the same time,' which Socrates a thinks to be a sign of the city's being completely one. 'All' is an ambiguous term. If it means 'each severally,' very likely this would more fully realize the state of things which Socrates wishes to produce (for in that case every citizen will call the same boy his son and also the same woman his wife, and will speak in the same way of property and indeed of everything that falls to his lot); but ex hypothesi the citizens, having community of women and children, will not call them 'theirs' in this sense, but will mean theirs collectively and not severally, and similarly they will call property

75
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΗΣ

1261 b

τὴν ουσίαν πάντες μὲν, οὐχ ὡς ἐκαστὸς δ᾽ αὐτῶν. ὅτι μὲν τοῖνυν παραλογισμὸς τὶς ἐστὶ τὸ λέγειν πάντας, φανερῶν (τὸ γάρ πάντες καὶ ἀμφότερα καὶ περιττὰ καὶ ἄρτια διὰ τὸ διηττὸν καὶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐριστικοῖς ποιεῖ συλλογισμοῖς). διὸ ἐστὶ τὸ πάντας τὸ αὐτὸ λέγειν ὡδὶ μὲν καλὸν ἀλλ᾽ οὐ δυνατὸν, ὡδὶ δ᾽ οὔδεν ὀμονοητικόν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐτέραν ἔχει βλάβην τὸ λεγόμενον. ἦκιστα γὰρ ἐπιμελείας τυγχάνει τὸ πλείστων κοινῶν. τῶν γὰρ ἰδίων μᾶλλον φροντίζουσιν, τῶν δὲ κοινῶν ἤττον, ἣ ὡς ἐκάστῳ ἐπιβάλλει: πρὸς γὰρ τοῖς ἀλλοις ὡς ἐτέρου φροντίζοντος ὀλυγωροῦσι μᾶλλον, ὡσπερ ἐν ταῖς οἰκετικαῖς διακονίαις οἱ πολλοὶ θεράποντες ἐνίοτε χείρον ὑπηρετοῦσι τῶν ἐλαττόνων. γίνονται δ᾽ ἐκάστῳ χίλιοι τῶν πολιτῶν νῦν, καὶ οὕτωι οὐχ ἐκάστῳ χίλιοι τῶν πολιτῶν νῦν, ὡστε πάντες ὀμοίως ὀλυγωρήσουσιν.

"Εἴτε οὕτως ἐκαστὸς ἐμὸς λέγει τὸν εὐ πράττοντα τῶν πολιτῶν ἡ κακώς ὀπόστος τυγχάνει τῶν ἀριθμῶν ὡν, οἶν ἐμὸς ἡ τοῦ δείνος, τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἐκαστον τῶν χιλίων ἡ ὡς ἡ πόλις ἐστὶ, καὶ τοῦτο διστάζων ἀδηλὸν γὰρ ὃν πρόσεβη γενέσθαι τέκνων καὶ σωθήναι γενόμενον. καίτοι πότερον οὕτω κρείττον τὸ ἐμὸν λέγειν, ἐκαστὸν τὸ
POLITICS, II. 1. 9-12

'theirs' meaning the property of them all, not of each of them severally. We see then that the phrase 'all say' is equivocal (in fact the words 'all,' 'both,' 'odd,' 'even,' owing to their ambiguity, occasion argumentative quibbling even in philosophical discussions); hence really for 'all' to say the same thing is in one sense admirable, although impracticable, but in another sense is not at all a sign of concord. And furthermore, the proposal has another disadvantage. Property that is common to the greatest number of owners receives the least attention; men care most for their private possessions, and for what they own in common less, or only so far as it falls to their own individual share; for in addition to the other reasons, they think less of it on the ground that someone else is thinking about it, just as in household service a large number of domestics sometimes give worse attendance than a smaller number. And it results in each citizen's having a thousand sons, and these do not belong to them as individuals but any child is equally the son of anyone, so that all alike will regard them with indifference.

Again, each speaks of one of his fellow-citizens who is prospering or getting on badly as 'my son' only in the sense of the fractional part which he forms of the whole number, meaning 'mine or so-and-so's,' indicating by 'so-and-so' each of the thousand citizens or whatever the number be of which the state consists, and even this dubiously, for it is uncertain who has chanced to have had a son born to him and when born safely reared. Yet which is the better way to use the word 'mine'—this way, each of two thousand or ten...
1262 a

αὐτὸ ἐμὸν¹ προσαγορεύοντα² δυσχιλῶν καὶ μυρίων, ἡ μᾶλλον ὡς νῦν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι τὸ ἐμὸν λέγουσιν; 10 ὁ μὲν γὰρ νῦν αὐτοῦ ὁ δὲ ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ προσ-

αγορεύει τὸν αὐτὸν, ὁ δὲ ἀνεψιόν ἡ κατ’ ἀληθῶν τινὰ 

συγγένειαν ἡ πρὸς αἴματος ἡ κατ’ οἰκείοτητα καὶ 

κηδείαν αὐτοῦ πρῶτον ἡ τῶν αὐτοῦ, πρὸς δὲ τούτου 

ἐτερος³ φράτορά ἡ φιλέτην. κρεῖττον γὰρ ἢ 

οὐν ἀνεψιὸν εἶναι ἡ τὸν τρόπον τούτον νῦν. οὐ μὴν 13 

ἀλλ’ οὔδε διαφυγεῖν δυνατὸν τὸ μὴ τινὰ ὑπολαμ-

βάνειν ἑαυτῶν ἀδελφοὺς τε καὶ παῖδας καὶ πατέρας 

καὶ μητέρας κατὰ γὰρ τὰς ὁμοιότητας αἱ γίνονται 

tοῖς τέκνοις πρὸς τοὺς γεννήσαντας ἀναγκαίων λαμ-

βάνειν περὶ ἄλληλων τὰς πίστεις. ὅπερ φασὶ καὶ 

συμβαίνει τινές τῶν τὰς τῆς γῆς περιόδους πραγ-

ματευομενῶν εἶναι γὰρ τισὶν τῶν ἁνὸν Ἀιβύων 

κοινὰς τὰς γυναῖκας, τὰ μέντοι γυνόμενα⁴ τέκνα 

diaφεῖδον κατὰ τὰς ὁμοιότητας. εἰσὶ δὲ τινὲς 

cαὶ γυναῖκες καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν ἱών, οἶνον ἦπτοι καὶ 

βόες, αἱ σφόδρα πεφύκασιν ὁμοία ἀποδιδόναι τὰ 

tέκνα τοῖς γονεῦσιν, ὑσπερ ἡ ἐν Φαρσάλῳ κληθεῖσα 

Δικαία ἦπτος.

25 Ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας δυσερείας οὐ ράδιον 14 

eὐλαβηθῆναι τοῖς ταύτην κατασκευάζουσι τὴν 

κοινωνίαν, οἶνον αἰκίας καὶ φόνους ἀκουσάντας, τοὺς 

de ἐκοινούσας, καὶ μάχας καὶ λοιπορίας· οἶνον οὐδὲν 

ὁσίον ἔστι γίνεσθαι πρὸς πατέρας καὶ μητέρας καὶ

¹ ἐμὸν Bornemann: ὡν Bonitz, μὲν codd.
² Bernays: ὡν codd.
³ ἐτερος Lindau: ἐτερον codd.
⁴ γυνόμενα (cf. infra b 25) Richards: γυνόμενα codd.
thousand people applying it to the same thing, or rather the way in which they say 'mine' in the actual states now? for the same person is called 'my son' by one man and 'my brother' by another, and another calls him 'nephew,' or by some other relationship, whether of blood or by affinity and marriage, the speaker's own in the first place, or that of his relations; and in addition someone else calls him 'fellow-clansman' or 'fellow-tribesman.' For it is better for a boy to be one's own private nephew than one's son in the way described. Moreover it would also be impossible to avoid men's supposing certain persons to be their real brothers and sons and fathers and mothers; for they would be bound to form their belief about each other by the resemblances which occur between children and parents. This indeed is said by some of those who write of travels round the world actually to occur; they say that some of the people of Upper Libya have their wives in common, yet the children born are divided among them according to their personal resemblances. And there are some females both of the human race and of the other animals, for instance horses and cattle, who have a strong natural tendency to produce offspring resembling the male parents, as was the case with the mare at Pharsalus named Honest Lady.

Moreover it is not easy for those who institute this communism to guard against such objectionable occurrences as outrage, involuntary and in some cases voluntary homicide, fights, abusive language; all of which are violations of piety when committed

a Books of geography, founded on travellers' reports—a famous one by Hecataeus, scoffed at by Herodotus, iv. 36.
b Or possibly 'Docile' (Jackson), cf. Xen. Cyneget. 7. 4.
ARISTOTLE

1262 a
tous μη πόρρω της συγγενείας οντας ώσπερ πρός
tous ἀπωθεν· ἄλλα καὶ πλεῖον συμβαίνειν ἀναγ-
καίον ἀγνοοῦντων ἢ γνωρίζοντων, καὶ γενομένων
τῶν μὲν γνωρίζοντων ἐνδέχεται τὰς νομιζομένας
γίνεσθαι λύσεις, τῶν δὲ μηδεμίαν. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ 15
tὸ κοινὸς ποιήσαντα τοὺς υἱοὺς τὸ συνεῖναι μόνον
ἀφελεῖν τῶν ἔρωτων, τὸ δ’ ἔραν μὴ κωλύσαι,
μηδὲ τὰς χρήσεις τὰς ἄλλας, ἃς πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν
eίναι πάντων ἐστὶν ἀπρεπέστατον καὶ ἀδελφῷ πρὸς
ἀδελφὸν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἔραν μόνον. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ
tὸ τὴν συνουσίαν ἀφελεῖν δι’ ἄλλην μὲν αἰτίαν
μηδεμίαν, ὡς λίαν δ’ ἰσχυρᾶς τῆς ἡδονῆς γνω-
μένης· ὅτι δ’ ὁ μὲν πατὴρ ἢ υἱὸς οὐ δ’ ἀδελφοὶ
ἀλλήλων, μηθὲν οἷόσθαν διαφέρειν. ἔσικε δὲ μάλλον
τοῖς γεωργοῖς εἶναι χρήσιμον τὸ κοινὸς εἶναι τὰς
1262 b γυναῖκας καὶ τοὺς παῖδας ἢ τοῖς φύλαξιν· ἦττον
γὰρ ἐστὶν φιλία κοινῶν οντων τῶν τέκνων καὶ τῶν
γυνακῶν, δεῖ δὲ τοιούτους εἶναι τοὺς ἄρχομένους
πρὸς τὸ πειθαρχεῖν καὶ μὴ νεωτερίζειν. ὅλως δὲ 16
συμβαίνειν ἀνάγκη τουναντίον διὰ τὸν τοιοῦτον
νόμον ἢν προσήκει τοὺς ὀρθῶς κειμένους νόμους
αἰτίους γίνεσθαι, καὶ δι’ ἦν αἰτίαν ὁ Σωκράτης
οὕτως οἴεται δεῖν τάττειν τὰ περὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ
τὰς γυναίκας. φιλίαν τε γὰρ οἰόμεθα μέγιστον
εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταῖς πόλεισιν (οὕτω γὰρ ἄν ἦκιστα
στασιάζομεν), καὶ τὸ μίαν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν ἑπανεῖ
μάλιστ’ ὁ Σωκράτης, ὁ καὶ δοκεῖ κάκεινος εἶναι

1 te om. MP, quidem (? ye) Guil.
against fathers, mothers and near relatives as if they were not relatives; but these are bound to occur more frequently when people do not know their relations than when they do, and also, when they do occur, if the offenders know their relationship it is possible for them to have the customary expiations performed, but for those who do not no expiation is possible.

Also it is curious that a theorist who makes the sons risk of common property only debar sons from intercourse and does not prohibit love, nor the other familiarities, which between father and son or brother and brother are most unseemly, since even the fact of love between them is unseemly. And it is also strange that he deprivè them of intercourse for no other reason except because the pleasure is too violent; and that he thinks it makes no difference that the parties are in the one case father or son and in the other case brothers of one another. And it seems more serviceable for the Farmers to have this community of wives and sons than the Guardians; for there will be less friendship among them if their children and women are in common, and unfriendliness in the subject classes is a good thing with a view to their being submissive to authority and not making revolution. But speaking generally such a law is bound to bring about the opposite state of things to that which rightly enacted laws ought properly to cause, and because of which Socrates thinks it necessary to make these regulations about the children and women. For we think that friendship is the greatest of blessings for the state, since it is the best safeguard against revolution, and the unity of the state, which Socrates praises most highly, both appears to be and is said by him to be
The comic poet, figuring as a character in Plato’s Symposium, see especially 192 c ff.
the effect of friendship, just as we know that Aristophanes in the discourses on love describes how the lovers owing to their extreme affection desire to grow together and both become one instead of being two. In such a union both personalities, or at least one, would be bound to be obliterated; and in the state friendship would inevitably become diluted in consequence of such association, and the expressions 'my father' and 'my son' would quite go out. For just as putting a little sugar into a quantity of water makes the mixture imperceptible, so it also must come about that the mutual relationship based on these names must become imperceptible, since in the republic described by Plato there will be the least possible necessity for people to care for one another as father for sons or as son for father or as brother for brother. For there are two motives that most cause men to care for things and be fond of them, the sense of ownership and the sense of preciousness; and neither motive can be present with the citizens of a state so constituted. Again, as to the transference of some of the children at birth from the Farmers and Artisans to the Guardians and of others from the Guardians to the Farmers and Artisans, there is much confusion as to how it is to be done; and the parents who give the children and the officials who transfer them are bound to know which they give to whom. And again, the things spoken of above are bound to occur even more with these transferred children, such as outrage, love-making and murder; for the children of the Guardians transferred to the other citizens will no longer speak

a The three classes in Plato's Republic.
καὶ μητέρας οί τε εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας δοθέντες τοὺς φύλακας¹ καὶ πάλιν οἱ παρὰ τοὺς φύλαξιν τοὺς² ἄλλους πολίτας, ὥστε εὐλαβεῖσθαι τῶν τοιούτων τι πράττειν διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς περὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας κοινωνίας διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τούτον.

II. Ἐχόμενον δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν ἐπισκέψασθαι 1 περὶ τῆς κτήσεως, τίνα τρόπον δεῖ κατασκευάζεσθαι τοῖς μέλλουσι πολιτεύεσθαι τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν, πότερον κοινὴν ἢ μὴ κοινὴν εἶναι τὴν κτήσιν. τοῦτο δ' ἂν τίς καὶ χωρίς σκέψατο ἀπὸ τῶν περὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας νευρομοθετημένων λέγω [δὲ τὰ περὶ τὴν κτήσιν]³ πότερον, κἂν ἢ ἐκείνα χωρίς καθ' ὑπὸ τῶν τρόπων ἔχει πάσιν, τὰς τε κτήσεις κοινὰς εἶναι βέλτιον καὶ τὰς χρήσεις . . .⁴ οἴον τὰ μὲν γήπεδα χωρίς τοὺς δὲ καρποὺς εἰς τὸ κοινὸν φέροντος ἀναλίσκεως (ὅπερ ἕνα ποιεῖ τῶν ἑθῶν), ἡ τούναντίον τὴν μὲν γῆν κοινὴν εἶναι καὶ γεωργεῖν κοινῇ, τοὺς δὲ καρποὺς διαμελεῖσθαι πρὸς τὰς ἱδίας χρήσεις (λέγονται δὲ τοὺς καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον κοινωνίαν τῶν βαρ-βάρων), ἡ καὶ τὰ γῆπεδα καὶ τοὺς καρποὺς κοινοὺς. ἑτέρων μὲν οὖν οὕτων τῶν γεωργοῦντων ἄλλος ἂν 2 εἰπὶ τρόπος καὶ ράμων, αὐτῶν δ' αὐτοῖς διαπονούντων τὰ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις. πλείους ἂν παρέχοι δυσκολίας καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἀπολαύσεις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις μὴ γνωμενῶν ὑσσων ἀναγκαίων ἐγκλήματα

¹ toûs phýlakas hic Guil.: ante oí te codd. (om. MP).
² toûs 1'MP: eis toûs cet.
³ Susemihl.
⁴ lacunam Busse.

* Something has clearly been lost here, signifying 'or should there be some limited form of communism?'
of the Guardians as brothers and children and fathers and mothers, nor yet will those living among the Guardians so speak of the other classes, so as to be careful not to commit any such offence because of their relationship.

Such therefore may be our decision as to community of children and women.

II. In connexion with this we have to consider the due regulation of property in a community that is to have the best political institutions: should property be owned in common or privately? This question might indeed be considered separately from the system laid down by law with regard to the children and the women: I mean, even if there be separate families as is now the case with all nations, is it better for both the ownership and the employment of property to be in common . . . , for example, should the farms be separate property but the farm-produce be brought into the common stock for consumption (as is the practice with some non-Greek races); or on the contrary should the land be common and farmed in common, but the produce be divided for private use (and this form of communism also is said to prevail among some of the barbarians); or should both farms and produce be common property?

II. In connexion with this we have to consider the due regulation of property in a community that is to have the best political institutions: should property be owned in common or privately? This question might indeed be considered separately from the system laid down by law with regard to the children and the women: I mean, even if there be separate families as is now the case with all nations, is it better for both the ownership and the employment of property to be in common . . . , for example, should the farms be separate property but the farm-produce be brought into the common stock for consumption (as is the practice with some non-Greek races); or on the contrary should the land be common and farmed in common, but the produce be divided for private use (and this form of communism also is said to prevail among some of the barbarians); or should both farms and produce be common property?

II. In connexion with this we have to consider the due regulation of property in a community that is to have the best political institutions: should property be owned in common or privately? This question might indeed be considered separately from the system laid down by law with regard to the children and the women: I mean, even if there be separate families as is now the case with all nations, is it better for both the ownership and the employment of property to be in common . . . , for example, should the farms be separate property but the farm-produce be brought into the common stock for consumption (as is the practice with some non-Greek races); or on the contrary should the land be common and farmed in common, but the produce be divided for private use (and this form of communism also is said to prevail among some of the barbarians); or should both farms and produce be common property?

II. In connexion with this we have to consider the due regulation of property in a community that is to have the best political institutions: should property be owned in common or privately? This question might indeed be considered separately from the system laid down by law with regard to the children and the women: I mean, even if there be separate families as is now the case with all nations, is it better for both the ownership and the employment of property to be in common . . . , for example, should the farms be separate property but the farm-produce be brought into the common stock for consumption (as is the practice with some non-Greek races); or on the contrary should the land be common and farmed in common, but the produce be divided for private use (and this form of communism also is said to prevail among some of the barbarians); or should both farms and produce be common property?

II. In connexion with this we have to consider the due regulation of property in a community that is to have the best political institutions: should property be owned in common or privately? This question might indeed be considered separately from the system laid down by law with regard to the children and the women: I mean, even if there be separate families as is now the case with all nations, is it better for both the ownership and the employment of property to be in common . . . , for example, should the farms be separate property but the farm-produce be brought into the common stock for consumption (as is the practice with some non-Greek races); or on the contrary should the land be common and farmed in common, but the produce be divided for private use (and this form of communism also is said to prevail among some of the barbarians); or should both farms and produce be common property?

II. In connexion with this we have to consider the due regulation of property in a community that is to have the best political institutions: should property be owned in common or privately? This question might indeed be considered separately from the system laid down by law with regard to the children and the women: I mean, even if there be separate families as is now the case with all nations, is it better for both the ownership and the employment of property to be in common . . . , for example, should the farms be separate property but the farm-produce be brought into the common stock for consumption (as is the practice with some non-Greek races); or on the contrary should the land be common and farmed in common, but the produce be divided for private use (and this form of communism also is said to prevail among some of the barbarians); or should both farms and produce be common property?

II. In connexion with this we have to consider the due regulation of property in a community that is to have the best political institutions: should property be owned in common or privately? This question might indeed be considered separately from the system laid down by law with regard to the children and the women: I mean, even if there be separate families as is now the case with all nations, is it better for both the ownership and the employment of property to be in common . . . , for example, should the farms be separate property but the farm-produce be brought into the common stock for consumption (as is the practice with some non-Greek races); or on the contrary should the land be common and farmed in common, but the produce be divided for private use (and this form of communism also is said to prevail among some of the barbarians); or should both farms and produce be common property?

II. In connexion with this we have to consider the due regulation of property in a community that is to have the best political institutions: should property be owned in common or privately? This question might indeed be considered separately from the system laid down by law with regard to the children and the women: I mean, even if there be separate families as is now the case with all nations, is it better for both the ownership and the employment of property to be in common . . . , for example, should the farms be separate property but the farm-produce be brought into the common stock for consumption (as is the practice with some non-Greek races); or on the contrary should the land be common and farmed in common, but the produce be divided for private use (and this form of communism also is said to prevail among some of the barbarians); or should both farms and produce be common property?

II. In connexion with this we have to consider the due regulation of property in a community that is to have the best political institutions: should property be owned in common or privately? This question might indeed be considered separately from the system laid down by law with regard to the children and the women: I mean, even if there be separate families as is now the case with all nations, is it better for both the ownership and the employment of property to be in common . . . , for example, should the farms be separate property but the farm-produce be brought into the common stock for consumption (as is the practice with some non-Greek races); or on the contrary should the land be common and farmed in common, but the produce be divided for private use (and this form of communism also is said to prevail among some of the barbarians); or should both farms and produce be common property?

II. In connexion with this we have to consider the due regulation of property in a community that is to have the best political institutions: should property be owned in common or privately? This question might indeed be considered separately from the system laid down by law with regard to the children and the women: I mean, even if there be separate families as is now the case with all nations, is it better for both the ownership and the employment of property to be in common . . . , for example, should the farms be separate property but the farm-produce be brought into the common stock for consumption (as is the practice with some non-Greek races); or on the contrary should the land be common and farmed in common, but the produce be divided for private use (and this form of communism also is said to prevail among some of the barbarians); or should both farms and produce be common property?

II. In connexion with this we have to consider the due regulation of property in a community that is to have the best political institutions: should property be owned in common or privately? This question might indeed be considered separately from the system laid down by law with regard to the children and the women: I mean, even if there be separate families as is now the case with all nations, is it better for both the ownership and the employment of property to be in common . . . , for example, should the farms be separate property but the farm-produce be brought into the common stock for consumption (as is the practice with some non-Greek races); or on the contrary should the land be common and farmed in common, but the produce be divided for private use (and this form of communism also is said to prevail among some of the barbarians); or should both farms and produce be common property?
The saying was ascribed to Pythagoras.
bound to arise between those who enjoy or take much but work little and those who take less but work more. And in general to live together and share all our human affairs is difficult, and especially to share such things as these. And this is shown in the partnerships of fellow-travellers, for it may be said that most of them quarrel because they come into collision with one another as a result of ordinary matters and trifles; and also we come into collision most with those of our servants whom we employ most often for ordinary attendance.

Community of property therefore involves these and other similar difficulties; and the present system, if further improved by good morals and by the regulation of correct legislation, would be greatly superior. For it will possess the merit of both systems, by which I mean the advantage of property being common and the advantage of its being private. For property ought to be common in a sense but private speaking generally. For the superintendence of properties being divided among the owners will not cause these mutual complaints, and will improve the more because each will apply himself to it as to private business of his own; while on the other hand virtue will result in making 'friends' goods common goods,' as the proverb a goes, for the purpose of use. Such a system exists even now in outline in some states, so it is not deemed impracticable, and especially in the ones that are well-administered parts of it are realized already and parts might be realized; for individuals while owning their property privately put their own possessions at the service of their friends and make use of their friends' possessions as common property; for in-
Δακεδαίμονι τοῖς τε δούλοις χρῶνται τοῖς ἄλληλων ὡς εἰπεῖν ιδίοις, ἑτὶ δὲ ὅποιος καὶ κυσίν, κἂν δεηθῶσιν ἐφοδιών ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς τῆς τῆς χώραν. f) φανερῶν τοῖς ὅτι βέλτιον εἶναι μὲν ἢ διὰ τὰς κτήσεις τῇ δὲ χρήσει ποιεῖν κοινὰς· ὅπως δὲ γίνωνται τοιούτων, τοῦ νομοθέτου τοῦτ' ἔργον ιδίον ἐστιν. ἑτὶ δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἱδονὴν ἀμύθητον ὥσον διαφέρει τὸ νομίζειν ἢ διὸν τῷ μὴ γὰρ οὐκών τήν πρὸς αὐτὸν αὐτὸς ἔχει φίλιαν ἐκαστος ἀλλ' ἐστι τούτο φυσικόν. τὸ δὲ φιλαντον εἶναι ψέγεται δικαίως· οὐκ ἐστὶ δὲ τοῦτο τὸ φιλεῖν ἐαυτὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δὲι φιλεῖν, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν φιλοχρήματον, ἐπεὶ φιλοῦσι γε πάντες ὡς εἰπεῖν ἐκαστὸν τῶν τοιούτων. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ χαρίσασθαι καὶ βοηθῆσαι φίλοις ἢ ξένοις ἢ ἐταίροις ἢδιστον· δὲ γίνεται τῆς κτήσεως ἢδιας οὐσίας. ταύτα τε δὴ οὐ συμβαίνει τοῖς λινν ἐν ποιοῖς τήν 7 πόλιν, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἀναροῦσι ἐργα δουῦν ἀρεταῖν φανερῶς, σωφροσύνης μὲν τὸ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας (ἔργων γὰρ καλὸν ἀλλοτρίας οὐσίας ἀπεχεῖσθαι διὰ σωφροσύνην), ἑλευθερίμητος δὲ τὸ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις (οὔτε γὰρ ἐστιν φανερὸς ἑλευθερίς ὃν οὔτε πράξει πράξειν ἑλευθερίον οὐδεμιᾶν· ἐν γὰρ τῇ χρήσει τῶν κτημάτων τὸ τῆς ἑλευθερίμητος ἐργον ἐστίν).

Εὔπροσώπος μὲν οὖν ἡ τοιαύτη νομοθεσία, καὶ φιλανθρωπος ὁ γὰρ ἀκρομένος ἀσμένος ἀποδέχεται, νομίζων ἐσεθταὶ φιλίαν τινὰ θαυμαστὴν πάσι πρὸς ἀπαντᾶς, ἀλλὰς τε καὶ ὅταν

1 tais ágrais Busse. 2 ὅραν Buecheler.
POLITICS, II. ii. 5–8

stance in Sparta people use one another’s slaves as virtually their own, as well as horses and hounds, and also use the produce in the fields throughout the country if they need provisions on a journey. It is clear therefore that it is better for possessions to be privately owned, but to make them common property in use; and to train the citizens to this is the special task of the legislator. And moreover to feel that a thing is one’s private property makes an inexpressibly great difference in one’s pleasure; for the universal feeling of love for oneself is surely not purposeless, but a natural instinct. Selfishness on the other hand is justly blamed; but this is not to love oneself but to love oneself more than one ought, just as covetousness means loving money too excess—since some love of self, money and so on is practically universal. Moreover, to bestow favours and assistance on friends or visitors or comrades is a great pleasure, and a condition of this is the private ownership of property. These advantages therefore do not come to those who carry the unification of the state too far; and in addition to this they manifestly do away with the practice of two virtues, temperance in relation to women (for it is a noble deed to refrain from one through temperance when she belongs to another) and liberality in relation to possessions (for one will not be able to show one’s liberality nor perform a single liberal action, since the active exercise of liberality takes place in the use of possessions).

Such legislation therefore has an attractive appearance, and might be thought to be humane; for he who is told about it welcomes it with gladness, thinking that it will result in a marvellous friendliness of everybody towards everybody, especially when
κατηγορή τις τῶν νῦν ὑπαρχόντων ἐν ταῖς πολι-
20 τελικοῖς κακῶς ὡς γνωμένων διὰ τὸ μὴ κοινὴν εἶναι τὴν οὔσιαν, λέγω δὲ δίκας τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους περὶ συμβολαίων καὶ ψευδομαρτυρίων κρίσεις καὶ πλουσίων κολακείας. ὡν οὐδὲν γίνεται διὰ τὴν ἀκοινωνίαν ἄλλα διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τοὺς κοινὰ κεκτημένους καὶ κοινωνοῦντας πολλῷ
diaferoménon málloν ὁρῶμεν ἡ τοὺς χωρίς τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντας· ἄλλα θεωροῦμεν ὄλγους τοὺς ἐκ τῶν κοινωνιών diaferoménous πρὸς πολλοὺς συμ-
βάλλοντες τοὺς κεκτημένους ἕδικα τὰς κτήσεις. ἔτι δὲ δίκαιοι μὴ μόνον λέγειν ὅσων στερήσονται κακῶς κοινωνήσαντες, ἄλλα καὶ ὅσων ἀγαθῶν-
φαίνεται δ' εἶναι πάμπαν ἀδύνατον ὁ βίος.
30 Αἶτουν δὲ τῷ Σωκράτει τῆς παρακρούσεως χρὴ νομίζειν τὴν ὑπόθεσιν οὐκ οὕσαν ὅρθην. δεῖ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι πως μίαν καὶ τὴν οἰκίαν καὶ τὴν πόλιν,
ἀλλ' οὐ πάντως. ἐστὶ μὲν γὰρ ὃς οὐκ ἔσται προϊόσα πόλις, ἐστὶ δ' ὡς ἕσται μὲν, ἐγγὺς δ' οὕσα τοῦ μὴ πόλις εἶναι1 χειρῶν πόλις, ὁσπέρ καὶ
ei τις τὴν συμφωνίαν ποιήσειν ὁμοφωνίαν ἡ τὸν ὑψιμὸν βάσιν μίαν. ἄλλα δεῖ πλῆθος ὃν, ὁσπέρ 10 εἰρήτηι πρότερον, διὰ τὴν παιδείαν2 κοινὴν καὶ μίαν ποιεών· καὶ τὸν γε μέλλοντα παιδείαν εἰςαγείν, καὶ νομίζοντα διὰ ταύτης ἔσεθαι τὴν πόλιν σπου-
daíain, ἀτοπόν τοῖς τουούσοις οἴεθαι διορθοῦν,3
40 ἄλλα μὴ τοῖς ἔθεσι καὶ τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις, ὁσπέρ τὰ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἐν Δακεδαίμον

1 εἶναι <ἔσται> Victorius.
2 τῆς παιδείας (cf. 38)? Richards.
3 <δεῖν> διορθοῦν? Richards.
somebody denounces the evils at present existing in states as due to the fact that wealth is not owned in common—I mean lawsuits between citizens about breach of contract, and trials for perjury, and the flattery of the rich. But the real cause of all these evils is not the absence of communism, but wickedness, since we see far more quarrels occurring among those who own or use property in common than among those who have their estates separate; but we notice that those who quarrel as a result of their partnerships are few when compared with the total number of private owners. And again it is just to state not only all the evils that men will lose by adopting communism, but also all the good things; and life in such circumstances is seen to be utterly impossible.

The cause of Socrates’ error must be deemed to be that his fundamental assumption was incorrect. It is certain that in a way both the household and the state should be a unit, but they should not be so in every way. For in one way the state as its unification proceeds will cease to be a state, and in another way, though it continues a state, yet by coming near to ceasing to be one it will be a worse state, just as if one turned a harmony into unison or a rhythm into a single foot. The proper thing is for the state, while being a multitude, to be made a partnership and a unity by means of education, as has been said before; and it is strange that the very philosopher who intends to introduce a system of education and thinks that this will make the city morally good should fancy that he can regulate society by such measures as have been mentioned instead of by manners and culture and laws, just as the legislator introduced
1284 a καὶ Κρήτη τοῖς συσσιτίοις ὁ νομοθέτης ἐκόινωσεν. 
δεὶ δὲ μηδὲ τούτῳ αὐτῷ ἄγνοεῖν, ὅτι χρῆ προσέχειν 
tῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἔτεσιν ᾗν, ὥστε οὐκ ἄν ἔλαθεν εἰ ταῦτα καλῶς εἶχεν. πάντα γὰρ 
σχεδον εὐρηταὶ μὲν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν οὐ συνήκεται τοῖς
δὲ οὐ χρώμεναι γυνώσκοντες. μάλιστα δὲ ἀν γένοιτο 11 
φανερὸν εἰ τοῖς ἔργοις ἰδοι τὴν τοιαύτην πολι-
teiain κατασκευαζομένην οὐ γὰρ δυνήσεται μὴ 
μερίζων αὐτὰ καὶ χωρίζων ποιῆσαι τὴν πόλιν, τὰ 
μὲν εἰς συσσίτια τὰ δὲ εἰς φρατρίας καὶ φυλάς. 
ὡστε οὔδεν ἄλλο συμβήσεται νενομοθετημένον πλήμ 
10 μὴ γεωργεῖν τοὺς φύλακας. ὅπερ καὶ νῦν Δακεδαι-
mόνοι ποιεῖν ἐπιχειροῦσιν.

Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' οὔδε ὁ τρόπος τῆς ὅλης πολιτείας 
tῆς ἐσται τοῖς κοινωνοῦσιν οὔτε ἐφηκεν ὁ Σωκράτης 
οὔτε ράδιον εἰπεῖν. καίτοι σχεδὸν τὸ γε πλῆθος ὑπὸ 
τῆς πόλεως τὸ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν γίνεται πλῆθος,
15 περὶ δὲν οὐδὲν διώρισται, πότερον καὶ τοῖς γεωργοῖς 
κοινὰς εἶναι δεὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἢ καὶ καθ’ ἐκαστὸν 
ἰδίας, ἐτι δὲ καὶ γυναίκας καὶ παιδάς ἰδίους ἢ 
κοινοὺς. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον κοινὰ πάντα 
πάντων, τὶ διοίσουσιν οὔτοι ἐκεῖνων τῶν φυλά-
kων; ἢ τὶ πλείον αὐτοῖς ὑπομένουσι τὴν ἄρχην 
20 αὐτῶν; ἢ τὶ μαθόντες ὑπομενοῦσι τὴν ἄρχην, εἷν

1 αὐτὸν ? Richards. 2 ἐθεοὺς Ar., ἐθεοὺς Bernays.
3 πλῆθος ? Richards. 4 καὶ secl. Susemihl.
5 Richards : τοῖς codd. (τοῖς ἑκουσὶ τὴν Greenwood).
community of property in Sparta and Crete by the institution of public messes. And this very point also must not be ignored, that attention must be paid to length of time and to the long period of years, in which it would not have escaped notice if these measures were good ones; for nearly all of them have been discovered already, although some of them have not been collected together and others though brought to knowledge are not put into practice.

And their value would become most manifest if one could see such a constitution in actual process of formation; for one will only be able to construct Plato's state by introducing its partitions and dividing up the community into common messes and also into brotherhoods and tribes. So that in the upshot no other regulation will have been enacted except the exemption of the Guardians from the work of agriculture, which is a measure that even now the Spartans attempt to introduce.

Moreover, the working of the constitution as a whole in regard to the members of the state has also not been described by Socrates, nor is it easy to say what it will be. Yet the general mass of the citizens of the other classes make almost the bulk of the state, and about these no definite regulations are laid down, as to whether the Farmers also are to have their property in common or to hold it in private ownership, and also whether community of wives and children is to apply to them or not. For if the Farmers are to have the same complete communism, what will be the difference between them and the Guardian class? or what advantage will they gain by submitting to their government? or what consideration will induce them to submit to the government, unless
1264 a

μὴ τι σοφίζωνται τοιούτων οἰον Κρῆτες; ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ τὰλλα ταὐτὰ τοὺς δούλους ἐφέντες μόνον ἀπειρήκασι τὰ γυμνάσια καὶ τὴν τῶν ὀπλών κτῆσιν. εἰ δὲ καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι καὶ παρ' ἐκεῖνοις ἐσται τὰ τουαῦτα, τίς ὁ τρόπος ἐσται τῆς 25 κοινωνίας; ἐν μιᾷ γὰρ πόλει δύο πόλεις ἀναγκαίον εἶναι, καὶ ταύτας ἑπενεντίας ἄλληλαισ. ποιεῖ γὰρ τοὺς μὲν φύλακας οἰον φρουροῦς, τοὺς δὲ γεωργοὺς καὶ τοὺς1 τεχνίτας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας. ἐγκλήματα δὲ καὶ δίκαι καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ταῖς πόλεσιν 13 ὑπάρχειν φησὶ κακὰ πάνθ' ὑπάρξει καὶ τούτοις. 30 καὶ τοιὸν λέγει ὁ Σωκράτης ὡς οὐ πολλῶν δεῖσονται νομίμων διὰ τὴν παιδείαν οἰον ἀστυνομικῶν καὶ ἀγορανομικῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων, ἀποδιδοὺς μόνον τὴν παιδείαν τοῖς φύλαξιν. ἔτι δὲ κυρίους ποιεῖ τῶν κτημάτων τοὺς γεωργοὺς ἀποφοράν ἑροντας- ἄλλα πολὺ μᾶλλον εἰκὸς εἶναι χαλεποὺς καὶ φρονημάτων πλήρεις ἡ τὰς παρ' ἐνίοις εἰλωτείας τε καὶ πενεστείας καὶ δουλείας. ἄλλα γὰρ ἐὰν ἀναγκαία ταῦθ' ὅρισθαι εἴτε μῆ, υἷν γ' οὐδὲν διώρισται, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐχομένων, τίς ἡ τούτων τε πολιτεία καὶ παιδεία καὶ νόμου τῖνες. ἔστι δ' οὐθ' εὑρέθω φάρδιον, οὔτε τὸ διαφέρον μικρόν, 40 τὸ ποιοῦσ τινας εἶναι2 τούτους πρὸς τὸ σώζεσθαι τὴν τῶν φυλάκων κοινωνίαν. ἄλλα μὴν εἰ γε τὰς μὲν γυναίκας ποιήσει κοινὰς τὰς δὲ κτήσεις ἰδίας,


a Or (omitting τοὺς before τεχνίτας) 'For Socrates makes one set of men guardians, a sort of garrison, and another set farmers and artisans and citizens of the other sorts.'
the Guardians adopt some clever device like that of the Cretans? These have conceded to their slaves all the same rights as they have themselves except that they are forbidden gymnastic exercises and the possession of arms. But if the family life and property of the Farmers are to be such as they are in other states, what will be the form of their community? There will inevitably be two states in one, and these antagonistic to one another. For Socrates makes the Guardians a sort of garrison, while the Farmers, 13 Artisans and other classes are the citizens. But quarrels and lawsuits and all the other evils which according to Socrates exist in actual states will all be found among his citizens too. Yet he says that owing to their education they will not need many regulations such as city and market by-laws and the other regulations of that sort, although he assigns his education only to the Guardians. Again, he makes the Farmers the masters of the estates, for which they pay rent; but they are likely to be far more unmanageable and rebellious than the classes of helots, serfs and slaves in certain states to-day.

However, whether this communism is to be compulsory for the Farmers in the same way as for the Guardians or whether it is not, has as a matter of fact not been definitely stated anywhere, nor is there any information about the connected questions, what are to be the political functions and the education of the lower classes, and the laws affecting them. But it is not easy to discover the answers to these questions, yet the character of the lower classes is of no small importance for the preservation of the community of the Guardians. But again, if Socrates intends to make the Farmers have their wives in
τις οἰκονομήσει ὀσπέρ τὰ ἐπὶ τῶν ἁγρῶν οἱ ἄνδρες αὐτῶν; κἂν εἰ κοιναὶ αἱ κτήσεις καὶ αἱ τῶν γεωργῶν γυναῖκες . . . 1

Ατοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐκ τῶν θηρίων ποιεῖσθαι τὴν 15 παραβολήν, ὅτι δεῖ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιτήδευσιν τὰς γυναίκας τοῖς ἀνδράσιν, ὅσα οἰκονομίας οὐδὲν μέτεστιν. ἐπισφαλὲς δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἀρχοντας ὡς καθίστην ὁ Σωκράτης· αἰε γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀρχοντας, τότε δὲ στάσεως αὕτων γίνεται καὶ παρὰ τοῖς μηδὲν ἀξίωμα κεκτημένοις, ἢ ποῦ δῆθεν 2 10 παρὰ γε θυμοειδές καὶ πολεμικοίς ἀνδράσιν. ὅτι δ' ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῶ ποιεῖν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀρχοντας φανερόν, οὐ γὰρ ὅτε μὲν ἄλλους ὅτε δὲ ἄλλους μέμικται τοῖς ψυχαῖς ὁ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ χρυσός, ἀλλ' αἰε τοῖς αὐτοῖς, φησὶ δὲ τοῖς μὲν εὐθὺ γυνομένοις μῆξαι χρυσόν, τοῖς δ' ἄργυρον, χαλκὸν δὲ 15 καὶ σίδηρον τοῖς τεχνίταις μέλλουσιν ἐσεσθαι καὶ γεωργοῖς. ἐτι δὲ καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀφαιρούμενος 16 τῶν φυλάκων, ὅλην φησὶ δεῖν εὐδαιμονα ποιεῖν τὴν πόλιν τὸν νομοθέτην. ἀδύνατον δὲ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὅλην, μὴ τῶν πλείστων ἢ 3 μὴ πάντων μερῶν ἢ των ἐχόντων τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, οὐ γὰρ τῶν 20 αὐτῶν τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἄνπερ τὸ ἄρτιον· τούτο μὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τῷ ὅλῳ υπάρχει τῶν δὲ μερῶν μηδετέρως, τὸ δὲ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀδύνατον. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ οἱ φύλakes μὴ εὐδαιμονεῖς, τῖνες ἐτεροί; οὐ γὰρ δὴ οἳ γε τεχνίται καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τὸ τῶν βαναυσιῶν.

1 lacunam Thurot.

2 ἢ που δῆθεν Goettling: ἢπονθεν δὴ, εἴπονθεν δὴ codd.

3 ei Victorius.

A passage has been lost here.
common but their property private, who is to manage the household in the way in which the women's husbands will carry on the work of the farms? And if the property and the wives of the Farmers are to be common . . .

It is also strange that Socrates employs the comparison of the lower animals to show that the women are to have the same occupations as the men, considering that animals have no households to manage. Also Socrates' method of appointing the magistrates is not a safe one. For he makes the same persons hold office always; but this occasions rebellion even among people of no special distinction, much more so then among high-spirited and warlike men. But it is clear that he is compelled to make the same persons govern always, for the god-given admixture of gold in the soul is not bestowed on some at one time and others at another time, but is always in the same men, and Socrates says that at the moment of birth some men receive an admixture of gold and others of silver and those who are to be the Artisans and Farmers an admixture of copper and iron. And again, although he deprives the Guardians of happiness, he says that it is the duty of the lawgiver to make the whole city happy. But it is not possible for the whole to be happy unless most or all of its parts, or some of them, possess happiness. For happiness is not a thing of the same sort as being an even number: that may belong to a whole but not to either of its parts, but happiness cannot belong to the whole and not to its parts. But yet, if the Guardians are not happy, what other class is? For clearly the Artisans and the general mass of the vulgar classes are not.
'Η μὲν οὖν πολιτεία περί ἄριστος ὁ Σωκράτης εὑρηκεν ταύτας τε τὰς ἀπορίας ἐχει καὶ τούτων οὐκ ἔλαττους ἐτέρας.

III. Χειδόν δὲ παραπλησίως καὶ περὶ τοῦς Νόμους ἐχει τοὺς ύστερον γραφέντας, διὸ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐνταῦθα πολιτείας ἐπισκέψασθαι μικρὰ βέλτιων, καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ περὶ ὀλίγων πάμπαν διώρικεν ὁ Σωκράτης, περὶ τε γυναικῶν καὶ τέκνων κοινωνίας, πῶς ἔχειν δεῖ, καὶ περὶ κτήσεως, καὶ τῆς πολιτείας τῆς τάξεως (διαφέρεται γὰρ εἰς δύο μέρη τὸ πλῆθος τῶν οὑκοῦντων, τὸ μὲν εἰς τοὺς γεωργοὺς τὸ δὲ εἰς τὸ προπολεμοῦν μέρος, τρίτον δὲ τούτων τὸ βουλευόμενον καὶ κύριον τῆς πόλεως), περὶ δὲ τῶν γεωργῶν καὶ τῶν τεχνών, πότερον οὐδεμιᾶς ἡ μετέχουσί τινος ἀρχῆς, καὶ πότερον ὅπλα δεῖ κεκτήσασθαι καὶ τούτων καὶ συμπολεμεῖν ἡ μῆ, περὶ τούτων οὐδὲν διώρικεν ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν γυναῖκας οἴσεται δεῖν συμπολεμεῖν καὶ παιδείας μετέχειν τῆς αὐτῆς τοῖς φύλαξιν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τοῖς ἐξωθεῖν λόγοις πεπλήρωσεν τῶν λόγων καὶ περὶ τῆς παιδείας, ποιάν τινά δεῖ γίνεσθαι τῶν φυλάκων. τῶν δὲ Νόμων τὸ μὲν πλείον μέρος νόμοι τυγχάνονος ὄντες, ὅληγα δὲ περὶ τῆς πολιτείας εὑρήκεν, καὶ ταύτην βουλευόμενον κοινοτέραν ποιεῖν ταῖς πόλεσι κατὰ μικρον περιάγει 5 πάλιν πρὸς τὴν ἔτεραν Πολιτείαν. ἔξω γὰρ τῆς τῶν γυναικῶν κοινωνίας καὶ τῆς κτήσεως, τὰ ἄλλα ταῦτα ἀποδιδοὺς ἀμφοτέραις ταῖς πολιτείαις.

1 καὶ—φυλάκων supra post 30 κτήσεως Susemihl.

a The last clause, ‘and about—to have,’ has almost certainly been misplaced by a copyist, and should come near the beginning of the sentence, after ‘about property.’
The republic discussed by Socrates therefore possesses these difficulties and also others not smaller than these.

III. And almost the same holds good of *Laws*, also, which was written later, so that it will be advantageous to make some small examination of the constitution described in that book as well. For in *The Republic* Socrates has laid down details about very few matters—regulations about community of wives and children and about property, and the structure of the constitution (for the mass of the population is divided into two parts, one forming the Farmer class and the other the class that defends the state in war, and there is a third class drawn from these latter that forms the council and governs the state), but about the Farmers and the Artisans, whether they are excluded from government or have some part in it, and whether these classes also are to possess arms and to serve in war with the others or not, on these points Socrates has made no decision, but though he thinks that the women ought to serve in war with the Guardians and share the same education, the rest of the discourse he has filled up with external topics, and about the sort of education which it is proper for the Guardians to have. *Laws* on the other hand is mostly a collection of statutes, but the author has said a little about the form of the constitution, and though wishing to make this more suitable for adoption by actual states he brings it round by degrees back to the other form, that of *The Republic*. For except community in wives and property, he assigns all his other regulations in the same form to both states, for he prescribes for both
ARISTOTLE

1265 a

καὶ γὰρ παιδείαν τὴν αὐτὴν, καὶ τὸ τῶν ἔργων τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀπεχομένους ζῆν, καὶ περὶ συνοπτίων ὥσαυτως, πλὴν ἐν ταὐτῇ φησὶ δεῖν εἶναι

συσστία καὶ γυναικῶν, καὶ τὴν μὲν χιλίων τῶν ὑπὸλα κεκτημένων, ταὐτὴν δὲ πεντακισχίλιων.

Τὸ μὲν οὖν περιττὸν ἔχουσι πάντες οἱ τοῦ Σω-κράτους λόγοι καὶ τὸ κομψὸν καὶ τὸ καυνότομον καὶ τὸ ἡττητικόν, καλῶς δὲ πάντα ἵσως χαλεπῶν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ νῦν εἰρημένον πλῆθος δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν

ὅτι χώρας δεῖσαι τοῖς τοσοοῦτοις Βαβυλωνίας ἢ τινος ἀλλῆς ἀπεράντου τὸ πλῆθος, ἐξ ἣς ἀργοὶ πεντακισχίλιοι θρεύονται καὶ περὶ τούτους γυναικῶν καὶ θεραπόντων ἔτερος ὁχλὸς πολλαπλάσιος. δεῖ μὲν οὖν ὑποτίθεσθαι κατ’ εὐχήν, μηδὲν μέντοι αὐδύνατον. λέγεται δ’ ὡς δεῖ τὸν νομοθέτην πρὸς 4

δύο βλέποντα τιθέναι τοὺς νόμους, πρὸς τε τὴν χώραν καὶ τοὺς ἀνδρώπους. ἔτι δὲ καλῶς ἔχει προσθεῖναι καὶ πρὸς τοὺς γειτνιῶντας τόπους, εἰ δὲ τὴν πόλιν ζῆν βίον πολιτικὸν (οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἀναγκαίων ἐστὶν τοιοῦτοι χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ὅπλοις ἀ χρήσιμα κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν χώραν

ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐξώ τόπους). εἰ δὲ τις μὴ τοιοῦτον ἀποδέχεται βίον μὴτε τῶν ἴδιων μήτε τῶν κοινῶν τῆς πόλεως, ὅμως οὐδὲν ἢττὸν δεῖ φοβεροὺς εἰναι τοῖς πολεμίοις μὴ μόνον ἐλθοῦσιν εἰς τὴν χώραν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπελθοῦσιν. καὶ τὸ 5

1 πολιτικὸν μὴ μονωτικὸν codd. plerique.
2 ἀπ[ελθό]ουσιν Bender.

a A euphemism for an aggressive policy, cf. 1327 b 5. Some mss. add 'not one of isolation'; this looks like an explanatory note interpolated.

b Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give 'when they are away from it.'
the same scheme of education, and a life detached from menial tasks, and similarly as regards common meals, except that in the state described in *Laws* he says there are to be common meals for women also, and he makes the Republic consist of a class possessing arms that numbers a thousand, but the state of *Laws* has five thousand.

3 Now it is true that all the discourses of Socrates possess brilliance, cleverness, originality and keenness of inquiry, but it is no doubt difficult to be right about everything: for instance with regard to the size of population just mentioned it must not be overlooked that a territory as large as that of Babylon will be needed for so many inhabitants, or some other country of unlimited extent, to support five thousand men in idleness and another swarm of women and servants around them many times as numerous. It is proper no doubt to assume ideal conditions, but not to go beyond all bounds of possibility. And it is said that in laying down the laws the legislator must have his attention fixed on two things, the territory and the population. But also it would be well to add that he must take into account the neighbouring regions also, if the city is to live a life of active policy, as it will have to use for war not only such arms as are serviceable within its own territory but also such as are serviceable against places outside it; and if one does not accept such a description whether for the life of the individual or for the common life of the state, yet it is none the less necessary for the citizens to be formidable to their enemies not only when they have entered the country but also when they have left it. Also...
πλήθος δὲ τῆς κτήσεως ὑπὸν δεῖ, μήποτε βέλτιον ἐτέρως διορίσαι τῷ σαφῶς μᾶλλον· τοσαύτην γὰρ εἰναι φησι δεῖν ὡστε ζηνὶ σωφρόνως, ὁπερ ἀν εἰ τις εἶπεν ὡστε ζηνὶ εὕ· τούτῳ δ᾿ ἀρ’ ἕστι καθόλου μᾶλλον, ἐπειδὴ ἕστι σωφρόνως μὲν ταλαιπώρως δὲ ζῆν· ἀλλὰ βελτίων ὄρος τὸ σωφρόνως καὶ ἐλευθερίως (χωρὶς γὰρ ἕκατερον τὸ μὲν τῷ τρυφῶν ἀκολουθήσει, το δὲ τῷ ἐπιτόνως), ἔπει ὅμως γ’

εἰσὶν ἕξεις ἀἱρεταὶ περὶ τὴν τῆς οὐσίας χρῆσιν αὐταί, οἴον οὐσία πρᾶς ἤ ἀνδρείας χρῆσθαι οὐκ ἔστων, σωφρόνως δὲ καὶ ἐλευθερίως ἔστων, ὡστε καὶ τὰς ἕξεις ἀναγκαίον περὶ αὐτήν εἰναι ταύτας. ἀτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ τὰς κτήσεις ἰσάζοντα τὸ περὶ ἑπετοῦ τὸ πλήθος τῶν πολιτῶν μὴ κατασκευάζειν, ἀλλ’ ἀφεῖναι τὴν τεκνοποιίαν ἀόριστον ὡς ἰκανὸς ἀνομαλισθησμένην εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ πλήθος διὰ τὰς ἀτεκνίας ὁσωνὸν γεννωμένων, ὅτι δοκεῖ τοῦτο καὶ νῦν συμβαίνειν περὶ τὰς πόλεις. δεὶ δὲ τούτ’ οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀκριβῶς ἔχειν περὶ τὰς πόλεις τότε καὶ νῦν νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὔδες ἀπορεῖ διὰ τὸ μερίζεσθαι τὰς οὐσίας εἰς ὁποσονοῦν πλήθος, τότε δ’ ἀδιαμέτρων οὐσίων ἀνάγκη τοὺς παράξυγος μηδὲν ἔχειν, εἰκὸν τ’ ἐλάττους ὅσι τὸ πλήθος εάν τε πλείονος. μᾶλλον δὲ δεῖν ὑπολάβοι τις ἄν 7 ὁρίζατι τῆς οὐσίας τῆς τεκνοποίαν, ὡστε ἀριθμοῦ τινὸς μὴ πλείονα γεννᾶν, τοῦτο δὲ τιθέναι τὸ πλήθος ἀποβλέποντα πρὸς τὰς τύχας, ἀν συμβαίνῃ

---

1 δ’ ἀρ’ ed.: γὰρ codd.
2 ἐπειδὴ Susemihl: ἕτι δ’ codd.
3 αἱρεταὶ Vettori: ἀἱρεταὶ codd.
4 ἕξεις Susemihl: χρῆσεις codd.
5 [περὶ τὰς πόλεις] Bender.
the amount of property requires consideration: Wealth
would it not perhaps be better to define it differently,
by a clearer formula? The writer says that it ought
to be sufficiently large for the citizens 'to live a
temperate life'—as if one were to say 'to live a good
life'; but really that phrase is too general, since it
is possible to live temperately yet miserably. But a
better definition would be 'to live temperately and
liberally' (for if the two are separated a liberal mode
of life is liable to slip into luxury and a temperate
one into a life of hardship), since surely these are
the only desirable qualities relating to the use of
wealth—for instance you cannot use wealth gently
or bravely, but you can use it temperately and
liberally, so that it follows that these are the qualities
that have to do with wealth. And it is also strange
that although equalizing properties the writer does
not regulate the number of the citizens, but leaves
the birth-rate uncontrolled, on the assumption that
it will be sufficiently levelled up to the same total
owing to childless marriages, however many children
are begotten, because this seems to take place in
the states at present. But this ought to be regulated
much more in the supposed case than it is now, for
now nobody is destitute, because estates are divided
among any number, but then, as division of estates
will not be allowed, the extra children will necessarily
have nothing, whether they are fewer in number or
more. And one might think that restriction ought
to be put on the birth-rate rather than on property,
so as not to allow more than a certain number of
children to be produced, and that in fixing their
number consideration should be paid to the chances
of its happening that some of the children born
10 τελευτάν τιναίς τῶν γεννηθέντων, καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἀτεκνίαι· τὸ δ’ ἀφείσαι, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς πλείσταις πόλεσι, πενίας ἀναγκαῖον αἵτιον γίνεσθαι τοῖς πολίταις, ἢ δὲ πενία στάσιν ἐμποιεῖ καὶ κακουργίαν. Φείδων μὲν οὖν ὁ Κορίνθιος, ὃν νομοθέτης τῶν ἀρχαιοτάτων, τοὺς οἰκους ἱσσοὺς ὑήθη δεῖν διαμένειν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν,
15 καὶ εἰ τὸ πρῶτον τοὺς κλήρους ἀνίσους ἐξὸν πάντες κατὰ μέγεθος· ἐν δὲ τοῖς Νόμοις τούτοις τοῦναντίον ἑστίν. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων πῶς οὐκέμεθα βέλτιον ἂν ἔχειν, λεκτέον ὑστερον ἔλλειπται δὲ τοῖς Νόμοις τούτοις καὶ τὰ περὶ τούς ἄρχοντας, ὅπως ἐσονται διαφέροντες τῶν ἄρχο-
20 μένων· φησὶ γὰρ δεῖν, ὡσπερ εἶ ἐτέρον τὸ ὅσμονον ἐρίου γίνεται τῆς κρόκης, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἔχειν1 πρὸς τοὺς ἄρχομένους. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν πᾶσαν οὐσίαν ἐφίσαι γίνεσθαι μείζονα μέχρι πενταπλασίας, διὰ τί τοῦτ’ οὐκ ἂν εἶν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς μέχρι τῖνος; καὶ τὴν τῶν οἰκοπεδῶν δὲ
25 διαίρεσιν δεῖ σκοπεῖν, μὴ ποτ’ οὐ συμφέρη πρὸς οἰκονομίαν· δύο γὰρ οἰκόπεδα ἐκάστῳ ἐνείμε διελῶν χωρίς, χαλεπών δὲ οἰκίας δύο οἰκεῖν. ἢ δὲ 9 σύνταξις ὅλη βούλεται μὲν εἶναι μήτε δημοκρατία μήτε ὀλυγαρχία, μέση δὲ τούτων ἢν καλούσι πολιτείαν, ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ὀπλιτευόντων ἑστίν. εἰ
30 μὲν οὖν ὃς κοινοτάτην ταύτην κατασκευάζει ταῖς

1 ed.: ἔχειν δεῖν aut déi codd.

---

a Otherwise unknown.
b i.e. the estates are equal, and the number of households fixed, but not the number of citizens.
c Laws 734 e f. In weaving cloth the warp (the threads set up first) must be of strong wool, the woof (the threads woven across the warp) must be softer.
may die, and to the absence of children in the other marriages; but for the matter to be left alone, as it is in most states, is bound to lead to poverty among the citizens, and poverty produces sedition and crime. The Corinthian Phidon⁴ in fact, one of the most ancient lawgivers, thought that the households and the citizen population ought to remain at the same numbers, even though at the outset the estates of all were unequal in size; but in Plato’s Laws the opposite is the case.⁵ However, we must say later what we think would be a better system in these matters; but another question omitted in the Laws is how the rulers will be different from the classes ruled; the writer prescribes that the rulers are to stand in the same relation to the ruled as the warp of cloth stands to the woof by being made of different wool.⁶ And inasmuch as he allows a man’s total property to be increased up to five times its original value, for what reason should not an increase in his landed estate be allowed up to a certain point? Also it must be considered whether the proposed separation of homesteads is not inexpedient for household economy—for the writer allotted two homesteads separate from one another to each citizen; but it is difficult to manage two households.⁷ And the whole constitution is intended, it is true, to be neither a democracy nor an oligarchy, but of the form intermediate between them which is termed a republic, for the government is constituted from the class that bears arms. If therefore he introduces this constitution as the one most commonly existing

⁴ The object was to provide a separate establishment for a married son, Laws 776 a.
πόλεσι τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν, καλῶς εὑρήκεν ἵσως, εἰ δ' ὡς ἀρίστην μετὰ τὴν πρώτην πολιτείαν, οὐ καλῶς· τάχα γάρ τὴν τῶν Δακώνων ἂν τις ἔπαινεσει μᾶλλον, ἢ κἂν ἄλλην τινα ἀριστοκρατικωτέραν. ἔνοι μὲν οὖν λέγουσιν ὡς δὲὶ τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν εξ ἀπασῶν εἶναι τῶν πολιτείων μεμεγμένην, διὸ καὶ τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐπαινοῦσιν (εἴναι γὰρ αὐτὴν οἱ μὲν εξ ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ μοναρχίας καὶ δημοκρατίας φασίν, λέγοντες τὴν μὲν βασιλείαν μοναρχίαν, τὴν δὲ τῶν γερόντων ἁρχὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, δημοκρατεῖσθαι δὲ κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἑφόρων ἁρχὴν διὰ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ δῆμου εἶναι τοὺς ἑφόρους, οἱ δὲ τὴν μὲν ἑφορείαν εἶναι τυραννίδα, δημοκρατεῖσθαι δὲ κατὰ τὰ συνοπτικαὶ καὶ τὸν ἄλλον βίον τὸν καθ' ἡμέραν). ἐν δὲ τοῖς Νόμοις εἰρήται τούτους ὡς δέον συγκείσθαι τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ἐκ δημοκρατίας καὶ τυραννίδος, ἂς ἢ τὸ παράπταν οὐκ ἂν τις θείῃ πολιτείας ἢ χειρίστας πασῶν. βελτιών οὖν λέγουσιν ὅτι πλείους μεγαλύτεροι. ἡ γὰρ ἐκ πλειόνων συγκείμενη πολιτεία βελτίων. ἐπειτ' οὐδ' ἔχουσα φαίνεται μοναρχικὸν οὐδέν, ἀλλ' ὀλιγαρχικὰ καὶ δημοκρατικὰ, μᾶλλον δ' ἐγκλίνειν βουλεύει πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν. δῆλον δ' ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἁρχόντων καταστάσεως· τὸ μὲν γὰρ εξ οἱρετῶν κληρωτοὺς

* Plato wrote 'monarchy,' *Laws* 693 ν (cf. here § 13, l. 23).
of all forms of constitution in the actual states, he has perhaps made a good proposal, but if he introduces it as the next best to the first form of constitution, it is not a good proposal; for very likely one might approve the Spartan constitution more highly, or perhaps some other form nearer to an aristocracy. In fact some people assert that the best constitution must be a combination of all the forms of constitution, and therefore praise the constitution of Sparta (for some people say that it consists of oligarchy, monarchy and democracy, meaning that the kingship is monarchy and the rule of the ephors oligarchy, but that an element of democracy is introduced by the rule of the ephors because the ephors come from the common people; while others pronounce the ephorate a tyranny but find an element of democracy in the public mess-tables and in the other regulations of daily life). In Plato's *Laws* on the other hand it is stated that the best constitution must consist of a combination of democracy and tyranny, which one might refuse to count as constitutional governments at all, or else rank as the worst of all constitutions. A better theory therefore is put forward by those who intermingle a larger number of forms, for the constitution composed of a combination of a larger number of forms is better. In the next place, the constitution in the *Laws* proves as a matter of fact not to contain any element of monarchy at all, but its factors are taken from oligarchy and democracy, and for the most part it tends to incline towards oligarchy. This appears from the regulations for the appointment of the magistrates; for their selection by lot from a list previously elected by vote is a feature common to
κοινὸν ἁμφοῖν, τὸ δὲ τοῖς μὲν εὐπορωτέροις ἐπάναγκες ἐκκλησιάζειν εἰναι καὶ φέρειν ἀρχοντας ἢ τι ποιεῖν ἄλλο τῶν πολιτικῶν, τοὺς δ’ ἁμαισθαί, τούτο δ’ ὀλυγαρχίκον, καὶ τὸ πειρᾶσθαι πλείους ἐκ τῶν εὐπόρων εἰναι τοὺς ἀρχοντας καὶ τὰς μεγίστας ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων τιμημάτων. ὀλυγαρχί-κὴν δὲ ποιεῖ καὶ τὴν τῆς βουλῆς αἴρεσιν· αἱρεύ-12

ταὶ μὲν γὰρ πάντες ἐπάναγκες, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τοῦ πρῶτου τιμήματος, εἶτα πάλιν ἵσους ἐκ τοῦ δευτέρου, εἰτ’ ἐκ τῶν τρίτων, πλὴν οὐ πάσιν ἐπάναγκες ἢν τοῖς ἐκ τῶν τρίτων ἢ τετάρτων, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ τετάρτου μόνοις ἐπάναγκες τοῖς πρῶτοι καὶ τοῖς δευτέρους· εἰτ’ ἐκ τούτων ἵσουν ἀφ’ ἐκάστου τιμήματος ἀποδείξει φησὶ δεῖν ἀριθμὸν. ἔσονται δὴ πλείους οἱ ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων τιμημάτων καὶ βελτίως διὰ τὸ ἐνίοτος ἡ αἴρεσις τῶν δημοσιῶν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐπάναγκες. ὡς μὲν οὖν 13

οὐκ ἐκ δημοκρατίας καὶ μοναρχίας δεὶ συνιστάναι τὴν τοιούτην πολιτείαν, ἐκ τούτων φανερὸν καὶ τῶν ύστερον ἡθησομένων ὅταν ἐπιβάλλῃ περὶ τῆς τοιούτης πολιτείας ἢ σκέψις· ἔχει δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν αἴρεσιν τῶν ἀρχοντῶν τὸ ἐξ αἱρετῶν αἱρετοὺς ἐπικίνδυνον, εἰ γάρ τινα συστήναι θέλουσι καὶ μέτροι τὸ πλῆθος, ἀεὶ κατὰ τὴν τούτων αἱρεθούσων διόνυσον. 25

Τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν ἐν τοῖς Νόμοις 30

τούτοις ἐξεῖ τὸν τρόπον.

1 ἀλλὰ <πρῶτον> ἐκ Lambinus.
2 Engelhardt: τοῦ τετάρτου τῶν τετάρτων codd.

a i.e. a better elective body because representative of all classes.
b i.e. from voting for the preliminary list from the third and fourth classes.
both oligarchy and democracy, but the compulsion put upon the richer citizens to attend the assembly and vote for magistrates or perform any other political function, while the others are allowed to do as they like, is oligarchical, as is the endeavour to secure that a majority of the magistrates shall be drawn from the wealthy and that the highest offices shall be filled from the highest of the classes assessed by wealth. But the writer also makes the election of the council oligarchical; for everybody is compelled to elect, but from the first property-class, and then again an equal number from the second class, and then from the members of the third class, except that it was not to be compulsory for all to vote for those to be elected from the members of the third or the fourth class, and to elect from the fourth class was only compulsory for the members of the first and second classes; and afterwards from those thus selected he says that they are to appoint an equal number from each class. Thus those who elect the members from the highest property classes will be more numerous and better, because some of the lower orders will abstain from voting as it is not compulsory. Accordingly that it is not proper to establish a constitution of this character from a blend of democracy and monarchy appears clearly from these considerations, and from what will be said later when our inquiry comes to deal with this class of constitution; also the provision for the election of the rulers from among candidates chosen at a preliminary election is dangerous, for if even a moderate number of people choose to combine into a party, the elections will always go according to their wish. Such are the points as to the constitution in the Laws.
1266 a IV. Εἰσὶ δὲ τινες πολιτείαι καὶ ἄλλαι, αἱ μὲν ἰδιωτῶν αἱ δὲ φιλοσόφων καὶ πολιτικῶν, πάσαι δὲ τῶν καθεστηκινων καὶ καθ’ ἀς πολιτεύονται νῦν ἐγγύτερον εἰσὶ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων· οὐδεὶς γὰρ οὔτε τὴν περὶ τὰ τέκνα κοινότητα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἄλλος κεκαινοτόμηκεν οὔτε περὶ τὰ συσσίτια τῶν γυναικῶν, ἄλλ’ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀρχονται μᾶλλον. δοκεῖ γὰρ τυσι τὸ περὶ τὰς οὐσίας εἶναι μέγιστον τετάχθαι καλῶς· περὶ γὰρ τούτων ποιεῖσθαι φασὶ τὰς στάσεις πάντας. διὸ Φαλέας ὁ

1266 b Χαλκηδόνως τούτ’ εἰσήγηηκε πρώτος· φησὶ γὰρ δεῖν ᾿ϊσας εἶναι τὰς κτήσεις τῶν πολιτῶν· τούτο δὲ κατοικιζομέναις μὲν εὑθὺς οὐ χαλεπὸν ᾤτο ποιεῖν, τὰς δ’ ἵδη κατοικομέναις ἐργοδέστερον μὲν, ὅμως δὲ τάχιστ’ ἀν ὁμαλισθῆναι τῷ τὰς προίκας τοὺς μὲν πλουσίους διδόναι μὲν λαμβάνειν δὲ μὴ, τοὺς δὲ πένητας μὴ διδόναι μὲν λαμβάνειν δὲ. Πλάτων δὲ τοὺς Νόμους γράφων μέχρι μὲν τνος ᾤτο δεῖν ἑαν, πλείον δὲ τοῦ πενταπλάσιαν εἶναι τῆς ἐλαχίστης μηδενὶ τῶν πολιτῶν ἔξουσίαν εἶναι κτήσεως, καθάπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον.

Δεὶ δὲ μηδὲ τούτῳ λανθάνειν τοὺς οὕτω νομοθετοῦντας, δ λανθάνει νῦν, ὡτι τὸ τῆς οὐσίας τάττον-10 τας πλῆθος προσήκει καὶ τῶν τέκνων τὸ πλῆθος τάττειν· ἐὰν γὰρ ὑπεραίρῃ τῆς οὐσίας τὸ μέγεθος ὁ τῶν τέκνων ἀριθμός, ἀνάγκη τὸν γε νόμον λύεσθαι, καὶ χωρὶς τῆς λύσεως φαύλον τὸ πολι-15 λούς ἐκ πλουσίων γίνεσθαι πένητας· ἔργον γὰρ μὴ

a Otherwise unknown.
IV. There are also certain other constitutional schemes, some drawn up by amateurs and others by philosophers and statesmen, but all of them are nearer to those which have been actually established and by which states are governed at present than are both of those which have been considered; for nobody else has introduced the innovation of community of children and women, nor that of public meals for the women, but they start rather with the absolute requisites. For some persons think that the right regulation of property is the most important; for the question of property, they say, is universally the cause of party strife. Therefore the Chalcedonian Phaleas was the first who introduced this expedient; for he says that the citizens' estates ought to be equal, and he thought that this would not be difficult to secure at the outset for cities in process of foundation, while in those already settled, although it would be a more irksome task, nevertheless a levelling would most easily be effected by the rich giving dowries but not receiving them and the poor receiving but not giving them. Plato when writing *Laws* thought that up to a certain point inequality ought to be allowed, but that no citizen should be permitted to acquire more land than would make his estate five times the size of the smallest, as has also been said before.

But those who bring in legislation of this sort must also not overlook this point, which is overlooked at present, that when regulating the amount of property legislators ought also to regulate the size of the family; for if the number of children becomes too large for the total property, the law is quite sure to be repealed, and apart from the repeal it is a bad thing that many citizens who were rich should become poor.
νεώτεροποιοὺς εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους. διότι μὲν οὖν 4

15 ἔχει τινὰ δύναμιν εἰς τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν ἡ
tῆς οὐσίας ὁμαλότητις, καὶ τῶν πάλαι τινὲς φαινο-
tαι διεγνωσκότες, οἷον καὶ Σόλων ἐνομοθέτησεν,
καὶ παρ᾿ ἀλλοις ἔστι νόμοις δὲ κωλύει κτάσθαι
gῆν ὀπόσην ἡν βούληται τις· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν
οὐσίαν πωλεῖν οἱ νόμοι1 κωλύουσιν, ὥστερ ἐν

20 Λοκροίς νόμοις ἔστι μὴ πωλεῖν ἐὰν μὴ φανερὰν
ἀτυχίαν δεῖξῃ συμβεβηκὸν· ἔτι δὲ τοὺς πολαίους
κλήρους διασώζειν, τούτῳ δὲ λυθέν καὶ περὶ
Λευκάδα δημοτικὴν ἐποίησε λίαν τὴν πολιτείαν
αὐτῶν, οὐ γὰρ ἔτι συνεβαινεν ἀπὸ τῶν ὁρισμένων
τιμημάτων εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς βαδίζειν. ἀλλ᾿ ἔστι τὴν

25 ἱσότητα μὲν ὑπάρχειν τῆς οὐσίας, ταῦτην δ᾿ ἡ
λίαν εἰναι πολλὴν, ὥστε τρυφᾶν, ἡ λιαν ὀλίγην,
ὡστε ξῆν γλύσχρως· δῆλον οὖν ὡς οὐχ ἵκανον τὸ
τὰς οὐσίας ἢσας ποιῆσαι τὸν νομοθέτην, ἀλλὰ τοῦ
μέσου στοχαστέον. ἔτι δ᾿ εἰ τις καὶ τὴν μετρίαν
tάξειν οὐσίαν πάσων, οὐδὲν ὀφελοῦς· μᾶλλον γὰρ

30 δεῖ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ὁμαλίζειν ἡ τὰς οὐσίας, τούτῳ
δ᾿ οὐκ ἔστι μὴ παιδευομένου ἢκανὸς ὑπὸ τῶν
νόμων. ἀλλ᾿ ἵσως εἴποι ἃν ὁ Φαλέας ὁτι ταῦτα
tυγχάνει λέγων αὐτὸς· οἴεται γὰρ δυνῶν τούτων
ἰσότητα δεῖν ὑπάρχειν ταῖς πόλεσιν, κτήσεως καὶ

35 παιδείας. ἀλλὰ τὴν [τε]2 παιδείαν ἦτις ἔσται δεὶ
λέγειν, καὶ τὸ μίαν εἶναι καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν οὐδὲν
ὀφελοῦς, ἔστι γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν μὲν εἶναι καὶ μίαν
ἀλλὰ ταῦτην εἶναι τοιαύτην εἷς ἦς ἐσοφαί τρο-

1 οἱ νόμοι: ἔννοι Buecheler: ἐν' λους οἱ νόμοι Richards.
2 ed.
for it is difficult for such men not to be advocates of a new order. That a level standard of property affects the community of the citizens in an important manner some men even in old times clearly have recognized; for example there is the legislation of Solon, and other states have a law prohibiting the acquisition of land to any amount that the individual may desire; and similarly there is legislation to prevent the sale of estates, as at Locri there is a law that a man shall not sell unless he can prove that manifest misfortune has befallen him; and also there is legislation to preserve the old allotments, and the repeal of this restriction at Leucas made the Leucadian constitution excessively democratic, for it came about that the offices were no longer filled from the established property-qualifications. But it is possible that equality of estates may be maintained, but their size may be either too large and promote luxury, or too small, causing a penurious standard of living; it is clear therefore that it is not enough for the lawgiver to make the estates equal, but he must aim at securing a medium size. And again, even if one prescribed a moderate property for all, it would be of no avail, since it is more needful to level men's desires than their properties, and this can only be done by an adequate system of education enforced by law. But perhaps Phaleas would say that he himself actually prescribes this, as he considers it fundamentally necessary for states to have equality in these two things, property and education. But the nature of the education needs to be defined: it is no use merely for it to be one and the same for all, for it is possible for all to have one and the same education but for this to be of such a nature as to
αιρετικοῖ τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ χρημάτων ἢ τιμῆς ἢ συναμφοτέρων. ἕτι στασιάζουσιν οὐ μόνον διὰ τὴν ἄνισότητα τῆς κτήσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν τιμῶν τούν, τούναντιόν δὲ περὶ ἐκάτερον οἱ μὲν γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἀνισον, οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες περὶ τῶν τιμῶν ἐὰν ἱσαί· ὅθεν καὶ ἐν δὲ ἢ τιμῆ ἢμεν κακὸς ἢ ὅπερ καὶ ἐσθλός.

οὐ μόνον δὲ οἱ ἀνθρωποὶ διὰ τάναγκαία ἄδικοσιν, ὅτι ἀκός εἰναι νομίζει τὴν ἴσοτητα τῆς οὐσίας, ὡστε μὴ λωποδυτεῖν διὰ τὸ μίγον ἢ πεινη, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅπως χαίρωσι καὶ μὴ ἐπιθυμῶσι. ἐὰν γὰρ μείζων ἔχουσιν ἐπιθυμίαν τῶν ἀναγκαίων, διὰ τὴν ταύτης ιατρείαν ἄδικησον. οὐ τοῦν διὰ ταύτην μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ [ἂν ἐπιθυμοῦν] ἵνα χαίρωσι ταῖς ἀνευ λυπῶν ἥδοναις. τι οὖν ἀκός τῶν τριῶν τούτων; τοῖς μὲν οὐσία βραχεία καὶ ἐργασία, τοῖς δὲ σωφροσύνη· τρίτων δὲ, εἰ τινὲς βουλοντο διὰ αὐτῶν χαίρειν, οὐκ ἄν ἐπιζητοῦν εἰ μὴ παρὰ φιλοσοφίας ἄκος, αἱ γὰρ ἄλλαι ἀνθρώπων δέονται. ἐπειδὴ ἄδικοσι γε τὰ μέγιστα διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολάς, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὰ ἀναγκαία (οἶνον τυραννόσιν οὐχ ἵνα μὴ μίγον, διὸ καὶ αἱ τιμαὶ μεγάλαι αὖ ἀποκείμεν τὶς οὐ κλέπτην ἀλλὰ τύραννον). ὡστε πρὸς τὰς μικρὰς ἄδικιας βοηθητικὸς μόνον ἃ τρόπος τῆς Φαλέου πολιτείας. ἐτὶ τὰ πολλὰ βούλεται.
make them desirous of getting more than their share of money or honour or both; moreover civil strife is caused not only by inequality of property, but also by inequality of honours, though the two motives operate in opposite ways—the masses are discontented if possessions are unequally distributed, the upper classes if honours are equally distributed, bringing it about that

Noble or base in the like honour stand.\(^b\)

Nor do men do wrong for the sake of the bare necessities only, the sort of wrongdoing for which Phaleas thinks that equality of substance is a cure—preventing highway robbery by removing the motive of cold or hunger; men also do wrong to gain pleasure and to satisfy desire. For if they have a desire above the bare necessities of existence, they will transgress to cure this desire; and moreover not because of desire only, but in order that they may enjoy the pleasures that are not associated with pains. What remedy then is there for these three classes of offences? For the first class, a modest competence and work; for the second, temperance; and as for the third sort, any people who desired pleasures depending on themselves could seek no cure for their desires save that which is derived from philosophy, for the other pleasures require the aid of fellow-creatures. Since clearly the greatest transgressions spring from a desire for superfluities, not for bare necessaries (for example, men do not become tyrants in order to avoid shivering with cold, and accordingly high honours are awarded to one who kills a tyrant, but not to one who kills a thief); so that the method of the constitution of Phaleas is efficacious only against the minor social disorders. Again, Phaleas desires to
A strong hold on the coast of Asia Minor acquired by Eubulus, a Bithynian banker, when the Persian empire was breaking up, middle 4th century B.C.; Autophradas was a Persian general.

116
frame institutions for the most part which will lead to a right state of affairs in the internal relations of the citizens, but the legislator should also have regard to relations with the neighbouring peoples and with all foreign nations. It is essential therefore for the constitution to be framed with a view to military strength, about which Phaleas has said nothing. And the same is true also about property; for the citizens should not only possess enough to meet their requirements in civic life, but also to encounter the perils that face them from outside; hence they should possess neither so large an amount of wealth that it will be coveted by their neighbours and by stronger states while its possessors will be unable to repel their assailants, nor yet so small an amount as not to be capable of sustaining a war even against equal and similar states. Phaleas, it is true, has laid down no rule at all, but the question must not be overlooked, what amount of wealth is advantageous. Perhaps therefore the best limit to prescribe is that it must not profit a stronger people to make war upon the state because of its excessive wealth, but only just as it might do even if the citizens had not got so much property. For example, when Autophradates was about to lay siege to Atarneus, Eubulus bade him consider how long it would take him to capture the place, and then calculate what his expenditure would be for that period, for he himself was willing for the payment of a smaller sum than that to evacuate Atarneus at once; these words caused Autophradates to ponder and led him to abandon the siege. Now equality of property among the citizens is certainly one of the factors that contribute to the avoidance of party faction; it is not however

POLITICS; II. iv. 9–11
ARISTOTLE

1267 a 40 ως εἴπειν. καὶ γὰρ ἂν οἱ χαρίεντες ἀγανακτοῦσιν ὡς ὁ κῦκλος ὄντες ἁξίου, διὸ καὶ φαίνονται πολὺ
1267 b λάκις ἐπιτυθέμενοι καὶ στασιάζοντες. ἐτί δὲ ἡ πονηρία τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπληστον, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον
mὲν ἰκανὸν διωβολία μόνον, ὅταν δὲ ἡδὴ τοῦτ ἕν πάτριον, ἀεὶ δεόντων τοῦ πλείονος, ἐως εἰς ἀπειρὸν ἐλθωσιν ἀπειρὸς γὰρ ἡ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας φύσις, ἦσ
5 πρὸς τὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ζῶσιν. τῶν οὖν τοιούτων ἀρχῆς, μᾶλλον τοῦ τὰς οὐσίας ὁμαλίζειν,
tοῦ τοὺς μὲν ἐπιεικεῖς τῇ φύσει τοιούτους παρα- σκευάζειν ὥστε μὴ βουλεσθαί πλεονεκτεῖν, τοὺς
dὲ φαινοὺς ὅτε μὴ δύνασθαι τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν ἂν ἄττους τε ὧσι καὶ μὴ ἁδικῶνται. οὐ καλῶς δὲ
10 οὐδὲ τὴν ἱσότητα τῆς οὐσίας εὑρισκεῖν περὶ γὰρ τὴν τῆς γῆς κτῆσιν ἱσάζει μόνον, ἔστι δὲ καὶ δούλων καὶ
βοσκημάτων πλοῦτος καὶ νομίσματος, καὶ κατασκευὴ πολλῆ τῶν καλουμένων ἑπίπλων. ἢ
pάντων οὖν τοιῶν ἱσότητα ζητήτεον ἢ τάξιν τινὰ
μετρίαι, ἢ πάντα ἐστέον. φαίνεται δὲ ἐκ τῆς
15 νομοθεσίας κατασκευάζων τὴν πόλιν μικρὰν, εἰ γ' οἱ τεχνῖται πάντες δημόσιοι ἐσονται καὶ μὴ πλη-
ρωμά τι παρέξουσι τῆς πόλεως. ἀλλ' εἴπερ δεῖ
dημοσιόν εἶναι, τοὺς τὰ κοινὰ ἐργαζομένους δεῖ
(καθάπερ ἐν 'Επιδάμνῳ τε καὶ ως Σιδηρατός ποτὲ
kατεσκευάζειν 'Αθηναίοι) τοῦτον ἔχειν τὸν τρόπον.
20 Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Φαλέου πολιτείας σχεδὸν ἐκ

1 ὃς MP: ἂν ὃς cet.
2 ἀκος Schneider: ἀπωγῇ Vermehren.
3 καὶ ὃς Morel: καὶ codd.

a Twopence-halfpenny for a seat in the theatre at Athens paid for citizens by the State after the time of Pericles.
118
POLITICS, II. iv. 11-13

a particularly important one. For the upper classes may resent it on the ground that their merits are not equal, owing to which we actually see them often attacking the government and rebelling; and also the baseness of human beings is a thing insatiable, and though at the first a dole of only two obols is enough, yet when this has now become an established custom, they always want more, until they get to an unlimited amount; for appetite is in its nature unlimited, and the majority of mankind live for the satisfaction of appetite. The starting-point in such matters therefore, rather than levelling estates, is to train those that are respectable by nature so that they may not wish for excessive wealth, and to contrive that the base may not be able to do so, and this is secured if they are kept inferior, while not unjustly treated. And also we cannot approve what Phaleas has said about equality of property, for he makes the citizens equal in respect of landed estate only, but wealth also consists in slaves and cattle and money, and there is an abundance of property in the shape of what is called furniture; we must therefore either seek to secure equality or some moderate regulation as regards all these things, or we must permit all forms of wealth. And it is clear from Phaleas's legislation that he makes the citizen-population a small one, inasmuch as all the artisans are to be publicly owned slaves and are not to contribute to the complement of the state. But if it is proper to have public slaves, it is the labourers employed upon the public works who ought to be of that status (as is the case at Epidamnus and as Diophantus once tried to institute at Athens).

These remarks may serve fairly well to indicate
toûtwn ὡν τις θεωρήσειν εἰ τι τυγχάνει καλῶς εἰρηκὼς ἢ μὴ καλῶς.

V. Ἱππόδαμος δὲ Εὐρυφῶντος Μιλήσιος (ὅς καὶ 1 τὴν τῶν πόλεων διαίρεσιν ἔθεκ καὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ κατέτημεν, γενόμενος καὶ περὶ τὸν ἄλλον βίον 25 περιττότερος διὰ φιλοτιμίαν οὕτως ὠστε δοκεῖν ἐνίοτες ἥν περιεργότερον τριχῶν τε πλῆθει καὶ κόσμῳ πολυτελεί, ἔτι δὲ ἔσθητος2 εὐτελοῦς μὲν ἀλεεινῆς δὲ οὕκ ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι μόνον ἄλλα καὶ περὶ τοὺς θερινοὺς χρόνους, λόγιος δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν ὀλὴν φύσιν εἶναι βουλόμενος) πρῶτος τῶν μή
30 πολυτευμένων ἐνεχειρήσε τι περὶ πολυτελείας εἰπεῖν τῆς ἀρίστης. κατεσκευάζε ὑδ τὴν πόλιν τῷ πλῆθει 2 μὲν μυριάνδρον, εἰς τρία δὲ μέρη διηρημενήν· ἐποίει γὰρ ἐν μὲν μέρος τεχνίτας, ἐν δὲ γεωργοὺς, τρίτον δὲ τὸ προπολεμούν καὶ τὰ ὀπλα ἔχον. διήρει δε' εἰς τρία μέρη τῆν χώραν, τὴν μὲν ἱερὰν 35 τὴν δε δημοσιαν τὴν δ' ἵδιαν ν' οὖν μὲν τὰ νομίζομενα ποιήσουσι πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς, ἱερὰν, ἀφ' ὄν δ' οἱ προπολεμοῦντες βιώσονται, κοινήν, τὴν δὲ τῶν γεωργῶν ἵδιαν, ᾑτεο δ' εἰδή καὶ τῶν νόμων εἶναι τρία μόνων' περὶ δὲ οὖν γὰρ αἱ δίκαι γίνονται, τρία ταῦτ' εἶναι τὸν ἀριθμὸν, ὑβρίν βλάβην θάνατον. 40 ενομοβεῖ δε καὶ δικαστήριον ἐν τῷ κύριον εἰς δ' 3 πάσας ἀνάγεσθαι δεῖν τὰς μή καλῶς κεκρίσθαι δοκούσας δίκας, τούτο δὲ κατεσκευάζεν ἐκ τινῶν γερόντων αἱρετῶν. τὰς δὲ κρίσεις ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις οὗ διὰ ψηφοφορίαν ᾑτεο γίνονται δεῖν,

1 κόσμῳ πολυτελεί codd. aliqui: κόμης ΓΜΠ1.
2 ἔσθητος <χρήσει>? Richards.

a Architect and town-planner (see 1330 b 24), c. 475 B.C. This personal sketch anticipates the manner of Theophrastus. 120
such merits and defects as may be contained in the constitution of Phaleas.

1 V. Hippodamus a son of Euryphon, a Milesian (who invented the division of cities into blocks and cut up Piraeus, and who also became somewhat eccentric in his general mode of life owing to a desire for distinction, so that some people thought that he lived too fussily, with a quantity of hair b and expensive ornaments, and also a quantity of cheap yet warm clothes not only in winter but also in the summer periods, and who wished to be a man of learning in natural science generally), was the first man not engaged in politics who attempted to speak on the subject of the best form of constitution. His system was for a city with a population of ten thousand, divided into three classes; for he made one class of artisans, one of farmers, and the third the class that fought for the state in war and was the armed class. He divided the land into three parts, one sacred, one public and one private: sacred land to supply the customary offerings to the gods, common land to provide the warrior class with food, and private land to be owned by the farmers. He thought that there are only three divisions of the law, since the matters about which lawsuits take place are three in number—outrage, damage, homicide. He also proposed to establish one supreme court of justice, to which were to be carried up all the cases at law thought to have been decided wrongly, and this court he made to consist of certain selected elders. He held that the verdicts in the courts ought not to be given by ballot, but that each juryman should

b At Sparta men wore their hair long, but at Athens this was the mark of a dandy.
ἈΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΕΣ

1268 a

ἀλλὰ φέρειν ἐκαστὸν πινάκιον, ἐν ὧν γράφειν, εἰ καταδικάζοι ἀπλῶς, τὴν δίκην, εἰ δ᾽ ἀπολύων ἀπλῶς, κενὸν, ἐι δὲ τὸ μὲν τὸ δὲ μὴ, τοῦτο διορίζειν. νῦν γὰρ οὐκ ἤφετο νευομοθετήσαι καλῶς, ἀναγκάζειν γὰρ ἐπιορκεῖν ἢ ταῦτα ἢ ταῦτα δικάζοντας. ἐτίθει δὲ νόμον περὶ τῶν εὐρισκόντων τι 4 τῆς πόλει συμφέρον, ὅπως τυγχάνωσι τιμῆς, καὶ τοῖς παισὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τελευτῶντων ἐκ δημοσίου γίνεσθαι τὴν τροφήν, ὡς οὕτω τούτῳ παρ᾽ ἄλλοις νευομοθετημένον· ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν ᾿Αθήναις οὗτος ὁ νόμος νῦν καὶ ἐν ἑτέραις τῶν πόλεων. τοὺς δ᾽ ἀρχοντας αἰρετοὺς ὑπὸ τοῦ δῆμου εἶναι πάντας, δῆμον δ᾽ ἐποίει τὰ τρία μέρη τῆς πόλεως· τοὺς δ᾽ αἰρεθέντας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι κοινῶν καὶ ἥνικῶν καὶ ὅρφαινων. τὰ μὲν οὕν πλείστα καὶ τὰ μάλιστα ἄξιόλογα τῆς ᾿Ιπποδάμου τάξεως ταυτ’ ἐστὶν. ἀπορήσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις πρῶτον μὲν τὴν 5 διαίρεσιν τοῦ πλήθους τῶν πολιτῶν. οἱ τε γὰρ τεχνίται καὶ οἱ γεωργοὶ καὶ οἱ τὰ ὀπλα ἔχοντες κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας πάντες, οἱ μὲν γεωργοὶ οὐκ ἔχοντες ὀπλα, οἱ δὲ τεχνίται οὔτε γῆν οὔτε ὀπλα, ὡστε γίνονται σχεδὸν δοῦλοι τῶν τὰ ὀπλα κεκτημένων. μετέχειν μὲν οὕν πασῶν τῶν τιμῶν ἀδύνατον (ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐκ τῶν τὰ ὀπλα ἔχοντων καθίστασθαι καὶ στρατηγοὺς καὶ πολιτοφύλακας καὶ τὰς κυριωτάτας ἄρχας ὡς εἰπεῖν). μὴ μετ- ἔχοντας δὲ τῆς πολιτείας πῶς οἶον τε φιλικῶς ἔχειν

1 κενὸν <ἐὰν> Meier.
POLITICS, II. v. 3-5

bring a tablet on which if he found a simple verdict of guilty he should write the penalty, and if simply not guilty leave a blank, but if he found the prisoner guilty on some counts but not on others he should state this; for the present state of the law he thought unsatisfactory, since it forces jurors to commit perjury by giving either the one verdict or the other. He proposed a law that those who discovered something of advantage to the state should receive honour, and that the children of those who died in war should have their maintenance from the state, in the belief that this had never yet been provided by law among other people—but as a matter of fact this law exists at present both at Athens and in others of the cities. The governing officials were all to be chosen by the assembly of the people, and this he made to consist of the three classes of the city; and the officials elected were to superintend the business of the community and the affairs of foreign residents and of orphans. These then are the greatest number and the most noteworthy of the provisions in the system of Hippodamus. But doubt might be raised first of all about the division of the general mass of the citizens. The artisans, the farmers and the military class all participate in the government, though the farmers have not got arms and the artisans neither arms nor land, which makes them almost the slaves of those who possess the arms. Therefore for them to share in all the offices is impossible (for it is inevitable that both military commanders and civic guards and in general the most important offices should be appointed from those that have the arms); but if they do not share in the government of the state, how is it possible for them to be friendly towards the
Militaristic posts must be filled by the military class; civilians will feel excluded and be disaffected; and the military class may not be strong enough to control them. Better, then, not to give full citizenship to civilians.
But it may be said that the ruling class as possessing the arms is bound to be stronger than both classes. But this is not easy if they are not numerous; and if this be the case, why should the other classes participate in the government and control the appointment of the rulers? Again, what use are the farmers to the state? Artisans there must necessarily be (for every state requires artisans), and they can make a living as in the other states from the practice of their craft; but as for the farmers, although it would have been reasonable for them to be a portion of the state if they provided the class possessing the arms with its food, as it is they have private land of their own and farm it for themselves. And again, if the common land from which those who fight for the state are to have their food is to be farmed by themselves, the military class would not be different from the agricultural, but the legislator intends it to be; while if the cultivators of the common land are to be a different set of people from both those who cultivate the private farms and the soldiers, this will be yet a fourth section of the state, holding no part in it but quite estranged from the government. But yet if one is to make those who cultivate the private and the common land the same people, the amount of the produce from the farms which each man will cultivate will be scanty for two households, and moreover why are they not both to take food for themselves and to supply it to the soldiers direct from the land and from the same allotments? All these points therefore involve much confusion. Also the law about trials is unsatisfactory—the permission for a qualified verdict though the charge in the indict-
τῆς κρίσεως ἀπλῶς γεγραμμένης, καὶ γίνεσθαι τὸν δικαστὴν διαυτητὴν. τοῦτο δ’ ἐν μὲν τῇ διαίτῃ καὶ πλείσσων ἐνδέχεται (κουνολογοῦνται γὰρ ἄλλη- λος περὶ τῆς κρίσεως), ἐν δὲ τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ὦκ ἔστων, ἄλλα καὶ τούναντὶ τούτω τῶν νομο- 
θετῶν οἱ πολλοὶ παρασκευάζουσιν ὅτι ὦκ ὦι δικασταὶ 
μὴ κουνολογοῦνται πρὸς ἄλληλους. ἔπειτα πῶς ὦκ 9 ἔσται παραχώδης ἡ κρίσις ὅταν οὐκέλεω μὲν ὦ 
dικαστὴς οὐκταὶ μὴ τοσοῦτον δ’ ὅσον ὦ δικαζόμενος; ὦ 
μὲν γὰρ εἰκοσὶ μνᾶς, ὦ δὲ δικαστὴς κρίνει1 δέκα 
μνᾶς (ἡ ὦ μὲν πλέον ὦ δ’ ἔλασσον), ἄλλος δὲ 
pέντε, ὦ δὲ τέτταρας (καὶ τοῦτον ὦ δὴ τὸν τρόπον 
δήλων ὅτι μεριώσων), ὦ δὲ πάντα καταδικάσουσιν, 
ὦ δ’ οὐδέν; τίς οὖν ὦ τὸ τρόπος ἔσται τῆς διαλογῆς 
tῶν ψήφων; ἔτι δ’ οὐδεὶς ἐπιορκεῖ ἄναγκαζε 
tὸν ἀπλῶς ἀποδικάσαντα ἡ καταδικάσαντα, εἴπερ 
ἀπλῶς τὸ ἐγκλῆμα γέγραπται, δικαίως2 ὥσ ὦ γὰρ 
μηδέν οὐκέλεω ὀ ἀποδικάσας κρίνει ἄλλα τὰς 
eἰκοσὶ μνᾶς: ἅλλ’ ἐκεῖνος ἡ ὦ ἐπιορκεῖ ὦ κατα-
δικάσας μὴ νομίζων οὐκέλεω τὰς εἰκοσὶ μνᾶς. 
περὶ δὲ τοῦ τοῖς εὐρίσκουσι τι τῇ πόλει συμφέρον ὥς 
δὲ ἐγὼ γίνεσθαι των τιμῶν, ὦκ ἔστων ἄσφαλες τὸ 
nομοθετεῖν, ἅλλ’ εὐφθαλμον ἀκοῦσαι μόνον’ ἔχει 
γὰρ συκοφαντίας καὶ κωνῆσεις, ἃν τὐχὶ, πολιτεῖας. 
ἐμπίπτει δ’ εἰς ἄλλο πρόβλημα καὶ σκέψιν ἐτέραν;

1 κρίνει Bekker: κρίνει codd. 2 δικαίως? Greenwood.

The mina, 100 drachmas, may be put at £4 (gold).
ment is unqualified, and the conversion of the juror into an arbitrator. A qualified verdict is practicable in an arbitration even when there are several arbitrators, for they confer with one another about their verdict; but it is not practicable in the law-courts, in fact the contrary to this is provided for by most lawgivers, who prohibit consultation between the jurymen. Then the verdict will inevitably be a confused one when the juror thinks that the defendant is liable for damages but not in so large an amount as the plaintiff claims; for the plaintiff will sue for twenty minae a and the juror will adjudge ten minae (or the former some larger and the latter some smaller sum), and another juror five minae, and yet another four (and they obviously make fractions like this), while others will award the whole sum, and others nothing; what then will be the method of counting the votes? Again, nobody compels the juror to commit perjury who, as the indictment has been drawn in simple form, gives a simple verdict of acquittal or condemnation, if he gives it justly; for the juror who gives a verdict of acquittal does not give judgement that the defendant owes nothing, but that he does not owe the twenty minae for which he is sued; it is only the juror who gives a verdict condemning the defendant when he does not think that he owes twenty minae who commits perjury. As for the view that an honour ought to be awarded to those who invent something advantageous to the state, legislation to this effect is not safe, but only specious to the ear; for it involves malicious prosecutions and, it may even happen, constitutional upheavals. And the matter leads to another problem and a different inquiry: 

Conservatism v. Reform in general.
ἈΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΈ

ἀποροῦσι γάρ τινες πότερον βλαβερόν ἢ συμφέρον ταῖς πόλεσι τὸ κινεῖν τοὺς πατρίους νόμους ἢ τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις βέλτιστον. διότερον οὐ ράδιον τῷ λεχθέντι ταχύ συγχωρεῖν, εἴπερ μὴ συμφέρει κινεῖν. ένδεχεται δ’ εἰσηγείσθαι τινὰς νόμων λύσιν ἢ πολιτείας ὡς κοινὸν ἀγαθόν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πεποίημεθα μνείαν, ἐτὶ μικρὰ περὶ αὐτοῦ διαστείλασθαι βέλτιον, ἔχει γάρ, ὡσπερ εἶπομεν, ἀπορίαν. καὶ δοξείει ὃν βέλτιον εἶναι τὸ κινεῖν· ἐπὶ γοῦν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν τούτῳ συνενήγοχεν, οἷον ιατρικὴ κινηθεῖσα παρὰ τὰ πάτρια καὶ γυμναστικὴ καὶ ὅλως αἱ τέχνει πᾶσαι καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις· ὥστ’ ἐπεὶ μίαν τούτων θετεῖν καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ περὶ ταύτην ἀναγκαῖον ὁμοίως ἔχειν. σημεῖον δ’ ἂν γεγονέναι φαύς τις ἐπ’ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων, τοὺς γὰρ ἄρχαίους νόμους λίαν ἄπλοος εἶναι καὶ βαρβαρικοὺς· ἐσιδηροφοροῦντο τε γάρ οἱ “Ελληνες καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἐννοοῦσιν τοῖς ἄλληλοις, ὥσα τε λοιπὰ τῶν ἄρχαίων ἡστὶ ποιμᾶν ἐστῶν, οἷον ἐν Κύμῃ περὶ τὰ φονικὰ νόμος ἐστῶν, αὖ πλῆθος τοῖς παρασχεθαι μαρτύρων ὁ διώκων τῶν φόνων τῶν αὐτοῦ συγγενῶν, ἔνοχον εἶναι τῷ φόνῳ τῶν φεύγοντα· ξητοῦσι δ’ ὅλως οὐ τὸ πάτριον ἄλλα τάγαθον πάντες· εἰκὸς τε τοὺς πρῶτους, εἴτε
some persons raise the question whether to alter the traditional laws, supposing another law is better, is harmful or advantageous to states. Hence it is not easy to give a speedy agreement to the above proposal to honour reformers, if really it is disadvantageous to alter the laws; and a revolutionary legal or constitutional proposal in the interest of the community is quite possible. And since we have made mention of this question, it will be better if we set out a few further details about it, for, as we said, it involves difficulty. And it might be thought that it would be better for alteration to take place; at all events in the other fields of knowledge this has proved beneficial—for example, medicine has been improved by being altered from the traditional system, and gymnastic training, and in general all the arts and faculties; so that since statesmanship also is to be counted as one of these, it is clear that the same thing necessarily holds good in regard to it as well. And it might be said that a sign of this has occurred in the actual events of history, for (one might argue) the laws of ancient times were too simple and uncivilized: the Hellenes, for instance, used both to carry arms and to purchase their wives from one another, and all the survivals of the customs of antiquity existing anywhere are utterly foolish, as for example at Cyme there is a law relating to trials for murder, that if the prosecutor on the charge of murder produces a certain number of his own relatives as witnesses, the defendant is guilty of the murder. And in general all men really seek what is good, not what was customary with their forefathers; and it is probable that primitive mankind, whether sprung from the
Aristotle believed that man had existed for ever, and that the world had experienced only local cataclysms.
earth or the survivors of some destructive cataclysm, were just like ordinary foolish people, as indeed is actually said of the earth-born race, so that would be absurd for us to abide by their notions. Moreover even written codes of law may with advantage not be left unaltered. For just as in the other arts as well, so with the structure of the state it is impossible that it should have been framed aright in all its details; for it must of necessity be couched in general terms, but our actions deal with particular things. These considerations then do seem to show that it is proper for some laws sometimes to be altered. But if we consider the matter in another way, it would seem to be a thing that needs much caution. For in cases when the improvement would be small, while it is a bad thing to accustom men to repeal the laws lightly, it is clear that some mistakes both of the legislator and of the magistrate should be passed over; for the people will not be as much benefited by making an alteration as they will be harmed by becoming accustomed to distrust their rulers. Also the example from the case of the arts is fallacious, as to change the practice of an art is a different thing from altering a law; for the law has no power to compel obedience beside the force of custom, and custom only grows up in long lapse of time, so that lightly to change from the existing laws to other new laws is to weaken the power of the law. Again, even if alteration of the laws is proper, are all the laws to be open to alteration, and in every form of constitution, or not? and is any chance person to be competent to introduce alterations or only certain people? for there is a great difference between these alternatives. Therefore let us abandon this


ARISTOTLE

νῦν μὲν ἀφώμεν ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν ἄλλων γὰρ ἔστι καίρων.

VI. Περὶ δὲ τῆς Λακεδαμονίων πολιτείας καὶ 1 τῆς Κρητικῆς, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν, δύο εἰσὶν αἱ σκέψεις, μία μὲν εἰ τι καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς πρὸς τὴν ἀρίστην νεομοθέτηται τάξιν, ἐτέρα δ᾽ εἰ τι πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν καὶ τὸν τρόπον ὑπεναντίως1 τῆς προκειμένης αὐτοῖς πολιτείας.

"Οτι μὲν οὖν δεῖ τῇ μελλοῦσῃ καλῶς πολιτείε- 2 σθαί τὴν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ύπάρχειν σχολὴν ὁμολογούμενόν ἐστιν· τίνα δὲ τρόπον ὑπάρχειν, οὐ διδοῦν λαβεῖν. ἦ τε γὰρ Θετταλῶν πενεστεία πολλάκις ἐπέθετο τοῖς Θετταλοῖς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς Λάκωσιν οἱ Εἰλωτες (ὡσπερ γὰρ ἐφεδρέωντες τοῖς ἀτυχήμασι διατελοῦσιν). περὶ δὲ τοὺς Κρήτας 3 οὔθεν πω τοιοῦτον συμβέβηκεν. αὐτικὸν δ᾽ ἵσωσ τὸ 4 τὰς γειτνιώσας πόλεις, καίπερ πολεμοῦσας ἀλλήλας, μηδεμίαν εἶναι σύμμαχον τοῖς ἀφισταμένοις διὰ τὸ μὴ συμφέρει καὶ αὐταῖς κεκτημέναις περιοίκους· τοῖς δὲ Λάκωσιν οἱ γειτνιώντες ἐχθροὶ πάντες ἦσαν, Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Μεσσήνιοι καὶ Ἀρ- 5 κάδεστε· ἐπεὶ καὶ τοὺς Θετταλοὺς κατ᾽ ἄρχας ἀφισταντὸ διὰ τὸ πολεμεῖν ἐτί τοῖς προσχώροις, Ἀχαιοὶς καὶ Περραιβοῖς καὶ Μάγνησιν. ἔσικε δὲ 4 καὶ εἰ μηδὲν ἐτερον, ἀλλὰ τὸ γε τῆς ἐπιμελείας ἑργῶδες εἶναι, τίνα δὲ πρὸς αὐτοῦς ὀμιλήσαι τρόπον ἀνεμένοι τέ γὰρ ὑβρίζουσι καὶ τῶν ἱσων ἀξιόσων ἐαυτοὺς τοῖς κυρίοις, καὶ κακοπαθῶς 1 <ἐπεναντίως Scaliger.
inquiry for the present, since it belongs to other occasions.

1 VI. On the subject of the constitution of Sparta and that of Crete, and virtually in regard to the other forms of constitution also, the questions that arise for consideration are two, one whether their legal structure has any feature that is admirable or the reverse in comparison with the best system, another whether it contains any provision that is really opposed to the fundamental principle and character of the constitution that the founders had in view.

2 Now it is a thing admitted that a state that is to be well governed must be provided with leisure from menial occupations; but how this is to be provided it is not easy to ascertain. The serf class in Thessaly repeatedly rose against its masters, and so did the Helots at Sparta, where they are like an enemy constantly sitting in wait for the disasters of the Spartiates. Nothing of the kind has hitherto occurred in Crete, the reason perhaps being that the neighbouring cities, even when at war with one another, in no instance ally themselves with the rebels, because as they themselves also possess a serf class this would not be for their interest; whereas the Lacoonians were entirely surrounded by hostile neighbours, Argives, Messenians and Arcadians. For with the Thessalians too the serf risings originally began because they were still at war with their neighbours, the Achaean, Perrhaebi and Magnesians. Also, apart from other drawbacks, the mere necessity of policing their serf class is a troublesome matter—the problem of how intercourse with them is to be carried on: if allowed freedom they grow insolent and claim to be as good as their masters, and if
żwnteș epîbouleúousei kai mìsoûsin. dhîlon onûs òs onûs òk êxeurîskousoi tôn bêltiston tròpôn oîs touto sýmbainei perî tîn eîlwteîan. ἔτι δ' ἡ perî tâs 5 γυναῖκας ἁνέσις καὶ πρὸς τὴν προάρεσιν τῆς πολιτείας βλαβερὰ καὶ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν πόλεως.

15 ὥσπερ γὰρ οἴκιας μέρος ἀνήρ καὶ γυνὴ, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ πόλις ἑγγὺς τοῦ δίχα διηρήθησαί δεὶ νομίζειν εἰς τὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν πλῆθος καὶ τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν, ὥστε ἐν ὁσίων πολιτείαις φαύλως ἔχει τὸ περὶ τᾶς γυναίκας τὸ ἡμείς τῆς πόλεως εἶναι δεὶ νομίζειν ἀνομοθέτητον. ὦσπερ ἐκεῖ συμβέβηκεν· οἶλην γὰρ τὴν πόλιν ὁ νομοθέτης εἶναι βουλόμενος καρτερικὴν, κατὰ μὲν τοὺς ἀνδρας φανερὸς ἐστὶ τιτότος ὁ ὅ, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν γυναικῶν ἐξημέληκεν· ζῶσι γὰρ ἀκολάστως πρὸς ἀπασαν ἀκολασίαν καὶ τρυφερῶς. ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ τιμᾶσθαι τῶν πλοῦτων, ἀλλως τε κἂν τύχωσι γυναικοκρατοῦμενοι, καθάπερ τὰ πολλά τῶν στρατιωτικῶν καὶ πολεμικῶν γενῶν, ἔξω Κελτῶν ἡ κἂν εἰ τινὲς ἐτεροὶ φανερῶς τετιμήκασι τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀρρενας συνουσίαν. ἔοικε γὰρ ὁ μυθολογὴς πρῶτος οὐκ ἀλόγως συζεύξεται τὸν Ἀρη πρὸς τὴν Ἀφροδίτην.

30 ἡ γὰρ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀρρενῶν ὁμιλίαν ἡ πρὸς τὴν τῶν γυναικῶν φαίνονται κατακώχῳ τοῖς τιτοῦτοι. διὸ παρὰ τοῖς Λάκωσι τοῦ ὑπῆρχεν, καὶ πολλὰ διωκεῖτο ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς αὐτῶν· καίτοι τί διαφέρει γυναῖκας ἀρχεῖν ἡ τοὺς ἀρχοντας ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν ἀρχεσθαι;

1 ἀνειμένως? Richards.

~ The textual emendation giving ‘live without restraint’ is probably correct.

134
made to live a hard life they plot against them and hate them. It is clear therefore that those whose helot-system works out in this way do not discover the best mode of treating the problem. Again, the freedom in regard to women is detrimental both in regard to the purpose of the constitution and in regard to the happiness of the state. For just as man and wife are part of a household, it is clear that the state also is divided nearly in half into its male and female population, so that in all constitutions in which the position of the women is badly regulated one half of the state must be deemed to have been neglected in framing the law. And this has taken place in the state under consideration, for the lawgiver wishing the whole community to be hardy displays his intention clearly in relation to the men, but in the case of the women has entirely neglected the matter; for they live dissolutely in respect of every sort of dissoluteness, and luxuriously. So that the inevitable result is that in a state thus constituted wealth is held in honour, especially if it is the case that the people are under the sway of their women, as most of the military and warlike races are, except the Celts and such other races as have openly held in honour attachments between males. For it appears that the original teller of the legend had good reason for uniting Ares with Aphrodite, for all men of martial spirit appear to be attracted to the companionship either of male associates or of women. Hence this characteristic existed among the Spartans, and in the time of their empire many things were controlled by the women; yet what difference does it make whether the women rule or the rulers are ruled by the women? The result is
ταύτο γὰρ συμβαίνει. χρησίμου δ’ οὔσης τῆς θρασύτητος πρὸς οὐδὲν τῶν ἐγκυκλίων, ἀλλ’ εἰπερ, πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, βλαβερώταται καὶ πρὸς ταῦθ’ αἱ τῶν Δακώνων ἡσαν· ἐδήλωσαν δ’ ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν Θηβαίων ἐμβολῆς, χρήσιμοι μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἦσαν, ὤστερ ἐν ἔτεραις πόλεσιν, θόρυβον δὲ παρείχον
πλείω τῶν πολεμίων. ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν οὖν ἔοικε 8
συμβεβηκέναι τοῖς Δάκωσιν εὐλόγως ἢ τῶν γυναικῶν ἀνεσίς, ἐξὸ γὰρ τῆς οἰκείας διὰ τὰς στρατείας ἀπεξενοῦντο πολὺν χρόνον, πολεμοῦντες τὸν τε πρὸς Ἀργείους πόλεμον καὶ πάλιν τὸν πρὸς Ἀρκάδας καὶ Μεσσηνίους· σχολάσαντες δὲ αὐτοὺς 5 μὲν παρείχον τῷ νομοθετῷ προσδοπτευομένους διὰ τῶν στρατιωτικὸν βίον (πολλά γὰρ ἔχει μέρη τῆς ἀρετῆς), τὰς δὲ γυναῖκας φασὶ μὲν ἄγειν ἐπι-
χειρήσαι τὸν Δυκούργον ὑπὸ τοὺς νόμους, ὡς δ’ ἀντέκρουν, ἀποστήναι πάλιν. αὐτίκα μὲν οὖν 9
εἰσὶν αὐταὶ τῶν γενομένων, ὡστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ
ταύτης τῆς ἁμαρτίας· ἀλλ’ ἦμεις οὐ τοῦτο σκοποῦμεν, τῶν δὲι συγγνώμην ἔχειν ἢ μὴ ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ
περὶ τοῦ ὀρθῶς καὶ μὴ ὀρθῶς. τὰ δὲ περὶ τὰς
γυναῖκας ἔχοντα μὴ καλῶς ἐοικεν, ὤστερ ἑλέχθη
καὶ πρότερον, οὐ μόνον ἀπρόφειαν τινα ποιεῖν τῆς
πολιτείας αὐτῆς καθ’ αὐτὴν, ἀλλὰ συμβάλλεσθαι
tὸ πρὸς τὴν φιλοχρηστίαν. μετὰ γὰρ τὰ νῦν 10
δηθέντα τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν τῆς κτήσεως
ἐπιτιμήσειν ἄν τις. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν συμ-
βέβηκε κεκτηθῆσαι πολλὴν λίαν οὐσίαν, τοῖς δὲ
πάμπαιν μικρὰν· διόπερ εἰς ὀλίγους ἦκεν ἡ χώρα.

1 τῶν om. codd. plurimi.

a Under Epaminondas, 369 B.C.
the same. And although bravery is of service for none of the regular duties of life, but if at all, in war, even in this respect the Spartans' women were most harmful; and they showed this at the time of the Theban invasion, for they rendered no useful service, like the women in other states, while they caused more confusion than the enemy. It is true therefore that at the outset the freedom allowed to women at Sparta seems to have come about with good reason, for the Spartans used to be away in exile abroad for long periods on account of their military expeditions, both when fighting the war against the Argives and again during the war against the Arcadians and Messenians, and when they had turned to peaceful pursuits, they handed over themselves to the lawgiver already prepared for obedience by military life (for this has many elements of virtue), but as for the women, though it is said Lycurgus did attempt to bring them under the laws, yet since they resisted he gave it up. So the Spartan women are, it is true, to blame for what took place then and therefore manifestly for the present defect; although for our own part we are not considering who deserves excuse or does not, but what is right or wrong in the constitution as it is. But, as was also said before, errors as regards the status of women seem not only to cause a certain unseemliness in the actual conduct of the state but to contribute in some degree to undue love of money. For next to the things just spoken of one might censure the Spartan institutions with respect to the unequal distribution of wealth. It has come about that some of the Spartans own too much property and some extremely little; owing to which the land
tōtō dé kai diá tōn nómuon tētaktai faiulωs.

οὐνεῖσθαί μὲν γὰρ ἡ πωλεῖν τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἐποίησεν οὐ καλόν, ὀρθῶς ποιήσας, διδόναι δὲ καὶ καταλείπειν εξουσίαν ἔδωκε τοῖς βουλομένοις· καίτοι τότῳ συμβαίνειν ἀναγκαῖον ἑκεῖνος τε καὶ οὕτως. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν σχεδὸν τῆς πάσης χώρας τῶν πέντε μερῶν τὰ δύο, τῶν τ' ἐπικλήρων πολλῶν γυνομένων καὶ διὰ τὸ προϊκας διδόναι μεγάλας· καίτοι βέλτιον ἢ μηδεμίαν ἢ ὀλίγην ἢ καὶ μετρίαν τετάχθαι. 1 νῦν δ' ἔξεστι δοῦναι τε τὴν ἐπικλήρον ὅτω ἄν βούληται, καὶ ἀποθάνη μὴ διαθέμενος, ὅν ἂν καταλήπτη κληρονόμον, οὕτως ὃ ἄν θέλῃ δίδωσιν. τοιγαροῦν δυναμένης τῆς χώρας χιλίων ἵππεις τρέφειν καὶ πεντακοσίους καὶ ὀπλίτας τρισμυρίους, οὐδὲ χίλιοι τὸ πλήθος ἦσαν. γέγονε δὲ διὰ τῶν ἐργῶν αὐτῶν δῆλον ὅτι 12 φαίλως αὐτοῖς εἶχε τὰ περὶ τὴν τὰξιν ταύτην· μίαν γὰρ πληγήν οὕχ ὑπῆρεγκεν ἡ πόλις, ἀλλ' ἀπώλετο διὰ τὴν ὀλιγανθρωπίαν. λέγουσι δ' ὡς ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν προτέρων βασιλέων μετεδίδοσαν τῆς πολιτείας, ὅστ' οὐ γίνεσθαι τότε ὀλιγανθρωπίαν πολεμοῦντων πολῶν χρόνον· καὶ φασὶν εἶναι ποτὲ τοῖς Σπαρτάταισ 2 καὶ μυρίους. οὐ μὴν ἄλλ' εἴτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ ταῦτα εἴπε μή, βέλτιον τὸ διὰ τῆς κτήσεως ὀμαιλισμένης πληθύνειν ἀνδρῶν τὴν πόλιν.

1 hic lacunam Buecheler.
2 τοὺς Σπαρτάτας Buecheler.

a A clause seems to have been lost: ‘Also it would have been better to regulate by law the marriage of heiresses.’

b i.e. the consequent fall in the number of men rich enough
has fallen into few hands, and this has also been badly regulated by the laws; for the lawgiver made it dishonourable to sell a family's existing estate, and did so rightly, but he granted liberty to alienate land at will by gift or bequest; yet the result that has happened was bound to follow in the one case as well as in the other. And also nearly two-fifths of the whole area of the country is owned by women, because of the number of women who inherit estates and the practice of giving large dowries; yet it would have been better if dowries had been prohibited by law or limited to a small or moderate amount; whereas in fact he is allowed to give an heiress in marriage to whomever he likes, and if he dies without having made directions as to this by will, whoever he leaves as his executor bestows her upon whom he chooses. As a result of this although the country is capable of supporting fifteen hundred cavalry and thirty thousand heavy-armed troopers, they numbered not even a thousand. And the defective nature of their system of land-tenure has been proved by the actual facts of history: the state did not succeed in enduring a single blow, but perished owing to the smallness of its population. They have a tradition that in the earlier reigns they used to admit foreigners to their citizenship, with the result that dearth of population did not occur in those days, although they were at war for a long period; and it is stated that at one time the Spartiates numbered as many as ten thousand. However, whether this is true or not, it is better for a state's male population to be kept up by measures to equalize to keep a horse or even to provide themselves with heavy arms.

\( ^{c} \) The battle of Leuctra, 371 B.C.
The five Ephors, elected for a year by the people, were the real rulers of Sparta. The two kings were hereditary; the senate of twenty-eight nobles advised them, and the Ephors presided at the Assembly of citizens over thirty years old, who voted on the measures of the Kings and Ephors but
POLITICS, II. vi. 13–15

13 property. The law in relation to parentage is also somewhat adverse to the correction of this evil. For the lawgiver desiring to make the Spartiates as numerous as possible holds out inducements to the citizens to have as many children as possible: for they have a law releasing the man who has been father of three sons from military service, and exempting the father of four from all taxes. Yet it is clear that if a number of sons are born and the land is correspondingly divided there will inevitably come to be many poor men.

14 Moreover the regulations for the Ephorate are also bad. For this office has absolute control over their most important affairs, but the Ephors are appointed from the entire people, so that quite poor men often happen to get into the office, who owing to their poverty used to be easily bought. This was often manifested in earlier times, and also lately in the affair at Andros; for certain Ephors were corrupted with money and so far as lay in their power ruined the whole state. And because the office was too powerful, and equal to a tyranny, the kings also were compelled to cultivate popular favour, so that in this way too the constitution was jointly injured, for out of an aristocracy came to be evolved a democracy. Thus this office does, it is true, hold together the constitution—for the common people keep quiet because they have a share in the highest office of state, so that owing to the lawgiver's foresight, or else to accident, the Ephorate is advanta-

could not discuss them. The small fleet was commanded by a single admiral appointed for a year by the Ephors and not allowed to hold office twice.

b Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give 'are.'

c Unknown.
ARISTOTLE

1270 b

φερόντως ἔχει τοῖς πράγμασιν, δεὶ γὰρ τὴν πολιτεῖαν τὴν μέλλουσαν οὑζεσθαι πάντα βού-
λεθαί τὰ μέρη τῆς πόλεως εἶναι καὶ διαμένειν κατὰ ταύτα. οἱ μὲν οὖν βασιλεῖς διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν τιμὴν οὖτως ἔχουσιν, οἱ δὲ καλοὶ κάναθοι διὰ τὴν
25 γερουσίαν (ἀθλον γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ αὐτῆ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐστὶν), ὃ δὲ δὴμος διὰ τὴν ἐφορεῖαν καθίσταται γὰρ ἡ ἀπάντων—ἀλλ' αἱρετὴν ἐδει τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι ταύτην ἐξ ἀπάντων μὲν, μὴ τὸν τρόπον δὲ τοῦτον ὅν νῦν, παυδαριώδης γὰρ ἐστὶ λιαν. ἐτὶ δὲ καὶ κρίσεων εἰσὶ μεγάλων κύριοι, ὄντες οἱ
tυχόντες, διότερον οὖν αὐτογνώμονας βέλτιον κρίνειν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰ γράμματα καὶ τοὺς νόμους. ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ ἡ διάστα τῶν ἐφόρων οὐχ ὀμολογουμένη τῷ βουλήματι τῆς πόλεως. αὐτῇ μὲν γὰρ ἀν-
εμένη λίαν ἐστὶν, εὖ δὲ τοῖς ἅλλοις μᾶλλον ὑπερβάλλει ἐπὶ τὸ σκληρὸν, ὡστε μὴ δύνασθαι καρ-
tερεῖν ἀλλὰ λάθρα τὸν νόμον ἀποδιδράσκοντας ἀπολαῦει τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν. ἔχει δὲ καὶ 17 τὰ περὶ τὴν τῶν γεροντῶν ἀρχὴν οὐ καλῶς αὐτῶι. ἐπιεικῶι μὲν γὰρ ὅτι τὸν καὶ πεπαιδευμένων ἰκανῶι πρὸς ἀνδραγαθίαν τάχ' ἀν εἰπεῖε τις συμφέρειν τῇ
pόλει, καὶ τοὶ τὸ γε διὰ βίου κυρίου εἶναι κρίσεων μεγάλων ἀμφιβητήσμον (ἐστι γὰρ, ὃστερ καὶ 1271 a σώματος, καὶ διανοιὰς γῆρας). τὸν τρόπον δὲ τούτον πεπαιδευμένων ὡστε καὶ τὸν νυμβέτον
c τοῦτον ἀποτείκ ωδ οὖν ἁγαθοῖς ἀνδράσιν, οὖν ἁσφαλεῖς. φαίνονται καὶ καταδωροδοκούμενοι 18 καὶ καταχαριζόμενοι πολλὰ τῶν κοινῶν οἱ κεκοι-
1 κατὰ ταὐτὰ Bernays: ταὐτά, ταὐτα, αὐτά codd.
2 πολιτειαν Scaliger.
3 αὐτὴ ΓΜΡIH.

a There is no clear evidence what the method was.
geous for the conduct of affairs; for if a constitution is to be preserved, all the sections of the state must wish it to exist and to continue on the same lines; so the kings are in this frame of mind owing to their own honourable rank, the nobility owing to the office of the Elders, which is a prize of virtue, and the common people because of the Ephorate, which is appointed from the whole population—but yet the Ephorate, though rightly open to all the citizens, ought not to be elected as it is now, for the method is too childish. And further the Ephors have jurisdiction in lawsuits of high importance, although they are any chance people, so that it would be better if they did not decide cases on their own judgement but by written rules and according to the laws. Also the mode of life of the Ephors is not in conformity with the aim of the state, for it is itself too luxurious, whereas in the case of the other citizens the prescribed life goes too far in the direction of harshness, so that they are unable to endure it, and secretly desert the law and enjoy the pleasures of the body. Also their regulations for the office of the Elders are not good; it is true that if these were persons of a high class who had been adequately trained in manly valour, one might perhaps say that the institution was advantageous to the state, although their lifetime of the judgeship in important trials is indeed a questionable feature (for there is old age of mind as well as of body); but as their education has been on such lines that even the lawgiver himself cannot trust in them as men of virtue, it is a dangerous institution. And it is known that those who have been admitted to this office take bribes and betray many of the public interests by favouritism; so that
νωνηκότες τῆς ἀρχῆς ταύτης· διόπερ βέλτιον αὐτοῦς μὴ ἀνευθύνουσ εἶναι, νῦν δ' εἰςών. δόξειε δ' ἂν ἡ τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχὴ πάσας εὐθύνεων τὰς ἁρχὰς· τοῦτο δὲ τῇ ἐφορείᾳ μέγα λίαν τὸ δῶρον, καὶ τὸν τρόπον οὐ τούτον λέγομεν διδόναι δεῖν τὰς εὐθύνας. ἐτι δὲ καὶ τὴν αἴρεσιν ἢν ποιοῦνται τῶν γερώντων κατὰ τε τὴν κρίσιν ἐστὶ παιδαριόδης, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸν αἰτεῖσθαι τὸν ἀξιωθοσίμουν τῆς ἁρχῆς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔχει· δεὶ γὰρ καὶ βουλόμενον καὶ μὴ βουλόμενον ἁρχεῖν τὸν ἄξιον τῆς ἁρχῆς. νῦν δ' ὅπερ καὶ περὶ τὴν ἀλλην πολιτείαν ὁ νομοθέτης φαίνεται ποιῶν· φιλοτίμους γὰρ κατασκευάζων τοὺς πολίτας τούτων κέχρηται πρὸς τὴν αἴρεσιν τῶν γερώντων, οὐδέις γὰρ ἂν ἁρχεῖν αἰτήσαιτο μὴ φιλοτίμος ὃν· καίτοι τῶν ἄδικημάτων τῶν γ' ἐκουσίων τὰ πλείστα συμβαίνει σχεδόν διὰ φιλοτιμίαν καὶ διὰ φιλοχρηματίαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. περὶ δὲ βασιλείας, εἰ μὲν μὴ βέλτιον ἄλλος ἐστὼ λόγος· ἄλλα μὴν βέλτιον γε μὴ καθάπερ νῦν, ἄλλα κατὰ τὸν αὐτοῦ βιον ἑκαστον κρίνεσθαι τῶν βασιλεῶν. ὅτι δ' ὁ νομοθέτης οὐδ' αὐτὸς οἴεται δύνασθαι ποιεῖν καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς, δῆλον· ἀπιστεῖ γοῦν ὡς οὐκ οὖσιν ἱκανῶς ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσιν· διόπερ ἐξεπεμπτον συμπρεσβεύτας τοὺς ἐχθροὺς, καὶ σωτηρίαν ἐνόμιζον τῇ πόλει εἶναι τὸ στασιάζειν τοὺς βασιλεῖς. οὐ καλῶς δ' οὐδὲ περὶ τὰ συσσίτια τὰ καλούμενα φιδίτια νευμοθέτηται

1 cd.: τῶν γ' ἄδικημάτων τῶν αὐτ ὧν γ' ἄδικημάτων codd.

144

a i.e. the Ephors, two of whom went with the Kings.
it would be better if they were not exempt from having to render an account of their office, but at present they are. And it might be held that the magistracy of the Ephors serves to hold all the offices to account; but this gives altogether too much to the Ephorate, and it is not the way in which, as we maintain, officials ought to be called to account. Again, the procedure in the election of the Elders as a mode of selection is not only childish, but it is wrong that one who is to be the holder of this honourable office should canvass for it, for the man worthy of the office ought to hold it whether he wants to or not. But as it is the lawgiver clearly does the same here as in the rest of the constitution: he makes the citizens ambitious and has used this for the election of the Elders, for nobody would ask for office if he were not ambitious; yet surely ambition and love of money are the motives that bring about almost the greatest part of the voluntary wrongdoing that takes place among mankind. As to monarchy, the question whether it is not or is an advantageous institution for states to possess may be left to another discussion; but at all events it would be advantageous that kings should not be appointed as they are now, but chosen in each case with regard to their own life and conduct. But it is clear that even the lawgiver himself does not suppose that he can make the kings men of high character: at all events he distrusts them as not being persons of sufficient worth; owing to which the Spartans used to send their enemies with them as colleagues on embassies, and thought that the safety of the state depended on division between the kings. Also the regulations for the public mess-tables called Phiditia have been badly
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΕΣ

1271 a
tῶ καταστήσαντι πρῶτον. ἔδει γὰρ ἀπὸ κοινοῦ μᾶλλον εἶναι τὴν σύνοδον, καθάπερ ἐν Κρήτῃ. 30 παρὰ δὲ τοῖς Λάκωσιν ἐκαστὸν δεῖ φέρειν, καὶ σφόδρα πενήτων ἐνίων ὄντων καὶ τούτο τὸ ἁνάλωμα οὐ δυναμένων δαιπάνων, ὡστε συμβαινεῖν τούναντίον τῷ νομοθέτῃ τῆς προαιρέσεως. βούλεται μὲν γὰρ δημοκρατικὸν εἶναι τὸ κατασκεύασμα τῶν συστιτῶν, γίνεται δ’ ἥκιστα δημο-

85 κρατικὸν οὗτω νενομοθετημένον μετέχειν μὲν γὰρ οὐ βάδιον τοῖς λίαν πένησιν, ὅρος δὲ τῆς πολιτείας οὔτός ἐστιν αὐτοῖς ὁ πάτριος, τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον τούτο τὸ τέλος φέρειν μὴ μετέχειν αὐτῆς. τῷ δὲ 22 περὶ τοὺς ναυάρχους νόμω καὶ ἐτεροὶ τινες ἐπιτετμήκασιν, ὅρθως ἐπιτιμώντες· στάσεως γὰρ γίνεται αἵτιος, ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῖς βασιλεῖσιν οὕσι στρατηγοῖς αἴδιος ἢ ναυαρχία σχεδὸν ἐτέρα βασιλεία καθέστηκεν. καὶ ὠδὶ δὲ τῇ ὑποθέσει τοῦ νομο-

1271 b θέτου ἐπιτιμήσειν ἀν τις, ὅπερ καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τοῖς Νόμοις ἐπιτετήθηκεν. πρὸς γὰρ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἢ πᾶσα σύνταξις τῶν νόμων ἐστὶ, τὴν πολεμικὴν· αὐτὴ γὰρ χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν. τοιγαροῦν ἐσώζοντο μὲν πολεμοῦντες, ἀπώλυντο δὲ ἀρέσαντες 5 διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι σχολάζειν μὴδὲ ἤσκηκέναι μηδεμίαν ἄσκησιν ἐτέραν κυριωτέραν τῆς πολε-

μικῆς. τούτου δὲ ἀμάρτημα οὐκ ἔλαττον νομι- 23 ξούσι μὲν γὰρ γίνεσθαι τὰ γαθαλὰ τὰ περιμάχητα δι’ ἀρετῆς μᾶλλον η ἄκακας, καὶ τούτο μὲν καλῶς, 10 ὅτι μέντοι ταῦτα κρείττω τῆς ἀρετῆς ὑπολαμ-

βάνουσιν, οὐ καλῶς. φαύλως δ’ ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰ κοινὰ χρήματα τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις· οὔτε γὰρ ἐν τῷ
laid down by their originator. The revenue for these ought to come rather from public funds, as in Crete; but among the Spartans everybody has to contribute, although some of them are very poor and unable to find money for this charge, so that the result is the opposite of what the lawgiver purposed. For he intends the organization of the common tables to be democratic, but when regulated by the law in this manner it works out as by no means democratic; for it is not easy for the very poor to participate, yet their established regulation for citizenship is that it is not to belong to one who is unable to pay this tax. The law about the Admirals has been criticized by some other writers also, and rightly criticized; for it acts as a cause of sedition, since in addition to the kings who are military commanders the office of Admiral stands almost as another kingship. Another criticism that may be made against the fundamental principle of the lawgiver is one that Plato has made in the Laws. The entire system of the laws is directed towards one part of virtue only, military valour, because this is serviceable for conquest. Owing to this they remained secure while at war, but began to decline when they had won an empire, because they did not know how to live a peaceful life, and had been trained in no other form of training more important than the art of war. And another error no less serious than that one is this: they think that the coveted prizes of life are won by valour more than by cowardice, and in this they are right, yet they imagine wrongly that these prizes are worth more than the valour that wins them. The public finance of Sparta is also badly regulated: when compelled
ARISTOTLE

κοινῷ τῆς πόλεως ἐστὶν οὐδὲν πολέμους μεγάλους ἀναγκαζομένους πολεμεῖν, εἰσφέροντοι τε κακῶς, διὰ γὰρ τὸ τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν εἶναι τὴν πλείστην γῆν οὐκ ἐξετάζουσιν ἄλληλων τὰς εἰσφοράς. ἀποβεβηκεί τε τούναντίον τῷ νομοθέτῃ τοῦ συμφέροντος· τὴν μὲν γὰρ πόλιν πεποίηκεν ἀρχήματον, τοὺς δ’ ὑδώτας φιλοχρημάτους.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀ μάλιστ’ ἀν τις ἐπιτιμήσειν.

VII. Η δὲ Κρητικὴ πολιτεία πάρεγγυς μὲν ἐστὶν ταύτης, ἔχει δὲ μικρὰ μὲν οὐ χεῖρον, τὸ δὲ πλεῖον ἦττον γλαφυρῶς. καὶ γὰρ έοικε καὶ λέγεται δὲ τὰ πλείστα μεμιμήθαι τὴν Κρητικὴν πολιτείαν ἢ τῶν Λακώνων, τὰ δὲ πλείστα τῶν ἀρχαίων ἦττον διήρθρωται τῶν νεωτέρων. φασὶ γὰρ τὸν Λυκοῦργον, ὅτε τὴν ἐπιτροπεῖαν τὴν Χαριλάου τοῦ βασιλέως καταλιπὼν ἀπεδήμησεν, τότε τὸν πλείστον διατίμησεν χρόνον περὶ τὴν Κρήτην διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν ἀποικίαν γὰρ οἱ Λύκτιοι τῶν Λακώνων ἦσαν, κατέλαβον δ’ οἱ πρὸς τὴν ἀποικίαν ἑλθόντες τὴν τάξιν τῶν νόμων ὑπάρχουσαν ἐν τοῖς τότε κατοικοῦσιν. διὸ καὶ νῦν οἱ περίοικοι τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπον χρωνναι αὐτοῦς, ὡς κατασκευάσαντος Μίην πρῶτον τὴν τάξιν τῶν νόμων. δοκεῖ δ’ ἡ νῆσος 2 καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν Ἐλληνικὴν περικέναι καὶ κείσθαι καλῶς· πάση γὰρ ἐπίκειται τῇ θαλάσσῃ.

1 Χαριλάου cod. inf., cf. 1316 a 34: Χαρίλαου hic cest.

---
a e.g. by Herodotus i. 65.
b Posthumous son of Lycurgus’s elder brother King Polydektes; cf. 1316 a 34.
c Lyctus was an inland city in the east of Crete, not far from Cnossus.
to carry on wars on a large scale she has nothing in the state treasury, and the Spartiates pay war taxes badly because, as most of the land is owned by them, they do not scrutinize each other's contributions. And the lawgiver has achieved the opposite result to what is advantageous—he has made the state poor and the individual citizen covetous.

So much for a discussion of the constitution of Sparta: for these are the main points in it for criticism.

1 VII. The Cretan constitution approximates to that of Sparta, but though in a few points it is not worse framed, for the larger part it has a less perfect finish. For the Spartan constitution appears and indeed is actually stated to have been copied in most of its provisions from the Cretan; and as a rule old things have been less fully elaborated than newer ones. For it is said that when Lycurgus relinquished his post as guardian of King Charilaus and went abroad, he subsequently passed most of his time in Crete because of the relationship between the Cretans and the Spartans; for the Lyctians were colonists from Sparta, and the settlers that went out to the colony found the system of laws already existing among the previous inhabitants of the place; owing to which the neighbouring villagers even now use these laws in the same manner, in the belief that Minos first instituted this code of laws. Also the island appears to be designed by nature and well situated to be the imperial state, as it lies across the whole of the sea, round which almost

2 Minos, Legendary ruler of Crete, son of Zeus and Europa, and after death a judge in the lower world.
Aristotle

1271b 35 σχεδὸν τῶν Ἐλλήνων ἰδρυμένων περὶ τὴν θάλασσαν πάντων· ἀπέχει γὰρ τῇ μὲν τῆς Πελοποννήσου μικρὸν, τῇ δὲ τῆς Ἀσίας τοῦ περὶ Τριόπτων τόπου καὶ Ῥόδου. διὸ καὶ τὴν τῆς θαλάσσης ἀρχὴν κατέσχεν ὁ Μίνως, καὶ τὰς νῆσους τὰς μὲν ἐχειρώσατο τὰς δ’ ὕβισεν, τέλος δὲ ἐπιθέμενος τῇ Σικελίᾳ τὸν βίον ἐτελεύτησεν ἐκεῖ περὶ Κάμικον.

1272a Ἐχει δ’ ἀνάλογον ἢ Κρητικὴ τάξις πρὸς τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν. γεωργοῦσι τε γὰρ τοῖς μὲν οἱ εἰλωτεῖς τοῖς δὲ Κρησίν οἱ περίοικοι, καὶ συσσίτια παρ’ ἀμφότεροι ἐστίν, καὶ τὸ γε ἀρχαῖον ἑκάλουν οἱ Λάκωνες οὐ φιδίτια ἄλλ’ ἀνδρια, καθάπερ οἱ Κρῆτες, ἢ καὶ δὴλον ὅτι ἐκεῖθεν ἐλήλυθεν. ἔτι δὲ τῆς πολιτείας ἡ τάξις· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐφοροὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἑχουσι δύναμιν τοῖς ἐν τῇ Κρήτῃ καλουμένως κόσμοις, πλὴροι οἱ μὲν ἐφοροὶ πέντε τὸν ἀριθμὸν οἱ δὲ κόσμοι δέκα εἰσίν· οἱ δὲ γέροντες τοῖς γέρουσιν οὐς καλοῦσιν οἱ Κρῆτες βουλήν ἵσοι· βασιλεία δὲ πρῶτον μὲν ἦν, εἰτα κατέλυσαν οἱ Κρῆτες, καὶ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν οἱ κόσμοι τὴν κατὰ πόλεμον ἑχουσιν ἐκκλησίας δὲ μετέχουσι πάντες, ἑκάστῳ δ’ οὐδενός ἐστιν ἄλλ’ ἡ συνεπιφυσικὰ τὰ δόξαντα τοῖς γέρουσι καὶ τοῖς κόσμοις.

Τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν συστιτῶν ἔχει βελτιών τοῖς Κρησίν ἢ τοῖς Λάκωνίν· ἐν μὲν γὰρ Λακεδαίμονι κατὰ κεφαλὴν ἐκαστὸς εἰςφέρει τὸ τεταγμένον, εἰ δὲ μῆ, μετέχειν νόμος κωλύει τῆς πολιτείας, καθάπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρῶτον, ἐν δὲ Κρήτῃ κοινο- 1 μὲν οἱ (vel μὲν Λάκων οἱ) ed.; μὲν codd.

150
all the Greeks are settled; for Crete is only a short distance from the Peloponnese in one direction, and from the part of Asia around Triopium and from Rhodes in the other. Owing to this Minos won the empire of the sea, and made some of the islands subject to him and settled colonies in others, but finally when making an attack on Sicily he ended his life there near Camicus.

3 The Cretan institutions are on the same lines as those of Sparta: in Sparta the land is tilled by the Helots and in Crete by the serfs; and also both have public mess-tables, and in old days the Spartans called them not ‘phiditia’ but ‘men’s messes,’ as the Cretans do, which is a proof that they came from Crete. And so also is the system of government; for the Ephors have the same power as the magistrates called Cosmi in Crete, except that the Ephors are five in number and the Cosmi ten; and the Elders at Sparta are equal in number to the Elders whom the Cretans call the Council; and monarchy existed in former times, but then the Cretans abolished it, and the Cosmi hold the leadership in war; and all are members of the Assembly, which has no powers except the function of confirming by vote the resolutions already formed by the Elders and the Cosmi.

Now the Cretan arrangements for the public mess-tables are better than the Spartan; for at Sparta each citizen pays a fixed poll-tax, failing which he is prevented by law from taking part in the government, as has been said before; but in Crete the system is more communal, for out of all the crops and cattle

* See Thucydides i. 4 and 8. The tradition of the wealth of Minos is supported by the recent excavations at Cnossus.
terws: apó pantwn gar twn gynoménon karpwv te kai boσkηmátwv dhmosiówv kai ek twn1 fórwn ouς fèrouswn oι perioukoi tētakta méros to mewn 20 proś touς theous kai tás kouνás leitourgias, to dè tois svusitíow, ὤς tote ek kouνo tréfesdai pántas, kai gynaikas kai paídas kai andras: proς dè tìn 5 oligositíán ous ωphelumon pollá pefiloșofhkev o noimobéth, kai proς tìn diaxeuśe twn gynai-
kawv oun µη poluteknav, tìn proś touς 4rnevas 25 poûsas ousliaν, peri ἵς e ᾁ faúlws ἡ µη faúlws ét eros èstai toù diasskeφhswa kairós. òti dē2 tα peri tα svusitía béltion té̂nakta tois Kρhos ָη tois Lákwoi, faνerón: tα dè peri tois kósmous éti xeiρov twn efórov. ὢ µen gar ἔxei kakov to 30 twn efórov arxeioun, υπάρχei kai toûtous, gínontai gar oι tuzhóntes: δ' δ' ἐkei swmferéi proś tìn poluteián, èntavθ' ouk èstiv. ἐkei µen gar dìa tò tìn aìresin ek pántwv eiwv metēchon d hímos tīs megísths arχhs boûletai mēnev tìn poluteiáν- èntavθa δ' ouk ε̂ξ ἀpántwv aìrouνta tòus kósmous 35 all' ek twn̄ genvwn, kai toûs gérontas ek twn kekôsmîkotwv, peri ón toûs autoûs àn tīs eîpēe 6 lógous kai peri twn̄ en Lakedaímoni gynomênov.3 to gar anûpêθwvov kai to dìa bión meîzov èstiv Giá̂ras tīs άξías autoûs, kai to µη katâc grâm̄ mata archeîn all' autogunwmonas eîpι̂s halês. to δ' 40 ἑntûxhazewuµή metēchonta tòn dēmou oûdên σημειον

1 ek twn ante fóron Richards, ante dhmosiów codd.
2 dē Lambinus: dè codd.
3 geryntow Congreve.

* This promise is not fulfilled.
produced from the public lands, and the tributes paid by the serfs, one part is assigned for the worship of the gods and the maintenance of the public services, and the other for the public mess-tables, so that all the citizens are maintained from the common funds, women and children as well as men; and the law-giver has devised many wise measures to secure the benefit of moderation at table, and the segregation of the women in order that they may not bear many children, for which purpose he instituted association with the male sex, as to which there will be another occasion to consider whether it was a bad thing or a good one. That the regulations for the common mess-tables therefore are better in Crete than at Sparta is manifest; but the regulations for the Cosmi are even worse than those regarding the Ephors. For the evil attaching to the office of the Ephors belongs to the Cosmi also, as the post is filled by any chance persons, while the benefit conferred on the government by this office at Sparta is lacking in Crete. At Sparta, as the election is made from all the citizens, the common people sharing in the highest office desire the maintenance of the constitution, but in Crete they do not elect the Cosmi from all the citizens but from certain clans, and the Elders from those who have held the office of Cosmos, about which regulations the same comments might be made as about what takes place at Sparta: their freedom from being called to account and their tenure for life gives them greater rank than their merit deserves, and their administration of their office at their own discretion and not under the guidance of a written code is dangerous. And the fact that the common people quietly tolerate their exclusion is no proof that the
ARISTOTLE

1272a τοῦ τετάχθαι καλῶς. οὐδὲν γὰρ λήμματος ἐστὶν.
1272b τοῖς κόσμοις ὁσπερ τοῖς ἐφόροις, πόρρῳ γὰρ ἀποικοῦσιν ἐν νήσῳ τῶν διαφθεροῦντων. ἦν δὲ ποιοῦται τῆς ἀμαρτίας ταύτης ἵππειαν, ἀτόπος καὶ οὐ πολιτικὴ ἀλλὰ δυναστευτικὴ πολλάκις γὰρ ἐκβάλλοντο συστάντες τινὲς τοὺς κόσμους ἢ τῶν
5 συναρχόντων αὐτῶν ἢ τῶν ἵδιωτῶν. ἔξεστι δὲ καὶ μεταξὺ τοῖς κόσμοις ἀπειπείν τὴν ἀρχὴν. ταύτα δὴ πάντα βέλτιον γίνεσθαι κατὰ νόμον ἢ κατὰ ἀνθρώπων βουλήσεωι οὐ γὰρ ἀσφαλῆς ὁ κανών. πάντων δὲ φαυλοτάτον τὸ τῆς ἀκοσμίας, ἦν καθιστᾶσι πολλάκις οἱ ἀν δὴ, μή δίκας βουλωνται δοῦναι τῶν δυνατῶν. ἦ καὶ δὴλον ὡς ἔχει τι
10 πολιτείας ἡ τάξις, ἀλλὰ οὐ πολιτεία ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ δυναστεία μᾶλλον. εἰώθασι δὲ διαλαμβάνοντες τὸν δήμον καὶ τοὺς φίλους ἀναρχίαν4 ποιεῖν καὶ στασιάζειν καὶ μάχεσθαι πρὸς ἄλληλους. καίτοι 8 τί διαφέρει τὸ τοιοῦτον ἡ διὰ τῶν χρόνου μηκέτι
15 πόλιν εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην, ἀλλὰ λύσοιται τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν;

"Εστὶ δὲ ἐπικύνδυνος οὖτως ἐχουσα πόλις, τῶν βουλομένων ἐπιτίθεσθαι καὶ δυναμένων. ἀλλὰ καθάπερ εἰρηται, σῳζεται διὰ τὸν τόπον ἐξενθεσίας γὰρ τὸ πόρρῳ πεποίθηκεν. διὸ καὶ τὸ τῶν περιόρικων μένει τοῖς Κρησίν, οἱ δὲ εἰλωτες ἀφιστανται
20 πολλάκις: οὔτε γὰρ ἐξωτερικῆς ἀρχῆς κοινωνοῦσιν

1 Richards: λήμματος τι codd.
2 οἵ ἂν Coraes: ὅταν codd.
3 τῶν δυνατῶν post 8 ἀκοσμίας codd. (alii hic sed δυναστῶν vel δικαστῶν.)
4 ἀναρχίαν Bernays: μοναρχίαν codd.

a i.e. the defect of the undue restriction of the office.
b See 1292 b 10 n.
c The mss. give 'bring about a monarchy.'
arrangement is a sound one; for the Cosmi unlike the Ephors make no sort of profit, as they live in an island remote from any people to corrupt them. Also the remedy which they employ for this defect is a curious one, and less characteristic of a republic than of a dynasty: often the Cosmi are expelled by a conspiracy formed among some of their actual colleagues or the private citizens; also the Cosmi are allowed to resign during their term of office. Now it would be preferable for all these matters to be regulated by law rather than to be at the discretion of individuals, for that is a dangerous principle. And the worst expedient of all is that of the suspension of the office of Cosmi, which is often brought about by members of the powerful class who wish to escape being punished; this proves that the constitution has a republican element, although it is not actually a republic but rather a dynasty. And the nobles frequently form parties among the common people and among their friends and so bring about a suspension of government, and form factions and engage in war with one another. Yet such a condition of things really means that for a time such a state is a state no longer, but the bonds of civil society are loosened.

And it is a precarious position for a state to be in, when those who wish to attack it also have the power to do so. But, as has been said, it is saved by its locality; for distance has had the same effect as alien-acts. A result of this is that with the Cretans the serf population stands firm, whereas the Helots often revolt; for the Cretans take no part in foreign

---

\textsuperscript{d} Aliens required special permission to reside at Sparta, and the ephors had powers to expel them for undesirable conduct.
ARISTOTLE

οί Κρήτης, νεώτης τε πόλεμος ἕνικος διαβέβηκεν εἰς τὴν νῆσον δὲ πεποίηκε φανερὸν τὴν ἀσθένειαν τῶν ἐκεί νόμων.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν ταύτης εἰρήσθοι τοσαθ΄ ἡμῖν τῆς πολιτείας.

VIII. Πολιτεύεσθαι δὲ δοκοῦσι καὶ Καρχηδόνιοι 1

25 καλῶς καὶ πολλά περιττός πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, μάλιστα δ᾽ ἐνια παραπλησίως τοῖς Δάκωσιν. αὐταί γὰρ αἱ πολιτεῖαι τρεῖς ἄλληλαις τε σύνεγγυς πῶς εἰσὶ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολὺ διαφέρουσιν, ἢ τε Κρητικὴ καὶ ἡ Δακωνική καὶ τρίτη τούτων ἡ Καρχηδόνιων. καὶ πολλὰ τῶν τεταγμένων ἔχει

30 παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς καλῶς. σημεῖον δὲ πολιτείας συν-
tεταγμένης τὸ τοῦ δήμου ἐκουσίον1 διαμένειν ἐν τῇ 
tάξει τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ μὴτε στάσιν ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον εἴπειν γεγένησθαι μὴτε τύραννοι.

"Εχει δὲ παραπλήσια τῇ Δακωνικῇ πολιτείᾳ τὰ 2
μὲν συσσίτια τῶν ἐταιρῶν τοῖς φιδιτίοις, τὴν δὲ
35 τῶν ἐκατόν καὶ τεττάρων ἀρχὴν τοὺς ἐφόρους (πλὴν ὃ ὦ² χείρον, οἱ μὲν³ ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων 
eἰσι, ταύτην δ᾽ αἱροῦνται τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀριστότηθι), τοὺς δὲ βασιλείς καὶ τὴν γερουσίαν ἀνάλογον τοῖς ἐκεῖ βασιλεῦσαι καὶ γέρουσαι, καὶ βέλτιον δὲ τοὺς βασιλείς μὴτε κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι γένος, μηδὲ
40 τοῦτο τὸ τυχόν, εἴτε διαφέρον . . . ἐκ τούτων αἱρετοὺς μᾶλλον ἡ καὶ ἡ λικίαν· μεγάλων γὰρ

1273 α κύριοι καθεστώτες, ὁν εὐτελεῖς ὃσι μεγάλα βλά-

1 ἐκουσίον Spengel: ἐχοσίαν codd.
2 ὃ ὦ Bernays: ὥ codd. 3 μὲν γὰρ codd. cet. plurimi.
4 lacunam Conring.

* Clauses seem to have been lost concluding the account
empire, and also the island has only lately been invaded by warfare from abroad, rendering manifest the weakness of the legal system there.

Let this suffice for our discussion of this form of constitution.

VIII. Carthage also appears to have a good constitution, with many outstanding features as compared with those of other nations, but most nearly resembling the Spartan in some points. For these three constitutions are in a way near to one another and are widely different from the others—the Cretan, the Spartan and, thirdly, that of Carthage. Many regulations at Carthage are good; and a proof that its constitution is well regulated is that the populace willingly remain faithful to the constitutional system, and that neither civil strife has arisen in any degree worth mentioning, nor yet a tyrant.

Points in which the Carthaginian constitution resembles the Spartan are the common mess-tables of its Comradeships corresponding to the Phiditia, and the magistracy of the Hundred and Four corresponding to the Ephors (except one point of superiority—the Ephors are drawn from any class, but the Carthaginians elect this magistracy by merit); the kings and the council of Elders correspond to the kings and Elders at Sparta, and it is another superior feature that the Carthaginian kings are not confined to the same family and that one of no particular distinction, and also that if any family distinguishes itself . . . a the Elders are to be chosen from these rather than by age; for as they are put in control of important matters, if they are men of no value they do great

of the appointment of the Kings and turning to the Elders and their selection on grounds of merit and wealth.
πτοσι, καὶ ἐβλαψαν ἥδη τὴν πόλιν τὴν τῶν Λακε-
ad

τὰ μὲν οὖν πλείστα τῶν ἐπιτυμηθέντων ἢν διὰ τὰς παρεκβάσεις κοινὰ τυγχάνει πάσαις οὖντα ταῖς εἰρημέναις πολιτείαις τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὴν υπόθεσιν τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας καὶ τῆς πολιτείας τὰ μὲν εἰς δήμον ἐκκλίνει μᾶλλον τὰ δ’ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν. τοῦ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μὲν προσάγειν τὸ δὲ μὴ προσάγειν πρὸς τὸν δήμον οἱ βασιλεῖς κύριοι μετὰ τῶν γερόντων ἢν ὄμωνωμονωσὶ πάντες, εἰ δὲ μῆ, καὶ τούτων ὁ δήμος. ὁ δ’ ἢν εἰσφέρωσιν οὔτοι, οὐ διακούσαι μόνον ἀποδιδόσαι τῷ δήμῳ τὰ δόξαντα τοῖς ἀρ-

χουσιν, ἀλλὰ κύριοι κρίνειν εἰσί, καὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ τοῖς εἰσφερομένοις ἀντεπεῖ ἔξεστιν, ὁπερ ἐν ταῖς ἐτέραις πολιτείαις οὐκ ἔστων. τὸ δὲ τὰς πενταρχίας 4 κυρίας οὕσσας πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων ύπ’ αὐτῶν 15 αἴρετας εἶναι, καὶ τὴν τῶν ἐκατόν ταύτας αἴρεισθαι τὴν μεγίστην ἀρχήν, ἐτὶ δὲ ταύτας πλείονα ἀρχεῖν χρόνων τῶν ἄλλων (καὶ γὰρ ἐξεληθυθότες ἄρχονται καὶ μέλλοντες) ὀλιγαρχίκον τὸ δ’ ἀμίσθους καὶ μὴ κληρωτὰς ἀριστοκρατικὸν θετέον, καὶ εἰ τι τοιούτον ἔτερον, καὶ τὸ τὰς ἄδικας ὑπὸ τῶν 2 ἀρχείων δικάζεσθαι πάσας (καὶ μὴ ἄλλας ὑπ’ ἄλλων καθάπερ ἐν Λακεδαιμονί). παρεκβᾶνει δὲ τῆς ἀριστο-

κράτιας η τάξις τῶν Καρχηδονίων μάλιστα πρὸς

1 δὲ περ—οὐκ ἔστι post δήμος 10 tr. Wade-Gery.
2 τινῶν Coraes.

* i.e. both parties agree to refer or not to refer.

* i.e. even when the Kings only or the Elders only desire reference, it takes place.
harm, and they have already injured the Spartan State.

3 Now most of the points in the Carthaginian system that would be criticized on the ground of their defects happen to be common to all the constitutions of which we have spoken; but the features open to criticism as judged by the principle of an aristocracy or republic are some of them departures in the direction of democracy and others in the direction of oligarchy. The reference of some matters and not of others to the popular assembly rests with the kings in consultation with the Elders in case they agree unanimously, but failing that, these matters also lie with the people; and when the kings introduce business in the assembly, they do not merely let the people sit and listen to the decisions that have been taken by their rulers, but the people have the sovereign decision and anybody who wishes may speak against the proposals introduced, a right that does not exist under the other constitutions.

4 The appointment by co-optation of the Boards of Five which control many important matters, and the election by these boards of the supreme magistracy of the Hundred, and also their longer tenure of authority than that of any other officers (for they are in power after they have gone out of office and before they have actually entered upon it) are oligarchical features; their receiving no pay and not being chosen by lot and other similar regulations must be set down as aristocratic, and so must the fact that the members of the Boards are the judges in all lawsuits, instead of different suits being tried by different courts as at Sparta. But the Carthaginian system Plutocracy deviates from aristocracy in the direction of oligarchy
τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν κατὰ τινα διάνοιαν ἢ συνδοκεῖ τοῖς πολλοῖς. οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἀριστικὴν ἄλλα καὶ πλουτικὴν οἴονται δεῖν αἴρεισθαι τοὺς ἄρχοντας,
25 ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὸν ἀποροῦντα καλῶς ἄρχειν καὶ σχολάζειν. εἰπέρ οὖν τὸ μὲν αἴρεισθαι πλουτικὴν ὀλιγαρχικὸν τὸ δὲ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν ἀριστοκρατικὸν,
αὕτη τίς ἂν εἴη τάξις τρίτη καθ᾽ ἡνπερ συντετακται καὶ τοῖς Ἀρχηγονοῖς τὰ περὶ τὴν πολιτείαν αἴρονται γὰρ εἰς δύο ταῦτα βλέποντες, καὶ μᾶ-
80 λιστα τὰς μεγίστας, τοὺς τε βασιλείας καὶ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς. δεὶ δὲ νομιζέων ἀμάρτημα νομοθέτου ἔτη παρέκβασιν εἶναι τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας ταύτην,
εἴ ἂρχης γὰρ τοῦθ᾽ ὧραν ἐστὶ τῶν ἀναγκαιοτάτων, ὅπως οἱ βέλτιστοι δύνασθαι σχολάζειν καὶ μηδέν ἀσχημονεῖν, μη μόνον ἄρχοντες ἄλλα μηδ' ἰδιω-
85 τεύνοντες. εἰ δὲ δεῖ βλέπειν καὶ πρὸς εὐπορίαν χάριν σχολής, φαίλον τὸ τὰς μεγίστας ὄνητας εἶναι τῶν ἄρχων, τὴν τε βασιλείαν καὶ τὴν στρατη-
γίαν. ἐντμον γὰρ ὃ νόμος οὐτὸς ποιεῖ τὸν πλοῦτον μᾶλλον τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὀλην φιλοχρή-
40 ματον: ὃ τι δ᾽ ἂν ὑπολάβῃ τίμιον εἶναι τὸ κύριον, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν δόξαν ἀκολου-
θεῖν τοῦτος: ὅπως δὲ μὴ μάλιστα ἀρετὴ τιμᾶται, ταύτην οὐχ οἶν τ᾽ εἶναι βεβαιώς ἀριστοκρατικὴν
1273 ἄλλων πολιτῶν δόξαν ἀκολου-
θεῖν τοῦτος: ὅπως δὲ μὴ μάλιστα ἀρετὴ τιμᾶται, ταύτην οὐχ οἶν τ᾽ εἶναι βεβαιώς ἀριστοκρατικὴν
πολιτείαν. ἐθίζεσθαι δ᾽ εὐλογον κερδάινειν τοὺς ὄνωμενα, ὅταν δαπανήσαντες ἄρχοντες ἀτοπον γὰρ εἰ πένης μὲν ὄν ἐπιεικῆς δὲ βουλήσεται κερδάινειν, φαυλότερος δ᾽ ὃν οὐ βουλήσεται δα-
most signally in respect of a certain idea that is shared by most people; they think that the rulers should be chosen not only for their merit but also for their wealth, as it is not possible for a poor man to govern well—he has not leisure for his duties. If therefore election by wealth is oligarchical and election by merit aristocratic, this will be a third system, exhibited for instance in the constitution of Carthage, for there elections are made with an eye to these two qualifications, and especially elections to the most important offices, those of the kings and of the generals. But it must be held that this divergence from aristocracy is an error on the part of a lawgiver; for one of the most important points to keep in view from the outset is that the best citizens may be able to have leisure and may not have to engage in any unseemly occupation, not only when in office but also when living in private life. And if it is necessary to look to the question of means for the sake of leisure, it is a bad thing that the greatest offices of state, the kingship and the generalship, should be for sale. For this law makes wealth more honoured than worth, and renders the whole state avaricious; and whatever the holders of supreme power deem honourable, the opinion of the other citizens also is certain to follow them, and a state in which virtue is not held in the highest honour cannot be securely governed by an aristocracy. And it is probable that those who purchase office will learn by degrees to make a profit out of it, when they hold office for money spent; for it would be odd if a man of small means but respectable should want to make a profit but an inferior person when he has spent money to get elected should not want to.
5 πανήσας. διὸ δεῖ τοὺς δυναμένους ἄριστ' ἀρχεῖν, τούτους ἀρχεῖν. βέλτιον δ', εἰ καὶ προεῖτο τὴν ἀπορίαν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν δ' νομοθέτης, ἂλλ' ἄρχοντων γε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς σχολῆς.

Φαύλων δ' ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι καὶ τὸ πλείους ἄρχας τὸν αὐτὸν ἀρχεῖν, ὅπερ εὐδοκιμεῖ παρὰ τοῖς 10 Καρχηδονίοις. ἐν γὰρ ύφ' ἑνὸς ἔργον ἄριστ' ἀποτελεῖται, δεὶ δ' ὁπως γίνηται τοῦθ' ὁρᾶν τὸν νομοθέτην, καὶ μὴ προστάτευε τῶν αὐτῶν αὐλεῖν καὶ σκυτοτομεῖν. ὥσθε' ὁποι μὴ μικρὰ πόλις, πολιτικῶτερον πλείονας μετέχειν τῶν ἄρχων καὶ δημοτικῶτερον κοινότερον τε γὰρ καθάπερ εὑπο-

μεν, καὶ κάλλιον ἕκαστον ἀποτελεῖται τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ θάττων. δὴν δὲ τούτο ἐπὶ τῶν πολεμικῶν καὶ τῶν ναυτικῶν ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἀμφοτέρους διὰ πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν διελήλυθε τὸ ἄρχειν καὶ τὸ ἄρχεσθαί.

'Ολγαρχικῇς δ' οὐσίας τῆς πολιτείας ἄριστα 9 ἐκφεύγουσι τῇ πλουτείᾳ, άεί τι τοῦ δήμου μέρος 20 ἐκπέμποντες ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις· τούτῳ γὰρ ἱδονται καὶ ποιοῦσι μόνιμον τὴν πολιτείαν. ἀλλὰ τούτῳ ἐστὶ τύχης ἔργον, δεὶ δὲ ἀστασιάστους εἶναι διὰ τὸν νομοθέτην νῦν δ', ἂν ἀτυχία γένηται τίς καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἀποστῇ τῶν ἄρχομενων, οὐδὲν ἐστὶ φάρμακον διὰ τῶν νόμων τῆς ἡσυχίας.

25 Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας καὶ Κρητικῆς καὶ τῆς Καρχηδονίων, αἴτιον δικαίως εὐδοκιμοῦσιν, τούτων ἔχει τὸν τρόπον.

1 ἄριστ' ἀρχεῖν Spengel: ἄρισταρχεῖν codd. (ἀριστα σχολάζειν Richards).
2 ἄριστα ἄριστον> Bernays.

a Or 'functions remaining the same, each is done better and more quickly.'
Hence the persons who should be in office are those most capable of holding office. And even if the lawgiver neglected to secure comfortable means for respectable people, it would at all events be better that he should provide for their leisure while in office.

And it might also be thought a bad thing for the same person to hold several offices, which is considered a distinction at Carthage. One man one job is the best rule for efficiency, and the lawgiver ought to see that this may be secured, and not appoint the same man to play the flute and make shoes. Hence except in a small city it is better for the state for a larger number to share in the offices and more democratic, for it is fairer to all, as we said, and also functions are performed better and more quickly when separate than when in the same hands. A This is clear in military and naval matters; for in both of these departments command and subordination penetrate throughout almost the whole body.

But the constitution being oligarchical they best escape the dangers by being wealthy, as they constantly send out a portion of the common people to appointments in the cities; by this means they cure this defect in their system and make it stable. However, this is the achievement of fortune, whereas freedom from civil strife ought to be secured by the lawgiver; but as it is, suppose some misfortune occurs and the multitude of the subject class revolts, there is no remedy provided by the laws to restore tranquillity.

This then is the character of the Spartan, Cretan and Carthaginian constitutions, which are justly famous.

\[ i.e. \] everyone in command (except the commander-in-chief) has someone of higher rank over him.
IX. Τῶν δὲ ἀποφημαμένων τι περὶ πολιτείας ἔνιοι μὲν οὐκ ἐκοινώνησαν πράξεων πολιτικῶν οὐδ’ ὤντωνον ἀλλὰ διετέλεσαν ἰδιωτεύοντες τὸν βίον. περὶ δὲ ὃν εἰ τι ἀξίολογον, εὑρήται σχεδον περὶ πάντων. ἔνιοι δὲ νομοθέται γεγόνασιν, οἱ μὲν ταῖς οἰκείαις πόλεσιν οἱ δὲ καὶ τῶν ὀδυνών τισὶ, πολιτεύουσαν αὐτοὶ· καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν νόμων ἐγένοντο δημιουργοὶ μόνον, οἱ δὲ καὶ πολιτεῖας, οίον καὶ Λυκοῦργος καὶ Σόλων· οὗτοι γὰρ καὶ νόμους καὶ πολιτείας κατέστησαν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Λακεδαιμονίας εὑρηται. Σόλωνα δ’ ἔνιοι μὲν οἱ οὖνται νομοθέτῃ γενέσθαι σπουδαῖον, ὀλιγαρχίαν τε γὰρ καταλῦσαι λιαν ἀκρατον οὐδαν καὶ δουλεύοντα τὸν δῆμον παῦσαι καὶ δημοκρατίαν καταστῆσαι τὴν πάτριον μίξαντα καλῶς τὴν πολιτείαν· εἰναι γὰρ τὴν μὲν ἐν 'Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλὴν ὀλιγαρχικόν, τὸ δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἱρετὰς ἀριστοκρατικόν, τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια δημοτικόν. ἔσωκε δὲ Σόλων ἑκαίνα μὲν ὑπάρχουσα πρότερον οὐ καταλῦσαι, τὴν τε βουλὴν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀρχῶν αἱρεσιν, τὸν δὲ δῆμον καταστῆσαι τὰ δικαστήρια ποιῆσας ἐκ πάντων. διὸ καὶ μέμφονται τινες αὐτοὶ· λῦσαι γὰρ θάτερα, κύριον ποιῆσαν τὸ δικαστήριον πάντων, κληρωτόν ὃν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ τοῦτ’ ἵσχυσεν, ὀσπερ τυράννω τῷ δῆμῳ χαριζόμενοι τὴν πολιτείαν εἰς τὴν νῦν δημοκρατίαν κατέστησαν, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐν 'Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλὴν Ὀφιάλτης ἐκόλουσε καὶ

1 Koraes: θάτεραν, θάτερον codd.
IX. Of those that have put forward views about politics, some have taken no part in any political activities whatever but have passed their whole life as private citizens; and something has been said about almost all the writers of this class about whom there is anything noteworthy. Some on the other hand have been lawgivers, either for their native cities or even for certain foreign peoples, after having themselves been actively engaged in government; and of these some have been framers of laws only, and others of a constitution also, for instance Solon and Lycurgus, who instituted both laws and constitutions. The Spartan constitution has been discussed.

As for Solon, he is considered by some people to have been a good lawgiver, as having put an end to oligarchy when it was too unqualified and having liberated the people from slavery and established our traditional democracy with a skilful blending of the constitution: the Council on the Areopagus being an oligarchic element, the elective magistracies aristocratic and the law-courts democratic. And although really in regard to certain of these features, the Council and the election of magistrates, Solon seems merely to have abstained from destroying institutions that existed already, he does appear to have founded the democracy by constituting the jury-courts from all the citizens. For this he is actually blamed by some persons, as having dissolved the power of the other parts of the community by making the law-court, which was elected by lot, all-powerful. For as the law-court grew strong, men courted favour with the people as with a tyrant, and so brought the constitution to the present democracy; and Ephialtes and Pericles docked the
Περικλῆς, τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια μισθοφόρα κατέστησε
10 Περικλῆς, καὶ τούτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἔκαστος
tῶν δημαγωγῶν προήγαγεν αὐξών εἰς τὴν νῦν
dημοκρατίαν. φαίνεται δὲ οὐ κατὰ τὴν Σόλωνος
gενέσθαι τοῦτο προάρεσιν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀπὸ συμ-
πτώματος (τῆς ναυαρχίας ἡ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς Μηδικῶις ὁ
dῆμος αὐτίως γενόμενος ἐφρονηματίσθη καὶ δημα-
15 γωγοὺς ἔλαβε φαύλους ἀντιπολιτευομένων τῶν
eπιευκών). ἐπεὶ Σόλων γε ἔοικε τὴν ἀναγκαιοτάτην
ἀποδεῖδαι τῷ δῆμῳ δύναμιν, τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἱρεῖ-
σθαι καὶ εὐθύνειν (μηδὲ γὰρ τούτου κύριος ὁ ὁ
dῆμος δοῦλος ἦν εἰς καὶ πολέμους), τὰς δὲ ἀρχὰς
ἐκ τῶν γνωρίμων καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων κατέστησε
20 πάσας, ἐκ τῶν πεντακοσιομεδίων καὶ ξενυγτῶν
καὶ τρίτων τέλους τῆς καλουμένης ἐππάδος, τὸ δὲ
tέταρτον θητικὸν, οἷς αὐξεμάς ἀρχὴς μετῆν.

Νομοθέται δὲ ἐγένοντο Ζάλευκός τε Δοκρός ὁ
tοῖς Ἕπιζεφυρίοις, καὶ Χαρώνδας ὁ Καταναίδος
τοῖς αὐτοῦ πολίταις καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις ταῖς Χαλκι-
25 δικαῖς πόλεις ταῖς περὶ Ἰταλίαν καὶ Σικελίαν.
πειρώτατα δὲ τινες καὶ συνάγειν, ὅς Ὅνομακρίτου
μὲν γενομένου πρῶτον δευτοῦ περὶ νομοθεσίαν,
γυμνασθῆναι δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐν Κρήτῃ Δοκρόν ὄντα καὶ
ἐπιδημοῦντα κατὰ τέχνην μαντικῆν, τούτου δὲ
20 γενέσθαι Θάλητα ἑταῖρον, Θάλητος δὲ ἀκροτητὴν
Ἀνκόρυγον καὶ Ζάλευκον, Ζαλεύκον δὲ Χαρώνδαν.

1 ναυμαχίας Powell.

a Or 'of the sea-fight,' Salamis.
b For Solon's classification of the citizens by the annual
income of their estates see Athenian Constitution, c. vii.
c Perhaps 664 B.C.
d Zephyrium, a promontory in S. Italy.
POLITICS, II. ix. 3-5

power of the Council on the Areopagus, while Pericles instituted payment for serving in the law-courts, and in this manner finally the successive leaders of the people led them on by growing stages to the present democracy. But this does not seem to have come about in accordance with the intention of Solon, but rather as a result of accident (for the common people having been the cause of naval victory at the time of the Persian invasion became proud and adopted bad men as popular leaders when the respectable classes opposed their policy); inasmuch as Solon for his part appears to bestow only the minimum of power upon the people, the function of electing the magistrates and of calling them to account (for if even this were not under the control of the populace it would be a mere slave and a foreign enemy), whereas he appointed all the offices from the notable and the wealthy, the Five-hundred-bushel class and the Teamsters and a third property-class called the Knighthood; while the fourth class, the Thetes, were admitted to no office. Laws were given by Zaleucus to the Epizephyrian Locrians and by Charondas of Catana to his fellow-citizens and to the other Chalcidic cities on the coasts of Italy and Sicily. Some persons try to connect Zaleucus and Charondas together: they say that Onomacritus first arose as an able lawgiver, and that he was trained in Crete, being a Locrian and travelling there to practise the art of soothsaying, and Thales became his companion, and Lycurgus and Zaleucus were pupils of Thales, and Charondas of

Notes on various lawgivers.

6 See 1252 b 14.
7 Colonies from Chalcis in Euboea.
8 Or 'try to make a series of legislators.'
ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν λέγουσιν ἀσκεπτότερον τῶν χρόνων ἔχοντες. ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Φιλόλαος ὁ Κορινθιός νομοθέτης Θεβαῖος.  ἤν δ’ ὁ Φιλόλαος τὸ μὲν γένος τῶν Βακχιδῶν, ἑραστὴς δὲ γενόμενος Διοκλέους τοῦ νικήσαντος Ὀλυμπίασιν, ὡς ἐκείνος τὴν πόλιν ἐλπίς διαμισήσας τὸν ἔρωτα τὸν τῆς μητρὸς Ἀλκυόνης, ἀπῆλθεν εἰς Θῆβας, κάκει τὸν βίον ἐπελεύσθησαν ἀμφότεροι. καὶ νῦν ἐτί δεικνύουσιν τοὺς τάφους αὐτῶν, ἀλλήλους μὲν εὐσυνόπτους ὄντας πρὸς δὲ τὴν τῶν Κορινθίων χώραν τὸν μὲν σύνοπτον τὸν δ’ οὐ σύνοπτον. μυθολογοῦσι γὰρ αὐτοὺς οὕτω τάξασθαι τῇ ταφῆν, τὸν μὲν Διοκλέα διὰ τὴν ἀπέχθειαν τοῦ πάθους ὅπως μὴ ἀποπτῶσ ἐσται ἡ Κορινθία ἀπὸ τοῦ χώματος, τὸν δὲ Φιλό- λαον ὅπως ἀποπτῶσ. ζηκησαν μὲν οὖν διὰ τὴν τουαύτην αἰτίαν παρὰ τοὺς Θεβαίους, νομοθέτης δ’ αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο Φιλόλαος περὶ τ’ ἄλλων τινῶν καὶ περὶ τῆς παιδοποιίας, οὕς καλοῦσιν ἐκεῖνοι νόμους θετικοὺς. καὶ τοῦτ’ ἐστίν ἰδίως ὑπ’ ἐκείνου νεομοθετημένον, ὅπως ὁ ἀριθμὸς σώζηται τῶν κλήρων. Χαράνδου δ’ ἰδιον μὲν οὐδὲν ἐστὶ πλὴν αἱ δίκαι τῶν ψευδομαρτυρῶν (πρῶτος γὰρ ἐποίησε τὴν ἐπίσκηψιν), τῇ δ’ ἄκριβεία τῶν νόμων ἐστὶ γλαφυρότερος καὶ τῶν νῦν νομοθέτων. (Φαλέου δ’ ἰδιον ἡ τῶν οὐσιῶν ἀνομάλωσι, Πλάτωνος δ’ ἡ τε τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ παῖδων καὶ τῆς οὐσίας κοινότης καὶ τὰ συστήτα τῶν γυναικῶν, ἐτὶ δ’ ὁ περὶ τὴν μέθην νόμο, τὸ τούς νήφοντας συμποσιαρχεῖν, καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἀσκησιν

1 τῶν χρόνων ἔχοντες Susemihl: τῶν χρόνων λέγουσιν codd.
2 τῶν—σύνοπτον bis Richards (duce partim Ross): τῶν—σύνοπτον bis codd.
POLITICS, II. ix. 5-8

Zaleucus; but these stories give too little attention 6 to the dates. Philolaus of Corinth also arose as lawgiver at Thebes. Philolaus belonged by birth to the Bacchiad family; he became the lover of Diocles the winner of Olympia, but when Diocles quitted the city because of his loathing for the passion of his mother Alcyone, he went away to Thebes, and there they both ended their life. Even now people still show their tombs, in full view of each other and one of them fully open to view in the direction of 7 the Corinthian country but the other one not; for the story goes that they arranged to be buried in this manner, Diocles owing to his hatred for his misfortune securing that the land of Corinth might not be visible from his tomb, and Philolaus that it might be from his. It was due then to a reason of this nature that they went to live at Thebes; but Philolaus became the Thebans' lawgiver in regard to various matters, among others the size of families, —the laws called by the Thebans laws of adoption; about this Philolaus enacted special legislation, in order that the number of the estates in land might 8 be preserved. There is nothing special in the code of Charondas except the trials for false witness (for he was the first to introduce the procedure of denunciation), but in the accuracy of his laws he is a more finished workman even than the legislators of to-day. (Peculiar to Phaleas is the measure for equalizing properties; to Plato, community of wives and children and of property, and the common meals for the women, and also the law about drunkenness, enacting that sober persons are to be masters of the drinking-bouts, and the regulation for military

* In 728 B.C.  b See c. iv.  c Above, cc. i.-iii.
ARISTOTLE

"...opws ἀμφιβαίοι γίνονται κατὰ τὴν μελέτην, ως δεόν μὴ τὴν μὲν χρήσιμον εἰναι τοῖν χεροῖν τὴν δὲ ἄχρηστον.) Δράκοντος δὲ νόμοι μὲν εἰσί, πολιτεία 9 δ' ὑπαρχούσῃ τοὺς νόμους ἑθηκεν, ἵδιον δ' ἐν τοῖς νόμοις οὐδὲν ἐστιν ὃ τι καὶ μνείας ἄξιον, πλὴν ἡ καλεπότητις διὰ τὸ τῆς ζημίας μέγεθος. ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Πιττακός νόμων δημιουργὸς ἄλλ' οὖ πολιτείας νόμοι δ' ἵδιος αὐτοῦ τὸ τοὺς μεθύοντας,

15 ἂν τυπτήσωσι, πλείω ζημίαν ἀποτύνειν τῶν νη- φόντων διὰ γὰρ τὸ πλεῖους ὑβρίζειν μεθύοντας ἡ νήφοντας οὐ πρὸς τὴν συγγνώμην ἀπέβλεψεν, ὅτι δεῖ μεθύοσοι ἔχειν μᾶλλον, ἄλλα πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον. ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Ἀνδροδάμας Ρηγίνου νομοθέτης Χαλκιδέως τοῖς ἐπὶ Θράκης, οὐ τὰ 1

20 περὶ τη τὰ φοινκά καὶ τὰς ἔπικλήρους ἐστίν οὐ μὴν ἄλλ' ἵδιον γε οὖδὲν αὐτοῦ λέγειν ἔχοι τις ἂν.

Τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς πολιτείας τὰς τε κυρίας καὶ τὰς ὕπο τινῶν εἰρημένας ἐστω τεθεωρημένα τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.

1 τὰ Η: om. cet.

a Author of the first written code at Athens, 621 B.C. (though in the Athenian Constitution, c. iv., his legislation is hardly mentioned; he appears there as the framer of the constitution).

b Of Mitylene in Lesbos, one of the Seven Sages, dictator 589-579 B.C.

c Otherwise unknown.

d Chalcidice, the peninsula in the N. Aegean, was colonized from Chalcis in Euboea.

Additional Notes

II. i. 5, 1261 a 31. As the best state consists of different classes, its unity is secured by each citizen giving services to society and receiving in return benefits proportionate to his services. Probably τὸ ἵσον is an interpolation (though Newman explains it as ‘the reciprocal rendering of an
training to make men by practice ambidextrous, on
the ground that it is a mistake to have one of the
two hands useful but the other useless.) There are
laws of Draco,\(^a\) but he legislated for an existing con-
istitution, and there is nothing peculiar in his laws
that is worthy of mention, except their severity in
imposing heavy punishment. Pittacus \(^b\) also was a
framer of laws, but not of a constitution; a special
law of his is that if men commit an assault when
drunk they are to pay a larger fine than those who
offend when sober; because since more men are
insolent when drunk than when sober he had regard
not to the view that drunken offenders are rightly
held less guilty, but to expediency. Androdamas \(^c\)
of Rhegium also became lawgiver to the Chalcidians
in the direction of Thrace,\(^d\) and to him belong the
laws dealing with cases of murder and with heiresses;
however one cannot mention any provision that is
peculiar to him.

Let such be our examination of the constitutional
schemes actually in force and of those that have been
proposed by certain persons.

equal amount of dissimilar things') omitting τὸ ὅνων, we
render 'reciprocity' and not 'reciprocal equality'; cf. N.E.
1132 b 33, t"In the interchange of services Justice in the
form of Reciprocity is the bond that maintains the associa-
tion: reciprocity, that is, on the basis of proportion, not on
the basis of equality.'

II. i. 6, 1261 a 33 ff. The best form of constitution is
where there is a superior class that governs continuously
—an aristocracy; so where there are no class-distinctions,
the next best thing is for all the citizens to take turns in
governing and being governed, those in office for the time
being forming a sort of aristocracy. Richards's alteration
of the text gives 'to take turns to govern is an imitation of
original inequality and class-distinction.'
1274

I. Τῷ περὶ πολιτείας ἐπισκοποῦντι, καὶ τὸς ἐκάστη καὶ ποία τις, σχεδὸν πρώτη σκέψις περὶ πόλεως ἰδεῖν, τί ποτ’ ἔστων ἡ πόλις. νῦν γὰρ ἀμφισβητούσιν, οἱ μὲν φάσκοντες τὴν πόλιν πεπραχέναι τὴν πράξιν, οἱ δ’ οὐ τὴν πόλιν ἄλλα τὴν ὀλγιαρχίαν ἢ τὸν τύραννον τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ νομοθέτου πάσαν ὅρῳμεν τὴν πραγματείαν οὕσαν περὶ πόλιν, ἢ δὲ πολιτεία τῶν τῆς πόλις οἰκοῦντων ἐστὶ τὰξις τις. ἐπεὶ δ’ ἡ πόλις τῶν 2 συγκεκιμένων καθάπερ ἀλλο τι τῶν ὅλων μὲν συνεστῶτων δ’ ἐκ πολλῶν μορίων, δῆλον δὴ πρότερον ὁ πολίτης ζητητέος· ἡ γὰρ πόλις πολιτῶν τι πλῆθος ἐστὶν, ὡστε τίνα χρή καλεῖν πολίτην καὶ τίς ὁ πολίτης ἐστὶ σκέπτεον. καὶ γὰρ ὁ πολίτης ἀμφισβητεῖται πολλάκις· οὐ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ὀμολογοῦσι πάντες εἶναι πολίτην· ἐστι γὰρ ὅστις 3 ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ πολίτης ὃν ἐν ὀλγιαρχίᾳ πολλάκις ὅπῃ ἐστὶ πολίτης. τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἄλλους πῶς τιν-χάνοντας ταύτης τῆς προσεγγίσεως, οἰν τοὺς ποιητούς πολίτας, ἀφετέον· ὁ δὲ πολίτης οὗ τῷ 1 Richards: γὰρ τις ὁ codd.

So we speak of an action planned and carried by the party in power as an Act of Parliament, and technically as an act of the sovereign.

172
BOOK III

1 I. For the student of government, and of the nature and characteristics of the various forms of constitution, almost the first question to consider is in regard to the state: what exactly is the essential nature of a state? As it is, this is a matter of dispute: a public act is spoken of by some people as the action of the state, others speak of it as the action not of the state but of the oligarchy or the tyrant in power; and we see that the activity of the statesman and lawgiver is entirely concerned with a state as its object, and a constitution is a form of organization of the inhabitants of a state. But a state is a composite thing, in the same sense as any other of the things that are wholes but consist of many parts; it is therefore clear that we must first inquire into the nature of a citizen; for a state is a collection of citizens, so that we have to consider who is entitled to the name of citizen, and what the essential nature of a citizen is. For there is often a difference of opinion as to this: people do not all agree that the same person is a citizen; often somebody who would be a citizen in a democracy is not a citizen under an oligarchy. We need not here consider those who acquire the title of citizen in some exceptional manner, for example those who are citizens by adoption; and citizenship is not constituted by domicile in a
οίκείν ποι πολίτης ἐστίν (καὶ γὰρ μέτοικοι καὶ
dούλοι κοινωνοῦσι τῆς οἰκήσεως), οὐδ’ οἱ τῶν δι-
καλῶν μετέχοντες οὔτως ὕστε καὶ δίκην ὑπέχειν
10 καὶ δικάζεσθαι (τοῦτο γὰρ ὑπάρχει1 καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ
συμβόλων κοινωνοῦσι, καὶ γὰρ ταύτα τούτοις
ὑπάρχει—πολλαχοῦ μὲν οὖν οὐδὲ τούτων τελέως
οἱ μέτοικοι μετέχουσιν, ἄλλα νέμειν ἀνάγκη προ-
στάτην, διὸ ἀτελῶς πως μετέχουσι τῆς τοιαύτης
cοινωνίας), ἄλλα2 καθάπερ καὶ παιδᾶς τοὺς μήπως
15 δι’ ἡλικίαν ἐγγεγραμμένους καὶ τοὺς γέροντας
τοὺς ἀφειμένους φατέον εἶναι μὲν πως πολίτας,
οὐχ ἀπλῶς δὲ λίγω ἄλλα προστιθέντας τοὺς μὲν
ἀτελεῖς τοὺς δὲ παρηκμακότας ἢ τι τοιοῦτον ἐτερον
(οὔδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει, δήλον γὰρ τὸ λεγόμενον).
Χητοῦμεν γὰρ τὸν ἀπλῶς πολίτην καὶ μηδὲν ἔχοντα
20 τοιοῦτον ἐγκλήμα διορθώσεως δεόμενον, ἐπεὶ καὶ
περὶ τῶν ἁτίμων καὶ φυγάδων ἔστι τὰ τοιαύτα καὶ
dιαπορεῖν καὶ λύειν. πολίτης δ’ ἀπλῶς οὐδενὶ τῶν
ἀλλων ὁρίζεται μάλλον ἢ τῷ μετέχειν κρίσεως καὶ
ἀρχῆς. τῶν δ’ ἀρχῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσὶ διηρημέναι κατὰ
25 χρόνων, ὥστ’ ἐνίας μὲν ὀλως διὰ τοῦ αὐτὸν οὐκ
ἐξεστίν ἀρχεῖν, ἢ διὰ τῶν ὁρισμένων χρόνων· ὁ
d’ ἀόριστος, οἷον ὁ δικαστής καὶ ἐκκλησιαστῆς.
tάχα μὲν οὖν ἀν φαίνω τις οὔτ’ ἀρχοντας εἶναι τοὺς
1 οὔτω γὰρ ἂν ὑπάρχω (sc. τὸ πολίτην εἶναι) Richards.

a This implies that aged citizens were excused attendance
at the assembly and law-courts, as well as military service.
174
certain place (for resident aliens and slaves share the domicile of citizens), nor are those citizens who participate in a common system of justice, conferring the right to defend an action and to bring one in the law-courts (for this right belongs also to the parties under a commercial treaty, as they too can sue and be sued at law,—or rather, in many places even the right of legal action is not shared completely by resident aliens, but they are obliged to produce a patron, so that they only share in a common legal procedure to an incomplete degree), but these are only citizens in the manner in which children who are as yet too young to have been enrolled in the list and old men who have been discharged 4 must be pronounced to be citizens in a sense, yet not quite absolutely, but with the added qualification of ‘under age’ in the case of the former and ‘superannuated’ or some other similar term (it makes no difference, the meaning being clear) in that of the latter. For we seek to define a citizen in the absolute sense, and one possessing no disqualification of this nature that requires a correcting term, since similar difficulties may also be raised, and solved, about citizens who have been disfranchised or exiled. A citizen pure and simple is defined by nothing else so much as by the right to participate in judicial functions and in office. But some offices of government are definitely limited in regard to time, so that some of them are not allowed to be held twice by the same person at all, or only after certain fixed intervals of time; other officials are without limit of tenure, for example the juryman and the member of the assembly. It might perhaps be said that such persons are not officials at all, and that the exercise
toioùtous, oudei metéchei diai taút' arxhís. kaítoi
geleioin tois kyriwótous aposternein arxhís.¹

30 allá diapherétev mìdein' peri ónomatos yar ó logos:
ánwunymon yar tò koíon épi diakastóu kai ékklhias-
stov ti dei taút' ámfow kalein. ́estw dei diorismóu
chároun áóristov arxhí. tìdheven dei polítas tois
oút o metéchontas.

'O mèn ou diálwv ev éfarwmásas polítis² epí
pántas tois légoymenous polítas sxedon toioùtós
35 ́estw. dei dei mì launhánein ou ti tòv prágmaton
en ou ti ἵποκειμενα diapherei tòv éidei, kai tò
mèn autów éstis prwtoy tò dei deuterov tò ð'
ékómenon, ñ to paraπan ou'd' énestov,3 ñ toiaúta,
tò koíon, ñ glívýchros. tás dei politeías obróme
éidei diapherousas állhlynov, kai tás mèn ústeras

tás dei protera ou'sas: tás yar hímatménas kai
perékebehnikias anagkaioi ústéras einai tòv
anamartítwov (tás dei perékebehnikias pòs légoumen
ústeron éstai fánerov). òste kai tòv polítin
6 étéron anagkaioy einai tòv kal' ékásthyn politeían.

dióper ó lextheis en mèn dhmokratía máliost' éstí
polítis, en dei taïs allaias enedéxetai mèn, ou mìn
tan anagkaion. en enías⁴ yar ouk éstí dhimov, ou'd'
èkklhiasian nomízoun álla⁵ sugklhitous, kai tás

1 [árchís] ? (sc. toí polítas eínai) ed. ² diorismós Richards.
3 ou'd' énestov Madvig: ou'dén éstov.
⁴ en enías Coraes: enías codd. ⁵ all' ñ Richards.

a Or, amending the text, 'and yet that it is absurd to deny
the title of citizen to those—'

b The meaning of this abstract principle is most easily seen
from its application here: if states are generically different
from one another, membership of a state, citizenship, can
hardly be a single thing, and come under a single definition.

176
of these functions does not constitute the holding of office; a and yet it is absurd to deny the title of official to those who have the greatest power in the state. But it need not make any difference, as it is only the question of a name, since there is no common name for a juryman and a member of the assembly that is properly applied to both. For the sake of distinction therefore let us call the combination of the two functions ‘office’ without limitation. Accordingly we lay it down that those are citizens who ‘participate in office’ in this manner.

Such more or less is the definition of ‘citizen’ that would best fit with all of those to whom the name is applied. But it must not be forgotten that things in the case of which the things to which they are related differ in kind, one of them being primary, another one secondary and so on, either do not contain a common nature at all, as being what they are, or barely do so. b Now we see that constitutions differ from one another in kind, and that some are subsequent and others prior; for erroneous and divergent forms are necessarily subsequent to correct forms (in what sense we employ the terms ‘divergent’ of constitutions will appear later). Hence the citizen corresponding to each form of constitution will also necessarily be different. Therefore the definition of a citizen that we have given applies especially to citizenship in a democracy; under other forms of government it may hold good, but will not necessarily do so. For in some states there is no body of common citizens, and they do not have the custom of a popular assembly but councils of specially convened members, and the

(though for non-democratic states this definition must be modified).
dikas diakazousi kataa meros, oion en Lakedaimoni
tas twn symbolaiow diakazei twn eforow allo
allas, oi de geryontes tas phonikas, etera de isos
arxhi tis eteras. ou ton auton de tropeon kai peri
Karckhdoa. pasaas gar arxai twnes krinouse tas
dikas. all' exei gar diorhswon o tou politon
dioriesos. en gar tais allais politelais oux o
aristos arxow ekklhsiasthis esti kai dikasthis,
al' o kata twn arxhyn arismaen. toutwn gar
h pason h tison apodeottesville to bouleuveshva kai
dikazein h peri pantwn h peri twn. tis mev ou
estin o politis, ek toutwn fanerwn, o gar exousia
koinovn arxhyn bouleuvtikhs h kritihs, politin
hde legeomene einai tautes tis polwos, polin de
to twn toinoutwn plithos ikanon pros autarkeian
zeihs, ois aplous eipein.

Oritzontai de pro twn chrishn politin ton 
amfoterwn politon kai me thaterou monon, oion
patros h mptros, oi de kai toout' epie plenon zhto-
sin, oion ep h papous duo h treis h plieous. ouw
h orizomenwn politikos kai tacheus, aporodosi
tines ton trimon ekeinon h tetarton, pws estai
politis. Gorhias men ou o Lousinios, ta mev
isos aporos ta de eirwneomenos, efh kathaper
olmos einai toous upo twn olmopoiwn peint-
menous, ouw kai Laristais toous upo town
demourgwn peintemounoi einai gar tinas larsi-

1 ou ton Coraes: ton codd.
2 kai Ar.
3 de G: d' codd.
4 tacheus Camerarius.

a The negative is a conjectural insertion, cf. 1273 a 20.
b Sicilian orator and nihilistic philosopher, visited Athens
427 B.C.
Office of trying law-suits goes by sections—for example at Sparta suits for breach of contract are tried by different ephors in different cases, while cases of homicide are tried by the ephors and doubtless other suits by some other magistrate. The same method is not followed at Carthage, where certain magistrates judge all the law-suits. But still, our definition of a citizen admits of correction. For under the other forms of constitution a member of the assembly and of a jury-court is not ‘an official’ without restriction, but an official defined according to his office; either all of them or some among them are assigned deliberative and judicial duties either in all matters or in certain matters. What constitutes a citizen is therefore clear from these considerations: we now declare that one who has the right to participate in deliberative or judicial office is a citizen of the state in which he has that right, and a state is a collection of such persons sufficiently numerous, speaking broadly, to secure independence of life.

But in practice citizenship is limited to the child of citizens on both sides, not on one side only, that is, the child of a citizen father or of a citizen mother; and other people carry this requirement further back, for example to the second or the third preceding generation or further. But given this as a practical and hasty definition, some people raise the difficulty, How will that ancestor three or four generations back have been a citizen? Gorgias of Leontini therefore, partly perhaps in genuine perplexity but partly in jest, said that just as the vessels made by mortar-makers were mortars, so the citizens made by the magistrates were Larisaeans, since some of the magistrates were actually larisae-
poioís. 1 ἐστι δ' ἀπλοῦν· εἰ γὰρ μετείχον κατὰ τὸν ῥηθέντα διορισμὸν τῆς πολιτείας, ἦσαν ἃν
πολίται· καὶ γὰρ οὐ δυνατὸν ἐφαρμότειν τὸ ἐκ
πολίτου ἢ ἐκ πολιτίδος ἐπὶ τῶν πρῶτων οἰκησάντων
νή κτισαίτων.
'Αλλ' ίσως ἐκεῖνοι μᾶλλον ἔχουσιν ἀπορίαν ὅσοι 10
35 μετέσχον μεταβολής γενομένης πολιτείας, οἱον
'Αθηναῖοι ἐποίησε Κλεισθένης μετὰ τὴν τῶν
tυραννῶν ἐκβολήν· πολλοὺς γὰρ ἐφυλέτευσε ξένους
καὶ δούλους μετοίκους. τὸ δ' ἀμφισβήτημα πρὸς
τούτους ἐστὶν οὐ τῖς πολίτης, ἀλλὰ πότερον ἄδικως
ἡ δικαίως. καίτοι κἂν τούτο τις ἐτί προσ-
1276 a ἀπορήσειν, ἄρ' εἰ μὴ δικαίως πολίτης, οὐ πολίτης,
ὡς ταύτο δυναμένου τοῦ τ' ἄδικου καὶ τοῦ ἴδιους.
ἐπεὶ δ' ὀρῶμεν καὶ ἄρχοντάς τινας ἄδικως, οὔς
ἄρχειε μὲν φήσομεν ἀλλ' οὐ δικαίως, ὁ δὲ πολίτης
ἀρκῇ τινὶ διωρισμένος ἐστὶν (ὁ γὰρ κοινωνῶν τῆς
5 τουασίδε ἄρχης πολίτης ἐστὶν, ὡς ἔφασαν), δὴν
ὅτι πολίτας μὲν εἶναι φατέον καὶ τούτους, περὶ δὲ
τοῦ δικαίου ἢ μὴ δικαίως συνάπτει πρὸς τὴν
eἰρημένην πρότερον ἀμφισβήτησιν. ἀποροῦσι γὰρ
τινες πόθ' ἢ πόλις ἐπραξεὶ καὶ πότε οὐχ ἢ πόλις,
οἰον ὅταν ἐξ ὀλυγαρχίας ἢ τυραννίδος γένηται
10 δημοκρατία. τότε γὰρ οὔτε τὰ συμβόλα ἐνιὸι
βουλοῖται διαλύειν (ὡς οὐ τῆς πόλεως ἀλλὰ τοῦ

1 λαρισαιοποιοῖς Camerarius. 2 καὶ Richards. 3 οἴον <οδ> Richards.

* Larisa, a city in Thessaly, was famous for the manufacture of a kind of kettle called a 'larisa.'
* In 509 B.C.
* The question, What is a state? 1274 b 34.
makers. But it is really a simple matter; for if they possessed citizenship in the manner stated in our definition of a citizen, they were citizens—since it is clearly impossible to apply the qualification of descent from a citizen father or mother to the original colonizers or founders of a city.

But perhaps a question rather arises about those who were admitted to citizenship when a revolution had taken place, for instance such a creation of citizens as that carried out by Cleisthenes after the expulsion of the tyrants, when he enrolled in his tribes many resident aliens who had been foreigners or slaves. The dispute as to these is not about the fact of their citizenship, but whether they received it wrongly or rightly. Yet even as to this one might raise the further question, whether, if a man is not rightly a citizen, he is a citizen at all, as 'wrongly' means the same as 'not truly.' But we sometimes see officials governing wrongly, as to whom we shall not deny that they do govern, but shall say that they do not do it rightly, and a citizen is defined by a certain function of government (a citizen, as we said, is one who shares in such and such an office); therefore it is clear that even persons wrongly admitted to citizenship are to be pronounced to be citizens, although the question whether they are so rightly or not rightly is connected with the question that was propounded before. For some persons raise the question, When is an occurrence the act of the state and when is it not? for example, when the government has been altered from oligarchy or tyranny to democracy. In such circumstances some people claim that the new government should not discharge public debts, on the ground that the money...
τυράννου λαβόντος) οὔτ' ἄλλα πολλά τῶν τοιούτων, ὡς ἐνίας τῶν πολιτειῶν τῷ κρατεῖν οὕσας ἄλλ' οὔ διὰ τὸ κοινὴ συμφέρον. εἴπερ οὖν καὶ δημοκρα-

15 τοῦτοι τίνες κατὰ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, ὅμοιως τῆς πόλεως φατέον εἶναι ταύτης τὰς τῆς πολιτείας ταύτης πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐκ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ τῆς τυραννίδος. ἔοικε δ' οἰκεῖος ὁ λόγος εἶναι τῆς ἀπορίας ταύτης, πῶς ποτὲ χρή λέγειν τὴν πόλιν εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν ἢ μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν ἄλλ' ἑτέραν. ἢ

20 μὲν οὖν ἐπιπολαιοτάτη τῆς ἀπορίας ζήτησις περὶ τῶν τόπων καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐστῖν: ἐνδέχεται γὰρ διακεχθηκεῖ τὸν τόπον καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους; καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἑτερον τοὺς δ' ἑτερον οἰκῆσαι τόπον. ταύτην μὲν οὖν πραστέραν θετέον τὴν ἀπορίαν, πολλαχῶς γὰρ τῆς πόλεως λεγομένης ἐστὶ περὶ τού

25 εὐμάρεια τῆς τοιαύτης ζήτησις: ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ τῶν τῶν αὐτὸν τόπον κατοικοῦντων ἀνθρώπων πότε δεῖ νομίζειν μίαν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοὺς τεῖχους, εὐθὺς γὰρ ἂν Πελοποννησίω περιβαλέω ἐν τείχοις· τοιαύτη δ' ἵνας ἐστὶ καὶ Βαβυλῶν καὶ πάσα ἡτίς ἐχει περιγραφὴν μᾶλλον ἔθνους ἡ πόλεως: ἤ γε φασιν ἐξαιρετικάς τρῖτην ἡμέραν οὖν αἰσθῆσαι τι μέρος τῆς πόλεως. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας εἰς ἄλλον καιρὸν χρήσιμος ἢ σκέψις (περὶ γὰρ μεγέθους τῆς πόλεως, τῷ τε πόσον καὶ πότερον ἔθνος ἐν ἡ πλείω συμ-

1 oikeios pws—tautηs, pote Richards.
2 tov—anthropous secl. Susemihl.

a i.e. πόλις means both (1) 'city' (and also 'citadel') and (2) 'state,' a collection of citizens; and if the citizens divide and settle in two different 'cities' with different governments, they are clearly not the same 'state' as before.

182
was borrowed by the tyrant and not by the state, and should repudiate many other similar claims also, because some forms of government rest upon force and are not aimed at the welfare of the community.

11 If therefore some democracies also are governed in that manner, the acts of the authorities in their case can only be said to be the acts of the state in the same sense as the public acts emanating from an oligarchy or a tyranny are said to be. Akin to this controversy seems to be the subject, What exactly is the principle on which we ought to pronounce a city to be the same city as it was before, or not the same but a different city? The most obvious mode of inquiring into this difficulty deals with place and people: the place and the people may have been divided, and some may have settled in one place, and some in another. In this form the question must be considered as easier of solution; for, as ‘city’ has several meanings, the inquiry so put is in a way not difficult. But it may similarly be asked, Suppose a set of men inhabit the same place, in what circumstances are we to consider their city to be a single city? Its unity clearly does not depend on the walls, for it would be possible to throw a single wall round the Peloponnesus; and a case in point perhaps is Babylon, and any other city that has the circuit of a nation rather than of a city; for it is said that when Babylon was captured a considerable part of the city was not aware of it three days later. But the consideration of this difficulty will be serviceable for another occasion, as the student of politics must not ignore the question, What is the most advantageous size for a city, and should its populations be of one
ARISTOTLE

1276 a

φέρει, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀλλὰ τῶν αὐτῶν. κατοικοῦντων τῶν αὐτῶν τόπων, πότερον ἐως ἃν ἢ τὸ γένος ταύτῳ τῶν κατοικοῦντων τῆν αὐτὴν εἶναι φατέον πόλιν, καίπερ ἀεὶ τῶν μὲν φθειρομένων τῶν δὲ γινομένων, ὡσπερ καὶ ποταμοὺς εἰώθαμεν λέγειν τοὺς αὐτοὺς καὶ κρήνας τὰς αὐτὰς καίπερ ἀεὶ τοῦ μὲν ἐπιγνωμένου νάματος τοῦ δ’ ὑπεξίόντος, ἢ τοὺς μὲν ἀνθρώπους φατέον εἶναι τοὺς αὐτοὺς διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν τὴν δὲ πόλιν ἑτέρας; εἴπερ γάρ ἐστι κοινωνία τις ἡ πόλις, ἐστὶ δὲ κοινωνία πολιτῶν πολιτείας, γνωμομένης ἑτέρας τῷ εἰδεὶ καὶ διαφέρουσης τῆς πολιτείας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι δόξειν ἃν καὶ τὴν πόλιν εἶναι μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν, ὡσπερ γε καὶ χορὸν ὅτε μὲν κωμικὸν ὅτε δὲ τραγικὸν ἑτέρον εἶναι φαμέν τῶν αὐτῶν πολλάκις ἀνθρώπων οὖντων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πάσαν ἀλλήν κοινωνίαν καὶ σύνθεσιν ἑτέραν ἃν εἶδος ἑτέρου ἢ τῆς συνθέσεως, οἷον ἀρμονίαν τῶν αὐτῶν φθορῶν ἑτέρων εἶναι λέγομεν ἃν ὅτε μὲν ἢ Δωρίος ὅτε δὲ Φρύγιος. εἰ δὴ τοῦτον ἔχει τῶν τρόπων, φανερῶν ὅτι μάλιστα λεκτέον τὴν αὐτὴν πόλιν εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν βλέποντας. οὖνομα δὲ καλεῖν ἑτέρον ἢ ταύτων ἐξεστί καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν κατοικοῦντων αὐτὴν καὶ πάμπαν ἑτέρων ἀνθρώπων. εἰ δὲ δικαιον διαλύειν ἢ μὴ διαλύειν ὅταν εἰς ἑτέραν μεταβάλλην πολιτείαν ἡ πόλις, λόγος ἑτέρος.

II. Τῶν δὲ νῦν εἰρημένων ἐξόμενον ἐστὶν ἐπι- 1

1 τῶν ἀνθρώπων Richards.
2 πολιτεία Congreve.

184
POLITICS, III. i. 13—II. 1

13 race or of several? But are we to pronounce a city, where the same population inhabit the same place, to be the same city so long as the population are of the same race, in spite of the fact that all the time some are dying and others being born, just as it is our custom to say that a river or a spring is the same river or spring although one stream of water is always being added to it and another being withdrawn from it, or are we to say that though the people are the same people for the similar reason of continuity, yet the city is a different city? For inasmuch as a state is a kind of partnership, and is in fact a partnership of citizens in a government, when the form of the government has been altered and is different it would appear to follow that the state is no longer the same state, just as we say that a chorus which on one occasion acts a comedy and on another a tragedy is a different chorus although it is often composed of the same persons, and similarly with any other common whole or composite structure we say it is different if the form of its structure is different—for instance a musical tune consisting of the same notes we call a different tune if at one time it is played in the Dorian mode and at another in the Phrygian. Therefore if this is the case, it is clear that we must speak of a state as being the same state chiefly with regard to its constitution; and it is possible for it to be called by the same or by a different designation both when its inhabitants are the same and when they are entirely different persons. But whether a state is or is not bound in justice to discharge its engagements when it has changed to a different constitution, is another subject.

II. The next thing to consider after what has now
Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give 'possible': see Additional Note on p. 275.
been said is the question whether we are to hold that the goodness of a good man is the same as that of a good citizen, or not the same. However, if this point really is to receive investigation, we must first ascertain in some general outline what constitutes the excellence of a citizen. Now a citizen we pronounced to be one sort of partner in a community, as is a sailor. And although sailors differ from each other in function—one is an oarsman, another helmsman, another look-out man, and another has some other similar special designation—and so clearly the most exact definition of their excellence will be special to each, yet there will also be a common definition of excellence that will apply alike to all of them; for security in navigation is the business of them all, since each of the sailors aims at that.

Similarly therefore with the citizens, although they are dissimilar from one another, their business is the security of their community, and this community is the constitution, so that the goodness of a citizen must necessarily be relative to the constitution of the state. If therefore there are various forms of constitution, it is clear that there cannot be one single goodness which is the perfect goodness of the good citizen; but when we speak of a good man we mean that he possesses one single goodness, perfect goodness. Hence it is manifestly possible to be a good citizen without possessing the goodness that constitutes a good man. Moreover it is also feasible to pursue the same topic by raising the question in another manner in relation to the best form of constitution. If it is impossible for a state to consist entirely of good men, and if it is necessary for each person to perform well the work of his position, and
These words in the Greek are probably an interpolation.
to do this springs from goodness, then because it is impossible for all the citizens to be alike, the goodness of a good citizen would not be one and the same as the goodness of a good man; for all ought to possess the goodness of the good citizen (that is a necessary condition of the state's being the best possible), but it is impossible that all should possess the goodness of a good man, if it is not necessary that all the citizens in a good state should be good men.

Again, since the state consists of unlike persons—just as an animal (to take this instance first) consists of soul and body, and a soul of reason and appetite, and a household of husband and wife and [ownership involves] \(^a\) master and slave, in the same manner a state consists of all of these persons and also of others of different classes in addition to these,—it necessarily follows that the goodness of all the citizens is not one and the same, just as among dancers the skill of a head dancer is not the same as that of a subordinate leader. It is clear then from these considerations that the goodness of a good citizen and that of a good man are not the same in general; but will the goodness of a good citizen of a particular sort be the same as that of a good man?

Now we say that a good ruler is virtuous and wise, and that a citizen taking part in politics must be wise. Also some people say that even the education of a ruler must be different, as indeed we see that the sons of kings are educated in horsemanship and military exercises, and Euripides says \(^b\)

No subtleties for me, but what the state Requireth—

implying that there is a special education for a ruler.
ARISTOTLE

1277 a ἀρετὴ ἀρχοντὸς τε ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ, πολῖτης δ᾽ ἔστι καὶ ὁ ἀρχόμενος, οὐχ ἢ αὐτὴ ἀπλῶς ἂν εἰη πολῖτον καὶ ἀνδρὸς, τινὸς μέντοι πολῖτον· οὐ γὰρ ἢ αὐτὴ ἀρχοντος καὶ πολῖτον, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἵσως 'Ἰάσων ἔψη πεινὴν ὅτε μὴ τυραννοῖ,

25 ὥς οὐκ ἐπιστάμενον ἰδιώτης εἶναι. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐπαινεῖται γε τὸ δύνασθαι ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι, καὶ πολῖτον δοκεῖ πον ἢ ἀρετὴ εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καὶ ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι καλῶς. εἰ οὖν τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀνδρὸς τίθεμεν ἀρχικὴν, τὴ δὲ τοῦ πολῖτον ἄμφω, οὐκ ἂν εἰη ἄμφω ἐπαινετὰ ὁμοίως.

30 ἐπεὶ οὖν ποτὲ δοκεῖ ἁμφότερα, καὶ οὐ ταύτα δεῖν τὸν ἀρχοντα μανθάνειν καὶ τὸν ἀρχόμενον, τὸν δὲ πολῖτην ἁμφότερ' ἐπιστάσθαι καὶ μετέχειν ἁμφοίν, . . . . καὶ τοῦτον νὰ κατάδοι τοις ἐστὶ γὰρ ἁρχὴ δεισποτικῆς ταύτην δὲ τὴν περὶ τάναγκαία ἑνα ἱέγουμεν, ἃ ποιεῖν ἐπιστάσθαι τὸν ἀρχοντ' οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλὰ χρῆσθαι μᾶλλον θάτερον δὲ καὶ ἀνδραποδῶδες, λέγω δὲ θάτερον τὸ δύνασθαι καὶ ὑπηρετεῖν τὰς διακοινκαὶ πράξεις. δούλου δ' ἐιῆ πλεῖω λέγουμεν, αἱ γὰρ ἐργασίαι πλείουσι. ὅν ἐν μέρος κατέχουσιν οἱ χερνῆτες· οὕτω δ' εἰσίν, ὡσπερ

35 ἁμαρταίνει καὶ τούνωμ' αὐτοὺς, οἱ ζώντες ἀπὸ τῶν χειρῶν, ἐν οἷς ὁ βάναυσος τεχνίτης ἐστίν. διὸ

1 δοκεῖ πον Jackson: δοκίμου codd.
2 ποτὲ δοκεῖ corruptum: ἀποδέχεσθαι δεῖ Susemihl.
3 ἁμφω ἐτερα Bernays: ἐτερα Coraes.
4 lacunam Susemihl.
5 αὐτο Montecatinus.

ᵃ Tyrant of Pherae in Thessaly, assassinated 370 B.C.
ᵇ Some words seem to have been lost, conveying 'we must consider how this dual fitness can be acquired,' or possibly 190
6 And if the goodness of a good ruler is the same as the goodness of a good man, yet the person ruled is also a citizen, so that the goodness of a citizen in general will not be the same as that of a man, although that of a particular citizen will; for goodness as a ruler is not the same as goodness as a citizen, and no doubt this is the reason why Jason \(^a\) said that whenever he was not tyrant he felt hungry, meaning that he did not know the art of being a private person. Another point is that we praise the ability to rule and to be ruled, and it is doubtless held that the goodness of a citizen consists in ability both to rule and to be ruled well. If then we lay it down that the goodness of the good man is displayed in ruling, whereas that of the citizen is shown in both capacities, the two capacities cannot be equally laudable. Since therefore both views are sometimes accepted, and it is thought that the ruler and the subject do not have to learn the same arts but that the citizen must know both arts and share in both capacities, . . . \(^b\) And it may be discerned from the following illustration:

7 one form of authority is that of a master; by this we mean the exercise of authority in regard to the necessary work of the house, which it is not necessary for the master to know how to execute, but rather how to utilize; the other capacity, I mean the ability actually to serve in these menial tasks, is indeed a slave's quality. But we distinguish several kinds of slave, as their employments are several. One department belongs to the handicraftsmen, who as their name implies are the persons that live by their hands, a class that includes the mechanic artisan. considerably more. But the text at the beginning of the sentence is also corrupt.
παρ' ἐνίοις οὐ μετείχον οἱ δημιουργοί τὸ πολαίον ἀρχὰ, πρῶν δὴμον γενέσθαι τὸν ἐσχάτον. τὰ μὲν ὁὐν ἐργα τῶν ἀρχομένων οὕτως οὐ δεὶ τὸν ἁγαθὸν
5 οὐδὲ τὸν πολιτικὸν οὐδὲ τὸν πολιτήν
1 τὸν ἁγαθὸν μανθάνειν, εἰ μή ποτὲ χρείας χάριν αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτόν (οὐ γὰρ ἐτί συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι τὸν
2 μὲν δεσπότην τὸν
de δοῦλον). ἀλλ' ἔστι τις ἀρχὴ καθ' ἣν ἄρχει τῶν ὁμοίων τῷ γένει καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων (ταύτην γὰρ λέγομεν εἰναι τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀρχὴν), ἦν δεὶ τὸν ἄρχοντα ἀρχόμενον μαθεῖν, οἰον ἵππαρχεῖν ὤπαρχηθέντα, στρατηγεῖν στρατηγηθέντα καὶ τὰς ἀρχήςαντα καὶ λοχαγήσαντα. διὸ καὶ λέγεται καὶ τούτο καλῶς, ὡς οὐκ έστων εὖ ἄρξαι μή ἄρχεντα. τούτων δὲ ἀρετὴ μὲν ἐτέρα, 10 δεὶ δὲ τὸν πολιτήν τὸν ἁγαθὸν ἐπίστασθαι καὶ δύνασθαι καὶ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν, καὶ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ πολιτῶ, τὸ τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχὴν ἐπίστασθαι ἐπ' ἀμφότερα. καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὴ ἁγαθοῦ ἄμφω, καὶ εἰ ἐτερον εἴδος σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἀρχικῆς καὶ γὰρ ἀρχομένου μὲν ἐλευθέρου δὲ δῆλον ὅτι οὐ μία ἄν εἰν τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ ἁρετῆ, οἰον δικαιοσύνην, ἀλλ' εἴδη ἔχουσα καθ' ἣ ἄρξει καὶ ἄρξεται, ὦσπερ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς ἐτέρα σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία (δόξα γὰρ ἄν εἰναι δειλὸς ἁνὴρ εἰ οὕτως ἀνδρείος εἰν ὄσπερ γυνή ἀνδρεία, καὶ γυνὴ λάλος
2 tóte pro τὸν bis Riese, δε Richards.
3 ἀλλος, ἀλαλος, ἀλλως codd. inf.: ἀκόλαστος Susemihl.

192
Hence in some states manual labourers were not admitted to office in old times, before the development of extreme democracy. The tasks of those who are under this form of authority therefore it is not proper for the good man or the man fit for citizenship or the good citizen to learn, except for his own private use occasionally (for then it ceases to be a case of the one party being master and the other slave). But there exists a form of authority by which a man rules over persons of the same race as himself, and free men (for that is how we describe political authority), and this the ruler should learn by being ruled, just as a man should command cavalry after having served as a trooper, command a regiment after having served in a regiment and been in command of a company and of a platoon. Hence there is much truth in the saying that it is impossible to become a good ruler without having been a subject.

And although the goodness of a ruler and that of a subject are different, the good citizen must have the knowledge and the ability both to be ruled and to rule, and the merit of the good citizen consists in having a knowledge of the government of free men on both sides. And therefore both these virtues are characteristic of a good man, even if temperance and justice in a ruler are of a different kind from temperance and justice in a subject; for clearly a good man's virtue, for example his justice, will not be one and the same when he is under government and when he is free, but it will be of different kinds, one fitting him to rule and one to be ruled, just as temperance and courage are different in a man and in a woman (for a man would be thought a coward if he were only as brave as a brave woman, and a woman a chatterer.
ARISTOTLE

1277 b

1 Or perhaps 'for the working-man is a citizen': see Additional Note p. 275.
2 Or, with Casaubon's probable correction of the Greek, 'only with a qualification.'
if she were only as modest as a good man; since even the household functions of a man and of a woman are different—his business is to get and hers to keep).

And practical wisdom alone of the virtues is a virtue peculiar to a ruler; for the other virtues seem to be necessary alike for both subjects and rulers to possess, but wisdom assuredly is not a subject's virtue, but only right opinion: the subject corresponds to the man who makes flutes and the ruler to the flute-player who uses them.

The question whether the goodness of a good man is the same as that of a good citizen or different, and how they are the same and how different, is clear from these considerations.

But one of the difficulties as to what constitutes a citizen is still left. Is it truly the case that a citizen is a person who has the right to share office in the government, or are the working classes also to be counted citizens? If these persons also are to be counted who have no share in offices, it is not possible for every citizen to possess the citizen's virtue; for the true citizen is the man capable of governing. If on the other hand no one of the working people is a citizen, in what class are the various workers to be ranked? for they are neither resident aliens nor foreigners. Or shall we say that so far as that argument goes no inconsistency results? for slaves also are not in one of the classes mentioned, nor are freedmen. For it is true that not all the persons indispensable for the existence of a state are to be deemed citizens, since even the sons of citizens are not citizens in the same sense as the adults: the latter are citizens in the full sense, the former only by presumption—they are citizens, but incomplete ones.
χρόνοις παρ’ ενίοις ἦν δούλον τὸ βάναυσον ἢ Ἕκενικόν, διόπερ οἱ πολλοὶ τοιοῦτοι καὶ νῦν ἢ δὲ βελτίστη πόλις οὐ ποιήσει βάναυσον πολίτην. εἰ δὲ καὶ οὕτως πολίτης, ἀλλὰ πολίτου ἄρετὴν ἦν
10 εἰπομεν λεκτέον οὐ παντὸς, οὔτε ἐλευθέροι μόνον, ἀλλ’ ὄσοι τῶν ἔργων εἰσὶν ἀφειμένοι τῶν ἀναγκαίων.
τῶν δ’ ἀναγκαίων οἱ μὲν εἰνε λειτουργοῦντες τὰ 3
tοιαῦτα δοῦλοι, οἱ δὲ κοινοὶ βάναυσοι καὶ θῆτες.
faction δ’ ἐντεῦθεν μικρὸν ἐπισκεφαμένοι πῶς
ἐχει περὶ αὐτῶν[• αὐτὸ γὰρ φανὲν τὸ λεγέν τοιεὶ
15 δὴλον]. ἐπει γὰρ πλεῖους εἰσὶν αἱ πολιτείαι, καὶ
eἰδὴ πολίτου ἀναγκαίον εἶναι πλείω, καὶ μάλιστα
τοῦ ἀρχομένου πολίτου, ὡστ’ εἰν μὲν των πολιτεία
τῶν βάναυσον ἀναγκαίον εἶναι καὶ τῶν θῆτα πολιταί,
ἐν τισὶ δ’ αδύνατον, οἷον εἰ τίς ἐστὶν ἢν καλοῦσιν
20 ἀριστοκρατικὴν καὶ εἱν ἢ κατ’ ἄρετὴν αἱ τιμαὶ
dιδοῦσι καὶ κατ’ ἀξίαν· οὐ γὰρ οἷον τ’ ἐπιτηδεύ
σαι τὰ τῆς ἄρετῆς ζωντα βίον βάναυσον ἢ θητικὸν.
ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλγαρχίαις θῆτα μὲν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι 4
πολιτὴν (ἀπὸ τιμημάτων γὰρ μακρῶν αἱ μεθέξεις
tῶν ἀρχῶν), βάναυσον δ’ ἐνδέχεται· πλουτοῦσι γὰρ
25 καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν τεχνιτῶν. ἐν Θῆβαις δὲ νόμοις
ἡ τὸν διὰ3 δέκα ἐτῶν μὴ ἀπεσχημένον τῆς ἁγορᾶς
μὴ μετέχειν ἀρχῆς. ἐν πολλαῖς δὲ πολιτείαις προσ-

1 ἀλλων Bernays.

* The ill-expressed clause ‘for what—clear’ seems almost certainly to be an interpolation. 196
In ancient times in fact the artisan class in some states consisted of slaves or aliens, owing to which the great mass of artisans are so even now; and the best-ordered state will not make an artisan a citizen. While if even the artisan is a citizen, then what we said to be the citizen’s virtue must not be said to belong to every citizen, nor merely be defined as the virtue of a free man, but will only belong to those who are released from menial occupations. Among menial occupations those who render such services to an individual are slaves, and those who do so for the community are artisans and hired labourers. The state of the case about them will be manifest from what follows when we consider it a little further, for what has been said when made known itself makes it clear. As there are several forms of constitution, it follows that there are several kinds of citizen, and especially of the citizen in a subject position; hence under one form of constitution citizenship will necessarily extend to the artisan and the hired labourer, while under other forms this is impossible, for instance in any constitution that is of the form entitled aristocratic and in which the honours are bestowed according to goodness and to merit, since a person living a life of manual toil or as a hired labourer cannot practise the pursuits in which goodness is exercised. In oligarchies on the other hand, though it is impossible for a hired labourer to be a citizen (since admission to office of various grades is based on high property-assessments), it is possible for an artisan; for even the general mass of the craftsmen are rich. At Thebes there was a law that no one who had not kept out of trade for the last ten years might be admitted to office. But under many
ἐφέλκεται καὶ τῶν ξένων ὁ νόμος: ὁ γάρ ἐκ πολιτικοῦ ἐν τοις δημοκρατίαις πολιτικῇς ἔστιν, τὸν 5 αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς νόδους παρὰ πολλοῖς. οὗ μὴν ἄλλ' ἔστιν δι' ἐνδειαν τῶν γνησίων πολιτών ποιοῦνται πολιτικά τοὺς τοιούτους (διὰ γάρ ὀλιγανθρωπίαν οὕτω χρῶνται τοῖς νόμοις), εὐποροῦντες δὴ ὁχλοῦ κατὰ μικρὸν παραροῦνται τοὺς ἐκ δούλου πρώτον ἡ δούλης, εἰτα τοὺς ἀπὸ γυναίκῶν· τέλος δὲ μόνον τοὺς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἀστῶν πολιτικά ποιοῦν. οτι μὲν οὖν εἴδη πλεῖον πολιτοῦ, 6 φανερῶν ἐκ τούτων, καὶ οτι λέγεται μάληστα πολιτικής ὁ μετέχων τῶν τιμῶν, ὥσπερ καί Ὁμηρος ἐποίησεν ὥσπερ μέτοικος γάρ ἔστιν ὁ τῶν τιμῶν μη μετέχων. ἄλλ' ἔστιν ὅπου τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐπικεκρυμμένον ἔστιν ἀπάτης χάρῳ τῶν συνοικούντων.

1278 b Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἐτέραν ἡ τήν αὐτὴν θετεόν καθ' ἴναν ἀγαθόν ἐστὶ καὶ πολιτικὴς σπουδαίος, δὴ λοιπὸν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, ὡς τῶν μὲν πόλεως ὁ αὐτὸς τίνος δ' ἐτέρας, κἀκεῖνος οὐ πᾶς ἄλλ' ὁ πολιτικὸς καὶ κύριος ἡ δυνάμενος εἶναι κύριος, ἡ καθ' αὐτὸν ἡ μετ' ἄλλων, τῆς τῶν κοινῶν ἐπιμελείας.

IV. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ταῦτα διώρισται, τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα  ἐδη Susemihl: δ' codd.
1 ὡσπερ ἐστὶν hic Welldon, post συνοικούντων codd.

a Iliad ix. 648, xvi. 59.
b The mss. give 'But where such exclusion is disguised, it (this concealment) is for the purpose of deceiving' etc.

198
constitutions the law draws recruits even from foreigners; for in some democracies the son of a citizen-mother is a citizen, and the same rule holds good as to base-born sons in many places. Nevertheless, inasmuch as such persons are adopted as citizens owing to a lack of citizens of legitimate birth (for legislation of this kind is resorted to because of under-population), when a state becomes well off for numbers it gradually divests itself first of the sons of a slave father or mother, then of those whose mothers only were citizens, and finally only allows citizenship to the children of citizens on both sides. These facts then show that there are various kinds of citizen, and that a citizen in the fullest sense means the man who shares in the honours of the state, as is implied in the verse of Homer:

Like to some alien settler without honour,—since a native not admitted to a share in the public honours is like an alien domiciled in the land. But in some places this exclusion is disguised, for the purpose of deceiving those who are a part of the population.

The answer therefore to the question, Is the goodness that makes a good man to be deemed the same as that which makes a worthy citizen, or different? is now clear from what has been said: in one form of state the good man and the good citizen are the same, but in another they are different, and also in the former case it is not every citizen but only the statesman, the man who controls or is competent to control, singly or with colleagues, the administration of the commonwealth, that is essentially also a good man.

IV. And since these points have been determined,
σκεπτέον πότερον μίαν θετέον πολιτείαν ἡ πλείους, κἂν εἰ πλείους, τίνες καὶ πόσαι καὶ διαφοραὶ τίνες αὐτῶν εἰςών. ἔστι δὲ πολιτεία πόλεως τάξις τῶν τε ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ μάλιστα τῆς κυρίας πάντων. κύριον μὲν γὰρ πανταχοῦ τὸ πολιτεύμα τῆς πόλεως, πολιτεύμα δ' ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτεία. λέγω δὲ οἶον ἐν μὲν ταῖς δημοκρατικαῖς κύριος ὁ δῆμος, οἱ δ' ὀλίγοι τούναντιον ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις. φαμέν δὲ καὶ πολιτείαν ἐτέραν εἶναι τούτων. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τούτον ἐρούμεν λόγον καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

'Ὑποθετέον δὲ πρῶτον τίνος χάριν συνέστηκε 2 πόλις καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς εἴδη πόσα τῆς περὶ ἀνθρωπον καὶ τῆς κοινωνίαν τῆς ζωῆς.

Εἰρηταί δὴ κατὰ τοὺς πρῶτους λόγους, ἐν οἷς περὶ οἰκονομίας διωρίσθη καὶ δεσποτείας, ὅτι 20 φύσει μὲν ἐστὶν ἀνθρωπος ζωὸν πολιτικὸν· διὸ καὶ μηδὲν δεόμενοι τῆς παρ' ἄλληλων βοηθείας οὐκ ἔλαττον ὄρεγονται τοῦ συζήτην. οὐ μὴν ἄλλα καὶ τὸ κοινὴ συμφέρον συνάγει, καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει μέρος ἕκαστῳ τοῦ ζῆν καλῶς. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τούτ' ἐστὶ τέλος, καὶ κοινὴ πάσι καὶ χωρίς· συνέρχονται δὲ καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἐνεκεν αὐτοῦ καὶ 25 συνέχουσι τὴν πολιτικῆν κοινωνίαν, ὡς γὰρ ἐναυτῷ τῷ τοῦ καλοῦ μόριον καὶ κατὰ τὸ ζῆν αὐτὸ μόνον· ἂν μὴ τοῖς χαλεποῖς κατὰ τὸν βιὸν ύπερβάλλῃ λίαν, δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καρτεροῦσι πολλὴν κακοπάθειαν

1 καὶ: κατὰ Bernays.
2 καὶ—κοινωνίαν post 26 μόριον codd. cet.

a 1253 a 1 foll.
the next question to be considered is whether we are to lay it down that there is only one form of constitution or several, and if several, what they are and how many and what are the differences between them. Now a constitution is the ordering of a state in respect of its various magistracies, and especially the magistracy that is supreme over all matters. For the government is everywhere supreme over the state and the constitution is the government. I mean that in democratic states for example the people are supreme, but in oligarchies on the contrary the few are; and we say that they have a different constitution. And we shall use the same language about the other forms of government also.

2 We have therefore to determine first the fundamental points, what is the object for which a state exists and how many different kinds of system there are for governing mankind and for controlling the common life.

Now it has been said in our first discourses, in which we determined the principles concerning household management and the control of slaves, that man is by nature a political animal; and so even when men have no need of assistance from each other they none the less desire to live together. At the same time they are also brought together by common interest, so far as each achieves a share of the good life. The good life then is the chief aim of society, both collectively for all its members and individually; but they also come together and maintain the political partnership for the sake of life merely, for doubtless there is some element of value contained even in the mere state of being alive, provided that there is not too great an excess on the side of the hardships of life, and it
Mentioned at 1323 a 22 (and also six times in other books); they are there appealed to for the tripartite classification of foods which in *Ethics* 1098 b 12 is ascribed to 'current opinion of long standing and generally accepted by students of philosophy.' The term may there predenote doctrines not peculiar to the Peripatetic school.
is clear that the mass of mankind cling to life at the cost of enduring much suffering, which shows that life contains some measure of well-being and of sweetness in its essential nature.

And again, the several recognized varieties of government can easily be defined; in fact we frequently discuss them in our external discourses. The authority of a master over a slave, although in truth when both master and slave are designed by nature for their positions their interests are the same, nevertheless governs in the greater degree with a view to the interest of the master, but incidentally with a view to that of the slave, for if the slave deteriorates the position of the master cannot be saved from injury. Authority over children and wife [and over the whole household, which we call the art of household management] is exercised either in the interest of those ruled or for some common interest of both parties,—essentially, in the interest of the ruled, as we see that the other arts also, like medicine and athletic training, are pursued in the interest of the persons upon whom they are practised, although incidentally they may also be in the interest of the practitioners themselves; for nothing prevents the trainer from being on occasions himself also one of the persons in training, just as the pilot is always a member of the crew; so although the trainer or pilot studies the good of those under his authority, when he himself also becomes one among them he incidentally shares the benefit, for the pilot is a sailor in the ship and the trainer can become one of the persons in training...
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΛΕ

1279 α

ζωμένων εἰς γίνεται παιδοτρίβης ὁν. διό καὶ τὰς ὀ
pολιτικὰς ἀρχὰς, ὅταν ἦ καὶ ἴσοτητα τῶν πολιτῶν
10 συνεστηκυία καὶ καθ’ ὀμοιότητα, κατὰ μέρος
ἀξιούσιν ἀρχεῖν, πρότερον μὲν, ἤ πέφυκεν, ἀξιούν-
tες ἐν μέρει λειτουργεῖν, καὶ σκοπεῖν τινὰ πάλιν
tὸ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθὸν ὑσπερ πρότερον αὐτὸς ἀρχὼν
ἐσκόπει τὸ ἐκεῖνον συμφέρον· νῦν δὲ διὰ τὰς
15 ὥφελείας τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ τὰς ἐκ τῆς
ἀρχῆς βούλονται συνεχῶς ἀρχεῖν, οἷν εἰ συνεβαίνει
ὑγιαίνειν ἀεὶ τοὺς ἀρχουσιν νοσακερῶς οὐσιν· καὶ
gὰρ ἄν οὐτῶς ὅσως ἐδίωκον τὰς ἀρχὰς.

Φανερὸν τοῖνυν ὡς ὅσι μὲν πολιτείαι τὸ κοινῆς
7 συμφέρον σκοποῦσιν, αὐτᾶς μὲν ὁρθαὶ τυχανοῦσιν
οὗσι καὶ τὸ ἀπλὸς δίκαιον, ὅσι δὲ τὸ σφέτερον
20 μόνον τῶν ἀρχόντων, ἡμαρτημέναι πάσαι καὶ
παρεκβάσεις τῶν ὁρθῶν πολιτεῶν· δεσποτικαὶ
γὰρ, ἦ δὲ πόλις κοινωνία τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἐστὶν.

Δωρισμένων δὲ τούτων ἐχόμενον ἐστὶ τὰς
25 πολιτείας ἐπισκέψασθαι, πόσαι τῶν ἀριθμῶν καὶ
tίνες εἰσί, καὶ πρῶτον τὰς ὁρθὰς αὐτῶν· καὶ γὰρ
μὲν ἀπεικόπτας ἐσοῦται φανερᾶ τούτων διορι-
σθείσων. ο. ἐπεὶ δὲ πολιτεία μὲν καὶ πολίτευμα
1 σημαίνει ταυτόν, πολίτευμα δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ κύριον τῶν
πόλεων, ἀνάγκη δ’ εἶναι κύριον ἡ ἕνα ἡ ὀλίγος ἡ
τοὺς πολλοὺς, ὅταν μὲν ὁ εἰς ἡ ὁ ὀλίγοι ἡ ὁ
πολλοὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρον ἀρχωσι, ταύτας
20 μὲν ὁρθὰς ἀναγκαίον εἶναι τὰς πολιτείας, τὰς δὲ
πρὸς τὸ ἰδιον ἡ τοῦ ἐνός ἡ τῶν ὀλίγων ἡ τοῦ
under his own direction. Hence in regard to the political offices also, when the state is constituted on the principle of equality and of similarity between the citizens, these claim to hold office by turn—in earlier times, under the natural system, claiming to do public services in turn, and for somebody in return to look after their own welfare just as previously they looked after his interest when in office themselves; but nowadays owing to the benefits to be got from public sources and from holding office people wish to be in office continuously, just as if it were the case that those in office although sickly people always enjoyed good health—in which case office would no doubt be much run after by invalids.

It is clear then that those constitutions that aim at the common advantage are in effect rightly framed in accordance with absolute justice, while those that aim at the rulers' own advantage only are faulty, and are all of them deviations from the right constitutions; for they have an element of despotism, whereas a city is a partnership of free men.

These matters having been determined the next step is to consider how many forms of constitution there are and what they are; and first to study the right forms of constitution, since the deviations will also become manifest when these are defined.

But inasmuch as 'constitution' means the same as 'government,' and the government is the supreme power in the state, and this must be either a single ruler or a few or the mass of the citizens, in cases when the one or the few or the many govern with an eye to the common interest, these constitutions must necessarily be right ones, while those administered with an eye to the private interest of either the one
ARISTOTLE

1279 a πλήθους παρεκβάσεις. ἡ γὰρ οὖ πολίτας φατέον εἶναι τοὺς μετέχοντας, ἡ δὲ κοινωνεῖν τοῦ συμφέροντος. καλεῖν δὲ εἴωθαμεν τῶν μὲν μοναρχιῶν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἀποβλέπουσαν συμφέρον βασιλείαν, τὴν δὲ τῶν ὁλίγων μὲν πλείουσι δὲ ἐνὸς ἀριστοκρατίαν (ἢ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄρχειν ἢ διὰ τὸ πρὸς τὸ ἀριστοτελεῖν τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτῆς), ὅταν δὲ τὸ πλήθος πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύηται συμφέρον, καλεῖται τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα πασῶν τῶν πολιτεῶν, πολιτεία. (συμ-3

40 βαίνει δὲ εὐλόγωσι εἴνα μὲν γὰρ διαφέρειν κατ’ ἄρετὴν ἢ ὁλίγους ἐνδέχεται, πλείους δὲ ἢ ἐκείνῳ καθῆκεν

1279 b ἡκριβώσθαι πρὸς πᾶσαν ἄρετὴν, ἄλλα μάλιστα τὴν πολεμικὴν, αὐτὴ γὰρ ἐν πλῆθει γίγνεται· διόπερ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν κυριώτατον τὸ προπολεμοῦν, καὶ μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰ ὅτι ὁμολαὸς, παρεκβάσεις δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων τυραννίσ 4
mὲν βασιλείας ὁλιγαρχία δὲ ἀριστοκρατίας δημοκρατία δὲ πολιτείας· ἡ μὲν γὰρ τυραννίς ἐστὶ μοναρχία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τοῦ μοναρχοῦντος, ἡ δὲ ὁλιγαρχία πρὸς τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων, ἡ δὲ δημοκρατία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων, πρὸς
dὲ τὸ τῶν κοινῶν λυσιτελοῦν οὐδεμία αὐτῶν.

Δεῖ δὲ μικρῷ διὰ μακροτέρων εἰπεῖν τὸς ἑκάστη τοῦτων τῶν πολιτεῶν ἑστὶν· καὶ γὰρ ἔχει τινὰς ἀπορίας, τῷ δὲ περὶ ἑκάστην μέθοδον φιλοσοφοῦντι

1 〈μή〉 μετέχοντας Bernays.
or the few or the multitude are deviations. For either we must not say that those who are part of the state are citizens, or those who are part of the state must share in the advantage of membership.

2 Our customary designation for a monarchy that aims at the common advantage is 'kingship'; for a government of more than one yet only a few 'aristocracy' (either because the best men rule or because they rule with a view to what is best for the state and for its members); while when the multitude govern the state with a view to the common advantage, it is called by the name common to all the forms of constitution, 'constitutional government.' (And this comes about reasonably, since although it is possible for one man or a few to excel in virtue, when the number is larger it becomes difficult for them to possess perfect excellence in respect of every form of virtue, but they can best excel in military valour, for this is found with numbers; and therefore with this form of constitution the class that fights for the state in war is the most powerful, and it is those who possess arms who are admitted to the government.) Deviations from the constitutions mentioned are tyranny corresponding to kingship, oligarchy to aristocracy, and democracy to constitutional government; for tyranny is monarchy ruling in the interest of the monarch, oligarchy government in the interest of the rich, democracy government in the interest of the poor, and none of these forms governs with regard to the profit of the community.

But it is necessary to say at a little greater length what each of these constitutions is; for the question involves certain difficulties, and it is the special mark of one who studies any subject philo-
καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀποβλέποντι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν ἀλλὰ δηλοῦν τὴν περὶ ἐκαστον ἄλληθειαν. ἔστι δὲ τοὺς τυραννίς μὲν μοναρχία, καθάπερ εἰρηται, δεσποτικὴ τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας, ὀλυγαρχία δ᾿ ὅταν ὅσι κύριοι τῆς πολιτείας οἱ τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντες, δημοκρατία δὲ τούναντίον ὅταν οἱ μὴ κεκτημένοι.

20 πλῆθος οὐσίας ἀλλ᾿ ἀποροι. πρώτη δ᾿ ἀπορία πρὸς τὸν διορισμὸν ἐστίν. εἰ γὰρ εἰεν οἱ πλείους οὔτε εὐποροι κύριοι τῆς πόλεως, δημοκρατία δ᾿ ἐστὶν ὅταν ἥ κύριον τὸ πλῆθος, ὁμοίως δὲ πάλιν κἂν εἰ ποιοι συμβαίνοι1 τοὺς ἀπόρους ἑλάττους μὲν εἶναι τῶν εὐπορῶν κρεῖττους δ᾿ ὅντας κυρίους εἶναι τῆς πολιτείας, ὅτσου δ᾿ ὀλίγων κύριον πλῆθος ὀλυγαρχίαν εἰναι φασιν, οὐκ ἂν καὶ χαῖν ἀδίκειεν διωρίσθαι περὶ τῶν πολιτεῶν. ἀλλὰ μὴν κἂν εἰ2 τίς συνθεῖ ἡ μὲν εὐπορία τῇ ὀλυγότητα τῇ δ᾿ ἀπορία τὸ πλῆθος οὔτω προσαγορεύοι τὰς πολιτείας, ὀλυγαρχίαν μὲν ἐν ἥ τὰς ἀρχάς ἔχουσιν οἱ εὐποροι ὀλίγων τὸ πλῆθος οὔτε, δημοκρατίαν δὲ ἐν ἥ οἱ ἀποροὶ πολλοὶ τὸ πλῆθος οὔτε, ἀλλὰν ἀπορίαν ἔχει. τίνας γὰρ ἐροῦμεν τὰς ἄρτι λεξιθείσας πολιτείας, τὴν ἐν ἥ πλείους οἱ εὐποροὶ καὶ τὴν ἐν3 ἥ ἑλάττους οἱ ἀποροὶ, κύριοι δὲ ἑκάτεροι τῶν πολιτεῶν, εἰπερ μηδεμία ἀλλη πολιτεία παρὰ τὰς εἱρημένας ἐστίν; ἔοικε τοῦν δὲ λόγον ποιεῖν 7 δῆλον ὃτι τὸ μὲν ὀλίγως ἥ πολλοὺς εἶναι κυρίους.

1 Schneider: συμβαίνει, -η codd.
2 κἂν el Susemihl: κἂν codd. 3 τὴν ἐν ed.: ἐν codd.

a i.e. it would be absurd to term government by the people democracy if the people happened to be very rich, or government by a few oligarchy if the few were poor and the many whom they governed rich.
sophically, and not solely with regard to its practical aspect, that he does not overlook or omit any point, but brings to light the truth about each. Now tyranny, as has been said, is monarchy exerting despotic power over the political community; oligarchy is when the control of the government is in the hands of those that own the properties; democracy is when on the contrary it is in the hands of those that do not possess much property, but are poor. A first difficulty is with regard to the definition. If the majority of the citizens were wealthy and were in control of the state, yet when the multitude is in power it is a democracy, and similarly, to take the other case, if it were to occur somewhere that the poor were fewer than the rich but were stronger than they and accordingly were in control of the government, yet where a small number is in control it is said to be an oligarchy, then it would seem that our definition of the forms of constitution was not a good one. And once again, if one assumed the combination of small numbers with wealth and of multitude with poverty, and named the constitutions thus—one in which the rich being few in number hold the offices, oligarchy: one in which the poor being many in number hold the offices, democracy,—this involves another difficulty. What names are we to give to the constitutions just described—the one in which there are more rich and the one in which the poor are the fewer, and these control their respective governments—if there exists no other form of constitution beside those mentioned? The argument therefore seems to make it clear that for few or many to have power is an accidental feature.
συμβεβηκός ἦστιν, τὸ μὲν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις τὸ δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις, διὰ τὸ τοὺς μὲν εὐπόρους ὀλύγους πολλοὺς δὲ εἶναι τοὺς ἀπόρους πανταχοῦ (διὸ καὶ οὐ συμβαίνει τὰς ρηθείσας αἰτίας γίνεσθαι διαφορᾶ), ὃ δὲ διαφέρουσιν ἡ τε δημοκρατία καὶ ἡ ὀλιγαρχία ἀλλήλων πενία καὶ πλοῦτος ἦστιν· καὶ ἀναγκαῖον μὲν ὅποι ἄρχωσι διὰ πλοῦτον, ἂν τ᾽ ἐλάττωσιν ἄν τε πλεῖον, εἶναι ταύτην ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὅποι δ᾽ οἱ ἀποροὶ, δημοκρατίαν, ἄλλα συμβαίνει, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, τοὺς μὲν ὀλύγους εἶναι τοὺς δὲ πολλούς, εὐπόρουσι μὲν γὰρ ὀλύγοι τῆς δ᾽ ἐλευθερίας μετέχουσι πάντες, δι᾽ ἃς αἰτίας ἀμφισβητοῦσιν ἀμφότεροι τῆς πολιτείας.

Δηπτέον δὲ πρῶτον τίνας ὄρους λέγουσιν τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ δημοκρατίας, καὶ τί τὸ δίκαιον τὸ τε ὀλιγαρχικὸν καὶ δημοκρατικὸν. πάντες γὰρ ἄπτονται δικαίου τινός, ἀλλὰ μέχρι τινός προέρχονται, καὶ λέγουσιν οὐ πάν τὸ κυρίως δίκαιον. οἶον δοκεῖ ἵσον τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ ἐστίν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πᾶσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἱσοίς· καὶ τὸ ἁνίσον δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ γὰρ ἐστίν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πᾶσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἁνίσοις· οἱ δὲ τούτ᾽ ἄφαιροῦσι, τὸ δὲς, καὶ κρίνουσι κακῶς. τὸ δ᾽ αἶτιον ὅτι περὶ αὐτῶν ἡ κρίσις, σχεδὸν δ᾽ οἱ πλεῖστοι φαύλοι κριταὶ περὶ τῶν οἰκείων. ὥστε ἔπει τὸ δίκαιον τισίν, καὶ δι᾽ ἥρηται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπὶ τε τῶν πραγμάτων

210

---

1 τὸ ἵσον δίκαιον Victorius.
of oligarchies in the one case and democracies in the other, due to the fact that the rich are few and the poor are many everywhere (so that it is not really the case that the points mentioned constitute a specific difference), but that the real thing in which democracy and oligarchy differ from each other is poverty and wealth; and it necessarily follows that wherever the rulers owe their power to wealth, whether they be a minority or a majority, this is an oligarchy, and when the poor rule, it is a democracy, although it does accidentally happen, as we said, that where the rulers hold power by wealth they are few and where they hold power by poverty they are many, because few men are rich but all men possess freedom, and wealth and freedom are the grounds on which the two classes lay claim to the government.

And first we must ascertain what are stated to be the determining qualities of oligarchy and democracy, and what is the principle of justice under the one form of government and under the other. For all men lay hold on justice of some sort, but they only advance to a certain point, and do not express the principle of absolute justice in its entirety. For instance, it is thought that justice is equality, and so it is, though not for everybody but only for those who are equals; and it is thought that inequality is just, for so indeed it is, though not for everybody, but for those who are unequal; but these partisans strip away the qualification of the persons concerned, and judge badly. And the cause of this is that they are themselves concerned in the decision, and perhaps most men are bad judges when their own interests are in question. Hence inasmuch as ‘just’ means just for certain persons, and it is divided in the same way in relation to the
καὶ οἷς, καθάπερ εὐρήται πρῶτερον ἐν τοῖς ἥδικοῖς, τὴν μὲν τοῦ πράγματος ἱσότητα ὁμολογοῦσιν, τὴν 20 δὲ οἷς ἀμφισβητοῦσι, μάλιστα μὲν διὰ τὸ λεχθὲν ἄρτι, διότι κρίνουσι τὰ περὶ αὐτοῦς κακῶς, ἐπειτα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ λέγειν μέχρι τινὸς ἐκατέρους δίκαιον τι νομίζοντι1 δίκαιον λέγειν ἀπλῶς. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἂν κατὰ τι ἀνισοὶ ὤσιν, οἱον χρήμασιν, ὅλως οἴ- ονται ἀνίσοι εἶναι, οἱ δὲ ἂν κατὰ τι ὴσοι, οἶνον ἐλευ- 25 θερία,2 ὅλως ἴσοι. τὸ δὲ κυριώτατον οὐ λέγουσιν. 10 εἰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν κτημάτων χάριν ἐκουσώνησαν καὶ συνήλθον, τοσοῦτον μετέχοντι τῆς πόλεως ὁσον- περ καὶ τῆς κτήσεως, ὡσθ' ο τῶν ὀλιγαρχικῶν λόγος δόξειν ἂν ἴσχυεν (οὗ γὰρ εἶναι δίκαιον ἴσον μετέχειν τῶν ἐκατὸν μνῶν3 τὸν εἰσενέγ- 80 καντα μίαν μνᾶν τῷ δόντι τὸ λοιπὸν πᾶν, οὔτε τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὔτε τῶν ἐπιγινομένων). εἰ δὲ μήτε τοῦ ζῆν μόνον ἐνεκεν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοῦ εὗ ζῆν (καὶ γὰρ ἂν δούλων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἦν πόλις, νῦν δ' οὖκ ἐστι διὰ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν εὐδαιμονίας μηδὲ τοῦ ζῆν κατὰ προαίρεσιν), μήτε συμμαχίας ἐνεκεν ὄπως ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ἂδικῶνται, μήτε διὰ τὰς

1 νομίζοντι <τὸ> Spengel.
2 Sepulveda: ἐλευθεροί, ἐλευθέροι codd.
3 ἐκατὸν ταλάντων Γ.

---

b See 1268 b 14 n.; or read '100 talents,' say £24,000 (gold).
212
things to be distributed and the persons that receive them, as has been said before in *Ethics*, the two parties agree as to what constitutes equality in the thing, but dispute as to what constitutes equality in the person, chiefly for the reason just now stated, because men are bad judges where they themselves are concerned, but also, inasmuch as both parties put forward a plea that is just up to a certain point, they think that what they say is absolutely just. For the one side think that if they are unequal in some respects, for instance in wealth, they are entirely unequal, and the other side think that if they are equal in some respects, for instance in freedom, they are entirely equal. But the most important thing they do not mention. If men formed the community and came together for the sake of wealth, their share in the state is proportionate to their share in the property, so that the argument of the champions of oligarchy would appear to be valid—namely that in a partnership with a capital of 100 minae it would not be just for the man who contributed one mina to have a share whether of the principal or of the profits accruing equal to the share of the man who supplied the whole of the remainder; but if on the other hand the state was formed not for the sake of life only but rather for the good life (for otherwise a collection of slaves or of lower animals would be a state, but as it is, it is not a state, because slaves and animals have no share in well-being or in purposive life), and if its object is not military alliance for defence against injury by anybody, and it does not exist for the

---

^ See 1260 a 12, and *N.E.* x. vi., 1177 a 8, 'but no one allows a slave any measure of happiness, any more than a life of his own.'
1280 a ἀλλαγάς καὶ τὴν χρήσιν τὴν πρὸς ἄλληλους· καὶ γὰρ ἄν Τυρρηνοὶ καὶ Καρχηδόνιοι, καὶ πάντες οἳ ἐστὶ σύμβολα πρὸς ἄλληλους, ὡς μιᾶς ἂν πολῖται πόλεως ἦσαν· εἰσὶ γοῦν αὐτοῖς συνθήκαι περὶ τῶν εἰςαγωγίμων καὶ σύμβολα περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν καὶ γραφαὶ περὶ συμμαχίας· ἀλλ’ οὔτ’ ἀρχαὶ πᾶσιν επὶ τούτοις κοιναί καθεστάσαι, ἀλλ’ ἔτεραι παρ’ ἐκατέρωσι, οὔτε τοῦ ποίους τινὰς εἶναι δεὶ προντίζουσιν ἄτεροι τοὺς ἐτέρους, οὐδ’ ὅπως μηδεῖς ἄδικος ἐσται τῶν ύπὸ τὰς συνθήκας μηδὲ μο- χθηρίαν ἔξει μηδεμίαν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ὅπως μηδὲν ἀδικήσουσιν ἄλληλους. περὶ δ’ ἄρετῆς καὶ κακίας πολιτικῆς διασκοποῦσιν ὅσοι προντίζουσιν εὐνομίας. ἦ καὶ φανερὸν ὅτι δεὶ περὶ ἄρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖ εἶναι τῇ γ’ ὡς ἀληθῶς νομοσχεδίαν πόλει, μὴ λόγου χάριν· γίνεται γὰρ ἡ κοινωνία συμμαχία, τῶν ἀλλων1 τόπω διαφέρουσα μόνου τῶν ἂπόθεν συμ- μάχων.2 καὶ ὁ νόμος συνθήκη καὶ, καθάπερ ἐφή Λυκόφρων ὁ σοφιστής, ἐγγυητής ἄλληλους τῶν δικαίων, ἀλλ’ οὐχ οἶος ποιεῖν ἁγαθοὺς καὶ δυκαίους τοὺς πολίτας. ὅτι δὲ τούτων ἔχει τὸν τρόπον φανερόν. εἰ γὰρ τις καὶ συναγάγω τοὺς τόπους εἰς ἐν, ὥστε ἀπεσταθή τὴν Μεγαρέων πόλιν καὶ Κορνθίων τοῖς τείχεσι, ὅμως οὐ μία πόλις· οὐδ’ εἰ πρὸς ἄλληλους ἐπιγαμίας ποιήσαντο, καὶ τοῦτο τῶν ἰδίων ταῖς πόλεις κοινωνημάτων ἐστίν.

1 τῶν ἀλλων: ἄλλως ? Immisch. 2 συμμαχιῶν Conring.

a The sentence here breaks off; the inference that should have formed its conclusion is given in § 15.

b Probably a pupil of Gorgias, see 1275 b 26 n.
sake of trade and of business relations— for if so, Etruscans and Carthaginians and all the people that have commercial relations with one another would be virtually citizens of a single state; at all events they have agreements about imports and covenants as to abstaining from dishonesty and treaties of alliance for mutual defence; but they do not have officials common to them all appointed to enforce these covenants, but different officials with either party, nor yet does either party take any concern as to the proper moral character of the other, nor attempt to secure that nobody in the states under the covenant shall be dishonest or in any way immoral, but only that they shall not commit any wrong against each other. All those on the other hand who are concerned about good government do take civic virtue and vice into their purview. Thus it is also clear that any state that is truly so called and is not a state merely in name must pay attention to virtue; for otherwise the community becomes merely an alliance, differing only in locality from the other alliances, those of allies that live apart. And the law is a covenant or, in the phrase of the sophist Lycophron, a guarantee of men’s just claims on one another, but it is not designed to make the citizens virtuous and just. And that this is how the matter stands is manifest. For if one were actually to bring the sites of two cities together into one, so that the city-walls of Megara and those of Corinth were contiguous, even so they would not be one city; nor would they if they enacted rights of intermarriage with each other, although intermarriage between citizens is one of the elements of community which are characteristic of states. And similarly even if certain
ARISTOTLE

ομοίως δ’ οὐδ’ εἰ τινες οἴκοιεν χωρίς μέν, μὴ μέντοι τοιοῦτον ἀποθεῖν ὅστε μὴ κοινωνεῖν, ἀλλ’ εἰςαν αὐτοῖς νόμοι τοῦ μὴ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀδικεῖν

περὶ τὰς μεταδόσεις—οἶον εἰ δ’ μὲν εἰὴ τέκτων ὁ δὲ γεωργὸς ὁ δὲ σκυτοτόμος ὁ δ’ ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον—, καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἰςεν μυρίοι, μὴ μέντοι κοινωνοῖεν ἄλλου μηδενὸς ἢ τῶν τοιούτων οἶον ἄλλαγῆς καὶ συμμαχίας, οὐδ’ οὕτω ποι ἄλλως. διὰ τίνα δὴ 13

ποτ’ αἰτίαν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ διὰ τὸ μὴ σύνεγγυς τῆς

κοινωνίας: εἰ γὰρ καὶ συνέλθοιαν οὕτω κοινω-

νοῆτες (ἐκαστὸς μέντοι χρῶτο τῇ ἱδίᾳ οἰκίᾳ ὡσπερ πόλει) καὶ οφίσιν αὐτοῖς ὡς ἐπιμαχίας οὕσης

βοηθοῦντες ἐπὶ τούς ἀδικοῦντας μόνον, οὐδ’ οὕτως ἄν εἰναι δοξεῖα πόλεσ τοῖς ἀκριβῶς θεωροῦν,

εἴπερ ὦμοίως ὠμολογεῖν συνελθόντες καὶ χωρίς.

φανερὸν τοῖνυν ὅτι ἡ πόλις οὐκ ἔστιν κοινωνία

tόπου καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τῆς

μεταδόσεως χάριν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἀναγκαῖον

ὑπάρχειν εἴπερ ἔσται πόλις, οὐ μὴν οὐδ’ ὑπ-

αρχόντων τούτων ἀπάντων ἦδη πόλις, ἀλλ’ ἡ τοῦ

ἐν ζῆν κοινωνία καὶ ταῖς οἰκίαις καὶ τοῖς γένεσι,

ζωῆς τελείας χάριν καὶ αὐτάρκους. οὐκ ἔσται 14

μέντοι τοῦτο μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἕνα κατοικοῦντων

tόπον καὶ χρωμένων ἐπιγαμίας. διὸ κηδεῖα τ’

ἐγένοντο κατὰ τὰς πόλεις καὶ φρατρίαι καὶ θυσίαι

καὶ διαγωγαὶ τοῦ συζήν. τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον φιλίας

216
people lived in separate places yet not so far apart as not to have intercourse, but had laws to prevent their wronging one another in their interchange of products—for instance, if one man were a carpenter, another a farmer, another a shoemaker and another something else of the kind,—and the whole population numbered ten thousand, but nevertheless they had no mutual dealings in anything else except such things as exchange of commodities and military alliance, even then this would still not be a state. What then exactly is the reason for this? for clearly it is not because their intercourse is from a distance; since even if they came together for intercourse of this sort (each nevertheless using his individual house as a city) and for one another’s military aid against wrongful aggressors only, as under a defensive alliance, not even then would they seem to those who consider the matter carefully to constitute a state, if they associated on the same footing when they came together as they did when they were apart. It is manifest therefore that a state is not merely the sharing of a common locality for the purpose of preventing mutual injury and exchanging goods. These are necessary pre-conditions of a state’s existence, yet nevertheless, even if all these conditions are present, that does not therefore make a state, but a state is a partnership of families and of clans in living well, and its object is a full and independent life. At the same time this will not be realized unless the partners do inhabit one and the same locality and practise intermarriage; this indeed is the reason why family relationships have arisen throughout the states, and brotherhoods and clubs for sacrificial rites and social recreations. But such organization is pro-
éργον, ἢ γὰρ τοῦ συζήν προαίρεσις φιλία. τέλος
40 μὲν οὖν πόλεως τὸ εὖ ζήν, ταύτα δὲ τοῦ τέλους
χάριν. πόλις δὲ ἡ γενών καὶ κωμῶν κοινωνία
ζωῆς τελείας καὶ αὐτάρκους,1 τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν, ὡς
φαμέν, τὸ ζήν εὐδαιμόνιος καὶ καλῶς· τῶν καλῶν
ἀρα πράξεων2 χάριν θετέον εἶναι τὴν πολιτικὴν
κοινωνίαν, ἀλλ' οὕ τοῦ συζήν· διόπερ οὖσι συμ- 15
βάλλονται πλείστον εἰς τὴν τουαύτην κοινωνίαν,
τούτοις τῆς πόλεως μέστι πλείον ἢ τοῖς κατὰ
μὲν ἔλευθερίαν καὶ γένος ἰσοῖς ἡ μείζον κατὰ δὲ
tὴν πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἀνίσοις, ἡ τοῖς κατὰ πλοῦτον
ὑπερέχουσι κατ' ἀρετὴν δ' ὑπερεχομένους.
"Ὅτι μὲν οὖν πάντες οἱ περὶ τῶν πολιτείων
10 ἀμφισβητοῦντες μέρος τι τοῦ δικαίου λέγουσιν,
φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.
VI. Ἐξει δ' ἀπορίαν τί δεὶ τὸ κύριον εἶναι τῆς 1
πόλεως. ἡ γὰρ τοῦ τὸ πλῆθος, ἡ τοὺς πλουσίους,
ἡ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς, ἡ τὸν βέλτιστον ἕνα πάντων, ἡ
τύραννον. ἀλλὰ ταύτα πάντα ἔχειν φαίνεται δυσκο-
15 λίαν. τί γὰρ; ἄν οἱ πένθητες διὰ τὸ πλείους εἶναι
dιανέμωνται τὰ τῶν πλουσίων, τοῦτ' οὐκ ἄδικον
ἔστιν; ἐδοξε γὰρ νῦ Δία τῷ κυρίῳ δικαίως. τὴν
οὖν ἀδίκιαν τί χρὴ λέγειν τὴν ἐσχάτην; πάλιν τε,
πάντων ληφθέντων, οἱ πλείους τὰ τῶν ἑλάττων
ἄν διανέμωνται, φανερὸν ὅτι θείρουσι τὴν πόλιν.
20 ἀλλὰ μὴν οὖχ ἢ γ' ἀρετὴ φθείρει τὸ ἔχον αὐτὴν,
οὐδὲ τὸ δίκαιον πόλεως φθαρτικόν, ὡστε δὴλον
ὅτι καὶ τὸν νόμον τοῦτον οὐχ οἶον τ' εἶναι δίκαιον.

1 αὐτάρκους <χάριν> Scaliger.
2 πράξεων om. ἸΜΠ1.
duced by the feeling of friendship, for friendship is the motive of social life; therefore, while the object of a state is the good life, these things are means to that end. And a state is the partnership of clans and villages in a full and independent life, which in our view constitutes a happy and noble life; the political fellowship must therefore be deemed to exist for the sake of noble actions, not merely for living in common. Hence those who contribute most to such fellowship have a larger part in the state than those who are their equals or superiors in freedom and birth but not their equals in civic virtue, or than those who surpass them in wealth but are surpassed by them in virtue.

It is therefore clear from what has been said that all those who dispute about the forms of constitution assert a part of the just principle.

VI. But it is a matter of question what ought to be the sovereign power in the state. Clearly it must be either the multitude, or the rich, or the good, or the one man who is best of all, or a tyrant. But all of these arrangements appear to involve disagreeable consequences. For instance, if the poor take advantage of their greater numbers to divide up the property of the rich, is not this unjust? No, it may be said, for it was a resolution made by the supreme authority in just form. Then what must be pronounced to be the extreme of injustice? And again, when everybody is taken into account, suppose the majority share out among themselves the property of the minority, it is manifest that they are destroying the state; but assuredly virtue does not destroy its possessor, and justice is not destructive of the state, so that it is clear that this principle also cannot
1281a ἔτι καὶ τὰς πράξεις ὄσας ὃ τύραννος ἐπραξεν 2 ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάσας δικαιὰς, βιάζεται γὰρ ὃν κρείττων, ἠστερ καὶ τὸ πλήθος τοὺς πλουσίους. 25 ἀλλ' ἄρα τοὺς ἐλάττους δίκαιον ἀρχεῖν καὶ τοὺς πλουσίους: ἂν οὖν κάκεινοι ταῦτα ποιῶσι καὶ διαρπάζωσι καὶ ἀφαιρῶνται τὰ κτήματα¹ τοῦ πλήθους, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ δίκαιον; καὶ θάτερον ἄρα. ταῦτα μὲν τοῖν ὅτι πάντα φαύλα καὶ οὐ δίκαια φανερόν. ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ἀρχεῖν δεῖ καὶ κυρίους 3 εἶναι πάντων; οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη τοὺς ἄλλους ἀτίμους εἶναι πάντας, μὴ τιμωμένους ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαῖς: τιμᾶς γὰρ λέγομεν εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς, ἀρχόντων δ' αἰεὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀναγκαίων εἶναι τοὺς ἄλλους ἀτίμους. ἀλλ' ἕνα τὸν σπουδαῖότατον ἀρχεῖν βελτιστον; ἀλλ' ἔτι τούτο ὀλγαρχικότερον, οὗ γὰρ ἀτίμους πλείους. ἀλλ' ὡς φαίη τις ἂν τὸ κύριον ὅλως ἀνθρωπον εἶναι ἀλλὰ μὴ νόμον φαύλον, ἔχοντά γε τὰ συμβαίνοντα πάθη περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν. ἂν οὖν ἡ νόμος μὲν ὀλγαρχικὸς δὲ ἡ δημοκρατικὸς, τί διοίσει περὶ τῶν ἡπορμημένων; συμβηστεῖ γὰρ ὄμοιως τὰ λεγέντα πρότερον.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἑστὼ τις ἐτερος λόγος: 40 ὅτι δὲ δεὶ κύριον εἶναι μάλλον τὸ πλήθος ἢ τοὺς ἀρίστους μὲν ὀλίγους δὲ, δοξείειν ἂν λύεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἐχειν ἀπορίαν, τάχα δὲ κἂν ἄλθεον. τοὺς γὰρ πολλούς, ὃν ἐκαστὸς ἐστὶν οὐ σπουδαῖος ἄνηρ, ὃμως ενδέχεται συνελθόντας εἶναι βελτίους

¹ Richards: τὰ κτήματα ἁφαιρόντας, codd.
² ἂν εὖ λύεσθαι Richards.
³ ἀπολογίαι Wilamowitz.

Technical term for disfranchisement and loss of civic rights. 220
be just. Also it follows from it that all the actions done by a tyrant are just, for his use of force is based upon superior strength, as is the compulsion exerted by the multitude against the rich. But is it just that the minority and the rich should rule? Suppose therefore they also act in the same way and plunder and take away the property of the multitude, is this just? If it is, so also is the plunder of the rich by the multitude. It is clear therefore that all these things are bad and not just. But ought the good to rule, and be in control of all classes? If so, then it follows that all the other classes will be dishonoured, if they are not honoured by holding the offices of government; for we speak of offices as honours, and if the same persons are always in office the rest must necessarily be excluded from honour. But is it better for the most virtuous individual to be the ruler? But that is still more oligarchical, for the people excluded from honour will be more numerous. But perhaps some one would say that in any case it is a bad thing for a human being, having in his soul the passions that are the attributes of humanity, to be sovereign, and not the law. Suppose therefore that law is sovereign, but law of an oligarchic or democratic nature, what difference will it make as regards the difficulties that have been raised? For the results described before will come about just the same.

Most of these points therefore must be discussed on another occasion; but the view that it is more proper for the multitude to be sovereign than the few of greatest virtue might be thought to be explicable, and to raise some difficulty but probably to be true. For it is possible that the many, though not individually good men, yet when they come
πείνων οὐχ ὡς ἔκαστον ἀλλ’ ὡς σύμπαντας, οἷον τὰ συμφορητὰ δείπνα τῶν ἐκ μιᾶς δαπάνης χορηγηθέντων· πολλῶν γὰρ οὖν ὕκαστον μόριον ἔχειν ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως, καὶ γίνεσθαι συνελθόντας ὥσπερ ἕνα άνθρωπον τὸ πλῆθος πολύτοπος καὶ πολύχειρα καὶ πολλὰς ἔχοντ’ αισθήσεις, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τὰ ἡθοὶ καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν. Διὸ καὶ κρίνονσιν ἀμείνων οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ τὰ τῆς μονοκηκῆς ἔργα καὶ τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν· ἄλλοι γὰρ ἄλλο τι μόριον, πάντα δὲ πάντες. ἀλλὰ τούτω διαφέρουσιν οἱ σπουδαίοι τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἔκαστον τῶν πολλῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν μη καλῶν τοὺς καλοὺς φασι καὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα διὰ τέχνης τῶν ἀληθινῶν, τῶ συνήχθαι τὰ διεσπαρμένα χωρίς εἷς ἐν, ἐπεὶ κεχωρισμένων γε κάλλιον ἔχειν τοῦ γεγραμμένου τουδὲ μὲν τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ἐτέρου δὲ τινος ἐτερον μόριον. εἰ μὲν οὖν περὶ πάντα δῆμον καὶ περὶ πῶν πλῆθος ἐνδέχεται ταῦτην εἶναι τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν πολλῶν πρὸς τοὺς ὀλίγους σπουδαίους, ἀδηλον, ἵσως δὲ νὴ Δία δῆλον ὅτι περὶ ἐνίων ἄδυνατον—ὅ γαρ αὐτός κἂν ἐπὶ τῶν θηρίων ἀρμόσεις λόγος, καίτοι τι διαφέρουσιν ἔννοι τῶν θηρίων ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν;—ἀλλὰ περὶ τι πλῆθος οὐδὲν εἶναι κωλύει τὸ λεχθὲν ἀληθές. διὸ καὶ τὴν τε πρότερον εἰρημένην ἀπορίαν λύσειν ἂν τις διὰ

1 καὶ ὥσπερ γίνεσθαι συνελθεῖν οἶον ἔνα Richards.
2 ἔκαστοι Thurot.
together may be better, not individually but collectively, than those who are so, just as public dinners to which many contribute are better than those supplied at one man's cost; for where there are many, each individual, it may be argued, has some portion of virtue and wisdom, and when they have come together, just as the multitude becomes a single man with many feet and many hands and many senses, so also it becomes one personality as regards the moral and intellectual faculties. This is why the general public is a better judge of the works of music and those of the poets, because different men can judge a different part of the performance, and all of them all of it. But the superiority of good men over the mass of men individually, like that of handsome men, so it is said, over plain men and of the works of the painter's art over the real objects, really consists in this, that a number of scattered good points have been collected together into one example; since if the features be taken separately, the eye of one real person is more beautiful than that of the man in the picture, and some other feature of somebody else. It is not indeed clear whether this collective superiority of the many compared with the few good men can possibly exist in regard to every democracy and every multitude, and perhaps it may be urged that it is manifestly impossible in the case of some—for the same argument would also apply to animals, yet what difference is there, practically, between some multitudes and animals?—but nothing prevents what has been said from being true about some particular multitude. One might therefore employ these considerations to solve not only the previously stated
τούτων καὶ τὴν ἐχομένην αὐτῆς, τίνων δὲ κυρίως εἶναι τοὺς ἐλευθέρους καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν
(τοιοῦτοι δ’ εἰόν ὅσοι μήτε πλουσίοι μήτε ἀξίωμα ἐχουσιν ἄρετῆς μηδεν). τὸ μὲν γὰρ μετέχειν αὐτοὺς τῶν ἀρχῶν τῶν μεγίστων οὐκ ἄσφαλες (διὰ τε γὰρ ἀδικίαν καὶ δι’ ἀφροσύνην τὰ μὲν ἀδικεῖν ἀνάγκη ¹ τὰ δ’ ἀμαρτάνειν αὐτοὺς), τὸ δὲ μὴ μεταδίδοναι μηδὲ μετέχειν φοβερόν ὅταν γὰρ
ἀτίμοι πολλοὶ καὶ πέντες ὑπάρχωσι, πολεμίων ἀναγκαίων εἶναι πλήρη τὴν πόλιν ταύτην. λείπεται δὴ τοῦ βουλευσθαί καὶ κρίνειν μετέχειν αὐτοὺς. διόπερ καὶ Σόλων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τινῶν νομοθετῶν τὰ πάσαν ἐπὶ τὲ τὰς ἀρχαιοεσίας καὶ τὰς εὐθύνας τῶν ἀρχόντων, ἀρχεῖν δὲ κατὰ μόνας οὐκ ἔσωσι.
πάντες μὲν γὰρ ἐχοῦσι συνελθόντες ἰκανὴν αἰσθησιν, καὶ μιγνύμενοι τοὺς βελτίσσι τὰς πόλεις ωφελόσιν, καθάπερ ἡ μὴ καθαρὰ τροφὴ μετὰ τῆς καθαρᾶς τήν πᾶσαν ποιεῖ χρησιμωτέραν τῆς ὀλίγης. χωρίς δ’ ἐκαστός ἄτελης περὶ τὸ κρίνειν ἐστίν. ἔχει ἡ τάξις αὕτη τῆς πολιτείας ἀπορίαν πρῶτην
μὲν ὅτι δὸξειεν ἀν τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἶναι τὸ κρίναι τίς ὀρθῶς ἱατρευκεν οὔπερ καὶ τὸ ἱατρεύσαι καὶ ποιήσαι υγίᾳ τὸν κάμνοντα τῆς νόσου τῆς παρούσης,
οὗτος δὲ ἐστὶν ἱατρός. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἑμεπειρίας καὶ τέχνας. ὡσπερ οὖν ἱατρὸν δεὶ διδόναι τὰς εὐθύνας ἐν ἱατροῖς, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς

¹ ἀνάγκη Rassow: ἄν codd.
² ἐπὶ τε <ταῦτα αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐπὶ> Wilamowitz.

---

a Probably words meaning ‘these functions and to’ have fallen out.
b i.e., especially, bran mixed with pure flour.
difficulty but also the related question, over what matters is the authority of the freemen, the mass of the citizens, to extend (using that expression to denote those who are not rich nor possessed of any distinguishing excellence at all)? For it is not safe for them to participate in the highest offices (for injustice and folly would inevitably cause them to act unjustly in some things and to make mistakes in others), but yet not to admit them and for them not to participate is an alarming situation, for when there are a number of persons without political honours and in poverty, the city then is bound to be full of enemies. It remains therefore for them to share the deliberative and judicial functions. For this reason Solon and certain other lawgivers appoint the common citizens to the election of the magistrates and the function of calling them to audit, although they do not allow them to hold office singly. For all when assembled together have sufficient discernment, and by mingling with the better class are of benefit to the state, just as impure food mixed with what is pure makes the whole more nourishing than the small amount of pure food alone; but separately the individual is immature in judgement. This arrangement of the constitution is however open to question in the first place on the ground that it might be held that the best man to judge which physician has given the right treatment is the man that is himself capable of treating and curing the patient of his present disease, and this is the man who is himself a physician; and that this is the case similarly with regard to the other arts and crafts. Hence just as a court of physicians must judge the work of a physician, so also all other practitioners ought to be called
άλλους ἐν τοῖς ὁμολογ. ὁιτρὸς δ' ὁ τε δημουργὸς καὶ ὁ ἀρχιτεκτονικὸς καὶ τρίτος ὁ πεπαιδευμένος 5 περὶ τὴν τέχνην (εἰσὶ γὰρ τινὲς τουοῦτοι καὶ περὶ πάσας ὡς εἶπεῖν τὰς τέχνας, ἀποδιδομέν δὲ τὸ κρίνειν οὐδὲν ἢττον τοῖς πεπαιδευμένοις ἢ τοῖς εἰδόσιν). ἐπειτα καὶ περὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν τὸν αὐτὸν ἀν 9 δοξεῖν ἔχειν τρόπον· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἐλέσθαι ὀρθῶς τῶν εἰδότων ἐργον ἐστίν, οἷον γεωμέτρην τε τῶν 10 γεωμετρικῶν καὶ κυβερνήτην τῶν κυβερνητικῶν· εἰ γὰρ καὶ περὶ ἐνίων ἐργον καὶ τεχνῶν μετέχουσι καὶ τῶν ἱδιωτῶν τινές, ἀλλ' οὗ τι τῶν εἰδότων γε μᾶλλον. ὡστε κατὰ μὲν τούτον τὸν λόγον οὖκ ἂν εἰ ἦ τὸ πλῆθος ποιητέων κύριον οὕτε τῶν ἄρχ- αἱρεσιῶν οὕτε τῶν εὐθυνῶν. ἀλλ' ἵσως οὗ πάντα 10 15 ταῦτα λέγεται καλῶς διὰ τε τοῦ πάλαι λόγον, ἂν ἢ τὸ πλῆθος μὴ λίαν ἀνδραποδῶδες (ἐσται γὰρ ἐκαστὸς μὲν χείρων κριτής τῶν εἰδότων, ἀπαντεῖ 6 δὲ συνελθόντες ἢ βελτίους ἢ οὐ χείρως), καὶ ὅτι περὶ ἐνίων οὗτοι δὲ μόνον ὁ ποιήσας οὔτ' ἀριστ' ἂν κρίνειν, ὡσιών τάργα γιγνώσκουσι καὶ οἱ μὴ 20 ἔχοντες τὴν τέχνην, οἷον οἰκίαν οὐ μόνον ἐστὶ γνώναι τοῦ ποιήσαντος, ἀλλὰ καὶ βελτίως ὁ χρώ- μενος αὐτῇ κρινεῖ (χρῆται δ' ὁ οἰκονόμος), καὶ πηδάλιον κυβερνήτης τέκτονος, καὶ θοινὴν ὁ δαίτυ- μῶν ἀλλ' οὐχ οὗ μάγειρος.

Ταύτην μὲν οὖν τὴν ἀπορίαν τάχα δοξεῖ τε ἂν

α See § 4.

226
to account before their fellows. But 'physician' means both the ordinary practitioner, and the master of the craft, and thirdly, the man who has studied medicine as part of his general education (for in almost all the arts there are some such students, and we assign the right of judgement just as much to cultivated amateurs as to experts). Further the same might be thought to hold good also of the election of officials, for to elect rightly is a task for experts—for example, it is for experts in the science of mensuration to elect a land-surveyor and for experts in navigation to choose a pilot; for even though in some occupations and arts some laymen also have a voice in appointments, yet they certainly do not have more voice than the experts. Hence according to this argument the masses should not be put in control over either the election of magistrates or their audit. But perhaps this statement is not entirely correct, both for the reason stated above, in case the populace is not of too slavish a character (for although each individual separately will be a worse judge than the experts, the whole of them assembled together will be better or at least as good judges), and also because about some things the man who made them would not be the only nor the best judge, in the case of professionals whose products come within the knowledge of laymen also: to judge a house, for instance, does not belong only to the man who built it, but in fact the man who uses the house (that is, the householder) will be an even better judge of it, and a steersman judges a rudder better than a carpenter, and the diner judges a banquet better than the cook.

This difficulty then might perhaps be thought to be
oútw λύειν ἰκανῶς. ἀλλὰ δὲ εστὶν ἔξομένη ταῦτης: 11

dokei γὰρ ἀτοπον εἶναι τὸ μειζόνων εἶναι κυρίους
tous φαύλους τῶν ἐπιεικῶν, αἱ δὲ ευθύναι καὶ αἱ
tῶν ἀρχῶν αἱρέσεις εἰσὶ μέγιστον, ὡς ἐν ἐνίασ
πολιτείαις, ὥσπερ εἰρήται, τοὺς δήμους ἀποδιδόσσων,
ἡ γὰρ ἐκκλησία κυρία πάντων τῶν τοιούτων ἐστὶν·

καὶ τούτῳ τῇς μὲν ἐκκλησίας μετέχουσι καὶ θουλεύουσι
καὶ δικάζουσιν ἀπὸ μικρῶν τιμημάτων καὶ τῆς
tυχούσης ἡλικίας, ταμεύουσι δὲ καὶ στρατηγοῦσι
καὶ τὰς μεγίστας ἀρχὰς ἀρχοῦσιν ἀπὸ μεγάλων.

ομοίως δὴ τις ἂν λύσει καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἀπορίαν— 12

ιὼσις γὰρ ἔχει καὶ ταύτ᾽ ὀρθῶς, οὐ γὰρ ὁ δικαστὴς

οὐδ᾽ ὁ θουλευτὴς οὐδ᾽ ὁ ἐκκλησιαστὴς ἀρχῶν ἐστίν,

ἀλλὰ τὸ δικαστήριον καὶ ἡ θουλὴ καὶ ὁ δήμος,
tῶν δὲ ῥηθέντων ἐκαστὸς μόριον ἐστὶ τούτων
(λέγω δὲ μόριον¹ τὸν θουλευτὴν καὶ τὸν ἐκκλησια-
στὴν καὶ τὸν δικαστήν). ὥστε δικαίως κύριον μει-
ζόνων τὸ πλῆθος, ἐκ γὰρ πολλῶν ὁ δήμος καὶ ἡ

θουλὴ καὶ τὸ δικαστήριον, καὶ τὸ τίμημα δὲ

πλείου τὸ πάντων τούτων ἡ τὸ τῶν καθ᾽ ἔνα καὶ

κατ᾽ ὀλγίους μεγάλας ἀρχὰς ἀρχόντων.

1282 b ῾Αὐτὰ μὲν Ὺοῦ διωρίσθω τούτων τὸν τρόπον· ἡ 13
dὲ πρῶτη λεξθεῖσα ἀπορία ποιεῖ φανερῶν οὐδὲν
οὐτῶς ἐπερον ὡς ὅτι δεὶ τοὺς νόμους εἶναι κυρίους
κειμένους ὀρθῶς, τῶν ἀρχοντα δὲ, ἂν τε εἰς ἀν ὑπὲ

πλείους ὡσι, περὶ τούτων εἶναι κυρίους περὶ

ὅσων ἔξαιδουσον οἱ νόμοι λέγειν ἀκριβῶς διὰ

tὸ μὴ βάδιον εἶναι καθόλου δηλώσαι περὶ πάντων.


a Viz. that under any plan some hardships will result, § 1.

228
11 satisfactorily solved in this way. But there is another one connected with it: it is thought to be absurd that the base should be in control over more important matters than the respectable; but the audits and elections of magistrates are a very important matter, yet in some constitutions, as has been said, they are assigned to the common people, for all such matters are under the control of the assembly, yet persons of a low property-assessment and of any age take part in the assembly and the council and sit on juries, whereas treasury officials, generals and the holders of the highest magistracies are drawn from among persons of large property. Now this difficulty also may be solved in a similar way; for perhaps these regulations also are sound, since it is not the individual juryman or councillor or member of the assembly in whom authority rests, but the court, the council and the people, while each of the individuals named (I mean the councillor, the members of assembly and the juryman) is a part of those bodies. Hence justly the multitude is sovereign in greater matters, for the popular assembly, the council and the jury-court are formed of a number of people, and also the assessed property of all these members collectively is more than that of the magistrates holding great offices individually or in small groups.

12 Let these points therefore be decided in this manner. But the difficulty first mentioned proves nothing else so clearly as that it is proper for the laws when rightly laid down to be sovereign, while the ruler or rulers in office should have supreme powers over matters as to which the laws are quite unable to pronounce with precision because of the difficulty of making a general rule to cover all cases. We have
ὅποιοὺς μέντοι τινὰς εἶναι δεῖ τοὺς ὀρθῶς κειμένους νόμους, οὐδέν πω δῆλον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐτι μένει τὸ πάλαι διαπορηθέν: ἀµὴ γὰρ καὶ ὁμοίως ταῖς πολιτείαις ἀνάγκη καὶ τοὺς νόμους φαύλους ἢ σπουδαίους εἶναι καὶ δικαίους ἢ ἄδικους (πλὴν τοῦτό γε φανερόν, ὅτι δεῖ πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν κεῖσθαι τοὺς νόμους). ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τοῦτο, δῆλον ὅτι τοὺς μὲν κατὰ τὰς ὀρθὰς πολιτείας ἀναγκαίου εἶναι δικαίους τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὰς παρεκβεβηκυῖαις οὖ δικαίους.

VII. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐν πάσαις μὲν ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις 1 καὶ τέχναις ἀγαθὸν τὸ τέλος, μέγιστον δὲ καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τῇ κυριωτάτῃ πασῶν, αὕτη δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτικὴ δύναμις, ἐστὶ δὲ τὸν πολιτικὸν ἀγαθὸν τὸ δίκαιον, τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ κοινὴ συμφέρον, δοκεῖ δὴ πάσιν ἵσον τί τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ μέχρι γε τῶν ὁμολογοῦσι τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοις ἐν 20 οἷς διαφέρουσι περὶ τῶν ἥθελων· τί γὰρ καὶ τις τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ δεῖν τοῖς ἵσοις ἵσον εἶναι φασιν. ποίων δ᾽ ἵστης ἐστὶ καὶ ποιῶν ἀνισότητας δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν. ἔχει γὰρ τοῦτο ἀπορίαν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν πολιτικὴν. ἵσως γὰρ ἂν φαίη τις κατὰ παντὸς 2 ὑπεροχὴν ἀγαθοῦ δεῖν ἀνίσως νενεμηθαί τὰς ἀρ-25χὰς, εἰ δὲ πάντα τὰ λοιπὰ μηδὲν διαφέροιεν ἀλλ᾽

1 ἀµὴ Bernays: ἀλλὰ codd., ἀλλὰ γὰρ . . . ἄδικους post 12 νόμους Congreve.
2 δὲ τὸ Susemihl: δὲ codd.
3 δὴ Immisch: δὲ codd.
4 εἰ <καὶ> ? ed.

a See 1281 a 36.
b Probably this clause should stand after the next, 'though—constitution' (which will be a parenthesis), and should run 'but <the difficulty is there> for necessarily—states.'
c The usual rendering is 'perverted,' but the Greek term is more neutral.

230
not however yet ascertained at all what particular character a code of laws correctly laid down ought to possess, but the difficulty raised at the start still remains; for necessarily the laws are good or bad, just or unjust, simultaneously with and similarly to the constitutions of states (though of course it is obvious that the laws are bound to be adapted to the constitution); yet if so, it is clear that the laws in conformity with the correct constitutions must necessarily be just and those in conformity with the divergent forms of constitution unjust.

And inasmuch as in all the sciences and arts the End is a good, and the greatest good and good in the highest degree in the most authoritative of all, which is the political faculty, and the good in the political field, that is, the general advantage, is justice, it is therefore thought by all men that justice is some sort of equality, and up to a certain point at all events they agree with the philosophical discourses in which conclusions have been reached about questions of ethics; for justice is a quality of a thing in relation to persons, and they hold that for persons that are equal the thing must be equal. But equality in what characteristics does this mean, and inequality in what? This must be made clear, since this too raises a difficulty, and calls for political philosophy. For perhaps someone might say that the offices of state ought to be distributed unequally according to superiority in every good quality, even if the candidates in all other respects did not differ

What follows is a summary of *Nicomachean Ethics*, I. cc. i., ii. See also *N.E.* V. c. iii.

Literally, 'the just is (a just) something and (something just) for somebody.'
1282b ὁμοιοὶ τυγχάνοιεν ὄντες· τοῖς γὰρ διαφέροντες ἐτερον εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τοῦτ' ἀληθές, ἔσται καὶ κατὰ χρώμα καὶ κατὰ μέγεθος καὶ καθ' ὃτιον τῶν ἀγαθῶν πλεονεχοῦσι. 35 εἰς τὸν πολιτικὸν δικαίων τοῖς ὑπερέχονσιν. ὡς τούτῳ ἐπιπόλαιον τὸ ψεύδος; φανέρον δ' ἔτι τῶν ἀλλῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ δυνάμεων· τῶν γὰρ ὁμοίων αὐλητῶν τὴν τέχνην οὐ δοτέον πλεονεξίαν τῶν αὐλῶν τοῖς εὐγενεστέρους· οὕδεν γὰρ αὐλήσομεν βέλτιον, δεῖ δὲ τῷ κατὰ τὸ ἔργον ὑπερέχοντι διδόναι καὶ τῶν ὁργάνων τῇ ὑπεροχῇ. εἰ δὲ μῆτρον ὄνομα τὸ λεγόμενον, ἐπὶ μᾶλλον αὐτὸ προαγαγοῦσιν ἵσται φανερὸν. εἰ γὰρ εἰπὶ τὰς ὑπερέχον μὲν κατὰ τὴν αὐλητικῆς πολὺ δ' ἐλλειπόν κατ' εὐγενειαν ἡ κάλλος, εἰ καὶ μείζον ἐκαστὸν ἐκείνων ἀγαθῶν ἐστὶ τῆς αὐλητικῆς (λέγω δὲ τῇ τῇ εὐγενείᾳ καὶ τῷ κάλλος) καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ὑπερέχονσι πλέον τῆς αὐλητικῆς ἡ ἐκείνος κατὰ τὴν αὐλητικήν, ὅμως τούτω δοτέον τοὺς διαφέροντας τῶν αὐλῶν· δεῖ γὰρ εἰς τὸ ἔργον συμβάλλονται τῆς ὑπεροχῆς καὶ τοῦ πλοῦτου καὶ τῆς εὐγενείας, συμβάλλονται δ' οὕδεν. ἐτι κατὰ γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον πᾶν ἀγαθὸν 4 πρὸς πᾶν ἀν εἰς συμβλήτουν· εἰ γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ τί μέγεθος, καὶ ὅλως ἀν τὸ μέγεθος ἐνάμιλλον εἰπὶ καὶ πρὸς πλοῦτον καὶ πρὸς ἐλευθερίαν· ὡστ' εἰ πλεῖον ὃδ' διαφέρει κατὰ μέγεθος ἡ ὃδ' κατ' ἀρετήν, καὶ πλεῖον ὑπερέχει· ὅλως ἄρετής μέγεθος,

1 <ὅδε> διαφέροντι ed.
2 ἐνάμιλλον Ingram: καλὸν Richards.
3 ὑπερέχειν <ἐνδέχεται> Ρ. Susemihl (ἐνδέχεται καὶ πλεῖον ὑπερέχει διὸς ἄρετής μεγέθους Bernays).
at all but were exactly alike, because men that are different have different rights and merits. Yet if this is true, those who are superior in complexion or stature or any good quality will have an advantage in respect of political rights. But surely the error here is obvious, and it comes out clearly if we consider the other sciences and faculties. Among flute-players equally good at their art it is not proper to give an advantage in respect of the flutes to those of better birth, for they will not play any better, but it is the superior performers who ought to be given the superior instruments. And if our meaning is not yet plain, it will become still clearer when we have carried the matter further. Suppose someone is superior in playing the flute but much inferior in birth or in good looks, then, even granting that each of these things—birth and beauty—is a greater good than ability to play the flute, and even though they surpass flute-playing proportionately more than the best flute-player surpasses the others in flute-playing, even so the best flute-player ought to be given the outstandingly good flutes; for otherwise superiority both in wealth and in birth ought to contribute to the excellence of the performance, but they do not do so at all. Moreover on this theory every good thing would be commensurable with every other. For if to be of some particular height gave more claim, then height in general would be in competition with wealth and with free birth; therefore if A excels in height more than B does in virtue, and speaking generally size gives more superiority than virtue,

\[\text{i.e. different in some good quality.}\]

\[\text{Perhaps we should rewrite the Greek to give 'even though speaking generally virtue gives more superiority than size.'}\]
Aristotle

1283 a  
ei ἂν συμβλητὰ πάντα· τοσόνδε γὰρ [μέγεθος]
εἰ κρείσττον τοσόνδε, τοσόνδε δῆλον ὡς ἴσουν.

10 ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτ’ ἄδυνατον, δῆλον ὡς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὅ
πολιτικῶν εὐλόγως οὐ κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀνυσότητ’ ἀμφι-
σβητοῦσι τῶν ἀρχῶν—εἰ γὰρ οἱ μὲν βραδεῖς οἱ
δὲ ταχεῖς, οὔδὲν διὰ τοῦτο δεῖ τοὺς μὲν πλείον
toüs δ’ ἑλαττὸν ἔχειν, ἀλλ’ ἐν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγώνων
η τούτων διαφορὰ λαμβάνει τὴν τιμῆν· ἀλλ’ ἐξ

15 ὧν πόλις συνεστηκεν, ἐν τούτοις ἀναγκαῖον ποιεί-
σθαι τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν. διόπερ εὐλόγως ἀντι-
pοιοῦνται τῆς τιμῆς οἱ εὐγενεῖς καὶ ἑλεύθεροι καὶ
πλοῦσιοι· δεὶ γὰρ ἑλευθέρους τ’ εἶναι καὶ τίμημα
φέροντες, οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἰ δῆλον ὡς ἰσόρων πάντων,

20 ὃσπερ οὖν’ ἐκ δουλῶν. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ δεῖ τούτων, θ
δῆλον ὅτι καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς
ἀρετῆς, οὔδὲ γὰρ ἂνευ τούτων οἰκεῖσθαι πόλιν
dυνατόν· πλὴν ἂνευ μὲν τῶν προτέρων ἄδυνατον
eἶnαι πόλιν, ἂνευ δὲ τούτων οἰκεῖσθαι καλῶς.

Πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πόλιν εἶναι δόξειεν ἂν ἡ πάντα
ἡ ἐνία γε τούτων ὅρθως ἀμφισβητεῖν, πρὸς μέντοι

25 ἵων ἀγαθὴν ἡ παιδεία καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ μάλιστα
dικαίως ἂν ἀμφισβητοῖσαν, καθάπερ εἴρηται καὶ
πρότερον. ἐπεὶ δ’ οὔτε πάντων ἴσουν ἔχειν δεὶ

20 τοὺς ἴσους ἐν τῷ μόνῳ ὄντας οὔτε ἄνωσιν τοὺς
ἀνίσους καθ’ ἐν, ἀνάγκη πᾶσας εἶναι τὰς τοιαύτας
πολιτείας παρεκβάσεις. εἰρήται μὲν οὖν καὶ πρό-

30 τερον ὅτι διαμφισβητοῦσι τρόπον των δικαίως

2 τοσόνδε (πλούτου) Richards.
3 τολεμικῆς codd. plerique.
4 (μετέχει) Wallies.

* Doubtless the author meant the other way round, 'for the slow having less and the fast more political power.'
all things would be commensurable; for if such-and-such an amount of one thing is better than such-and-such an amount of another, it is clear that such-and-such an amount of the one is equal to that amount of another. But since this is impossible, it is clear that in politics with good reason men do not claim a right to office on the ground of inequality of every kind—if one set of men are slow runners and another fast, this is no good ground for the one set having more and the other less political power, but the latter's superiority receives its honour in athletic contests; but the claim to office must necessarily be based on superiority in those things which go to the making of the state. Hence it is reasonable for the well-born, free and wealthy to lay claim to honour; for there must be free men and tax-payers, since a state consisting entirely of poor men would not be a state, any more than one consisting of slaves. But then, granting there is need of these, it is clear that there is also need of justice and civic virtue, for these are also indispensable in the administration of a state; except that wealth and freedom are indispensable for a state's existence, whereas justice and civic virtue are indispensable for its good administration.

As a means therefore towards a state's existence all or at all events some of these factors would seem to make a good claim, although as means to a good life education and virtue would make the most just claim, as has been said also before. On the other hand since those who are equal in one thing only ought not to have equality in all things nor those unequal as regards one thing inequality in all, it follows that all these forms of constitution must be deviations. Now it has been said before that all make a claim for education and virtue form the good life, c. v. § 15. c. v. §§ 8 ff.
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΗΛΕΣ

1283 a

πάντες, ἀπλῶς δ' οὖ πάντες¹ δικαίως, οἱ πλούσιοι μὲν ὅτι πλείον μέτεστι τῆς χώρας αὐτοῖς, ἥ δὲ χώρα κοινόν, ἐτὶ² πρὸς τὰ συμβόλαμα πιστοὶ μᾶλ-λον ὃς ἐπὶ τὸ πλέον, οἱ δ' ἐλεύθεροι καὶ εὐγενεῖς

35 ὃς ἔγγυς ἄλληλων (πολίται γὰρ μᾶλλον οἱ γενναίοτέροι τῶν ἄγγενῶν, ἥ δ' εὐγένεια παρ' ἐκάστοις οὐκοι τίμιοι), ἐτι διότι βελτίως εἰκὸς τοὺς ἐκ βελτιώνων, εὐγένεια γὰρ ἐστιν ἁρετή γένους· ὁμοίως δὲ³ φήσομεν δικαίως καὶ τὴν ἁρετὴν ἁμφί-

σβητεῖν, κοινωνικὴν γὰρ ἁρετὴν εἶναι φαμεν τὴν δικαιοσύνην, ἢ πάσας ἀναγκαῖοι ἄκολουθεῖν τὰς ἄλλας· ἄλλα μὴν καὶ οἱ πλείους πρὸς τοὺς ἑλάτ-

τους, καὶ γὰρ κρείττους καὶ πλουσιώτεροι καὶ βελτίως εἰσὶν ὃς λαμβανομένων τῶν πλεῖόνων

1283 b

πρὸς τοὺς ἑλάττους. ἄρ' οὖν εἰ πάντες εἰεν ἐν μιᾷ πόλει, λέγω δ' οἶνον οἱ τ' ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ εὐγενεῖς, ἐτι δὲ πλῆθος ἄλλο τι πολιτικόν, πότερον ἁμφισβήτητος ἐσται τίνας ἁρχεῖν δεῖ ἡ ὃν κ' ἐσται; καθ' ἐκάστην μὲν οὖν πολιτείαν τῶν 9

5 εἰρημένων ἀναμφισβήτητος ἡ κρίσις τίνας ἁρχεῖν δεῖ (τοὺς γὰρ κυρίους διαφέρουσιν ἄλληλων, οἶον ἡ μὲν τῷ διὰ πλούσιων ἡ δὲ τῷ διὰ τῶν σπουδαίων ἄνδρῶν εἶναι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκάστη τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπον). ἄλλ' ὁμοίως σκοποῦμεν, ἡταν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ταύτας ὑπάρχῃ χρόνον, πὼς διοριστέον.

10 Ἐι δὴ τὸν ἄριθμὸν εἰεν ὅλην πάμπαν οἱ τῆν ἁρετὴν ἐχοντες, τίνα δεῖ διελεῖν τὸν τρόπον; ἡ τὸ ὅλην πρὸς τὸ ἐργον δεῖ σκοπεῖν εἰ δυνατοὶ

¹ [πάντες] Richards. ² ἐτι ὃς ed. ³ δὲ Γ: δὴ codd.
that is in a manner just, though not all a claim that is absolutely just; the rich claiming because they have a larger share of the land, and the land is common property, and also as being for the most part more faithful to their covenants; the free and well-born as being closely connected together (for the better-born are citizens to a greater degree than those of low birth, and good birth is in every community held in honour at home), and also because it is probable that the children of better parents will be better; for good birth means goodness of breed; and we shall admit that virtue also makes an equally just claim, for we hold that justice is social virtue, which necessarily brings all the other virtues in its train; but moreover the majority have a just claim as compared with the minority, since they are stronger and richer and better if their superior numbers are taken in comparison with the others' inferior numbers. Therefore supposing all were in one city, I mean, that is, the good and the wealthy and noble and also an additional mass of citizens, will there be a dispute, or will there not, as to who ought to govern? It is true that under each of the forms of constitution that have been mentioned the decision as to who ought to govern is undisputed (for the difference between them lies in their sovereign classes—one is distinguished by being governed by the rich men, one by being governed by the good men, and similarly each of the others); but nevertheless we are considering the question how we are to decide between these classes supposing that they all exist in the state at the same period.

If then the possessors of virtue should be quite few in number, how is the decision to be made? ought we to consider their fewness in relation to the
διοικεῖν τὴν πόλιν ἣ τοσοῦτοι τὸ πλῆθος ὅστ’
εἶναι πόλιν ἐξ αὐτῶν; ἔστι δὲ ἀπορία τις πρὸς
ἀπαντας τοὺς διαμφισβητοῦντας περὶ τῶν πολι-
τικῶν τιμῶν. δόξαιεν γὰρ ἂν ὁδέν λέγειν
dίκαιον οἱ διὰ τὸν πλοῦτον ἀξιοῦντες ἄρχειν,
ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ κατὰ γένος: δῆλον γὰρ ὡς εἰ
tis πάλιν εἰς πλουσιώτερος ἀπάντων ἔστι, δηλόνοιτι
κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιαν τοῦτον ἄρχειν τὸν ἐνα ἀπά-
ντων δεῖσει, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν εὐγενεῖα διαφέροντα
τῶν ἀμφισβητοῦντων δι’ ἐλευθερίαν. ταῦτο δὲ
τούτ’ ἰσως συμβῆσαι καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀριστο-
κρατίας ἐπί τῆς ἀρετῆς: εἰ γὰρ τοις ἐς ἀμείνων
ἀνήρ εἰη τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι
σπουδαίων ὄντων, τοῦτον εἶναι δεῖ κύριον κατὰ
tαῦτο δίκαιον. οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι γε

dεῖ κύριον διότι κρείττους εἰσὶ τῶν ὀλίγων, κἂν
eis η πλείους μεν τοῦ ἐνός ἐλάττους δὲ τῶν πολλῶν
κρείττους ὅσι τῶν ἄλλων, τοῦτος ἄν δέοι κυρίως
εἶναι μᾶλλον ἡ τὸ πλῆθος. πάντα δὴ ταῦτ’ ἔοικε

φανερὸν ποιεῖν δι’ τοῦτων τῶν ὀρων οὐδεὶς ὀρθὸς
ἔστι καθ’ ὧν ἀξιοῦσαν αὐτοὶ μὲν ἄρχειν τοὺς δ’

ἄλλους ὑπὸ σφῶν ἄρχεσθαι πάντας. καὶ γὰρ δὴ
καὶ πρὸς τοὺς κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἀξιοῦντας κυρίους εἶναι
tοῦ πολιτεύματος, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς κατὰ πλοῦ-
τον, ἔχοιεν ἂν λέγειν τὰ πλῆθη λόγον τύα δίκαιον:
οὐδέν γὰρ κωλύει ποτε τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι βέλτιον τῶν
ὁλίγων καὶ πλουσιώτερον, οὐχ ὡς καθ’ ἐκαστὸν

35 ἀλλ’ ὃς άθρόοιν.

Διὸ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀπορίαν ἦν ἦτούσι καὶ πρὸ-

1 γὰρ ἂν Coraes: γὰρ codd.
2 γ’ εἶναι (vel supra κατὰ γε) Richards.
3 oûs ? ed.
task, and whether they are able to administer the state, or sufficiently numerous to constitute a state? And there is some difficulty as regards all the rival claimants to political honours. Those who claim to rule because of their wealth might seem to have no justice in their proposal, and similarly also those who claim on the score of birth; for it is clear that if, to go a step further, a single individual is richer than all the others together, according to the same principle of justice it will obviously be right for this one man to rule over all, and similarly the man of outstanding nobility among the claimants on the score of free birth. And this same thing will perhaps result in the case of aristocratic government based on virtue; for if there be some one man who is better than the other virtuous men in the state, by the same principle of justice that man must be sovereign. Accordingly if it is actually proper for the multitude to be sovereign because they are better than the few, then also, if one person or if more than one but fewer than the many are better than the rest, it would be proper for these rather than the multitude to be sovereign. All these considerations therefore seem to prove the incorrectness of all of the standards on which men claim that they themselves shall govern and everybody else be governed by them. For surely even against those who claim to be sovereign over the government on account of virtue, and similarly against those who claim on account of wealth, the multitudes might be able to advance a just plea; for it is quite possible that at some time the multitude may be collectively better and richer than the few, although not individually.

Hence it is also possible to meet in this way the
At the end of the last sentence, § 12.

Pupil of Socrates and founder of the Cynic sect of philosophers.

'Where are your claws and teeth?'

240
question which some persons investigate and put forward (for some raise the question whether the legislator desiring to lay down the rightest laws should legislate with a view to the advantage of the better people or that of the larger number) in cases when the situation mentioned occurs. And 'right' must be taken in the sense of 'equally right,' and this means right in regard to the interest of the whole state and in regard to the common welfare of the citizens; and a citizen is in general one who shares in governing and being governed, although he is different according to each form of constitution, but in relation to the best form a citizen is one who has the capacity and the will to be governed and to govern with a view to the life in accordance with virtue.

VIII. But if there is any one man so greatly distinguished in outstanding virtue, or more than one but not enough to be able to make up a complete state, so that the virtue of all the rest and their political ability is not comparable with that of the men mentioned, if they are several, or if one, with his alone, it is no longer proper to count these exceptional men a part of the state; for they will be treated unjustly if deemed worthy of equal status, being so widely unequal in virtue and in their political ability: since such a man will naturally be as a god among men. Hence it is clear that legislation also must necessarily be concerned with persons who are equal in birth and in ability, but there can be no law dealing with such men as those described, for they are themselves a law; indeed a man would be ridiculous if he tried to legislate for them, for probably they would say what in the story of Antisthenes the lions said when the hares made speeches in...
ARGONAUTS

1284 a
dημηγορούντων τῶν δασυπόδων καὶ τὸ ἵσον ἄξιον
tων πάντας ἔχειν. διὸ καὶ τίθενται τὸν ὀστρα-
κισμὸν αἱ δημοκρατούμεναι πόλεις διὰ τὴν τοιαύ-
tην αἰτίαν· αὐταὶ γὰρ δὴ δοκοῦσι διώκειν τὴν
ἰσότητα μάλιsta πάντων, ὡστε τοὺς δοκοῦντας
ὑπερέχειν δυνάμει διὰ πλοῦτον ἢ πολυφιλίαν ἢ τινα
Ἀλλήν πολιτικὴν ἵσχυν ὀστρακίζον καὶ μεθίστασαν
ἐκ τῆς πόλεως χρόνους ὀρισμένους. μυθολογεῖται 3
dὲ καὶ τοὺς Ἀργοναύτας τὸν Ἡρακλέα κατα-
λυτεῖν διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν· οὐ γὰρ ἔθελεν αὐτὸν

25 ἄγειν τὴν Ἀργώ μετὰ τῶν πλωτήρων1 τῶν ἅλλων
ὡς ὑπερβάλλοντα πολὺ. διὸ καὶ τοὺς ὕεγοντας
τὴν τυραννίδα καὶ τὴν Περιάνδρου Ὀθραυβούλω
συμβουλίαν αὐτό ἀπλῶς οἰητέον ὥρθως ἑπτημαῖν
(φασι γὰρ τὸν Περιάνδρον εἰπεῖν μὲν οὐδὲν πρὸς
τὸν πεμφθέντα κήρυκα περὶ τῆς συμβουλίας, ἀφ-

30 αίροντα δὲ τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας τῶν σταχῶν
ὁμαλῶς τὴν ἄρουραν· ὅθεν ἄγνοιοντος μὲν τοῦ
κήρυκος τοῦ γινομένου τῆς αἰτίαν, ἀπαγγεῖλαντος
dὲ τὸ συμπεσόν, συννοῆσαι τὸν Ὀθραυβούλον ὅτι
dὲ τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας ἄνδρας ἀναίρευτον· τοῦτο γὰρ

4 οὐ μόνον συμφέρει τοῖς τυράννοις οὐδὲ μόνον οἱ
tύραννοι ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλ’ ὁμοίως ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰς
ὁλογραφίας καὶ τὰς δημοκρατίας· ο γὰρ ὀστρα-
κισμὸν τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν τρόπον τινά τῶ
κολούειν τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας καὶ φυγαδεύειν. τὸ δ’
aυτὸ καὶ περὶ τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὰ θυτὶ ποιοῦσιν
οἱ κύριοι τῆς δυνάμεως, οἶδον Ἀθηναίοι μὲν περὶ

1 τῶν πλωτήρων hic Richards, post πολὺ codd.

a Cf. Apollodorus, Bibliotheca i. 9. 19 τῆς Ἀργο̣ς φθεγ̣αμένης
μὴ δύνασθαι φέρειν τὸ τούτου βάρος. Argo was a live creature,
and Athena had built a 'talking timber' into her cutwater.

242
the assembly and demanded that all should have equality. This is why democratically governed states institute the system of ostracism, because of a reason of this nature; for these are the states considered to pursue equality most of all things, so that they used to ostracize men thought to be outstandingly powerful on account of wealth or popularity or some other form of political strength, and used to banish them out of the city for fixed periods of time. And there is a mythical story that the Argonauts left Heracles behind for a similar reason; for the Argo\(^a\) refused to carry him with the other voyagers because he was so much heavier. Hence also those who blame tyranny and Periander's advice to Thrasybulus\(^b\) must not be thought to be absolutely right in their censure (the story is that Periander made no reply to the herald sent to ask his advice, but levelled the corn-field by plucking off the ears that stood out above the rest; and consequently, although the herald did not know the reason for what was going on, when he carried back news of what had occurred, Thrasybulus understood that he was to destroy the outstanding citizens); for this policy is advantageous not only for tyrants, nor is it only tyrants that use it, but the same is the case with oligarchies and democracies as well; for ostracism has in a way the same effect as docking off the outstanding men by exile. And the same course is adopted in regard to cities and races by the holders of sovereign power, for example the Athenians so

\(^b\) Periander was tyrant of Corinth \textit{circa} 626-585 b.c.; Thrasybulus was tyrant of Miletus. Herodotus v. 92 tells the story with their parts reversed.
40 Σαμίους καὶ Χίους καὶ Λεσβίους (ἐπεὶ γὰρ θάττον ἐγκρατῶς ἐσχὸν τὴν ἀρχήν, ἔταπεινωσαν αὐτοὺς παρὰ τὰς συνθήκας), οὐ δὲ Περσῶν βασιλέως Μήδους καὶ Βαβυλωνίους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τοὺς περί-ματισμένους διὰ τὸ γενέσθαι ποτ’ ἐπ’ ἀρχής ἐπέ-έκοπτε πολλάκις. τὸ δὲ πρόβλημα καθόλου περὶ δ ἀκταίς ἐστὶ τὰς πολιτείας, καὶ τὰς ὅρθας: οὐ μὲν γὰρ παρεκβεβηκόντο πρὸς τὸ ἱδίον ἀποσκοποῦσαν τούτῳ δρῶσιν, οὐ μὴν ἄλλα περὶ τὰς τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐπισκοποῦσας τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει τρόπων. δήλον δὲ τούτῳ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν· οὔτε γὰρ γραφεύς ἔσσεσίν αὖ τὸν ἕπερ-βάλλοντα πόδα τῆς συμμετρίας ἐχεῖν τὸ ζῷον, οὐδ’ εἰ διαφέροι τὸ κάλλος, οὔτε ναυπηγὸς πρύμναν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τι μορίων τῶν τῆς νεώς, οὐδὲ δὴ χοροδιδάσκαλος τὸν μείζον καὶ κάλλιον τοῦ παντὸς χοροῦ φθεγγόμενον ἐάσεις συγχροεῖσιν. ὡστε διὰ τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν κωλύει τοὺς μονάρχους συμφωνεῖν ταῖς πόλεσιν, εἰ τῆς οἰκείας ἀρχῆς ωφελίμου ταῖς πόλεσιν οὐσία τούτῳ δρῶσιν. διὸ κατὰ τὰς ὁμο-λογομενὰς ὑπεροχὰς ἔχει τὸ δίκαιον πολιτικόν ὁ λόγος ὁ περὶ τὸν ὀστρακισμὸν. βέλτιον μὲν οὖν τὸν νομοθέτην εἰς ἀρχής οὕτω συντῆσαι τὴν πολι-τείαν ὡστε μὴ δεῖσθαι τοιαύτης ιατρείας· δεύτερος δὲ πλοῦς, ἃν συμβῆ, πειράσθαι τοιοῦτοι τοῖς διορ-θώματι διορθῳσόν. ὅπερ οὐκ ἐγένετο περὶ τὰς πόλεις, οὐ γὰρ ἐβλέπον πρὸς τὸ τῆς πολιτείας τῆς

In 410, 424 and 427 B.C. respectively.
dealt with the Samians and Chians and Lesbians (for no sooner did they get a strong hold of their empire than they humbled them in contravention of their covenants), and the king of the Persians frequently used to cut down the numbers of the Medes and Babylonians and the other races that had waxed proud because they had once been head of an empire. And the problem applies universally to all the forms of constitution, even the right forms; for while the divergent forms of government do this because their regard is fixed on their private advantage, nevertheless with the constitutions directed to the common good the same is the case. And this is also clear in the field of the other arts and sciences; a painter would not let his animal have its foot of disproportionately large size, even though it was an exceptionally beautiful foot, nor would a shipbuilder make the stern or some other part of a ship disproportionately big, nor yet will a trainer of choruses allow a man who sings louder and more beautifully than the whole band to be a member of it. Hence as far as this practice goes nothing prevents monarchs from being in harmony with the cities they rule, if they resort to it when their own personal rule is beneficial to the cities. Therefore in relation to acknowledged superiorities the argument for ostracism has a certain element of political justice. True, it is better for the lawgiver so to constitute the state at the outset that it does not need this medicine; but the next best course to steer, if occasion arises, is to endeavour to correct the constitution by some such method of rectification. But this was not what happened with the states, for they were not looking at what was advantageous for their proper constitu-
ARISTOTLE

1284 b

οἰκείας συμφέρον, ἀλλὰ στασιαστικῶς ἐχρῶντο
tοῖς ὀστρακισμοῖς. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς παρεκβεβη-
kύαις πολιτείαις ὁτι μὲν ἤδη συμφέρει καὶ δίκαιον
25 ἦστι, φανερόν, ἵσως δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐχὶ ἄπλως δίκαιον,
καὶ τούτο φανερόν· ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας ἦ
ἐχει πολλὴν ἀπορίαν, οidepress τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν
τὴν ὑπεροχήν, οἶνον ἰσχύος καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ πολυ-
φιλίας, ἀλλ' ἂν τις γενήται διαφέρων κατ' ἄρετήν,
tί χρὴ ποιεῖν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ φαίνει ἂν δεῖν ἐκβάλλει
καὶ μεθυστάναι τὸν τοιοῦτον· ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἀρχεῖν
γε τοῦ τοιοῦτον, παραπλήσιον γὰρ κἂν εἰ τοῦ Διὸς
ἀρχεῖν ἀξιότερα, μεριζόμενες τὰς ἄρχας. λείπεται
τοῖς, ὅπερ ἕνωκε πεφυκέναι, πείθεσθαι τῷ τοιοῦτῳ
πάντας ἄσμενος, ὥστε βασιλέας εἶναι τοὺς τοιοῦ-
tους ἁδικοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν.

35 IX. Ἡσως δὲ καλῶς ἔχει μετὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους λόγους μεταβηναι καὶ σκέφτασθαι περὶ βασιλείας·
팜έν γὰρ τῶν ὀρθῶν πολιτειῶν μίαν εἶναι ταύτην.
σκεπτέον δὲ πότερον συμφέρει τῇ μελλούσῃ καλῶς
οἰκήσεσθαι καὶ πόλει καὶ χώρᾳ βασιλεύσεσθαι, ἥ
οὔ, ἀλλ' ἂλλη τῆς πολιτείας μάλλον, ἥ τισι μὲν
συμφέρει τοῖς δ' οὖ συμφέρει. δεῖ δὲ πρῶτον
dιελέσθαι πότερον ἐν τῷ γένος ἐστὶν αὐτῆς ἥ
1285 a πλείους ἔχει διαφοράς.

Ῥάδιον δὴ τούτο γε καταμαθεῖν, ὅτι πλείω τε ἡ
γένη περιέχει καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ὁ τρόπος ἐστὶν οὕχ
εἰς πασῶν. ἡ γὰρ ἐν τῇ Λακωνικῇ πολιτείᾳ δοκεῖ

1 [οὐχ] Bernays.

a Perhaps 'not' should be struck out; but if it stands, the
clause refers to § 5 init.—in these cases ostracism is practised
only in the interest of those in power.

246
tion, but their acts of ostracism were done in a revolutionary spirit. In the divergent forms of constitution therefore it is evident that ostracism is advantageous and just under the special constitution, though perhaps it is also evident that it is not just absolutely; but in the case of the best constitution there is much doubt as to what ought to be done, not as regards superiority in the other things of value, such as strength and wealth and popularity, but in the case of a person becoming exceptionally distinguished for virtue. It certainly would not be said that such a man must be banished and got out of the way; yet nevertheless no doubt men would not think that they ought to rule over such a man, for that would be the same as if they claimed to rule over Zeus, dividing up his spheres of government. It remains therefore, and this seems to be the natural course, for all to obey such a man gladly, so that men of this sort may be kings in the cities for all time.

IX. And perhaps it is well after the subjects that have been discussed to pass over to consider royal government; for we pronounce this to be one of the correct constitutions. And it has to be considered whether it is advantageous for a city or a country that is to be well administered to be ruled by a king, or whether it is not so but some other constitution is more expedient, or whether royal rule is expedient for some states and not for others. But it is needful to decide first whether there is only one sort of kingship or whether it has several varieties.

Now it is at all events easy to discern that kingship includes several kinds, and that the mode of government is not the same in all. For the kingship in the Spartan constitution, which is held to be a typical...
μὲν εἶναι βασιλεία μάλιστα τῶν κατὰ νόμον, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κυρία πάντων, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἐξέλθη τὴν χώραν ἡγεμῶν ἐστὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, ἔτι δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ἀποδέδοται τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν. αὐτὴ μὲν οὖν ἡ βασιλεία οἶον στρατηγία τις αὐτοκρατόρων καὶ ἀδιός ἐστὶν· κτείναι γὰρ οὗ κύριος, εἰ μὴ ἐν τυί καιρῷ,1 καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἐν ταῖς πολεμικαῖς ἐξόδοις ἐν χειρὸς νόμῳ· δὴ λοι ὁ Ομηρός, ὁ γὰρ Ἀγαμέμνον κακῶς μὲν ἄκουον ἥμεῖς ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις, ἐξελθόντων δὲ καὶ κτείναι κύριος ἦν· λέγει γοῦν δὲ κ' ἐγών ἀπάνευθε μαχησ... ... οὐ οἱ ἀρκίους ἐσσεῖται φυγεῖν κύνας ἴδ'. οἶωνοὺς· πάρ γὰρ ἐμοὶ θάνατος.

1285 a

125 ἐν μὲν οὖν τούτ' εἶδος βασιλείας, στρατηγία διὰ 3 βίου, τούτων δ' αἱ μὲν κατὰ γένος εἰσὶν αἱ δ' αȋρεται· παρὰ ταύτην δ' ἄλλο μοναρχίας εἴδος, οἶαι παρ᾽ ἐνίοις εἰσὶ βασιλεῖα τῶν βαρβάρων. ἔχουσι δ' αὐτὰ τὴν δύναμιν πᾶσαν παραπλησίαν τυραννίσων, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ δ' κατὰ νόμον καὶ πατρικικαὶ.

διὰ γὰρ τὸ δουλικότεροι εἶναι τὰ ἥθη φύσει οἱ μὲν βάρβαροι τῶν Ἑλλήνων οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἄσιαν τῶν περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην, ὑπομένουσι τὴν δεσποτικὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδὲν δυσχεραίνοντες. τυραννικαὶ μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτόν εἰσιν, ἀσφαλεῖς δὲ διὰ τὸ πάτρια

1 καιρῷ (vel ἀνάγκη) Richards: βασιλεία (e βασιλεία supra) codd. (non vertit Ar.).
2 τυραννισίων—καὶ Susemihl: lacunas et fragmenta varia codd.

248
royalty of the kind guided by law, does not carry sovereignty in all matters, though when a king goes on a foreign expedition he is the leader in all matters relating to the war; and also matters relating to religion have been assigned to the kings. This kingship therefore is a sort of military command vested in generals with absolute powers and held for life; for the king has not authority to put a subject to death, except in some emergency, as in ancient times kings on their military expeditions could kill an offender out of hand, as Homer proves, for Agamemnon endured being reviled in the assemblies but when they were on an expedition had authority to put a man to death: at all events he says

But whomsoe’er I see far from the fray . . .
Shall have no hope to fly from dogs and vultures,
For death is in my hands! a

3 This then is one sort of kingship, a lifelong generalship, and some of the kingships of this kind are hereditary, others elective; and by its side there is another sort of monarchy, examples of which are kingships existing among some of the barbarians. The power possessed by all of these resembles that of tyrannies, but they govern according to law and are hereditary; for because the barbarians are more servile in their nature than the Greeks, and the Asiatics than the Europeans, they endure despotic rule without any resentment. These kingships therefore are for these reasons of a tyrannical nature, but they are secure because they are hereditary and

a Quoted from Iliad ii. 391, but the last line is not in our Homer.
καὶ κατὰ νόμον εἶναι. καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ δὲ βασιλικὴ καὶ οὐ τυραννικὴ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν. οἱ γὰρ πολίται φυλάττουσιν ὁπλοὺς τοὺς βασιλείς, τοὺς δὲ τυραννους ἐξενικόν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ νόμον καὶ ἐκόντων οἱ δὲ ἀκόντων ἀρχουσιν, ὥσθ' οἱ μὲν παρὰ τῶν πολιτῶν οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τοὺς πολίτας ἔχουσι τὴν φυλακὴν. δύο μὲν οὖν εἴδη ταύτα μοναρχίας· δὲ ἐπερ ήν ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαῖοις Ἑλλήσων, οὓς καλοῦσιν αἰσυμνήτας. ἐστὶ δὲ τοῦτο ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν αἱρετὴ τυραννίς, διαφέρουσα δὲ τῆς βαρβαρικῆς οὐ τῷ μὴ κατὰ νόμον ἀλλὰ τῷ μὴ πάτριος εἶναι μόνον. ἠρχον δὲ οἱ μὲν διὰ βίου τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην, οἱ δὲ μέχρι τινῶν ὀρισμένων χρόνων ἡ πράξεων, οἶνον εἰλοντὸ ποτε Μυτιληναίοι Πιττακόν πρὸς τοὺς φυγάδας ἢν προειστήκεσαν Ἀντιμενίδης καὶ Ἀλκαῖος δ' ὑπηρτῆς. δηλοὶ δ' Ἀλκαῖος δ' ὅτι τύραννον εἰλοντὸ τὸν Πιττακόν ἐν τινὶ τῶν σκολιῶν μελῶν· ἐπιτιμᾶ γὰρ ὅτι
tὸν κακοπάτριδα1
Πιττακόν πόλιος2 τὰς ἀχόλῳ3 καὶ βαρυδαίμονος ἐστάσαντο τύραννον μέγ' ἐπαινεότες ἀολλέες.

αὖτα μὲν οὖν εἰσὶ τε καὶ ἦσαν διὰ μὲν τὸ δεσποτικαὶ εἶναι τυραννικαῖ,4 διὰ δὲ τὸ αἱρεταὶ καὶ ἐκόντων βασιλικαὶ· τέταρτον δ' εἰδος μοναρχίας βασιλικῆς 5 αἱ κατὰ τοὺς ἡρωίκους χρόνους ἐκούσαί τε καὶ πάτριαὶ γεγνόμεναι κατὰ νόμον. διὰ γὰρ τὸ τοὺς πρῶτος γενέσθαι τοῦ πλῆθους εὐεργέτας κατὰ

1 κακοπάτριδαν Wackernagel.
2 πόλιος Schneidewin: πόλεως codd.
3 δι’χόλῳ Schmidt.
4 τυραννικαὶ εἶναι δεσποτικαὶ codd.: tr. Sepulveda.

250
4 rule by law. Also their bodyguard is of a royal and not a tyrannical type for the same reason; for kings are guarded by the citizens in arms, whereas tyrants have foreign guards, for kings rule in accordance with law and over willing subjects, but tyrants rule over unwilling subjects, owing to which kings take their guards from among the citizens but tyrants have them to guard against the citizens.

5 These then are two kinds of monarchy; while another is that which existed among the ancient Greeks, the type of rulers called aesymnetae. This, to put it simply, is an elective tyranny, and it differs from the monarchy that exists among barbarians not in governing without the guidance of law but only in not being hereditary. Some holders of this type of monarchy ruled for life, others until certain fixed limits of time or until certain undertakings were ended, as for example the people of Mitylene once elected Pittacus to resist the exiles under the leadership of Antimenides and the poet Alcaeus. That they elected Pittacus as tyrant is proved by Alcaeus in one of his catches; for he rebukes the people because

The base-born Pittacus they did set up
As tyrant of the meek and luckless city,
And all did greatly praise him.

These monarchies therefore now and in the past are of the nature of tyrannies because they are autocratic, but of the nature of kingships because they are elective and rule over willing subjects. A fourth class of royal monarchy consists of the hereditary legal kingships over willing subjects in the heroic period. For because the first of the line had been benefactors of

6

7

a Pittacus held the office 587-579 B.C. He was one of the Seven Sages. Antimenides and Alcaeus were brothers.
1285 b
tέχνας ἡ πόλεμον ἡ διὰ τὸ συναγαγεῖν ἡ πορίσαι χώραν, ἐγκέφαλον βασιλείσ ἐκόντων καὶ τῶν παραλαμβάνουσι πάτρου. κύριοι δ' ἡσαν τῆς τε κατὰ πόλεμον ἡγεμονίας καὶ τῶν θυσιῶν ὅσιοι μὴ ἱερατικαί, καὶ πρὸς τούτως τὰς δίκας ἑκρίνον. τούτο δ' ἐποίουν οἱ μὲν οὐκ ὁμνύοντες οἱ δ' ὁμνύοντες, ὁ δ' ὥρκος ἦν τοῦ σκῆπτρου ἐπανάτασις, οἱ μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων χρόνων καὶ τὰ κατὰ πόλιν καὶ τὰ ἐνδήμα καὶ τὰ υπερόρια συνεχῶς ἱρχον: ὑστερον δὲ τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν παρεντὼν τῶν βασιλέων τὰ δὲ τῶν ὁχλῶν παραιρουμένων, ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἀλλαῖς πόλεσι θυσία κατελείφθησαν τοῖς βασιλεύσι μόνον, ὅποι δ' ἄξιον εἶπεῖν εἶναι βασιλεύαν, ἐν τοῖς υπερορίοις τῶν πολεμικῶν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν μόνον ἐχον.

20 Χ. Βασιλείας μὲν οὖν εἶδο ταῦτα, τέτταρα τὸν ἀριθμὸν, μία μὲν ἡ περὶ τοὺς ἡρωικοὺς χρόνους (ἀὕτη δ' ἦν ἐκόντων μὲν, ἐπὶ τοιού ὥρισμένοις, στρατηγός γὰρ ἦν καὶ δικαστὴς ὁ βασιλεὺς καὶ τῶν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς κύριος), δευτέρα δ' ἡ βαρβαρική (ἀὕτη δ' ἐστίν ἐκ γένους ἀρχῆς δεσποτικῆ κατὰ νόμον), τρίτη δ' ἦν αἰσθητείαν διασαγορεύουσιν (ἀὕτη δ' ἐστίν ἀρετὴς τυραννίσ), τετάρτη δ' ἡ Δακωνική τούτων (ἀὕτη δ' ἐστίν ὡς εἶπεῖν ἀπλῶς στρατηγία κατὰ γένους αἴδιος). αὕτα μὲν οὖν τούτων τὸν τρόπον διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων. 25 πέμπτην δ' εἴδος βασιλείας ὅταν ἡ πάντων κύριος εἰς ὁν ὠσπερ ἐκαστὸν ἐθνὸς καὶ πόλις ἐκαστῇ τῶν κοινῶν, τεταγμένη κατὰ τὴν οἰκονομικῆν·

---

a This ritual is mentioned in Iliad i. 234, vii. 412, x. 328.

b The monarchy was reduced to a priesthood at Cyrene (Herod. iv. 161) and at Ephesus.
the multitude in the arts or in war, or through having drawn them together or provided them with land, these kings used to come to the throne with the consent of the subjects and hand it on to their successors by lineal descent. And they had supreme command in war and control over all sacrifices that were not in the hands of the priestly class, and in addition to these functions they were judges in law-suits; some gave judgement not on oath and some on oath—the oath was taken by holding up the sceptre. These kings then of ancient times used to govern continuously in matters within the city and in the country and across the frontiers; but later on when gradually the kings relinquished some of their powers and had others taken from them by the multitudes, in the cities in general only the sacrifices were left to the kings, while where anything that deserves the name of royalty survived the kings only had the command in military expeditions across the frontiers.

X. There are then these kinds of kingship, four in number: one belonging to the heroic times, which was exercised over willing subjects, but in certain limited fields, for the king was general and judge and master of religious ceremonies; second, the barbarian monarchy, which is an hereditary despotism governing in conformity with law; third, the rule of the functionary called an aesymnetes, which is an elective tyranny; and fourth among these is the Spartan kingship, which may be described simply as an hereditary generalship held for life. These kingships then differ from one another in this manner. But a fifth kind of kingship is when a single ruler is sovereign over all matters in the way in which each race and each city is sovereign over its common affairs; this
ARISTOTLE

1285 b ὡσπερ γὰρ ἡ οἰκονομικὴ βασιλεία τις οἰκίας ἐστίν, οὕτως ἡ παμβασιλεία1 πόλεως καὶ ἐθνοὺς ἔνος ἡ πλειόνων οἰκονομία.

Σχεδὸν δὴ δῶ ἐστὶν ὡς εἰπεῖν εἶδή βασιλείας περὶ ὧν σκεπτόν, αὐτὴ τε καὶ ἡ Λακωνική. τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων αἱ πολλαὶ μεταξὺ τοῦτων εἰσὶν: ἐλαττοῦσι μὲν γὰρ κύριοι τῆς παμβασιλείας, πλειόνων δὲ εἰσὶ τῆς Λακωνικῆς. ὥστε τὸ σκέμμα σχεδὸν περὶ δυνῶν ἐστὶν, ἐν μὲν πότερον συμφέρει ταῖς πόλεσι στρατηγοῦ ἀδιὸν εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτον ἡ κατὰ γένος ἡ κατὰ μέρος,2 ἢ ὑπὸ συμφέρει, ἐν δὲ πότερον ἕνα συμφέρει κύριον εἶναι πάντων ἡ ὑπὸ συμφέρει. τὸ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης στρατηγικῆς ἐπὶ-3 σκοπεῖν νόμων ἔχει μᾶλλον εἰδὸς ἡ πολιτείας (ἐν ἀπάσαις γὰρ ἐνδεχεται γίγνεσθαι τοῦτο ταῖς πολιτείαις), ὥστε αφείσθω τὴν πρώτην: ὅ δὲ λοιπὸς τρόπος τῆς βασιλείας πολιτείας εἰδός ἐστιν, ὥστε περὶ τοῦτον δεὶ θεωρῆσαι καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας ἐπι- δραμεῖν τὰς ἐνούσας.

Ἀρχὴ δ' ἐστὶ τῆς ξητήσεως αὐτῆς, πότερον συμφέρει μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἄνδρος ἀρχεῖσθαι ἡ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρίστων νόμων. δοκοῦσι δὴ τοῖς νομί-4 θοις συμφέρειν βασιλεύεσθαι τὸ καθόλου μόνον τοι νόμοι λέγειν ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὰ προσπίπτοντα ἐπιτάττειν: ὥστε ἐν ὅποιοις τεχνη ἡ κατὰ γράμμαι ἄρχων ἡλίθιον (καὶ5 ἐν Δικτυτῳ μετὰ τὴν τετρήμερον κωνεῖν ἐξεστὶ τοῖς ἱστροῖς, ἕαν δὲ

1 παμβασιλεία Susemihl (cf. 36): βασιλεία codd. 
2 μέρος: αἵρεσιν codd. aliqui (cf. a 16).
3 καὶ πῶς, καὶ ὡς codd. nonnulli (ἡλίθιον πῶς καὶ? Richards).

*a Some mss. give 'or by election.'
*b Cf. 1289 a 11 foll.; but the promise of a full discussion of law is not fulfilled.

254
monarchy ranges with the rule of a master over a household, for just as the master's rule is a sort of monarchy in the home, so absolute monarchy is domestic mastership over a city, or over a race or several races.

There are therefore, we may say, virtually two kinds of kingship that have been examined, this one and the Spartan. For most of the others lie between these, since with them the king is sovereign over fewer things than under absolute monarchy, but over more than under the Spartan kingship. Hence our inquiry is virtually about two questions, one whether it is expedient or inexpedient for states to have a military commander holding office for life, and that either by descent or by class, and one whether it is expedient or inexpedient for one man to be sovereign over everything. Now the study of a military command of the kind mentioned has more the aspect of a legal than of a constitutional inquiry (for it is possible for this form of office to exist under all constitutions), so let it be dismissed at the first stage; but the remaining mode of kingship is a kind of constitution, so that it is necessary to consider this one and to run over the difficulties that it involves.

And the starting-point of the inquiry is the question whether it is more advantageous to be ruled by the best men or by the best laws. Those of the opinion that it is advantageous to be governed by a king think that laws enunciate only general principles but do not give directions for dealing with circumstances as they arise; so that in an art of any kind it is foolish to govern procedure by written rules (and indeed in Egypt physicians have the right to alter their prescription after four days, although if one of them alters it
πρότερον, ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτοῦ κινδύνῳ. φανερὸν τοῖνυν
15 ὡς οὐκ ἐστὶν ἢ κατὰ γράμματα καὶ νόμους ἀρίστη
πολιτεία διὰ τῆς αὐτῆς αἰτίαν. ἄλλα μὴν κάκευνον
dεῖ ὑπάρχειν τὸν λόγον τὸν καθόλου τοῖς ἀρχον.
κρείττον δὲ ὧ μὴ πρόσεστι τὸ παθητικὸν ὅλως ἢ
ὀ συμφυῖες. τῷ μὲν οὖν νόμῳ τούτῳ οὐχ ὑπάρχει,
20 ὑπακὴν δὲ ἀνθρωπίνην ἀνάγκη τοῦτ' ἔχειν πᾶσαν.
ἄλλ' ἵσως ἂν φαίη τις ὡς ἀντὶ τοῦτον βουλεύοσιται 5
περὶ τῶν καθ' ἐκαστά κάλλιον. ὡτι μὲν τοῖνυν
ἀνάγκη νομοθέτην αὐτὸν εἴναι, δὴ λοιπ., καὶ κεῖσθαι
νόμους, ἄλλα μὴ κυρίους ἢ παρεκβαινοῦν, ἐπεὶ
περὶ τῶν γ' ἄλλων εἶναι δεὶ κυρίους. ὅσα δὲ μὴ
25 δυνατὸν τὸν νόμον κρίνειν ἢ ὅλως ἢ εὖ, πότερον
ἐνα τὸν ἀριστον δεὶ ἄρχειν ἢ πάντας; καὶ γὰρ
νὸν συνιόντες δικάζουσι καὶ βουλεύονται καὶ κρί-
νουσιν, αὐταὶ δὲ αἱ κρίσεις εἰσὶ πᾶσαι περὶ τῶν
καθ' ἐκαστον. καθ' ἑνα μὲν οὖν συμβαλλόμενον
ὀστισοῦν ἵσως χείρων· ἄλλ' ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις ἐκ
30 πολλών, ὥσπερ δ' ἐστίασις συμφορητὸς καλλίων
μιᾶς καὶ ἀπλῆς, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ κρίνει ἀμείνον
ὀχλος πολλὰ ἢ εἰς ὀστισοῦν. ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀδιά- 6
θορον τὸ πολὺ—καθάπερ 2 ὑδωρ τὸ πλεῖον, οὔτω
καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ὁλίγων ἀδιαφορώτερον τοῦ
δ' ἐνὸς ὑπ' ὀργῆς κρατηθέντος ἢ των ἐτέρου
35 πάθους τοιούτου ἀναγκαίον διεφθάρθαι τῇ κρίσιν,
ἐκεῖ δ' ἐργον ἁμα πάντας ὄργισθηναι καὶ ἀμαρτεῖν.

1 ὥσπερ δ' ed., ὥσπερ codd.
2 καθάπερ ᾐγ' Bekker.

* i.e. unalterably binding, and not be set aside by special dispensation of the ruler when deemed to be unjust in some particular case.

256
before he does so at his own risk); it is clear therefore that government according to written rules, that is laws, is not the best, for the same reason. At the same time, however, rulers ought to be in possession of the general principle before mentioned as well. And a thing that does not contain the emotional element is generally superior to a thing in which it is innate; now the law does not possess this factor, but every human soul necessarily has it. But perhaps someone might say that in compensation for this a single ruler will decide better about particular cases. Therefore it is clear that on the one hand the ruler must necessarily be a legislator, and that there must be laws laid down, although these must not be sovereign⁵ where they go astray—admittedly in all other cases they ought to be sovereign; but on the other hand in matters which it is impossible for the law either to decide at all or to decide well, ought the one best man to govern or all the citizens? As it is, the citizens assembled hear lawsuits and deliberate and give judgements, but these judgements are all on particular cases. Now no doubt any one of them individually is inferior compared with the best man, but a state consists of a number of individuals, and just as a banquet to which many contribute dishes is finer than a single plain dinner, for this reason in many cases a crowd judges better than any single person. Also the multitude is more incorruptible—just as the larger stream of water is purer, so the mass of citizens is less corruptible than the few; and the individual's judgement is bound to be corrupted when he is overcome by anger or some other such emotion, whereas in the other case it is a difficult thing for all the people to be roused to anger and go

⁵ Law best applied by the collective wisdom of the noble or free.
1286 a ἐστώ δὲ τὸ πλῆθος οἱ ἑλεύθεροι, μηδὲν παρὰ τὸν νόμον πράττοντες ἀλλ' ἢ περὶ ὃν ἐκλείπειν ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῶν. εἰ δὲ δὴ τούτῳ μὴ βάδιον εὖ πολλοῖς, ἀλλ' εἰ πλείους εἶπεν ἁγαθοὶ καὶ ἄνδρες καὶ πολίται, πότερον ὦ εἷς ἀδιαφορώτερος ἀρχων ἦ μᾶλλον οἱ πλείους μὲν τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἁγαθοὶ δὲ πάντες; ἡ δὲ ἡ μέν ὑπὸ οἱ πλείους; ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν στασιάζουσιν, ὦ δ' εἶς ἀστασίαστος. ἀλλ' πρὸς τούτῳ ἀντιθετέον ἱσος ὅτι σπουδαίοι τῇ ψυχῇ ὦσπερ κάκεινος ὦ εἷς. εἰ δὲ τὴν μὲν τῶν πλείονων 7 ἄρχην ἁγαθῶν δ' ἄνδρῶν πάντων ἀριστοκρατίαν θετέον, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἐνὸς βασιλείαν, αἱρετώτερον ἄν εἰς ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀριστοκρατία βασιλείας, καὶ μετὰ δυνάμεως καὶ χωρίς δυνάμεως οὖσα τῆς ἁρχῆς, ἃν ἡ λαβεῖν πλείους ὁμοίους. καὶ διὰ τούτῳ ἱσως ἐβασιλεύοντο πρότερον, ὅτι σπάνιον ἦν εὑρεῖν ἄνδρας πολυ1 διαφέρουσα κατ' ἁρετῆν, ἀλλως τε καὶ τότε μικρὰς οἰκοῦντας πόλεις. ἐτι δ' ἀπ' εὐεργεσίας καθίστασαν τοὺς βασιλεῖς, ὅπερ ἑστὶν ἔργον τῶν ἁγαθῶν ἄνδρῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ συνεβαινε γίγνεσθαι πολλοὺς ὁμοίους πρὸς ἁρετῆν, οὐκέτι ὑπέμενον ἀλλ' ἐξήτων κοινὸν τι καὶ πολιτείαν καθίστασαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ χείρους γιγνόμενοι ἔχρημα- 8 τίς οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν, ἐντεῦθεν ποθὲν εὐλογον γενέσθαι τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας· ἐντιμὸν γὰρ ἐποίησαν

1 πολλοὺς (plures Ar.) Sylburg.

258
wrong together. But the multitude must consist of the freemen, doing nothing apart from the law except about matters as to which the law must of necessity be deficient. And if this is not indeed easy to ensure in the case of many men, yet if there were a majority of good men and good citizens, would an individual make a more incorruptible ruler or rather those who though the majority in number yet are all good? The majority, is it not obvious? But it will be said that they will split up into factions, whereas with a single ruler this cannot happen. But against this must perhaps be set the fact that they are as virtuous in soul as the single ruler. If then the rule of the majority when these are all good men is to be considered an aristocracy, and that of the one man kingship, aristocracy would be preferable for the states to kingship, whether the royal office be conjoined with military force or without it, if it be possible to get a larger number of men than one who are of similar quality. And it was perhaps only owing to this that kingships existed in earlier times, because it was rare to find men who greatly excelled in virtue, especially as in those days they dwelt in small cities. Moreover they used to appoint their kings on the ground of public service, and to perform this is a task for the good men. But as it began to come about that many men arose who were alike in respect of virtue, they would no longer submit to royalty, but sought for some form of commonwealth, and set up a republican constitution. And as men becoming baser began to make money out of the community, it is reasonable to suppose that some such cause as this occasioned the rise of oligarchies; for they brought wealth into honour.
τὸν πλοῦτον. ἐκ δὲ τούτων πρῶτον εἰς τυραννίδας μετέβαλλον, ἐκ δὲ τῶν τυραννίδων εἰς δημοκρατίαν· ἂεὶ γὰρ εἰς ἐλάττους ἄγοντες δὲ αἰσχροκέρδειαν, ἠχυρότερον τὸ πλῆθος κατέστησαν, ὡστ' ἑπιθέσαν καὶ γενέσαν δημοκρατίας. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ μεῖζον εἶναι συμβεβήκε τὰς πόλεις, ἵνας οὐδὲ ρέδιον ἐτὶ γίγνεσθαι πολυτείαν ἔτεραν παρὰ δημοκρατίαν. εἰ δὲ δὴ τὸς ἁριστὸν θείη τὸ βασιλεύεσθαι 9 ταῖς πόλεσιν, πῶς ἐξει τὰ περὶ τῶν τέκνων; πότερον καὶ τὸ γένος δεῖ βασιλεύειν; ἀλλὰ γιγνο- μένων ὅποιοί τινες ἔτυχον βλαβερῶν. ἀλλ' οὐ παραδώσει κύριος ὃν τοῖς τέκνοις. ἀλλ' οὖν ἐτὶ τοῦτο ρέδιον πιστεύσαι· χαλεπὸν γὰρ, καὶ μεῖζονς ἀρετῆς ἢ καὶ ἀνδροπίνην φύσιν. ἔχει δὲ ἀπορίαν 10 καὶ περὶ τῆς δυνάμεως, πότερον ἐχεῖν δεῖ τὸν μέλλοντα βασιλεύειν ἴσχύν τινα περὶ αὐτὸν ἢ δυνη- σεῖται βιάζεσθαι τοὺς μὴ βουλομένους πειθαρχεῖν; ἢ πῶς ἐνδέχεται τὴν ἀρχὴν διωκεῖν; εἰ γὰρ καὶ κατὰ νόμον εἰς κύριος, μὴ δὲν πράττων κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ βούλησιν παρὰ τὸν νόμον, ὁμως ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ δύναμιν ἢ φυλάξει τοὺς νόμους. τάχα μὲν οὖν τὰ περὶ τὸν βασιλέα τὸν τοιοῦτον οὐ χαλεπὸν διορίσατο· δεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸν μὲν ἐχεῖν¹ ἴσχύν, εἶναι δὲ τοσαύτην τὴν ἴσχυν ὡστε ἐκάστοτε μὲν καὶ ἔνος καὶ συμπλειόνων κρείττω, τοῦ δὲ πλῆθους ἦττω, καθάπερ οἱ τ' ἀρχαῖοι τὰς φυλακὰς ἐδίδοσαν

¹ ἐχεῖν μὲν (vel ἴσχυν μὲν ἐχεῖν) Richards.

---

* i.e. more men of consideration went over to the opposition.
And from oligarchies they first changed to tyrannies, and from tyrannies to democracy; for by constantly bringing the government into fewer hands owing to a base love of gain, they made the multitude stronger, so that it set upon the oligarchs, and democracies came into existence. But now that the states have come to be even greater than they were, perhaps it is not easy for yet another form of constitution beside democracy to come into existence. And even if one held that royal government is best for states, what is to be the position as regards the king's children? Is the sovereignty to be hereditary? But this will be disastrous if the king's sons turn out to be like what some have been. It may be said that the king being sovereign will not in that case bequeath the throne to his children. But that is too much to be easy to believe: it would be difficult for a king to disinherit his sons, and an act of virtue above the level of human nature. And there is a difficulty also about the royal power: ought the man who is to reign as king to have an armed force about him, by means of which he will have power to compel those who may be unwilling to obey, or if not, how is it possible for him to administer his office? For even if he were a law-abiding sovereign and never acted according to his own will against the law, nevertheless it would be essential for him to have power behind him whereby to safeguard the laws. Probably therefore it is not difficult to define the regulations for a king of this sort: he must have a force of his own, but the force must be only so large as to be stronger than a single individual or even several individuals banded together, but weaker than the multitude, on the principle on which the men of old times used to assign bodyguards.
ARISTOTLE

1286 b

οτε καθισταίεν τινα τῆς πόλεως οὖν ἐκάλουν αἰσθητή-
tην ἡ τύραννον,1 καὶ Διονύσιω τις, ὡτ' ἦτε τοὺς
40 φύλακας, συνεβούλευε τοῖς Συρακουσίοις διδόναι
tοσοῦτοι τοὺς φύλακας.

1287 a

XI. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως τοῦ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ 1

βοûλησιν πάντα πράττοντος ὅ τε λόγος ἐφέστηκε

νῦν καὶ ποιητέων τὴν σκέψιν. ὡ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ

νόμον λεγόμενος βασιλεύς οὐκ ἔστιν εἰδος, καθάπερ

6 εἰπομεν, πολιτείας (ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ὑπάρχει ἐν-

δέχεται στρατηγίαν ἀδίδων, οἶνον ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ καὶ

ἀριστοκρατίᾳ, καὶ πολλοὶ ποιοῦσιν ἕνα κύριον τῆς

dιοικήσεως: τοιαύτη γὰρ ἀρχή τίς ἐστι καὶ περὶ

Ἐπίδαμνον, καὶ περὶ Ὀποῦντα δὲ κατὰ τι μέρος

ἔλαττον). περὶ δὲ τῆς παμβασιλείας καλομείνης, 2

10 αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ καθ' ἢν ἀρχεῖ πάντωνa κατὰ τὴν

εἰσαυτοῦ βοûλησιν ὁ βασιλεύς. δοκεῖ δὲ τῶν οὐδὲ

κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι τὸ κύριον ἕνα πάντων εἶναι τῶν

πολιτῶν ὁποιον συνέστηκεν ἐξ ὁμοίων ἡ πόλις: τοῖς

γὰρ ὁμοίως φύσει τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον ἁναγκαῖον καὶ

τὴν αὕτην ἀξίαν κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι, ὡστ' εἴπερ καὶ

15 τὸ ἵσην ἔχειν τοὺς ἀνίσους τροφὴν ἢ ἐσθήτα

βλαβέρον τοῖς σώμασιν, οὕτως ἔχεινb καὶ τὸ περὶ

tὰς τιμὰς: ὁμοίως τοίνυν καὶ τὸ ἀνίσον τοὺς ἰσοὺς, 3

dιόπερ οὐδέναc μᾶλλον ἀρχεῖν ἢ ἀρχεσθαι δίκαιον,

καὶ τὸ ἁνα μέρος τοῖνυν ὠσαύτως. τούτο δ' ἤδη

νόμος: ἡ γὰρ τάξις νόμος. τὸν ἁρα νόμον ἀρχεῖν

1 [ἡ τύραννον] Susemihl.  ḡ β πάντων Jul.: πάντα codd.

2 ἔχειν Schneider: ἔχει codd.

3 οὐδένα Bernays: οὐδέν codd.

a 'Or tyrant' looks like an incorrect note, see 1285 b 25.

b See 1259 a 39 n.

c See c. x. § 3.

d Durazzo, on the Adriatic.

262
whenever they appointed somebody as what they termed *aesymnetes* or tyrant of the state, and also, when Dionysius asked for his guards, somebody advised him to give the same number of guards to the citizens of Syracuse.

1 XI. Our discussion has now reached the case of the king who acts in all matters according to his own will, and we must examine this type of royalty. For the so-called constitutional monarchy, as we said, is not a special kind of constitution (since it is possible for a life-long generalship to exist under all constitutions, for example under a democracy and an aristocracy, and many people make one man sovereign over the administration, for instance there is a government of this sort in Epidamnus, and also at Opus to a certain smaller extent); but we have now to discuss what is called Absolute Monarchy, which is the monarchy under which the king governs all men according to his own will. Some people think that it is entirely contrary to nature for one person to be sovereign over all the citizens where the state consists of men who are alike; for necessarily persons alike in nature must in accordance with nature have the same principle of justice and the same value, so that inasmuch as for persons who are unequal to have an equal amount of food or clothing is harmful for their bodies, the same is the case also in regard to honours; similarly therefore it is wrong for those who are equal to have inequality, owing to which it is just for no one person to govern or be governed more than another, and therefore for everybody to govern and be governed alike in turn. And this constitutes law; for regulation is law. Therefore

- Chief town of Locri, near the Straits of Euboea.
αἱρετῶτερον μᾶλλον ἡ τῶν πολιτῶν ἕνα τινά, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ λόγον τούτον, κἂν εἴ τινας ἀρχειν βέλτιον, τοῦτος καταστατέον νομοφύλακας καὶ ὑπηρέτας τοῖς νόμοις: ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ εἶναι τινας ἀρχάς, ἀλλ' οὖχ ἕνα τούτον εἶναι φασί δίκαιον ὁμοίων γε ὀντων πάντων. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁσα γε μὴ 4 δοκεῖ δύνασθαι διωρίζειν ὁ νόμος, οὔδ' ἀνθρωπος ἂν δύνατο γνωρίζειν. ἀλλ' ἐπίτηδες πατεύεσας ὁ νόμος ἐφίστησι τὰ λοιπὰ 'τῇ δικαιοστάτῃ γνώμῃ' κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν τοὺς ἀρχοντας, ἐτι δ' ἐπανορ-θοῦσθαι δίδωσιν ὧ τι ἄν δόξῃ πειρωμένοις ἁμενον εἶναι τῶν κειμένων. ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νοῦν κελεὺων ἀρχειν δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἀρχειν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν νοῦν μόνους, ἡ δ' ἀνθρωπον κελεύων προστίθησι καὶ θηρίον: ἡ τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοιοῦτον, καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ἀρχοντας διαστρέφει καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἀνδρας. διόπερ ἄνευ ὅρεξεως νοῦς ὁ νόμος ἐστὶν. τὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ παράδειγμα ψεύδος, ὅτι τὸ κατὰ γράμματα ἰατρεύεσθαι φαίλον, ἀλλ' ἀἱρετῶτερον χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἔχουσι τὰς τέχνας. οἱ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν διὰ φιλίαν παρὰ τὸν λόγον ποιοῦν, ἀλλ' ἀρνούνται τὸν μισθὸν τοὺς κάμνοντας ύγιά-σοντας, οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαῖς πολλὰ πρὸς ἐπήρειαν καὶ χάριν εἰώθασι πράττειν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τοὺς ἱατροὺς ὅταν ὑποπτεύσωσι πιστεύουσιν τοῖς ἐχθροῖς διαφθείρειν διὰ κέρδος, τότε τὴν ἐκ τῶν

2 ἀλλ' καὶ codd. plurimi.
3 πεισθέντας Schneider.

a This formula came in the oath taken by the dicasts at Athens.
b i.e. the practical sciences, of which medicine is taken as an example.

264
it is preferable for the law to rule rather than any one of the citizens, and according to this same principle, even if it be better for certain men to govern, they must be appointed as guardians of the laws and in subordination to them; for there must be some government, but it is clearly not just, men say, for one person to be governor when all the citizens are alike. It may be objected that any case which the law appears to be unable to define, a human being also would be unable to decide. But the law first specially educates the magistrates for the purpose and then commissions them to decide and administer the matters that it leaves over ‘ according to the best of their judgement,’ and furthermore it allows them to introduce for themselves any amendment that experience leads them to think better than the established code. He therefore that recommends that the law shall govern seems to recommend that God and reason alone shall govern, but he that would have man govern adds a wild animal also; for appetite is like a wild animal, and also passion warps the rule even of the best men. Therefore the law is wisdom without desire. And there seems to be no truth in the analogy which argues from the arts that it is a bad thing to doctor oneself by book, but preferable to employ the experts in the arts. For they never act contrary to principle from motives of friendship, but earn their fee when (for instance) they have cured their patients, whereas holders of political office usually do many things out of spite and to win favour; since when people suspect even the physicians of being in the confidence of their enemies and of trying to make away with them for gain, in that case they would sooner look up the treat-
Perhaps this should be 'and.'

b i.e. the rules of duty and of manners that are customary but not embodied in legislation: cf. 1319 b 40.

c Iliad x. 224: the passage goes on kal te πρὸ ὀ τοῦ ἐνύφασεν | διπώς κέρδος ἔγι, 'then one discerneth | Before the other how advantage lieth.'

a Iliad ii. 372.
ment in the books. Yet certainly physicians themselves call in other physicians to treat them when they are ill, and gymnastic trainers put themselves under other trainers when they are doing exercises, believing that they are unable to judge truly because they are judging about their own cases and when they are under the influence of feeling. Hence it is clear that when men seek for what is just they seek for what is impartial; for the law is that which is impartial. Again, customary laws are more sovereign and deal with more sovereign matters than written laws, so that if a human ruler is less liable to error than written laws, yet he is not less liable to error than the laws of custom. But also it is certainly not easy for the single ruler to oversee a multitude of things; it will therefore be necessary for the officials appointed by him to be numerous; so that what difference does it make whether this has been the arrangement immediately from the outset or the single ruler appoints them in this manner? Again, a thing that has also been said before, if the virtuous man justly deserves to rule because he is better, yet two good men are better than one: for that is the meaning of the line:

When two together go—

and of the prayer of Agamemnon

May ten such fellow-councillors be mine.

And even now the magistrates, like the Athenian dicast, have power to judge certain cases about which the law is unable to give a clear declaration, since nobody disputes that in matters about which it can do so the law would be the best ruler and judge.
καὶ κρίνειεν. ἂλλ’ ἔπειδὴ τὰ μὲν ἐνδέχεται περὶ 8
20 ληφθῆναι τοῖς νόμοις τὰ δ’ ἄδυνατα, ταῦτ’ ἐστὶν ἃ ποιεῖ διαπορεῖν καὶ ζητεῖν πότερον τὸν ἁριστὸν νόμον ἁρχεῖν αἱρετῶτερον ἣ τὸν ἀνδρα τὸν ἁριστὸν. περὶ δὲν γὰρ βουλεύοντα νομοβιβήσαι τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστίν. οὐ τούν ποτὸ γ’ ἀντιλέγονται, ὡς οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἀνθρώπον εἶναι τὸν κρινοῦντα περὶ
25 τῶν τοιούτων, ἂλλ’ ὃτι οὐχ ἐνα μόνον ἀλλὰ πολλοὺς. κρίνει γὰρ ἐκαστὸς ἁρχὼν πεπαιδευμένος ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου καλῶς, ἀτοποὶ δ’ ἰσως ἂν εἶναι δόξειν εἰ 9 βέλτων ἵδοι τις δυνὸν ὁμισαὶ καὶ δυσὶν ἁκοίς κρίνων καὶ πράττων3 δυσὶ ποια καὶ χερσὶν ἡ πολλοὶ πολλοὶς, ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν ὁθαλμοὺς πολλοὺς οἱ
30 μόναρχοι ποιοῦσιν αὐτῶν καὶ ὅτα καὶ χεῖρας καὶ πόδας, τοὺς γὰρ τῇ ἁρχῇ καὶ αὐτοῖς3 φίλους ποιοῦνται συνάρχους. μὴ φίλοι μὲν οὖν οἶνες οὐ ποιήσουσι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ μονάρχου προαιρεσιν εἰ δὲ φίλοι κάκεινον καὶ τῆς ἁρχῆς, δ’ γε φίλος ἰσος καὶ ἰμοιος, ὥστ’ εἰ τούτους οἴεται δεῖν ἁρχεῖν, τοὺς
35. ἰσους καὶ ἰμοιους ἁρχεῖν οἴεται δεῖν ἰμοῖως.

"Α μὲν οὖν οἱ διαμφισβητοῦντες πρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν λέγουσιν, σχεδὸν ταῦτ’ ἐστίν.

’Αλλ’ ἰσως ταῦτ’ ἐπὶ μὲν τινῶν ἔχει τὸν τρόπον 10 τοῦτον, ἐπὶ δὲ τινῶν οὕς οὕτως. ἐστὶ γὰρ τὶ φύσει δεσποτῶν καὶ ἀλλο βασιλευτῶν καὶ ἀλλο πολιτικῶν, καὶ δίκαιων καὶ συμφέρουν ἀλλο ἀλλοις4. 40 τυραννικὸν δ’ οὐκ ἐστι κατὰ φύσιν, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων

---

1 ἰχοὶ Susemihl.
2 πράττων Conring.
3 αὐτοῖς Mus.: αὐτοῖ, αὐτοῦς codd.
4 ἀλλο ἀλλοι codd. Richards.
But since, although some things can be covered by the laws, other things cannot, it is the latter that cause doubt and raise the question whether it is preferable for the best law to rule or the best man. For to lay down a law about things that are subjects for deliberation is an impossibility. Therefore men do not deny that it must be for a human being to judge about such matters, but they say that it ought not to be a single human being only but a number. For the individual official judges well when he has been instructed by the law, and it would doubtless seem curious if a person saw better when judging with two eyes and two organs of hearing and acting with two feet and hands than many persons with many, since even as it is monarchs make many eyes and ears and hands and feet their own, for they adopt persons that are friendly to their rule and to themselves as their fellow-rulers. Although therefore if these assistants are not friendly they will not act in conformity with the monarch’s policy, if they are friends of him and of his rule, well, a friend is one’s equal and like, so that if the monarch thinks that his friends ought to rule he thinks that people who are equal to and like himself ought to rule like himself.

This then more or less is the case advanced by those who argue against kingship.

But perhaps, although this is a true account of the matter in some cases, it does not apply in others. For there is such a thing as being naturally fitted to be controlled by a master, and in another case, to be governed by a king, and in another, to exercise citizenship, and a different government is just and expedient for different people; but there is no such thing as natural fitness for tyranny, nor for any other
ARISTOTLE

1287 b

1288 a

The clause translated 'that—populace' some editors excise as a superfluous insertion.

They also excise 'in which—populace.'
of the forms of government that are divergences, for these come about against nature. But merely from what has been said, it is clear that among people who are alike and equal it is neither expedient nor just for one to be sovereign over all—neither when there are no laws, but he himself is in the place of law, nor when there are laws, neither when both sovereign and subjects are good nor when both are bad, nor yet when the sovereign is superior in virtue, except in a certain manner. What this manner is must be stated; and in a way it has been stated already even before. But first we must define what constitutes fitness for royal government, what fitness for aristocracy, and what for a republic. A fit subject for royal government is a populace of such a sort as to be naturally capable of producing a family of outstanding excellence for political leadership; a community fit for aristocracy is one that naturally produces a populace capable of being governed under the form of government fit for free men by those who are fitted by virtue for taking the part of leaders in constitutional government; a republican community, one in which there naturally grows up a military populace capable of being governed and of governing under a law that distributes the offices among the well-to-do in accordance with merit. When therefore it comes about that there is either a whole family or even some one individual that differs from the other citizens in virtue so greatly that his virtue exceeds that of all the others, then it is just for this family to be the royal family or this individual king, and sovereign over all matters. For, as has been said before, this holds good not only in accordance with the right that is usually brought forward by those
καθιστάντες οἱ τε τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς καὶ οἱ τὰς ἀληγαρχικὰς, καὶ πάλιν οἱ τὰς δημοκρατικὰς (πάντες γὰρ καθ’ ὑπεροχὴν ἀξιοῦσιν ἀλλ’ ὑπεροχὴν οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν), ἀλλὰ <καὶ>¹ κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον λεχθὲν. οὔτε γὰρ κτεῖνεν ἢ φυγαδεύειν οὐδ’ ὁστρακίζειν δὴ ποὺ τὸν τοιοῦτον πρέπον ἔστιν, οὔτ’ ἀξιοῦν ἀρχεσθαι κατὰ μέρος οὐ γὰρ πέφυκε τὸ μέρος ὑπερέχειν τῷ πάντος, τῷ δὲ τηλικαῦτην ὑπερβολὴν ἔχοντι τούτῳ συμβεβηκεν. ὡστε λείπεται μόνον τὸ πείθεσθαι τῷ τοιούτῳ, καὶ κύριον εἶναι μὴ κατὰ μέρος τούτον ἀλλ’ ἀπλῶς.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν βασιλείας, τῖνας ἔχει διαφοράς, καὶ πρῶτον οὐ συμφέρει τὰς πόλεις ἢ συμφέρει, καὶ τίσι, καὶ πώς, διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τούτον.

XII. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τρεῖς φαμέν εἶναι τὰς ὀρθὰς 1 πολιτείας, τούτων δ’ ἀναγκαῖον ἀρίστην εἶναι τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρίστων ὁικονομομενήν, τοιαύτη δ’ ἔστιν ἐν ἡ συμβεβηκέν ἢ ἕνα τινὰ συμπάντων ἢ γένος ὅλον ἢ πλῆθος ὑπερέχον εἶναι κατ’ ἀρετὴν, τῶν μὲν ἀρχεσθαι δυναμένων τῶν δ’ ἀρχεῖν πρὸς τὴν αἱρετωτάτην ζωὴν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρῶτοις ἐδείχθη λόγοις ὅτι τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ πολίτου τῆς πόλεως τῆς ἀρίστης, φανερὸν ὅτι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνήρ τε γίνεται σπουδαῖος καὶ πόλιν συστήσειν αὖ τις ἀριστοκρατομενὴν² ἢ βασιλευομενήν, ὡστ’ ἐσται 2

¹ ἀλλὰ καὶ ? Γ (immo Guil.).
² <ἀριστ’ ἢ> ἀριστοκρατομενήν Buecheler.

---

a i.e. the right of merit, c. viii. § 7.
b Bk. III. cc. ii., iii.
c Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give ' establish a
who are founding aristocratic and oligarchic constitutions, and from the other side by those who are founding democratic ones (for they all make their claim on the ground of superiority, though not the same superiority), but it also holds good in accordance with the right spoken of before. For it is not seemly to put to death or banish, nor yet obviously to ostracize, such a man, nor is it seemly to call upon him to take his turn as a subject; for it is not in the order of nature for the part to overtop the whole, but the man that is so exceptionally outstanding has come to overtop the whole community. Hence it only remains for the community to obey such a man, and for him to be sovereign not in turn but absolutely.

Let this be our answer to the questions as regards kingship, what are its varieties, and whether it is disadvantageous for states or advantageous, and for what states, and under what conditions.

And since we pronounce the right constitutions to be three, and of these the one governed by the best men must necessarily be the best, and such is the one in which it has come about either that some one man or a whole family or a group of men is superior in virtue to all the citizens together, the latter being able to be governed and the former to govern on the principles of the most desirable life, and since in the first part of the discourse it was proved that the virtue of a man and that of a citizen in the best state must of necessity be the same, it is evident that a man becomes good in the same way and by the same means as one might establish an aristocratically or monarchically governed state, so that it will be state governed in the best way by an aristocracy or a monarchy.
ARISTOTLE

1288 b καὶ παιδεία καὶ ἔθη ταυτὰ σχεδὸν τὰ ποιοῦντα σπουδαἰον ἀνδρα καὶ τὰ ποιοῦντα πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλικῶν.

Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων περὶ τῆς πολιτείας ἡδη πειρατέον λέγειν τῆς ἀριστῆς, τίνα πέφυκε γίνεσθαι τρόπον καὶ καθισταθαι πῶς. [ἀνάγκη δὴ τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ αὐτῆς ποιήσασθαι τὴν προσήκουσαν σκέψιν. . . .1]

1 partem exordii libri VII. admodum uariatam hue transluterunt codd.

a The concluding sentence, by whomever written, clearly leads on to the Book that is No. VII. in the mss. and in this edition; and after it the mss. add half the first sentence of that Book, slightly altered. Some editors therefore transfer Books VII. and VIII. here and put Books IV., V. and VI. after them; opinions vary as to the proper order of Books IV., V. and VI. among themselves.
almost the same education and habits that make a man good and that make him capable as a citizen or a king.

These conclusions having been laid down, we must now endeavour to discuss the best form of constitution and to say in what way it is natural for it to come into existence and how it is natural for it to be organized.

Additional Notes

III. ii. 3, 1276 b 38. If we emend the text with Bernays to έι γάρ δύνατον ἐξ ἀπάντων σπουδαῖων δυναμεῖν εἶναι πόλιν, the sense is: assuming the possibility of a perfect state, with all its factors the best of their kind, this means that all the population will be good citizens, not that they will all be perfect specimens of the human race, because the state needs citizens of the working classes, etc., and these cannot in the nature of things be perfect human beings.

III. iii. 1, 1277 b 38 οὗτος γὰρ πολίτης. The translation takes πολίτης as subject and οὗτος as predicate (meaning ἐκων τῆν τοιαύτην ἀρετήν, possessing capacity to govern). But possibly the predicate is πολίτης and the subject οὗτος, which then stands for ὁ βάναυσος; if so, the whole sentence means that if the non-official classes are citizens, not all the citizens will possess civic virtue (which is capacity to govern), for the working-man will be a citizen (and he is not capable of governing).
I. Ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς τέχναις καὶ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις ταῖς μὴ κατὰ μόριον γυνομέναις ἀλλὰ περὶ γένος ἐν τι τελείαις οὖσαις, μιᾶς ἐστὶ θεωρῆσαι τὸ περὶ ἐκαστὸν γένος ἁρμόττον, οἷον ἀσκήσεις σώματι ποία τε ποίω συμφέρει καὶ τίς ἀρίστη (τῷ γὰρ κάλλιστα πεφυκότι καὶ κεχορηγημένω τὴν ἀρίστην ἀναγκαῖον ἁρμόττειν), καὶ τίς τοῖς πλείστοις μία τὰσιν (καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς γυμναστικῆς ἐστὶν), ἂτι δ' ἐάν τις μὴ τῆς ἱκνουμένης ἐπιθυμή, μὴθ' ἐξεις μὴτ' ἐπιστήμης τῶν περὶ τὴν ἀγωνίαν, μηδὲν τῶν παιδοτρίβου καὶ τοῦ γυμναστικοῦ παρασκευάσαι γε καὶ ταύτην ἔστι τὴν δύναμιν ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ περὶ ἱατρικὴν καὶ περὶ ναυπηγιάν καὶ ἑσθήτα καὶ περὶ πᾶσαν ἄλλην τέχνην ὁρῶμεν συμβαῖνον. ὡστε δὴλον ὅτι καὶ πολιτείαν τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστίν ἐπιστήμης τὴν ἀρίστην θεωρῆσαι τίς ἔστι καὶ ποία τις ἂν ὀψα μάλιστ' εἰη κατ' εὐχήν μηδενὸς ἐμποδίζουσι τῶν ἐκτόσ, καὶ τίς τίσιν ἁρμότ-

1 γένος secl. Spengel.
2 οὐδὲν Bk² (μηδὲν ἡττον cum praecedentibus Immisch, tr. infra post δύναμιν Richards).
3 γε Coraes (tr. supra, τὸν γε παιδοτρίβου Richards): τε codd.

Transposed as Book VI. by some editors: see p. 274 n.
Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give "to each individual."
BOOK IV

1. In all the arts and the sciences that are not merely sectional but that in relation to some one class of subject are complete, it is the function of a single art or science to study what is suited to each class, for instance what sort of gymnastic exercise is beneficial for what sort of bodily frame, and what is the best sort (for the best must naturally suit the person of the finest natural endowment and equipment), and also what one exercise taken by all is the best for the largest number (for this is also a question for gymnastic science), and in addition, in case someone desires a habit of body and a knowledge of athletic exercises that are not the ones adapted to him, it is clearly the task of the trainer and gymnastic master to produce this capacity also just as much; and we notice this also happening similarly in regard to medicine, and ship-building, and the making of clothes, and every other craft. Hence it is clear that in the case of the constitution as well it is the (1) business of the same science to study which is the best constitution and what character it must have to be the most ideal if no external circumstance stands (2) in the way, and what constitution is adapted to what

* i.e. a bodily bearing and athletic skill that are not the ones most suited to the pupil's particular physique.
The fourfold classification given just before is repeated in rather loose terms in this sentence.

The word originally denoted the duty of the wealthy citizen holding the office of Choregus to supply dresses, etc., for the chorus and actors in a drama.
people (since for many it is doubtless impossible to attain the best one, so that the good lawgiver and the true statesman must be acquainted with both the form of constitution that is the highest absolutely and that which is best under assumed conditions), and also thirdly the form of constitution based on a certain supposition (for he must be also capable of considering both how some given constitution could be brought into existence originally and also in what way having been brought into existence it could be preserved for the longest time: I mean for example if it has befallen some state not only not to possess the best constitution and to be unprovided even with the things necessary for it, but also not to have the constitution that is practicable under the circumstances but an inferior one); and beside all these matters he must ascertain the form of constitution most suited to all states, since most of those who make pronouncements about the constitution, even if the rest of what they say is good, entirely miss the points of practical utility. For it is proper to consider not only what is the best constitution but also what is the one possible of achievement, and likewise also what is the one that is easier and more generally shared by all states. But as it is, some students inquire which is the highest form of all even though requiring much material equipment, while those who rather state some general form sweep aside the constitutions actually existing and praise that of Sparta or some other; but the proper course is to bring forward an organization of such a sort that men will easily be persuaded and be able in the existing circumstances to take part in it, since to reform a constitution is no less a task than to frame
5 ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μεταμανθάνειν τοῦ μανθάνειν ἐξ ἀρχῆς. διὸ πρὸς τοὺς εὐρήμενους καὶ ταῖς ὑπαρχοῦσις πολιτείαις δεὶ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν τῶν πολιτικῶν, καθάπερ ἐλέγξη καὶ πρῶτερον. τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον ἁγνοοῦντα πόσα πολιτείαις ἐστὶν εἶδην, μίαν δημοκρατίαν οἴονται τινες εἶναι καὶ μίαν ὀλιγαρχίαν, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τούτ' ἀληθές. ὡστε δὲ τάς διαφορὰς μὴ λανθάνειν τὰς τῶν πολιτείων, πόσαι, καὶ συντίθενται ποσαχῶς. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῆς αὐτῆς φρονήσεως ταύτης καὶ νόμους τοὺς ἀρίστους ἱδεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἐκάστης τῶν πολιτειῶν ἀρμόττοντας. πρὸς γὰρ τὰς πολιτείας τοὺς νόμους δεὶ τίθεσθαι καὶ τίθενται πάντες, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰς πολιτείας πρὸς τοὺς νόμους. πολιτεία μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ τάξις ταῖς πόλεσιν ἢ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς, τίνα τρόπον νενέμηται, καὶ τὸ τό κύριον τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τὸ τέλος ἐκάστης τῆς κοινωνίας ἐστὶν, νόμοι δὲ κεχωρισμένοι τῶν δηλοῦντων τὴν πολιτείαν, καθ' ὁμοίους δὲ τοὺς ἀρχοντας ἀρχεῖν καὶ φυλάττειν τοὺς παραβαίνοντας αὐτούς. ὡστε δὴ λοιπόν ὅτι τὰς διαφορὰς ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἔχειν τῆς πολιτείας ἐκάστης καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν νόμων θέσεως· οὐ γὰρ οἶδον τε τοὺς αὐτοὺς νόμους συμβεβεῖν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις οὐδὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις πάσαις, εἰπὲ δὴ πλείους καὶ μὴ μία δημοκρατία μηδὲ ὀλιγαρχία μέν ἐστὶν.

II. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ μεθόδῳ περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν διειλόμεθα τρεῖς μὲν τὰς ὅρθας πολιτείας,

---

1 μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα anon. apud Stahr: μετὰ δὲ codd.
2 πλείους codd. cet. (εἰπὲ εἶδη πλείους Spengel).

---

a Book III. c. v.
one from the beginning, just as to re-learn a science is just as hard as to learn it originally; in addition therefore to the things mentioned the student of politics must also be able to render aid to the constitutions that exist already, as was also said before. But this is impossible if he does not know how many kinds of constitution there are; but at present some people think that there is only one kind of democracy and one kind of oligarchy, but this is not true. Hence he must take in view the different varieties of the constitutions, and know how many there are and how many are their combinations. And after this it needs this same discrimination also to discern the laws that are the best, and those that are suited to each of the forms of constitution. For the laws should be laid down, and all people lay them down, to suit the constitutions—the constitutions must not be made to suit the laws; for a constitution is the regulation of the offices of the state in regard to the mode of their distribution and to the question what is the sovereign power in the state and what is the object of each community, but laws are distinct from the principles of the constitution, and regulate how the magistrates are to govern and to guard against those who transgress them. So that clearly it is necessary to be in possession of the different varieties of each form of constitution, and the number of these, even for the purpose of legislation; for it is impossible for the same laws to be expedient for all oligarchies or democracies if there are really several kinds of them, and not one sort of democracy or oligarchy only.

II. And inasmuch as in our first inquiry about the forms of the constitution we classified the right
ARISTOTLE

1289 a

βασιλείαν ἀριστοκρατίαν πολιτείαν, τρεῖς δὲ τὰς τούτων παρεκβάσεις, τυραννίδα μὲν βασιλείασ ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ ἀριστοκρατίας δημοκρατίαν δὲ πολιτείας, καὶ περὶ μὲν ἀριστοκρατίας καὶ βασιλείας εἶρηται (τὸ γὰρ περὶ τῆς ἀριστης πολιτείας θεωρῆσαι ταῦτα καὶ περὶ τούτων ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν τῶν ὁνομάτων, βούλεται γὰρ ἐκατέρα κατ' ἀρετὴν συνεστάναι κεχορηγημένην), ἐτὶ δὲ τὶ διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων ἀριστοκρατίας καὶ βασιλείας καὶ πότε δεὴ βασιλείαν νομίζειν διώρισται πρῶτον, λοιπὸν περὶ πολιτείας διελθεῖν τῆς τῷ κοινῷ προσ- αγορευομένης ὁνόματι, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν, ὀλιγαρχίας τε καὶ δημοκρατίας καὶ τυραννίδος. φανερὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τούτων τῶν παρεκ- βάσεων τίς χειρίστη καὶ δεύτερα τίς ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὴν μὲν τῆς πρώτης καὶ θειοτάτης παρεκβασιν εἶναι χειρίστη, τὴν δὲ βασιλείαν ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τούνομα μόνον ἐχειν οὐκ οὔσαν ἢ διὰ πολλὴν ὑπεροχὴν εἶναι τὴν τοῦ βασιλεύοντος· ὡστε τὴν τυραννίδα χειρίστην οὔσαν πλειστὸν ἀπέχειν πολιτείας, δεύτερον δὲ τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν (ἡ γὰρ ἀριστοκρατία διέστηκεν ἀπὸ ταύτης πολὺ τῆς πολιτείας), μετριωτάτην δὲ τὴν δημοκρατίαν. ὡδὴ μὲν οὖν τις ἀπεφήνατο καὶ τῶν πρῶτον οὕτως, οὐ μὴν εἰς ταύτη βλέψας ἡμῖν· ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ ἔκρινε πασῶν μὲν οὔσων ἐπιεικῶν, οἶον ὀλιγαρχίας τε

---

a i.e. πολιτεία, 'polity,' which denotes not only a constitution of any form, but also (like our term 'constitutional government') a particular form, viz., a republic, cf. Bk. III. c. v. § 2.

b The three forms of constitution last mentioned.

c Corruptio optimi pessima, a Socratic notion: 'the men
constitutions as three, kingship, aristocracy and constitutional government, and the deviations from these as three, tyranny from kingship, oligarchy from aristocracy and democracy from constitutional government, and about aristocracy and kingship we have spoken (for to study the best constitution is the same thing as to speak about the forms that bear those names, since each of them means a system based on the qualification of virtue equipped with means), and as also the question what constitutes the difference between aristocracy and kingship and when a royal government is to be adopted has been decided before, it remains to discuss the form of constitution designated by the name a common to them all, and the other forms, oligarchy, democracy and tyranny. Now it is manifest also which of these deviations b is the worst and which the second worst. For necessarily the deviation from the first and most divine must be the worst, c and kingship must of necessity either possess the name only, without really being kingship, or be based on the outstanding superiority of the man who is king; so that tyranny being the worst form must be the one farthest removed from constitutional government, and oligarchy must be the second farthest (for aristocracy is widely separated from that constitution), while democracy must be the most moderate. An account of their relative merits has indeed already been given also by one of the former writers, d though not on the same principle as ours; for he inclined to judge that there were good varieties of all the forms, of the best natural gifts, when uneducated, are the worst, Xen. Mem. iv. 1. 3.

a Plato, Politicus 302 a ff.
χρηστῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, χειρίστην δημοκρατίαν, 
φαύλων δὲ ἀρίστην, ἡμεῖς δὲ ὅλως ταύτας ἐξήμαρτον 4
μένας εἶναι φαυμεν, καὶ βελτίων μὲν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἄλλην 
ἄλλης οὐ καλῶς ἔχειν1 λέγειν, ἢττον δὲ φαύλην, 
ἄλλα περὶ μὲν τῆς τοιαύτης κρίσεως ἀφείσθω 
τὰ νῦν· ἡμῖν δὲ πρῶτον μὲν διαιρετέον πόσαι δια-
φορᾶς τῶν πολυτείων, εἴπερ ἔστω εἰδὴ πλείονα τῆς 
τῆς δημοκρατίας καὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας, ἑπείτα τῖς 
κοινοτάτη, καὶ τῆς αἱρετωτάτη μετὰ τὴν ἀρίστην 
πολυτείαν, κἂν εἰ τῆς ἄλλη τετύχηκεν ἀριστοκρατική 
καὶ συνεστῶσα καλῶς, ἄλλ' οὔ2 ταῖς πλείσταις ἀρ-
μόττουσα πόλεσι, τίς ἔστων, ἑπείτα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων 5
τίς τίσιν αἱρέτη (τάχα γὰρ τοῖς μὲν ἀναγκαία δημο-
κρατία μᾶλλον ὀλιγαρχίας, τοῖς δ' αὐτή μᾶλλον 
ἐκεῖνης), μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τίνα τρόπον δεῖ καθιστάναι 
τὸν βουλόμενον ταύτας τὰς πολυτείας, λέγω δὲ 
δημοκρατίας τε καθ' ἐκαστὸν εἴδος καὶ πάλιν ὀλιγ-
αρχίας, τέλος δὲ, πάντων τούτων ἡταν ποιησώμεθα 
συντόμως τὴν ἐνδεχομένην μνείαν, πειρατέον ἐπ-
ελθεῖν τίνες φθορὰς καὶ τίνες σωτηρία τῶν πολυ-
τείων καὶ κοινῆ καὶ χωρίς ἐκάστης, καὶ διὰ τίνας 
αἰτίας ταῦτα μάλιστα γίνεσθαι πέφυκεν.

III. Τοῦ μὲν οὖν εἶναι πλείονος πολυτείας αἰτιών 1
ὅτι πάσης ἐστὶ μέρη πλείω πόλεως τὸν ἀριθμὸν.
πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ εἴς οἰκίων συγκειμένας πάσας 25
δρόμων τὰς πόλεις, ἑπείτα πάλιν τούτον τοῦ
πλῆθους τούς μὲν εὐπόρους ἀναγκαίον εἶναι τοὺς
1 Richards: ἔχει codd. 2 ou add. Coraes (cf. 1295 a 31 ff.).
for instance a good sort of oligarchy and so on, and that democracy was the worst among these, but the 4 best among the bad varieties, whereas we say that the deviations are wholly wrong, and that it is not right to speak of one form of oligarchy as better than another, but only as less bad. But let us for the present dismiss the question of a classification of this nature. Our business is first to distinguish how many different forms of the constitutions there are, assuming that there do exist several kinds of democracy and of oligarchy; next, which form is most general, and which most desirable after the best constitution, and also if there exists some other form that is aristocratic in nature and well constructed but not fitted to the largest number of cities, which this is; next, which of the other forms too is desirable for what people (since probably for some democracy is necessary more than oligarchy, and for others oligarchy more than democracy); and after this, in what way should one proceed who wishes to set up these constitutions, I mean the various forms of democracy and of oligarchy; and finally, when as far as possible we have concisely touched upon all these questions, we must endeavour to review what are the agencies that destroy and what are those that preserve constitutions generally and each variety of constitution in particular, and what are the causes by which it is most natural for these events to be brought about.

1 III. Now the reason of there being several forms of constitution is that every city has a considerable number of parts. For in the first place we see that all the cities are composed of households, and then again that of this multitude some must necessarily...
ARISTOTLE

1289 b δ’ ἀπόροις τοὺς δὲ μέσους, καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων τὸ μὲν ὀπλιτικὸν τὸ δὲ ἀνοπλον. καὶ τὸν μὲν γεωργικὸν δῆμον ὅμως ὅτα, τὸν δ’ ἀγοραῖον, τὸν δὲ βάναυσον. καὶ τῶν γνωρίμων εἰσὶ διαφοραὶ καὶ κατὰ τὸν πλοῦτον καὶ τὰ μεγέθη

35 τῆς οὐσίας (οἶνον ἐπιποτρωίας, τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ βάφην μὴ πλούτοντας ποιεῖν’ διότερ ἐπὶ τῶν 2 ἀρχαίων χρόνων ὅσις πόλεσιν ἐν τοῖς ἱπποῖς ἡ δύναμις ἢ, ὁλυγαρχεῖα παρὰ τούτοις ἥσαν’ ἐχρῶντο δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πολέμους’ ἱπποί πρὸς τοὺς Ἀσυγείτονας, οἶνον Ἐρετριεῖς καὶ Χαλκιδεῖς καὶ

40 Μάγνητες οἵ ἐπὶ Μαίανδρῳ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολλοί περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν). ἔτι πρὸς ταῖς κατὰ πλοῦτον δια-

1290 a φοραῖς ἐστὶν ἢ μὲν κατὰ γένος ἢ δὲ κατ’ ἀρετήν, καὶ εἴ τι δὴ τοιοῦτον ἔτερον εἰρήτα χίολεσι εἶναι μέρος ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν (ἐκεῖ γὰρ διειλόμεθα ἐκ πόσων μερῶν ἀναγκαῖον ἐστὶ πάσα πόλις). τοῦτων γὰρ τῶν μερῶν ὅτε μὲν πάντα μετ-

5 ἐχεῖ τῆς πολιτείας ὅτε δ’ ἐλάττων ὅτε δὲ πλείω. φανερὸν τοῖνυν ὅτι πλείους ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πολι-

3 τείας εἴδει διαφεροῦσας ἀλλήλων καὶ γὰρ ταῦτ’ εἴδει διαφέρει τὰ μέρη σφῶν αὐτῶν. πολιτεία μὲν γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἀρχῶν τάξις ἐστὶ, ταύτας δὲ διανεμοῦ-

ται πάντες ἡ κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν τῶν μετεχόντων ἡ

10 κατὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἱσότητα κοινῆ, λέγω δ’ οἶνον τῶν ἀπόρων ἡ τῶν εὐπόρων ἡ κοινῆ τῶν ἀμφότερων ἀναγκαῖον ἀρα πολιτείας εἶναι τοσαυτάς ὅσιοι περ

1 πολέμους Γ (cf. 1330 a 18): πολεμίους codd.
2 [πρὸς] Immisch (cf. ibid.).
3 Richards: ταύτῃ codd. 4 [ἡ—ἀμφότερων] Ramus.

* This clause looks like an interpolation.
be rich and some poor and some between the two, and also of the rich and the poor the former class is heavy-armed and the latter without armour. And we see that one portion of the common people is agricultural, another engaged in trade and another mechanic. And the upper classes have distinctions also corresponding to their wealth and the amounts of their property (for example in a stud of horses—for it is not easy to rear horses without being rich, and this is why in ancient times there were oligarchies in all the states whose strength lay in their cavalry, and they used to use horses for their wars against their neighbours, as for instance did the Eretrians and Chalcidians and the people of Magnesia on the Maeander and many of the other Asiatic peoples). Moreover in addition to differences in wealth there is the difference of birth, and that in regard to virtue, and indeed any other similar distinction that in the discussion of aristocracy has been stated to constitute a part of the state (for there we distinguished how many necessary parts there are of which every state must consist); for sometimes all of these parts participate in the constitution and sometimes a smaller or a larger number of them. It is clear therefore that there must necessarily be several forms of constitution differing in kind from one another, inasmuch as these parts differ in kind among themselves. For a constitution means the arrangement of the magistracies, and these all people distribute either according to the power of those who share political rights, or according to some common equality between them, I mean for example between the poor or between the rich, or some equality common to them both. It follows therefore that there are as many forms of
Aristotle refers to this view in *Meteorologica* 364 a 19, saying that west winds are classed with north and east winds with south, because wind from the setting sun is cooler and from the rising sun warmer. He notes that north and south
constitution as there are modes of arrangement according to the superiorities and the differences of the sections. But the forms mostly are thought to be two—just as in the case of the winds we speak of some as north and some as south and regard the rest as deviations from these, so also of constitutions there are held to be two forms, democracy and oligarchy; for men reckon aristocracy as a kind of oligarchy because it is oligarchy of a sort, and what is called constitutional government as democracy, just as in the case of the winds they reckon the west wind as a kind of north wind and the east wind as a kind of south wind. And the case is similar with musical modes, as some people say: for there too they posit two kinds, the Dorian mode and the Phrygian, and call the other scales some of them Dorian and the others Phrygian. For the most part therefore they are accustomed to think in this way about the constitutions; but it is truer and better to class them as we did, and assuming that there are two well-constructed forms, or else one, to say that the others are deviations, some from the well-blended constitution and the others from the best one, the more tense and masterful constitutions being oligarchic and the relaxed and soft ones demotic.

But it is not right to define democracy, as some people are in the custom of doing now, merely as the constitution in which the multitude is sovereign (for even in oligarchies and everywhere the majority is sovereign) nor oligarchy as the constitution in which a few are sovereign over the government. For if the whole number were thirteen hundred, and a thousand winds are the most frequent, ib. 361 a 6; this may have suggested the idea that they were the typical winds.
καὶ μὴ μεταδιδοίην ἀρχῆς τοῖς τριακοσίοις καὶ
tένησιν ἔλευθέρως οὐσὶ καὶ τάλλα ὁμοίως, οὕθεις
ἂν φαίη δημοκρατεῖσαθαί τούτους· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
eἰ πέντες μὲν ὄλιγοι εἶν, κρείττους δὲ τῶν
eὐπόρων πλειόνων ὄντων, οὕθεις ἂν ὀλιγαρχίαν
προσαγορεύσειεν οὐδὲ τὴν τοιαύτην εἰ τοῖς ἄλλοις"1
οὐσὶ πλοιοῖς μὴ μετείχη τῶν τιμῶν. μᾶλλον7

tοίνυν λεκτέον ὅτι δῆμοι μὲν ἐστιν ὅταν οἱ ἔλευ-
θεροι κύριοι οὐσὶν ὀλιγαρχία δ' ὅταν οἱ πλοῦσιοι,
ἀλλὰ συμβαίνει τοὺς μὲν πολλοὺς εἶναι τοὺς δ' ὀ-
λίγους, ἐλευθεροὶ μὲν γὰρ πολλοὶ πλοῦσοι δ' ὀ-
λίγου. καὶ γὰρ ἂν εἴ κατὰ μέγεθος διενέμοντο
tὰς ἀρχὰς, ὦσπερ ἐν Ἀἰθιοπία φασί τινες,2 ἡ κατὰ
cάλλος, ὀλιγαρχία ἢν ἂν, ὀλίγον γὰρ τὸ πλῆθος
cαὶ τὸ τῶν καλῶν καὶ τὸ τῶν μεγάλων. οὖ μὴν8
ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τούτους μόνον ἰκανῶς ἔχει διωρίσθαι
tὰς πολιτείας ταύτας· ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ πλείονα μόρια
καὶ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας εἰσίν, ἔτι δια-
ληπτέον ὡς οὔτ' ἂν οἱ ἔλευθεροὶ ὀλίγοι ὄντες
πλειόνων καὶ μὴ ἔλευθεροιν ἀρχωσὶ δῆμος, οἴον
ἐν Ἀπολλωνία τῇ ἐν τῷ Ἰούνω καὶ ἐν Θήρᾳ (ἐν τοῦ-
tων γὰρ ἐκατέρα τῶν πόλεων ἐν ταῖς τιμαῖς ἦσαν
οἱ διαφέροντες κατ' εὐγένειας καὶ πρῶτοι κατα-
σχόντες τὰς ἀποικίας, ὀλίγοι ὄντες πολλῶν), οὔτ' ἂν
οἱ πλοῦσιοι διὰ τὸ κατὰ πλῆθος ὑπερέχειν, δῆμος,3
οἴον ἐν Κολοφῶν τὸ παλαιὸν (ἐκεῖ γὰρ ἐκέκτητο
μακρὰν οὐσίαν οἱ πλείοις πρὶν γενέσθαι τὸν πό-

1 πολλοῖς Richards. 2 τινα? Susemihl. 3 ὀλιγαρχία Bojesen.

a e.g. Herodotus iii. 20. b i.e. those of citizen birth.
of these were rich and did not give the three hundred poor a share in the government although they were free-born and like themselves in all other respects, no one would say that this people was governed democratically; and similarly also if there were few poor, but these more powerful than the rich who were more numerous, no one would call such a government a democracy either, if the other citizens being rich had no share in the honours. Rather therefore ought we to say that it is a democracy when the free are sovereign and an oligarchy when the rich are, but that it comes about that the sovereign class in a democracy is numerous and that in an oligarchy small because there are many men of free birth and few rich. For otherwise, suppose people assigned the offices by height, as some persons say is done in Ethiopia, or by beauty, that would be an oligarchy, because both the handsome and the tall are few in number. Nevertheless it is not enough to define these constitutions even by wealth and free birth only; but inasmuch as there are more elements than one both in democracy and in oligarchy, we must add the further distinction that neither is it a democracy if the free being few govern the majority who are not of free birth, as for instance at Apollonia on the Ionian Gulf and at Thera (for in each of these cities the offices of honour were filled by the specially noble families who had been the first settlers of the colonies, and these were few out of many), nor is it a democracy if the rich rule because they are in a majority, as in ancient times at Colophon (for there the majority of the population owned large property.

Perhaps the Greek should be altered here to give 'an oligarchy.'
λεμον τὸν πρὸς Λυδοῦς), ἀλλ' ἔστι δημοκρατία μὲν ὅταν οἱ ἐλεύθεροι καὶ ἀποροι πλείους ὄντες κύριοι τῆς ἀρχῆς ὄσων, ὅλυγαρχία δ’ ὅταν οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ εὐγενεστέροι ὅλγοι ὄντες.

"Ὅτι μὲν οὖν πολιτείαι πλείους, καὶ δ’ ἦν αὐτίαν, 9 εἴρηται· διότι δὲ πλείους τῶν εἰρημένων, καὶ τίνες καὶ διὰ τί, λέγωμεν ἀρχὴν λαβόντες τὴν εἰρημένην πρότερον. ὁμολογοῦμεν γὰρ οὐχ ἐν μέρος ἀλλὰ 25 πλείων πᾶσαν ἔχειν πόλιν. ὅσπερ οὖν εἰ ζῷον προηρούμεθα λαβέιν εἶδη, πρῶτον ἂν ἀποδιωρίζομεν ὅπερ ἀναγκαῖον τὰν ἔχειν ζῶον (οὗν ἐνὶ τῇ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων καὶ τῇ τῆς τροφῆς ἐργαστικῷ καὶ δεκτικῷ, οὗν στομα καὶ κοιλίαι, πρὸς δὲ τούτως, οἷς κινεῖται μορίους ἐκαστὸν αὐτῶν), εἰ 10 δὲ τοσαῦτα εἰ ὡς μόνον, τούτων δ’ εἰὲν διαφοραὶ (λέγω δ’ οἷον στόματος τῶν πλείων γένη καὶ κοιλίας καὶ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων, ἔτι δ’ καὶ τῶν κινητικῶν μορίων), ὧ τῇς συζευγεσὶς τῆς τούτων ἀρμικὸς ἐς ἀνάγκης ποιῇσι πλείων γένη ζῶον (οὐ γὰρ οἷον τοῦ τούτων ζῶον ἔχειν πλείους στόματος διαφοράς, ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδ’ ὡτών), ὡστ’ ὅταν ληφθῶσι τούτων πάντες οἱ εἰδεχόμενοι συνδυασμοὶ πουῆσουσιν εἶδη ζῶον, καὶ τοσαῦτ’ εἶδη τοῦ ζῶον ὅσιπερ αἱ συζευγες τῶν ἀναγκαίων μορίων εἰςὶν—τὸν αὐτὸν 11 δὴ τρόπον καὶ τῶν εἰρημένων πολιτείων. καὶ γὰρ αἱ πόλεις οὐκ ἐξ ἔνος ἀλλ’ ἐκ πολλῶν σύγκειται.

1 ἰ’ Thurot: δὴ aut δέi codd.
2 εἰ δ Newm: εἰ δη codd. 3 δὴ Coraes: δὲ codd.

See § 1.
before the war against the Lydians took place), but it is a democracy when those who are free are in the majority and have sovereignty over the government, and an oligarchy when the rich and more well born are few and sovereign.

9 It has then been stated that there are several forms of constitution, and what is the cause of this; but let us take the starting-point that was laid down before and say that there are more forms than those mentioned, and what these forms are, and why they vary. For we agree that every state possesses not one part but several. Therefore just as, in case we intended to obtain a classification of animals, we should first define the properties necessarily belonging to every animal (for instance some of the sense-organs, and the machinery for masticating and for receiving food, such as a mouth and a stomach, and in addition to these the locomotive organs of the various species), and if there were only so many necessary parts, but there were different varieties of these (I mean for instance certain various kinds of mouth and stomach and sensory organs, and also of the locomotive parts as well), the number of possible combinations of these variations will necessarily produce a variety of kinds of animals (for it is not possible for the same animal to have several different sorts of mouth, nor similarly of ears either), so that when all the possible combinations of these are taken they will all produce animal species, and there will be as many species of the animal as there are combinations of the necessary parts:—so in the same way also we shall classify the varieties of the constitutions that have been mentioned. For states also are composed not of one but of several parts, as
merōn, ὡσπερ ἐϊρηται πολλάκις. ἐν μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν τροφὴν πλῆθος, οἱ καλούμενοι γεωρ-γοὶ, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ καλούμενον βάναυσον (Ἴστι δὲ τούτῳ περὶ τὰς τέχνας ὡς ἀνευ πόλιν ἀδύνατον οἱκεῖσθαι, τούτων δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν τὰς μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχειν δει, τὰς δὲ εἰς τρυφὴν ἢ τὸ καλὸς ξῆν),

τρίτον δ’ ἀγοραῖον (λέγω δ’ ἀγοραῖον τὸ περὶ τὰς πράσεις καὶ τὰς ὑώνας καὶ τὰς ἐμπορίας καὶ καπηλείας διατρίβουν), τέταρτον δὲ τὸ θητικόν, πέμπτον δὲ γένος τὸ προπολεμήσον, δ’ τούτων οὐθέν ἤττόν ἐστιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν εἰ μέλλουσι μὴ δουλεύσειν τοῖς ἔπιονοις μὴ γὰρ ἐν τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἢ πόλιν ἄξιον εἶναι καλεῖν τὴν φύσει δούλην,

αὐτάρκης γὰρ ἢ πόλις τὸ δὲ δοῦλον οὐκ αὐτάρκες. διόπερ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ κομψός τούτο, οὐχ ἰκανῶς δὲ εἰρηται. φησι γὰρ δ’ Σωκράτης ἐκ τεττάρων τῶν ἀναγκαστάτων πόλιν συγκεῖσθαι, λέγει δὲ τούτως ὕφαντην καὶ γεωργὸν καὶ σκυτοτόμον καὶ οἰκοδόμον’ πάλιν δὲ προστίθησιν, ὡς οὐχ αὐτάρκων τούτων, χαλκέα καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναγκαῖοις βοσκήμασιν, ἐτὶ δ’ ἐμπρόν τε καὶ κάπηλον. καὶ ταῦτα πάντα γίνεται πλήρωμα τῆς πρώτης πόλεως, ὡς τῶν ἀναγκαίων γε χάριν πᾶσαι πόλιν συν-εστηκότων ἀλλ’ οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ μᾶλλον, ἵσον τε δεομένην σκυτέων τε καὶ γεωργῶν τὸ δὲ προ-

πολεμοῦν οὐ πρότερον ἀποδίδουσι μέρος πρὶν ἢ τῆς χώρας αὐξομένης καὶ τῆς τῶν πλησίον ἀπτομένης

a Plato, Rep. ii. 369 b-371 e.
b i.e. the first sketch of the City-state, loc. cit.
has been said often. One of these parts therefore is the mass of persons concerned with food who are called farmers, and second is what is called the mechanic class (and this is the group engaged in the arts without which it is impossible for a city to be inhabited, and some of these arts are indispensably necessary, while others contribute to luxury or noble living), and third is a commercial class (by which I mean the class that is engaged in selling and buying and in wholesale and retail trade), and fourth is the class of manual labourers, and the fifth class is the one to defend the state in war, which is no less indispensable than the others if the people are not to become the slaves of those who come against them; for surely it is quite out of the question that it should be proper to give the name of state to a community that is by nature a slave, for a state is self-sufficient, but that which is a slave is not self-sufficient. Therefore the statement made in the Republic a is witty but not adequate. For Socrates says that the most necessary elements of which a state is composed are four, and he specifies these as a weaver, a farmer, a shoemaker and a builder; and then again he adds, on the ground that these are not self-sufficient, a copper-smith and the people to look after the necessary live-stock, and in addition a merchant and a retail trader. These elements together constitute the full complement of his first city, b implying that every city is formed for the sake of the necessaries of life and not rather for the sake of what is noble, and that it has equal need of both shoemakers and farmers; but the warrior class he does not assign to it until as the territory is increased and comes into contact with that of the neighbours they are brought into
eis pòlemos katastósws. allá mēn kai ev tois tēttarou kai tois óposoioi kouwnois anagkaion einai tina tov apodóswonta kai krinónta to dikaiou. eîper oiv kai psikhēn àn tis thei zêfou 25 mōrioν mállyn ē sóma, kai pòlewn và touauta māllon theteîn tōn eis tîn anagkaian xrhēiν syn-
tewnōnton, to polemiκon kai to metēχon dikaiosūnyhs dikastikhs, prôs de toutois to bouleuvōmenon, óper èstî synésews politikhs ērgon. kai taút' eîte kekhwrismênov1 ὑπάρχει τυπίν eîte tois autois, 80 outheîn diaphereî prôs tov lōgon kai gar ópliteuèvon kai geurvediν synymbainei tois autois pollákis. òoste eîper kai taútata kai èkeîna thetàa mōria tîs pòlews, fanerôn ὃtî tî ge ópliteikôn anagkaîon èstî mōrioν tîs pòlews. ébdomon de tî taús òusias leitourgyon, ò kalouμen eîpòrous. òγdouν de tî 85 ðhmouρgiκon kai tî peri tâs ãrkhas leitourgōun, eîper àneu ãrhōnton ãdýνatov eînai pòlivn anag-
kaîon ouv eînai tînas toûs dynamēnov ãrchiν kai leitourgōûntas ò synexhôs ò katã mēros tî pòleî 
tauth tîn leitourgyâν. louta de peri ìn tûn-
χânomen diwrikōtes ãrτîws, to bouleuvōmenon kai 40 to2 krînov peri tōn dikaiwn tois ãmfisbhtouν. 
eîper ouv taútata deî ginēsboî3 taûs pòleis kai 1291a kállos ginēsboî3 kai dikaiws, anagkaîon kai met-

1 kekhwrismênov? Richards. 2 kal to ed.: kal codd. 3 ginēsboî ed.: ginēsboî codd.

* The first four classes and the military and judicial.
war. But yet even among the four partners or whatever their number be there must necessarily be somebody to assign justice and to judge their claims; inasmuch therefore as one would count the soul of an animal to be more a part of it than the body, so also the factors in states corresponding to the soul must be deemed to be parts of them more than those factors which contribute to necessary utility,—the former being the military class and the class that plays a part in judicial justice, and in addition to these the deliberative class, deliberation being a function of political intelligence. And it makes no difference to the argument whether these functions are held by special classes separately or by the same persons; for it often happens for the same men to be both soldiers and farmers. Hence inasmuch as both groups of classes must be counted parts of the state, it is clear that the heavy-armed soldiery at any rate must be a part of the state. And a seventh class is the one that serves the community by means of its property, the class that we call the rich. And an eighth is the class of public servants, that is, those who serve in the magistracies, inasmuch as without rulers it is impossible for a city to exist; it is therefore necessary that there should be some men who are able to govern and who render this service to the state either continuously or in turn. And there remain the classes which we happen to have defined just before, the deliberative class and the one that judges the claims of litigants. If therefore it is proper for the states to have these functions performed, and well and justly performed, it is necessary

---

b Lower grades of the forces may be excluded from citizenship, e.g. the rowers of the triremes (see below, 1376 b 15).
έχοντας εἶναι τινὰς ἁρετῆς τῆς τῶν πολιτικῶν. 2
τὰς μὲν οὖν ἄλλας δυνάμεις τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν 15
ἔνδεχεσθαι δοκεῖ πολλοῖς, οἷον τοὺς αὐτοὺς εἶναι
τοὺς προπολεμοῦντας καὶ γεωργοῦντας καὶ τεχ-
νῶτας, ἐτὶ δὲ τοὺς βουλευομένους τε καὶ κρίνοντας,
ἀντιποιοῦνται δὲ καὶ τῆς ἁρετῆς πάντες καὶ τὰς
πλείστας ἄρχας ἄρχειν οἶονται δύνασθαι. ἄλλα
πένεσθαι καὶ πλούτειν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀδύνατον.
διὸ ταύτα μέρη μάλιστα εἶναι δοκεῖ πόλεως, οἱ
εὐποροὶ καὶ οἱ ἀποροὶ. ἐτὶ δὲ διὰ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ
10 πολὺ τοὺς μὲν ὀλύγους εἶναι τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς,
tαύτα ἐναντία μέρη 3 φαίνεται τῶν τῆς πόλεως
μορίων. ὥστε καὶ τὰς πολιτείας κατὰ τὰς ὑπερχάς
τούτων καθιστάσι, καὶ δύο πολιτείαι δοκοῦν
εἶναι, δημοκρατία καὶ ὀλυγαρχία.

IV. "Ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶ πολιτεῖαι πλείους, καὶ διὰ 1
15 τινὰς αἰτίας, εἴρηται πρότερον ὅτι δ' ἐστὶ καὶ
dημοκρατίας εἶδη πλείω καὶ ὀλυγαρχίας, λέγωμεν.
φανερῶν δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. εἶδη
γὰρ πλείω τοῦ τε δήμου καὶ τῶν λεγομένων
γνωρίμων ἐστὶν, οἷον δήμου μὲν εἶδη ἐν μὲν οἱ
γεωργοὶ, ἔτερον δὲ τὸ περὶ τὰς τέχνας, ἀλλο δὲ τὸ
20 ἁγοραίον τὸ περὶ ὡνήν καὶ πρᾶσιν διατριβῶν, ἀλλο
dὲ τὸ περὶ θάλασσας, καὶ τούτων τὸ μὲν πολεμικὸν
tὸ δὲ χρηματιστικὸν τὸ δὲ πορθμευτικὸν τὸ δ'
ἄλλωττικὸν (πολλαχοὶ γὰρ ἑκατά τούτων πολύσχολα,

1 ἁρετῆς τῆς Richards: ἁρετῆς codd.
2 πολιτῶν ? Richards.
3 μόνα Wilamowitz.

* Cf. iii. 11, 12 fin.
for there also to be some men possessing virtue in the
form of political excellence. Now as to the other
capacities many people think that it is possible for
them to be possessed in combination, for example,
for the same men to be the soldiers that defend the
state in war and the farmers that till the land and
the artizans, and also the councillors and judges, and
indeed all men claim to possess virtue and think
themselves capable of filling most of the offices of
state; but it is not possible for the same men to
be poor and rich. Hence these seem to be in the
fullest sense the parts of the state, the rich and the
poor. And also the fact that the rich are usually
few and the poor many makes these two among the
parts of the state appear as opposite sections; so
that the superior claims of these classes are even
made the guiding principles upon which constitutions
are constructed, and it is thought that there are two
forms of constitution, democracy and oligarchy.

IV. That there are then several forms of constitu-
tion, and what are the reasons for this, has been
stated before; let us now say that there are several
varieties both of democracy and of oligarchy. And
this is clear even from what has been said already.
For there are several classes both of the people and
of those called the notables; for instance classes of
the people are, one the farmers, another the class
dealing with the arts and crafts, another the com-
mmercial class occupied in buying and selling and
another the one occupied with the sea—and this
is divided into the classes concerned with naval
warfare, with trade, with ferrying passengers and
with fishing (for each of these classes is extremely
numerous in various places, for instance fishermen
ARISTOTLE

1291 b

οὗν ἀλιεῖς μὲν ἐν Τάραντι καὶ Βυζαντίω, τρυμηρικὸν δὲ Ἀθήνησι, ἐμπορικὸν δὲ ἐν Αἰγίνῃ καὶ Χίῳ, 25 πορθμευτικὸν δ' ἐν1 Τενέδω, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὸ χερνητικὸν καὶ τὸ μικρὰν ἔχον οὐσίαν ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι σχολάζειν, ἢτι τὸ μὴ εἷς ἄμφωτερον πολιτῶν ἐλεύθερον, κἂν εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἑτερον2 πλήθους εἴδος· τῶν δὲ γνωρίμων πλοῦτος, εὐγένεια, ἀρετή, παιδεία καὶ τὰ τούτοις λεγόμενα κατὰ τὴν 30 αὐτὴν διαφοράν.

Δημοκρατία μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ πρώτῃ μὲν ἡ λεγομένη 2 μάλιστα κατὰ τὸ ὅσον. ἵσον γάρ φησιν ὁ νόμος ὁ τῆς τουαύτης δημοκρατίας τὸ μηδὲν μᾶλλον ὑπερέχειν3 τοὺς ἀπόρους ἢ τοὺς εὐπόρους μηδὲ κύριους εἶναι ὑποτερουσοίν ἀλλ' ὀμοίους ἄμφωτέρους· εἴπερ γὰρ ἐλευθερία μάλιστ' ἐστὶν ἐν 35 δημοκρατίᾳ, καθάπερ ὑπολαμβάνουσι τινες, καὶ ἰσότης, οὐτως ἂν εἴῃ μάλιστα κοινωνοῦντων ἀπάντων μάλιστα4 τῆς πολιτείας ὀμοίως. ἐπεὶ δὲ πλείων ὁ δήμος, κύριον δὲ τὸ δόξαν τοῖς πλείοσιν, ἀνάγκη δημοκρατίαν εἶναι ταύτην. ἐν μὲν οὖν 3 εἴδος δημοκρατίας τούτο, τὸ5 τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀπὸ τιμημάτων εἶναι, βραχέων δὲ τούτων ὄντων· δεὶ δὲ τῷ κτωμένῳ ἐξουσίαν εἶναι μετέχειν καὶ 40 τὸν ἀποβάλλοντα μὴ μετέχειν. ἑτερον δ' εἴδος δημοκρατίας τὸ μετέχειν ἀπαντας τοὺς πολίτας ὅσοι ἀνυπεύθυνοι, ἄρχειν δὲ τὸν νόμον· ἑτερον δὲ εἴδος δημοκρατίας τὸ πᾶσι μετείναι τῶν ἀρχῶν

1 δ' ἐν Susemihl (autem in Guil.): ἐν codd.
2 Sylburg: ἑτερον codd.
3 ὑπάρχειν codd. plerique, ἄρχειν Victorius (cf. 1318 a 7).
4 secl. Coraes.
5 τὸ Schloesser (cf. 1318 b 6 seq., ed.): ἀλλὸ δὲ τὸ codd.
at Tarentum and Byzantium, navy men at Athens the mercantile class at Aegina and Chios, and the ferryman-class at Tenedos), and in addition to these the hand-working class and the people possessing little substance so that they cannot live a life of leisure, also those that are not free men of citizen parentage on both sides, and any other similar class of common people; while among the notables wealth, birth, virtue, education, and the distinctions that are spoken of in the same group as these, form the classes.

2. The first kind of democracy therefore is the one which receives the name chiefly in respect of equality. For the law of this sort of democracy ascribes equality to the state of things in which the poor have no more prominence than the rich, and neither class is sovereign, but both are alike; for assuming that freedom is chiefly found in a democracy, as some persons suppose, and also equality, this would be so most fully when to the fullest extent all alike share equally in the government. And since the people are in the majority, and a resolution passed by a majority is paramount, this must necessarily be a democracy. This therefore is one kind of democracy, where the offices are held on property-qualifications, but these low ones, although it is essential that the man who acquires the specified amount should have the right to hold office, and the man who loses it should not hold office. And another kind of democracy is for all the citizens that are not open to challenge to have a share in office, but for the law to rule; and another kind of democracy is for all to share in the offices on the mere qualification of

* i.e. on the score of birth, cf. c. v. § 4.
έαν μόνον ἡ πολιτῆς, ἀρχεῖν δὲ τὸν νόμον. ἐτερον
5 δ’ εἶδος δημοκρατίας τάλλα μὲν εἶναι ταυτά, κύριον
d’ εἶναι τὸ πλῆθος καὶ μή τὸν νόμον. τούτο δὲ 4
gίνεται ὅταν τὰ ψηφίσματα κύρια ἢ ἀλλὰ μὴ ὁ
νόμος. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο διὰ τοὺς δημαγωγούς.
ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς κατὰ νόμον δημοκρατομέναις οὐ
gίνεται δημαγωγός, ἀλλ’ οἱ βέλτιστοι τῶν πολιτῶν
10 εἰσὶν ἐν προεδρίᾳ. ὅπου δ’ οἱ νόμοι μὴ εἰσὶν κύριοι,
ἔνταξι γίνονται δημαγωγοί· μόναρχος γὰρ ὁ
dήμος γίνεται σύνθετος εἰς ἕκ πολλῶν, οἱ γὰρ
pολλοὶ κύριοι εἰσίν οὐχ ὡς ἐκαστος ἀλλὰ πάντες.
"Ομορος δὲ ποιαν λέγει οὐκ ἄγαθον εἰναι πολυ-
κοιρανήν, πότερον ταύτην ἡ ὅταν πλείους ὄσιν
15 οἱ ἄρχοντες ὡς ἐκαστος, ἄδηλον. ὃ δ’ οὐν τοιοῦτος 5
dήμος ἀτε μόναρχος ὡν ἔτη ῶ μόναρχεων διὰ τὸ
μὴ ἀρχεσθαι ὑπὸ νόμου καὶ γίνεται δεσποτικός,
ὡστε οἱ κόλακες ἐντιμοὶ. καὶ ἑστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος
dήμος ἀνάλογον τῶν μοναρχιῶν τῇ τυραννίδι,
διότι καὶ τὸ ἦθος τὸ αὐτὸ, καὶ ἀμφω δεσποτικὰ
20 τῶν βελτίωνν, καὶ τὰ ψηφίσματα ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ τὰ
ἐπιτάγματα, καὶ ὁ δημαγωγός καὶ ὁ κόλαξ οἱ
αὐτοὶ καὶ ἀνάλογον, καὶ μάλιστα δ’ ἐκάτεροι παρ’
ἐκατέρως ἐσχύνουσι, οἱ μὲν κόλακες παρὰ τυράν-
νοις, οἰ δὲ δημαγωγοὶ παρὰ τοῖς δήμοις τοῖς τοιοῦ-
τοις. αἴτιοι δ’ εἰσὶ τοῦ εἶναι τὰ ψηφίσματα κύρια 6
25 ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς νόμους οὗτοι, πάντα ἀνάγοντες εἰς
tὸν δήμον· συμβαίνει γὰρ αὐτοῖς γίνεσθαι μεγάλους
dιὰ τὸ τὸν μὲν δήμον πάντων εἶναι κύριον τῆς δὲ

1 ed.: δ’ codd.

a Iliad, ii. 204.
being a citizen, but for the law to rule. Another kind of democracy is where all the other regulations are the same, but the multitude is sovereign and not the law; and this comes about when the decrees of the assembly over-ride the law. This state of things is brought about by the demagogues; for in the states under democratic government guided by law a demagogue does not arise, but the best classes of citizens are in the most prominent position; but where the laws are not sovereign, then demagogues arise; for the common people become a single composite monarch, since the many are sovereign not as individuals but collectively. Yet what kind of democracy Homer means by the words 'no blessing is the lordship of the many'—whether he means this kind or when those who rule as individuals are more numerous, is not clear. However, a people of this sort, as being monarch, seeks to exercise monarchic rule through not being ruled by the law, and becomes despotic, so that flatterers are held in honour. And a democracy of this nature is comparable to the tyrannical form of monarchy, because their spirit is the same, and both exercise despotic control over the better classes, and the decrees voted by the assembly are like the commands issued in a tyranny, and the demagogues and the flatterers are the same people or a corresponding class, and either set has the very strongest influence with the respective ruling power, the flatterers with the tyrants and the demagogues with democracies of this kind. And these men cause the resolutions of the assembly to be supreme and not the laws, by referring all things to the people; for they owe their rise to greatness to the fact that the people is sovereign over all things
τοῦ δήμου δόξης τούτους, πείθεται γὰρ τὸ πλῆθος τούτους. ἐτὶ δ’ οἱ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐγκαλοῦντες τὸν δήμον φασὶ δεῖν κρίνειν, ὦ δὲ ἀσμένως ἰδέχεται τὴν πρόκλησιν, ὥστε καταλύνονται πᾶσαι αἱ ἀρχαῖ. εὐλόγως δὲ ἣν δόξειν ἐπιτιμᾶν ὁ φάσκων τὴν τουαύτην εἶναι δημοκρατίαν οὐ πολιτείαν. ὅπου γὰρ μὴ νόμοι ἄρχουσιν, οὐκ ἔστι πολιτεία, δεῖ γὰρ τὸν μὲν νόμον ἄρχειν πάντων τῶν δὲ καθ’ ἐκαστὰ τὰς ἀρχὰς, καὶ ταύτην πολιτείαν κρίνειν ὥστ’ εἴπερ ἐστὶ δημοκρατία μία τῶν πολιτειῶν, φανερὸν ὡς ἡ τουαύτη κατάστασις, ἐν ἥ ψηφίσμασι πάντα διοικεῖται, οὐδὲ δημοκρατία κυρίως, οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ψήφισμα εῖναι καθόλου.

Τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς δημοκρατίας εἶδη διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τούτου.

V. Ὁλιγαρχίας δὲ εἶδη ἐν μὲν τὸ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς τηλικοῦτων ὡστε τοὺς ἀπόρους μὴ μετέχειν πλείουσιν ὄντας, ἐξεῖναι δὲ τῷ κτωμένῳ μετέχειν τῆς πολιτείας, ἀλλο δὲ ὅταν ἀπὸ τιμημάτων μακρῶν ὡσὶν αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ αἱρώνται αὐτοὶ τοὺς ἐλλείποντας (ἀν μὲν οὖν ἐκ πάντων τούτων τούτῳ ποιῶσιν, δοκεῖ τοῦτ’ εἶναι μᾶλλον ἀριστοκρατικόν, ἐὰν δὲ ἐκ τινῶν ἀφωρισμένων, ὅλιγαρχικὸν). ἔτερον δὲ εἴδος ὅλιγαρχίας ὅταν παῖς ἀντὶ πατρὸς εἰσίη, τέταρτον δ’ ὅταν ὑπάρχῃ τε τὸν νῦν εἰς τὸν καθόλου πάντων Richards.

1 τῶν καθόλου πάντων codd.
2 Madvig: τὴν codd.
3 ἔτερον ὃ’ ed.: ὥτε ρον codd.
4 το τὸ ed.: τὸ τὸ codd.
while they are sovereign over the opinion of the people, for the multitude believes them. Moreover those who bring charges against the magistrates say that the people ought to judge the suits, and the people receive the invitation gladly, so that all the magistracies are put down. And it would seem to be a reasonable criticism to say that such a democracy is not a constitution at all; for where the laws do not govern there is no constitution, as the law ought to govern all things while the magistrates control particulars, and we ought to judge this to be constitutional government; if then democracy really is one of the forms of constitution, it is manifest that an organization of this kind, in which all things are administered by resolutions of the assembly, is not even a democracy in the proper sense, for it is impossible for a voted resolution to be a universal rule.

Let this be our discussion of the different kinds of democracy.

V. Of the kinds of oligarchy, one is for the magistrates to be appointed from property-assessments so high that the poor who are the majority have no share in the government, but for the man who acquires the requisite amount of property to be allowed to take part in it; another is when the magistrates are filled from high assessments and the magistrates themselves elect to fill vacancies (so that if they do so from all the citizens of this assessment, this appears rather to be of the nature of an aristocracy, but if from a particular section of them, it is oligarchical); another variety of oligarchy is when son succeeds father in office; and a fourth kind is when the hereditary system just mentioned exists.
ARISTOTLE

1292 b

λεγθέν καὶ ἄρχῃ μὴ ὁ νόμος ἀλλ’ οἱ ἀρχοντες. καὶ ἔστιν ἀντίστροφος αὕτη ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις ὁσπερ ἡ τυραννίς ἐν ταῖς μοναρχίαις καὶ περὶ ἦς τελευταίας εἴσαμεν δημοκρατίας ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις, καὶ καλοῦσι δὴ τὴν τοιαύτην ὀλιγαρχίαν δυναστείαν. 10 Ὀλιγαρχίας μὲν οὖν εἶδη τοσαῦτα καὶ δημοκρατίας. οὐ δὲ δὲ λαυθάνειν ὅτι πολλαχοῦ συμβεβήκεν ὡστε τὴν μὲν πολιτείαν τὴν κατὰ τούς νόμους μὴ δημοτικὴν εἶναι, διὰ δὲ τὸ ἥθος καὶ τὴν 15 ἀγωγὴν πολιτεύεσθαι δημοτικῶς, ὁμοίως δὲ πάλιν παρ’ ἄλλοις τῇ μὲν κατὰ τούς νόμους εἶναι πολιτείαν δημοτικωτέραν, τῇ δ’ ἀγωγῇ καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ὀλιγαρχεῖσθαι μᾶλλον. συμβαίνει δὲ τούτῳ μάλιστα μετά τὰς μεταβολὰς τῶν πολιτειῶν· οὐ γὰρ εὖθὺς μεταβαίνουσιν ἀλλ’ ἀγαπῶσι τὰ πρῶτα 20 μικρὰ πλεονεκτοῦντες παρ’ ἄλληλων, ὥστ’ οἱ μὲν νόμοι διαμένουσιν οἱ προͭταρχοντες κρατοῦσι δ’ οἱ μεταβαλόντες τὴν πολιτείαν.

"Οτι δ’ ἐστὶ τοσαῦτα εἶδη δυναστείας καὶ 3 ὀλιγαρχίας, έξ αὐτῶν τῶν εἰρημένων φανερῶν ἐστὶν. ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἡ πάντα τὰ εἰρημένα μέρη τοῦ δήμου 25 κοινωνεῖν τῆς πολιτείας, ἡ τὰ μὲν τὰ δὲ μὴ. ὅταν μὲν οὖν τὸ γεωργικόν καὶ τὸ κεκτημένον μετρίαν οὐσίαν κύριον ἡ τῆς πολιτείας, πολιτεύονται κατὰ νόμους· ἐχουσι γὰρ ἐργαζόμενοι ζῆν οὐ δύνανται 26 ἀρχολάζειν, ὡστε τὸν νόμον ἐπιστήσαντες ἐκ-

1 Richards: μεταβάλλοντες.

a Government controlled by a few powerful families. Cf. Thuc. iii. 62. 4, where the Thebans say, ‘In those days our state was not governed by an oligarchy that granted equal justice to all, nor yet by a democracy; the power was in the hands of a small cabal (δυναστεία ὀλίγων ἀνδρῶν), than which
POLITICS, IV. v. 1-3

and also the magistrates govern and not the law. This among oligarchies is the form corresponding to tyranny among monarchies and to the form of democracy about which we spoke last among democracies, and indeed oligarchy of this sort has the special name of dynasty.  

2 So many therefore are the kinds of oligarchy and of democracy; but it must not escape notice that in many places it has come about that although the constitution as framed by the laws is not democratic, yet owing to custom and the social system it is democratically administered, and similarly by a reverse process in other states although the legal constitution is more democratic, yet by means of the social system and customs it is carried on rather as an oligarchy. This occurs chiefly after alterations of the constitutions have taken place; for the people do not change over to the new system immediately but are content at the first stages to gain small advantages from the other party, so that the previously existing laws continue although power is in the hands of the party that changed the constitution.

3 And that these various kinds of democracy and oligarchy exist is manifest from the actual things that have been said. For necessarily either all the parts of the population that have been mentioned must have a share in the government, or some and not others. When therefore the farmer class and the class possessed of moderate property is sovereign over the government, they govern according to laws; for they have a livelihood if they work, but are not able to be at leisure, so that they put the law in nothing is more opposed to law or to true political order, or more nearly resembles a tyranny' (Jowett).
κλησιάζουσι τὰς ἀναγκαίας ἐκκλησίας. τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις μετέχειν ἔξεστιν ὅταν κτήσωνται τὸ τίμημα τὸ διωρισμένον ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων, διὸ πᾶσι τοῖς κτησισμένοις ἔξεστι μετέχειν ὅλως μὲν γὰρ τὸ μὲν μὴ ἔξειναι πᾶσιν ὁλιγορχικόν, τὸ δὲ δὴ ἔξειναι σχολάζειν ἄδυνατον μὴ προσόδων ὑσῶν. τούτῳ μὲν οὖν εἴδος ἐν δημοκρατίας διὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας. ἔτερον δὲ εἴδος διὰ τὴν ἐχομένην διαίρεσιν⁵. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ πᾶσιν ἔξειναι τοῖς ἀνυπεθύνοις κατὰ τὸ γένος, μετέχειν μὲντοι δυναμένους σχολάζειν· διόπερ ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ δημοκρατίᾳ οἱ νόμοι ἀρχοῦσι, διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι πρόσοδον. τρίτον δὲ εἴδος τὸ πᾶσιν ἔξειναι ὅσοι ἂν ἐλεύθεροι ὅσι μετέχειν τῆς πολιτείας, μὴ μέντοι μετέχειν διὰ τὴν προειρημένην αἰτίαν, ὥστ' ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ ἄρχειν τὸν νόμον. τέταρτον δὲ εἴδος δημοκρατίας ἡ τελευταία ὑπὸ τοῖς χρόνοις ἐν ταῖς πόλεις γεγενημένη. διὰ γὰρ τὸ μείζον γεγονέναι πολὺ τὰς πόλεις τῶν ἔξω ὑπαρχῆς καὶ προσόδων ὑπάρχειν εὐπορίας, μετέχον τοῖς πάντας τῆς πολιτείας διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ πλῆθους, κομνηνοῦσι δὲ καὶ πολιτεύονται διὰ τὸ δύνασθαι σχολάζειν καὶ τοὺς ἀπόρους λαμβάνοντας μισθόν. καὶ μάλιστα δὲ σχολάζει τὸ τοιοῦτον πλῆθος· οὐ γὰρ ἐμποδίζει αὐτῶς οὐθὲν ἢ τῶν ἰδίων ἐπιμέλεια, τοὺς δὲ πλουσίους ἐμποδίζει,


a i.e. revenues from abroad; the poor can only attend often if paid for attendance, and this can only be financed if the state has income from tribute or foreign property.

308
control and hold the minimum of assemblies necessary; and the other persons have the right to take part when they have acquired the property-assessment fixed by the laws, so that to take part in the government is open to all who have got that amount of property; since for it not to be open to everybody on any terms at all is a characteristic of oligarchy, but then on the other hand it is impossible for it to be open to them to have leisure if there are no revenues. This then is one kind of democracy for these reasons. Another kind is due to the distinction that comes next: it is possible that all the citizens not liable to objection on the score of birth may have the right to take part in the assembly, but may actually take part only when they are able to be at leisure; hence in a democracy of this nature the laws govern because there is no revenue. A third kind is when all those who are free men have the right to take part in the government yet do not do so because of the aforesaid reason, so that it follows that in this form of democracy also the law governs. And a fourth kind of democracy is the one that has been the last in point of time to come into existence in the states. Because the states have become much greater than the original ones and possess large supplies of revenue, while all the citizens have a share in the government because of the superiority of the multitude, all actually take part in it and exercise their citizenship because even the poor are enabled to be at leisure by receiving pay. Indeed the multitude in this kind of state has a very great deal of leisure, for they are not hampered at all by the care of their private affairs, but the rich

* Cf. 1288 a 20 ff.
1293 a ώστε πολλάκις οὐ κοινωνοῦσι τῆς ἐκκλησίας οὐδὲ τοῦ δικάζειν. διὸ γίνεται τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων πλήθος κύριον τῆς πολιτείας ἀλλ' οὐχ οἱ νόμοι. τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς δημοκρατίας εἰδὴ τοσαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα διὰ ταύτας τὰς ἀνάγκας ἐστὶν. τὰ δὲ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας, ὅταν μὲν πλείους ἔχωσιν οὐσίαν, ἐλάττω δὲ καὶ μὴ πολλὴν λίαν, τὸ τῆς πρώτης ὀλιγαρχίας εἰδός ἐστιν. ποιοῦσι γὰρ ἔξουσιαν μετέχειν τῷ κτωμένῳ, καὶ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι τῶν μετεχόντων τοῦ πολιτεύματος ἀνάγκη μὴ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀλλὰ τὸν νόμον εἶναι κύριον (ὅσω γὰρ ἄν πλεῖον ἀπέχωσι τῆς μοναρχίας, καὶ μήτε τοσαῦτην ἔχωσιν οὐσίαν ὡστε σχολάζειν ἀμελοῦντες1 μὴν οὕτως ὀλίγην ὡστε τρέφεσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως, ἀνάγκη τὸν νόμον ἀξιών αὐτοῖς ἄρχειν ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτοὺς). εάν δὲ δὲ ἐλάττους ὅσου οἱ τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντες ἢ οἱ τὸ πρῶτον, πλείω δὲ, τὸ τῆς δευτέρας ὀλιγαρχίας γίνεται εἰδὸς. μᾶλλον γὰρ ἰσχύοντες πλευτεκτεῖν ἀξιώσω, διὸ αὐτοὶ μὲν αἱροῦνται ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων τοὺς εἰς τὸ πολιτεύμα βαδίζοντας, διὰ δὲ τὸ μῆτις οὕτως ἰσχυροὶ εἶναι ἃνευ νόμου ἄρχειν, τὸν νόμον τίθενται τοιοῦτον. εάν δὲ ἐπιτείνωσι τῷ εἴδος ἐλάττονες ὄντες μείζονας οὐσίας ἔχειν, ἡ τρίτη ἐπίδοσις γίνεται τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας, τὸ δὲ αὐτῶν μὲν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἔχειν, κατὰ νόμον δὲ τὸν κελεύοντα τῶν τελευτῶν διαδέχεσθαι τοὺς νεῖσι. ὅταν δὲ ἡδὴ πολὺ ύπερτείνωσι ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ ταῖς πολυφιλίαις, ἐγγὺς ἡ τοιαύτη δυναστεία μοναρχίας ἐστὶν, καὶ κύριοι γίνονται οἱ ἀνθρώποι ἀλλ' οὐχ 1 ἀμελοῦντες Spengel: -tas codd.

---

a i.e. they legalize the recruiting of the ruling class by co-optation; or the words may mean 'they make the law ruler.'
are, so that often they take no part in the assembly nor in judging lawsuits. Owing to this the multitude of the poor becomes sovereign over the government, instead of the laws. Such in number and in nature are the kinds of democracy that these causes necessarily bring into existence. To turn to the varieties of oligarchy, when more men possess property, but less of it and not a very large amount, this is the first form of oligarchy; for they allow the man that acquires property the right to participate, and because there is a large number of persons participating in the government it necessarily follows that not the men but the law is sovereign (for the farther removed they are from monarchy, and as they have not so much property as to be idle and neglect it, nor yet so little as to be kept at the expense of the state, they are compelled to call upon the law to rule instead of ruling themselves). But then if the owners of the properties are fewer than those who owned them previously, and own more, the second form of oligarchy comes into being; for as they become stronger they claim to have a larger share, and therefore they themselves select those from among the rest of the citizens who go into the government, but as they are not yet strong enough to rule without law they make the law conform with this. And if they carry matters further by becoming fewer and holding larger properties, there comes about the third advance in oligarchy, which consists in their keeping the offices in their own hands, but under a law enacting that they are to be hereditary. And when finally they attain very great pre-eminence by their wealth and their multitude of friends, a dynasty of this nature is near to monarchy, and men become
We now pass from the varieties of Oligarchy and of Democracy to those of the other actually existing constitutions, Aristocracy so-called and Constitutional Government.
POLITICS, IV. v. 8-11

supreme instead of the law; and this is the fourth kind of oligarchy, the counterpart of the last kind of democracy.  

Furthermore there are two constitutions by the side of democracy and oligarchy, one of which is counted by everybody and has been referred to as one of the four forms of constitution (and the four meant are monarchy, oligarchy, democracy and fourth the form called aristocracy), but there is a fifth, entitled by the common name of them all (for it is called constitutional government), but as it does not often occur it is overlooked by those who try to enumerate the forms of constitution, and they use the four names only (as does Plato) in the list of constitutions. Now the name of aristocracy is indeed properly given to the constitution that we discussed in our first discourses (for it is right to apply the name 'aristocracy'—'government of the best'—only to the constitution of which the citizens are best in virtue absolutely and not merely good men in relation to some arbitrary standard, for under it alone the same person is a good man and a good citizen absolutely, whereas those who are good under the other constitutions are good relatively to their own form of constitution); nevertheless there are also some constitutions that have differences both in comparison with oligarchically governed states and with what is termed constitutional government, inasmuch as in them they elect the officials not only by wealth but also by goodness; this form of constitution differs from both and is called aristocratic. For even in the states that do not pay any public attention to virtue there are nevertheless

‡ i.e. aristocracy.  

 Constitu- 
 tional 
 Government 
 really a fifth 
 actual form 
 of constitu- 
 tion (cf. 
 1289 a 26). 

 Secondary 
 kinds of 
 Aristocracy 

Bk. III. 1279 a 35 ff., 1286 b 3 ff.
tinvēs oi eudokimountes kai dokountes einai epieikeis.

15 óppou oûn h politeia blēpei eis te plouton kai āreteñn kai ðêmoun, oîn en Karχhiðon, autē āri-

20 stokratikē ēstwv kai en aïs eis tâ dúo mónon, oîn h Lakedaimonîwn, eis te āreteñn kai ðêmoun, kai ēstι méziw tōn dúo tou̲tωn, ðemokratias te kai āreteñn. āri-stokratias mēn oûn paraph tēn prōtēn

30 tēn āristēn politeian tauta dúo eîðh, kai tritôn dûsa tēs kaloumēnēs politeias rēpouni prōs tēn

35 ðilynarchian màllon.

VI. Louton δ' ēstιn hμwv peri te tēs ònoma-

40 zômēnēs politeias eîpein kai peri tūranvítōs. ép-tαxamenv δ' oûtw oûk oûsan oûte tautēn parékb-

45 bavn oûte tās ārte rîtheias aristokratias, õtι tō mēn ãlłtheis pâsai dhimartēkôsi tēs orðotatēs

50 politeias, eîpeita kataribmouνntai metà tou̲tωn, eis t' autōn autai parēkbăseis, õsper en tois

55 kai' ārchn eîpomen. tēleutaiōn de peri tūranvítōs

60 ðulogōn ēstι poûsas thαι mneiān diā tō pao̲w

65 hēkιsta tautēn eînai politeian, hμwv de tēn méthdoν

70 eînai peri politeias.

75 Di' hμn mēn oûn aîtian tētaktau tōn trōpōn tou-

80 ton, eîrīntai: nûn de deiktēn hμwv peri politeias.

85 fanevotēra gár ò ðûnāmīs autēs diwriwmēnōn tōw 2

90 peri ðulargikia kai ðemokratias. ēstι gár h

95 politeia òs ápλwos eîpein méziw ðulargikias kai

100 ðemokratias. eîṓthαι de kaiēn tās mēn âpo-

1 te post āreteñn codd. cet. (sed cf. 1. 14 et 1296 b 17).

See 1279 b 4 ff. Actual aristocracies are a falling-off from the Aristocracy and Polity is a decline from Monarchy and Aristocracy; but they are not deviations in the technical sense.

314
some men that are held in high esteem and are thought worthy of respect. Where then the constitution takes in view wealth and virtue as well as the common people, as for instance at Carthage, this is of the nature of an aristocracy; and so also are the states, in which the constitution, like that of Sparta, takes in view two of these things only, virtue and the common people, and there is a mingling of these two factors, democracy and virtue. These then are two kinds of aristocracy beside the first, which is the best constitution, and a third kind is those instances of what is called constitutional government that incline more in the direction of oligarchy.

VI. It remains for us to speak about what is termed constitutional government and also about tyranny. Though neither the former nor the aristocracies spoken of just now are really deviations, we have classed them thus because in actual truth they have all fallen away from the most correct constitution, and consequently are counted with the deviation-forms, and those are deviations from them, as we said in our remarks at the beginning. Tyranny is reasonably mentioned last because it is the least constitutional of all governments, whereas our investigation is about constitutional government.

Having then stated the reason for this mode of classification, we have now to set forth our view about constitutional government. For its meaning is clearer now that the characteristics of oligarchy and democracy have been defined; since constitutional government is, to put it simply, a mixture of oligarchy and democracy. But people customarily
κλινούσας ὡς πρὸς τὴν δημοκρατίαν πολιτείας, τὰς
dὲ πρὸς τὴν ὀλγαρχίαν μᾶλλον ἀριστοκρατίας, διὰ
tὸ μᾶλλον ἀκολουθεῖν παῖδειαν καὶ εὐγένειαν τοῖς
eὐπορωτέροις, ἐτι δὲ δοκοῦσιν ἔχειν οἱ εὐποροὶ
ἀν ἐνεκεν οἱ ἀδικοῦντες ἀδικοῦσιν· ὅθεν καὶ καλὸς
κάγαθος καὶ γνωρίμους τούτους προσαγορεύομεν.
ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ ἀριστοκρατία βούλεται τὴν ὑπεροχήν 3
ἀπονέμειν τοῖς ἀρίστοις τῶν πολιτῶν, καὶ τὰς
ὀλιγαρχίας εἶναι φασιν ἐκ τῶν καλῶν κάγαθων
μᾶλλον. δοκεῖ δ᾿ εἶναι τῶν ἄδυνάτων τὸ εὐ-
νομεῖσθαι τὴν μὴ ἀριστοκρατομενήν πόλιν ἄλλα
πονηροκρατουμένην, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀριστοκρατε-
σθαι τὴν μὴ εὐνομουμένην. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ εὐνομία
tὸ εὗ κεῖσθαι τοὺς νόμους μὴ πεἰθεσθαι δέ. διὸ
μίαν μὲν εὐνομίαν ὑποληπτέον εἶναι τὸ πεῖθεσθαι
τοῖς κειμένοις νόμοις, ἑτέραν δὲ τὸ καλῶς κεῖσθαι
tοὺς νόμους οίς ἐμμένουσιν (ἔστι γὰρ πεῖθεσθαι
cαὶ κακῶς κειμένοις). τοῦτο δ᾿ ἐνδέχεται διηχῶς·
ἡ γὰρ τοῖς ἀρίστοις τῶν ἐνδεχομένων αὐτοῖς ἡ τοῖς
ἀπλῶς ἀρίστοις. δοκεῖ δὲ ἀριστοκρατία μὲν εἶναι
μάλιστα τὸ τὰς τιμὰς νεκεμήσθαι κατ᾿ ἁρετὴν·
ἀριστοκρατίας μὲν γὰρ ὅρος ἁρετή, ὀλιγαρχίας δὲ
πλοῦτος, δῆμου δ᾿ ἐλευθερία (τὸ δ᾿ ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ
toῖς πλείσσων ἐν πάσαις ὑπάρχει, καὶ γὰρ ἐν ὀλιγ-
αρχία καὶ ἐν ἀριστοκρατία καὶ ἐν δήμοις ὅ τι ἂν
dόξῃ τῷ πλείον μέρει τῶν μετεχόντων τῆς πολι-
tείας τούτῳ ἐστὶ κύριον). ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς πλείσταις

1 μὴ hic Thurot: post τὸ codd.
give the name of constitutional government only to those among such mixed constitutions that incline
towards democracy, and entitle those that incline more towards oligarchy aristocracies, because educa-
tion and good birth go more with the wealthier classes, and also the wealthy are thought to have
already the things to get which wrongdoers commit
wrong; owing to which people apply the terms
'gentry' and 'notabilities' to the rich. Since
therefore aristocracy means the assignment of the
highest place to the best of the citizens, oligarchies
also are said to be drawn rather from the gentry.
And it seems an impossibility for a city governed
not by the aristocracy but by the base to have well-
ordered government, and similarly also for a city that
has not a well-ordered government to be governed
aristocratically. But to have good laws enacted but
not obey them does not constitute well-ordered
government. Hence one form of good government
must be understood to consist in the laws enacted
being obeyed, and another form in the laws which
the citizens keep being well enacted (for it is possible
to obey badly enacted laws). And for laws to be
well enacted is possible in two ways: they must
either be the best laws possible for the given people
or the best absolutely. But aristocracy in the fullest
sense seems to consist in the distribution of the honours
according to virtue; for virtue is the defining factor
of aristocracy, as wealth is of oligarchy, and freedom
of democracy (while the principle that a decision of
the majority is supreme is found in them all: for
in both oligarchy and aristocracy and democracies
whatever the larger part of those who have a share
in the government decides is supreme). In most
πόλεις τούτων τῆς πολιτείας εἶδος καλεῖται, μόνον γὰρ ἡ μίξις στοχάζεται τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων, πλούτου καὶ ἐλευθερίας (σχεδὸν γὰρ τοῖσ πλείστοις οἱ εὐποροὶ τῶν καλῶν κἀκισθών δοκοῦσι κατέχειν χῶραν). Ἐπεὶ δὲ τρία ἐστὶ τὰ ἀμφίσ- βητοῦντα τῆς ἰδότητος τῆς πολιτείας, ἐλευθερία πλοῦτος ἀρετῆ (τὸ γὰρ τέταρτον, δὲ καλοῦσιν εὐγένειαν, ἀκολουθεῖ τοῖς δυσίν, ἡ γὰρ εὐγένεια ἐστὶν ἀρχαῖος πλοῦτος καὶ ἀρετῆ), φανερὸν ὅτι τὴν μὲν τῶν δυοῖν μίξιν, τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων, πολιτείαν λεκτέον, τὴν δὲ τῶν τριῶν ἀριστοκρατίαν μᾶλιστα τῶν ἄλλων παρὰ τὴν ἀληθινὴν καὶ πρώτην.

"Οτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ καὶ ἑτέρα πολιτείας εἰδὴ παρὰ μοναρχίαν τε καὶ δημοκρατίαν καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν, εἰρημέναι, καὶ ποία ταῦτα, καὶ τὰ διαφέροντα ἐλληνῶν αἱ τ' ἀριστοκρατίαι καὶ αἱ πολιτείαι [τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας]. καὶ ὅτι οὐ πόρρω αὕται ἐλληνῶν, φανερῶν.

VII. Τίνα δὲ τρόπον γίνεται παρὰ δημοκρατίαν καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν ἡ καλουμένη πολιτεία, καὶ τῶν αὐτῆς δεῖ καθιστάναι, λέγωμεν ἐφεξῆς τοῖς οἱ εἰρημένοις. ἡμιν δὲ δήλων ἐστι καὶ οἷς δρῖζονται τὴν δημοκρατίαν καὶ τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν. ληπτέον γὰρ τὴν τούτων διαιρεσιν, εἰτα ἐκ τούτων ἀφ' ἐκατέρας ὀσπρας σύμβολον λαμβάνοντας συνθετέον. εἰτε δὲ ὅρου τρεῖς τῆς συνθέσεως καὶ μίξεως. ἡ γὰρ ἀμφότερα ληπτέον ὑπ' ἐκατέραν νομοθετοῦσιν, οἶδον

1 toûto ed. (cf. 1292 a 33): τὸ codd. 2 γὰρ: δὲ Immisch. 3 ⟨τὴν⟩ τῶν Coraes. 4 [τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας] ed.

a i.e. in most states that are considered aristocracies.
b i.e. the more oligarchical form, 1293 b 36.
states a then the name of aristocracy is given to that form of constitutional government, b for the combination aims only at the well-off and the poor, wealth and freedom (since in almost the largest number of states the rich seem to occupy the place of the gentry); but as there are three things that claim equal participation in the constitution, freedom, wealth and virtue (for the fourth, what is called nobility, accompanies the two latter—nobility means ancient wealth and virtue), it is manifest that the mixture of the two factors, the rich and the poor, c ought to be termed constitutional government, while the mixture of the three factors deserves the name of aristocracy most of all the various forms of aristocracy beside the true and best form.

It has then been stated that other forms of constitution also exist besides monarchy, democracy and oligarchy, and what their characteristics are, and how the various sorts of aristocracy and of constitutional government differ from one another; and it is manifest that aristocracy and constitutional government are not widely apart from one another.

VII. Next to what has been said let us state the way in which what is called constitutional government comes into existence by the side of democracy and oligarchy, and how it is proper to establish it. At the same time the defining characteristics of democracy and oligarchy will also be clear; for we must grasp the distinction between these and then make a combination out of them, taking, so to say, a contribution from each. And there are three principles determining this combination or mixture. Under one plan we must adopt both features from the legis-

a Loosely put for 'wealth and free birth.'
περὶ τοῦ δικάζειν—ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ὀλυγαρχίαις τοῖς εὐπόροις ζημίαν τάπτουσιν ἃν μὴ δικάζωσι τοῖς
δὲ ἀπόροις οὐδένα μισθὸν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις τοῖς μὲν ἀπόροις μισθὸν τοῖς δὲ εὐπόροις οὐδεμίαν ζημίαν, κοινὸν δὲ καὶ μέσον τούτων ἀμφότερα ταῦτα, διὸ καὶ πολιτικόν, μέμικται γὰρ ἐξ ἄμφοτν.
eἰς μὲν οὖν οὕτως τοῦ συνδυασμοῦ τρόπος· ἐτερος ἐν τὸ μέσον λαμβάνειν ὅν ἐκάτεροι τάπτουσιν, οἷον ἐκκλησίαζεν οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τιμήματος οὐθενὸς ἢ μικροῦ πάμπαν, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ μακροῦ τιμήματος, κοινὸν δὲ γε οὐδέτερον ἄλλα τὸ μέσον ἐκατέρου τιμήματος τούτων. τρίτον δὲ ἐκ δυοὶ ταγμάτων, τὰ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ ὀλυγαρχικοῦ νόμου τὰ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ δημοκρατικοῦ. λέγω δ’ οἴον δοκεῖ δημοκρατικὸν μὲν εἶναι τὸ κληρωτάς εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς τὸ δ’ αἱρετὰς ὀλυγαρχικὸν, καὶ δημοκρατικὸν μὲν τὸ μὴ ἀπὸ τιμήματος ὀλυγαρχικὸν δὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τιμήματος· ἀριστοκρατικὸν τούτων καὶ πολιτικὸν τὸ εἴ ἐκάτερας ἐκάτερον λαβεῖν, ἐκ μὲν τῆς ὀλυγαρχίας τὸ αἱρετὰς ποιεῖν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐκ δὲ τῆς δημοκρατίας τὸ μὴ ἀπὸ τιμήματος. δ’ μὲν οὖν τρόπος τῆς μίξεως οὕτως· τοῦ δ’ εὖ μεμιχθαὶ δημοκρατίαν καὶ ὀλυγαρχίαν ὅρος ὅταν ἐνδέχεται λέγειν τὴν αὐτὴν πολιτείαν δημοκρατίαν καὶ ὀλυγαρχίαν· δὴλον γὰρ ὅτι τούτο πάσχουσιν οἱ λέγουτες οἱ λέγουτες1 διὰ τὸ μεμιχθαί


* Perhaps 'the speakers feel' should be excised.
relative schemes of the two different constitutions: for example, in regard to the administration of justice, in oligarchies they institute a fine for the rich if they do not serve on juries but no pay for the poor for serving, while in democracies they assign pay for the poor but no fine for the rich, but a common and intermediate principle is to have both payment and fine, and therefore this is a mark of a constitutional government, since it is a mixture of elements from both oligarchy and democracy. This then is one mode of combining the two. Another is to take the middle course between the regulations of each: for example, democracies permit membership of the assembly on no property-qualification at all or a quite small one, oligarchies on a large property-qualification, but the combination clearly is to have neither principle, but one which lies in the middle between either of these two qualifications. In the third place is a combination of the two systems, taking some features from the oligarchical law and some from the democratic; I mean, for example, that it is thought to be democratic for the offices to be assigned by lot, for them to be elected oligarchic, and democratic for them not to have a property-qualification, oligarchic to have one; therefore it is aristocratic and constitutional to take one feature from one form and the other from the other, from oligarchy that offices are to be elected, and from democracy that this is not to be on a property-qualification. This then is the mode of the mixture; and the mark of a good mixture of democracy and oligarchy is when it is possible to speak of the same constitution as a democracy and as an oligarchy; for manifestly the speakers feel this is so because the mixture is complete, and this is
καλῶς, πέπονθε δὲ τούτο καὶ τὸ μέσον, ἐμφαίνεται
gὰρ ἐκάτερον ἐν αὐτῷ τῶν ἄκρων. ὅπερ συμ· 5
βαίνει περὶ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείαν. πολλοὶ
20 γὰρ ἐγχειροῦσι λέγειν ὡς δημοκρατίας οصلة διὰ
tὸ δημοκρατικὰ πολλὰ τὴν τάξιν ἔχειν, οἶνον πρῶ-
tον τὸ περὶ τὴν τροφῆν τῶν παιδῶν, ὁμοίως γὰρ
οἱ τῶν πλούσιων τρέφονται τοὺς τῶν πενήτων, καὶ
παιδεύονται τῶν τρόπον τοῦτον ὅπως ἰὸν δύναντο καὶ
tῶν πενήτων οἱ παῖδες, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς
25 ἐχομενῆς ἡλικίας, καὶ ὅταν ἄνδρες γένωνται, τὸν
αὐτὸν τρόπον, οὐθὲν γὰρ διάδηλος ὁ πλουσίος καὶ
ὁ πένης—οὕτω τὰ περὶ τὴν τροφὴν ταύτα πᾶσιν ἐν
tοῖς συσσωμίσας, καὶ τὴν ἔσθητα οἱ πλουσίοι
tουαύτην οἶμαι ἄν τις παρασκευάζαι δύνατο καὶ
tῶν πενήτων ὀστισοῦν, ἐτι τῷ δύο τὰς μεγίστας
30 ἀρχὰς τὴν μὲν αἱρεῖσθαι τὸν δῆμον, τῆς δὲ μετ-
έχειν (τοὺς μὲν γὰρ γέροντας αἱροῦνται, τῆς δὲ
ἐφορείας μετέχουσιν). οἱ δὲ ὀλιγαρχίαν, διὰ τὸ
πολλὰ ἔχειν ὀλιγαρχικά, οἶνον τὸ πάσας αἱρετὰς
eἶναι καὶ μηδεμίαν κληρωτὴν, καὶ ὀλίγους εἰναι
κυρίους θανάτου καὶ φυγῆς, καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα
35 πολλά. δεῖ δὲ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ μεμιμημένῃ καλῶς 6
ἀμφότερα δοκεῖν εἶναι καὶ μηδέτερον,1 καὶ σῦ-
ξεσθαι δι’ αὐτῆς καὶ μὴ ἔξωθεν, καὶ δι’ αὐτῆς μὴ
tῶν πλείους ἔξωθεν2 εἶναι τοὺς βουλομένους (εἰὶ
 γὰρ ἄν καὶ πονηρὰ πολιτεία τοῦ ὑπάρχων) ἄλλα
τῶν μηδ’ ἄν βουλεύεθαι πολιτείαν ἐτέραν μηθὲν τῶν
tῆς πόλεως μορίων ὠλως.

1 μηδέτερον: μὴ θάτερον Boltenstern. 2 [ἔξωθεν] Thurot.

ᵃ A conjectural emendation removes this mysterious epi-
gram, giving ‘and not one of the two (only).’
ᵇ Or, if ἔξωθεν is an interpolation, ‘not merely because
the case with the form that lies in the middle, for each of the two extreme forms can be seen in it.  

5 This is the case with the constitution of Sparta. For many people endeavour to describe it as being a democracy, because its system has many democratic features, for instance first of all its regulation for the rearing of boys, since the sons of the rich are brought up in the same way as those of the poor, and are educated in a manner in which the sons of the poor also could be educated, and they are also treated similarly at the next age, and in the same manner when they are grown up, for there is nothing that distinguishes the rich man from the poor man—thus the arrangements for food are the same for all at the common messes, and the rich wear clothes such as even any poor man could procure, and also because of the two greatest offices the common people elect to one and share in the other (they elect the Elders and share in the Ephorate); but others call it an oligarchy, because it has many oligarchical features, for instance that all the offices are elective and none appointed by lot and few persons have the power to sentence to death and exile, and a number of other such matters. But in a well-constructed mixed constitution both of the two factors, and neither of them, should seem to be present, and it should be kept safe by its own means and not by outside aid, and by its own means not because those who desire its security are more numerous outside it (for even a bad constitution might possess this quality), but because no section of the state whatever would even wish for another constitution.

those (citizens) who wish it to survive are more numerous (than those who do not).'}
Τίνα μὲν οὖν τρόπον δεῖ καθιστάναι πολιτείαν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς ὄνομαξομένας ἀριστοκρατίας, νῦν εἴρηται.

VIII. Περὶ δὲ τυραννίδος ἢν ἦμῖν λοιπὸν εἶπεῖν, ἕν ὡς ἐνούσης πολυλογίας περὶ αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' ὅπως λάβῃ τῆς μεθόδου τὸ μέρος, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ταύτην τίθημεν τῶν πολιτειῶν τι μέρος. περὶ μὲν οὖν βασιλείας διωρίσαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι λόγοις, ἐν οἷς περὶ τῆς μάλιστα λεγομένης βασιλείας ἔποιούμεθα τὴν σκέψιν, πότερον ἀσύμφορον ἢ συμφέρει ταῖς πόλεσιν, καὶ τίνα καὶ πόθεν δεῖ καθιστάναι. καὶ πῶς τυραννίδος δ' εἴδη δύο μὲν διείλομεν ἐν οἷς περὶ βασιλείας ἐπεσκοποῦμεν, διὰ τὸ τὴν δύναμιν ἐπαλλάττειν πως αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν, διὰ τὸ κατὰ νόμον εἰνai ἀμφότερας ταύτας τὰς ἀρχὰς (ἐν τε γὰρ τῶν βαρβάρων τιοῦν αἴροιται αὐτοκράτορας μονάρχους, καὶ τὸ παλαιὸν ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαῖοι Ἑλλησόν εγίγνοντο τινες μοναρχοὶ τὸν τρόπον τούτον, οὐς ἐκάλουν αἰσθητάσις), ἐξουσί δὲ τινας πρὸς ἄλληλας αὐταὶ διαφοράς, ἢσαν δὲ διὰ μὲν τὸ κατὰ νόμον βασιλικαὶ καὶ διὰ τὸ μοναρχεῖν ἐκόντων, τυραννικαὶ δὲ διὰ τὸ δεσποτικῶς ἀρχεῖν καὶ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν γνώμην. τρύτον δὲ εἴδος τυραννίδος ἦπερ μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ τυραννίς, ἀντίστροφος οὖσα τῇ παμβασιλείᾳ. τοιαύτῃ δ' ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τυραννίδα τὴν μοναρχίαν ἢτις ἀνυπεύθυνος ἀρχεῖ τῶν ὁμοίων καὶ βελτιώνων

1 καὶ κατὰ Susemihl (et secundum suam Guil.): κατὰ codd.

a Bk. III. cc. ix.-xii.
The proper way therefore to establish a constitutional government, and similarly also the governments named aristocracies, has now been stated.

VIII. It remained for us to speak of tyranny, not Tyranny, because there is much that can be said about it, but in order that it may receive its part in our inquiry, since we rank this also as one among the kinds of constitution. The nature of kingship we have defined in our first discourses, in which we examined the question in relation to the constitution most commonly denoted by the term 'kingship,' whether it is disadvantageous or an advantage to states, and what person ought to be set up as king, and from what source, and by what procedure; and in the passage in which we were considering kingship we distinguished two kinds of tyranny, because their power in a manner borders upon royalty, because both these forms of rule are in accordance with law (for among some of the barbarians they elect monarchic rulers with autocratic powers, and also in old times among the ancient Greeks some men used to become monarchs of this sort, the rulers called aesymnetae), but these two forms of tyranny have certain differences from one another, although they were on the one hand of the nature of royalty because they were in accordance with law and because they exercised monarchic rule over willing subjects, and on the other hand of the nature of a tyranny because they ruled despotically and according to their own judgement. But there is a third kind of tyranny which is thought to be tyranny in the fullest degree, being the counterpart of universal kingship; to this sort of tyranny must necessarily belong a monarchy that exercises irresponsible rule over

325
ARISTOTLE

1295 a  
πάντων πρὸς τὸ σφέτερον αὐτῆς συμφέρον ἄλλα μὴ πρὸς τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων. διόστε ἄκοινοις: 
οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἐκὼν ύπομένει τῶν ἔλευθερων τὴν 
τοιαύτην ἄρχην.

Τυραννίδος μὲν οὖν εἶδη ταῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτα διὰ 
tὰς εἰρημένας αἰτίας.

25  IX. Τῆς δ' ἀρίστη πολιτεία καὶ τίς ἀριστος βίος 1 
tαῖς πλείστας πόλεις καὶ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν 
ἀνθρώπων, μήτε πρὸς ἀρετὴν συγκρίνουσιν τὴν ὑπὲρ 
τοὺς ἰδιώτας μήτε πρὸς παιδείαν ἢ φύσεως δεῖται 
καὶ χορηγίας τυχηρᾶς μήτε πρὸς πολιτείαν τὴν κατ' 
eὐχήν γινομένην, ἀλλὰ βίον τε τὸν τοῖς πλείστοις 
κοινωνήσαι δυνατὸν καὶ πολιτείαν ἃς τὰς πλείστας 
pόλεις ἐνδέχεται μετασχεῖν; καὶ γὰρ ἂς καλοῦσιν 2 
ἀριστοκρατίας, περὶ ὅν νῦν εἰπομεν, τὰ μὲν ἐξωτέρῳ 
πίπτοντι ταῖς πλείσταις τῶν πόλεων, τὰ δὲ γειτνιώσι 
τῇ καλουμένῃ πολιτείᾳ, διὸ περὶ ἀμφοῖν ὡς μιᾶς 
λεκτέον. ἡ δὲ δὴ κρίσις περὶ ἀπάντων τούτων ἐκ 
tῶν αὐτῶν στοιχείων ἐστὶν. εἰ γὰρ καλῶς ἐν τοῖς 
ἡθικοῖς εἰρηταὶ τὸ τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον εἶναί τὸν κατ' 
ἀρετὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον, μεσότητα δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν, τὸν 
μέσον ἀναγκαῖον βίον εἶναι βέλτιστον, τῆς ἐκάστου 
ἐνδεχομένης τυχεῖν μεσότητος. τοὺς δὲ αὐτοὺς 3 
tούτους ὅρους ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ πόλεως ἀρετῆς 
καὶ κακίας καὶ πολιτείας, ἡ γὰρ πολιτεία βίος τίς 
ἐστὶ πόλεως. ἐν ἀπάσαις δὴ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐστὶ 
τρία μέρη τῆς πόλεως, οἱ μὲν εὐποροι σφόδρα, οἱ

1 συντείνουσι Richards.

a Or 'if we do not aim at.'

b See 1293 b 7-21, cf. ib. 36—1294 a 25.

c N.E. 1101 a 14.
subjects all of the same or of a higher class with a view to its own private interest and not in the interest of the persons ruled. Hence it is held against the will of the subjects, since no free man willingly endures such rule. These then are the kinds of tyranny and such is their number, for the reasons stated.

IX. But what is the best constitution and what is the best mode of life for most cities and most of mankind, if we do not judge by the standard of a virtue that is above the level of private citizens or of an education that needs natural gifts and means supplied by fortune, nor by the standard of the ideal constitution, but of a mode of life able to be shared by most men and a constitution possible for most states to attain? For the constitutions called aristocracies, of which we spoke just now, in some cases fall somewhat out of the scope of most states, and in others approximate to what is called constitutional government, so that it is proper to speak of these two forms as if they were one. And indeed the decision in regard to all these questions is based on the same elementary principles. For if it has been rightly said in Ethics that the happy life is the life that is lived without impediment in accordance with virtue, and that virtue is a middle course, it necessarily follows that the middle course of life is the best—such a middle course as it is possible for each class of men to attain. And these same criteria must also necessarily apply to the goodness and badness of a state, and of a constitution—for a constitution is a certain mode of life of a state. In all states therefore there exist three divisions of the state, the very rich, the very poor, and thirdly those...
The text is an emendation; some mss. give 'to rule the tribe and to rule the council,' but most have 'to love office and rule the council,' apparently thinking that the verb translated 'rule the council' meant 'wish office.'
POLITICS, IV. ix. 3–6

who are between the two. Since then it is admitted that what is moderate or in the middle is best, it is manifest that the middle amount of all of the good things of fortune is the best amount to possess. For this degree of wealth is the readiest to obey reason, whereas for a person who is exceedingly beautiful or strong or nobly born or rich, or the opposite—exceedingly poor or weak or of very mean station, it is difficult to follow the bidding of reason; for the former turn more to insolence and grand wickedness, and the latter overmuch to malice and petty wickedness, and the motive of all wrongdoing is either insolence or malice. And moreover the middle class are the least inclined to shun office and to covet office, and both these tendencies are injurious to states. And in addition to these points, those who have an excess of fortune’s goods, strength, wealth, friends and the like, are not willing to be governed and do not know how to be (and they have acquired this quality even in their boyhood from their home-life, which was so luxurious that they have not got used to submitting to authority even in school), while those who are excessively in need of these things are too humble. Hence the latter class do not know how to govern but know how to submit to government of a servile kind, while the former class do not know how to submit to any government, and only know how to govern in the manner of a master. The result is a state consisting of slaves and masters, not of free men, and of one class envious and another contemptuous of their fellows. This condition of affairs is very far removed from friendliness, and from political partnership—for friendliness is an element
Aristotle

25 oúde γὰρ ὁδοὺ βουλονται κοινωνεῖν τοῖς ἑχθροῖς. βουλεῖται δὲ γε ἡ πόλις εξ ἵσων εἶναι καὶ ὁμοίων ὅτι μάλιστα, τούτῳ δὲ ὑπάρχει μάλιστα τοῖς μέσοις· ὥστε ἀναγκαίων ἀριστα πολιτεύεσθαι ταύτην τὴν πόλιν ἑστὶν· ἐξ ὅν φαμέν φύσει τὴν σύστασιν εἶναι τῆς πόλεως. καὶ σύζονται δέ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν οὕτως οὕτως

30 μάλιστα τῶν πολιτῶν· οὔτε γὰρ αὐτοὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ὥσπερ οἱ πένητες ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, οὔτε τῆς τούτων ἑτεροι καθάπερ τῆς τῶν πλουσίων οἱ πένητες ἐπιθυμοῦσιν· καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐπιβουλεύσθαι μήτε ἐπιβουλεύειν ἀκινδύνως διάγοσιν. διὰ τοῦτο καλῶς ἡ ἡεξατο Φωκυλίδης—

πολλὰ μέσουν ἄριστα· μέσος θέλω ἐν πόλει εἶναι.

85 δὴ λον ἄρα ὅτι καὶ ἡ κοινωνία ἡ πολιτικὴ ἄριστη ἡ διὰ τῶν μέσων, καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐνδέχεται εἰς πολιτεύεσθαι πόλεις ἐν αἶσ ὅτι πολὺ τὸ μέσον καὶ κρείττων μάλιστα μὲν ἄμφοῖν, εἰ δὲ μῆ, θατέρου μέρους, προστιθέμενον γὰρ ποιεῖ ῥοπήν καὶ κυλεῖ γίνεσθαι τὰς ἐναντίας ὑπερβολὰς. διὸπερ εὐτυχία

40 μεγίστη τοὺς πολιτευμένους οὐσίαν ἐξεῖν μέσην καὶ ἰκανὴν, ὡς ὅπου οἱ μὲν πολλὰ σφόδρα κέκτηται οἱ δὲ μηθέν, ἢ δήμος ἔχοι τὸν ἀληθινὸν ἀλλὰ ἐδέχθεται ἡ ὀλιγαρχία ἀκρατος ἡ τυραννίς δι' ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ὑπερβολὰς· καὶ γὰρ ἐκ δημοκρατίας τῆς νεανικωτάτης καὶ ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας γίνεται τυραννίς, ἐκ δὲ τῶν μέσων καὶ

1 ἐστίν ομ. ΙΜ: ἡ συνέστη Lambinus.

a Probably Lambinus’s alteration of the Greek should be accepted, giving ‘hence that state will necessarily be best governed which consists of those elements—.’

b A gnomic poet of Miletus, born 560 B.C.

* i.e. extreme democracy and very limited oligarchy.
of partnership, since men are not willing to be partners with their enemies even on a journey. But surely the ideal of the state is to consist as much as possible of persons that are equal and alike, and this similarity is most found in the middle classes; therefore the middle-class state will necessarily be best constituted in respect of those elements of which we say that the state is by nature composed.

And also this class of citizens have the greatest security in the states; for they do not themselves covet other men's goods as do the poor, nor do the other classes covet their substance as the poor covet that of the rich; and because they are neither plotted against nor plotting they live free from danger. Because of this it was a good prayer of Phocylides—

In many things the middle have the best;
Be mine a middle station.

It is clear therefore also that the political community administered by the middle class is the best, and that it is possible for those states to be well governed that are of the kind in which the middle class is numerous, and preferably stronger than both the other two classes, or at all events than one of them, for by throwing in its weight it sways the balance and prevents the opposite extremes from coming into existence. Hence it is the greatest good fortune if the men that have political power possess a moderate and sufficient substance, since where some own a very great deal of property and others none there comes about either an extreme democracy or an unmixed oligarchy, or a tyranny may result from both of the two extremes, for tyranny springs from both democracy and oligarchy of the most unbridled kind, but much less often from the middle forms of constitu-
τῶν σύνεγγυς πολὺ ἤττον. τὴν δ' αἰτίαν ὑστερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς μεταβολὰς τῶν πολιτειῶν ἐροῦμεν. ὅτι δ' ἡ μέση βελτίστη, φανερὸν· μόνη γὰρ ἄστα-σίαστος, ὅπως γὰρ πολὺ τὸ διὰ μέσον, ἦκιστα στάσεις καὶ διαστάσεις γίγνονται τῶν πολιτειῶν. καὶ αἱ μεγάλαι πόλεις ἀστασιαστότεραι διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν, ὅτι πολὺ τὸ μέσον ἐν δὲ ταῖς μικραῖς ῥάδιον τε διαλαβεῖν εἰς δύο πάντας ὡστε μηθὲν καταλιπεῖν μέσον, καὶ πάντες σχεδὸν ἁποροὶ ἢ εὐποροὶ εἰσών. καὶ αἱ δημοκρατίαι δὲ ἀσφαλέστεραι τῶν ὀλγαρχῶν εἰσὶ καὶ πολυχρονιστέραι διὰ τῶν μέσων (πλεῖους τε γὰρ εἰσὶ καὶ μᾶλλον μετέχουσι τῶν τιμῶν ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἢ ταῖς ὀλγαρχίαις), ἐπεῖ δὴν ἀνευ τοῦτων τῷ πλῆθει ὑπερεῖσαι οἱ ἁποροὶ, κακοπραγία γίνεται καὶ ἀπόλλυται ταχέως. σημειοῦν δὲ δεῖ νομίζειν καὶ τὸ τοὺς βελτίστους νομοθέτας εἶναι τῶν μέσων πολιτῶν. Σόλων τε γὰρ ἢν τοῦτων (δηλαὶ δ' ἐκ τῆς ποιήσεως) καὶ Λυκοδρυγος (οὐ γὰρ ἢν βασιλεύς) καὶ Χαρώνδας καὶ σχεδὸν οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἄλλων.

Φανερὸν δ' ἐκ τούτων καὶ διότι αἱ πλείσται πολιτείαι αἱ μὲν δημοκρατικῖαι εἰσών αἱ δ' ὀλγαρχικῖαι. διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἐν ταῦταις πολλάκις ὀλίγον εἶναι τὸ μέσον, αἰεὶ ὁποτέροι ἀν ὑπερέχουσιν, εἴθ' οἱ τὰς ὀυσίας ἔχοντες εἴθ' ὁ δήμος, οἱ τὸ μέσον ἐκ-βαίνοντες καθ' αὐτοὺς ἄγουσι τὴν πολιτείαν, ὡστε ἡ δήμος γίγνεται ἡ ὀλγαρχία. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις διὰ τὸ στάσεις γίνεσθαι καὶ μάχας πρὸς ἀλλήλους τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τοῖς εὐπόροις, ὁποτέροις ἃν μᾶλλον.
tion and those near to them. The cause of this we will speak of later in our treatment of political revolutions. That the middle form of constitution is the best is evident; for it alone is free from faction, since where the middle class is numerous, factions and party divisions among the citizens are least likely to occur. And the great states are more free from faction for the same reason, because the middle class is numerous, whereas in the small states it is easy to divide the whole people into two parties leaving nothing in between, and also almost everybody is needy or wealthy. Also democracies are more secure and more long-lived than oligarchies owing to the citizens of the middle class (for they are more numerous and have a larger share of the honours in democracies than in oligarchies), since when the poor are in a majority without the middle class, adversity sets in and they are soon ruined. And it must be deemed a significant fact that the best lawgivers are from among the middle citizens; for Solon was of that class, as appears from his poetry, and so was Lycurgus (for he was not a king) and Charondas and almost the greatest number of the other lawgivers.

And these considerations also show the reason why the constitutions of most states are either democratic or oligarchical; owing to the middle class in these states being often a small one, the classes diverging from the middle status—whichever of the two, the owners of the estates or the people, from time to time has the upper hand—conduct the government on their own lines, so that it becomes either a democracy or an oligarchy. And in addition to this, because factions occur and fights between the people and the wealthy, whichever party happens...
ARISTOTLE

1296 a

30 συμβη κρατησαι των εναντιων, ου καθιστασι κοινην

politieian ouδι ᾳσην, αλλα της νικης άθλον την

υπεροχη της politieias λαμβανουσι, και οι μεν

dημοκρατιαν οι δι ολιγαρχιαν ποιοσιν. ετι δε και

των εν ηγεμονια γενομενων της ‘Ελλαδος προς την

παρ’ αυτοις εκάτεροι politieian αποβλεποντες οι

35 μεν δημοκρατιας εν ταις πολεσι καθιστασαν οι δι

ολιγαρχιας, ου προς το των πολεων συμφερον

σκοπουντες αλλα προς το σφετερων αυτων. ουτε 12

dia ταυτας τας αιτιας η μηδετο την μεσην

ginesathai politieian η oligakis και παρ’ oligous: εις

gar anηρ συνεπεισθη μονος των προτερον εφ

ηγεμονια γενομενων ταυτην αποδοναι την ταξιν,

ηδη δε και τοις εν ταις πολεσι εθος καθεστηκε

μηδε βοηθεθαι το ίσον, αλλ’ η αρχεων ζητειν η

κρατουμενων υπομενειν.

Της μεν ουν αριστη politieia, και δια τιν αιτιαν,

εκ των πολεων διαφορον: των δι άλλων politieion

(επειδη πλειους δημοκρατιας και πλειους ολιγ-

5 αρχιας φαμεν ειναι) ποιαν πρωτην θετων και

deuteraν και τουτον δη των τροπον εχομενην τω

tην μεν ειναι βελτιω την δε χειρω, διωρισμενης της

αριστης ου χαλεπων ιδεων. αει γαρ αναγκαιον

ειναι βελτιω την εγγυτατα ταυτης, χειρω δε της

αφεστηκυιαν του μεου πλειων, αν μη προς υποθεσων

10 κρινη της. λεγω δε το προς υποθεσων, οτι πολλακας

1 αει Spengel: αει codd.

a It is quite uncertain who is meant, possibly Solon or Theramenes.

334
to gain the upper hand over its opponents does not establish a common or equal government, but takes the superior share in the government as a prize of victory, and makes it a democracy in the one case and an oligarchy in the other. Moreover each of the two states that in the past held the leadership of Greece took as a pattern the form of government that existed among themselves and set up in the one case democracies and in the other oligarchies in the cities, not considering the interest of the cities but their own advantage. Hence owing to these causes the middle form of constitution either never comes into existence or seldom and in few places; for one man only among the states that have formerly held the leadership was induced to grant this form of organization, and by this time it has become a fixed habit with the people of the separate cities also not even to desire equality, but either to seek to rule or to endure being under a master.

These considerations therefore make it clear which is the best constitution, and why it is the best; and now that the best has been defined, it is not difficult to see, among the other forms of constitution (inasmuch as we pronounce that there are various forms of democracy and various oligarchies), what kind is to be placed first, what second, and what next in this order, by reason of one being better and another worse. For at each stage the form nearest to the best one must necessarily be superior, and the form that is more remote from the middle must be inferior —unless one is judging relatively to given conditions: I make this reservation because it is quite possible that although one form of constitution is
ούσας ἄλλης πολιτείας αἱρετωτέρας ἐνίοις οὐθὲν κωλύσει συμφέρειν ἐτέραν μᾶλλον εἶναι πολιτείαν.

Χ. Τίς δὲ πολιτεία τίσι καὶ ποιὰ συμφέρει ποιῶς, ἕχομενον ἐστὶ τῶν εἰρημένων διελθεῖν. ληπτεῖσθαι δὲ 
15 πρῶτον περὶ πασῶν καθόλου ταύτων. δεῖ γὰρ κρείττων εἶναι τὸ βουλόμενον μέρος τῆς πόλεως τοῦ 
μὴ βουλομένου μένειν τὴν πολιτείαν. ἔστι δὲ ἑνὸς 
pόλιος ἐκ τε τοῦ ποιοῦ καὶ ποσοῦ. λέγω δὲ ποιῶν 
μὲν ἐλευθερίαν πλοῦτον παϊδείαν εὐγένειαν, ποσοῦ 
de τὴν τοῦ πλῆθους ὑπεροχῆν. ἐνδέχεται δὲ τὸ 
20 μὲν ποιῶν ὑπάρχειν ἐτέρῳ μέρει τῆς πόλεως, εἰς 
ἀυτὲς συνεστηκείς μερῶν ἡ πόλις, ἄλλω δὲ μέρει τὸ 
pοσοῦ, οἷον πλείον τὸν ἁριθμὸν εἶναι τῶν γενναίων 
tοὺς ἁγγειεῖς ἢ τῶν πλουσίων τοὺς ἀπόρους, μὴ 
mέντοι τοσοῦτον ὑπέρεχειν τῷ ποσῷ ὅσον λει-
pεσθαι τῷ ποιῷ. διὸ ταῦτα πρὸς ἄλληλα συν-
κρίτεσθαι.

25 Ὄπως μὲν οὖν ὑπέρεχει τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων πλῆθος 
tὴν εἰρημένην ἀναλογίαν, ἐνταῦθα πέρυκεν εἶναι 
δημοκρατίαν, καὶ ἐκαστὸν εἶδος δημοκρατίας κατὰ 
tὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ δήμου ἐκάστου, οἷον ἕαν μὲν τὸ 
tῶν γεωργῶν ὑπερετεινὴ πλῆθος, τὴν πρώτην 
δημοκρατίαν, ἔαν δὲ τὸ τῶν βαναισῶν καὶ μισθ-
30 αρνοῦτων, τὴν τελευταίαν, ὅρμοις δὲ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας 
tὰς μεταξὺ τούτων ὅπου δὲ τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ 
γνωρίμων μᾶλλον ὑπερετείνει τῷ ποσῷ ἢ λειπεῖσθαι 
tῷ ποσῷ, ἐνταῦθα δὲ ὀλιγαρχίαν, καὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας 
tῶν αὐτῶν τρόπον ἐκαστὸν εἶδος κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν

a i.e. so as to outbalance their inferiority in quality.
b i.e. superiority in quality.
preferable it may often be more advantageous for certain people to have another form.

1 X. The next thing after what has been said is to discuss which constitution is advantageous for which people, and what sort of constitution for what sort of people. Now we must first grasp a general principle that applies equally to all sorts of constitution: it is essential that the part of the state that wishes the constitution to remain should be stronger than the part that does not wish it. But every state consists of both quality and quantity: by quality I mean freedom, wealth, education, good birth, and by quantity the superior numbers of the multitude.

2 And it is possible that, while the quality of the state belongs to one among the parts of which the state consists and its quantity to another part—for example the low-born may be more numerous than the noble or the poor than the rich,—yet the more numerous class may not exceed in quantity as much as they fall behind in quality. Hence these two factors have to be judged in comparison with one another.

Where therefore the multitude of the poor exceeds in the proportion stated,\(^a\) here it is natural for there to be democracy, and each kind of democracy in accordance with the superior number of the common people of each sort, for example if the number of the farming class exceeds, the first sort of democracy, but if that of the common labourers and wage-earners, the last sort, and similarly also with the other sorts that lie between these two; but where the class of the well-to-do and notable exceeds in quality more than it falls behind in quantity, here it is natural for there to be an oligarchy, and likewise the various kinds of oligarchy according to the degree of superiority\(^b\)
ARISTOTLE

1296b 85 τοῦ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ πλῆθους. δεῖ δ’ αἰτὶ τὸν νομοθέτην ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ προσλαμβάνειν τοὺς μέσους· ἂν τε γὰρ ὀλιγαρχικοὺς τοὺς νόμους τιθῇ, στοχάζεσθαι χρῆ τῶν μέσων, ἕαν τε δημοκρατικοὺς, προσάγεσθαι τοῖς νόμοις τούτοις. ὅπου δὲ τὸ τῶν μέσων 4 ὑπερτείνει πλῆθος ἢ συναμφότερων τῶν ἄκρων ἢ καὶ θατέρου μόνον, ἐνταῦθ’ ἐνδέχεται πολιτείαν εἶναι μόνιμον· οὐθὲν γὰρ φοβερὸν μὴ ποτὲ συμφωνήσωσιν οἱ πλούσιοι τοῖς πένησιν ἐπὶ τούτοις· οὐδέποτε γὰρ ἄτεροι βουλήσονται δουλεύειν τοῖς ἑπέροις, κοινοτέραν δ’, ἂν ξητῶσιν, οὐθεμίαν εὑρήσουσιν ἄλλην ταύτης, ἐν μέρει γὰρ ἀρχεῖν οὐκ ἂν ὑπομείνειαν διὰ τὴν ἀπιστίαν τὴν πρὸς ἄλληλους· πανταχοῦ δὲ πιστότατος ὁ δι- αυτητής, διαυτητής δ’ ὁ μέσος. ὅσω δ’ ἂν ἁμείνον ἡ πολιτεία μιχθῇ, τοσοῦτω μονωμέτερα· δια- 5 μαρτάνουσι δὲ πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς βουλομένων ποιεῖν πολιτείας οὐ μόνον ἐν τῷ πλεῖον νέμειν τοῖς εὐπόροις ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ παρακρούσιοι τὸν δήμον· ἀνάγκη γὰρ χρῶν ποτὲ ἐκ τῶν ψευδῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀληθὲς συμβῆναι κακῶν, αἱ γὰρ πλεονεξεῖαι τῶν πλούσιων ἀπολλύουσι μᾶλλον τὴν πολιτείαν ἢ αἱ τὸν δήμον.

1297a Ἡστι δ’ ὡσα προφάσεως χάριν ἐν ταῖς πολι- 6 τείαις σοφίζονται πρὸς τὸν δήμον πέντε τὸν ἀριθμὸν, περὶ ἐκκλησίαν, περὶ τὰς ἄρχας, περὶ δικαστήρια, περὶ ὁπλισμοῦ, περὶ γυμνασίαν· περὶ ἐκκλησίαν μὲν τὸ ἐξεῖναι ἐκκλησίαξεν πᾶσιν, ξημίαν δὲ ἐπικείσκεσθαι τοῖς εὐπόροις ἑαυτῷ ἐκκλησίαξειν ἢ μόνοις ἢ μείζω πολλῷ· περὶ δὲ τὰς ἄρχας τὸ τοῖς μὲν ἔχουσι τίμημα μὴ ἐξεῖναι

a The word is loosely used of this small class.
of the oligarchical multitude. But the lawgiver in his constitution must always take in the middle class; if he is making the laws of an oligarchical character he must keep the middle class in view, and if democratic, he must legislate so as to bring them in.

And where the number of the middle class exceeds both the extreme classes together, or even one of them only, here it is possible for a constitutional government to be lasting; for there is no fear of the rich ever coming to terms with the poor against this numerous middle class; for neither class will ever wish to be subject to the other, and if they look for another constitution fairer to both than this they will not find one, for they would not endure to take turns to govern because they distrust each other: everywhere it is the arbitrator that is most trusted, and the man in the middle is an arbitrator. And the better the constitution is mixed, the more permanent it is; and many even of those who want to establish aristocratic forms of constitution make a great mistake not only in giving too large a share to the well-to-do but also in cheating the people; for false benefits inevitably result ultimately in true evil, as the encroachments of the rich ruin the constitution more than those of the people.

The artifices employed in constitutions as a pretext in regard to the people are five in number, and are concerned with the assembly, the magistracies, the law-courts, the bearing of heavy arms, and gymnastic exercises; in relation to the assembly, the granting to all of the right to attend but the imposition of a fine for non-attendance on the well-to-do only, or a much larger fine on them than others; in relation to the magistracies, the denial to the
εξόμνυσθαι τοῖς δ’ ἀπόροις ἐξεῖναι· καὶ περὶ τὰ
dικαστήρια τοῖς μὲν εὐπόροις εἶναι ζημιάν ἃν μὴ
dικαίωσι τοῖς δ’ ἀπόροις ἄδειαν, ἥ τοῖς μὲν
μεγάλην τοῖς δὲ μικράν, ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς Χαρών-
dου νόμοις. ἐνιαχοῦ δ’ ἐξεστὶ μὲν πάσιν ἀπο-

25 γραφαμένοις ἐκκλησιαζέν καὶ δικάζειν, ἐὰν δὲ ἀπο-
γραφάμενοι μὴ ἐκκλησιαζόσι μήτε δικαίωσιν
ἐπικείμενα μεγάλαι ζημίαι τοῦτοις, ἵνα διὰ μὲν
τὴν ζημίαν φεύγωσι τὸ ἀπογράφεσθαι διὰ δὲ τὸ
μὴ ἀπογράφεσθαι μὴ δικαίωσι μὴτ’ ἐκκλησιαζόσιν.
tὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὑπλα κεκτήσθαι

80 καὶ τοῦ γυμνάζεσθαι νομοθετοῦσιν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ
ἀπόροις ἐξεστὶ μὴ κεκτήσασθαι τοῖς δ’ εὐπόροις
ἐπιζήμιον μὴ κεκτημένος, κἂν μὴ γυμνάζονται
tοῖς μὲν οὐδεμία ζημία τοῖς δ’ εὐπόροις ἐπιζήμιον,
ὅπως οἱ μὲν διὰ τὴν ζημίαν μετέχωσιν οἱ δὲ διὰ
tὸ μὴ φοβεῖσθαι μὴ μετέχωσιν. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν
οἶνοι ὀλιγαρχικὰ σοφόσματα τῆς νομοθεσίας, ἐν δὲ 8
ταῖς δημοκρατίαις πρὸς ταῦτ’ ἀντισοφίζονται· τοῖς
μὲν γὰρ ἀπόροις μισθὸν πορίζουσιν ἐκκλησιαζόσι
καὶ δικάζουσιν, τοῖς δ’ εὐπόροις οὐδεμίαν τάττουσι
ζημίαν. ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι εἰ τις βούλεται μιγνύναι

85 ὀικαίως, δεῖ τὰ παρ’ ἐκατέρους συνάγειν καὶ τοῖς
μὲν μισθὸν πορίζειν τοῖς δὲ ζημίαν· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν
κοινωνοῦσιν ἀπαντεῖς, ἐκεῖνος δ’ ἡ πολιτεία γίνεται

1297 δ τῶν ἐτέρων μόνον. δεῖ δὲ τὴν πολιτείαν εἶναι μὲν

340
owners of rated property of the right to swear off serving, while the poor have this right; in relation to the law-courts, the imposition of a fine on the well-to-do if they do not serve on a jury, but no penalty for the poor, or else a large fine for the one class and a small one for the others, as in the laws of Charondas. In some places all have the right to serve in the assembly and on juries after having their names put on a register, but large fines are imposed on those who after so registering fail to attend in either capacity, in order that the fine may cause them to avoid registration and that owing to their not registering they may not serve on juries or in the assembly. They also legislate in the same manner about owning heavy arms and engaging in gymnastic exercises: the poor are not allowed to possess arms, but the well-to-do are liable to a fine if they have not got them, and there is no fine for the former class if they abstain from gymnastics, but the well-to-do are liable to a fine, in order that the one class because of the fine may take part in them and the other because they have no penalty to fear may not. These artifices of legislation then are of an oligarchic nature; in democracies they introduce contrary devices in regard to these matters: they provide pay for the poor for serving in the assembly and on juries and impose no fine upon the well-to-do for abstaining. Hence it is manifest that if anybody wishes to make a just blend, he must bring together the regulations existing in each of the two forms of constitution, and provide pay for attendance and a fine for non-attendance; for thus all would participate, whereas in the other way the government comes to be in the hands of only one of the two classes. And
ἐκ τῶν τὰ ὁπλα ἐχόντων μόνον, τοῦ δὲ τυμῆματος τὸ πλῆθος ἄπλώς μὲν ὄρισμένους οὐκ ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν τοσοῦτον ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ σκεφαλέως τὸ 5 ποῖον ἑπιβάλλει μακρότατον ὥστε τοὺς μετέχοντας τῆς πολιτείας εἶναι πλείους τῶν μὴ μετεχόντων, τοῦτο τάττειν. ἐθέλουσι γὰρ οἱ πένητες καὶ μὴ 9 μετέχοντες τῶν τιμῶν ἦσυχαίν ἔχειν εὰν μὴ ὑβρίζῃ τις αὐτούς μήτε ἀφαίρηται μηθὲν τῆς οὐσίας· ἀλλὰ τούτο οὐ βάδιον, οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ συμβαίνει 10 νεὶ χαρίεντας εἶναι τοὺς μετέχοντας τοῦ πολιτεύματος. καὶ εἰώθασι δὲ ὅταν πόλεμος ἢ ὁκνεῖν ἄν μὴ λαμβάνουσι τροφῆν ἂποροι δὲ ὅσιοι· εὰν δὲ πορίζῃ τις τροφῆν, βούλονται πολεμεῖν. ἔστι δ’ ἡ πολιτεία 15 παρ’ ἐνίοις οὐ μόνον ἐκ τῶν ὀπλιτευόντων ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὀπλιτευκότων· ἐν Μαλιεῦσι δὲ ἡ μὲν πολιτεία ἢν ἐκ τούτων τὰς δὲ ἄρχας ἱροῦντο ἐκ τῶν στρατευομένων. καὶ ἡ πρώτη δὲ πολιτεία ἐν τοῖς Ἑλληνσιν ἐγένετο μετὰ τὰς βασιλείας ἐκ τῶν πολεμούντων, ἡ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκ τῶν ἱππέων (τὴν γὰρ ἴσχυν καὶ τὴν ὑπέροχην ἐν τοῖς ἱππεύσιν ὁ 20 πόλεμος εἶχεν, ἀνευ μὲν γὰρ συντάξεως ἀχρηστον τὸ ὀπλιτικὸν, αἱ δὲ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἐμπερίαν καὶ τάξεις ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαῖοις οὐχ ὑπήρχον, ὥστ’ ἐν τοῖς ἱππεύσιν εἶναι τὴν ἴσχυν), αὐξανομένων δὲ τῶν πόλεων καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ὀπλοίς ἴσχυσάντων μᾶλλον πλείους μετείχον τῆς πολιτείας. διόπερ 25 ἂς νῦν καλουµέν πολιτείας οἱ πρότερον ἐκάλουν

1 πόσον Lindau.
although it is proper that the government should be drawn only from those who possess heavy armour, yet it is not possible to define the amount of the property-qualification absolutely and to say that they must possess so much, but only to consider what sort of amount is the highest that is compatible with making those who have a share in the constitution more numerous than those who have not, and to fix that limit. For those who are poor and have no share in the honours are willing to keep quiet if no one insults them or takes away any part of their substance; but this is not easy to secure, for it does not always happen that those who are in the governing class are gentlemen. Also people have a way of being reluctant to serve when there is a war if they do not get rations and are poor men; but if somebody provides food they want to fight. In some states the citizen-body consists not only of those who are serving as heavy-armed soldiers, but also of those who have so served; and at Malea the citizen-body consisted of these, while the magistrates were elected from those who were actually on service. And indeed the earliest form of constitution among the Greeks after the kingships consisted of those who were actually soldiers, the original form consisting of the cavalry (for war had its strength and its pre-eminence in cavalry, since without orderly formation heavy-armed infantry is useless, and the sciences and systems dealing with tactics did not exist among the men of old times, so that their strength lay in their cavalry); but as the states grew and the wearers of heavy armour had become stronger, more persons came to have a part in the government. Hence what we now call constitutional governments the men of
δημοκρατίας ἦσαν δὲ αἱ ἀρχαῖαι πολιτεῖαι εὐλόγως ὁλιγαρχικά καὶ βασιλικά, δὲ ὁλιγανθρωπίαν γὰρ οὐκ έίχον πολὺ τὸ μέσον, ὅστ' ὁλίγοι τε οντες τὸ πλῆθος καὶ κατὰ τὴν σύνταξιν μᾶλλον ὑπέμενον τὸ ἀρχεσθαι.

Διὰ τίνα μὲν οὖν εἴσον αἰτίαν αἱ πολιτεῖαι πλείους, καὶ διὰ τί παρὰ τὰς λεγομένας ἔτεραι (δημοκρατία· τε γὰρ οὐ μία τὸν ἄριθμόν ἐστι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως), ἔτι δὲ τίνες αἱ διαφοραὶ καὶ διὰ τίνα αἰτίαν συμβαίνει, πρὸς δὲ τούτως τίς ἄριστη τῶν πολιτείων ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον εἰπεῖν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολὰ ποιῶς ἀρμόττει τῶν πολιτείων, εἰρηταί.

XI. Πάλιν δὲ καὶ κοινῆ καὶ χωρὶς περὶ ἕκαστῆς λέγωμεν περὶ τῶν ἐφεξῆς, λαβόντες ἀρχὴν τῆς προσήκουσαν αὐτῶν. ἔστι δὴ τρία μόρια τῶν πολιτείων πασῶν περὶ ὅν δὲὶ θεωρεῖν τὸν σπουδαῖον νομοθέτην ἕκαστη τὸ συμφέρον· ὅν ἑξόντων καλῶς ἀνάγκη τὴν πολιτείαν ἔχειν καλῶς, καὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἀλλήλων διαφέρειν ἐν τῷ διαφέρειν ἕκαστον τούτων. ἔστι δὲ τῶν τριῶν τούτων ἐν μὲν τί1 τὸ βουλευόμενον περὶ τῶν κοινῶν, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς, τούτο δὲ ἐστὶ τίνας2 δεὶ καὶ τίνων εἶναι κυρίας, καὶ ποιῶν τίνα δεὶ γίγνεσθαι τὴν αἴρεσιν αὐτῶν, τρίτον δὲ τί τὸ δικάζον.

Κύριον δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ βουλευόμενον περὶ πολέμου

1 μὲν τί Congreve: μὲν τί, μὲν τοι codd.
2 ἐστὶ τίνας Wilson: ἐστὶν ὡς codd.
3 δεὶ <εἶναι> καὶ ὁ? ed.
former times called democracies; but the constitutional governments of early days were naturally oligarchical and royal, for owing to the smallness of the populations their middle class was not numerous, so that because of their small numbers as well as in conformity with the structure of the state the middle class more readily endured being in a subject position.

It has then been said what is the reason of there being several forms of constitution, and why there are others besides those designated by name (for there is not one single democracy only, and similarly there are more than one of the other forms), and also what are the differences between them and what is the reason why these differences occur, and in addition to these points, which is the best of the constitutions speaking generally, and of the other constitutions which sort is suited to which sort of people.

XI. And again, let us speak about the points that come next, both generally and with reference to each constitution separately, taking their appropriate starting-point. All forms of constitution then have three factors in reference to which the good lawgiver has to consider what is expedient for each constitution; and if these factors are well-ordered the constitution must of necessity be well-ordered, and the superiority of one constitution over another necessarily consists in the superiority of each of these factors. Of these three factors one is, what is to be the body that deliberates about the common interests, second the one connected with the magistracies, that is, what there are to be and what matters they are to control, and what is to be the method of their election, and a third is, what is to be the judiciary.

The deliberative factor is sovereign about war and
καὶ εἰρήνης καὶ συμμαχίας καὶ διαλύσεως, καὶ
περὶ νόμων, καὶ περὶ θανάτου καὶ φυγῆς καὶ
dημεύσεως, καὶ τῶν εὐθυνῶν. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ ἦτοι 2
πᾶσι τοῖς πολίταις ἀποδεδόθαι πᾶσας ταύτας τὰς
κρίσεις ἥ τις πάσας (οἷν ἄρχη τινὶ μιᾶ ἡ πλείοσιν)
ἣ ἐτέραις ἐτέρας ἥ τινὰς μὲν αὐτῶν πᾶσι τινὰς δὲ
τισὶν.

Τὸ μὲν οὖν πάντας καὶ περὶ ἀπάντων δημοτικῶν,
tὴν τοιαύτην γὰρ ἱσότητα ξητεὶ ὁ δῆμος. εἰσὶ δὲ 3
οἱ τρόποι τοῦ πάντας πλείους, εἰς μὲν τὸ κατὰ
μέρος ἄλλα μὴ πάντας ἄθροόν (ὡσπερ ἐν τῇ
πολιτείᾳ τῇ Τηλεκλέους ἐστὶ τοῦ Μιλησίου, καὶ
ἐν ἄλλαις δὲ πολιτείαις βουλεύονται αἱ συναρχίαι
15 συνιστοῦσα εἰς δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς βαδίζουσι πάντες κατὰ
μέρος ἐκ τῶν φυλῶν καὶ τῶν μορίων τῶν ἐλαχίστων
παντελῶς ἐως ἀν διέλθῃ διὰ πάντων), συνιστοῦσα δὲ
μόνον περὶ τε νόμων θέσεως καὶ τῶν περὶ τῆς
πολιτείας καὶ τὰ παραγγελλόμενα ἀκοινοσυμένους
20 ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων· ἄλλος δὲ τρόπος τὸ πάντας 4
ἀθρόον, συνιστοῦσα δὲ μόνον πρὸς τε τὰς ἀρχὴς
αιρεσίας [αἵρεσιοις] καὶ πρὸς τὰς νομοθεσίας
καὶ περὶ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης καὶ πρὸς εὐθύνας,
tὰ δὲ ἄλλα τὰς ἀρχὰς βουλεύεσθαι τὰς ἐφ’ ἐκάστους
tεταγμένας, αἱρετὰς οὐκ ἢ ἢ ἀπάντων ἡ κληρω-
25 τὰς· ἄλλος δὲ τρόπος τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς
eὐθύνας ἀπαντᾷν τοὺς πολίτας, καὶ περὶ πολέμου

1 Susemihl.

* Otherwise unknown.
peace and the formation and dissolution of alliances, and about laws, and about sentences of death and exile and confiscation of property, and about the audits of magistrates. And necessarily either all these decisions must be assigned to all the citizens, or all to some of them (for instance to some one magistracy or to several), or different ones to different magistracies, or some of them to all the citizens and some to certain persons.

For all the citizens to be members of the deliberative body and to decide all these matters is a mark of a popular government, for the common people seek for equality of this nature. But there are several modes of such universal membership. One is for the citizens to serve in rotation and not all in a body (as is enacted in the constitution of the Milesian Telecles, and in other constitutions also the boards of magistrates deliberate in joint assemblies but all the citizens enter into the magistracies from the tribes or from the very smallest sections of the citizen-body in rotation until office has gone through the whole body), and for there to be joint assemblies only to consider legislation and reforms of the constitution and to hear the reports submitted by the magistrates. Another mode is for all to assemble in a body, but only for the purpose of electing magistrates, enacting laws, considering the declaration of war and the conclusion of peace and holding the audit of magistrates, but for all other matters to be considered by the magistrates appointed to deal with each respectively and elected by suffrage or by lot from all the citizens. Another mode is for the citizens to meet about the magistracies and the audits and in order to deliberate about declaring war
1298 a

ARISTOTLE

βουλευσομένους καὶ συμμαχίας, τὰ δ′ ἄλλα τὰς ἀρχὰς διοικεῖν αἱρετὰς οὕσας, ὡςας ἐνδέχεται, τοιαῦται δ′ εἰσὶν ὡςας ἀρχεῖν ἀναγκαῖον τοὺς ἐπισταμένους, τέταρτος δὲ τρόπος τὸ πάντας περὶ πάντων βουλεύεσθαι συνιόντας, τὰς δ′ ἀρχὰς περὶ μηθενὸς κρίνειν ἄλλα μόνον προανακρίνειν, ὡντερ ἡ τελευταία δημοκρατία νῦν διοικεῖται τρόπον, ἡν ἀνάλογον φαμεν εἶναι ὀλυγαρχία τε δυναστευτικῇ καὶ μοναρχίᾳ τυραννικῇ. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τούτῳ διαφορὰς πλείους. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων μετριωτέρων αἱρετοὶ τε ὤσι καὶ πλεῖους διά τὴν μετριότητα τοῦ τιμηματος, καὶ περὶ ὅν ὁ νόμος ἀπαγορεύει μὴ κινώσων ἀλλὰ ἀκολουθῶσι, καὶ ξεῖ κτωμένῳ τὸ τίμημα μετέχειν, ὀλυγαρχία μὲν πολιτικὴ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ τοιαύτῃ διὰ τὸ μετριάζειν· ὅταν δὲ μὴ πάντες τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι μετέχωσιν ἄλλα πρόκριτοι, κατὰ νόμον δ′ ἀρχιων ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον, ὀλυγαρχικόν· ὅταν δὲ καὶ αἱρῶνται αὐτοὶ αὐτοὺς οἱ κύριοι τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι, καὶ ὅταν παῖς ἀντὶ πατρὸς εἰσίῃ καὶ κύριοι τῶν νόμων ὅσιν, ὀλυγαρχικὴν ἅναγκαίον εἶναι τὴν τάξιν ταύτην. ὅταν δὲ τινὼν 7

1 ἄλλα πρόκριτοι Immisch: ἄλλ᾽ αἱρετοὶ codd.
2 ὀλυγαρχικωτέραν Garvey, <μάλλον> ὀλυγαρχικὴν Spengel.

* i.e. in an advanced democracy.
and concluding an alliance, but for all other matters to be dealt with by the magistrates, elected by suffrage in as many cases as circumstances allow, and such magistracies are all those which must of necessity be filled by experts. A fourth mode is for all to meet in council about all matters, and for the magistracies to decide about nothing but only to make preliminary decisions; this is the mode in which democracy in its last form is administered at the present day—the form of democracy which we pronounce to correspond to dynastic oligarchy and to tyrannical monarchy. These modes then are all of them democratic. On the other hand for some persons to deliberate upon all matters is oligarchic. But this also has several variations. For when the members of the deliberative body are elected on comparatively moderate property-qualifications, and the eligible persons are comparatively numerous because of the moderateness of the qualification, and when they do not make changes in things in which the law forbids it but follow the law, and when anybody acquiring the property-qualification is allowed to become a member, a constitution of this sort is indeed an oligarchy, but one of the nature of constitutional government, because of its moderation. When on the other hand not everybody thus qualified participates in deliberation but only certain persons previously chosen by election, and these govern in accordance with law as in the former case, this is oligarchical; and also when the deliberative officials are elected by co-optation, and when the office is hereditary and has supreme control over the laws, this system is bound to be oligarchical. But when certain persons control certain matters, for
1298 b
tinēs,1 οἶνον πολέμου μὲν καὶ εἰρήνης καὶ εὐθυνῶν πάντες τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἀρχοντες καὶ οὕτωι αἱρετοὶ μὴ κληρωτοί,2 ἀριστοκρατία ἢ πολιτεία: εἶναι δ’ ἐνίων μὲν αἱρετοὶ ἐνίων δὲ κληρωτοί, καὶ κληρωτοὶ ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἐκ προκρίτων, ἢ κοινῆ
10 αἱρετοὶ καὶ κληρωτοὶ, τὰ μὲν πολιτείας ἀριστοκρατικῆς ἐστὶ τούτων, τὰ δὲ πολιτείας αὐτῆς.

Διήρηται μὲν οὖν τὸ βουλεύομενον πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας τούτων τὸν τρόπον, καὶ διοικεῖ3 ἐκάστη πολιτεία κατὰ τὸν εἰρημένον διορισμὸν· συμφέρει δὲ δημοκρατία τῇ4 μάλιστ’ εἶναι δοκούσῃ δημοκρατία νῦν (λέγω δὲ τοιαύτην ἐν ἢ κύριος ὁ δῆμος καὶ τῶν νόμων ἐστίν) πρὸς τὸ βουλεύεσθαι βέλτιων τὸ αὐτὸ ποιεῖν ὄπερ ἐπὶ τῶν δικαστηρίων ἐν ταῖς ὁλιγαρχίαις (τάττουσι γὰρ ξημιάν τούτοις οὐς βούλονται δικάζειν ἢν δικάζωσιν, οἱ δὲ δημοτικοὶ μισθῶν τοῖς ἀπόροις), τούτῳ δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς
15 ἐκκλησίας ποιεῖν (βουλεύονται γὰρ βέλτιων κοινῇ βουλεύομενοι πάντες, ὁ μὲν δῆμος μετὰ τῶν γνωρίμων, οὕτωι δὲ μετὰ τοῦ πλῆθους). συμ-

20 φέρει δὲ καὶ τὸ αἱρετοῦς εἶναι τοὺς βουλευομένους ἢ κληρωτοῦς ἢσω ἐκ τῶν μορίων, συμφέρει δὲ καν ὑπερβάλλωσι πολὺ κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος οἱ δημοτικοὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν5 ἢ μὴ πᾶσι διδόναι μισθῶν ἄλλο.

1 tinēs secl. Camerarius (cum Guilelmi codd. plerisque).
3 disponitur (diœkeiται ?) Guil.: diœse Congreve.
4 τῇ Coraes: τῇ τε codd.
5 πολιτῶν ? Richards.

a The mss. give ‘or by lot.’
instance when all the citizens control decisions as to war and peace and the audit of officials while everything else is controlled by magistrates and these are elected by vote, not by lot, a the constitution is an aristocracy; while if some matters are controlled by magistrates elected by vote and others by magistrates chosen by lot, and this either directly or from a list previously selected by vote, or if magistrates elected by vote and by lot sit in a joint body, some of these regulations are features of an aristocratic constitution and others of constitutional government itself.

We have then in this way distinguished the different kinds of deliberative body in relation to the forms of constitution, and each form of constitution carries on the administration in accordance with the distinction stated. But for a democracy of the form that at the present day is considered to be democracy in the fullest degree (and I mean one of the sort in which the people is sovereign even over the laws) it is advantageous for the improvement of its deliberative function for it to do the same as is done in oligarchies in the matter of the law-courts (for they enact a fine to compel the attendance on juries of those whom they want to attend, whereas democratic states institute payment for attendance for the benefit of the poor), and also to do this in respect of the assemblies (for they will deliberate better when all are deliberating jointly, the common people when with the notables and these when with the masses), and it is also advantageous for those who deliberate to be elected by vote or by lot equally from the different sections, and, if the men of the people far exceed the political class in number, it is advantageous
ARISTOTLE

1298 b

όσοι σύμμετροι πρὸς τὸ τῶν γνωρίμων πλῆθος ἢ ἀποκληροῦν τοὺς πλείους. ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλυγαρχίαις ἢ προσαρείσθαί τινας ἐκ τοῦ πλῆθους, ἢ, κατασκευάσαντας ἀρχεῖον οἶν ἐν ἐνίαις πολιτείαις ἐστὶν οὕς καλοῦσι προβούλους καὶ νομοφύλακας.

80 περὶ τούτων χρηματίζειν περὶ ὑν ἄν ὁ οὕτω προβουλεύσωσιν (οὕτω γὰρ μεθέξει ὁ δήμος τοῦ βουλεύσως καὶ λύειν οὐθέν δυνήσεται τῶν περὶ τήν πολιτείαν), ἐτὶ ἢ ταῦτα ψηφίζεσθαι τὸν δήμον ἢ μηθὲν ἐναντίον τοὺς εἰσφερομένους, ἢ τῆς συμβουλῆς μὲν μεταδίδοναι πάσι βουλεύσωσιν δὲ τοὺς ἀρχοντας, καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον δὲ τοῦ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις γιγνομένου δεὶ ποιεῖν· ἀποψηφιζόμενον μὲν γὰρ κύριον δεὶ ποιεῖν τὸ πλῆθος, καταψηφιζόμενον δὲ μὴ κύριον, ἀλλ' ἐπαναγέσθων πάλιν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀρχοντας· ἐν γὰρ ταῖς πολιτείαις ἀντεστραμμένως ποιοῦσιν, οἱ γὰρ οἶλον ἀπο-ψηφισμένοι μὲν κύριον, καταψηφισμένοι δὲ οὐ κύριοι, ἀλλ' ἐπανάγεται εἰς τοὺς πλείστους αἰεὶ.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ βουλευμένου καὶ τοῦ κύριου δὴ τῆς πολιτείας τοῦτον διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον.

XII. Ἐχομένη δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν ἢ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς διαίρεσις (ἐχεὶ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μόριον τῆς πολιτείας πολλὰς διαφοράς), πόσα τε ἀρχαὶ καὶ

1 Susemihl: προσαρ. codd. 2 Coraes: -κας καὶ codd.

a There were πρόβουλοι at Corinth as well as a βουλή and an ἐκκλησία; and νομοφύλακες at Sparta, Athens and elsewhere: at Athens they sat with the presidents of the βουλή and ἐκκλησία to check illegal procedure.

352
either not to give pay to all but only to as many as are commensurate with the number of the notables, or to discard by lot those who exceed this number.

In oligarchies on the other hand it is advantageous either to co-opt some persons from the multitude, or to institute an office like the one that exists in certain constitutional governments under the name of Preliminary Councillors or Guardians of the Law, and deal with the matters about which these officials have held a preliminary deliberation (for thus the common people will have a share in deliberation and will not have the power to abolish any part of the constitution), and then for the people by their vote either to confirm or at all events not to pass anything contrary to the resolutions brought before them, or to allow all to take part in debate but only the magistrates to frame resolutions; and in fact it is proper to do just the opposite of what takes place in constitutionally governed states; for the common people ought to be given power to vote the rejection of a measure, but not to vote its ratification, but it should be referred back to the magistrates. In constitutional governments the procedure is the reverse; the few are competent to vote the rejection of a resolution but are not competent to vote its ratification, this being always referred back to the most numerous body.

Let us then decide in this manner about the deliberative body, which in fact is the sovereign power in the constitution.

XII. Connected with this subject is the determination in regard to the magistracies (for this part of the constitution also has many varieties), how many magistracies there are to be, and what are to be their
κύριαι τίνων, καὶ περὶ χρόνου, πόσος ἐκάστης ἀρχῆς (οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔξαμενοι, οἱ δὲ δι᾽ ἑλάττονος, οἱ δ᾽ ἐναυσίας, οἱ δὲ πολυχρωνιστέρας ποιοῦσι τὰς ἀρχὰς), καὶ πότερον εἶναι δεῖ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἰ- δίους ἢ πολυχρωνίους, ἢ μηδέτερον ἀλλὰ πλεονά-

κις τοὺς αὐτούς, ἢ μὴ τοῦ αὐτοῦ διὸ ἀλλ᾽ ἀπαξ μόνον. ἔτι δὲ περὶ τὴν κατάστασιν τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἐκ 2 τίνων δεῖ γίνεσθαι καὶ ὑπὸ τίνων καὶ πῶς. περὶ πάντων γὰρ τούτων δεῖ δύνασθαι διελεῖν κατὰ πόσους ἐνδέχεται γενέσθαι τρόπους, καπετα προσ-

αρµόσαι ποίαις ποιοὶ πολιτείαις συµφέρουσιν.

ἔστι δὲ οὐδὲ τούτῳ διορίσαι βάδιον, ποίας δεῖ καλεῖν ἀρχὰς: πολλῶν γὰρ ἐπιστατῶν ἡ πολιτικὴ κοινωνία δεῖται, διόπερ οὐ πάντας οὔτε τοὺς αἱρετοὺς οὔτε τοὺς κληρουτοὺς ἀρχοντάς θετέον, οἶδον τοὺς ἑρείς πρῶτον (τοῦτο γὰρ ἐτερὸν τι παρὰ τὰς πολιτικὰς ἀρχὰς θετέον), ἔτι δὲ χορηγοὶ καὶ

κήρυκες, αἱροῦνται δὲ καὶ πρεσβευταί. εἰοί δὲ 3 αἱ μὲν πολιτικαί τῶν ἐπιμελεῖών, ἡ πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν πρὸς τινα πράξεων, οἶδον στρατηγὸς στρατευομένων, ἡ κατὰ μέρος, οἶδον ὁ γυναικο-

νόμος ἡ παιδονόμος· αἱ δ᾽ οἰκονομικαί (πολλάκις γὰρ αἱροῦνται σιτιομέτρας): αἱ δ᾽ ὑπηρετικαί καὶ

πρὸς ἁς, ἂν εὐπορῶσι, τάττουσι δούλους. μάλιστα ὡδ᾽ ἐστὶν ἐπεί τῶν ἀρχῶν λεκτέον ταῦτα ὅσας ἀποδέδοται βουλεύσασθαι τε περὶ τινῶν καὶ κρῖναι

1 Ἀρ.: ποῖαι codd. (et nonnulli πολιτείαι).
2 οὐ suppleuit Rassow.

* Distributions of corn were made at times of scarcity, or when the state had received a present of corn.
powers, and what their various periods of tenure (for some people make their magistracies tenable for six months, others for less, others for a year and others for a longer period)—shall the magistracies be for life or for a long period, or if for a shorter term shall the same people be allowed to hold them several times or not the same man twice but once only? and also as to the appointment of magistrates, who shall be eligible, who the electors, and what the mode of election? For on all these points it is needful to be able to determine how many modes of procedure are possible, and then to settle what modes are expedient for what sorts of constitution. Nor is it easy to decide to what kinds of office the name of magistracy ought to be applied; for the political community requires a great many officials, owing to which it is not proper to reckon all of them magistrates, whether elected by vote or by lot,—for instance first the priests (for this office must be considered as something different from the political magistracies), and again there are leaders of choruses, and heralds, and persons are also elected as ambassadors. And of the offices exercising superintendence some are political, and are exercised either over the whole of the citizens in regard to some operation—for instance a general superintends them when serving as soldiers, or over a section—for instance the superintendent of women or of children; while others are economic (for states often elect officers to dole out corn a); and others are subordinate, and are the sort of services to which people when well off appoint slaves. But the title of magistracy, to put it simply, is chiefly to be applied to all those offices to which have been assigned the duties of deliberating about certain matters and of
καὶ ἔπιτάξαι, καὶ μάλιστα τούτο, τὸ γὰρ ἐπιτάττειν ἄρχικωτερὸν ἔστιν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα διαφέρει πρὸς μὲν τὰς χρήσεις οὗθεν ὡς εἰπεῖν (οὗ γὰρ πως κρίσις γέγονεν ἀμφισβητούντων περὶ τοῦ ὄνοματός), ἔχει δὲ τιν' ἄλλην διανοητικὴν πραγματείαν. ποῖαι δ' ἄρχαι καὶ πόσαι ἀναγκαῖαι εἰ ἐσται 4 πόλεις, καὶ ποῖαι ἀναγκαῖαι μὲν οὐ χρήσιμοι δὲ πρὸς σπουδαίαν πολιτείαν, μᾶλλον ἂν τις ἀπορήσειε πρὸς ἀπασάν τε δὴ πολιτείαν καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰς μικρὰς πόλεις. ἐν μὲν γὰρ δὴ ταῖς μεγάλαις ἐνδέχεται τε καὶ δεῖ μίαν τετάχθαι πρὸς ἐν ἔργον (πολλοὺς τε γὰρ εἰς τὰ ἄρχεια ἐνδέχεται βαδίζειν διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς εἶναι τοὺς πολίτας, ὡστε τὰς μὲν διαλείπειν πολλὰν χρόνον τὰς δ' ἀπαξ ἄρχειν, καὶ βέλτιον ἐκαστὸν ἐργὸν τυγχάνει τῆς ἐπιμελείας μονοπραγματούσης ἡ πολυπραγματούσης). ἐν δὲ ταῖς μικραῖς ἀνάγκῃ συνάγειν εἰς 5 ὀλίγους πολλὰς ἄρχας (διὰ γὰρ ὀλιγανθρωπίαν οὐ βαδίον ἐστὶ πολλοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἄρχαις εἶναι· τῶν γὰρ οἱ τούτους ἑσονται διαδεξόμενοι πάλιν;) δέονται δ' ἐνίοτε τῶν αὐτῶν ἄρχων καὶ νόμων αἱ μικρὰς ταῖς μεγάλαις· πλὴν αἱ μὲν δέονται πολλάκις τῶν αὐτῶν, ταῖς δ' ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ τούτο συμβαίνει. διότι συν ὀφθέν κωλύει πολλάς ἐπιμελείας ἀμα προστάτευ τα ἄρχεια τῶν ὄβελισκολύχνια ποιεῖν. εάν οὖν 6

*An implement (its exact shape does not appear to be known), used by soldiers on campaign, here mentioned as an illustration of one tool serving two purposes, cf. 1252 b 1.*
acting as judges and of issuing orders, and especially the last, for to give orders is most characteristic of authority. But this question is of virtually no practical importance (for no decision has yet been given, our discussion being merely about the name), although it does admit of some further inquiry of a speculative kind. On the other hand the questions what kinds and what number of magistracies are necessary to constitute a state at all, and what kinds although not necessary are advantageous for a good constitution, are questions that might preferably be discussed, both indeed as regards every form of constitution and particularly in regard to the small states. For it is true that in the large states it is possible and proper for one magistracy to be assigned to one function (for the large number of the citizens makes it possible for many people to enter on an official career, so as to intermit their tenure of some offices for a long time and to hold others only once, and also every task is better attended to if the attention is directed to one thing only than if it is busy with many); but in the small states it is inevitable that many offices must be gathered into few hands (for owing to shortage of man-power it is not easy for many people to be in office, since who will take over the posts as their successors?). But sometimes small states require the same magistracies and laws as large ones; except that the latter require the same persons to serve often, but in the former this only occurs after a long interval. Hence it is possible to assign several duties to one man at the same time (since they will not interfere with one another), and to meet the shortage of man-power it is necessary to make the magistracies like spit-lampholders. If therefore we are able to
έξωμεν λέγειν πόσας ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν πάση πόλει καὶ πόσας οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον μὲν δεὶ δ’ ὑπ- ἄρχειν, βάσιν ἂν τις εἰδὼς ταῦτα συνίδοι1 ποιας ἀρμόττει συνάγειν ἄρχας εἰς μίαν ἄρχην. ἀρ- μόττει δὲ καὶ τοῦτο μή λεληθέναι, ποίων2 δεῖ 15 κατὰ τόπον ἄρχεια πολλά3 ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ ποιῶν πανταχοῦ μίαν ἄρχην εἶναι κυρίαν, οἰον εὐκοσμίας πότερον ἐν ἁγορᾷ μὲν ἁγορανόμοιν ἄλλον δὲ κατ’ ἄλλον τόπον, ἡ πανταχοῦ τῶν αὐτῶν· καὶ πότερον κατὰ τὸ πράγμα δεὶ διαφερέιν ἡ κατὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώ- πους, λέγω δ’ οἶδον ἐνα τῆς εὐκοσμίας, ἡ παίδων 20 ἄλλον καὶ γυναικῶν· καὶ κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας δὲ, 7 πότερον διαφέρει καθ’ ἐκάστην καὶ τὸ τῶν ἄρχων γένος ἢ οὐθέν, οἶδον ἐν δημοκρατία καὶ ὁλιγαρχία καὶ ἀριστοκρατία καὶ μοναρχία πότερον αἱ αὐταὶ μὲν εἰςων ἅρχαι κύριαι, οὐκ ἐξ ἱσων δ’ οὐδ’ ἐξ 25 ὁμοίων, ἄλλ’ ἔτεραι ἐν ἑτέραις (οἶδον ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἀριστοκρατίαις ἐκ πεπαιδευμένων ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὁλιγαρχίαις ἐκ τῶν πλουσίων ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημο- κρατίαις ἐκ τῶν ἑλευθέρων) ἡ τυγχάνουσι μὲν τινες οὕσαι καὶ καθ’ αὐτᾶς τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν ἄρχων, ἐστὶ δ’ ὅποις συμφέρουσι αἱ αὐταὶ καὶ ὅποι διαφέρουσιν (ἐνθα μὲν γὰρ ἀρμόττει μεγάλας, 80 ἐνθα δ’ εἶναι μικρὰς τὰς αὐτὰς). οὐ μὴν ἄλλα καὶ 8

1 Bojesen: συνάγοι codd. (συνάγοι οίας ? ed.).
2 Thurot: ποιὰ codd.
3 Thurot: πολλῶν codd.
say how many magistracies every state must necessarily possess and how many, though not absolutely necessary, it ought to possess, knowing these points one might more easily realize what kinds of magistracies are of a suitable nature to be combined into a single office. And it is suitable for the further question not to be overlooked, what kinds of matters ought to be attended to by a number of officials locally distributed and what ought to be under the authority of one magistrate for all localities, for example should good order be seen to in the market-place by a Controller of the Market and elsewhere by another official, or everywhere by the same one? and ought the offices to be divided according to the function or according to the persons concerned— I mean, for instance, should there be a single official in control of good order, or a different one for children and for women? and also under the various constitutions does the nature of the magistracies vary in accordance with each or does it not vary at all—for example in democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy and monarchy are the magistracies the same in their powers, although they are not filled from equal ranks nor from similar classes but are different in different constitutions (for example in aristocracies drawn from the educated, in oligarchies from the wealthy, and in democracies from the free), or although some constitutions happen to be correspondent with the actual differences of their magistracies, yet in other cases are the same magistracies advantageous even where the constitutions differ (for in some places it is suitable for the same magistracies to have large functions and in other places small ones)? Not but what there are also some offices peculiar to special
1299 b

'ídaí tivés eisw, olon h tōn proboúllon. autē

γαρ οὗ δημοκρατική, bouli̔ de dēmōtikon, deī

mēn γαρ είναι τι τουοῦτον ὃς ἐπιμελές ἐσται τοῦ
dhμου προβουλεύειν, ὅπως ἀσχολοῦν ἐσται· τοῦτο

δ', εάν ὀλίγοι τῶν ἀριθμοῦ ὄσιν, ὀλιγαρχικόν,

65 toûs de proboúllous ὀλίγους ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸ

πλῆθος, ὡστ' ὀλιγαρχικόν. ἀλλ' ὃπον ἄμφω

αὐται αἱ ἀρχαι, οἱ πρόβουλοι καθεστάς ἐπὶ τοῖς

βουλευταῖς· ὃ μὲν γὰρ βουλευτὴς δημοτικόν, ὃ
de proboulos oligarchikon. kataluvetai de kai

tis bouli̔s ἡ δύναμις ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις δημο-

κρατίαις ἐν αἷς αὐτός συνιῶν ὃ δῆμος χρηματίζει

pei' pantein. τοῦτο de sumbaíinein eìswen ὅταν
evporia τις ἡ μισθοῦ tois ékklhpasaizousin, σχολα-

ζοντες γὰρ συλλέγονται τε πολλάκις καὶ ἀπαντά

avtoi kri̔nuousin. pai̔dovòmos de kai γνωικονόμος

5 kai ei̔ tis a̔llou arxhvn kurio̔s êsti̔ toiaú̔tai̔s

ἐπιμελείας ἀριστοκρατικόν, δημοκρατικόν δ' οὐ

(pώs γαρ οἶν τε κωλύειν εξιέναι τᾶς τῶν ἀπόρων;)
oopd' oligarchikon (truphôsoi γαρ αἱ τῶν ὀλιγ-

archoûntw). alla perî meν ouτotwv ēpî tous ou̔tan

10 eirhêsoin vûn, peri̔ de tâs tωn arxhôn katastâsaeis 10

peiratêon e̔s̔ arxhês diehthêin. eisî δ' a̔i̔ diaforai̔

en tri̔wv όροις, ὧν συντιθεμένων ἀναγκαῖων

pantas eîlîthrai toûs trîpous. êsti de tâw tri̔wv

tou̔twn ἐν μὲν tînes oĩ kathistantês tâs arxhâs,

deu̔teron δ' ēk tîwv, loîpôn de tîa trîpou̔.

1 μισθοῦ Spengel: ἡ μισθὸς codd.

a See 1298 b 29 n.
b Or possibly 'from going in processions': Solon made
regulations ταῖς ἑξάδοις τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ ταῖς πένθεσι καὶ ταῖς
φορταῖς (Plutarch, Solon 21).

360
forms of constitution, for instance the office of Preliminary Councillors. This is undemocratic, although a Council is a popular body, for there is bound to be some body of this nature to have the duty of preparing measures for the popular assembly, in order that it may be able to attend to its business; but a preparatory committee, if small, is oligarchical, and Preliminary Councillors must necessarily be few in number, so that they are an oligarchical element. But where both of these magistracies exist, the Preliminary Councillors are in authority over the Councillors, since a councillor is a democratic official, but a preliminary councillor is an oligarchic one. Also the power of the Council is weakened in democracies of the sort in which the people in assembly deals with everything itself; and this usually happens when there is a plentiful supply of pay for those who attend the assembly, for being at leisure they meet frequently and decide all things themselves. But a Superintendent of Children and a Superintendent of Women, and any other magistrates that exercise a similar sort of supervision, are an aristocratic feature, and not democratic (for how is it possible to prevent the wives of the poor from going out of doors?) nor yet oligarchic (for the wives of oligarchic rulers are luxurious). But let the discussion of these matters go no further at present, and let us attempt to go through from the beginning the question of the ways of appointing the magistrates. The varieties here depend on three determinants, the combinations of which must give all the possible modes. One of these three determining points is, who are the persons who appoint the magistrates? the second is, from whom?
ARISTOTLE

1300 a
ekástou de tōn triōn toutōn diaforai treis
15 eisín. ἣ γὰρ πάντες οἱ πολῖται καθιστάσων ἡ
tinés, καὶ ἡ ἐκ πάντων ἡ ἐκ τινῶν ἀφωρισμένων
(οἵον ἡ τιμῆματι ἡ γένει ἡ ἀρετῇ ἡ τινι τοιούτῳ
ἀλλω, ῥώσας ἐν Μεγάροις ἐκ τῶν συγκατελθόντων
καὶ συμμαχεσαμένων πρὸς τὸν δήμον), καὶ ταῦτα
20 ἡ αἱρέσει ἡ κλήρῳ· πάλιν ταῦτα συνδυαζόμεναι,
λέγω δὲ ταῖς μὲν τινὲς τὰς δὲ πάντες, καὶ τὰς
μὲν ἐκ πάντων τὰς δ’ ἐκ τινῶν, καὶ τὰς μὲν
αιρέσει τὰς δὲ κλήρῳ. τοῦτων δ’ ἐκάστης
ἐσονται τῆς διαφορᾶς ἑρσόποι τέσσαρες: ἡ γὰρ
πάντες ἐκ πάντων αἱρέσει, ἡ πάντες ἐκ πάντων
25 κλήρῳ—καὶ [ἡ]2 εἴ ἀπάντων ἡ ὡς ἀνὰ μέρος, οἷον
κατὰ φυλάς καὶ δήμους καὶ φαραγη τίς ἡν ἀν
diélthη διὰ πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν,3 ἡ ἀεὶ εἴ ἀπάντων,
—ἡ καὶ4 τὰ μὲν οὖτω τὰ δὲ ἐκείνως. πάλιν εἰ
tinēs οἱ καθιστάντες, ἡ ἐκ πάντων αἱρέσει ἡ ἐκ
πάντων κλήρῳ, ἡ ἐκ τινῶν αἱρέσει ἡ ἐκ τινῶν
30 κλήρῳ, ἡ τὰ μὲν οὖτω τὰ δ’ ἐκείνως, λέγω δὲ τὰ
μὲν ἐκ πάντων5 αἱρέσει τὰ δὲ κλήρῳ. ὥστε
dwēdeka οἱ τροποὶ γίνονται χωρίς τῶν δύο συν-
dυασμῶν. τοῦτων δ’ αἱ μὲν δύο καταστάσεις 12
demotikai, τὸ πάντα ἐκ πάντων6 αἱρέσει ἡ κλήρῳ
[γινεθαι]7 ἡ ἀμφοῖν, τὰς μὲν κλήρῳ τὰς δ’
αιρέσει τῶν ἀρχῶν τὸ δὲ μὴ πάντας άμα μὲν

1 1300 a 23-b 5 locum vertiginosum viri docti ad libidinem quisque suam rescripterunt.
2 Thurot. 3 πολιτῶν Ar.; πολιτικῶν.
4 ἡ καὶ Rabe: καὶ ἡ, καὶ codd. 5 Hayduck.
5 post πάντων add. καὶ τὸ πάντας ἐκ τινῶν Rabe.
7 Thurot.

* It is quite uncertain when this event took place and
and last, in what manner? And of each of these three determinants there are three variations: either all the citizens appoint or some, and either from all or from a certain class (defined for instance by property-assessment or birth or virtue or some other such qualification, as at Megara only those were eligible who returned in a body from exile and fought together against the common people), and the mode of appointment may be either by vote or by lot; and again, these systems may be coupled together—I mean that some citizens may appoint to some offices but all to others, and to some offices all citizens may be eligible but to others only a certain class, and to some appointment may be by vote but to others by lot. And of each variation of these determinants there will be four modes: either all citizens may appoint from all by vote, or all from all by lot—and from all either section by section, for instance by tribes or demes or brotherhoods until the procedure has gone through all the citizens, or from the whole number every time,—or else partly in one way and partly in the other. Again, if the electors are some of the citizens, they must either appoint from all by vote, or from all by lot, or from some by vote, or from some by lot, or partly in one way and partly in the other—I mean partly by vote and partly by lot. Hence the modes prove to be twelve, apart from the two combinations. And among these, two ways of appointment are democratic—for all to appoint from all by vote, or by lot, or by both—some offices by lot and others by vote; but for not all to be the electors and for them to appoint simultaneously, and either whether it is the same as those referred to at 1302 b 30 f. and 1304 b 34 ff.
καθιστάναι, εξ ἀπάντων δ' ἂν τινῶν, ἡ κλήρῳ ἡ ἀἱρέσει ἡ ἀμφοῖν, ἡ τὰς μὲν ἐκ πάντων τὰς δ' ἐκ τινῶν ἀμφοῖν (τὸ δὲ ἀμφοῖν λέγω τὰς μὲν κλήρῳ τὰς δ' ἀἱρέσει) πολιτικῶν. καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ πάντων τὰς μὲν ἀἱρέσει καθιστάναι τὰς δὲ κλήρῳ ἡ ἀμφοῖν (τὰς μὲν κλήρῳ τὰς δ' ἀἱρέσει) ὀλυγαρχικῶν· ὀλυγαρχικῶτερον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν. τὸ δὲ τὰς μὲν ἐκ πάντων τὰς δ' ἐκ τινῶν πολι-13

τικὸν ἀριστοκρατικῶς, ἡ τὰς μὲν ἀἱρέσει τὰς δὲ κλήρῳ. τὸ δὲ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν <ἀἱρέσει> ὀλυ-

αρχικῶν, καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν κλήρῳ (μὴ γενόμενον δ' ὁμοίως), καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν ἀμφοῖν.

τὸ δὲ τινὰς ἐξ ἀπάντων τότε2 δὲ ἐκ τινῶν ἀἱρέσει 5 πάντας ἀριστοκρατικῶν.

Οἱ μὲν οὖν τρόποι τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς το-

σοῦτοι τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἰσὶ, καὶ διήγησθαι κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας οὕτως· τίνα δὲ τίσι συμφέρει καὶ πῶς ἰδίως τὰς καταστάσεις ἄμα ταῖς δυνάμεις τῶν ἀρχῶν [καὶ]3 τίνας εἰσὶν ἐσται φανερῶν. λέγω δὲ δύναμιν ἀρχῆς οἶον τὴν κυρίαν τῶν προσόδων καὶ τὴν κυρίαν τῆς φυλακῆς· ἄλλο γὰρ εἴδος δυνάμεως οὐν στρατηγιὰς καὶ τῆς τῶν περὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν συμβολαίων κυρίας.

XIII. Λοιπὸν δὲ τῶν τριῶν τὸ δικαστικὸν εἰπεῖν, 1 λήπτεόν δὲ καὶ τοῦτων τοὺς τρόπους κατὰ τὴν

---

1 Lambinus. 2 τότε P²: τὸ cet. 3 [καὶ] om. ΓΜΠ¹.

---

* Perhaps the Greek should be rewritten to give 'for some to appoint from all either by vote or by lot or by both.'

* This insertion by Lambinus seems certain.
from all or from some either by lot or by vote or by both, or some offices from all and others from some by both (by which I mean some by lot and others by vote) is constitutional. And for some to appoint from all, to some offices by vote and to others by lot or by both a (to some by lot and to others by vote) is oligarchical; and it is even more oligarchical to appoint from both classes. But to appoint some offices from all and the others from a certain class is constitutional with an aristocratic bias; or to appoint some by vote and others by lot. And for a certain class to appoint from a certain class <by vote> b is oligarchical, and so it is for a certain class to appoint from a certain class by lot (although not working out in the same way), and for a certain class to appoint from a certain class by both methods. And for a certain class to make a preliminary selection from the whole body and then for all to appoint from among certain persons (thus selected) is aristocratic.

So many in number therefore are the modes of appointing to the magistracies, and this is how the modes are classified according to the different constitutions; and what regulations are advantageous for what people and how the appointments ought to be conducted will be made clear at the same time as we consider what are the powers of the offices. By the power of an office I mean for instance the control of the revenues and the control of the guard; since a different sort of power belongs for example to a generalship and to the office that controls market contracts.

XIII. Of the three factors of a constitution it remains to speak of the judiciary, and of judicial bodies also we must consider the various modes, in
ARISTOTLE

1300 b

15 aut'hen upótheisun. esti de diafora twv dikasthriwv en triswv árois, eis dvn te kai peri dvn kai pwv. legw de eis dvn mén, póteron ek pantwn h ek twn: peri dvn de, pósas eídhe dikasthriwv: to de pwv, póteron klhro h aírseui. práton ouv diaréisow pósas eídhe dikasthriwv. esti de twv

20 arithmou oktw, en mén euthyntikon, allo de ei tis ti twv koivwn ádikei, ãteron ðsa eis tw twv politiexan ferei, têtaartov kai árkhousi kai idwtais ðsa peri ÿmiwsouw amphiobhtoous, péumptov to peri twv idwv synallagmawv kai1 exóntov ménéthos, kai para taûta to te fónikov kai to xevnikov

25 (phoiniou mév ouv eídhe, an t' en tois autw dikas-2 staîs an t' en allwv, peri te twv ék pronoias kai peri twv akouwv kai ðsa òmologetai mén amphiobhteita dei peri twv dikaiou, têtaartov de ðsa tois feugousi fónou epit kathw epifereita, oïon 'Athýngou légetai kai to en Æreatov dikas-

30 sthrwv, synbainey dei ta toiauta en tw panti chrónoi olíga kai en tws megálais pólesin: tov de xevnikov en mén xénois pro's xénois, allo de2 xénois pro's atopous): eti de para pánta taûta peri twv mikrwv synallagmawv, ðsa drahmawa kai pentádraxma kai mikrwv pleiwnos: dei mén

35 gar kai peri toutov ginesthai krísow, ouk émpitépei de eis dikastwv plhthos. allà peri mév touton 3

1 <twn> kai Richards. 2 allo de Richards: allo codd.

a i.e. men that had been allowed to flee the country when charged with accidental homicide, and on their return were accused of another homicide, a wilful murder.

366
accordance with the same plan. And a difference among judicial courts rests upon three determinants—constituents, sphere of action, and mode of appointment. As to their constituents I mean are the courts drawn from all the citizens or from a certain class? as to sphere of action, how many kinds of courts are there? and as to mode of appointment, are they appointed by lot or by vote? First then let us distinguish how many kinds of courts there are. They are eight in number, one a court of audit, another to deal with offenders against any public interest, another with matters that bear on the constitution, a fourth for both magistrates and private persons in disputes about penalties, fifth the court dealing with private contracts that are on an important scale, and beside these there is (6) the court that tries homicide, and (7) that which hears alien suits (of courts of homicide there are four kinds, whether the jury is the same or different—namely, for cases of deliberate homicide, of involuntary homicide, of homicide admitted but claimed to be justifiable, and fourth to deal with charges of homicide brought against men that have fled from the country for homicide, upon their return, such as at Athens for instance the Court at Phreatto is said to be, although such cases are of rare occurrence in the whole course of history, even in the great states; and of the aliens' court one branch hears suits of aliens against aliens and another of aliens against citizens); and also beside all of these there are (8) courts to try cases of petty contracts, involving sums of one drachma, five drachmas or a little more—for even these cases have to be tried, though they are not suitable for a numerous jury. But let us dismiss the subject of these petty
ἀφείσθω καὶ τῶν φονικῶν καὶ τῶν ξενικῶν, περὶ
δὲ τῶν πολιτικῶν λέγομεν, περὶ δὲν μὴ γινομένων
καλῶς διαστάσεις γίνονται καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν αἱ
κινήσεις. ἀνάγκη δ’ ἦτοι πάντας περὶ πάντων
κρίνειν τῶν διηρημένων αἱρέσει ἡ κλήρῳ,
ἡ πάντας περὶ πάντων τὰ μὲν κλήρῳ τὰ δ’ αἱρέσει,
ἡ περὶ ἐνίων τῶν αὐτῶν τοὺς μὲν κλήρῳ τοὺς δ’
αἱρετοὺς. οὕτωι μὲν οὐν οἱ τρόποι τέτταρες τῶν
ἀριθμῶν, τοσοῦτοι δ’ ἔτεροι καὶ οἱ κατὰ μέρος:
πάλιν γὰρ ἐκ τινῶν καὶ οἱ δικάζοντες περὶ πάντων
αἱρέσει, ἡ ἐκ τινῶν περὶ πάντων κλήρῳ, ἡ τὰ μὲν
κλήρῳ τὰ δ’ αἱρέσει, ἡ ἐνεά δικαστήρια περὶ τῶν
αὐτῶν ἐκ κληρωτῶν καὶ αἱρετῶν. οὕτωι μὲν οὖν,
ὡσπερ ἐλέξθησαν, οἱ τρόποι ἀντιστροφοῖ 
τοῖς
eἰρημένοις. ἔτι δὲ τὰ αὐτὰ συνδυαζόμενα, λέγοι 
οἱ τὰ μὲν ἐκ πάντων τὰ δ’ ἐκ τινῶν τὰ δ’ ἐξ
ἀμφῶν, οἱ τοῦ αὐτοῦ δικαστηρίου εἶναι οἱ μὲν
ἐκ πάντων οἱ δ’ ἐκ τινῶν, καὶ ἡ κλήρῳ ἡ αἱρέσει
ἡ ἀμφῶν. ὅσοις μὲν οὖν ἐνδέχεται τρόποις εἶναι
τὰ δικαστήρια, εἰρηταὶ: τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν πρῶτα
dημοτικά, ὡσα ἐκ πάντων περὶ πάντων, τὰ δὲ
deύτερα ὀλιγαρχικά, ὡσα ἐκ τινῶν περὶ πάντων, τὰ
dὲ τρίτα ἀριστοκρατικά καὶ πολιτικά, ὡσα τὰ μὲν
ἐκ πάντων τὰ δ’ ἐκ τινῶν.

1 ἀντιστροφοῖ suppleuit Newman.
2 περὶ Susemihl: ἡ περὶ codd.
suits, and the courts for homicide and those for aliens, and let us speak about political trials, which when not well conducted cause party divisions and revolutionary disturbances. And necessarily either all the judges of all the cases that have been classified will be appointed by vote, or by lot, or all in all cases partly by lot and partly by vote, or in some cases some judges will be appointed by lot and others by vote for the same case. These modes then are four in number, and the sectional modes also make as many others; for here again the judges for all cases may be drawn by vote from a certain class, or for all cases by lot from a certain class, or some courts may be appointed by lot and others by vote, or some courts may be composed of judges chosen by lot and by vote for the same cases. These then are the modes, as was said, corresponding to those mentioned. And there are also the same courts in combination—I mean for example some drawn from the whole body and some from a class and some from both, as for instance if the same court contained some members from the whole body and others from a class, and appointed either by lot or by vote or both. We have then stated all the modes in which it is possible for the courts to be composed; and of these the first set, drawn from all the citizens and dealing with all cases, are popular, the second, drawn from a certain class to deal with all cases, are oligarchic, and the third, drawn partly from all and partly from a certain class, are suited to an aristocracy and to a constitutional government.
1301 a

I. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ὄν προειλόμεθα 1 σχεδὸν εἰρηταὶ περὶ πάντων· ἐκ τῶν δὲ μετα-
βάλλουσιν αἱ πολιτείαι καὶ πόσων καὶ ποίων, καὶ τίνες ἐκάστης πολιτείας φθοραί, καὶ ἐκ ποίων
ἐἰς ποιάς μάλιστα μεθιστανταὶ, ἐτὶ δὲ σωτηρίας
tίνες καὶ κοινὴ καὶ χωρὶς ἐκάστης εἰσίν, ἐτὶ δὲ διὰ
tίνων ἀν μάλιστα σφόδρο τῶν πολιτεἰῶν ἐκάστης,
sκεπτέον ἐφεξῆς τοῖς εἰρημένοις.

Δεῖ δὲ πρῶτον ὑπολαβεῖν τὴν ἀρχήν, ὅτι πολλ'ai 2
γεγενήται πολιτείαι πάντων μὲν ὀμολογοῦντων τὸ
δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν ἵσον τούτου δ' ἀμαρτανόντων (ἀστερ εἰρηταὶ καὶ πρότερον).
δήμος μὲν γὰρ ἐγένετο ἐκ τοῦ ἵσους ὅτι οὖν ὄντας
οἰκεθαι ἀπλῶς ἵσους εἶναι (ὅτι γὰρ ἐλεύθεροι πάντες
ὀμοίως, ἀπλῶς ἵσοι εἶναι νομίζουσιν), ὀλυνάρχα δὲ
ἐκ τοῦ ἁνίσοσ ἐν τι ὄντας ὅλως εἶναι ἁνίσους
ὑπολαμβάνειν (κατ’ οὐσίαν γὰρ ἁνισοὶ ὄντες
ἀπλῶς ἁνισοὶ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι). εἶτα οἱ μὲν 3
ὡς ἱσοὶ ὄντες πάντων τῶν ἵσων ἁξιοῦσι μετέχειν,

---

1 Book V. is placed as Book VII. by some editors, as Book VIII. by others, see Book III. fin. note.
2 For this distinction between broad methods of guarding against revolution and the practical means by which those methods can be put into effect Newman compares c. ix. §§ 2 f., 10 f., iv. ii. 5 fin., vi. i. 1.
BOOK V

I. Almost all the other subjects which we intended to treat have now been discussed. There must follow the consideration of the questions, what are the number and the nature of the causes that give rise to revolutions in constitutions, and what are the causes that destroy each form of constitution, and out of what forms into what forms do they usually change, and again what are the safeguards of constitutions in general and of each form in particular, and what are the means by which the safeguarding of each may best be put into effect. And we must first assume the starting-point, that many forms of constitution have come into existence with everybody agreeing as to what is just, that is proportionate equality, but failing to attain it (as has also been said before). Thus democracy arose from men’s thinking that if they are equal in any respect they are equal absolutely (for they suppose that because they are all alike free they are equal absolutely), oligarchy arose from their assuming that if they are unequal as regards some one thing they are unequal wholly (for being unequal in property they assume that they are unequal absolutely); and then the democrats claim as being equal to participate in all things in equal
ARISTOTLE

1301 a
35 οἱ δ᾽ ὡς ἄνισοι ὄντες πλεονεκτεῖν ζητοῦσιν, τὸ γὰρ πλεῖον ἄνισον. ἔχουσι μὲν οὖν τι πᾶσα δίκαιον, ἡμαρτημέναι δὲ ἀπλῶς εἰσίν· καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν, ὅταν μὴ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν ἢν ἐκάτεροι τυγχάνουσιν ἔχοντες μετέχωσι τῆς πολιτείας, στασιάζοιν. πάντων δὲ δικαιότατα μὲν ἂν στασιάζοιν, ἢκιστα δὲ τούτο πρᾶττονσοι, οἱ κατ’ ἄρετὴν διαφέροντες· μάλιστα γὰρ εὐλογον ἄνισους ἀπλῶς εἶναι τούτους μόνον1. εἰσὶ δὲ τινες οἱ κατὰ γένος ὑπερέχοντες οὐκ ἄξιοισι τῶν ἵσων αὐτῶς διὰ τὴν ἁυισότητα ταύτην· εὐγενεῖς γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν οίς ὑπάρχει προγόνων ἄρετη καὶ πλοῦτος.

5 'Αρχαί μὲν οὖν ὡς εἰπείν2 αὐταί καὶ πηγαί τῶν στάσεων εἰσὶν ὅθεν στασιάζοισιν (διὸ καὶ αἱ μεταβολαι γίγνονται διχῶς· ὅτε μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, ὅπως ἐκ τῆς καθεστηκυίας ἄλλην μεταστήσωσιν, οἴον ἐκ δημοκρατίας ὀλιγαρχίαν ἢ δημοκρατίαν ἢ ὀλιγαρχίας, ἢ πολιτείαν καὶ ἀριστοκρατίαν ἢ τούτων, ἢ ταύτας ἢ ἔκεινων· ὅτε δ᾽ οὗ πρὸς τὴν καθεστηκυίαν πολιτείαν, ἄλλη τὴν μὲν κατάστασιν προαιροῦνται τὴν αὐτὴν, δι᾽ αὐτῶν δ᾽ εἶναι βούλονται ταύτην, οἴον τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἢ τὴν μοναρχίαν. ἐτι περὶ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ 5 ἢπτον, οἴον ἢ ὀλιγαρχίαν οὔσαν εἰς τὸ μᾶλλον ὀλιγαρχεῖσθαι ἢ εἰς τὸ ἢπτον, ἢ δημοκρατίαν οὔσαν εἰς τὸ μᾶλλον δημοκρατεῖσθαι ἢ εἰς τὸ ἢπτον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν πολιτεῶν, ἢ

1 μόνον? ed.
2 ἐπὶ τοῦ μᾶλλον vel ὡς εἰπείν post πηγαί Richards. 372
shares, while the oligarchs as being unequal seek to have a larger share, for a larger share is unequal. All these forms of constitution then have some element of justice, but from an absolute point of view they are erroneous; and owing to this cause, when each of the two parties has not got the share in the constitution which accords with the fundamental assumption that they happen to entertain, class war ensues. And of all men those who excel in virtue would most justifiably stir up faction, though they are least given to doing so; for they alone can with the fullest reason be deemed absolutely unequal. And there are some men who being superior in birth claim unequal rights because of this inequality; for persons who have ancestral virtue and wealth behind them are thought to be noble.

4 These then roughly speaking are the starting-points and sources of factions, which give rise to party strife (and revolutions due to this take place in two ways: sometimes they are in regard to the constitution, and aim at changing from the one established to another, for instance from democracy to oligarchy, or to democracy from oligarchy, or from these to constitutional government and aristocracy, or from those to these; but sometimes the revolution is not in regard to the established constitution, but its promoters desire the same form of government, for instance oligarchy or monarchy, but wish it to be in their own control. Again it may be a question of degree; for instance, when there is an oligarchy the object may be to change to a more oligarchical government or to a less, or when there is a democracy to a more or to a less democratic government, and similarly in the case of the remaining constitutions.
This ethical arithmetic is helped out in Greek by the fact that, even without the qualification κατ’ ἀξίαν, ἴσος often means 'equal to desert,' fair, just.

* See 1307 a 34 n.

* This ethical arithmetic is helped out in Greek by the fact that, even without the qualification κατ’ ἀξίαν, ἴσος often means 'equal to desert,' fair, just.

* See 1301 a 27 ff. and note.
the aim may be either to tighten them up or to relax them. Or again the aim may be to change a certain part of the constitution, for example to establish or abolish a certain magistracy, as according to some accounts Lysander attempted to abolish the kingship at Sparta and the king Pausanias the ephorate; and also at Epidamnus the constitution was altered in part, for they set up a council instead of the tribal rulers, and it is still compulsory for the magistrates alone of the class that has political power to come to the popular assembly when an appointment to a magistracy is put to the vote; and the single supreme magistrate was also an oligarchical feature in this constitution. For party strife is everywhere due to inequality, where classes that are unequal do not receive a share of power in proportion (for a life-long monarchy is an unequal feature when it exists among equals); for generally the motive for factional strife is the desire for equality. But equality is of two kinds, numerical equality and equality according to worth—by numerically equal I mean that which is the same and equal in number or dimension, by equal according to worth that which is equal by proportion; for instance numerically 3 exceeds 2 and 2 exceeds 1 by an equal amount, but by proportion 4 exceeds 2 and 2 exceeds 1 equally, since 2 and 1 are equal parts of 4 and 2, both being halves. But although men agree that the absolutely just is what is according to worth, they disagree (as was said before) in that some think that if they are equal in something they are wholly equal, and others claim that if they are unequal in something they deserve an unequal share of all things. Owing to this two principal varieties of constitution
ARISTOTLE

1302a ὀλιγαρχία: εὐγένεια γὰρ καὶ ἀρετὴ ἐν ὀλίγοις, ταῦτα1 δὲ ἐν πλείοσιν· εὐγενεῖς γὰρ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἐκατόν, εὐποροὶ2 δὲ πολλαχοῦ.3 τὸ δὲ ἀπλῶς πάντη καθ' ἐκατέραν τετάχθαι τὴν ἴσοτητα φαύλον. φανερὸν δὲ ἐκ τοῦ συμβαίνοντος· οὐδεμία

5 γὰρ μόνιμος ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων πολιτεῶν. τούτου δὲ αὐτῶν ὅτι ἀδύνατον ἀπὸ τοῦ πρῶτου καὶ τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἡμαρτημένου μὴ ἀπαντᾶν εἰς τὸ τέλος κακοῦ τι. διὸ δεῖ τὰ μὲν ἀριθμητικὴ ἴσοτητι χρήσθαι, τὰ δὲ τῇ καθ' ἀξίαν. ὅμως δὲ ἀσφαλεστέρα καὶ ἀστασίαστος μᾶλλον ἡ δημοκρατία τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας.

10 ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις εὐγένωται δύο, ἡ τε πρὸς ἄλληλοις στάσεις καὶ ἐτι ἡ πρὸς τὸν δήμον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἡ πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν μόνον, αὐτῶ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁ τι καὶ ἀξίων εἰπεῖν οὐκ εὐγένεται τῷ δήμῳ στάσεις. ἐτι δὲ ἡ ἐκ τῶν μέσων πολιτεία εὐγυντέρω τοῦ δήμου ἡ [ἡ]4 τῶν

15 ὀλίγων, ἣτερ ἐστὶν ἀσφαλεστάτη τῶν τοιούτων πολιτεῶν.

II. 'Επεὶ δὲ σκοποῦμεν ἐκ τῶν αἱ τε στάσεις γίγνονται καὶ αἱ μεταβολαὶ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας, λήπτεν καθὸλου πρῶτον τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας αὐτῶν. εἰδεὶ δὴ σχεδὸν ὡς εἰπεῖν τρεῖς τὸν ἀριθμὸν, ἀς διωριστέον καθ' αὐτὰς τύπω πρῶτον. δεὶ γὰρ λαβεῖν πῶς τε ἐχοντες στασιάζουσι καὶ τίνων

1 τάναντα Lambinus.
2 ἄποροι Γ: εὔποροι δὲ <καὶ ἄποροι> Stahr.
3 πολλαχοῦ codd. det.
4 ἡ om. p2: τῆς Victorius.

a That is, numbers and wealth.
b Perhaps the text should be emended to give 'there are many rich men and poor men in many places.'

376
come into existence, democracy and oligarchy; for noble birth and virtue are found in few men, but the qualifications specified a in more: nowhere are there a hundred men nobly born and good, but there are rich men b in many places. But for the constitution to be framed absolutely and entirely according to either kind of equality is bad. And this is proved by experience, for not one of the constitutions formed on such lines is permanent. And the cause of this is that it is impossible for some evil not to occur ultimately from the first and initial error that has been made. Hence the proper course is to employ numerical equality in some things and equality according to worth in others. But nevertheless democracy is safer and more free from civil strife than oligarchy; for in oligarchies two kinds of strife spring up, faction between different members of the oligarchy and also faction between the oligarchs and the people, whereas in democracies only strife between the people and the oligarchical party occurs, but party strife between different sections of the people itself does not occur to any degree worth mentioning. And again the government formed of the middle classes is nearer to the people than to the few, and it is the safest of the kinds of constitution mentioned.

II. And since we are considering what circumstances give rise to party factions and revolutions in constitutions, we must first ascertain their origins and causes generally. They are, speaking roughly, three in number, c which we must first define in outline separately. For we must ascertain what state of affairs gives rise to party strife, and for what

---

a Viz. the material, final and efficient causes of revolutions (Jowett).
ṣακάτων τάτων καὶ τοῦ τῶν πολιτικῶν ταραξῶν καὶ τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλους στάσεων.

Τοῦ μὲν οὖν αὐτούς ἔχειν πως πρὸς τὴν μεταβολὴν αἰτίαν καθόλου μάλιστα θετέον περὶ ἣς ἦδη τυγχάνομεν εἰρηκότες. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἰσότητος ἐφιέμενοι στασιάζουσιν ἄν νομίζουσι ἐλαττον ἔχειν ὅντες ἵσοι τοῖς πλεονεκτοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ τῆς ἀνυστήτους καὶ τῆς ὑπεροχῆς ἄν ὑπολαμβάνωσιν ὅντες ἀνισοὶ μὴ πλέον ἔχειν ἀλλ' ἴσον ἢ ἐλαττον (τούτων δ' ἔστι 2 μὲν ὀρέγεσθαι δικαίως, ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἀδίκως). ἐλάττους τε γὰρ ὅντες ὅπως ἴσοι ὲσοὶ στασιάζουσι, καὶ ἴσοι ὅντες ὅπως μείζουσι. πῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχοντες στασιάζουσιν, εἰρήται.

Περὶ δὲν δὲ στασιάζουσιν, ἔστι κέρδος καὶ τιμή, καὶ τάναντια τούτοις, καὶ γὰρ ἀτιμίαν φεύγοντες καὶ ἐνιαίαν ἢ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἢ τῶν φιλῶν στασιάζουσιν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν.

Αἱ δ' αἰτίαι καὶ ἀρχαὶ τῶν κινήσεων, θεν αὐτοὶ τῷ περὶ διατίθενται τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον καὶ περὶ τῶν λεχθέντων, ἔστι μὲν ὡς τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐπτὰ τυγχάνουσιν οὕσαι, ἔστι δ' ὡς πλείους. ὅν δυο μὲν ἐστὶ ταῦτα τοῖς εἰρημένοις, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡσαύτως. διὰ κέρδος γὰρ καὶ διὰ τιμὴν καὶ παροξύνονται πρὸς ἄλληλους οὐχ ἢν κτήσωνται σφίσσαν αὐτοῖς.

ἔστι διὰ ὑβριν, διὰ φόβου, διὰ ὑπεροχῆς.

1 καὶ suppleuit Immisch.
objects it is waged, and thirdly what are the origins of political disorders and internal party struggles.

Now the principal cause, speaking generally, of the citizens being themselves disposed in a certain manner towards revolution is the one about which we happen to have spoken already. Those that desire equality enter on party strife if they think that they have too little although they are the equals of those who have more, while those that desire inequality or superiority do so if they suppose that although they are unequal they have not got more but an equal amount or less (and these desires may be felt justly, and they may also be felt unjustly); for when inferior, people enter on strife in order that they may be equal, and when equal, in order that they may be greater. We have therefore said what are the states of feeling in which men engage in party strife.

The objects about which it is waged are gain and honour, and their opposites, for men carry on party faction in states in order to avoid dishonour and loss, either on their own behalf or on behalf of their friends. And the causes and origins of the disturbances which occasion the actual states of feeling described and their direction to the objects mentioned, according to one account happen to be seven in number, though according to another they are more. Two of them are the same as those spoken of before although not operating in the same way: the motives of gain and honour also stir men up against each other not in order that they may get them for themselves, as has been said before, but because they see other men in some cases justly and in other cases unjustly getting a larger share of them. Other causes are insolence, fear, excessive
The four causes now mentioned are those alluded to just above (a 38) as in addition to the seven enumerated above, a 38-b 5.

Cf. 1284 a 18.

Perhaps in 390 b.c., cf. l. 32 f. and 1304 b 27 ff.

380
predominance, contempt, disproportionate growth of power; and also other modes of cause \(^a\) are election intrigue, carelessness, pettiness, dissimilarity. Among these motives the power possessed by insolence and gain, and their mode of operation, is almost obvious; for when the men in office show insolence and greed, people rise in revolt against one another and against the constitutions that afford the opportunity for such conduct; and greed sometimes preys on private property and sometimes on common funds. It is clear also what is the power of honour and how it can cause party faction; for men form factions both when they are themselves dishonoured and when they see others honoured; and the distribution of honours is unjust when persons are either honoured or dishonoured against their deserts, just when it is according to desert. Excessive predominance causes faction, when some individual or body of men is greater and more powerful than is suitable to the state and the power of the government; for such are the conditions that usually result in the rise of a monarchy or dynasty. Owing to this in some places they have the custom of temporary banishment, \(^b\) as at Argos and Athens; yet it would be better to provide from the outset that there may be no persons in the state so greatly predominant, than first to allow them to come into existence and afterwards to apply a remedy. Fear is the motive of faction with those who have inflicted wrong and are afraid of being punished, and also with those who are in danger of suffering a wrong and wish to act in time before the wrong is inflicted, as the notables at Rhodes banded together \(^c\) against the people because of the law-suits that were
δίκας. διὰ καταφρόνησιν δὲ καὶ στασιάζουσι καὶ θέπυτθένται, οἷον ἐν τε ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις ὅταν πλεῖον ὄριοι οἱ μὴ μετέχοντες τῆς πολιτείας (κρείττους γὰρ οἶνον τείναι), καὶ ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις οἱ εὕποροι καταφρονήσαντες τῆς ἀταξίας καὶ ἀναρχίας, οἴον καὶ ἐν Θῆβαις μετὰ τήν ἐν Ὀινοφύτοις μάχην κακῶς πολιτευμένων ἡ δημοκρατία διεφθάρη, καὶ ἡ Μεγαρέων δι’ ἀταξίαν καὶ ἀναρχίαν ἡττηθέντων, καὶ ἐν Συρακούσαις πρὸ τῆς Γέλωνος τυραννίδος, καὶ ἐν Ρώδῳ ὁ δῆμος πρὸ τῆς ἐπαναστάσεως. γίνονται δὲ καὶ δ’ αὐξήσεων τὴν παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον μεταβολαί τῶν πολιτειῶν.

ἀπόπερ γὰρ σῶμα ἐκ μερῶν σύγκειται καὶ δεῖ αὐξάνεσθαι ἀνάλογον ἢν μένη συμμετρία, εἴ δὲ μὴ, φθείρεται, ὅταν δ’ μὲν ποὺς τεττάρων πηχῶν ἢ τὸ δ’ ἄλλο σῶμα δυνών σπιθαμὰν ἐνίοτε δὲ κἂν εἰς ἀλλοῦ ζώου μεταβάλλου μορφήν εἰ μὴ μόνον κατὰ τὸ ποσόν ἄλλα καὶ κατὰ τὸ ποιόν αὐξάνοιτο παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον, οὐτως καὶ πόλις σύγκειται ἐκ μερῶν, ὅν πολλάκις λανθάνει τι αὐξανόμενον, οἷον τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων πλήθος ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις καὶ πολιτείαις. συμβαίνει δ’ ἐνίοτε τούτο καὶ διὰ τύχας, οἷον ἐν Τάραντῃ ἡττηθέντων καὶ ἀπολογόμενων πολλῶν γυναικῶν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἰατρῶν μικρῶν υπότερον τῶν Μηδικῶν δημοκρατία ἐγένετο ἐκ πολιτείας, καὶ ἐν Ἀργεί τῶν ἐν τῇ ἐβδόμῃ ἀπ-

\[\text{Against Athens, 456 B.C.} \]

\[\text{See 1300 a 18 n.} \]

\[\text{See 1. 23 n.} \]

\[\text{It is not clear whether what follows refers to a work of art (cf. 1284 b 8) or is an exaggerated account of a disease; Galen describes one called σατυρίας, in which the bones of the temple swell out like satyrs' horns.} \]

\[\text{i.e. if, for example, the foot became as hard as a hoof.} \]
being brought against them. Contempt is a cause of faction and of actual attacks upon the government, for instance in oligarchies when those who have no share in the government are more numerous (for they think themselves the stronger party), and in democracies when the rich have begun to feel contempt for the disorder and anarchy that prevails, as for example at Thebes the democracy was destroyed owing to bad government after the battle of Oenophyta, and that of the Megarians was destroyed when they had been defeated owing to disorder and anarchy, and at Syracuse before the tyranny of Gelo, and at Rhodes the common people had fallen into contempt before the rising against them. Revolutions in the constitutions also take place on account of disproportionate growth; for just as the body is composed of parts, and needs to grow proportionately in order that its symmetry may remain, and if it does not it is spoiled, when the foot is four cubits long and the rest of the body two spans, and sometimes it might even change into the shape of another animal if it increased disproportionately not only in size but also in quality, so also a state is composed of parts, one of which often grows without its being noticed, as for example the number of the poor in democracies and constitutional states. And sometimes this is also brought about by accidental occurrences, as for instance at Tarentum when a great many notables were defeated and killed by the Iapygians a short time after the Persian wars a constitutional government was changed to a democracy, and at Argos when those in the seventh
ολομένων ὑπὸ Κλεομένους τοῦ Δάκωνος ἡμαγκά-
θησαν παραδέξασθαι τῶν περιοίκων τινάς, καὶ ἐν Ἀθήναις ἀτυχοῦντων πεζῷ οἱ γνώριμοι ἐλάττους

10 ἐγένοντο διὰ τὸ ἐκ καταλόγου στρατεύεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν Δακωνικῶν πόλεμον. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις, ἦττον δὲ· πλειόνων γὰρ τῶν εὐπόρων γυνομένων ἡ τῶν οὐσίων αὐξανομένων μεταβάλλουσι εἰς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ δυναστείαις. μεταβάλλουσι δ᾽ αἰ πολιτείαι καὶ ἄνευ στάσεως ἐν
diá τε τὰς ἐρίθειας, ὦσπερ ἐν Ἡραίᾳ (ἐξ αἰρετῶν
gὰρ διὰ τοῦτο ἐποίησαν κληρωτὰς ὅτι ἤροῦν τοὺς ἐριθευμένους), καὶ δὴ ὀλιγωρίαν, ὅταν ἐάσωσον
eἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς κυρίας παρίεναι τοὺς μὴ τῆς
pολιτείας φίλους, ὦσπερ ἐν Ὄρεῳ κατελύθη ἡ ὀλιγαρχία τῶν ἀρχοῦντων γενομένου Ἡράκλεοδώρου,
diá τε τὰς ἐρίθειας πολιτείαν καὶ δημοκρατίαν κατ-
eskeύασεν. ἔτι διὰ τὸ παρὰ μικρόν· λέγω δὲ
παρὰ μικρόν, ὅτι πολλάκις λανθάνει μεγάλη γυνο-
mένη μετάβασις τῶν νομίμων, ὅταν παρορώσα τὸ
μικρὸν, ὦσπερ ἐν Ἀμβρακίᾳ μικρὸν ἢν τὸ τίμημα
tέλος δ᾽ ἀπ᾽ οὐθένος ἥρχον, ὡς ἔγγυον ἡ μηθὲν
diaφέρον τοῦ μηθὲν τὸ μικρόν. στασιωτικὸν δὲ 10
καὶ τὸ μὴ ὀμόφυλον, ἕως ἃν συμπνεύσῃ· ὦσπερ
gὰρ οὐδ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος πλήθους πόλις γίγνεται,
1 καὶ τοῦτο Susemihl. 2 ἀπὸρων Γ΄Μ.
3 δ᾽ ἀπ᾽ Aretinus: δ᾽ codd.
4 ἔγγυον ὑν; vel ἔγγυον? Immisch (tanquam propinquum sit Guil.).

1 The word to be understood here may be φυλή, or possibly ἡμέρα: the seventh day of the month was sacred to Apollo, especially at Sparta, and one account assigns Cleomenes' victory to that day, in which case the casualties may well have been known afterwards as 'those who fell on the seventh.'
tribe had been destroyed by the Spartan Cleomenes the citizens were compelled to admit some of the surrounding people, and at Athens when they suffered disasters by land the notables became fewer because at the time of the war against Sparta the army was drawn from a muster-roll. And this happens also in democracies, though to a smaller extent; for when the wealthy become more numerous or their properties increase, the governments change to oligarchies and dynasties. And revolutions in constitutions take place even without factious strife, owing to election intrigue, as at Heraeae (for they made their magistrates elected by lot instead of by vote for this reason, because the people used to elect those who canvassed); and also owing to carelessness, when people allow men that are not friends of the constitution to enter into the sovereign offices, as at Oreus oligarchy was broken up when Heracleodorus became one of the magistrates, who in place of an oligarchy formed a constitutional government, or rather a democracy. Another cause is alteration by small stages; by this I mean that often a great change of institutions takes place unnoticed when people overlook a small alteration, as in Ambracia the property-qualification was small, and finally men hold office with none at all, as a little is near to nothing, or practically the same. Also difference of race is a cause of faction, until harmony of spirit is reached; for just as any chance multitude of people does not form a state, so a state is not

---

\(^b\) i.e. was made up of citizens and not of mercenaries.

\(^c\) See 1292 b 10 n.

\(^d\) On the Alpheus, in Arcadia.

\(^e\) In Euboea; its secession from Sparta to Athens, 377 B.C., was perhaps the occasion of this revolution.
ou'tos ou'd' e'n tîs tucónti xronw'. diò òsoi ë'dh
suneikous e'dexantò h' e'poukous oui plêuutoi esata-
íasasav, oui Troupíntios 'Achaiou sínikhtou Sú-
barwv, eita plêuou oui 'Achaiou gevómenou e'zébalov
tou'Troupíntios, òthenv tò ágos synébh tois
Súbarítasv' kai e'n Oupróiou Súbarítai tois syn-
oukýsasav, plêuuketewn gar ãzioyntes wû sfeiteras
th'márras e'ızepesov' kai Vúkantious oui e'poukoi
epibouléwntes fwrathéntes e'ızepesov dia máxh's-
ka 'Antissáíou tou' Xíwv fuyádas eisodezámenvi
dia máxh's e'ızébalov. Zagyklwíou dé 'Sámis ouv 11
úpodezámenvi e'ızepesov kai autôi' kai 'Ápol-
lwnitai oui en tîs Eúeínw pûntw e'poukous e't-
agómenoi esataíasasv' kai Súrakóusou metâ tâ
tu'ranikâ tou's ëzous kai tou's mušophórous
polítas pou'mámenovi esataíasasv kai eis máxh'
ỳlhov' kai 'Amfipolítai de'zámenvi Xaluki'déwn
e'poukous1 e'ızepesov òpò tou'tou oui plêuutoi autâv
(Sustasíázouvoud' e'n vè 'tâs òlígarxhía oui
tolloi, wû adikouménoi ôti oui metéchouvi tîw
ísou, kathàper eìrhtai prôterov, ìsoi òntes, e'n dé
tâs ðemokratìsw oui gnwðrìwou, ôti metéchouvi tîw
ísou ouk ìsoi òntes.)

1 Spengel: ápoikous codd.

a i.e. colonists not from the mother-city, admitted either
at the foundation of the colony or later.

b Sybaris, founded 720 B.C., became very wealthy. The
Trooezenian population when expelled were received at Croton,
which made war on Sybaris and destroyed it 510 B.C. To
what exactly tò ágos refers is unknown.

c In Lesbos.

d Later Messana, Messina.

e Thrasybulus succeeded his brother Hiero as tyrant in
467 B.C. and fell within a year.
formed in any chance period of time. Hence most of the states that have hitherto admitted joint settlers or additional settlers have split into factions; for example Achaeans settled at Sybaris jointly with Troezenians, and afterwards the Achaeans having become more numerous expelled the Troezenians, which was the cause of the curse that fell on the Sybarites; and at Thurii Sybarites quarrelled with those who had settled there with them, for they claimed to have the larger share in the country as being their own, and were ejected; and at Byzantium the additional settlers were discovered plotting against the colonists and were expelled by force of arms; and the people of Antissa after admitting the Chian exiles expelled them by arms; and the people of Zancle after admitting settlers from Samos were themselves expelled; and the people of Apollonia on the Euxine Sea after bringing in additional settlers fell into faction; and the Syracusans after the period of the tyrants conferred citizenship on their foreign troops and mercenaries and then faction set in and they came to battle; and the Amphipolitans having received settlers from Chalcis were most of them driven out by them. (And in oligarchies civil strife is raised by the many, on the ground that they are treated unjustly because they are not admitted to an equal share although they are equal, as has been said before, but in democracies it begins with the notables, because they have an equal share although they are not equal.)

1 Cf. 1306 a 2. The exact circumstances are unknown; Amphipolis was colonized from Athens 437 B.C.
2 This sentence is out of place here, and would fit in better if placed (as it is by Newman) above at 1301 a 39, after στασιάγοντι, or (with other editors) ib. b 26.
ARISTOTLE

1303 b

Στασιάζοντι δὲ ἐνίοτε αἱ πόλεις καὶ διὰ τοὺς τόπους, ὅταν μὴ εὐφυῶς ἔχῃ ἡ χώρα πρὸς τὸ μίαν εἶναι πόλιν, οἶον ἐν Κλαζομεναίς οἱ ἐπὶ Χύτρῳ

10 πρὸς τοὺς ἐν νήσῳ, καὶ Κολοφώνιοι καὶ Νοτιεῖς· καὶ Ἀθήνησιν οὖχ ὅμοιος εἶσίν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δημοτικοὶ οἱ τὸν Πειραιᾶ οἰκοῦντες τῶν τὸ ἁστυ. ὥστεν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις αἱ διαβάσεις τῶν ὀχετῶν, καὶ τῶν πάνω σμικρῶν, διασπάσει τὰς φάλαγγας, οὕτως ἔσκε πάσα διαφορὰ ποιεῖν
diάστασιν. μεγίστη μὲν οὖν ἑσώς διάστασις ἀρετῆ καὶ μοχθηρία, εἶτα πλοῦτος καὶ πενία, καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἔτερὰ ἐτέρας μᾶλλον, ὅν μία καὶ ἡ εἰρημένη ἐστὶν.

III. Γίγνονται μὲν οὖν αἱ στάσεις οὐ περὶ 1 μικρῶν ἀλλ' ἐκ μικρῶν, στασιάζουσι δὲ περὶ μεγάλων. μάλιστα δὲ καὶ αἱ μικραὶ ἱσχύουσιν

20 ὅταν ἐν τοῖς κυρίοις γένονται, οἶον συνέβη καὶ ἐν Συρακούσαις ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαῖοις χρόνοις. μετέβαλε γὰρ ἡ πολιτεία ἐκ δύο νεανίσκων στασιασάντων, τῶν2 ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖσ ὅντων, περὶ ἑρωτικῆς αὐτῶν·

25 θατέρου γὰρ ἀποδημοῦντος ἄτερος3 ἐστιόρος ὃν τὸν ἕρωμενον αὐτοῦ ὑπεπούσατο, πάλιν δ' ἐκείνος τούτῳ χαλεπήνας τὴν γυναίκα αὐτοῦ ἀν-

ἐπείσεν ὡς αὐτὸν ἐλθεῖν· ο郤εν προσλαμβάνοντες
toὺς ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι διεστασάσαν πάντας.

1 Χυτῷ Sylburg. 2 τῶν suppleuit Richards. 3 ἄτερος suppleuit Coraes. 4 τὸν Coraes: τις τὸν codd.

a Topography uncertain: Clazomenae near Smyrna was partly on a small island, which Alexander joined to the mainland with a causeway.

388
POLITICS, V. II. 12—III. 1

12 Also states sometimes enter on faction for geographical reasons, when the nature of the country is not suited for there being a single city, as for example at Clazomenae the people near Chytrum are in feud with the inhabitants of the island, and the Colophonians and the Notians; and at Athens the population is not uniformly democratic in spirit, but the inhabitants of Piraeus are more so than those of the city. For just as in wars the fording of watercourses, even quite small ones, causes the formations to lose contact, so every difference seems to cause division. Thus perhaps the greatest division is that between virtue and vice, next that between wealth and poverty, and so with other differences in varying degree, one of which is the one mentioned.

1 III. Factions arise therefore not about but out of small matters; but they are carried on about great matters. And even the small ones grow extremely violent when they spring up among men of the ruling class, as happened for example at Syracuse in ancient times. For the constitution underwent a revolution as a result of a quarrel that arose between two young men, who belonged to the ruling class, about a love affair. While one of them was abroad the other who was his comrade won over the youth with whom he was in love, and the former in his anger against him retaliated by persuading his wife to come to him; owing to which they stirred up a party struggle among all the people in the state, enlisting them on

\(^{b}\) Notium was the port of Colophon.

\(^{c}\) i.e. difference of locality.

\(^{d}\) Perhaps under the oligarchy of the Gamori, overthrown by the people and followed by Gelo's tyranny, 485 B.C. 

389


ARISTOTLE

1303b

dio pep arxoménon eulabeïஸθαι dei τῶν τοιοῦτων, 2
kai dialuvêv tás tòv ñgevìmon ñkai dunamevìon
stásêsaì. ev arxì gár gýnetai to ñmártìma, ñ 3
85 arxì légetai ñìmusì éinai pountòs, ñsste kai to ëv
autì múkron ñmártìma anàlologón ëstì pros tà ëv
tois állois méresiw. ñlwos ðè ai tòv ñgnoùmòv
stásêsaì sunapolaìèv pòioucí kai tìn ñlìn pòlwv,
oìn ev 'Epvtaiaì suvëbh metà tà Mìdikà, dúo
âdêlphòn peri ñìs patrpìas 1 nómyìs dienevëntovv.

1304a

ò ñèn gár àporowteros, ñs ouk àpofaiìntovòs
batérou tìn ñuðiàan ouðè tòn ñhæsanòv ñv èþen ð
patëp, prosýngânetò 2 toutò dëmòtikouv, ð ð èterov
ëxìwv ñuðiàan pòllhì toutò evpòropouvs. kai ëv 3
Dëlfòis èk këdeìas genomënhìs diaforàs arxì
pàsoù ëgëneto tòv stàsèwv tòv ñstéreov. ð ñèn
gár, ouwnìsàìmevò tì ñùmìttovìa ñs ñlìvèn ëpi tìn
vùmnìv, ou labhìw àpììlhèn, ou ð ñs ñbrìsthëntes
ëvëbalov tòv èrìwv xëmmàtov thûntovs kàpeita
ìs ìeròsulìv ñpëktënav. kai peri Mìtvììhìv ðè

ëx èpìkëlìròv stàsèwv genomënhìs pòllhìw ëgëneto
arxì kakòv, kai toutò polémov toutò prós 'Athetaìous
ëv ð Páchsì ëlalbe tìn pòlw aùtwv. Tìmofànovòs
gár tòv evpòropòv tìnòs katalevòntos dúo ñygà-
téra, ð perëwstheiv kai ou labhìw toutò vësìw aùtòv
Dòxàndrov ñìrëxe tìs stàsèwv kai toutò 'Athetaìous

1 patrpìwv codd. cet. (òv tì. Victorius).
2 ed.: proshìgeto codd.

a i.e. the ratio of being a half to the whole: a bad start
does as much harm as all the later mistakes put together.
390
2 their sides. On account of this it is necessary to
guard against such affairs at their beginning, and to
break up the factions of the leaders and powerful
men; for the error occurs at the beginning, and the
beginning as the proverb says is half of the whole,
so that even a small mistake at the beginning stands
in the same ratio\(^a\) to mistakes at the other stages.
And in general the faction quarrels of the notables
involve the whole state in the consequences, as
happened at Hestiaea\(^b\) after the Persian wars, when
two brothers quarrelled about the division of their
patrimony; for the poorer of the two, on the ground
that the other would not make a return of the estate
and of the treasure that their father had found, got the
common people on his side, and the other possessing
3 much property was supported by the rich. And at
Delphi the beginning of all the factions that occurred
afterwards was when a quarrel arose out of a mar-
riage; the bridegroom interpreted some chance
occurrence when he came to fetch the bride as a bad
omen and went away without taking her, and her
relatives thinking themselves insulted threw some
articles of sacred property into the fire when he was
performing a sacrifice and then put him to death as
guilty of sacrilege. And also at Mitylene\(^c\) a faction
that arose out of some heiresses was the beginning of
many misfortunes, and of the war with the Athenians
in which Paches captured the city of Mitylene: a
wealthy citizen named Timophanes left two daughters,
and a man who was rejected in his suit to ob-
tain them for his own sons, Doxander, started the

\(^a\) Also called Oreus, see a 18.

\(^b\) Also called Oreus, see a 18.

\(^c\) The revolt of Mitylene 428 B.C. is ascribed to purely political causes by Thucydides (iii. 1-30).
ARISTOTLE

1304 a

10 παρώξυνε, πρόξενος ὁν τῆς πόλεως. καὶ ἐν Θ
Φωκεύσων ἐς ἐπικλήρου στάσεως γενομένης περὶ Μνασέαν τὸν Μνάσωνος πατέρα καὶ Εὐθυκράτη
tὸν Ὀνομάρχου, ἡ στάσις αὐτῆς ἀρχὴ τοῦ ἱεροῦ
πολέμου κατέστη τοῖς Φωκεύσων. μετέβαλε δὲ καὶ ἐν Ἑπιδάμνῳ ἡ πολιτεία ἐκ γαμικῶν ὑπο-
μνηστευσάμενος γάρ τις θυγατέρα, ὡς ἐξημίσθωσεν
αυτῶν ὁ τοῦ ὑπομνηστευθέντος πατήρ γενόμενος
τῶν ἀρχόντων, ἀτερος συμπαρέλαβε τοὺς ἐκτὸς
τῆς πολιτείας ὡς ἐπηρεασθεῖς. μεταβάλλουσι δὲ 5 καὶ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν καὶ εἰς δῆμον καὶ εἰς πολιτείαν
ἐκ τοῦ εὐδοκιμήσας τι ἡ αὐξηθῆναι ἡ ἀρχείων ἡ
μόριον τῆς πόλεως. οἷον ἡ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλῇ
eὐδοκιμήσασα ἐν τοῖς Μηδικοῖς ἐδοξεί συντων-
tέραν ποιήσαι τὴν πολιτείαν, καὶ πάλιν ὁ ναυτικὸς
ὀχλος γενόμενος αὐτῶν τῆς περὶ Σαλαμώνα νίκης
cαι διὰ ταύτης τῆς ἡγεμονίας διὰ τὴν κατὰ θάλα-
tαν δύναμιν τῆς δημοκρατίας ἵσχυροτέραν ἐποίησεν.
καὶ ἐν Ἀργείῳ οἱ γνώριμοι εὐδοκιμοῦσαν περὶ τὴν
ἐν Μαντινείᾳ μάχην τὴν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους
ἐπεχείρησαν καταλύειν τὸν δήμον. καὶ ἐν Συρα-
κώσσαις ὁ δήμος αὐτῶν γενόμενος τῆς νίκης τοῦ
πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίων ἐκ πολιτείας εἰς
dημοκρατίαν μετέβαλεν καὶ ἐν Χαλκίδι Φόξον
τὸν τύραννον μετὰ τῶν γνωρίμων ὁ δήμος ἀνελῶν
eὐθὺς εἰχετο τῆς πολιτείας. καὶ ἐν Ἀμβρακίᾳ
πάλιν ὁσαύτως Περίανδρον συνεκβαλὼν τοῖς ἐπι-

1 θυγατέρα om. codd. fere omnes.

a i.e. the fathers of the two suitors for the heiress’s hand
turned the quarrel into a faction fight.

b Perhaps the same event as that referred to 1301 b 21.

c Unknown.
faction and kept on stirring up the Athenians, whose consul he was at Mitylene. And among the Phocians when a faction arising out of an heiress sprang up in connexion with Mnaseas the father of Mnason and Euthykrates the father of Onomarchus, this faction proved to be the beginning for the Phocians of the Holy War. At Epidamnus also circumstances relating to a marriage gave rise to a revolution in the constitution; somebody had betrothed his daughter, and the father of the man to whom he had betrothed her became a magistrate, and had to sentence him to a fine; the other thinking that he had been treated with insolence formed a party of the unenfranchised classes to assist him. And also revolutions to oligarchy and democracy and constitutional government arise from the growth in reputation or in power of some magistracy or some section of the state; as for example the Council on the Areopagus having risen in reputation during the Persian wars was believed to have made the constitution more rigid, and then again the naval multitude, having been the cause of the victory off Salamis and thereby of the leadership of Athens due to her power at sea, made the democracy stronger; and at Argos the notables having risen in repute in connexion with the battle against the Spartans at Mantinea took in hand to put down the people; and at Syracuse the people having been the cause of the victory in the war against Athens made a revolution from constitutional government to democracy; and at Chalcis the people with the aid of the notables overthrew the tyrant Phoxus and then immediately seized the government; and again at Ambracia similarly the people joined with the adversaries and from party predominance.  

418 B.C.  

412 B.C.
θεμένοις ὁ δῆμος τῶν τύραννων εἰς ἑαυτὸν περὶ-/έστησε τὴν πολιτείαν. καὶ ὅλως δὴ δεῖ τοῦτο μὴ
35 λανθάνειν, ὡς οἱ δυνάμεως αὐτικοι γενόμενοι, καὶ
ιδιώται καὶ ἀρχαὶ καὶ φυλαὶ καὶ ὅλως μέρος καὶ
ὀποιονοῦν πλῆθος, στάσιν κινοῦσιν· ἡ γὰρ οἱ τού-
τοις φθονοῦντες τιμωμένοι ἁρχοῦσι τῆς στάσεως,
ἡ οὖτοι διὰ τὴν ἕπεροχήν οὐ θέλουσι μένειν ἐπὶ
tῶν ᾗς. κινοῦνται δὲ αἱ πολιτείαι καὶ ὅταν
τάναντια εἰναι δοκοῦντα μέρη τῆς πόλεως ἰσάζῃ
άλληλοις, οἴον οἱ πλοῦσιοι καὶ ὁ δῆμος, μέσον δὲ
ἡ μηθεὶν ἡ μικρὸν πάμπαν· ἄν γὰρ πολὺ ὑπερέχῃ
ὀποτερονοῦν τῶν μερῶν, πρὸς τὸ φανερῶς κρείττον
tὸ λοιπὸν οὐ θέλει κινδυνεύειν. διὸ καὶ οἱ κατἠ
5 ἀρετὴν διαφέροντες οὐ ποιοῦσι στάσιν ὡς εἴπειν,
ὅλοι γὰρ γίγνονται πρὸς πολλοὺς. καθόλου μὲν
οὐν περὶ πάσας τὰς πολιτείας αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ αἰτίαι
tῶν στάσεων καὶ τῶν μεταβολῶν τοῦτον ἐχοῦσι
τὸν τρόπον.

Κινοῦσι δὲ τὰς πολιτείας ὅτε μὲν διὰ βίας ὅτε 8
δὲ δὲ ἀπάτης· διὰ βίας μὲν ἡ εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς
10 ἡ ὑστερον ἀναγκάζοντες· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀπάτη διττῆ·
ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἔξαπατήσαντες τὸ πρῶτον ἐκόν-
tῶν μεταβάλλουσι τὴν πολιτείαν, εἰθ' ὑστερον βία
κατέχονσιν ἀκόντων, οἴον ἐπὶ τῶν τετρακοσίων
tῶν δήμου ἐξηπάτησαν φάσκοντες τὸν βασιλέα.

1 ὅποιονονοῦν Richards.

a 580 B.C.; cf. 1311 a 39 ff.

b The oligarchy at Athens 411 B.C.
of the tyrant Periander in expelling him and then brought the government round to themselves.7 And indeed in general it must not escape notice that the persons who have caused a state to win power, whether private citizens or magistrates or tribes, or in general a section or group of any kind, stir up faction; for either those who envy these men for being honoured begin the faction, or these men owing to their superiority are not willing to remain in a position of equality. And constitutions also undergo revolution when what are thought of as opposing sections of the state become equal to one another, for instance the rich and the people, and there is no middle class or only an extremely small one; for if either of the two sections becomes much the superior, the remainder is not willing to risk an encounter with its manifestly stronger opponent. Owing to this men who are exceptional in virtue generally speaking do not cause faction, because they find themselves few against many. Universally then in connexion with all the forms of constitution the origins and causes of factions and revolutions are of this nature.

8 The means used to cause revolutions of constitutions are sometimes force and sometimes fraud. Force is employed either when the revolutionary leaders exert compulsion immediately from the start or later on—as indeed the mode of using fraud is also twofold: sometimes the revolutionaries after completely deceiving the people at the first stage alter the constitution with their consent, but then at a later stage retain their hold on it by force against the people's will: for instance, at the time of the Four Hundred,8 they deceived the people by saying
χρήματα παρέδωσεν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς
15 Λακεδαιμονίους, ψευδάμενοι δὲ κατέχειν ἐπειρῶντο
τὴν πολιτείαν· ὅτε δὲ εἶ ἀρχῆς τε πείσαντες καὶ
ὑστερον πάλιν πεισθέντων ἐκόντων ἀρχουσιν αὐτῶν.
'Απλῶς μὲν οὖν περὶ πάσας τὰς πολιτείας ἐκ
τῶν εἰρημένων συμβέβηκε γίγνεσθαι τὰς μεταβολὰς.

IV. Καθ' ἐκαστον δ' εἶδος πολιτείας ἐκ τούτων 1
20 μερίζοντας τὰ συμβαίνοντα δεῖ θεωρεῖν. αἱ μὲν
οὖν δημοκρατίαι μάλιστα μεταβάλλουσι διὰ τὴν
τῶν δημαγωγῶν ἀσέλγειαν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἴδια
συνοφαντοῦντες τοὺς τὰς ωὐσίας ἔχοντας συστρε-
φοῦσιν αὐτούς (συνάγει γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἐχθρίστους
ὁ κουνὸς φόβος), τὰ δὲ κοινὴ τὸ πλῆθος ἐπάγοντες.
25 καὶ τοῦτο ἐπὶ πολλὰν ἀν τὸς ἤδει γιγνόμενον οὕτως.
καὶ γὰρ ἐν Κώ ἡ δημοκρατία μετέβαλε ποιηρῶν 2
ἐγγενομένων δημαγωγῶν, οἱ γὰρ γνώριμοι συν-
ἐστησαν· καὶ ἐν Ὑπάρχω, μυσθοφοράν τε γὰρ οἱ
dημαγωγοὶ ἐπορίζον καὶ ἐκώλυνον ἀποδιδόνα τὰ
οφειλόμενα τοῖς τρηπάρχοις, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὰς ἐπιφέρο-

30 μένας δίκας ἡγακέσθησαν συστάντες καταλύσατι
tὸν δῆμον. κατελύθη δὲ καὶ ἐν Ὑπάρχω ὁ
dήμος μετὰ τὸν ἀποκεισμὸν εὐθὺς διὰ τοὺς δημ-
αγωγοὺς· ἀδικούμενοι γὰρ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν οἱ γνώριμοι
ἐξέπτυσαν, ἐπειτὰ ἀθροισθέντες οἱ ἐκπιπτόντες
καὶ κατελθόντες κατέλυσαν τὸν δήμον. παρα-

--
396

\[a\] Date unknown.
\[b\] See 1302 b 23 n.
\[c\] i.e. owed for repairs to the ships, and perhaps also for advances of pay to the crews.
\[d\] Probably the Pontic Heraclea (cf. 1305 b 5, 36, 1306 a 37), founded middle of 6th century B.C., not the Trachinian.
that the Persian King would supply money for the war against the Spartans, and after telling them this falsehood endeavoured to keep a hold upon the government; but in other cases they both persuade the people at the start and afterwards repeat the persuasion and govern them with their consent.

Speaking generally therefore in regard to all the forms of constitution, the causes that have been stated are those from which revolutions have occurred.

IV. But in the light of these general rules we must consider the usual course of events as classified according to each different kind of constitution. In democracies the principal cause of revolutions is the insolence of the demagogues; for they cause the owners of property to band together, partly by malicious prosecutions of individuals among them (for common fear brings together even the greatest enemies), and partly by setting on the common people against them as a class. And one may see this taking place in this manner in many instances. In Cos the democracy was overthrown when evil demagogues had arisen there, for the notables banded themselves together; and also in Rhodes, for the demagogues used to provide pay for public services, and also to hinder the payment of money owed to the naval captains, and these because of the lawsuits that were brought against them were forced to make common cause and overthrow the people. And also at Heraclea the people were put down immediately after the foundation of the colony because of the people’s leaders; for the notables being unjustly treated by them used to be driven out, but later on those who were driven out collecting together effected their return and put down the
πλησίως δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐν Μεγάροις κατελύθη δημοκρατία: οἱ γὰρ δημαγωγοί, ἵνα χρήματα ἐχωσὶ δημεσεύειν, ἐξεβάλλον πολλοὺς τῶν γνωρίμων, ἐως πολλοὺς ἐποίησαν τοὺς φεύγοντας, οἱ δὲ κατιόντες ἐνίκησαν μαχόμενοι τὸν δήμον καὶ κατέστησαν τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν. συνέβη δὲ ταύτων καὶ περὶ

Κύμην ἐπὶ τῆς δημοκρατίας ἦν κατέλυσε Θρασύμαχος. σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἣν τις ἴδοι θεωρῶν τὰς μεταβολὰς τούτων ἐχοῦσας τὸν τρόπον. ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἵνα χαρίζωνται ἄδικοιντες τοὺς γνωρίμους συμπτάσιν, ἢ τὰς οὐσίας ἀναδάστωσιν τὰς προσόδους ταῖς λειτουργίαις, ὅτε δὲ διαβάλλοντες, ἵνα ἐχωσὶ δημεσεύειν τὰ κτήματα τῶν πλουσίων. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀρχαίων, ὅτε γένοιτο ὁ αὐτὸς δημαγωγὸς καὶ στρατηγὸς, εἰς τυραννίδα μετέβαλλον: σχεδὸν γὰρ οἱ πλείστοι τῶν ἀρχαίων τυράννων ἐκ δημαγωγών γεγόνασιν. αὐτὸν δὲ τοῦ τότε μὲν γίγνεσθαι νῦν δὲ μὴ, ὅτι τότε μὲν οἱ δημαγωγοὶ ἦσαν ἐκ τῶν στρατηγοῦντων (οὐ γὰρ πω δεινὸν ἦσαν λέγειν), νῦν δὲ τῆς ῥητορικῆς ηὐξημένης οἱ δυνάμενοι λέγειν δημαγωγοῦσι μὲν, δι’ ἀπειρίαν δὲ τῶν πολεμικῶν οὐκ ἐπιτίθενται,

πλὴν εἰ που βραχὺ τι γέγονε τοιοῦτον. ἐγίγνοντο δὲ τυραννίδες πρότερον μᾶλλον ἢ νῦν καὶ διὰ τὸ μεγάλας ἀρχὰς ἐγχειρίζοσθαι τισιν, ὥσπερ ἐν Μιλήτῳ ἐκ τῆς πρωτανείας (πολλῶν γὰρ ἤν καὶ

a See 1300 a 18 ff. ἂ.

b An event otherwise unknown.

c Perhaps that of Thrasybulus (Hdt. i. 20), 612 B.C.

398
people. And also the democracy at Megara was put down in a similar manner; the people's leaders in order to have money to distribute to the people went on expelling many of the notables, until they made the exiles a large body, and these came back and defeated the people in a battle and set up the oligarchy. And the same thing happened also at Cyme in the time of the democracy which Thrasy-machus put down, and in the case of other states also examination would show that revolutions take place very much in this manner. Sometimes they make the notables combine by wronging them in order to curry favour, causing either their estates to be divided up or their revenues by imposing public services, and sometimes by so slandering them that they may have the property of the wealthy to confiscate. And in old times whenever the same man became both leader of the people and general, they used to change the constitution to a tyranny; for almost the largest number of the tyrants of early days have risen from being leaders of the people. And the reason why this used to happen then but does not do so now is because then the leaders of the people were drawn from those who held the office of general (for they were not yet skilled in oratory), but now when rhetoric has developed the able speakers are leaders of the people, but owing to their inexperience in military matters they are not put in control of these, except in so far as something of the kind has taken place to a small extent in some places. And tyrannies also used to occur in former times more than they do now because important offices were entrusted to certain men, as at Miletus a tyranny arose out of the presidency (for the president
μεγάλων κύριος ο πρύτανις). έτι δε διὰ τὸ μὴ μεγάλας εἶναι τότε τὰς πόλεις ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγρῶν οἰκεῖν τὸν δῆμον ἀσχολοῦν ὄντα πρὸς τοὺς ἔργοις, οἱ προστάται τοῦ δήμου, ὅτε πολεμικοὶ γένοντο, τυραννίδι ἐπετίθεντο. πάντες δὲ τοῦτο ἔδρων ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου πιστευθέντες, ἢ δὲ πίστις ἢν ἢ ἀπέχθεια ἢ πρὸς τοὺς πλουσίους, οἶον Ἀθηνησί τοι Πεισίστρατος στασάσας πρὸς τοὺς πεδικοὺς, καὶ Θεαγένης ἐν Μεγάροις τῶν ἑυπόρων τὰ κτήνη ἀποσφάξας, λαβὼν παρὰ τῶν ποταμῶν ἐπινέμοντας, καὶ Διονύσιος κατηγορῶν Δαφνίαν καὶ τῶν πλουσίων ἡξιώθη τῆς τυραννίδος, διὰ τὴν ἐχθραν πιστευθεῖσα ὡς δημοτικὸς ὄν. μεταβάλλοναι δὲ τ καὶ ἐκ τῆς πατρίας δημοκρατίας εἰς τὴν νεωτάτην ὅπου γὰρ αἴρεται μὲν αἱ ἀρχαὶ, μὴ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων δὲ, αἴρεται δὲ ὁ δῆμος, δημαγωγοῦντες οἱ σπουδ- αρχῶντες εἰς τοῦτο καθιστάσων ὡςτε1 κύριον εἶναι τὸν δῆμον καὶ τῶν νόμων. ἀκος δὲ τοῦ ἢ μὴ γίνεσθαι ἢ τοῦ γίνεσθαι ἢττον τὸ τὰς φυλὰς φέρειν τοὺς ἀρχοντας ἀλλὰ μὴ πάντα τὸν δῆμον.

Τῶν μὲν οὖν δημοκρατῶν αἱ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται πάσαι σχεδὸν διὰ ταύτας τὰς αὐτίας.

V. Αἱ δ’ ὀλγαρχίας μεταβάλλοναι διὰ2 δύο 1 μάλιστα τρόπους τοὺς φανερωτάτους, ἔνα μὲν εὰν ἀδικῶσι τὸ πλῆθος· πᾶσα γὰρ ἰκανὸς γίνεται προ-

40 στάτης, μάλιστα δ’ ὅταν ἔξ αὐτῆς συμβῇ τῆς ὀλγαρχίας γίνεσθαι τὸν ἱγεμόνα, καθάπερ ἐν Νάξῳ Λύγδαμι, δὲ καὶ ἐτυράννησεν ύπότερον τῶν Ναξίων. ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἢ ἔξ ἄλλων ἀρχὴ στάσεως 2

---

1 ὡς τε ed.: ὡς codd. 2 κατὰ Richards.

---

a Dionysius the elder, see 1259 a 29 n.
had control of many important matters). And moreover, because the cities in those times were not large but the common people lived on their farms busily engaged in agriculture, the people's champions when they became warlike used to aim at tyranny. And they all used to do this when they had acquired the confidence of the people, and their pledge of confidence was their enmity towards the rich, as at Athens Pisistratus made himself tyrant by raising up a party 650 B.C. against the men of the plain, and Theagenes at Megara by slaughtering the cattle of the well-to-do 625 B.C. which he captured grazing by the river, and Dionysius a established a claim to become tyrant when he accused Daphnaeus and the rich, since his hostility to them caused him to be trusted as a true man of the people. And revolutions also take place from the ancestral form of democracy to one of the most modern kind; for where the magistracies are elective, but not on property-assessments, and the people elect, men ambitious of office by acting as popular leaders bring things to the point of the people's being sovereign even over the laws. A remedy to prevent this or to reduce its extent is for the tribes to elect the magistrates, and not the people collectively.

These then are the causes through which almost all the revolutions in democracies take place.

1 V. Oligarchies undergo revolution principally through two ways that are the most obvious. One is if they treat the multitude unjustly; for anybody makes an adequate people's champion, and especially so when their leader happens to come from the oligarchy itself, like Lygdamis at Naxos, who afterwards actually became tyrant of the Naxians. c. 540 B.C.

2 Faction originating with other people also has
The contrasted case, of dissolution of oligarchy arising from the people, should follow, but is omitted.

Cf. 1321 a 29 ff.

Near the mouth of the Danube.

See 1304 b 31 n.

Perhaps not the same as the one mentioned at 1306 b 3.

Just west of Smyrna. The family name implies a claim to royal ancestry.

This sentence is interrupted by a parenthesis and is resumed in § 6, ‘And revolutions in oligarchy also—’.
various ways of arising. Sometimes when the honours of office are shared by very few, dissolution originates from the wealthy themselves, but not those that are in office, as for example has occurred at Marseilles, at Istrus, at Heraclea, and in other states; for those who did not share in the magistracies raised disturbances until as a first stage the older brothers were admitted, and later the younger ones again (for in some places a father and a son may not hold office together, and in others an elder and a younger brother may not). At Marseilles the oligarchy became more constitutional, while at Istrus it ended in becoming democracy, and in Heraclea the government passed from a smaller number to six hundred. At Cnidus also there was a revolution of the oligarchy caused by a faction formed by the notables against one another, because few shared in the government, and the rule stated held, that if a father was a member a son could not be, nor if there were several brothers could any except the eldest; for the common people seized the opportunity of their quarrel and, taking a champion from among the notables, fell upon them and conquered them, for a party divided against itself is weak. Another case was at Erythrae, where at the time of the oligarchy of the Basilidae in ancient days, although the persons in the government directed affairs well, nevertheless the common people were resentful because they were governed by a few, and brought about a revolution of the constitution.

On the other hand, oligarchies are overthrown from within themselves both when from motives of rivalry they play the demagogue (and this dem-
1305 b διττή, ἢ µὲν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὀλίγοις, ἐγγίνεται γὰρ
dημαγωγῶς καὶ πάνυ ὀλίγοι ὀσιν—οὖν ἐν τοῖς
τριάκοντα Ἀθηναῖοι οἱ περὶ Χαρικλεᾶ ἱσχύσαν
τοὺς τριάκοντα δημαγωγοῦντες, καὶ ἐν τοῖς τετρα-
κοσίοις οἱ περὶ Φρύνιχον τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον—, ἢ δὲν
οταν τῶν ὄχλων δημαγωγῶσιν οἱ ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ
ὄντες, οἶνον ἐν Λαρίσῃ οἱ πολιτοφύλακες διὰ τὸ
80 αἱρεῖσθαι αὐτοὺς τὸν ὄχλον ἐδημαγώγουν, καὶ ἐν
ὥσις ὀλιγαρχίας οὐχ οὔτοι οἱ ἀρχαὶ τὰς ἀρχαὶ
ἐξ ὤν οἱ ἀρχοντες εἰσίν ἀλλ' αἱ μὲν ἀρχαὶ έκ
τιμημάτων μεγάλων εἰσίν ἡ ἠταιρίας αἱροῦνται
δὲ οἱ ὅπλα τῇ ὃ δήμος, ὅπερ ἐν Ἀθηναίων συν-
ἐβαινεν, καὶ ὅποι τὰ δικαστήρια μη ἐκ τοῦ πολι-
τεύματος ἐστίν—δημαγωγοῦντες γὰρ πρὸς τὰς
κρίσεις μεταβάλλουσι τὴν πολιτείαν, ὅπερ καὶ ἐν
Ἡρακλεία ἐγένετο τῇ ἐν τῷ Πόντῳ—, ἔτι δὲ
οταν ἐνιοὶ εἰς ἐλάττους ἐλκωσι τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ,
on γὰρ τὸ ἵσον ἔτούντες ἀναγκάζονται βοήθον
ἐπαγαγέσθαι τὸν δήμον). γίγνονται δὲ μεταβολαι
τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ ὅταν ἀναλώσωσι τὰ ἱδια
ζώντες ἀσελγὼς καὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι καυστομοῖς
ζητοῦσι, καὶ ἡ τυραννίδα ἐπιτίθενται αὐτοὶ ἡ
κατασκευάζουσι ἐτερον (ὡσπερ Ἡσσαρίνος Διο-
νύσιον ἐν Συρακούσαις, καὶ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει ὁ
ὀνομα ἣν Κλεότιμος τοὺς ἐποίκους τοὺς Χαλκιδέων
ήγαγε καὶ ἐλθόντων διεστασίασεν αὐτοὺς πρὸς
toὺς εὐπόρους, καὶ ἐν Αἰγίνῃ ὃ τὴν πράξει τὴν

1 ἢ δ' ed.: ἢ codd. 2 αὐτοῖ ? Richards.

* a See 1304 b 12 n. b See 1275 b 29 n.
* i.e. (apparently) where membership is not confined to the
class eligible for the magistracies. d See 1304 b 31 n.
* See 1259 a 29 n. f See 1303 b 2 n.

404
agogy is of two sorts, one among the oligarchs themselves, for a demagogue can arise among them even when they are a very small body,—as for instance in the time of the Thirty at Athens, the party of Charicles rose to power by currying popularity with the Thirty, and in the time of the Four Hundred the party of Phrynichus rose in the same way,—the other when the members of the oligarchy curry popularity with the mob, as the Civic Guards at Larisa courted popularity with the mob because it elected them, and in all the oligarchies in which the magistracies are not elected by the class from which the magistrates come but are filled from high property-grades or from political clubs while the electors are the heavy-armed soldiers or the common people, as used to be the case at Abydos, and in places where the jury-courts are not made up from the government—for there members of the oligarchy by courting popular favour with a view to their trials cause a revolution of the constitution, as took place at Heraclea on the Euxine; and a further instance is when some men try to narrow down the oligarchy to a smaller number, for those who seek equality are forced to bring in the people as a helper.) And revolutions in oligarchy also take place when they squander their private means by riotous living; for also men of this sort seek to bring about a new state of affairs, and either aim at tyranny themselves or suborn somebody else (as Hipparinus put forward Dionysius at Syracuse, and at Amphipolis a man named Cleotimus led the additional settlers that came from Chalcis and on their arrival stirred them up to sedition against the wealthy, and in Aegina
ARISTOTLE

5 πρὸς Χάρητα πράξας ἐνεχείρησε μεταβαλεῖν τὴν πολιτείαν διὰ τοιαύτην αὐτίαν· ὅτε μὲν ὦν ἐπὶ-7 χειροῦσι τι κινεῖν, ὅτε δὲ κλέπτουσι τὰ κοινά, ὅθεν πρὸς αὐτούς στασιάζουσι ἢ οὔτοι ἢ i i πρὸς τοὺ-
10 σουβέβη τῇ ἐν τῷ Πόντῳ. ὁμονοοῦσα δὲ ὀλγαρχιά oúk εὐδιάφθορος εἷς αὐτής· σημεῖον δὲ ἢ ἐν Φαρ-
σάλῳ πολιτείᾳ, ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ ὄλγοι οὕτε πολλῶν κύριοι εἰσὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσαντοι σφίσαν αὐτῶς καλῶς.
καταλύονται δὲ καὶ ὅταν ἐν τῇ ὀλγαρχιᾷ ἐτέραν 8 ὀλγαρχιάν ἐμποιῶσιν. τούτῳ δ' ἐστὶν ὅταν τοῦ
15 παντὸς πολιτεύματος ὄλγον οὕτος τῶν μεγίστων ἀρχῶν μὴ μετέχοντοι οἱ ὄλγοι πάντες· ὅπερ ἐν Ἡλίδι συνεβή ποτὲ, τῆς πολιτείας γὰρ δι' ὄλγων οὕσις τῶν γερόντων ὄλγοι πάμπαν ἐγένοντο διὰ τὸ αἴδιους εἶναι ἐνενήκοντα οὕτως, τὴν δ' αἱρεσιν δυναστευτικὴν εἶναι καὶ ὁμοίαν τῇ τῶν ἐν Λακε-
dαйтесь γερόντων.
20 Γίγνεται δὲ μεταβολὴ τῶν ὀλγαρχικῶν καὶ ἐν 9 πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ· ἐν μὲν πολέμῳ διὰ τὴν πρὸς
tὸν δήμον ἀπιστίαν στρατιώταις ἀναγκαζομένων χρήσαται (ὅ γὰρ ἄν ἐγχειρίσονται, οὕτως πολλάκις
gίγνεται τύραννος, ὅπερ ἐν Κορώνῳ Τιμοφάνης,
25 ἄν δὲ πλεῖον, οὕτωι αὐτοῖς περιποιοῦνται δυνα-
στείαν), ὅτε δὲ ταῦτα δεδιότες μεταδιδόσαι τῷ

1 ὅθεν ἢ αὐτοῖ πρὸς αὐτοὺς στασιάζουσιν ἢ Richards.

a i.e. he had squandered his fortune in riotous living; this deal with the Athenian general may have been in 367 B.C.
b i.e. both of the lower classes and of the subject cities.
c i.e. the small governing body.
d i.e. like a dynasteia, favourable to the interest of a few very wealthy families; see 1292 b 10 n.
e Corinth was at war with Argos c. 350 B.C. Timophanes 406
the man who carried out the transactions with Chares attempted to cause a revolution in the constitution for a reason of this sort a); so sometimes they attempt at once to introduce some reform, at other times they rob the public funds and in consequence either they or those who fight against them in their peculations stir up faction against the government, as happened at Apollonia on the Black Sea. On the other hand, harmonious oligarchy does not easily cause its own destruction; and an indication of this is the constitutional government at Phar-salus, for there the ruling class though few are masters of many men b because on good terms with one another. Also oligarchical governments break up when they create a second oligarchy within the oligarchy. This is when, although the whole citizen class is small, its few members are not all admitted to the greatest offices; this is what once occurred in Elis, for the government being in the hands of a few, very few men used to become members of the Elders, c because these numbering ninety held office for life, and the mode of election was of a dynastic type d and resembled that of the Elders at Sparta.

9 Revolutions of oligarchies occur both during war and in time of peace—during war since the oligarchs are forced by their distrust of the people to employ mercenary troops (for the man in whose hands they place them often becomes tyrant, as Timophanes did at Corinth, e and if they put several men in command, these win for themselves dynastic power), and when through fear of this they give a share in the constitution to the multitude, the oligarchy falls was killed by his brother the famous Timoleon, in order to restore constitutional government.
πλήθει τῆς πολυτείας, διὰ τὸ ἀναγκάζεσθαι τῷ δήμῳ χρήσθαι· ἐν δὲ τῇ εἰρήνῃ διὰ τὴν ἀπεισίαν τὴν πρὸς ἄλληλους ἐγχειρίζουσι τὴν φυλακὴν στρατιώταις καὶ ἁρχοντί μεσιδίω, ὃς ἐνυότε γίνεται κύριος ἀμφοτέρων, ὅπερ σωνεβή ἐν Δαρίῳ ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν Ἀλευαδῶν ἀρχῆς τῶν· περὶ Σίμων καὶ ἐν Ἀβύδω ἐπὶ τῶν ἑταρίων δὲν ἦν μία ἡ Ἰφιάδου. γίνονται δὲ στάσεις καὶ έκ τοῦ περισσεύοντοι 10 ἐτέρους ὑφ’ ἐτέρων τῶν ἐν τῇ ὀλυγαρχίᾳ αὐτῶν καὶ καταστασίαζεσθαι κατὰ γάμους ἡ δίκας, οἶνον ἐκ γαμικῆς μὲν αἰτίας αἱ εἰρημέναι πρότερον, καὶ τῆν ἐν Ἑρετρίᾳ δ’ ὀλυγαρχίαν τὴν τῶν ἱππέων Διαγόρας κατέλυσεν ἀδικήθηκεν περὶ γάμου, ἐκ δὲ δικαστηρίων κρίσεως ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ στάσις ἐγένετο καὶ ἡ 2 ἐν Θήβαις, ἐπ’ αἰτίας μοιχείας δικαίως μὲν στασιστικῶς δὲ ποιησαμένων τῆν κόλασιν τῶν μὲν ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ κατ’ Ἐιριτέρων τῶν δ’ ἐν Θήβαις κατ’ Ἀρχίον· ἐφιλόνεικησαν γὰρ αὐτοὺς 3 οἱ ἐχθροί ὡστε δεθήναι ἐν ἄγορα ἐν τῷ κύφων. πολλαὶ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ ἁγαν δεσποτικὰς 11 εἶναι τὰς ὀλυγαρχίας ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ πολυτείᾳ τῶν δ’ δυσχερανάτων κατελύθησαν, ἤσπερ ἤ ἐν Κνίδῳ καὶ ἤ ἐν Χίῳ ὀλυγαρχίᾳ. γίγνονται δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ συμπτώματος μεταβολαὶ καὶ τῆς καλομενῆς πολυτείας καὶ τῶν ὀλυγαρχῶν ἐν ὀσαις ἀπὸ τιμή-

1 τῶν non vertit Guil.: τοῖς Niemeyer.

A probable emendation of the Greek gives ‘happened at Larisa to Simus and his party at the time of the government of the Aleuadæ.’ This family were hereditary rulers of Larisa (see also 1275 b 29 ff. n., and 1305 b 29 ff.).
because they are compelled to make use of the common people; during peace, on the other hand, because of their distrust of one another they place their protection in the hands of mercenary troops and a magistrate between the two parties, who sometimes becomes master of both, which happened at Larisa in the time of the government of the Aleuadae led by Simus, and at Abydos in the time of the political clubs of which that of Iphiades was one.

And factions arise also in consequence of one set of the members of the oligarchy themselves being pushed aside by another set and being driven into party strife in regard to marriages or law-suits; examples of such disorders arising out of a cause related to marriage are the instances spoken of before, and also the oligarchy of the knights at Eretria was put down by Diagoras when he had been wronged in respect of a marriage, while the faction at Heraclea and that at Thebes arose out of a judgement of a law-court, when the people at Heraclea justly but factiously enforced the punishment against Eurytion on a charge of adultery and those at Thebes did so against Archias; for their personal enemies stirred up party feeling against them so as to get them bound in the pillory in the market-place. Also many governments have been put down by some of their members who had become resentful because the oligarchies were too despotic; this is how the oligarchies fell at Cnidus and at Chios. And revolutions also occur from an accident, both in what is called a constitutional government and in those oligarchies in

---

\* Possibly before the Persian wars. See 1289 b 36 ff. The two following cases are unrecorded elsewhere.
\* See 1305 b 13 n.
ματος Βουλεύουσι καὶ δικάζουσι καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς ἀρχουσιν. πολλάς γὰρ τὸ ταχθεὶν πρῶτον 10 τίμημα πρὸς τοὺς παρόντας καρπούς, ὥστε μετέχειν ἐν μὲν τῇ ὀλγαρχίᾳ ὀλίγους ἐν δὲ τῇ πολιτείᾳ τοὺς μέσους, εὐετηρίας δὲ εἰρήνην ἢ δὲ ἄλλην τῶν εὐτυχίας συμβαίνει πολλαπλασιοῦ γίγνεσθαι τιμήματος ἀξίας τὰς αὐτὰς κτήσεις, ὥστε πάντας πάντων μετέχειν, ὅτε μὲν ἐκ προσ- 15 ἄγωγῆς καὶ κατὰ μικρὸν γνωριμίας τῆς μεταβολῆς καὶ λαμβανούσης, ὅτε δὲ καὶ θάττων.

Αἱ μὲν οὖν ὀλγαρχίᾳ μεταβάλλουσι καὶ στασιά- 12 ζουσι διὰ τοιαύτας αἰτίας (ὅλως δὲ καὶ αἱ δημο- κρατίαι καὶ ὀλγαρχίαι εξίστανται ἐνίοτε οὐκ εἰς τὰς ἐναντίας πολιτείας ἀλλ’ εἰς τὰς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει, 20 οἴον έκ τῶν εὐανόμων δημοκρατίων καὶ ὀλγαρχίων εἰς τὰς κυρίους καὶ έκ τούτων εἰς ἐκεῖνας).

VI. Ἔν δὲ ταῖς ἀριστοκρατίαις γίγνονται αἱ 1 στάσεις αἱ μὲν διὰ τὸ ὀλίγους τῶν τιμῶν μετέχειν (ὅπερ εἰρήται κινεῖν καὶ τὰς ὀλγαρχίας, διὰ τὸ 25 καὶ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν ὀλγαρχίαν εἶναι πως, ἐν ἀμφοτέραις γὰρ ὀλίγοι οἱ ἀρχοντες—οὐ μεντοι διὰ ταυτών ὀλίγων—ἐπεὶ δοκεῖ γε διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ή ἀριστοκρατία ὀλγαρχία εἶναι). μάλιστα δὲ τούτο συμβαίνειν ἀναγκαίον ὅταν ή τις πλῆθος τῶν πεφρονηματισμένων ὡς ὀμοίων κατ’ ἀρετὴν (ὄιον 80 ἐν Λακεδαιμονί οἱ λεγόμενοι Παρθενίαι—ἐκ τῶν

1 γὰρ <εί καί ικανών> Richards.
2 εὐετηρίας <δὲ> Immisch.
3 τι Congreve: τò codd.
4 ὀμοίων Lambinus: ὀμοίων codd.

See 1806 a 13 ff.
which membership of the council and the law-courts and tenure of the other offices are based on a property-qualification. For often the qualification first having been fixed to suit the circumstances of the time, so that in an oligarchy a few may be members and in a constitutional government the middle classes, when peace or some other good fortune leads to a good harvest it comes about that the same properties become worth many times as large an assessment, so that all the citizens share in all the rights, the change sometimes taking place gradually and little by little and not being noticed, but at other times more quickly.

Such then are the causes that lead to revolutions and factions in oligarchies (and generally, both democracies and oligarchies are sometimes altered not into the opposite forms of constitution but into ones of the same class, for instance from legitimate democracies and oligarchies into autocratic ones and from the latter into the former).

VI. In aristocracies factions arise in some cases because few men share in the honours (which has also been said to be the cause of disturbances in oligarchies, because an aristocracy too is a sort of oligarchy, for in both those who govern are few—although the reason for this is not the same in both—since this does cause it to be thought that aristocracy is a form of oligarchy). And this is most bound to come about when there is a considerable number of people who are proud-spirited on the ground of being equals in virtue (for example the clan called the Maidens' Sons at Sparta—for

\footnote{Said to be descended from irregular unions authorized in order to keep up the population during the First Messenian War. They founded Taranto 708 B.C.}
1307 b

ομοίων γὰρ ἦσαν,—οὖς φωράσαντες ἐπιβουλεύσαν-
tας ἀπέστειλαν Τάραντος οἰκιστάς). ἦν δὲν τινὲς 2
ἀτιμάζωνται μεγάλοι ὄντες καὶ μηθενὸς ἦττους
κατ' ἄρετήν υπὸ τινῶν ἐντιμοτέρων (οἶνον Λύσανδρος
ὑπὸ τῶν βασιλέων). ἦν δὲν ἀνδρώδης τις ὁν μὴ
μετέχῃ τῶν τιμῶν (οἶνον Κυνάδων ὃ τὴν ἐπ' Ἀγη-
σιλάου1 συστήσας ἐπίθεσιν ἐπὶ τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας).
ἐτι δὲν οἱ μὲν ἀπορώσι λιαν οἱ δ' εὐπορώσι
(καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις τοῦτο γίνεται,
συνέβη δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἐν Λακεδαίμον ὑπὸ τὸν
Μεσσηνικὸν πόλεμον—δῆλον δὲ [καὶ τοῦτο]2 ἐκ
πῆς Τυρταίου ποιῆσεως τῆς καλομείνης Εὐνομίας.
θλιβόμενοι γὰρ τινὲς διὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἥξιον ἀναδάστον ποιεῖν τὴν χώραν). ἐτι ἐὰν τις μέγας
ὦ καὶ δυνάμενος ἐτι μεῖζων εἶναι, ὣν μοναρχῇ
(ὕστερ ἐν Λακεδαίμον δοκεῖ Παυσανίας ὃ στρα-
τηγῆσας κατὰ τὸν Μηδικὸν πόλεμον καὶ ἐν
Καρχηδόνω Ἀινων).

Ἀυτοῖς δἐ μάλιστα αἱ τε πολιτείαι καὶ αἱ 3
ἀριστοκρατίαι διὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πολιτείᾳ τοῦ
dικαίου παρέκβασιν. ἀρχῆ γὰρ τὸ μὴ μεμίχθαι
καλῶς ἐν μὲν τῇ πολιτείᾳ δημοκρατίαι καὶ ὀλγ-
αρχίαν ἐν δὲ τῇ ἀριστοκρατίᾳ ταῦτα τε καὶ τὴν
ἀρετήν, μάλιστα δὲ τὰ δύο (λέγω δὲ τὰ δύο δῆμον

1 Ἀγησιλάου Schneider: -λῶν codd.
2 Verrall (καὶ non vertit Guil.).

a King Pausanias II. checked Lysander after his conquest of Athens in 403 B.C., and King Agesilaus thwarted him on the expedition into Asia Minor in 396.

b His conspiracy against the "Ὀμοίων in 398 B.C. was discovered and he was executed.
they were descended from the Equals—whom the Spartans detected in a conspiracy and sent away to colonize Tarentum); or when individuals although great men and inferior to nobody in virtue are treated dishonourably by certain men in higher honour (for example Lysander by the kings); or when a person of manly nature has no share in the honours (for example Cinadon, who got together the attack upon the Spartans in the reign of Agesilaus). Faction in aristocracies also arises when some of the well-born are too poor and others too rich (which happens especially during wars, and this also occurred at Sparta at the time of the Messenian War—as appears from the poem of Tyrtaeus entitled Law and Order; for some men being in distress because of the war put forward a claim to carry out a re-division of the land of the country). Also if a man is great and capable of being yet greater, he stirs up faction in order that he may be sole ruler (as Pausanias who commanded the army through the Persian war seems to have done at Sparta, and Hanno at Carthage).

But the actual overthrow of both constitutional governments and aristocracies is mostly due to a deviation from justice in the actual framework of the constitution. For what starts it in the case of a constitutional government is that it does not contain a good blend of democracy and oligarchy; and in the case of an aristocracy it is the lack of a good blend of those two elements and of virtue, but chiefly of the two elements (I mean popular government and

c Perhaps Hanno who fought in Sicily against the elder Dionysius c. 400 B.C.
καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν), ταῦτα γὰρ αἱ πολιτεῖαι τε πειρώνται μιγνῦναι καὶ αἱ πολλαὶ τῶν καλουμένων ἀριστοκρατίαν. διαφέρουσι γὰρ τῶν ὄνομαζο-μένων πολιτείων αἱ ἀριστοκρατίαι τοῦτω, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' εἰσὶν αἱ μὲν ἢττον αἱ δὲ μᾶλλον μόνιμοι αὐτῶν. τὰς γὰρ ἀποκλίνουσας μᾶλλον πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἀριστοκρατίας καλοῦσιν, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος πολιτείας, διότι ἀσφαλέστερα αἱ τοιαῦται τῶν ἐτέρων εἰσὶν, κρεῖττον τε γὰρ τὸ πλείων καὶ μᾶλλον ἀγαπῶσιν ἵσον ἔχοντες, οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς εὐπορίαις, ἥν ἡ πολιτεία διδᾷ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν, ύβρίζειν ξητοῦσι καὶ πλεονεκτεῖν. ὅλως δ' ἐφ' ὀπότερον ἂν ἐγκλίψῃ η ἡ πολιτεία, ἐπὶ τοῦτοι μεθίσταται ἐκατέρω τὸ σφέτερον αὐξανόντων, οἴον ἡ μὲν πολιτεία εἰς δὴμον ἀριστοκρατία δ' εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν, ἡ εἰς τάναντια, οἴον ἡ μὲν ἄριστοκρατία εἰς δήμου (ὡς ἀδικούμενοι γὰρ περισσῶν εἰς τούναντιον οἱ ἀπορώτεροι) αἱ δὲ πολιτείαι εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν (μόνον γὰρ μόνιμον τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἵσον καὶ τὸ ἐχεῖν τὰ αὐτῶν). συνέβη δὲ τὸ εἰρήμενον εἰν Θουρίων: διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀπὸ πλείων τιμήματος εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς εἰς ἐλαττὸν μετέβη καὶ εἰς ἀρχεῖα πλείω, διὰ δὲ τὸ τὴν χώραν ὅλην τοὺς γνωρίμους συγκτῆσασθαι παρὰ τὸν νόμον (ἡ γὰρ

---

1 τοῦτο (uel ὀπότερα) Spengel: ταῦτα codd.

---

a i.e. their mode of blending oligarchy and democracy.

b The writer loosely speaks of aristocracies and polities as a single class, differing only in degree of concentration of power in the hands of the upper classes.

c i.e. from aristocracy to democracy. Possibly these events occurred after the defeat of Athens at Syracuse in 413 B.C., when the Athenian party at Thurii was banished.
POLITICS, V. vi. 3-6

oligarchy), for both constitutional governments and most of the constitutions that are called aristocracies aim at blending these. For this is the point of distinction between aristocracies and what are called constitutional governments, and it is owing to this that some of them are less and others more stable; for the constitutions inclining more towards oligarchy men call aristocracies and those inclining more to the side of the multitude constitutional governments, owing to which those of the latter sort are more secure than the others, for the greater number is the stronger, and also men are more content when they have an equal amount, whereas the owners of wealthy properties, if the constitution gives them the superior position, seek to behave insolently and to gain money. And speaking broadly, to whichever side the constitution leans, that is the side to which it shifts as either of the two parties increases its own side—a constitutional government shifts to democracy and an aristocracy to oligarchy, or to the opposite extremes, that is, aristocracy to democracy (for the poorer people feeling they are unjustly treated pull it round to the opposite) and constitutional governments to oligarchy (for the only lasting thing is equality in accordance with desert and the possession of what is their own). And the change mentioned came about at Thurii, for because the property-qualification for honours was too high, the constitution was altered to a lower property-qualification and to a larger number of official posts, but because the notables illegally bought up the whole of the land (for the constitution (Lysias 835 ν). The events in § 8 were perhaps in the fourth century.
ARISTOTLE

1307 a

πολιτεία ὀλυγαρχικωτέρα ἢν, ὡστε ἐδύναντο πλεονεκτεῖν). . . 1 ὁ δὲ δῆμος γυμνασθεὶς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τῶν φρουρῶν ἐγένετο κρέιττων, ἕως ἀφείσαν τῆς χώρας ὅσοι πλείω ἦσαν ἔχοντες.

"Ετὶ διὰ τὸ πάσας τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς πολιτείας 7 ὀλυγαρχικὰς εἶναι μᾶλλον πλεονεκτοῦσιν οἱ γνώριμοι (οἶνον καὶ ἐν Δακεδαίμον εἰς ὀλίγους αἱ οὐσίαι ἔρχονται). καὶ ἔξεστί ποιεῖν ὃ τι ἂν θέλωσι τοῖς γνωρίμοις μᾶλλον, καὶ κηδεύειν ὅτε θέλωσιν (διὸ καὶ ἦ Δοκρῶν πόλις ἀπωλεῖτο ἐκ τῆς πρὸς Διονύσιον κηδείας, δὲ ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ οὐκ ἂν ἐγένετο, οὔτε ἂν ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ εὐθέαμην).

μάλιστα δὲ λανθάνουσιν αἱ ἀριστοκρατικαὶ μεταβάλλουσι τῷ λύεσθαι κατὰ μικρόν, ὅπερ ἐφηται ἐν τοῖς πρότερον καθόλου κατὰ πασῶν τῶν πολιτεῶν, ὅτι αὐτοὶ τῶν μεταβολῶν καὶ τὸ μικρόν ἔστων ὅταν γὰρ τι προῶται τῶν πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἄλλο μικρῷ μείζον εὐχερέστερον κινοῦσι, ἐφ' ὃν πάντα κινήσωσι τὸν κόσμον. συνέβη δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς Θω- 8 ρίων πολιτείας. νόμον γὰρ ὅντος διὰ πέντε ἔτων στρατηγεῖν, γενόμενοι τινες πολεμικοὶ τῶν νεωτέρων καὶ παρὰ τῷ πλήθει τῶν φρουρῶν εὐδοκιμοῦντες, καταφρονήσαντες τῶν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ νομίζοντες ῥάδιως κατασχῆσειν, τοῦτον τὸν νόμον λύειν ἐπεχείρησαν πρῶτον, ὡστ' ἔξειν ταύτα αὐτούς συνεχῶς στρατηγεῖν, ὡράντες τὸν δήμον αὐτούς χειροτονήσοντα προθύμως. οἱ δ' 1

1 lacunam vel vitium Schneider.

---

1 Probably a clause meaning 'civil strife ensued' has been lost.

416
was too oligarchical, so that they were able to grasp at wealth) . . .\(^a\) And the people having been trained in the war overpowered the guards, until those who were in the position of having too much land relinquished it.

7 Besides, as all aristocratic constitutions are inclined towards oligarchy, the notables grasp at wealth (for example at Sparta the estates are coming into a few hands); and the notables have more power to do what they like, and to form marriage connexions with whom they like (which was the cause of the fall of the state of Locri, as a result of the marriage with Dionysius,\(^b\) which would not have taken place in a democracy, nor in a well-blended aristocracy). And aristocracies are most liable to undergo revolution unobserved, through gradual relaxation, just as it has been said in what has gone before about all forms of constitution in general, that even a small change may cause a revolution. For when they give up one of the details of the constitution, afterwards they also make another slightly bigger change more readily, until they alter the whole system. This occurred for instance with the constitution of Thurii. There was a law that the office of general could be held at intervals of four years, but some of the younger men, becoming warlike and winning high repute with the mass of the guards, came to despise the men engaged in affairs, and thought that they would easily get control; so first they tried to repeal the law referred to, so as to enable the same persons to serve as generals continuously, as they saw that the people would vote for themselves with enthusiasm.

\(^a\) See 1259 a 28 n. He married in 397 B.C. the daughter of a Locrian citizen, who bore him the younger Dionysius.
ARISTOTLE

1807 b

επὶ τοῦτω τεταγμένοι τῶν ἄρχοντων, οἱ καλοῦμενοι
15 σύμβουλοι, ὁρμήσαντες τὸ πρῶτον ἐναντιοῦσθαι
συνεπείσθησαν, ὑπολαμβάνοντες τοῦτον κινήσαν-
tας τὸν νόμον εἴσειν τὴν ἄλλην πολιτείαν,
ὕστερον δὲ βουλόμενοι κωλύειν ἄλλων κινουμένων
οὐκέτι πλέον ἐποίουν οὔθεν, ἀλλὰ μετέβαλεν ἡ
τάξις πᾶσα τῆς πολιτείας εἰς δυναστείαν τῶν
ἐπιχειρησάντων νεωτερίζειν.

20 Πάσαι δὴ αἱ πολιτείαι λύονται ὅτε μὲν ἐξ ἀυτῶν ὅτε
dὲ ἐξωθεν, ὅταν ἐναντία πολιτεία ἢ ἡ
πλησίον ἢ πόρρω μὲν ἔχουσα δὲ δύναμιν. ὅπερ
συνέβαινεν ἐπὶ Ἀθηναίων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων· οἱ
μὲν γὰρ Ἀθηναίοι πανταχοῦ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας οἱ
dὲ Λάκωνες τοὺς δήμους κατέλυσον.

25 Οθεν μὲν οὖν αἱ μεταβολαὶ γίγνονται τῶν
πολιτειῶν καὶ αἱ στάσεις, εἰρήται σχεδὸν.
VII. Περὶ δὲ σωτηρίας καὶ κοινῆ καὶ χωρὶς ἡ
ἐκάστης πολιτείας ἔχομενόν ἐστιν εἰςεῖν. πρῶτον
μὲν οὖν δῆλον ὅτι εἰπερ ἔχομεν δι' ὅν φθειρονται
αἱ πολιτεῖαι ἔχομεν καὶ δι' ὅν σύζονται· τῶν γὰρ
28 ἐναντίων τάναντία ποιητικά, φθορὰ δὲ σωτηρία
ἐναντίον. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς εἰς κεκραμέναις πολι-
teiαις, εἰπερ ἀλλο τὴ δὲ τηρεῖν ὅπως μηθὲν
παρανομώσω, καὶ μάλιστα τὸ μικρὸν φυλάσσων
λανθάνει γὰρ παραδουμένη ἡ παρανομία, ὁσπερ 2
τὰς οὐσίας αἱ μικραὶ δαπάναι δαπανῶσι πολλάκις
35 γινόμεναι· λανθάνει γὰρ ἡ δαπάνη διὰ τὸ μὴ

1 εἰπερ Richards: ὁσπερ codd.
2 παραδουμένη ἡ παρανομία (ex Plat. de rep. 424 d) M8P1:
ὑπεισόνυσα ἡ παράβασις cet.
3 δαπάνη: ἀπάτη M8, μετάβασις Par.
And though the magistrates in charge of this matter, called the Councillors, at first made a movement to oppose them, they were won over, believing that after repealing this law they would allow the rest of the constitution to stand; but later, though they wished to prevent them when other laws were being repealed, they could no longer do anything more, but the whole system of the constitution was converted into a dynasty of the men who had initiated the innovations.

And constitutions of all forms are broken up sometimes from movements initiating from within themselves, but sometimes from outside, when there is an opposite form of constitution either near by or a long way off yet possessed of power. This used to happen in the days of the Athenians and the Spartans; the Athenians used to put down oligarchies everywhere and the Spartans democracies.

We have then approximately stated the causes that give rise to revolutions in the constitutions of states and to party factions.

VII. The next thing to speak about is security both in general and for each form of constitution separately. First then it is clear that if we know the causes by which constitutions are destroyed we also know the causes by which they are preserved; for opposites create opposites, and destruction is the opposite of security. In well-blended constitutions therefore, if care must be taken to prevent men from committing any other breach of the law, most of all must a small breach be guarded against, for transgression of the law creeps in unnoticed, just as a small expenditure occurring often ruins men's estates; for the expense is not noticed because it
αἱρόα γίγνεσθαι, παραλογίζεται γαρ ἡ διάνοια ὑπ’ αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος ‘εἰ ἔκαστον μικρὸν, καὶ πάντα.’ τοῦτο δ’ ἐστι μὲν ὡς, ἐστὶ δ’ ὡς ὁτ’ ὧ τὸ γὰρ ὅλον καὶ τὰ πάντα οὐ μικρὸν ἀλλὰ σύγκειται ἐκ μικρῶν. μίαν μὲν οὖν φυλα-
κήν πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ἀρχήν δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι, ἔπειτα

μη πιστεύειν τοῖς σοφισματος χάριν πρὸς τὸ πλήθος συγκειμένους, ἐξελέγχεται γαρ ὑπὸ τῶν ἔργων (ποῖα δὲ λέγομεν τῶν πολιτειών σοφισματα, πρότερον εἰρηται). ἐτι δ’ ὅραν ὅτι ἐναι μένουσιν οὐ 3 μόνον ἀριστοκρατίαν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν οὐ διὰ τὸ ἀσφαλείς εἶναι τὰς πολιτείας ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ εὖ ἄρχεσθαι τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς γνωμένους καὶ τοὺς ἔξω τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι, τοὺς μὲν μὴ μετέχοντας τῷ μὴ ἄδικεῖν καὶ τῷ τοὺς ἴγεμονικοὺς αὐτῶν εἰσάγειν εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν καὶ τοὺς μὲν φιλοτίμους μὴ ἄδικεῖν εἰς ἀτιμίαν τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς εἰς κέρδος, πρὸς αὐτοὺς δὲ καὶ τοὺς μετέχοντας τῷ χρήσθαι ἀλλήλους δημοτικῶς. ὁ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ πλῆθους ζητοῦσιν οἱ δημοτικοὶ τὸ ἴσον, τούτ’ ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμοίων οὐ μόνον δίκαιον ἀλλὰ καὶ συμφέρον ἐστίν. διὸ ἐὰν πλείους ὤσιν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι, πολλὰ συμφέρει τῶν δημοτικῶν νομοθετημάτων, οἶον τὸ ἐξαμήνους τὰς ἀρχὰς εἶναι, ἵνα πάντες οἱ ὁμοίοι μετέχωσιν· ἐστὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ δήμος ἢ ὁ ὁμοίοι (διὸ καὶ ἐν τούτως ἐγγίζονται δημαγωγοὶ πολλάκις, ὥσπερ εἰρηται πρῶτερον), ἔπειθ’ ἦττον εἰς δυναστείας ἐμπίπτουσιν αἱ ὀλγ-

a See Additional Note on p. 483.
does not come all at once, for the mind is led astray by the repeated small outlays, just like the sophistic puzzle, ‘if each is little, then all are a little.’ This is true in one way but in another it is not; for the whole or total is not little, but made up of little parts. One thing therefore that we must guard against is this beginning; and the next point is that we must not put faith in the arguments strung together for the sake of tricking the multitude, for they are refuted by the facts (and what sort of constitutional sophistries we refer to has been said before). And again we must observe that not only some aristocracies but also some oligarchies endure not because the constitutions are secure but because those who get in the offices treat both those outside the constitution and those in the government well, on the one hand by not treating those who are not members of it unjustly and by bringing their leading men into the constitution and not wronging the ambitious ones in the matter of dishonour or the multitude in the matter of gain, and on the other hand, in relation to themselves and those who are members, by treating one another in a democratic spirit. For that equality which men of democratic spirit seek for in the case of the multitude is not only just but also expedient in the case of their compeers. Hence if there are a greater number in the governing class, many of the legislative enactments of a democratic nature are advantageous, for example for the offices to be tenable for six months, to enable all the compeers to participate in them; for the compeers in this case are as it were the people (owing to which demagogues often arise even among them, as has been said already), and also oligarchies and aristocracies fall into dyn-
αρχίαι καὶ ἀριστοκρατίαι (οὐ γὰρ ὀμοίως ράδιον ἐκατέρα ἐπιτίθενται τυραννίδες. ἦ γὰρ οἱ μέγιστοι ἐν δημοκρατίαις γίνονται τυραννοὶ, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ὁλιγορχίαις καὶ πολλοῖς ἔπει διὰ τοῦτο ἐν ταῖς ὁλιγαρχίαις καὶ δημοκρατίαις γίνονται τυραννίδες. ὦ τίς, καὶ δὴ αἱ πολιτείαι οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ πόρρω ἐπιτίθενται τυραννοὶ, ἐν δὲ τοῖς δημοκρατίαις γίνονται τυραννοὶ, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ὁλιγαρχίαις γίνονται τυραννοὶ, ἐν δὲ τοῖς δημοκρατίαις γίνονται τυραννοὶ, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ὁλιγαρχίαις γίνονται τυραννοὶ, ἐν δὲ τοῖς δημοκρατίαις γίνονται τυραννοὶ, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ὁλιγαρχίαις γίνονται τυραννοὶ, ἐν δὲ τοῖς δημοκρατίαις γίνονται τυραννοὶ, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ὁλιγαρχίαις γίνονται τυραννοὶ, ἐν δὲ τοῖς δημοκρατίαις γίνονται τυραννοὶ, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ὁλιγαρχίαις γίνονται τυραννοὶ, ἐν δὲ τοῖς δημοκρατίαις γίνονται τυραννοὶ, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ὁλιγαρχίαις γίνονται τυραννοὶ, ἐν δὲ τοῖς δημοκρατίαις γίνονται τυραννοὶ, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ὁλιγαρχίαις γίνονται τυραννοὶ, ἐν δὲ τοῖς δημοκρατίαις γίνονται τυραννοὶ, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ὁλιγαρχίαις γίνονται τυραννοὶ, ἐν δὲ τοῖς δημοκρατίαις γίνονται τυραννοὶ, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ὁλιγαρχίαις γίνονται τυραννοὶ, ἐν δὲ τοῖς δημοκρατίαις γίνονται τυραννοὶ, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ὁλιγαρχίαις γίνονται τυραννοὶ, ἐν δὲ τοῖς δημοκρατίαις γίνονται τυραννοὶ, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ὁλιγαρχίαις γί

---

* This modifies 1207 a 31.
asties less (for it is not so easy to do wrongs when in office for a short time as when in for a long time, since it is long tenure of office that causes tyrannies to spring up in oligarchies and democracies; for either those who are the greatest men in either sort of state aim at tyranny, in the one sort the demagogues and in the other the dynasts, or those who hold the greatest offices, when they are in office for a long time).

And constitutions are kept secure not only through being at a distance from destroyers but sometimes also through being near them, for when they are afraid the citizens keep a closer hold on the government; hence those who take thought for the constitution must contrive causes of fear, in order that the citizens may keep guard and not relax their vigilance for the constitution like a watch in the night, and they must make the distant near. Again, they must also endeavour to guard against the quarrels and party struggles of the notables by means of legislation, and to keep out those who are outside the quarrel before they too have taken it over; since to discern a growing evil at the commencement is not any ordinary person’s work but needs a statesman.

And to deal with the revolution from oligarchy and constitutional government that arises because of the property-qualifications, when this occurs while the rates of qualification remain the same but money is becoming plentiful, it is advantageous to examine the total amount of the rated value of the community as compared with the past amount, in states where the assessment is made yearly, over that period, and three years or five years ago in the larger states, and if the new total is many times larger or many times smaller than the former one at the time when
teias, nómoi eînai kai tâ tîmîmatâ épiteîneîn ã
5 ânînai, éán mên úperbâllî épiteînountas kata tîn pòllaplaqísîas, éán d' ëlleîptî ânîntas kai ëlattî poiîntîas tîn tîmînas. év1 gâr tâis òlîgârrhias kai tâis politeîias mî poiîntîos, óútîs mên* ènînta mên òlîgârrhias ènînta de ënuastîas gînnesîai sympânêi, èkêînos de èk mên politeîas deîmokrâtiian èk d' òlîgârrhias politeîias ã deîmou. kîonos de kai èn dîmou kai òlîgârrhias [kai èn mîonarhîa]9 kai pásy politeîa mî't' aûzâneîv4 lîas mûthêna pârâ tîn sýmmetriân allâ màllîos peîrâos kai poluvronîous dîdînai tîmîs ã tâxuv5 megalas (diasphêrîntai gâr, kai fêreîn oû pantaos ândrûs eûtvîxîan), eî de mî, mî tòi y' âðróa dûntas âfârîntaî pâtîn âðróa allê èk prosagwghîs' kai màlistu mên peîrâs tòis s nómuoi óútîs âgên oîste mûthêna ègînnesîai polû úperêqûnta dûnamêi mîte fîlwî mîte chrîmaton, eî de mî, âpòdhîmêtîkas poieîstha tâs paraustasîes àuvûwn. ëpetê de kai diâ tòus idîous bîous nevterî- zônou, deî èmîpoieîn aðrhîn tîna tîn èpofhimênh tòus èwntas àsumphûros prôs tîn poluteîan, èn mên deîmokrâtiâ prôs tîn deîmokrâtiâ, èn de òlîgârrhia prôs tîn òlîgârrhia, òmôiwos de kai tûn allûn poluteîôn èkásth. kai tò ènûmerûn

1 èv Susemihl: èv mên codd.
2 Niemeyer: mên óútîs codd.
3 om. codd. cet. 4 aûzâneîv ðêîv? ed.
5 tâxû vîx sanum: breviter et Guil., bpraxû kai Susemihl, bpraXûronîous kai Sepulveda.

a i.e. if the total valuation has decreased.
b i.e. if the total has increased.
c Some mss. and many editors omit these words.

424
the rates qualifying for citizenship were fixed, it is advantageous that there should be a law for the magistrates correspondingly to tighten up or to relax the rates, tightening them up in proportion to the ratio of increase if the new total rated value exceeds the old, and relaxing them and making the qualification lower if the new total falls below the old. For in oligarchies and constitutional states, when they do not do this, in the one case the result is that in the latter an oligarchy comes into existence and in the former a dynasty, and in the other case a constitutional government turns into a democracy and an oligarchy into a constitutional government or a government of the people. But it is a policy common to democracy and oligarchy [and to monarchy], and every form of constitution not to raise up any man too much beyond due proportion, but rather to try to assign small honours and of long tenure or great ones quickly (for officials grow corrupt, and not every man can bear good fortune), or if not, at all events not to bestow honours in clusters and take them away again in clusters, but by a gradual process; and best of all to try so to regulate people by the law that there may be nobody among them specially pre-eminent in power due to friends or wealth, or, failing this, to cause their periods out of office to be spent abroad. And since men also cause revolutions through their private lives, some magistracy must be set up to inspect those whose mode of living is unsuited to the constitution—unsuited to democracy in a democracy, to oligarchy in an oligarchy, and similarly for each of the other forms of constitution.

The text should probably be emended 'with a short tenure.'
ARISTOTLE

1308 b 25 δὲ τῆς πόλεως ἀνὰ μέρος φυλάττεσθαι διὰ τὰς αὐτὰς αἰτίας τούτου δ’ ἀκος τὸ αἰεὶ τοῖς ἀντικε-
μένοις μορίοις ἐγχειρίζειν τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς (λέγω δ’ ἀντικείσθαι τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς τῷ πλήθει
καὶ τοὺς ἀπόρους τοῖς εὐπόροις), καὶ τὸ πει-
ρᾶσθαι ἢ συμμιγνύναι τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων πλήθος
καὶ τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων ἢ τὸ μέσον αὐξεῖν (τούτο
γὰρ διαλύει τὰς διὰ τὴν ἀνισότητα στάσεις).
μέγιστον δὲ ἐν πάσῃ πολιτείᾳ τὸ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις καὶ τῇ ἀλήθειας ὀικονομία ὦ
τετάχθαι ὥστε μὴ εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς κερδαίνειν.
τούτῳ δὲ μάλιστα ἐν ταῖς ὀλγαρχικαῖς δὲ τηρεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ὦτος ἀγανα-
κτοῦσι εἰργόμενοι τοῦ ἀρχεῖν οἱ πολλοὶ (ἀλλὰ
καὶ χαίρονσι εάν τις ἕν πρὸς τοὺς ἱδίους σχολά-
ζειν) ὡς ἕαν οἶωνται τὰ κοινά κλέπτειν τοὺς
ἀρχωτάτας, τότε δ’ ἀμφότερα λυπεῖ, τὸ τε τῶν
τμῶν μὴ μετέχειν καὶ τὸ τῶν κερδῶν. μοναχῶς δὲ καὶ
καὶ ἐνδεχεσθαι ἀμα εἶναι δημοκρατίαν καὶ
ἀριστοκρατίαν, εἴ τοῦτο κατασκευάσει τίς· ἐν-
1309 a δέχοιτο γὰρ ἂν καὶ τοὺς γνωρίμους καὶ τὸ πλῆθος
ἐχειν ἃ βουλούσαι ἀμφιτέρους· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐξεῖναι
πάσιν ἀρχεῖν δημοκρατίαν καὶ τὸ δὲ τους γνωρίμους
εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἀριστοκρατίαν, τοῦτο δ’
ἐσται όταν μὴ ἢ κερδαίνειν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν· οἱ
γὰρ ἀποροὶ οὐ βούλησονται ἀρχεῖν τῷ μηδὲν
κερδαίνειν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῖς ἱδίοις εἶναι μᾶλλον, οἱ
δ’ εὐποροὶ δυνηθοῦσαν διὰ τὸ μηδὲν προσδεῖσθαι
tῶν κοινῶν· ὅστε συμβάλλεται τοῖς μὲν ἀπόροις γί-

* i.e. render it impossible to make money out of office.
And also sectional prosperity in the state must be guarded against for the same reasons; and the way to avert this is always to entrust business and office to the opposite sections (I mean that the respectable are opposite to the multitude and the poor to the wealthy), and to endeavour either to mingle together the multitude of the poor and that of the wealthy or to increase the middle class (for this dissolves party factions due to inequality). And in every form of constitution it is a very great thing for it to be so framed both by its laws and by its other institutions that it is impossible for the magistracies to make a profit. And this has most to be guarded against in oligarchies; for the many are not so much annoyed at being excluded from holding office (but in fact they are glad if somebody lets them have leisure to spend on their own affairs) as they are if they think that the magistrates are stealing the common funds, but then both things annoy them, exclusion from the honours of office and exclusion from its profits.

And indeed the sole way in which a combination of democracy and aristocracy is possible is if someone could contrive this arrangement; for it would then be possible for the notables and also the multitude both to have what they want; for it is the democratic principle for all to have the right to hold office and the aristocratic one for the offices to be filled by the notables, and this will be the case when it is impossible to make money from office; for the poor will not want to hold office because of making nothing out of it, but rather to attend to their own affairs, while the wealthy will be able to hold office because they have no need to add to their resources from the public funds; so that the result will be that the poor
Groups of citizens normally three to a tribe, supposed to be based on relationship.

Originally a military, later a civil classification.
POLITICS, V. vii. 10-13

will become well-off through spending their time upon their work, and the notables will not be governed by any casual persons. Therefore to prevent peculation of the public property, let the transfer of the funds take place in the presence of all the citizens, and let copies of the lists be deposited for each brotherhood, company and tribe; and to get men to hold office without profit there must be honours assigned by law to officials of good repute. And in democracies it is necessary to be sparing of the wealthy not only by not causing properties to be divided up, but not incomes either (which under some constitutions takes place unnoticed), and it is better to prevent men from undertaking costly but useless public services like equipping choruses and torch-races and all other similar services, even if they wish to; in an oligarchy on the other hand it is necessary to take much care of the poor, and to allot to them the offices of profit, and the penalty if one of the rich commits an outrage against them must be greater than if it is done by one of themselves, and inheritance must not go by bequest but by family, and the same man must not inherit more than one estate, for so estates would be more on a level, and more of the poor would establish themselves as prosperous. And it is expedient both in a democracy and in an oligarchy to assign to those who have a smaller share in the government—in a democracy to the wealthy and in an oligarchy to the poor—either equality or precedence in all other things excepting the supreme offices of state; but

Constitutional safeguards in democracies and in oligarchie

Equipping the chorus and actors for tragedies and comedies and providing for the ceremonial torch-races were public services borne by individuals at Athens.

Or possibly ' than if he does it against one of his own class.'
1309 a
taútas dè toîs èk tîs polioteîas éγχειρίζειν mónous ἥ πλείσσων.

Tría dé tìnà khrh éxein tòus mëllontas árxein 14 tás kuriás áρχâs, prôtovn mèn fîlián pròs tìn kathèstwosan polioteîan, épeita dûnamîn meγîsthn tòw èrgwv tîs áρχhς, trítovn d' árætîn kai dîkaiosûnîn èv èkásth polioteîa tîn pròs tìn polioteîan (eî gàp mû tawtûn to dîkaiov kata pássas tás polioteîas, ánâγkê kai tîs dîkaiosûnîs èînai diafôrâs). étôi d' àpôriâv, étovn mû sùmbâvnh 40 taúta pánta pèri tòn aútvn, pówv khrh poieîsthai tîn àîrèsvn1. óîon eî stratýngkôs mév tîs eîn pònhrôs dè kai mû tî polioteîa fîlos, d' dè dîkaios kai fîlos,² pówv déi poieîsthai tîn àîrèsvn; éovke 15 dè déiwn blèpewn eis dúo, tînos pleetôn metèkousai pântes kai tînos èlattovn. diô èv stratýngkh mév eîs tîn èmpeirìan mâllon tîs árætîs, èlattovn gàr stratýngkias metèkousai, tîs d' èpîneikêias pleetôn- èn dè fûlakhy kai tâmêía tânântia, pleetônvs gàr árætîs déiâta ÿ òschn oî polloî èxhouv, ÿ dè èpîsthîn kouvî pássyn. àporhêmei d' àn tîs kàv dûnamîs úpàrçh kai tîs polioteîas3 fîliâ, tî déi tîs árætîs; poûseî gàr tà suîmphiôronta kai tà dúo. ÿ òti ènêxêtai toûs tà dúo taúta èxontas ākratêsîs èînai, òwste kathâpêr kai aútvos oûch ûpîrêtoûsîn eîðôtes kai fîlòûntes aútvos, ouîw

1 àîrèsvn corr. cod. inferior: diaîrèsvn cet.
2 fîlos mû stratýngkôs dè codd. nonnulli.
3 kai post polioteîas codd., tr. Stahr.
these should be entrusted to those prescribed by the constitution exclusively, or to them for the most part.

14 There are some three qualities which those who are to hold the supreme magistracies ought to possess, first, loyalty to the established constitution, next, very great capacity to do the duties of the office, and third, virtue and justice—in each constitution the sort of justice suited to the constitution (for if the rules of justice are not the same under all constitutions, it follows that there must be differences in the nature of justice also). It is a difficult question how the choice ought to be made when it happens that all these qualities are not found in the same person; for instance, if one man is a good military commander but a bad man and no friend of the constitution, and the other is just and loyal, how should the choice be made? It seems that two things ought to be considered, what is the quality of which all men have a larger share, and what the one of which all have a smaller share? Therefore in the case of military command one must consider experience more than virtue, for men have a smaller share of military experience and a larger share of moral goodness; but in the case of a trusteeship or a stewardship the opposite, for these require more virtue than most men possess, but the knowledge required is common to all men. And somebody might raise the question, why is virtue needed if both capacity and loyalty to the constitution are forthcoming, as even these two qualities will do what is suitable? May not the answer be, because those who possess these two qualities may possibly lack self-control, so that just as they do not serve themselves well although they know how to and
καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν οὕθεν κωλύει ἔχειν ἐνίους, ἀπλῶς δὲ, ὅσα ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ὑπὸ συμφέροντα λέ- 16
15 γομεν τὰς πολιτείας, ἀπαντά ταῦτα σφὶξει τὰς πολιτείας, καὶ τὸ πολλάκις εἰρημένον μέγιστον στοιχεῖον, τὸ τηρεῖν ὅπως κρεῖττον ἔσται τὸ βουλόμενον τὴν πολιτείαν πλήθος τοῦ μὴ βουλο-
μένου. παρὰ πάντα δὲ ταῦτα δεὶ μὴ λανθάνειν, ὃ ὑνν λανθάνει τὰς παρεκβεβηκυίας πολιτείας, τὸ
20 μέσον: πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν δοκούτων δημοτικῶν λύει τὰς δημοκρατίας καὶ τῶν ὁλιγαρχικῶν τὰς ὁλι-
γαρχίας. οἱ δ’, οἰόμενοι ταύτην εἶναι μίαν ἀρετήν, 17
ἐλκουσιν εἰς τὴν ὑπερβολήν, ἀγνοοῦντες ὅτι καθάπερ ρήσ ἐστι παρεκβεβηκυία μὲν τὴν εὐθύτητα τὴν καλλιστὴν πρὸς τὸ γρυπὸν ἢ τὸ σιμὸν ἄλλ’
25 ὡμως ἐτὶ καλὴ καὶ χάριν ἔχουσα πρὸς τὴν ὁψιν, οὐ μὴν ἄλλῃ ἐὰν ἐπιτείνῃ τις ἔτι μᾶλλον εἰς τὴν ὑπερβολήν, πρῶτον μὲν ἀποβαλεὶ τὴν μετριότητα τὸν μορίον τέλος δ’ οὔτως ὡστε μηδὲ βία
ποιήσει φαίνεσθαι διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἔλλευψιν τῶν ἐναντίων (τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει
30 καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων μορίων), συμβαίνει δὴ τοῦτο καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας: καὶ γὰρ ὁλιγαρχίαν 18
καὶ δημοκρατίαν ἐστιν ὡστ’ ἔχειν ἰκανός, καὶ περὶ ἔξεστηκυίας τῆς βελτίστης τάξεως, ἐὰν δὲ τις
ἐπιτείνῃ μᾶλλον ἐκατέραν αὐτῶν, πρῶτον μὲν ἱερῶ ποιήσει τὴν πολιτείαν, τέλος δ’ οὐ ἔτι πολι-
35 τείαν. διὸ δεὶ τοῦτο μὴ ἀγνοεῖν τὸν νομοθέτην

* See 1279 a 20.
although they love themselves, so possibly in some cases they may behave in this way in regard to the community also? And broadly, whatever provisions in the laws we describe as advantageous to constitutions, these are all preservative of the constitutions, and so is the supreme elementary principle that has been often stated, that of taking precautions that the section desirous of the constitution shall be stronger in number than the section not desirous of it. And beside all these matters one thing must not be overlooked which at present is overlooked by the deviation-forms of constitution—the middle party; for many of the institutions thought to be popular destroy democracies, and many of those thought oligarchical destroy oligarchies.

But the adherents of the deviation-form, thinking that this form is the only right thing, drag it to excess, not knowing that just as there can be a nose that although deviating from the most handsome straightness towards being hooked or snub nevertheless is still beautiful and agreeable to look at, yet all the same, if a sculptor carries it still further in the direction of excess, he will first lose the symmetry of the feature and finally will make it not even look like a nose at all, because of its excess and deficiency in the two opposite qualities (and the same is the case also in regard to the other parts of the body), so this is what happens about constitutions likewise; for it is possible for an oligarchy and a democracy to be satisfactory although they have diverged from the best structure, but if one strains either of them further, first he will make the constitution worse, and finally he will make it not a constitution at all. Therefore the legislator and the statesman must not fail to
καὶ τὸν πολιτικὸν, ποῖα σώζει τῶν δημοτικῶν καὶ ποῖα φθείρει τὴν δημοκρατίαν, καὶ ποῖα τῶν ὀλυγαρχικῶν τὴν ὀλυγαρχίαν. οὐδετέραν μὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται αὐτῶν εἶναι καὶ διαμένειν ἀνευ τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ τοῦ πλῆθους, ἀλλὰ ὅταν διμαλότης γενηται τῆς οὐσίας, ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη εἶναι ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν, ὥστε φθείροντες τοὺς καθ' ὑπεροχὴν νόμους φθείρουσι τὰς πολιτείας. ἀμαρτάνουσι δὲ καὶ εὖ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις καὶ εὖ ταῖς ὀλυγαρχίαις, ἐν μὲν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις οἱ δημαγωγοὶ, ὅπου τὸ πλῆθος κύριον τῶν νόμων· δύο γὰρ ποιοῦσιν ἀεὶ τὴν πόλιν μαχόμενοι τοὺς εὐπόρους, δεὶ δὲ τούναντίον αἰεὶ δοκεῖν λέγειν ὑπὲρ εὐπόρων, ἕν δὲ ταῖς ὀλυγαρχίαις ὑπὲρ τοῦ δήμου τοὺς ὀλυγαρχικοὺς, καὶ τοὺς ὀρκους ἐναντίους ἢ νῦν ὀμνύουν τοὺς ὀλυγαρχικοὺς, νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἐν ἐνίαις ὀμνύουσιν "καὶ τῷ δήμῳ κακὸνς ἔσομαι καὶ βουλεύσω ὅ τι ἂν ἔχω κακόν," χρῆ δὲ καὶ ὑπολαμβάνειν καὶ ὑποκρίνεσθαι τούναντίον, ἐπισημανομένους ἐν τοῖς ὀρκοὺς ὧτι "οὐκ ἄδικήσω τὸν δήμον." μέγιστον δὲ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων πρός τὸ διαμένειν τὰς πολιτείας, οὗ νῦν ὀλυγροῦσι πάντες, τὸ παιδεύεσθαι πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας. ὁφελος γὰρ οὐθὲν τῶν ὦφελος τῶν εὐπόρων νόμων καὶ συνδεδεξασμένων ὑπὸ πάντων τῶν πολιτευμένων, εἰ μὴ ἔσονται ἐθισμένοι καὶ πεπαιδευμένοι ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ, εἰ μὲν οἱ νόμοι δημοτικοὶ, δημοτικῶς, εἰ δ' ὀλυγαρχικοί,

1 τῶν εὐπόρων cod. inferior.

a The ‘scoffing anapaestic cadence’ of this oath has been noted. In 411 b.c. the democratic reaction at Athens swore 434
know what sort of democratic institutions save and what destroy a democracy, and what sort of oligarchical institutions an oligarchy; for neither constitution can exist and endure without the well-to-do and the multitude, but when an even level of property comes about, the constitution resulting must of necessity be another one, so that when men destroy these classes by laws carried to excess they destroy the constitutions. And a mistake is made both in democracies and in oligarchies—in democracies by the demagogues, where the multitude is supreme over the laws; for they always divide the state into two by fighting with the well-to-do, but they ought on the contrary always to pretend to be speaking on behalf of men that are well-to-do, while in democracies the oligarchical statesmen ought to pretend to be speaking on behalf of the people, and the oligarchies ought to take oath in terms exactly opposite to those which they use now, for at present in some oligarchies they swear, "And I will be hostile to the people and will plan whatever evil I can against them," but they ought to hold, and to act the part of holding, the opposite notion, declaring in their oaths, "I will not wrong the people." But the greatest of all the means spoken of to secure the stability of constitutions is one that at present all people despise: it is a system of education suited to the constitutions. For there is no use in the most valuable laws, ratified by the unanimous judgement of the whole body of citizens, if these are not trained and educated in the constitution, popularly if the laws are popular, oligarchically if they are oligarchical; 'to be enemies of the Four Hundred and to hold no parley with them.'
1310 a

ολιγαρχικῶς· εἰπερ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐφ᾽ ἐνὸς ἀκρασία,
20 ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπὶ πόλεως. ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ πεπαιδεύσθαι 21
πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν ὦ τούτο, τὸ ποιεῖν ὅσα χαίρουσιν
οἱ ολιγαρχοῦντες ἢ οἱ δημοκρατίαν βουλόμενοι,
ἀλλ’ ὁσ δυνάσσονται ὅμεν οἰ οἱ οἱ ολιγαρχεῖν οἱ δὲ δημο-
κρατεῖσαν. νῦν δὲ ἐν μὲν ταῖς ολιγαρχίαις οἱ
tῶν ἄρχοντων νεότεροι τρυφῶσιν, οἱ δὲ τῶν ἀπόρων
25 γίνονται γεγυμνασμένοι καὶ πεπονηκότες, ὡστε
καὶ βούλονται μᾶλλον καὶ δύνανται νεωτερίζειν·
ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ταῖς μάλιστα εἶναι 22
dοκούσασι δημοκρατικάς τοῦ ἄντων τοῦ συμ-
φέροντος καθέστηκεν. αὐτοῖς δὲ τούτου ὅτι κακῶς
ὁρίζονται τὸ ἐλεύθερον (δύο γὰρ ἐστὶν ὅσ ἡ
δημοκρατία δοκεῖ ὃρισθαι, τῷ τὸ πλεῖον εἶναι
28 κύριον καὶ τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ); τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἄκαθον
ἰσον1 δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἵσον δ’ ὅ τ’ ἄν δόξη τῷ πλῆθει
tοῦτ’ εἶναι κύριον, ἐλεύθερον δὲ [καὶ ἵσον]2 τοῦ τ’
ἄν βουληταί τις ποιεῖν· ὡστε ζή ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις
dημοκρατίαις ἐκαστὸς ὃς βουλεῖται, καὶ εἰς ὅ
χρῆζων, ὃς φησίν Εὐριπίδης. τοῦτο δ’ ἔστι
35 φαύλον· οὐ γὰρ δεῖ οἰκεῖον δουλεῖαν εἶναι τὸ ζήν
πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν ἀλλὰ σωτηρίαν.

Ἐξ ὁν μὲν οὖν αἱ πολιτεῖαι μεταβάλλουσι καὶ
φθείρονται καὶ διὰ τῶν σωρίζονται καὶ διαμένουσιν,
ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπέων τοσαῦτὰ ἐστὶν.

VIII. Δείπτεται δ’ ἐπελθεῖν καὶ περὶ μοναρχίας, 1

εξ ὁν τε φθείρεται καὶ δι’ ὅν σωρίζονται πεφυκέν.

1310 b σχέδον δὲ παραπλήσια τοῖς εἰρημένοις περὶ τὰς
πολιτείας ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ συμβαίνοντα περὶ τὰς

1 ισον ante δίκαιον Richards.
2 Spengel.

a Fragment 883, from an unknown play.
for there is such a thing as want of self-discipline in a state, as well as in an individual. But to have been educated to suit the constitution does not mean to do the things that give pleasure to the adherents of oligarchy or to the supporters of democracy, but the things that will enable the former to govern oligarchically and the latter to govern themselves democratically. But at present in the oligarchies the sons of the rulers are luxurious, and the sons of the badly-off become trained by exercise and labour, so that they are both more desirous of reform and more able to bring it about; while in the democracies thought to be the most democratic the opposite of what is expedient has come about. And the cause of this is that they define liberty wrongly (for there are two things that are thought to be defining features of democracy, the sovereignty of the majority and liberty); for justice is supposed to be equality, and equality the sovereignty of whatever may have been decided by the multitude, and liberty doing just what one likes. Hence in democracies of this sort everybody lives as he likes, and 'unto what end he listeth,' as Euripides a says. But this is bad; for to live in conformity with the constitution ought not to be considered slavery but safety.

This therefore, speaking broadly, is a list of the things that cause the alteration and the destruction of constitutions, and of those that cause their security and continuance.

1 VIII. It remains to speak of monarchy, the causes that destroy it and the natural means of its preservation. And the things that happen about royal governments and tyrannies are almost similar to those that have been narrated about constitu-

---

a Euripides: Ancient Greek dramatist.
1310 b

βασιλείας καὶ τὰς τυραννίδας. ἡ μὲν γὰρ βασιλεία κατὰ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν ἐστὶν, ἡ δὲ τυραννίς ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας τῆς ύστατῆς σύγκειται καὶ δημοκρατίας, διὸ δὴ καὶ βλαβερωτάτη τοῖς ἀρχομένοις ἐστὶν, ἂτε ἐκ δυνῶν συγκειμένη κακῶν καὶ τὰς παρεκβάσεις καὶ τὰς ἀμαρτίας ἔχουσα τὰς παρ’ ἀμφοτέρων. ὑπάρχει δ’ ἡ γένεσις εὐθὺς 2 εἴς ἐναντίων ἐκατέρα τῶν μοναρχῶν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ βασιλεία πρὸς βοήθειαν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ δήμου τοῖς ἑπιεικέσι γέγονεν, καὶ καθίσταται βασιλεὺς ἐκ τῶν ἑπιεικῶν καθ’ ὑπεροχὴν ἀρετῆς ἢ πράξεων τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἢ καθ’ ὑπεροχὴν τοιοῦτον γένους, ὃ δὲ τύραννος ἐκ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τοῦ πλῆθους ἐπὶ τοὺς γνωρίμους, ὅπως ὁ δῆμος ἀδικήται μηθεὶν ὑπ’ αὐτῶν. φανερῶν δ’ ἐκ τῶν συμβεβηκότων. 3

15 σχεδὸν γὰρ ὦ πλείστοι τῶν τυράννων γεγόνασιν ἐκ δημαγωγῶν ὡς ἑπείν, πιστευθέντες ἐκ τοῦ διαβάλλειν τοὺς γνωρίμους. αἱ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον κατέστησαν τῶν τυραννίδων ἡδη τῶν πόλεων γνωρίμων, αἱ δὲ πρὸ τοῦτον ἐκ [τε] 2 τῶν βασιλέων παρεκβαίνοντων τὰ πάτρια καὶ δεσποτικῶτερας ἀρχῆς ὑποχομένων, αἱ δ’ ἐκ τῶν αἱρετῶν ἐπὶ τὰς κυρίας ἀρχὰς (τὸ γὰρ ἀρχαῖον οἱ δῆμοι καθίστασαν πολυχρονίους τὰς δημοσιευρίας καὶ τὰς θεωρίας), αἱ δ’ ἐκ τῶν ὀλιγαρχῶν αἱρετῶν ἐνα τινὰ κύριον ἐπὶ τὰς μεγίστας ἀρχὰς. πάσι γὰρ ὑπῆρχε τοῖς τρόποις τούτοις τὸ κατεργά- 4

25 ζεσθαὶ βαδίως, εἰ μόνον βουλήθειεν, διὰ τὸ δύναμιν

1 ἐπὶ τὸν δῆμον Rassow.
2 [τε] om. cod. inferior.

a Cf. 1296 a 3, 1312 b 35.
b Here δημοσιεύρεια means 'magistracy' generally; δημοσιεύρος was the title of a special officer in some Peloponnesian states.
political governments. For royal government corresponds with aristocracy, while tyranny is a combination of the last form of oligarchy and of democracy; and for that very reason it is most harmful to its subjects, inasmuch as it is a combination of two bad things, and is liable to the deviations and errors that spring from both forms of constitution. And these two different sorts of monarchy have their origins from directly opposite sources; royalty has come into existence for the assistance of the distinguished against the people, and a king is appointed from those distinguished by superiority in virtue or the actions that spring from virtue, or by superiority in coming from a family of that character, while a tyrant is set up from among the people and the multitude to oppose the notables, in order that the people may suffer no injustice from them. And this is manifest from the facts of history. For almost the greatest number of tyrants have risen, it may be said, from being demagogues, having won the people's confidence by slander ing the notables. For some tyrannies were set up in this manner when the states had already grown great, but others that came before them arose from kings departing from the ancestral customs and aiming at a more despotic rule, and others from the men elected to fill the supreme magistracies (for in old times the peoples used to appoint the popular officials and the sacred embassies for long terms of office), and others from oligarchies electing some one supreme official for the greatest magistracies. For in all these methods they had it in their power to effect their purpose easily, if only they wished, because they already

\[\text{439}\]
ARISTOTLE

1310 b προϋπάρχειν τοῖς μὲν βασιλικὴς ἀρχῆς τοῖς δὲ τῇ τῆς τιμῆς, οἳον Φείδων μὲν περὶ Ἀργος καὶ ἑτεροι τύραννοι κατέστησαν βασιλείας ὑπαρχοῦσις, οἵ δὲ περὶ τὴν 'Ἰωνίαν καὶ Φάλαιροι ἐκ τῶν τιμῶν, Παναίτιος δ' ἐν Λεοντίνοις καὶ Κύπελος ἐν Κορίνθῳ καὶ Πεισίστρατος Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Διονύσιος ἐν Συρακούσαις καὶ ἑτεροι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐκ δημαγωγίας. καθάπερ οὖν εἶπομεν, ἡ βασιλεία 5 τετακταὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν κατ᾽ ἀξίαν γάρ ἐστιν, ἡν κατ᾽ ἱδίαι ἄρετὴν ἡ κατὰ γένους ἡ κατ᾽ εὐεργεσίαν ἡ κατὰ ταύτα τε καὶ δύναμιν.

35 ἀπαντες γάρ εὐεργετήσαντες ἡ δυνάμενοι τὰς πόλεις ἡ τὰ ἐθνη εὐεργετεῖν ἐτύγχανον τῆς τιμῆς ταύτης, οἳ μὲν κατὰ πόλειν κωλύσαντες δουλεύειν, ὡσπερ Κόδρος, οἵ δ’ ἐλευθερώσαντες, ὡσπερ Κύρος, ἡ κτίσαντες ἡ κτησάμενοι χώραν, ὡσπερ οἱ Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεῖς καὶ Μακεδόνων καὶ Μολοττῶν. βούλεται δ’ ὃ βασιλεύς εἶναι φύλαξ, 6

1311 a ὅπως ὦ τοῖς μὲν κεκτημένοι τὰς οὐσίας μηθὲν ἄδικον πάσχοσιν ὃ δὲ δήμος μὴ ὑβρίζῃται μηθὲν, ἡ δὲ τυραννίς, ὡσπερ εἰρηται πολλάκις, πρὸς οὖν ἀποβλέπει κοινὸν εἰ μὴ τῆς ἱδίας ὕφελείας χάριν. 5 ἐστι δὲ σκοπός τυραννικὸς μὲν τὸ ἣδυ βασιλικὸς δὲ τὸ καλὸν. διὸ καὶ τῶν πλεονεκτημάτων τὰ μὲν χρήματα ὑπερανάκτος τὰ δ’ εἰς τιμὴν βασιλικὰ μᾶλλον καὶ φυλακὴ βασιλικὴ ἐν πολιτικῇ, τυραν-

χρήματων Γ; <eis> χρήματα ? Susemihl.

---

a Perhaps c. 750 B.C.

b e.g. Thrasybulus, tyrant of Miletus, 612 B.C.

c Tyrant of Agrigentum 572 B.C.

See 1305 a 23 n.

See 1259 a 28 n.

440
possessed the power of royal rule in the one set of cases and of their honourable office in the other, for example Phidon in Argos and others became tyrants when they possessed royal power already, while the Ionian tyrants and Phalaris rose from offices of honour, and Panaetius at Leontini and Cypselus at Corinth and Pisistratus at Athens and Dionysius at Syracuse and others in the same manner from the position of demagogue. Therefore, as we said, royalty is ranged in correspondence with aristocracy, for it goes by merit, either by private virtue or by family or by services or by a combination of these things and ability. For in every instance this honour fell to men after they had conferred benefit or because they had the ability to confer benefit on their cities or their nations, some having prevented their enslavement in war, for instance Codrus, others having set them free, for instance Cyrus, or having settled or acquired territory, for instance the kings of Sparta and Macedon and the Molossians. And a king wishes to be a guardian, to protect the owners of estates from suffering injustice and the people from suffering insult, but tyranny, as has repeatedly been said, pays regard to no common interest unless for the sake of its private benefit; and the aim of tyranny is what is pleasant, that of royalty what is noble. Hence even in their requisitions money is the aim of tyrants but rather marks of honour that of kings; and a king's bodyguard consists of citizens, a tyrant's of foreign

The usual tradition was that Codrus was already king when he saved Athens by sacrificing his life.

Cyrus liberated Persia from the Median empire 559 B.C.

Neoptolemus, son of Achilles, conquered the Molossi and became their king.
νικῇ δὲ διὰ ξένων. ὅτι δ' ἡ τυραννίς ἕχει κακὰ 7
καὶ τὰ τῆς δημοκρατίας καὶ τὰ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας,
10 φανερῶν· ἐκ μὲν ὀλιγαρχίας τὸ τὸ τέλος εἶναι
πλοῦτον (οὔτω γὰρ καὶ διαμένειν ἀναγκαῖον μόνως
τὴν τε φιλακῆν καὶ τὴν τρυφῆν) καὶ τὸ τῷ πλῆθει
μηδὲν πιστεύειν (διὸ καὶ τὴν παραίρεσιν ποιοῦνται
τῶν ὀπλῶν, καὶ τὸ κακοῦν τὸν ὅχλον καὶ τὸ ἐκ
τοῦ ἀστεοῦ ἀπελαύνειν καὶ διοικίζειν ἀμφοτέρων
15 κοινῶν, καὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ τῆς τυραννίδος),
ἐκ δημοκρατίας δὲ τὸ πολεμεῖν τοῖς γνωρίμοις καὶ
διαφθείρειν λάθρα καὶ φανερῶς καὶ φυγαδεύειν ὡς
ἀντιτέχνους καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐμποδίουσι· ἐκ
γὰρ τούτων συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὰς ἑπιβουλάς,
τῶν μὲν ἄρχειν αὐτῶν βουλομένων, τῶν δὲ μὴ
dουλεύειν. ὃθεν καὶ τὸ Περιάνδρου πρὸς Ὑρασύ-
βουλον συμβούλευμα ἡστιν, ἡ τῶν ὑπερεχόντων
σταχυῶν κόλουσις, ὡς δέον ἄει τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας
τῶν πολιτῶν ἄναρεῖν. καθάπερ οὖν σχεδὸν 8
ἐλέχθη, τὰς αὐτὰς ἄρχας δεὶ νομίζειν περὶ τε τὰς
πολιτείας εἶναι τῶν μεταβολάν καὶ περὶ τὰς
25 μοναρχίας· διὰ τε γὰρ ἄδικῶν καὶ διὰ φοβῶν καὶ
diὰ καταφρόνησιν ἐπιτίθενται πολλοὶ τῶν ἄρχο-
μένων ταῖς μοναρχίαις, τῆς δὲ ἄδικας μάλιστα
2 δ' ὤβριν, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἴδιων στέρησιν.
ἐστι δὲ καὶ τὰ τέλη ταύτα καθάπερ κάκει καὶ περὶ
30 τὰς τυραννίδας καὶ τὰς βασιλείας· μέγεθος γὰρ
ὑπάρχει πλοῦτον καὶ τιμῆς τοῖς μονάρχοις, ὃν

1 σχεδὸν post ἐλέχθη Spengel (om. ΓΜΠ¹).
2 μάλιστα <μὲν> ? ed.

⁴ See 1284 a 26 n.
mercenaries. And it is manifest that tyranny has the evils of both democracy and oligarchy; it copies oligarchy in making wealth its object (for inevitably that is the only way in which the tyrant’s bodyguard and his luxury can be kept up) and in putting no trust in the multitude (which is why they resort to the measure of stripping the people of arms, and why ill-treatment of the mob and its expulsion from the city and settlement in scattered places is common to both forms of government, both oligarchy and tyranny), while it copies democracy in making war on the notables and destroying them secretly and openly and banishing them as plotting against it and obstructive to its rule. For it is from them that counter-movements actually spring, some of them wishing themselves to rule, and others not to be slaves. Hence comes the advice of Periander to Thrasybulus, his docking of the prominent cornstalks, meaning that the prominent citizens must always be made away with.

Therefore, as was virtually stated, the causes of revolutions in constitutional and in royal governments must be deemed to be the same; for subjects in many cases attack monarchies because of unjust treatment and fear and contempt, and among the forms of unjust treatment most of all because of insolence, and sometimes the cause is the seizure of private property. Also the objects aimed at by the revolutionaries in the case both of tyrannies and of royal governments are the same as in revolts against constitutional government; for monarchs possess great wealth and great honour, which are

This has not been stated, but can be inferred from what precedes.
ARISTOTLE

1311a εφίενται πάντες. τῶν δ' ἐπιθέσεων αἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ σώμα γίγνονται τῶν ἄρχοντων αἱ δ' ἐπὶ τήν ἀρχήν, αἱ μὲν οὖν δ' ὑβριν ἑπὶ τὸ σῶμα· τῆς δ' υβρεως οὕσης πολυμεροῦς, ἡκαστὸν αὐτῶν αὐτιὼν γίγνεται τῆς ὄργης, τῶν δ' ὄργυομένων σχεδὸν οἱ πλεῖστοι τιμωρίας χάριν ἐπιτίθενται ἄλλοι οὐχ ὑπεροχῆς· οἶνον ἢ μὲν τῶν Πεισοτρατιδῶν διὰ τὸ προπηλακίσαι μὲν τὴν Ἀρμοδίου ἀδελφὴν, ἔπηρεάσα δ' Ἀρμοδίου (ὁ μὲν' γὰρ Ἀρμόδιος διὰ τὴν ἀδελφὴν δ' ἂριστογείτων διὰ τὸν Ἀρμόδιον,

1311b ἐπεβούλευσαν δὲ καὶ Περιάνδρῳ τῷ ἐν Ἀμφρακίᾳ τυράννῳ διὰ τὸ συμπινύοντα μετὰ τῶν παιδικῶν ἐρωτημέναι αὐτῶν εἴ ἦδη εἴς αὐτοῦ κύρε), ἡ δὲ Φιλίππου ὑπὸ Παυσανίου διὰ τὸ ἐᾶσαι υβρισθῆναι αὐτῶν ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ Ἀτταλοῦ, καὶ ἡ Ἀμύντου τοῦ μικροῦ ὑπὸ Δέρδα, διὰ τὸ καυχήσασθαι εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἡ τοῦ εὐνοῦχου Εὐαγόρα τῷ Κυπρίῳ, διὰ γὰρ τὴν γυναῖκα παρελέσθαι τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ ἀπεκτείνειν ὡς υβρισμένοις. πολλαὶ δ' ἐπιθέσεως γεγένηται καὶ διὰ τὸ εἰς τὸ σώμα αἰσχύνεσθαι τῶν μονάρχων τινῶν· οἶνον καὶ ἡ Κραταίου εἰς Ἀρχέλαου· ἀεὶ γὰρ βαρέως εἴχε πρὸς τὴν ὀμλίαν, ὥστε ἱκανὴ καὶ ἐλάττων ἐγένετο πρόφασις, ἡ διότι τῶν θυγατέρων οὐδεμίαν ἐδωκεν ὁμολογήσας αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν προτεραν κατ' ἐχόμενος ὑπὸ πολέμου πρὸς Σίρραν καὶ Ἀρράβαιον ἐδωκε τῷ βασιλεῖ τῷ τῆς Ἐλιμείας, τὴν δὲ νεω-

1 μὲν om. mg. H.

2 Ἀμύντου ὑπὸ Δέρδα [τοῦ μικροῦ] Thompson.

3 Ἰρραν Paton (sic Plutarchus et Strabo).

See 1304 a 31 n.

A Macedonian youth of family, who murdered Philip 336 B.C. Attalus was the uncle of Philip’s wife Cleopatra.

444
9 desired by all men. And in some cases the attack is aimed at the person of the rulers, in others at their office. Risings provoked by insolence are aimed against the person; and though insolence has many varieties, each of them gives rise to anger, and when men are angry they mostly attack for the sake of revenge, not of ambition. For example the attack on the Pisistratidae took place because they outraged Harmodius’s sister and treated Harmodius with contumely (for Harmodius attacked them because of his sister and Aristogiton because of Harmodius, and also the plot was laid against Periander the tyrant in Ambracia because when drinking with his favourite he asked him if he was yet with child by him), and the attack on Philip by Pausanias was because he allowed him to be insulted by Attalus and his friends, and that on Amyntas the Little by Derdas because he mocked at his youth, and the attack of the eunuch on Evagoras of Cyprus was for revenge, for he murdered him as being insulted, because Evagoras’s son had taken away his wife.

11 And many risings have also occurred because of shameful personal indignities committed by certain monarchs. One instance is the attack of Crataeas on Archelaus; for he was always resentful of the association, so that even a smaller excuse became sufficient, or perhaps it was because he did not give him the hand of one of his daughters after agreeing to do so, but gave the elder to the king of Elimea when hard pressed in a war against Sirras and Arrabaeus, and

Perhaps the adjective should be transferred to Derdas and expunged as an interpolated note. The persons referred to are uncertain.

King of Macedon 413-399 B.C. Euripides went to reside at his court 408 B.C. and died there 406 B.C. at the age of 75.
τέραν τῷ νυεῖ Ἀμίντα οὐόμενος οὕτως ἄν ἐκεῖνον 

ηκιστά διαφέρεσθαι καὶ τὸν ἐκ τῆς Κλεοπάτρας· 

ἀλλὰ τῆς γε ἀλλοτριότητος ὑπήρχεν ἀρχῇ τὸ 

βαρέως φέρειν πρὸς τὴν ἀφροδιαστικήν χάριν. 

συνεπέθετο δὲ καὶ Ἐλλανοκράτης ὁ Λαρίσαίος 12 

diὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αὐτίαν· ώς γάρ χρώμενος αὐτὸν τῇ 

ηλικίᾳ οὐ κατῆγεν ὑποσχόμενος, δι’ ὕβριν καὶ οὗ 

di’ ἐρωτικῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ ὑμὲν εἶναι τὴν γεγενημένην 

ομιλίαν. Πῦθων δὲ καὶ Ἡρακλείδης οἱ Λύνοι 

Κότυν διέφθειραν τῷ πατρὶ τιμωροῦντες, Ἀδάμας 

δ’ ἀπέστη Κότυνς διὰ τὸ ἐκτυμηθῆναι παῖς ὃν ὑπ’ 

αὐτοῦ, ως ὑβρισμένος. πολλοὶ1 δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ εἰς 13 

tὸ σῶμα ἀικιωθῆναι πληγαῖς ὀργισθέντες οἱ μὲν 

dιέφθειραν οὐ γὰρ ἐνεχείρησαν ως ὑβρισθέντες, καὶ 

tὸν περὶ τὰς ἁρχὰς καὶ βασιλικὰς δυναστείας, οἷον 

eὰν Μιτυλήνη τοὺς Πενθιλίδας Μεγακλῆς περιοῦντας 

καὶ τύπτοντας ταῖς κορώναις ἐπιθέμενοι μετὰ τῶν 

φίλων ἀνείλεν, καὶ ὑστερὸν Σμέρδις Πένθιλον 

πληγάς λαβὼν καὶ παρὰ τῆς γυναικὸς ἐξελκουθεὶς 

dιέφθειρεν. καὶ τῆς Ἀρχελάου δ’ ἐπιθέσεως 

Δεκάμυκχος ἡγεμῶν ἐγένετο, παροξύνων τοὺς 

ἐπιθεμένους πρῶτος· αὐτίον δὲ τῆς ὀργῆς ὧτι 

αὐτὸν ἐξέδωκε μαστυγώσαι Εὐρипίδη τῷ ποιητῇ. 

ὁ δ’ Εὐριπίδης ἐχαλέπανεν εἰπόντος τι αὐτοῦ εἰς 

dυσώδιαν τοῦ στόματος. καὶ ἄλλοι δὲ πολλοὶ διὰ 14 

τοιαύτας αὐτίας οἱ μὲν ἀνηρέθησαν οἱ δ’ ἐπεβου- 

λεύθησαν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ διὰ φόβον· ἐν γάρ τι 

1 πολλοὶς Richards.

* King of Thrace 382-358 B.C.

b The ruling family in the early oligarchy there, claiming 
descent from Penthilus, an illegitimate son of Orestes.

446
the younger to his son Amyntas, thinking that thus Amyntas would be least likely to quarrel with his son by Cleopatra; but at all events Crataeas's estrangement was primarily caused by resentment because of the love affair. And Hellanocrates of Larisa also joined in the attack for the same reason; for because while enjoying his favours Archelaus would not restore him to his home although he had promised to do so, he thought that the motive of the familiarity that had taken place had been insolence and not passionate desire. And Pytho and Heraclides of Aenus made away with Cotys to avenge their father, and Adamas revolted from Cotys because he had been mutilated by him when a boy, on the ground of the insult. And also many men when enraged by the indignity of corporal chastisement have avenged the insult by destroying or attempting to destroy its author, even when a magistrate or member of a royal dynasty. For example when the Penthilidae at Mitylene went about striking people with their staves Megacles with his friends set on them and made away with them, and afterwards Smerdis when he had been beaten and dragged out from his wife’s presence killed Penthilus. Also Decamnichus took a leading part in the attack upon Archelaus, being the first to stir on the attackers; and the cause of his anger was that he had handed him over to Euripides the poet to flog, Euripides being angry because he had made a remark about his breath smelling. And many others also for similar reasons have been made away with or plotted against. And similarly also from the motive of fear; for this was one of the
ARISTOTLE

1311 b
toúto tōn aitíōn ἕν, ὦσπερ καὶ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας, καὶ περὶ τὰς μοναρχίας. οἶον Ἑρξην Ἄρταπάνης φοβούμενος τὴν διαβολὴν τὴν περὶ Δαρείου, ὅτι ἐκρέμασεν οὐ κελεύσαντος Ἑρξην ἀλλ' οἰόμενος συγγνώσεσθαι ὡς ἀμηνοῦντα διά τὸ δεύτερον. αἰ δὲ διὰ καταφρόνησιν, ὦσπερ Σαρδανάπαλλον ἱδόν τις ἕξαυντα μετὰ τῶν γυναικῶν (εἰ ἄληθη ταῦτα οἱ μυθολογοῦντες λέγουσιν, εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐπ' ἐκείνου, ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἄλλου γε ἂν γένοιτο ἀληθῆς), καὶ Διονυσίω τῷ υἱῷ Διών ἐπέθετο διὰ τὸ καταφρονεῖν, ὥρων τοὺς τε πολίτας οὕτως ἔχοντας καὶ αὐτῶν ἀεὶ μεθύοντα. καὶ τῶν φίλων τινὲς ἐπιτίθενται διὰ καταφρόνησιν· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πιστεύεσθαι καταφρονοῦσιν ὡς λήσοντες. καὶ οἱ οἰόμενοι δύνασθαι κατασχεῖν τὴν ἀρχὴν τρόπων τινὰ διὰ τὸ καταφρονεῖν ἐπιτίθενται· ὡς δυνάμενοι γὰρ καὶ καταφρονοῦντες τοῦ κυνδύνου διὰ τὴν δύναμιν ἐπιχειροῦσι βαδίως, ὦσπερ οἱ στρατηγοῦντες τοῖς μονάρχοις, οἴον Κύρος Ἀστυάγη καὶ τοῦ βίου καταφρονών καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως διὰ τὸ τὴν μὲν δύναμιν ἐξηρηγηκέναι αὐτῶν δὲ τρυφὰν, καὶ Σεῦθης ὁ Θραξ Ἀμαδόκω στρατηγὸς ὄν. οἱ δὲ καὶ διὰ πλείω τούτων ἐπιτίθενται, οἴον καὶ καταφρονοῦντες καὶ διὰ κέρδος, ὦσπερ Ἀρισταρκῆς

1 καὶ περὶ ed.; καὶ codd.

a Captain of Xerxes’ body-guard.
b Last king of the Assyrian empire at Nineveh.
c Tyrant of Syracuse 367-356 and 346-343 B.C., cf. 1312 a 34 ff.
d The last king of Media, reigned 594-559 B.C.

448
causes we mentioned in the case of monarchies, §6, as also in that of constitutional governments; c. ii. §5, for instance Artapanes a killed Xerxes fearing the charge about Darius, because he had hanged him when Xerxes had ordered him not to but he had thought that he would forgive him because he would forget, as he had been at dinner. And other attacks on monarchs have been on account of contempt, as somebody killed Sardanapallus b when he saw him combing his hair with his women (if this story told by the narrators of legends is true—and if it did not happen with Sardanapallus, it might quite well be true of somebody else), and Dion attacked the younger Dionysius c because he despised him, when he saw the citizens despising him and the king himself always drunk. And contempt has led some even of the friends of monarchs to attack them, for they despise them for trusting them and think they will not be found out. And contempt is in a manner the motive of those who attack monarchs thinking that they are able to seize the government; for they make the attempt with a light heart, feeling that they have the power and because of their power despising the danger, as generals commanding the armies attack their monarchs; for instance Cyrus attacked Astyages d when he despised both his mode of life and his power, because his power had waned and he himself was living luxuriously, and the Thracian Seuthes attacked Amadocus e when his general. Others again attack monarchs for more than one of these motives, for instance both because they despise them and for the sake of gain, as

a Both these Thracian kings became allies of Athens 390 B.C., but the event referred to may be later.
Mithridatēs. μάλιστα¹ δὲ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αὐτίαν ἐγχειροῦσιν οἱ τὴν φύσιν μὲν θρασεῖς τιμὴν δ’ ἔχουσες πολεμικὴν παρὰ τοὺς μονάρχους· ἀνδρεία 20 γὰρ δύναμιν ἔχουσα θάρσος ἐστὶν, δι’ ἂς ἀμφοτέρας ὡς βαδίσως κρατήσοντες ποιοῦντα τὰς ἐπιθέσεις. τῶν δὲ διὰ φιλοτιμίαν ἐπιτιθεμένων ἔτερος τρόπος ἐστὶ τῆς αὐτίας· παρὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους πρότερον· οὔ γὰρ ὦσπερ ἕνιοι τοῖς τυράννοις ἐγχειροῦσιν ὀρῶντες κέρδη τε μεγάλα καὶ τιμᾶς μεγάλας οὕσας 25 αὐτοῖς, οὔτω καὶ τῶν διὰ φιλοτιμίαν ἐπιτιθεμένων ἔκαστος προαρεῖται κινδυνεύειν· ἀλλ’ ἐκείνοι μὲν διὰ τὴν εἰρημένην αὐτίαν, οὔτοι δ’, ὦσπερ καὶ ἄλλος τινὸς γενομένης πράξεως περιττής καὶ δι’ ἡν ὀνομαστοὶ γίγνονται καὶ γνώριμοι τοῖς ἀλλοις, οὔτω καὶ τοῖς μονάρχοις ἐγχειροῦσιν οὐ κτήσασθαι 30 βουλώμενοι μοναρχίαν ἀλλὰ δοξᾶν. οὐ μὴν ἄλλ’ 17 ἐλάχιστοι γε τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἰσὶν οἱ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αὐτίαν ὀρμῶντες· ὑποκεῖσθαι γὰρ δεῖ τὸ τοῦ σωθῆναι μηδὲν φροντίζειν ἃν μὴ μέλλῃ κατασχῆσει τὴν πράξιν· οίς ἀκολουθεῖν μὲν δεῖ τὴν Δίωνος ὑπόληψιν, οὐ βαδίσων δ’ αὐτὴν ἐγγενέσθαι 35 πολλοῖς· ἐκεῖνος γὰρ μετ’ ὀλίγων ἐστράτευσεν ἐπὶ Διονύσιον οὔτως ἔχειν φάσκων ὡς ὅποις πέρ ἂν δύνηται προελθεῖν ἱκανὸν αὐτῷ τοσοῦτον μετασχεῖν τῆς πράξεως, οἶνοι εἰ μικρόν ἐπιβάντα τῆς γῆς εὐθὺς συμβαίνῃ τελευτῆσαι τούτον³ καλῶς ἔχειν αὐτῷ τὸν θάνατον.

40 Φθείρεται δὲ τυραννὸς ἕνα μὲν τρόπον, ὦσπερ 18

¹ μάλιστα—20 ἐπιθέσεις post 6 μεθύοντα traicienda Newman.
² ὅποι Thompson: ὅπου codd.
³ τὸν βίον, τούτον Pl.

* Perhaps Mithridates II., who succeeded his father Ariobarzanes as satrap of Pontus 336 B.C.
Mithridates a attacked Ariobarzanes. b And it is men of bold nature and who hold a military office with monarchs who most often make the attempt for this reason; for courage possessing power is boldness, and they make their attacks thinking that with courage and power they will easily prevail. But with those whose attack is prompted by ambition the motive operates in a different way from those spoken of before; some men attack tyrants because they see great profits and great honours belonging to them, but that is not the reason that in each case leads the persons who attack from motives of ambition to resolve on the venture; those others are led by the motive stated, but these attack monarchs from a wish to gain not monarchy but glory, just as they would wish to take part in doing any other uncommon deed that makes men famous and known to their fellows. Not but what those who make the venture from this motive are very few indeed in number, for underlying it there must be an utter disregard of safety, if regard for safety is not to check the enterprise; they must always have present in their minds the opinion of Dion, although it is not easy for many men to have it; Dion marched with a small force against Dionysius, saying that his feeling was that, whatever point he might be able to get to, it would be enough for him to have had that much share in the enterprise—for instance, if it should befall him to die as soon as he had just set foot in the country, that death would satisfy him.

And one way in which tyranny is destroyed, as is
ARISTOTLE

1312 b καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκάστη πολιτείαν, ἔξωθεν, ἐὰν ἐναντία τις ἡ πολιτεία κρείττων (τὸ μὲν γὰρ βοûλεσθαι δῆλον ὡς ὑπάρξει διὰ τὴν ἐναντίοντα τῆς προαίρεσεως, ἀ δὲ βοûλονται, δυνάμενοι πράττοντι πάντες), ἐναντίαι δ' αἱ πολιτείαι, δῆμος μὲν τυραννίδι καὶ Ἡσίοδον ὡς ‘κεραμεῖ κεραμεῖς’ (καὶ γὰρ ἡ δημοκρατία ἡ τελευταία τυραννίς ἐστίν), βασιλεία δὲ καὶ ἀριστοκρατία διὰ τὴν ἐναντιότητα τῆς πολιτείας (διὸ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πλείστας κατέλυσαν τυραννίδας καὶ Συρακούσιοι κατὰ τὸν χρόνον ὑπὸ επολιτεύοντο καλῶς): ἔνα δ' εὖ 19 αὐτῆς, ὅταν οἱ μετέχοντες στασιάζωσιν, ὁσπερ ἡ τῶν περὶ Γέλωνα καὶ νῦν ἡ τῶν περὶ Διονύσιον, ἡ μὲν Γέλωνος Θρασυβοῦλον τοῦ Ιέρωνος ἀδελφόν τοῦ νῦν τοῦ Γέλωνος δημαγωγοῦντος καὶ πρὸς ἡδονᾶς ὀρμώντος ὡς αὐτὸς ἄρχης, τῶν δ' οἰκείων συστησάντων ἢν μὴ ἡ τυραννίς ὅλως καταλυθῇ.

15 ἄλλα Θρασυβοῦλος, οἱ δὲ συστάντες αὐτῶν ὡς καὶ ρὸν ἐχοντες ἐξέβαλον ἀπαντᾶς αὐτοῦς. Διονύσιον δὲ Δίωνος στρατεύσας κηδεσθῆ ὡν, καὶ προσλαβοῦν τὸν δήμον, ἐκείνον ἐκβαλον διεθάρη. δύο δὲ 20 οὐσῶν αὐτῶν δι' ἃς μάλιστ' ἐπιτίθενται ταῖς τυραννίσι, μίσους καὶ καταφρονήσεως, ϑάτερον 20 μὲν ἀεί τούτων ὑπάρχει τοῖς τυράννοις, τὸ μίσος,

1 συστατῶν ΓΜΠ: στασιασάντων Richards.
2 μὴ ἦ ed.: μὴ codd.
3 <μετ'> αὐτῶν Susemihl: tr. post 13 <ἡ> τυραννίς Richards.
4 ἀεὶ τούτων ὑπάρχει Richards: δεὶ τ. ὑπάρχειν codd.

a Works and Days 25 καὶ κεραμεῖς κεραμεῖ κοτεῖ καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων, 'two of a trade never agree.'

b Tyrant of Syracuse 485-478 B.C., succeeded by his
each of the other forms of constitution also, is from without, if some state with an opposite constitution is stronger (for the wish to destroy it will clearly be present in such a neighbour because of the opposition of principle, and all men do what they wish if they have the power)—and the constitutions opposed to tyranny are, on the one hand democracy, which is opposed to it as (in Hesiod’s phrase a) ‘potter to potter,’ because the final form of democracy is tyranny, and on the other hand royalty and aristocracy are opposed to tyranny because of the opposite nature of their constitutional structure (owing to which the Spartans put down a very great many tyrannies, and so did the Syracusans at the period when they were governed well). But one way is from within itself, when the partners in it fall into discord, as the tyranny of the family of Gelo b was destroyed, and in modern times c that of the family of Dionysius d—Gelo’s, when Thrasybulus the brother of Hiero paid court to the son of Gelo and urged him into indulgences in order that he himself might rule, and the son’s connexions banded together a body of confederates in order that the tyranny might not be put down entirely but only Thrasybulus, but their confederates seizing the opportunity expelled them all; Dionysius was put down by Dion, his relative, who got the people on to his side and expelled him, but was afterwards killed. There are two causes that chiefly lead men to attack tyranny, hatred and contempt; the former, hatred, attaches to tyrants always, but it is

brother Hiero who died 467. Gelo’s son is unknown. Cf. 1315 b 35 ff.

356 B.C., a good many years before this book was written.

See 1312 a 4 n.
έκ δε τοῦ καταφρονεῖσθαι πολλαὶ γίνονται τῶν καταλύσεων. σημεῖον δέ· τῶν μὲν γὰρ κτησαμένων οἱ πλείστοι καὶ διεφύλαξαν τὰς ἄρχας, οἱ δὲ παραλαβόντες εὐθὺς ὡς εἰπεῖν ἀπολλύσαι πάντες, ἀπολαυστικὸς γὰρ ζῶντες εὐκαταφρόνητοι τε γίγνονται καὶ πολλοὺς καυροὺς παραδίδοσι τοῖς ἐπιτιθεμένοις. μόριον δὲ τῷ μίσους καὶ τῇ ὁργῇ δεὶ τιθέναι, τρόπον γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν αἰτία γίνεται πράξεων. πολλάκις δὲ καὶ πρακτικώτερον τοῦ μίσους· συντονώτερον γὰρ ἐπιτίθενται διὰ τὸ μῆ χρῆσθαι λογισμῷ τὸ πάθος (μάλιστα δὲ συμβαίνει τοῖς θυμοῖς ἀκολουθεῖν διὰ τὴν ὑβρίν, δι’ ἣν αἰτίαν ἦ τε τῶν Πεισιστρατιδῶν κατελύθη τυραννίς καὶ πολλαὶ τῶν ἄλλων), ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ μίσος· ἡ μὲν ὁργὴ μετὰ λύπης πάρεστιν, ὡστε οὐ ράδιον λογίζεσθαι, ὡς δ’ ἔχθρα ἄνεν λύπης. ὡς δ’ ἐν κεφαλαίοις εἰπεῖν, ὅσα αἰτίας εἰρήκαμεν τῆς τε ὀλυγαρχίας τῆς ἀκράτου καὶ τελευταίας καὶ τῆς δημοκρατίας τῆς ἔσχάτης, τοσαύτας καὶ τῆς τυραννίδος θετέων· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ τυχάνανοιν οὐκ εἰς αἰρετάι τυραννίδες. βασιλεία δ’ ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν ἐξωθεὶν ἦκιστα φθείρεται, διὸ καὶ πολυχρόνος ἐστιν· ἐξ αὐτῆς δ’ αἱ πλείσται φθορᾶς συμβαίνουσιν.

1 αἱρεταί codd. nonnulli.
2 μοναρχίαι Spengel: μοναρχίαι καὶ codd.
their being despised that causes their downfall in many cases. A proof of this is that most of those that have won tyrannies have also kept their offices to the end, but those that have inherited them almost all lose them at once; for they live a life of indulgence, and so become despicable and also give many opportunities to their attackers. And also anger must be counted as an element in the hatred felt for them, for in a way it occasions the same actions. And often it is even more active than hatred, since angry men attack more vigorously because passion does not employ calculation (and insolence most frequently causes men to be led by their angry tempers, which was the cause of the fall of the tyranny of the Pisistratidae and many others), but hatred calculates more; for anger brings with it an element of pain, making calculation difficult, but enmity is not accompanied by pain. And to speak summarily, all the things that we have mentioned as causing the downfall of unmixed and extreme oligarchy and of the last form of democracy must be counted as destructive of tyranny as well, since extreme oligarchy and democracy are in reality divided tyrannies. Royal government on the other hand is very seldom destroyed by external causes, so that it is long-lasting; but in most cases its destruction arises out of itself. And it is destroyed in two ways, one when those who participate in it quarrel, and another when the kings try to administer the government too tyrannically, claiming to exercise sovereignty in more things and contrary to the law. Royal governments do not occur any more now, but if ever monarchies

—a i.e. divided among several persons, ‘put into commission.’
1313 α

διὰ τὸ τὴν βασιλείαν ἐκούσιον μὲν ἀρχὴν εἶναι μειζόνων δὲ κυρίαν, πολλοὺς δ' εἶναι τοὺς ὀμοίους καὶ μηδένα διαφέροντα τοσοῦτον ὅστε ἀπαρτίζειν πρὸς τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ ἄξιωμα τῆς ἀρχῆς. ὅστε διὰ μὲν τούτο ἐκόντες οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν, ἀν δὲ δὲν ἀπάτης ἀρξῇ τις ἡ βίας, ἡδὲ δοκεῖ τοῦτο εἶναι τυραννίς. ἐν δὲ ταῖς κατὰ γένος βασιλείαις τιθέναι 23 δεὶ τῆς φθορᾶς αἰτίαν πρὸς ταῖς εἰρημέναις καὶ τὸ γίνεσθαι πολλοὺς εὐκαταφρονήτους καὶ τὸ δύναμιν μὴ κεκτημένους τυραννικὴν ἀλλὰ βασιλικὴν τιμὴν ὑβρίζειν· ῥᾴδια γὰρ ἐγίνετο ἡ κατάλυσις, μὴ 15 βουλομένων γὰρ εὐθὺς οὐκ ἐσται βασιλεύς, ἀλλ’ ὁ τύραννος καὶ μὴ βουλομένων.

Φθείρονται μὲν οὖν αἱ μοναρχίαι διὰ ταύτας καὶ τοιαύτας ἐτέρας αἰτίας.

IX. Σφόζονται δὲ δῆλον ὃς ἀπλῶς μὲν εἰπεῖν 1 ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων, ὡς δὲ καθ’ ἐκαστον, τῷ τάς μὲν 20 βασιλείας ἄγειν ἐπὶ τὸ μετριώτερον. ὅσον γὰρ ἄν ἐλαττόνων ὅσι κύριοι, πλεῖω χρόνου ἀναγκαῖον μένειν πάσαν τὴν ἀρχὴν, αὐτοὶ τε γὰρ ἤττον γίνον- ται δεσποτικοὶ καὶ τοῖς ήθεσιν ἵσοι μᾶλλον καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄρχομένων φθονοῦνται ἤττον. διὰ γὰρ τούτο καὶ ἡ περὶ Μυλοττοὺς πολὺν χρόνου βα- σιλεία διέμεινε, καὶ ἡ Λακεδαιμονίων διὰ τὸ ἐξ

1 δῆλον <ὅτι> Vahlen.
do occur they are rather tyrannies, because royalty is government over willing subjects but with sovereignty over greater matters, but men of equal quality are numerous and no one is so outstanding as to fit the magnitude and dignity of the office; so that for this reason the subjects do not submit willingly, and if a man has made himself ruler by deception or force, then this is thought to be a tyranny.

In cases of hereditary royalty we must also set down as a cause of their destruction, in addition to those mentioned, the fact that hereditary kings often become despicable, and that although possessing not the power of a tyrant but the dignity of a king they commit insolent outrages; for the deposition of kings used to be easy, since a king will at once cease to be king if his subjects do not wish him to be, whereas a tyrant will still be tyrant even though his subjects do not wish it.

These causes then and others of the same nature are those that bring about the destruction of monarchies.

IX. On the other hand it is clear that monarchies, speaking generally, are preserved in safety as a result of the opposite causes to those by which they are destroyed. But taking the different sorts of monarchy separately—royalties are preserved by bringing them into a more moderate form; for the fewer powers the kings have, the longer time the office in its entirety must last, for they themselves become less despotic and more equal to their subjects in temper, and their subjects envy them less. For this was the cause of the long persistence of the Molossian royalty, and that of Sparta has continued because the office was from the beginning divided
1313a ἀρχῆς τε εἰς δύο μέρη διαιρεθήναι τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ 
πάλιν Θεοτόμπου μετριάσαντος τοῖς τε ἄλλοις καὶ 
τὴν τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχὴν ἐπικαταστήσαντος· τῆς γὰρ 
δυνάμεως ἄφελων γνῶσις τῷ χρόνῳ τὴν βασιλείαν, 
ὡστε τρόπον τινὰ ἐποίησεν οὐκ ἐλάττωνα ἄλλα 
μειώσαν αὐτὴν. ὅπερ καὶ πρὸς τὴν γυναικὰ ἀπο-
κρίνασθαι φασὶν αὑτὸν, εἰσιοῦσαν εἰ μηδὲν αἰ-
σχύνεται τὴν βασιλείαν ἐλάττων παραδίδοις τοῖς 
νιέσιν ἢ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς παρέλαβεν· "οὔ δὴτα" 
φάναι. "παραδίδωμι γὰρ πολυχρωμίαν."

Ἀδὼν τυραννίδες σώζονται κατὰ δύο τρόπους 2 
τοὺς ἑαυτωτάτους. ἦν ἀτέρος ἐστιν ὁ παραδεδο-
μένος καὶ καθ' ὑπὸ διωκοῦσιν οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν τυ-
ράνων τὴν ἀρχὴν τούτων δὲ τὰ πολλὰ φασὶ 
katastήσαι Περίανδρον τὸν Κορίνθιον, πολλὰ δὲ 
καὶ παρὰ τῆς τῶν Περσῶν ἀρχῆς ἐστὶ τοιαύτα 
λαβεῖν. ἐστὶ δὲ τὰ τε πάλαι λειχθέντα πρὸς 
40 σωτηρίαν, ὅσι οἶδον τε, τῆς τυραννίδος, τὸ τοὺς 
ὑπερέχοντας κολούειν καὶ τοὺς φρονηματίας ἀν-
1313b αίρείν, καὶ μήτε συσσίτια ἐὰν μήτε ἐταιρίαι μήτε 
παυδείαι μήτε ἄλλο μηθὲν τοιοῦτον, ἄλλα πάντα 
φυλάττειν οἴθεν εἰσώθη γίνεσθαι δύο, φρόνημα τε 
καὶ πίστις, καὶ μήτε σχολᾶς μήτε ἄλλοις συλλόγοις 
ἐπιτρέπειν γίνεσθαι σχολαστικοῖς, καὶ πάντα 
5 ποιεῖν ἐξ ὧν ὅτι μάλιστα ἄγνωτες ἄλληλος ἐσονται 
πάντες (ἡ γὰρ γνώσις πίστιν ποιεῖ μᾶλλον πρὸς 
ἀλλήλους). καὶ τὸ τοὺς ἐπιδημοῦντας ἂεὶ φανεροῦς 3

1 ὡς οἶδον τε Bekker (ὡς οἶδον τε post 41 ὑπερέχοντας vel 
alia transp. Richards).

a King of Sparta c. 770-720 b.c.  b See 1284 a 26 n.

The phrases cover Plato’s gatherings in the Academy, 
Aristotle’s in the Peripatos of the Lyceum, and other meet-
458
into two halves, and because it was again limited in various ways by Theopompus, in particular by his instituting the office of the ephors to keep a check upon it; for by taking away some of the kings' power he increased the permanence of the royal office, so that in a manner he did not make it less but greater. This indeed as the story goes is what he said in reply to his wife, when she asked if he felt no shame in bequeathing the royal power to his sons smaller than he had inherited it from his father: "Indeed I do not," he is said to have answered, "for I hand it on more lasting."

2 Tyrannies on the other hand are preserved in two extremely opposite ways. One of these is the traditional way and the one in which most tyrants administer their office. Most of these ordinary safeguards of tyranny are said to have been instituted by Periander of Corinth, and also many such devices may be borrowed from the Persian empire. These are both the measures mentioned some time back to secure the safety of a tyranny as far as possible—the lopping off of outstanding men and the destruction of the proud,—and also the prohibition of common meals and club-fellowship and education and all other things of this nature, in fact the close watch upon all things that usually engender the two emotions of pride and confidence, and the prevention of the formation of study-circles and other conferences for debate, and the employment of every means that will make people as much as possible unknown to one another (for familiarity increases mutual confidence); and for the people in the city to be always

ings for the intellectual use of leisure in gymnasia, palaestrae and leschaes.
ARISTOTLE

1313 b

'είναι καὶ διατριβευν περὶ θύρας (οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἥκιστα λαθάναιειν τί πράττουσιν, καὶ φρονεῖν ἂν ἐθιλζοντο μικρὸν αἰεὶ δουλεύοντες). καὶ τάλλα ὃσα
tοιαῦτα Περσικὰ καὶ βάρβαρα τυραννικὰ ἔστων
(πάντα γὰρ ταύτων δύναται); καὶ τὸ μὴ λαθάνειν
πειρᾶθαι ὃσα τυγχάνει τις λέγων ἢ πράττων τῶν
ἀρχυμένων, ἀλλ' εἶναι κατασκόπους, οἷον περὶ
Συρακούσας αἱ ποταμωγίδες καλοῦμεναι, καὶ οὐς
ὡτακουστὰς ἐξέπεμπεν Ἰέρων ὅποι οἱ έυ συν-
ουσία καὶ σύλλογος (παρρησιάζονται τε γὰρ ἦττον
φοβοῦμενοι τοὺς τοιούτους, καὶ παρρησιάζονται
λαθάνουσιν ἦττον). καὶ τὸ διαβάλλειν ἄλληλοις
cal συγκρούειν καὶ φίλους φίλοις καὶ τὸν δήμον
tὸς γνωρίμοις καὶ τοὺς πλουσίους ἐαυτοῖς. καὶ
tὸ πένητας ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀρχυμένους τυραννικῶν,
ὅπως μὴτε φυλακὴ τρέφηται καὶ πρὸς τῷ καθ'
ἡμέραν ὄντες ἀσχολοὶ ὅσων ἐπιβουλευεῖν. Παρά-
δειγμα δὲ τούτου αἱ τε πυραμίδες αἱ περὶ Ἅγιοντο
καὶ τὰ ἀναθήματα σῶν Κυψελίδων καὶ τοῦ
Ὀλυμπιείου ὣς οἰκοδόμησις ὑπὸ τῶν Πεισι-
στρατιῶν, καὶ τῶν περὶ Σάμων. ἔργα Polυκράτεια
(πάντα γὰρ ταύτα δύναται ταύτων, ἀσχολῶν καὶ
πενίαν τῶν ἀρχυμένων). καὶ ἡ εἰσφορὰ τῶν τελῶν, 5
οἰον ἐν Συρακούσαις (ἐν πέντε γὰρ ἐτεσιν ἐπὶ

1 ohs Coraes: tovs codd. (ὡτακουστὰς ohs M¹).
3 φυλακὴ: δύναμις Thurot. 4 τὸ ἀναθήμα το Cobet.
5 Ὁλυμπιείου anonymus: Ὁλυμπιείου codd.
6 ἔργων τὰ Coraes.

Apparently this means a citizen force side by side with
the tyrant's mercenaries; a variant gives 'in order that the
(tyrant's) guard may be kept.'

460
visible and to hang about the palace-gates (for thus there would be least concealment about what they are doing, and they would get into a habit of being humble from always acting in a servile way); and all the other similar devices of Persian and barbarian tyranny (for all have the same effect); and to try not to be uninformed about any chance utterances or actions of any of the subjects, but to have spies like the women called 'provocatrices' at Syracuse and the 'sharp-ears' that used to be sent out by Hiero wherever there was any gathering or conference (for when men are afraid of spies of this sort they keep a check on their tongues, and if they do speak freely are less likely not to be found out); and to set men at variance with one another and cause quarrels between friend and friend and between the people and the notables and among the rich. And it is a device of tyranny to make the subjects poor, so that a guard may not be kept, and also that the people being busy with their daily affairs may not have leisure to plot against their ruler. Instances of this are the pyramids in Egypt and the votive offerings of the Cypselids, and the building of the temple of Olympian Zeus by the Pisistratidae and of the temples at Samos, works of Polycrates (for all these undertakings produce the same effect, constant occupation and poverty among the subject people); and the levying of taxes, as at Syracuse (for in the

\(^b\) Cypselus and his son Periander (1310 b.29 n., 1284 a.26 n.) dedicated a colossal statue of Zeus at Olympia and other monuments there and at Delphi.

\(^c\) Pisistratus is said to have begun the temple of Olympian Zeus at Athens, not finished till the time of Hadrian.

\(^d\) Tyrant of Samos, d. 522 B.C.
The proverb ἡλίξ ἡλος ἐκκρούεται usually meant driving out something by a thing of the same kind (‘set a thief to
462
reign of Dionysius\(^a\) the result of taxation used to be that in five years men had contributed the whole of their substance). Also the tyrant is a stirrer-up of war, with the deliberate purpose of keeping the people busy and also of making them constantly in need of a leader. Also whereas friends are a means of security to royalty, it is a mark of a tyrant to be extremely distrustful of his friends, on the ground that, while all have the wish, these chiefly have the power. Also the things that occur in connexion with the final form of democracy\(^b\) are all favourable to tyranny—dominance of women in the homes, in order that they may carry abroad reports against the men, and lack of discipline among the slaves, for the same reason; for slaves and women do not plot against tyrants, and also, if they prosper under tyrannies, must feel well-disposed to them, and to democracies as well (for the common people also wishes to be sole ruler). Hence also the flatterer is in honour with both—with democracies the demagogue (for the demagogue is a flatterer of the people), and with the tyrants those who associate with them humbly, which is the task of flattery. In fact owing to this tyranny is a friend of the base; for tyrants enjoy being flattered, but nobody would ever flatter them if he possessed a free spirit—men of character love their ruler, or at all events do not flatter him. And the base are useful for base business, for nail is driven out by nail, as the proverb goes.\(^c\) And it is a mark of a tyrant to dislike anyone that is proud or free-spirited; for the tyrant claims for himself alone the right to bear that character, and the man who catch a thief\(^d\)), not as here the execution of evil designs by appropriate agents.

463
nόμενος καὶ ἔλευθεριάζων ἀφαιρέται την ὑπεροχήν καὶ τὸ δεσποτικὸν τῆς τυραννίδος· μισοῦσιν οὖν ὁσπέρ καταλύοντας τὴν ἄρχήν. καὶ τὸ χρήσαμεν συνσέστοις καὶ συνημερευταῖς ἐξεικοῖς μᾶλλον ἡ πολιτικοὶς τυραννικόν, ὡς τοὺς μὲν πολεμίους τοὺς δ’ οὐκ ἀντιποιοῦμένους. ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τυραννικὰ μὲν καὶ σωτηρία τῆς ἁρχῆς, οὔθεν δ’ ἐλλείπει μοχθήριας. ἐστὶ δ’ ὡς εἴπετο 8 πάντα ταῦτα περιελημμένα τρισὶν εἴδεσιν· στο- χάζεται γὰρ ἡ τυραννίς τριῶν, ἐνὸς μὲν τοῦ μικρὰ φρονεῖν τοὺς ἁρχομένους (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν μικρός ὕψος επιβουλεύσειν), δευτέρου δὲ τοῦ διαπιστείν ἄλληλος (οὗ καταλύεται γὰρ πρῶτον τυραννίς πρὶν ἡ πιστεύουσι τινὲς αὐτοῖς, διο καὶ τοῖς 20 ἐπιεικέσι πολεμοῦσιν ὡς βλαβεροῖς πρὸς τὴν ἁρχήν οὗ μόνον διὰ τὸ μή ἄξιον ἁρχεῖαν δεσποτικῆς ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ πιστοὺς καὶ ἑαυτοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις εἶναι καὶ μὴ καταγορευέων μῆτε ἑαυτῶν μῆτε τῶν ἄλλων). τρίτον δ’ ἄδυναμία τῶν πραγμάτων (οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἐπιλείπει τοῖς ἄδυνατοις, ὥστε οὐδὲ τυραννίδα καταλύειν μὴ δυνάμεως ὑπαρχοῦσης). εἰς οὗς μὲν οὖν ὄροις ἀνάγεται τὰ βουλεύματα1 τῶν 25 τυράννων, οὕτω τρεῖς τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες· πάντα γὰρ ἀναγάγοις τις ἃν τὰ τυραννικὰ πρὸς ταῦτας τὰς υποθέσεις, τὰ μὲν ὅπως μὴ πιστεύσων ἄλλη- λοις, τὰ δ’ ὅπως μὴ δύνωνται, τὰ δ’ ὅπως μικρὸν φρονώσων. 30 ‘Ὁ μὲν οὖν εἰς τρόπος δι’ οὖ γίνεται σωτηρία ταῖς τυραννίσι τοιούτος ἐστιν. ο δ’ ἐτερος σχεδόν εξ ἐναντίας ἔχει τοῖς εἰρημένοις τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν.

1 Richards: βουλήματα codd.

a i.e. do not claim to be respected as his equals.
meets his pride with pride and shows a free spirit robs tyranny of its superiority and position of mastery; tyrants therefore hate the proud as undermining their authority. And it is a mark of a tyrant to have men of foreign extraction rather than citizens as guests at table and companions, feeling that citizens are hostile but strangers make no claim against him. These and similar habits are characteristic of tyrants and preservative of their office, but they lack no element of baseness. And broadly speaking, they are all included under three heads; for tyranny aims at three things, one to keep its subjects humble (for a humble-spirited man would not plot against anybody), second to have them continually distrust one another (for a tyranny is not destroyed until some men come to trust each other, owing to which tyrants also make war on the respectable, as detrimental to their rule not only because of their refusal to submit to despotic rule, but also because they are faithful to one another and to the other citizens, and do not inform against one another nor against the others); and the third is lack of power for political action (since nobody attempts impossibilities, so that nobody tries to put down a tyranny if he has not power behind him). These then in fact are the three aims to which the plans of tyrants are directed; for all the measures taken by tyrants one might class under these principles—some are designed to prevent mutual confidence among the subjects, others to curtail their power, and others to make them humble-spirited.

Such then is the nature of one method by which security is obtained for tyrannies. The other tries to operate in a manner almost the opposite of the
ARISTOTLE

1314a ἐστὶ δὲ λαβεῖν αὐτὸν ἐκ τῆς φθορᾶς τῆς τῶν βασιλείων. ὥσπερ γὰρ τῆς βασιλείας εἰς τρόπος τῆς φθορᾶς τὸ ποιεῖν τὴν ἀρχήν τυραννικώτεραν, οὕτω τῆς τυραννίδος σωτηρία ποιεῖν αὐτὴν βασιλικώτεραν, ἐν φυλάττοντα μόνον, τὴν δύναμιν, ὡς ἡ ἀρχὴ μὴ μόνον βουλομένων ἀλλὰ καὶ μὴ βουλομένων· προϊέμενος γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο προϊέται καὶ τὸ τυραννεῖν. ἀλλὰ τούτῳ μὲν ὡσπερ ὑπόθεσον δεῖ μένειν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν τὰ δὲ δοκεῖν ὑποκρινόμενον τῷ βασιλικὸν καλῶς. πρῶτον μὲν 11 τοῦ δοκείν·

1314b [τοῦ δοκείν]2 φροντίζειν τῶν κοινῶν, μὴ δαπανῶντα δωρεάς τοιαύτας ἐφ’ αἰς τὰ πλήθη χαλεπαίνονσιν, ὅταν ἀπ’ αὐτῶν μὲν λαμβάνουσιν ἐργαζόμενων καὶ πονούντων γλῖσχρως, διδῶσι δ’ ἐταῖραις καὶ ξένοις καὶ τεχνίταις ἄφθονως, λόγον τε ἀποδιδόντα τῶν λαμβανομένων καὶ δαπανώμενων, ὅπερ ἢδη πεποιήκασι τινες τῶν τυράννων (οὕτω γὰρ ἄν τις διοικῶν οἰκονόμος ἀλλ’ οὐ τύραννος εἶναι δόξειν, οὐ δεὶ δὲ φοβεῖσθαι μὴ ποτὲ ἀπορήση χρημάτων κύριος ὡν τῆς πόλεως· ἀλλὰ τοῖς γ’ 12 ἐκτοπίζονσι τυράννοις ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας καὶ συμφέρει τούτῳ μάλλον ἡ καταλιπεῖν ἀθροίσατας, ἦττον γὰρ ἂν οἱ φυλάττοντες ἐπιτιθέεσθο τοῖς πράγμασιν· εἰσὶ δὲ φοβερώτεροι τῶν τυράννων τοῖς ἀποδημοῦσι οἱ φυλάττοντες τῶν πολιτῶν, οἱ μὲν γὰρ συναποδημοῦσι οἱ δὲ υπομένουσιν). ἔπειτα 15 τὰς εἰσφορὰς καὶ τὰς λειτουργίας δεῖ φαίνεσθαι τῆς τε οἰκονομίας ἐνεκα συνάγοντα κἂν ποτε δειθὴ χρῆσθαι πρὸς τοὺς πολεμικοὺς καυροὺς, ὅλως τε

1 τὸ ΓΗ: τὸν cet.
2 Spengel (δοκείν codd. nonnulli).
POLITICS, V. ix. 10–12

devices mentioned. And it can be ascertained from considering the downfall of royal governments. For just as one mode of destroying royalty is to make its government more tyrannical, so a mode of securing tyranny is to make it more regal, protecting one thing only, its power, in order that the ruler may govern not only with the consent of the subjects but even without it; for if he gives up this, he also gives up his position as tyrant. But while this must stand as a fundamental principle, in all his other actions real or pretended he should cleverly play the part of royalty. The first step is to be careful of the public funds, not squandering presents such as the multitudes resent, when tyrants take money from the people themselves while they toil and labour in penury and lavish it on mistresses and foreigners and craftsmen, and also rendering account of receipts and expenditure, as some tyrants have done already (for this careful management would make a ruler seem a steward of the state and not a tyrant, and he need not be afraid of ever being at a loss for funds while he is master of the state; on the contrary, for those tyrants who go abroad on foreign campaigns this is actually more expedient than to leave their money there collected into one sum, for there is less fear of those guarding it making an attempt on power; since for tyrants campaigning abroad the keepers of the treasury are more to be feared than the citizens, for the citizens go abroad with him but the others stay at home). Secondly he must be seen to collect his taxes and benevolences for purposes of administration and to meet his occasional requirements for military emergencies, and generally must pose as
αὐτὸν παρασκευάζειν φύλακα καὶ ταμίαν ὡς κοινῶν ἄλλα μὴ ὡς ἴδιων. καὶ φαίνεσθαι μὴ 13 χαλεπῶν ἄλλα σεμνῶν, ἐτὶ δὲ τοιοῦτον ὡστε μὴ
20 φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας ἄλλα μᾶλλον αἰδεῖσθαι, τοῦτον μέντοι τυγχάνειν οὐ βάδιον ὅντα εὐκαταφρόνητον, διὸ δὲι κἂν μὴ τῶν ἄλλων ἄρετῶν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιήται ἄλλα τῆς πολεμικῆς,1 καὶ δόξαν ἐμποιεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ τοιαύτην. ἐτὶ δὲ μὴ μόνον αὐτὸν φαίνεσθαι μηθένα τῶν ἀρχόμενων ὑβρίζοντα,
25 μὴτε νέον μὴτε νέαν, ἄλλα μηδ’ ἄλλον μηδένα τῶν περὶ αὐτόν, ὡμοῖς καὶ καὶ τὰς οἰκείας ἕχειν γυναίκας πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας, ὥς καὶ διὰ γυναικῶν ὑβρεῖς πολλαὶ τυραννίδες ἀπολύλασιν. περὶ τε τὰς ἀπολαύσεις τὰς σωματικὰς τοῦντίον ποιεῖν ἣ νῦν τινὲς τῶν τυράννων ποιοῦσιν (οὐ γὰρ μόνον εὐθὺς ἐσοῦν τοῦτο δρῶσιν καὶ συνεχῶς πολλὰς ἡμέρας, ἄλλα καὶ φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἄλλοις βούλονται τοῦτο πράττοντες ἢ ως εὐθαίμονας καὶ μακαρίους θαυμάσωσιν). ἄλλα μάλιστα μὲν μετριάζειν τοῖς τοιούτοις, εἰ δὲ μὴ, τὸ γε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἄλλοις διαφεύγειν (οὔτε γὰρ εὐθείητος οὔτε εὐκατα-
35 πρόνιτος οὐφων ἄλλο μεθύων, οὐδ’ οὐρυπνὸς ἄλλο, ο καθεύδων). τοῦντίον τε ποιητέον τῶν 15 πάλαι λεχθέντων σχεδὸν πάντων, κατασκευάζειν γὰρ δὲι καὶ κοσμεῖν τήν τόλμην ὡς ἐπιτροπον ὅντα καὶ μὴ τύραννον. ἐτὶ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς φαίνε-
40 σθαί ἀεὶ σπουδάζοντα διαφερόντως (ἐπὶ τὸν τοὺς θεοὺς φοβοῦντα τοῖς παθεῖν τι παράνομον ὑπὸ τῶν τοιοῦ-
1315 α τῶν, ἐὰν δειπνόμενα νομίζωσιν εἶναι τὸν ἀρχόντα καὶ φροντίζειν τῶν θεῶν, καὶ ἐπιθυμεύουσιν ἢττον ὡς συμμάχους ἔχοντι καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς), δει δ’ ἄνευ

1 πολεμικῆς Madvig: πολιτικῆς codd.
guardian and steward as it were of a public fund and not a private estate. And his bearing must not be harsh but dignified, and also such as to inspire not fear but rather respect in those who encounter him, though this is not easy to achieve if he is a contemptible personality; so that even if he neglects the other virtues he is bound to cultivate military valour, and to make himself a reputation as a soldier. And furthermore not only must he himself be known not to outrage any of his subjects, either boy or girl, but so also must everybody about him, and also their wives must similarly show respect towards the other women, since even the insolences of women have caused the fall of many tyrannies. And in regard to bodily enjoyments he must do the opposite of what some tyrants do now (for they not only begin their debaucheries at daybreak and carry them on for many days at a time, but also wish to be seen doing so by the public, in order that people may admire them as fortunate and happy), but best of all he must be moderate in such matters, or if not, he must at all events avoid displaying his indugences to his fellows (for not the sober man but the drunkard is easy to attack and to despise, not the wakeful man but the sleeper). And he must do the opposite of almost all the things mentioned some time back, for he must lay out and adorn the city as if he were a trustee and not a tyrant. And further he must be seen always to be exceptionally zealous as regards religious observances (for people are less afraid of suffering any illegal treatment from men of this sort, if they think that their ruler has religious scruples and pays regard to the gods, and also they plot against him less, thinking that he has even the gods as allies), though
άβελτηρίας φαίνεσθαι τοιοῦτον· τούσ τε ἁγαθοὺς 16
5 περὶ τι γιγνομένους τιμὰν οὕτως ὥστε μὴ νομίζειν
ἄν ποτε τιμηθῆναι μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν
αὐτονόμων ὄντων· καὶ τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας τιμὰς
ἀπονέμειν αὐτόν, τὰς δὲ κολάσεις δι’ ἐτέρων
ἀρχόντων καὶ δικαστηρίων. 1 κοινὴ δὲ φυλακὴ
πάσης μοναρχίας τὸ μηθένα ποιεῖν ἕνα μέγαν, ἀλλ’
10 εὑπερ, πλείους (τηρήσουσι γὰρ ἀλλήλους), ἐὰν δ’
ἀρα τινὰ δὴ ποιῆσαι μέγαν, μὴ τοι τὸ γε ἡθος
θρασύν (ἐπιθετικώτατον γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἡθος
περὶ πᾶσας τὰς πράξεις). κἂν τῆς δυνάμεως τινα
δοκῇ παραλύειν, ἕκ προσαγωγῆς τούτῳ δρᾶν καὶ
μὴ πᾶσαν ἄθροισαν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὴν ἐξουσίαν. ἔτη 17
15 δὲ πάσης μὲν ὑβρεώς εὑρησθαί, παρὰ πάσας δὲ
δυοῖν, τῆς τε εἰς τὰ σώματα κολάσεως 3 καὶ τῆς
eἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν. μάλιστα δὲ ταύτην ποιητέον τὴν
εὐλάβειαν περὶ τοὺς φιλοτίμους· τὴν μὲν γὰρ εἰς
tὰ χρήματα ὀλιγωρίαν οἱ φιλοχρήματοι φέρουσι
βαρέως, τὴν δ’ εἰς 4 ἀτιμίαν οἱ τε φιλότιμοι καὶ οἱ
20 ἐπιεικεῖς τῶν άνθρώπων. διόπερ ἢ μὴ χρῆσθαι
δεὶ τοῖς τοιούτους, ἢ τὰς μὲν κολάσεις πατρικῶς
φαίνεσθαι ποιούμενοι καὶ μὴ δ’ ὀλιγωρίαν, τὰς δὲ
πρὸς τὴν ἡλικίαν ὀμιλίας δι’ ἐρωτικὰς αἰτίας ἀλλὰ
μὴ δι’ ἐξουσίαν, ὅλως δὲ τὰς δοκοῦσας ἀτιμίας
ἐξωνεῖσθαι μείζονι τιμαῖς. τῶν δ’ ἐπιχειροῦντων 18
25 ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος διαφθορὰν οὕτω φοβερώτατοι
καὶ δέονται πλείστης φυλακῆς δοσοί μὴ προαιροῦνται

1 αρχόντων καὶ δικαστηρίων secl. Oncken.
2 ed.: ἄθροισ codd.
3 κολάσεως secl. Schneider.
4 εἰς secl. Spengel.
he should not display a foolish religiosity. And he must pay such honour to those who display merit in any matter that they may think that they could never be more honoured by the citizens if they were independent; and honours of this kind he should bestow in person, but inflict his punishments by the agency of other magistrates and law-courts. And it is a protection common to every sort of monarchy to make no one man great, but if necessary to exalt several (for they will keep watch on one another), and if after all the ruler has to elevate an individual, at all events not take a man of bold spirit (for such a character is most enterprising in all undertakings); and if he thinks fit to remove somebody from his power, to do this by gradual stages and not take away the whole of his authority at once. And again he should carefully avoid all forms of outrage, and two beyond all, violent bodily punishments and outrage of the young. And this caution must especially be exercised in relation to the ambitious, for while to be slighted in regard to property annoys the lovers of wealth, slights that involve dishonour are what men of honourable ambition and high character resent. Hence the tyrant should either not consort with men of this kind, or appear to inflict his punishments paternally and not because of contempt, and to indulge in the society of the young for reasons of passion, not because he has the power; and in general he should buy off what are thought to be dishonours by greater honours. And among those who make attempts upon the life of a ruler the most formidable and those against whom the greatest precaution is needed are those that are ready to
The natural philosopher of Ephesus, fl. c. 513 B.C., known as ὁ σκοτεινός for his epigrammatic obscurity.
sacrifice their lives if they can destroy him. Hence the greatest care must be taken to guard against those who think that insolent outrage is being done either to themselves or to those who happen to be under their care; for men attacking under the influence of anger are reckless of themselves, as Heraclitus also observed when he said that anger is hard to combat because it buys its wish with life.

And since states consist of two parts, the poor people and the rich, the most important thing is for both to think that they owe their safety to the government and for it to prevent either from being wronged by the other, but whichever class is the stronger, this must be made to be entirely on the side of the government, as, if this support for the tyrant’s interests is secured, there is no need for him to institute a liberation of slaves or a disarming of the citizens, for one of the two parts of the state added to his power will be enough to make him and them stronger than their attackers. But to discuss each of such matters separately is superfluous; for the thing to aim at is clear, that it is necessary to appear to the subjects to be not a tyrannical ruler but a steward and a royal governor, and not an appropriator of wealth but a trustee, and to pursue the moderate things of life and not its extravagances, and also to make the notables one’s comrades and the many one’s followers. For the result of these methods must be that not only the tyrant’s rule will be more honourable and more enviable because he will rule nobler subjects and not men that have been humiliated, and will not be continually hated and feared, but also that his rule will endure longer, and moreover that he himself in his personal character
1315 b

10 καλῶς πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἡ ἡμίχρηστον ὄντα, καὶ μὴ πονηρὸν ἀλλ' ἡμίπονηρον.

Καί τοι πάσων ὀλιγοχρονωτέραι τῶν πολι-21
tειῶν εἰσὶν ὀλιγαρχία καὶ τυραννίς. πλείστον γὰρ
ἐγένετο χρόνον ἡ περὶ Σικυώνα τυραννίς, ἡ τῶν
'Ὀρθαγόρου παίδων καὶ αὐτοῦ Ὁρθαγόρου, ἔτη
15 δ' αὐτή διέμεινεν ἐκατόν. τούτου δ' αὕτων ὅτι
τοῖς ἀρχιμένοις ἔχρωντο μετρίως καὶ πολλά τοῖς
νόμοις ἔδουλευον, καὶ διὰ τὸ πολεμικὸς γενέ-
σθαι Κλεισθένης οὐκ ἦν εὐκαταφρόνητος, καὶ τὰ
πολλά ταῖς ἐπιμελείαις ἐδημαγώγουν. λέγεται γοῦν
Κλεισθένης τὸν ἀποκρίναντα τῆς νίκης αὐτῶν ὡς
20 ἐστεφάνωσεν· ἐνιοὶ δ' εἰκόνα φανερά εἶναι τοῦ κρί-
ναντος οὕτω τῶν ἀνδριάντα τὸν ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ καθ-
ήμενον. φαί δὲ καὶ Πεισιστρατὸν ὑπομειναὶ ποτε
προσκληθέντα δίκην εἰς Ἀρείου πάγουν. δευτέρα 22
δὲ ἡ3 περὶ Κόρινθου ἡ τῶν Κυψελιδῶν καὶ γὰρ
αὐτὴ διετέλεσεν ἐτη τρία καὶ ἐβδομήκοντα καὶ ἕξ
25 μῆνας, Κύψελος μὲν γὰρ ἐτυραννήσεν ἐτη τρία-
konta, Περιάνδρος δὲ τετταράκοντα καὶ τέτταρα,4
Ψαμμῆτιχος δ' ὁ Γορδίου τρία ἐτη. τὰ δ' αὕτως
ταύτα καὶ ταύτης. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κύψελος δημ-
αγωγός ἦν καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχήν διετέλεσεν ἀδορυ-
φόρητος, Περιάνδρος δ' ἐγένετο μὲν τυραννικός,
30 ἀλλὰ πολεμικὸς. τρίτη δ' ἡ τῶν Πεισιστρατιδῶν 23

1 ἣ <ὁς> ? Richards.
2 καὶ διὰ—εὐκαταφρόνητος infra post 23 πάγου Richards.
3 δὲ ἡ ed.: δὲ codd.
4 τέτταρα: ἡμαυ edd. arithmetices gratia.
5 Θργου Susemihl.

* Oligarchy is not mentioned in what follows, and the context deals with the forms of monarchy. Tyranny is included among the constitutions at 1312 a 40, but not else-
will be nobly disposed towards virtue, or at all events half-virtuous, and not base but only half-base.

Nevertheless oligarchy and tyranny are less lasting than any of the constitutional governments. For the longest-lived was the tyranny at Sicyon, that of the sons of Orthagoras and of Orthagoras himself, and this lasted a hundred years. The cause of this was that they treated their subjects moderately and in many matters were subservient to the laws, and Cleisthenes because he was a warlike man was not easily despised, and in most things they kept the lead of the people by looking after their interests. At all events it is said that Cleisthenes placed a wreath on the judge who awarded the victory away from him, and some say that the statue of a seated figure in the market-place is a statue of the man who gave this judgement. And they say that Pisistratus also once submitted to a summons for trial before the Areopagus. And the second longest is the tyranny at Corinth, that of the Cypselids, for even this lasted seventy-three and a half years, as Cypselus was tyrant for thirty years, Periander for forty-four, and Psammetichus son of Gordias for three years. And the reasons for the permanence of this tyranny also are the same: Cypselus was a leader of the people and continuously throughout his period of office dispensed with a bodyguard; and although Periander became tyrannical, yet he was warlike. The third longest tyranny is that of where in this Book. Some editors bracket ll. 19-29 as spurious or out of place.

\[\text{i.e. descendants;}\] Cleisthenes was his grandson.

\[\text{From 670 B.C.}\] \[\text{See 1305 a 23 n.}\] \[\text{From 655 B.C.}\]

\[\text{The Greek may be corrected to 'forty and a half' to give the stated total.}\]
'Αθήνηςων, οὐκ ἐγένετο δὲ συνεχὴς: διὸ γὰρ ἔφυγε Πεισίστρατος τυραννῶν, ὥστ' ἐν ἔτεσι τριάκοντα καὶ τρισών ἑπτακαίδεκα ἐτῆς τούτων ἑτυράννευσεν, ὀκτωκαίδεκα δὲ οἱ παῖδες, ὥστε τὰ πάντα ἐγένετο ἐτής τριάκοντα καὶ πέντε. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἡ περὶ Ἰέρωνα καὶ Γέλωνα περὶ Συρακούσας, ἐτῆς δ' οὖδ' αὐτὴ πολλὰ διεμεῖνεν, ἀλλὰ τὰ σύμπαντα δυοῖν δέοντα εἶκοσι. Γέλων μὲν γὰρ ἑπτὰ τυραννεύσας τῷ ὁγδόῳ τῶν βίων ἐτελεύτησεν, δέκα δ' Ἰέρων, Ὀρασύβουλος δὲ τῷ ἐνδεκάτῳ μηνὶ ἑξέπεσεν. αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ τῶν τυραννίδων ὀλυγοχρόνιαι πάσαι γεγόνασι παντελῶς.

1316 Ἐν δὲ τῇ Πολιτείᾳ λέγεται μὲν περὶ τῶν μεταβολῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους, οὐ μὲντοι λέγεται καλῶς. τῆς τε γὰρ ἀρίστης πολιτείας καὶ πρώτης οὕτως οὐ λέγει τὴν μεταβολὴν ἵδιώς. φησὶ γὰρ αὐτὸν εἶναι τὸ μῆ μένειν μηθὲν ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς περιόδοις μεταβάλλειν, ἀρχὴν δ' εἶναι τούτων ὧν ἐπίτροποι πυθμῆν πεμπάδι συξύγεις δύο ἄρμονίας παρέχεται, λέγων ὅταν ὃ τοῦ διαγράμματος ἀριθμῶν τούτου γένηται στέρεος, ὡς τῆς φύσεως ποτὲ φυόντος φαύλους καὶ κρείττους τῆς παίδειας, τούτο μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ λέγων ἵσως οὐ κακῶς (ἐνδεχεται γὰρ εἶναι τινας οὓς ποιευθήναι

1 ἡ τῶν περὶ Βοισεν.
2 ἐν Συρακούσαις Schneider: παρὰ Συρακουσιος Sylburg.

See 1305 a 23 n.  b See 1312 b 12 n.  c Plato, Republic, Bks. VIII., IX. init.: the mathematical
the Pisistratidae at Athens, but it was not continuous; for while Pisistratus\(^a\) was tyrant he twice fled into exile, so that in a period of thirty-three years he was tyrant for seventeen years out of the total, and his sons for eighteen years, so that the whole duration of their rule was thirty-five years. Among the remaining tyrannies is the one connected with Hiero and Gelo\(^b\) at Syracuse, but even this did not last many years, but only eighteen in all, for Gelo after being tyrant for seven years ended his life in the eighth, and Hiero ruled ten years, but Thrasybulus was expelled after ten months. And the usual tyrannies have all of them been of quite short duration.

The causes therefore of the destruction of constitutional governments and of monarchies and those again of their preservation have almost all of them been discussed.

1 X. The subject of revolutions is discussed by Socrates in the Republic,\(^c\) but is not discussed well. For his account of revolution in the constitution that is the best one and the first does not apply to it particularly. He says that the cause is that nothing is permanent but everything changes in a certain cycle, and that change has its origin in those numbers 'whose basic ratio 4:3 linked with the number 5 gives two harmonies,'—meaning whenever the number of this figure becomes cubed,—in the belief that nature sometimes engenders men that are evil, and too strong for education to influence—speaking perhaps not ill as far as this particular dictum goes (for it is possible that there are some formula for the change from Aristocracy to Timocracy quoted here occurs at 546 c—see Adam's note there.

\(\)
καὶ γενέσθαι οποιδαίοις ἀνδρας ἀδύνατον), ἀλλ' αὐτή τι ἂν ἰδίος εἴη μεταβολή τῆς ὑπ' ἐκείνου λεγομένης ἁρίστης πολίτειας μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ἄλλων πασῶν καὶ τῶν γιγνομένων πάντων; καὶ διὰ γε1 2
tοῦ2 χρόνου, δι' ὅν λέγει πάντα μεταβάλλειν, καὶ
tὰ μὴ ἄμα ἀρξάμενα γίγνεσθαι ἄμα μεταβάλλει,
οἷον εἰ τῇ πρωτέρα ἡμέρα ἐγένετο τῆς τροπῆς,
ἄμα ἄρα μεταβάλλει; πρὸς δὲ τούτοις διὰ τὴν
αἰτίαν ἐκ ταύτης εἰς τὴν Δακωνικὴν μεταβάλλει;
πλεονάκις γὰρ εἰς τὴν ἐναντίαν μεταβάλλουσι πᾶσαι
20 αἱ πολίτειαι ἡ τῆς σύνεγγυς. δὲ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ
περὶ τῶν ἄλλων μεταβολῶν· ἐκ γὰρ τῆς Δακωνι-
κῆς, φησί, μεταβάλλει εἰς τὴν ὀλυγαρχίαν, ἐκ δὲ
tαύτης εἰς δημοκρατίαν, εἰς τυραννίδα δὲ ἐκ δημο-
κρατίας. καὶ τοι καὶ ἀνάπαλω μεταβάλλουσι, οἷον
ἐκ δῆμου εἰς ὀλυγαρχίαν, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ εἰς μον-
25 αρχίαν. ἔτι δὲ τυραννίδος οὐ λέγει οὔτ' εἰ ἐσται
3 μεταβολὴ οὔτ' εἰ μὴ ἔσται, <οὔτ' εἰ ἐσται,>3 διὰ τὴν
αἰτίαν καὶ εἰς ποιὰν πολίτειαν· τούτου δὲ αἰτίων
ὁτι οὐ ραδίως ἂν εἴχε λέγειν, ἀν ὀριστὸν γὰρ, ἐπεὶ
καὶ ἐκείνου δεῖ εἰς τὴν πρώτην καὶ τὴν ἁρίστην,
οὔτω γὰρ ἃν ἐγίγνετο συνεχές καὶ κύκλος, ἀλλὰ
80 μεταβάλλει καὶ εἰς τυραννίδα τυραννίς, ὥσπερ ἡ
Σικυώνος ἐκ τῆς Μύρωνος εἰς τὴν Κλεισθένους,

1 γε corr. cod. inf.: τε codd.
2 <τό> τὸ codd.
3 Casaubon (potius όδ' ed.).

---
a Timocracy, Plato, Republic 545 a.
b See 1315 b 13 n.
persons incapable of being educated and becoming men of noble character), but why should this process of revolution belong to the constitution which Socrates speaks of as the best, more than to all the other forms of constitution, and to all men that come into existence? and why merely by the operation of time, which he says is the cause of change in all things, do even things that did not begin to exist simultaneously change simultaneously? for instance, if a thing came into existence the day before the completion of the cycle, why does it yet change simultaneously with everything else? And in addition to these points, what is the reason why the republic changes from the constitution mentioned into the Spartan form? For all constitutions more often change into the opposite form than into the one near them. And the same remark applies to the other revolutions as well. For from the Spartan constitution the state changes, he says, to oligarchy, and from this to democracy, and from democracy to tyranny. Yet revolutions also occur the other way about, for example from democracy to oligarchy, and more often so than from democracy to monarchy. Again as to tyranny he does not say whether it will undergo revolution or not, nor, if it will, what will be the cause of it, and into what sort of constitution it will change; and the reason for this is that he would not have found it easy to say, for it is irregular; since according to him tyranny ought to change into the first and best constitution, for so the process would be continuous and a circle, but as a matter of fact tyranny also changes into tyranny, as the constitution of Sicyon passed from the tyranny of Myron to that of Cleisthenes, and into
καὶ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὡστερ ἢ ἐν Χαλκίδι ἢ Ἁντι-
λέοντος, καὶ εἰς δημοκρατίαν, ὡστερ ἢ τῶν
Γέλωνος ἐν Συρακούσαις, καὶ εἰς ἀριστοκρατίαν,
ὡστερ ἢ Χαριλάου ἐν Λακεδαιμονί [καὶ ἐν Καρχη-
δόνι].
καὶ εἰς τυραννίδα μεταβάλλει εξ ὀλιγαρχίας, ὡστερ ἐν Σικελίᾳ σχεδὸν αἱ πλείοται τῶν ἀρχαῖων,
ἐν Λεοντίνου εἰς τὴν Πανατίνιου τυραννίδα καὶ ἐν
Γέλα εἰς τὴν Κλεάνθρου καὶ ἐν Ἰηρώ εἰς τὴν
Ἀναξιλάου καὶ ἐν ἄλλαις πολλαῖς πόλεσιν ὁποιῶς.

άτοπον δέ καὶ τὸ οἴεσθαι εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν διὰ τοῦτο
μεταβάλλειν ὅτι φιλοχρήματοι καὶ χρηματισταὶ
οἱ ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὅτι οἱ πολὺ ὑπερ-
έχοντες ταῖς οὔσιας οὐ δίκαιον οὖνται εἰναι ἵνα
μετέχειν τῆς πόλεως τοὺς κεκτημένους μηθὲν τοῖς
κεκτημένοις· ἐν πολλαῖς τε ὀλιγαρχίας οὐκ ἔξεστι
χρηματίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ νόμοι εἰσὶν οἱ κωλύοντες, ἐν
Καρχηδόνι δὲ δημοκρατουμένη χρηματίζονται καὶ
οὕτω μεταβεβλήκασιν. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ φάναι
dύο πόλεις εἰναι τὴν ὀλιγαρχικήν, πλουσίων καὶ
πενήτων. τί γὰρ αὐτὴ μᾶλλον τῆς Λακωνικῆς
πέποθεν ἡ ὁποιασθοῦ ἀλλῆς οὐ μὴ πάντες κέκτην-
tαι ἢ ἡ μὴ πάντες ὀμοίως εἰσὶν ἅγαθοι ἄνδρες;
οὐδένος δὲ πενεστέρον γενομένου ἡ πρότερον
οὐθὲν ἤττου μεταβάλλουσι εἰς δῆμον εξ ὀλυ-

1 secl. ? Susemihl: om. cod. inferior.
2 <φιλο>χρηματισται e Platone Spengel.
4 αὐτὴ <τοῦτο> Richards.

a Unknown, cf. 1304 a 29 n.
b See 1302 b 33 n.
c See 1271 b 26 n.
oligarchy, as did that of Antileon at Chalcis, and into democracy, as that of the family of Gelo at Syracuse, and into aristocracy, as that of Charilaus at Sparta [and as at Carthage]. And constitutions change from oligarchy to tyranny, as did almost the greatest number of the ancient oligarchies in Sicily, at Leon-tini to the tyranny of Panaetius, at Gelo to that of Cleander, at Rhegium to that of Anaxilaus, and in many other cities similarly. And it is also a strange idea that revolutions into oligarchy take place because the occupants of the offices are lovers of money and engaged in money-making, but not because owners of much more than the average amount of property think it unjust for those who do not own any property to have an equal share in the state with those who do; and in many oligarchies those in office are not allowed to engage in business, but there are laws preventing it, whereas in Carthage, which has a democratic government, the magistrates go in for business, and they have not yet had a revolution. And it is also a strange remark that the oligarchical state is two states, one of rich men and one of poor men. For what has happened to this state rather than to the Spartan or any other sort of state where all do not own an equal amount of wealth or where all are not equally good men? and when nobody has become poorer than he was before, none the less revolution takes place from oligarchy to democracy

\[d\] This clause seems an interpolation; \textit{cf.} b 6.

\[e\] See 1310 b 29 n.

\[f\] Unknown. Reggio is situated in relation to Sicily as Calais is to England.

\[g\] Apparently this clause also is an interpolation, or 'democratic' is a copyist's mistake for 'oligarchic' or 'timocratic,' see 1272 b 24 ff.

\[h\] Plato, \textit{Republic} 551 d.
ARISTOTLE

1316b

ἀρχίας ἀν γένωνται πλείους οἱ ἀποροὶ, καὶ ἐκ δῆμον εἰς ὀλυγαρχίαν, ἐὰν κρείττον ἢ τοῦ πλῆθους τὸ εὔπορον καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀμελῶσιν οἱ δὲ προσέχωσι τὸν νοῦν. πολλῶν τε οὐσῶν αἰτιῶν δι’ ἄν γίγνονται αἱ μεταβολαὶ, οὐ λέγει ἀλλ’ ἤ μιαν, ὅτι ἁσωτευόμενοι κατατοκιζόμενοι γίγνονται πένητες, ὡς εἴς ἀρχῆς πλουσίων ὄντων πάντων ἢ τῶν πλείστων.

τούτῳ δ’ ἐστὶ ψεύδος, ἀλλ’ ὅταν μὲν τῶν ἡγεμόνων τινὲς ἀπολέσωσι τὰς οὐσίας, καινοτομοῦσιν, ὅταν δὲ τῶν ἄλλων, οὐθὲν γίγνεται δεινόν· καὶ μεταβάλλουσιν οὐθὲν μᾶλλον οὐδὲ τότε εἰς δῆμον ἢ εἰς ἄλλην πολιτείαν. ἐτὶ δὲ κἂν τιμῶν μὴ μετέχωσιν, κἂν ἀδικῶνται ἡ βρίζωνται, στασιάζουσι καὶ μεταβάλλουσι τὰς πολιτείας, κἂν μὴ καταδαπανήσωσι τὴν οὐσίαν . . . διὰ τὸ ἑξείναι ὅ τι ἂν βουλῶνται ποιεῖν· οὗ αἰτιῶν τὴν ἁγιάν ἐλευθερίαν εἰναι φήσων. πλειόνων δ’ οὐσῶν ὀλυγαρχῶν καὶ δημοκρατιῶν, ὡς μιᾶς οὐσίας ἐκατέρας λέγει τὰς μεταβολὰς ὁ Σωκράτης.

1 ἄλλ’ ἤ Richards: ἄλλα codd.
2 <καὶ> κατατοκιζόμενοι Lambinus.
3 οὐδὲ τότε Camotius: οὐδέποτε.
4 lacunam Schneider.

Some words appear to be lost here; what follows refers to democracy, cf. Plato, Republic 587 b.
if the men of no property become more numerous, and from democracy to oligarchy if the wealthy class is stronger than the multitude and the latter neglect politics but the former give their mind to them. And although there are many causes through which revolutions in oligarchies occur, he mentions only one—that of men becoming poor through riotous living, by paying away their money in interest on loans—as if at the start all men or most men were rich. But this is not true, but although when some of the leaders have lost their properties they stir up innovations, when men of the other classes are ruined nothing strange happens; and even when such a revolution does occur it is no more likely to end in a democracy than in another form of constitution. And furthermore men also form factions and cause revolutions in the constitution if they are not allowed a share of honours, and if they are unjustly or insolently treated, even if they have not run through all their property . . . * because of being allowed to do whatever they like; the cause of which he states to be excessive liberty. And although there are several forms of oligarchy and of democracy, Socrates speaks of the revolutions that occur in them as though there were only one form of each.

Additional Note

V. vii. 2, 1307 b 37 (p. 421). This is the sorites fallacy; add to one stone another, and another, and another—when do they make a heap (σωρός)? and take away stone after stone—when do they cease to be a heap? Horace's 'ratio ruentis acerui' (Epistles ii. 1. 47).
1316 b

I. Πόσαι μὲν οὖν διαφοράι καὶ τῖνες τοῦ τε βουλευτικοῦ καὶ κυρίου τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τάξεως καὶ περὶ δικαστηρίων, καὶ ποία πρὸς ποῦν συντετακται πολιτείαν, ἔτι δὲ περὶ φθοράς τε καὶ σωτηρίας τῶν πολιτειῶν ἐκ ποίων τε γίνεται καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας, εἴρηται πρότερον. ἔπει δὲ τετύχθηκεν εἶδη πλείω δημοκρατίας ὁντα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως πολιτειῶν, ἀμα τε περὶ ἐκείνων εἰ τι λοιπὸν οὐ χεῖρον ἐπισκέψασθαι καὶ τὸν οἰκεῖον καὶ τὸν συμφέροντα τρόπον ἀποδοῦναι πρὸς ἐκάστην. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰς συναγωγὰς αὐτῶν τῶν εἴρημένων ἐπισκεπτέων πάντων τῶν τρόπων. ταῦτα γὰρ συνυπαξόμενα ποιεῖ τὰς πολιτείας ἐπαλλάττειν, ὥστε ἀριστοκρατίας τε ὀλιγαρχικὰς εἶναι καὶ πολιτείας δημοκρατικώτερας. λέγω δὲ τοὺς συνυπασμοὺς οὓς δεὶ μὲν ἐπισκοπεῖν οὐκ ἐσκεμμένοι δ' εἰσίν νῦν, 5 οἶον ἂν τὸ μὲν βουλευόμενον καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχαρεσίας ὀλιγαρχικῶς ἢ συντεταγμένον τὰ δὲ περὶ

1 τὸ μὲν <περὶ τὸ> Spengel.

a Book VII. in some editions, Book VIII. in others.
b Book IV., 1297 b 35 ff.
c Book V.
d 1318 b—1319 a 6.
e These topics do not occur in the extant work.
BOOK VI

I. We have already discussed how many and what are the varieties of the deliberative body or sovereign power in the state, and of the system of magistracies and of law-courts, and which variety is adapted to which form of constitution, and also the destruction of constitutions and their preservation, from what sort of people they originate and what are their causes. But as a matter of fact since there have come into existence several kinds of democracy and similarly of the other forms of constitution, it will be well at the same time to consider any point that remains about these varieties, and also determine the mode of organization appropriate and advantageous for each. And further we must also investigate the combinations of all the modes of organizing the actual departments of state that have been mentioned, for these modes when coupled together make the constitutions overlap, so as to produce oligarchical aristocracies and republics inclining towards democracy. I refer to the combinations which ought to be investigated but have not at present been studied, for example if the deliberative body and the system of electing magistrates are organized oligarchically, i.e. the deliberative, executive and judicial, see 1297 b 41 ff.


ARISTOTLE

1317 a
tà δικαστήρια ἀριστοκρατικῶς, ἣ ταύτα μὲν καὶ τὸ
peri to bouleuómenon ὀλγαρχικῶς ἀριστοκρατι-
κῶς δὲ τὸ peri tás ἀρχαιεσίας, ἣ καὶ ἄλλον
10 tivā trópolon μὴ πάντα συντεθῇ τὰ τῆς πολιτείας
οἰκεῖα.

Ποία μὲν οὖν δημοκρατία πρὸς ποιαν ἁρμόττει τὸ
πόλιν, ὑσαύτως δὲ καὶ ποία τῶν ὀλγαρχῶν
ποίω πλήθει, καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν δὲ πολιτείων τίς
συμφέρει τίσιν, εἰρηται πρότερον· ὃμως δὲ ἐπεὶ
15 δει γενέσθαι δὴλον μὴ μόνον ποία τούτων τῶν
πολιτείων ἁρίστη ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀλλὰ καὶ πῶς
dei katakevάξειν καὶ ταύτας καὶ τὰς ἀλλας, ἐπ
ἐλθωμεν συντόμως. καὶ πρῶτον περὶ δημοκρατίας
eipωμεν· ἁμα γὰρ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀντικειμένης
πολιτείας φανερὸν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἣν καλοῦσι τινὲς
ὀλγαρχίαν.

Αηπτέον δὲ πρὸς ταύτην τὴν μέθοδον πάντα τὰ
20 δημοτικά καὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα ταῖς δημοκρατίαις
ἀκολουθεῖν· ἐκ γὰρ τούτων συντιθεμένων τὰ τῆς
dημοκρατίας εἴθη γίνεσθαι συμβαίνει, καὶ πλείους
dημοκρατίας μᾶς εἶναι καὶ διαφόρους. δύο γὰρ
eisw αἰτίαι δ' ἀσπερ αἱ δημοκρατίαι πλείους
eisw, πρῶτον μὲν ἡ λεχθείσα πρότερον, ὅτι διά
25 φοροὶ οἱ δὴμοι (γίνεται γὰρ τὸ μὲν γεωργικὸν πλήθος
to δὲ βάναυσον καὶ θητικόν, ὡν τοῦ πρῶτου τῷ
devtērō προσλαμβανομένου καὶ τοῦ τρίτου πάλιν
tois ámfotérous ou μόνον διαφέρει τῷ βελτίω

1 ὃ ἐπεὶ δει duce Lambino ed.: δε δει codd.
2 áριστη ταῖς: αἰρετή ποιας Spengel.
but the regulations as to the law-courts aristocratically, or these and the structure of the deliberative body oligarchically and the election of magistracy aristocratically, or if in some other manner not all the parts of the constitution are appropriately combined.

3 Now it has been stated before a what kind of democracy is suited to what kind of state, and similarly which of the kinds of oligarchy is suited to what kind of populace, and also which of the remaining constitutions is advantageous for which people; but nevertheless since it must not only be made clear which variety of these constitutions is best for states, but also how both these best varieties and the other forms must be established, let us briefly pursue the subject. And first let us speak about democracy; for at the same time the facts will also become clear about the opposite form of constitution, that is, the constitution which some people call oligarchy. b

4 And for this inquiry we must take into view all the features that are popular and that are thought to go with democracies; for it comes about from combinations of these that the kinds of democracy are formed, and that there are different democracies and more than one sort. In fact there are two causes for there being several kinds of democracy, first the one stated before, the fact that the populations are different (for we find one multitude engaged in agriculture and another consisting of handicraftsmen and day-labourers, and when the first of these is added to the second and again the third to both of them it not only makes a difference in that the

b 'Rule of the few,' i.e. the few rich, but the name is not exact, for in aristocracy also the rulers are few.
καὶ χείρω γίνεσθαι τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἄλλα καὶ τῷ μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν), δευτέρα δὲ περὶ ἃς νῦν λέγομεν.

80 τὰ γὰρ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἀκολουθοῦντα καὶ δοκοῦντα εἶναι τής πολιτείας οἰκεία ταύτης ποιεῖν συντιθέμενα τὰς δημοκρατίας ἔτερας· τῇ μὲν γὰρ ἐλάττω τῇ δ' ἀκολουθήσει πλείονα τῇ δ' ἀπαντα ταύτα. χρήσιμον δ' ἐκαστον αὐτῶν γνωρίζειν πρὸς τε τὸ κατασκευάζειν ἢν ἂν τις αὐτῶν τύχῃ βουλόμενος, καὶ πρὸς τὰς διορθώσεις. ξητούν μὲν γὰρ οἱ τὰς πολιτείας καθιστάντες ἀπαντα τὰ οἰκεία συναγαγεῖν πρὸς τὴν ύπόθεσιν, ἀμαρτάνοντο δὲ τούτο ποιοῦντες, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς φθορὰς καὶ τὰς σωτηρίας τῶν πολιτειῶν εἰρηται πρότερον. νυνὶ δὲ τὰ ἀξιόματα καὶ τὰ ἥθη καὶ ὃν ἐφείσεται λέγομεν.

40 'Ὑπόθεσις μὲν οὖν τῆς δημοκρατικῆς πολιτείας ἡ ἐλευθερία· τοῦτο γὰρ λέγειν εἰώθασιν, ὡς ἐν μόνη τῇ πολιτείᾳ ταύτῃ μετέχοντας ἐλευθερίας, τούτου γὰρ στοχάζονται φασί πάσαν δημοκρατίαν. ἐλευθερίας δὲ ἐν μὲν τὸ ἐν μέρει ἀρχεσθαί καὶ ἀρχείν· καὶ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ δημοτικὸν τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν ἐστὶν καὶ ἂριστον ἄλλα μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν, τούτου δ' οὖν τοῦ δικαίου τὸ πλήθος ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι κύριον καὶ τι ἂν δόξῃ τοῖς πλείοις τοῦτ' εἶναι τέλος καὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον, φασὶ γὰρ δὲν ἴσον ἔχειν ἐκαστον τῶν πολιτῶν· ὡστε ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις συμβαίνει κυριώτέρους εἶναι τοὺς ἀπόρους τῶν εὐπόρων, πλείους γὰρ εἰσὶν κύριον δὲ τὸ τοῖς καὶ τέλος codd. cett.

1 εἶναι καὶ τέλος Richards.

2 καὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι post 7 πολιτῶν Richards.
quality of the democracy becomes better or worse but also by its becoming different in kind); and the second cause is the one about which we now speak. For the institutions that go with democracies and seem to be appropriate to this form of constitution make the democracies different by their combinations; for one form of democracy will be accompanied by fewer, another by more, and another by all of them. And it is serviceable to ascertain each of them both for the purpose of instituting whichever of these kinds of democracy one happens to wish and for the purpose of amending existing ones. For people setting up constitutions seek to collect together all the features appropriate to their fundamental principle, but in so doing they make a mistake, as has been said before in the passage dealing with the causes of the destruction and the preservation of constitutions. And now let us state the postulates, the ethical characters and the aims of the various forms of democracy.

Now a fundamental principle of the democratic form of constitution is liberty—that is what is usually asserted, implying that only under this constitution do men participate in liberty, for they assert this as the aim of every democracy. But one factor of liberty is to govern and be governed in turn; for the popular principle of justice is to have equality according to number, not worth, and if this is the principle of justice prevailing, the multitude must of necessity be sovereign and the decision of the majority must be final and must constitute justice, for they say that each of the citizens ought to have an equal share; so that it results that in democracies the poor are more powerful than the rich, because there are more of them and whatever is decided by the majority
pelios o tov tis eileuthrias syneion toutou du tithetai pantes oi demotikoi tis politeias oron, en de to zin ws bouletai tis toutou gar tis eileuthrias ergon ei na phain, eipeter tou doulo ou ontos to zin mii ws bouletai. tis men oiv demokratias oros ou tos deuteropoiyn euthidein de
elilege to mi arxethai, malista men upo mhevenos, ei de mii, kato meros kai symballetai tauti pro to eileuthriai tivn kata to ison. toutron de upokeimenon kai toiauths outhis tis arxhias, tiv politeia demotikai to aireithai tas arxhas pantas
ek panton, to arxhein pantas men ekastou ekastou de en merhe panton, to klhrotas einai tas arxhas h paseas h osai mh empathyas deountai kai teknyia, to mh apd trhmatos mhvenos einai tas arxhas h oti mikrotaton, to mh di tas auton arxhein mhevmian h olygakias h olygias exw ton kata
polemon, to olychosonious tas arxhas h paseas h osas evdeketai, to dikazein pantas kai ek panton, kai peri panton h peri ton plieston kai ton megyoton kai ton kwrwataxw, odon peri evthnwn kai politeias kai ton idiaon sunallagmaton, to tiv ekklhsiav kuriav einai panton arxhyn de
mhevmian mhvenos h oti olygiotan, h ton megyston boulhyn kuriav (ton de arxhwn demotikwstan 9 boulh) opon mh misothi eutoria pasoyn eutath avar aforoynai kai tauih tis arxhias tivn dwamwn, eis auton avar anaigei tas kriseis paseas h himos

5 Boulih kuriav Immisch: kuriav codd.

This clause is obscure: perhaps it is an interpolation.

490
7 is sovereign. This then is one mark of liberty which all democrats set down as a principle of the constitution. And one is for a man to live as he likes; for they say that this is the function of liberty, inasmuch as to live not as one likes is the life of a man that is a slave. This is the second principle of democracy, and from it has come the claim not to be governed, preferably not by anybody, or failing that, to govern and be governed in turns; and this is the way in which the second principle contributes to equalitarian liberty. And these principles having been laid down and this being the nature of democratic government, the following institutions are democratic in character: election of officials by all from all; government of each by all, and of all by each in turn; election by lot either to all magistracies or to all that do not need experience and skill; no property-qualification for office, or only a very low one; no office to be held twice, or more than a few times, by the same person, or few offices except the military ones; short tenure either of all offices or of as many as possible; judicial functions to be exercised by all citizens, that is by persons selected from all, and on all matters, or on most and the greatest and most important, for instance the audit of official accounts, constitutional questions, private contracts; the assembly to be sovereign over all matters, but no official over any or only over extremely few; or else a council to be sovereign over the most important matters (and a council is the most democratic of magistracies in states where there is not a plentiful supply of pay for everybody—for where there is, they deprive even this office of its power, since the people draws all the trials to itself when it has plenty
1817 b

εὐπορῶν μισθοῦ, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τῇ μεθόδῳ τῇ πρὸ ταῦτης), ἐπειτὰ τὸ μισθοφορεῖν μαλιστὰ μὲν πάντας, ἐκκλησίαις δικαστῆρια ἀρχὰς, εἰ δὲ μῆ, τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰ δικαστήρια καὶ τὴν βουλὴν καὶ τὰς ἐκκλησίας τὰς κυρίας, ἣ τῶν ἀρχῶν αὐτὸν ἀνάγκη συσσιτεῖν μετ' ἀλλήλων. ἦτι ἐπειδὴ ὀλιγαρχία καὶ γενεῖ καὶ πλοῦτω καὶ παιδείᾳ ὃ ὅριζεται, τὰ δημοτικὰ δοκεῖ τάναντα τούτων εἶναι, ἀγενεια πενία βαναυσία. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀρχῶν τὸ μηδεμίαν αἴδιν εἶναι· ἕαν δὲ τις καταλειπθῇ ἐξ ἀρχαίας μεταβολῆς, τὸ γε1 περιμερείσθαι τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς καὶ ἐξ αἰρέτων κληρωτοὺς ποιεῖν.

Τὰ μὲν2 οὖν κοινὰ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ταῦτ' ἐστὶ· συμβαίνει δ' ἐκ τοῦ δικαιοῦ τοῦ ὁμο-5 λογουμένου εἶναι δημοκρατικῶς (τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἵσον ἔχειν ἀπαντᾶς κατ' ἀριθμὸν) ἢ μαλιστ' εἶναι δοκούσα δημοκρατία καὶ δήμος. ἰσον γὰρ τὸ μηθὲν μᾶλλον ἀρχεῖν τοὺς ἀπόρους ἢ τοὺς εὐπόρους, μηδὲ κυρίους εἶναι μόνους ἀλλὰ πάντας εἰς ἰσον [κατ' ἀριθμὸν]3· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ὑπάρχειν νομίζοιεν 10 τὴν τ' ἱσότητα τῇ πολιτείᾳ καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν. τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀπορεῖται, πῶς ἔξουσι τὸ 11 ἰσον; πότερον δεῖ τὰ τιμήματα διελεῖν χιλίοις4 τὰ τῶν πεντακοσίων καὶ τοὺς χιλίους ἰσον δύνασθαι τοῖς πεντακοσίοις; ἡ οὖχ οὕτω δεῖ τιθέναι τὴν

1 τὸ γε Coraes: τότε codd.
2 τὰ μὲν—b 5 φροντίζων secl. Susemihl. 3 ed.
4 διελεῖν <ἰσόντα τοῖς> χιλίοις ? Richards.

a Book IV. 1299 b 38 ff. (Books IV. and V. are regarded as forming one treatise).
b i.e. owing to the nature of their duties, and by general custom.
492
of pay, as has been said before in the treatise preceding this one \(^a\); also payment for public duties, preferably in all branches, assembly, law-courts, magistracies, or if not, for the magistracies, the law-courts, council and sovereign assemblies, or for those magistracies which are bound \(^b\) to have common mess-tables. Also inasmuch as oligarchy is defined by birth, wealth and education, the popular qualifications are thought to be the opposite of these, low birth, poverty, vulgarity. And in respect of the magistracies it is democratic to have none tenable for life, and if any life-office has been left after an ancient revolution, at all events to deprive it of its power and to substitute election by lot for election by vote.

10 These then are the features common to democracies. But what is thought to be the extreme form of democracy and of popular government comes about as a result of the principle of justice that is admitted to be democratic, and this is for all to have equality according to number. For it is equality for the poor to have no larger share of power than the rich, and not for the poor alone to be supreme but for all to govern equally; for in this way they would feel that the constitution possessed both equality and liberty.

11 But the question follows, how will they have equality? are the property-assessments of five hundred citizens to be divided among a thousand and the thousand to have equal power to the five hundred \(^d\)? or is

\(^a\) The rest of the chapter is most obscure, and its authenticity is questioned.

\(^d\) i.e. two groups of voters, with equal total wealth and total voting-power, but one group twice as numerous as the other, so that a man in the rich group has two votes and one in the poor group one, the former being on the average twice as rich as the latter.
κατὰ τὸ τοῦτο ἴσότητα, ἀλλὰ διελεῖν μὲν οὐτως, ἕπειτα ἐκ τῶν πεντακοσίων ἵσους λαβόντα καὶ ἐκ τῶν χιλίων, τούτους κυρίους εἶναι τῶν αἱρέσεων ἢ καὶ τῶν δικαστηρίων; πότερον οὖν αὐτῇ ἡ πολιτεία δικαιοτάτη κατὰ τὸ δημοτικὸν δίκαιον, ἢ μᾶλλον ἢ κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος, φασὶ γὰρ οἱ δημοτικοὶ τοῦτο δίκαιον ὅ τι ἄν δόξη τοῖς πλείοσιν, οἱ δ’ ὀλιγαρχικοὶ ὅ τι ἄν δόξη τῇ πλείονι οὐσία, κατὰ πλῆθος γὰρ οὐσίας φασὶ κρίνεσθαι δειν. ἔχει δ’ ἀμφότερα ἰσότητα καὶ ἀδικίαν· εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὅ τι ἄν οἱ ὀλίγοι, τυραννίς, καὶ γὰρ ἐὰν εἴσ ἐξὶ πλείω τῶν ἀλλῶν εὐπόρων, κατὰ τὸ ὀλιγαρχικὸν δίκαιον ἄρχειν δίκαιον μόνος· εἰ δ’ ὅ τι ἄν οἱ πλείους κατ’ ἀριθμὸν, ἀδικήσουσι δημεύοντες τὰ τῶν πλουσίων καὶ ἐλαττόνων, καθάπερ εἰρηται πρότερον. τίς ἄν οὖν εἴη ἴσοτητα ἢν ὀμολογήσουσιν ἀμφότεροι, σκεπτόντειν εἰς ὅν ὀρίζονται δικαίως ἀμφότεροι. λέγουσι γὰρ ὅσ τι ἄν δόξη τοῖς πλείοις τῶν πολιτῶν τοῦτ’ εἶναι δεὶ κύριον. ἔστω δὴ τοῦτο, μὴ μέντοι 13 πάντως, ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ δύο μέρη τετύχηκεν εἰς ὅν ἡ πόλις, πλούσιοι καὶ πένητες, ὅ τι ἄν ἀμφότεροι δόξη ἢ τοῖς πλείσι τοῦτο κύριον ἔστω, ἐὰν δὲ τάναντια δόξη, ὅ τι ἄν οἱ πλείους καὶ ὅν τὸ

1 aἱρέσεων Camotius: διαἱρέσεων codd.

---

\[a\] i.e. ‘equality in proportion to number.’

\[b\] i.e. ‘one man one vote.’

\[c\] i.e. apparently, more than the property of all the others put together.

\[d\] 1281 a 14.
equality on this principle would not to be arranged in this manner, but the division into classes to be on this system, but then an equal number to be taken from the five hundred and from the thousand and these to control the elections and the law-courts? Is this then the justest form of constitution in accordance with popular justice, or is it rather one that goes by counting heads? For democrats say that justice is whatever seems good to the larger number, but advocates of oligarchy think that it is whatever seems good to the owners of the larger amount of property, for they say that the decision ought to go by amount of property. But both views involve inequality and injustice; for if the will of the few is to prevail, this means a tyranny, since if one man owns more than the other rich men, according to the oligarchic principle of justice it is just for him to rule alone; whereas if the will of the numerical majority is to prevail, they will do injustice by confiscating the property of the rich minority, as has been said before. What form of equality therefore would be one on which both parties will agree must be considered in the light of the principles of justice as defined by both sets. For they say that whatever seems good to the majority of the citizens ought to be sovereign. Let us then accept this principle, yet not wholly without qualification, but inasmuch as fortune has brought into existence two component parts of the state, rich and poor, let any resolution passed by both classes, or by a majority of each, be sovereign, but if the two classes carry opposite resolutions, let the decision of the majority, in the sense of the group whose total property-assessment is the larger, prevail: for instance, if
ARISTOTLE

1318 a τίμημα πλειον· οίον οἱ μὲν δέκα οἱ δ' εἶκοσιν,
35 εδοξε δὲ τῶν μὲν πλουσίων τοῖς ἐξ τῶν δ' ἀπορω-
τέρων τοῖς πεντεκαίδεκα, προσγεγένηται τοῖς μὲν
πένησι τέτταρες τῶν πλουσίων τοῖς δὲ πλουσίοις
πέντε τῶν πενήτων· ὅποτέρων οὖν τὸ τίμημα
ὑπερτείνει συναριθμομένων ἀμφοτέρων ἑκατέροις,
tούτῳ κύριον. εὰν δὲ ἴσοί συμπέσωσι, κοινὴν
14 εἰναι ταύτην νομισεόν ἀπορίαν, ὡστερ νῦν ἐὰν δίχα

1318 b Ἡ ἐκκλησία γένηται ἡ τὸ δικαστήριον· ἡ γὰρ
ἀποκλήρωσε τῇ, ἀλλὰ τοιούτων ποιητέων. ἀλλὰ
περὶ μὲν τοῦ ἴσου καὶ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ ἢ πάνω
χαλεπόν εὐρείν τὴν ἀλήθειαν περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅμως
ῥίον τυχεῖν ἡ συμπείσαι τοὺς δυναμένους πλεον-
5 εκτείν· ἂεὶ γὰρ ξητοῦσι τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ δικαίον οἱ
ήττους, οἱ δὲ κρατοῦντες οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν.

II. Δημοκρατίων δ' οὐσῶν τεττάρων βελτιστή 1
μὲν ἡ πρώτη τάξει, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρὸ τούτων
ἐλέχθη λόγοις· ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ ἀρχαιοτάτη πασῶν
αὐτῆ, λέγω δὲ πρώτην ὡσπερ ἀν τις διέλοι τοὺς
10 δήμους. βελτιστότερος γὰρ δῆμος ὁ γεωργικός ἐστιν,
ὡστε καὶ ποιεῖν1 ενδεχεται δημοκρατίαν ὅπου ζη
τὸ πλῆθος ἀπὸ γεωργίας ἡ νομισ. διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ
μὴ πολλὴν οὐσίαν ἔχειν ἀσχολος, ὡστε μὴ πολ-
lάκης ἐκκλησιαζειν, διὰ δὲ τὸ2 ἔχειν τάναγκαῖα

1 <χρήσεως> ποιεῖν (cf. 1319 a 34) Richards.
2 τὸ Bojesen: τὸ μὴ codd.

---

1 If the rich citizens are on the average twice as wealthy as the poor (§ 11), and therefore a rich man has two votes to a poor man’s one, when 6 rich and 5 poor vote one way, and 15 poor and 4 rich the other, the division is 17 to 23, and the view of the latter party, which is carried, represents a larger total of wealth but a larger proportion of poor men.

2 Cf. IV., 1291 b 30-41, 1292 b 25-33.
there are ten rich citizens and twenty poor ones, and opposite votes have been cast by six of the rich on one side and by fifteen of the less wealthy on the other, four of the rich have sided with the poor and five of the poor with the rich; then the side that has the larger total property when the assessments of both classes on either side are added together carries the voting. But if the totals fall out exactly equal, this is to be deemed an impasse common to both sides, as it is at present if the assembly or law-court is exactly divided; either a decision must be made by casting lots or some other such device must be adopted. But on questions of equality and justice, even though it is very difficult to discover the truth about them, nevertheless it is easier to hit upon it than to persuade people that have the power to get an advantage to agree to it; equality and justice are always sought by the weaker party, but those that have the upper hand pay no attention to them.

II. There being four kinds of democracy, the best is the one that stands first in structure, as was said in the discourses preceding these; it is also the oldest of them all, but by first I mean first as it were in a classification of the kinds of common people. The best common people are the agricultural population, so that it is possible to introduce democracy as well as other forms of constitution where the multitude lives by agriculture or by pasturing cattle. For owing to their not having much property they are busy, so that they cannot often meet in the assembly, while owing to their having the necessaries of life they pass their time attending to their

\[497\]
πρὸς τοῖς ἔργοις διατρίβουσι καὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων
15 οὐκ ἐπιθυμοῦσι, ἀλλ' ἤδιον τὸ ἐργάζεσθαι τοῦ
πολιτεύεσθαι καὶ ἀρχεῖν, ὅποιον ἄν μὴ ἢ λήμματα
μεγάλα ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν. οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ μάλλον
ὀρέγονται τοῖς κέρδοις ἢ τῆς τιμῆς. σημεῖον δὲ 2
καὶ γὰρ τὰς ἀρχαίας τυραννίδας ὑπέμενον καὶ τὰς
ὁλιγαρχίας ὑπομένουσιν, ἐάν τις αὐτοὺς ἐργά-
20 ζεσθαι μὴ κωλύῃ μηδ' ἀφαιρηται μηθέν ταχέως
γὰρ οἱ μὲν πλουτοῦσιν αὐτῶν οἱ δ' οὐκ ἀποροῦσιν.
ἐτει δὲ τὸ κυρίου εἶναι τοῦ ἐλέσθαι καὶ εὐθύνειν
ἀναπληρῆν τὴν ἐνίδειαν εἰ τι φιλοτιμίας ἔχουσιν,
ἐπεὶ παρ' ἐνίοις δήμωις, κἂν μὴ μετέχωσι τῆς
αιρέσεως τῶν ἁρχῶν ἀλλὰ τινες αἱρετοί κατὰ
25 μέρος ἕκ πάντων, ὡσπερ ἐν Μαντινείᾳ, τοῦ δὲ
βουλεύεσθαι κύριοι ὦσιν, ἵκανος ἔχει τοῖς πολλοῖς
(καὶ δεῖ νομίζειν καὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι σχήμα τι δημο-
κρατίας, ὡσπερ ἐν Μαντινείᾳ ποτ' ἦν). διὸ δὴ καὶ 3
συμφέρον ἔστι τῇ πρώτερον ῥήθεισθαι δημοκρατία
καὶ ὑπάρχειν εἰσιδεν, αἱρεῖσθαι μὲν τὰς ἁρχὰς καὶ
30 εὐθύνεια καὶ δικαία πάντας, ἀρχεῖν δὲ τὰς
μεγίστας αἱρετοὺς καὶ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, τὰς
μείζονς ἀπὸ μειζόνων, ἢ καὶ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων
μὲν μηδεμίαν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς δυναμένους. ἀνάγκη δὲ
πολιτευομένους οὕτω πολιτεύεσθαι καλῶς (αἳ τε 4
γὰρ ἁρχαι ἀδιὰ διὰ τῶν βελτίστων ἔσονται τοῦ
35 δήμου βουλομένου καὶ τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν οὐ φθονοῦν-
tos), καὶ τοῖς ἐπιεικέσι καὶ γνωρίμοις ἀρκοῦσαι

1 τε ante καλῶς transposuit Richards.
farmwork and do not covet their neighbours' goods, but find more pleasure in working than in taking part in politics and holding office, where the profits to be made from the offices are not large; for the mass of mankind are more covetous of gain than of honour.

And this is indicated by the fact that men endured the tyrannies of former times, and endure oligarchies, if a ruler does not prevent them from working or rob them; for then some of them soon get rich and the others free from want. And also, if they have any ambition, to have control over electing magistrates and calling them to account makes up for the lack of office, since in some democracies even if the people have no part in electing the magistrates but these are elected by a special committee selected in turn out of the whole number, as at Mantinea, yet if they have the power of deliberating on policy, the multitude are satisfied. (And this too must be counted as one form of democracy, on the lines on which it once existed at Mantinea.) Indeed it is for this reason that it is advantageous for the form of democracy spoken of before, and is a customary institution in it, for all the citizens to elect the magistrates and call them to account, and to try law-suits, but for the holders of the greatest magistracies to be elected and to have property-qualifications, the higher offices being elected from the higher property-grades, or else for no office to be elected on a property-qualification, but for officials to be chosen on the ground of capacity. And a state governed in this way is bound to be governed well (for the offices will always be administered by the best men with the consent of the people and without their being jealous of the upper classes), and this arrangement is certain to be satis-
Leader of the Heraclidae in their invasion of the Peloponnese, and afterwards king of Elis.

Aphytis was on the Isthmus of Pallene in Macedonia.
factory for the upper classes and notables, for they will not be under the government of others inferior to themselves, and they will govern justly because a different class will be in control of the audits—since it is expedient to be in a state of suspense and not to be able to do everything exactly as seems good to one, for liberty to do whatever one likes cannot guard against the evil that is in every man’s character. Hence there necessarily results the condition of affairs that is the most advantageous in the government of states—for the upper classes to govern without doing wrong, the common people not being deprived of any rights. It is manifest therefore that this is the best of the forms of democracy, and why this is so—namely, because in it the common people are of a certain kind.

For the purpose of making the people an agricultural community, not only were some of the laws that were enacted in many states in early times entirely serviceable, prohibiting the ownership of more than a certain amount of land under any conditions or else of more than a certain amount lying between a certain place and the citadel or city (and in early times at all events in many states there was even legislation prohibiting the sale of the original allotments; and there is a law said to be due to Oxylus with some similar provision, forbidding loans secured on a certain portion of a man’s existing estate), but at the present day it would also be well to introduce reform by means of the law of the Aphytaeans, as it is serviceable for the purpose of which we are speaking; the citizens of Aphytis although numerous and possessing a small territory nevertheless are all engaged in agriculture, for they
ARISTOTLE

ktísseis, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τηλικά τὰ μόρια διαιροῦντες ὥστ' ἔχειν ὑπερβάλλειν ταῖς τιμήσει καὶ τοὺς πένητας.

20 Μετὰ δὲ τὸ γεωργικὸν πλῆθος βέλτιστος ὁ ὅστιν ὅπον νομεῖς εἰσί καὶ ξῶσιν ἀπὸ βοσκημάτων. πολλὰ γὰρ ἔχει τῇ γεωργίᾳ παραπλησίως, καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς πράξεις μάλιστ' οὐτοί γεγυμνασμένοι τὰς ἔξεις καὶ χρήσιμοι τὰ σώματα καὶ δυνάμενοι θυραυλεῖν. τὰ δ' ἄλλα πλῆθῃ πάντα χεῖ αὐτὸν ἀλλ' λοιπὰ δημοκρατίαι συνεστὰσι πολλῶν φαύλοτερα τούτων. δ' γαρ βίος φαύλος, καὶ οὐθὲν ἔργον μετ' ἀρετῆς ἢν μεταχειρίζεται τὸ πλῆθος τό τε τῶν βασιλέων καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀγοραίων ἀνθρώπων καὶ τὸ θητικών, ἓτε δὲ διὰ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἄγορᾶν καὶ τὸ ἄστυ κυλίσθαι πάν τὸ τοιοῦτον γένος ὡς εἰπεῖν ἀράνως ἐκκλησιάζει, οἳ δὲ γεωργοῦντες διὰ τὸ διεσπάρθαι κατὰ τὴν χώραν οὐτ' ἀπαντῶσιν οὐθ' ὀρμοῖς δέονται τῆς συνόδου ταῦτης. ὅποι δὲ καὶ συμβαίνει τὴν χώραν τὴν θέσιν ἔχειν τοιαύτην ὅστε τὴν χώραν πολὺ τῆς πόλεως ἀπηρτήσας, ἀδιόν καὶ δημοκρατίαν ποιεῖσθαι χρηστήν καὶ πολιτείαν, ἀναγκάζεται γὰρ τὸ πλῆθος ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγρῶν ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ἀποκίαις, ὥστε διε, κἂν ἀγοραῖος ὀχλος ἢ, μὴ ποιεῖν ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἐκκλησίαις ἂνευ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν χώραν πλῆθους.

Πῶς μὲν οὖν δεῖ κατασκευάζειν τὴν βελτίστην

1 ἐπιτολάζειν vel πλεονάζειν Immisch.
2 Lambinus: δημοκρατικαί ἐκκλησίαι codd.

---

a No satisfactory explanation seems to have been suggested of what this means.

b i.e. in a largely agricultural democracy, even though
are assessed not on the whole of their estates, but on divisions of them so small that even the poor can exceed the required minimum in their assessments.  

After the agricultural community the best kind of democracy is where the people are herdsmen and get their living from cattle; for this life has many points of resemblance to agriculture, and as regards military duties pastoral people are in a very well trained condition and serviceable in body and capable of living in the open. But almost all the other classes of populace, of which the remaining kinds of democracy are composed, are very inferior to these, for their mode of life is mean, and there is no element of virtue in any of the occupations in which the multitude of artisans and market-people and the wage-earning class take part, and also owing to their loitering about the market-place and the city almost all people of this class find it easy to attend the assembly; whereas the farmers owing to their being scattered over the country do not attend, and have not an equal desire for this opportunity of meeting.  

And where it also happens that the lie of the land is such that the country is widely separated from the city, it is easy to establish a good democracy and also a good constitutional government, for the multitude is forced to live at a distance on the farms; and so, even if there is a crowd that frequents the market-place, it is best in democracies not to hold assemblies without the multitude scattered over the country.  

It has then been stated how the best and first there may be a considerable idle population, which would attend frequent assemblies, it is best to hold them infrequently, so as to secure the attendance of the farmers.
In Book V.

Diodorus (xiv. 34) describes a revolution there in 401 B.C., when five hundred of the rich were put to death and others fled, but after a battle a compromise was arranged.
kind of democracy is to be organized, and it is clear how we ought to organize the other kinds also. For they must diverge in a corresponding order, and at each stage we must admit the next inferior class. The last kind of democracy, because all the population share in the government, it is not within the power of every state to endure, and it is not easy for it to persist if it is not well constituted in its laws and customs (but the things that result in destroying both this state and the other forms of constitution have been nearly all of them spoken of before a). With a view to setting up this kind of democracy and making the people powerful their leaders usually acquire as many supporters as possible and admit to citizenship not only the legitimate children of citizens but also the base-born and those of citizen-birth on one side, I mean those whose father or mother is a citizen; for all this element is specially congenial to a democracy of this sort. Popular leaders therefore regularly introduce such institutions; they ought however only to go on adding citizens up to the point where the multitude outnumber the notables and the middle class and not to go beyond that point; for if they exceed it they make the government more disorderly, and also provoke the notables further in the direction of being reluctant to endure the democracy, which actually took place and caused the revolution at Cyrene b; for a small base element is overlooked, but when it grows numerous it is more in evidence. A democracy of this kind will also find useful such institutions as were employed by Cleisthenes c at Athens when he wished to increase the power of the democracy, and by the party setting

\[ c \text{ See 1275 b 36 n.} \]
οἱ τῶν δήμον καθιστάντες· φυλαί τε γὰρ ἐτεραὶ
ποιητέαι πλεῖον καὶ φρατρίαι, καὶ τὰ τῶν ἱδίων
ιερῶν συνακτεῖον εἰς ὀλίγα καὶ κοινά, καὶ πάντα
σοφιστεόν ὅπως ἂν ὅτι μᾶλιστα ἀναμιχθῶσι
πάντες ἄλληλοις αἱ δὲ συνήθειαι διαζευχθῶσιν
αἱ πρότερον. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ τυραννικὰ κατα-
σκευάσματα δημοτικὰ δοκεῖ πάντα, λέγω δ` οἶνον
ἀναρχία τε δουλῶν (ἀυτὴ δ` ἂν εἰς μέχρι του
συμφέρουσα) καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ παιδῶν, καὶ τὸ
ξῆν ὅπως τις βούλεται παρορᾶν· πολὺ γὰρ ἔσται
tὸ τῇ τουαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ βοηθῶν, ἦ διόν γὰρ τοῖς
πολλοῖς τὸ ξῆν άτάκτως ἢ τὸ σωφρόνως.

III. Ἐστὶ δὲ [ἔργον]¹ τοῦ νομοθέτου καὶ τῶν 1
βουλομένων συνιστάναι τινα τουαύτην πολιτείαν
οὐ τὸ καταστήσαι μέγιστον ἔργον οὐδὲ μόνον, ἀλλά
ὅπως σώζῃται μᾶλλον· μίαν γὰρ ἡ δύο ἢ τρεῖς
ήμερας οὐ χαλεπὸν μεῖναι πολιτευμένος ὅπωσοδεν.
διὸ δεῖ περὶ ἃν τεθεώρηται πρότερον, τίνες σωτη-
ρίαι καὶ φθορὰς τῶν πολιτειῶν, ἐκ τούτων πειρά-
θαι κατασκευάζειν τὴν ἀσφάλειαν, εὐλαβομέ-
νους μὲν τὰ φθείροντα, τιθεμένους δὲ τοιοῦτοις
νόμοις καὶ τούς ἄγραφους καὶ τοὺς γεγραμμένους
οἱ περιλήμβονται μᾶλιστα τὰ σώζοντα τὰς πολι-
τείας, καὶ μὴ νομίζειν τοῦτ' εἶναι δημοτικὸν μηδὲ
ὀλιγαρχικὸν δ` ποιήσει τὴν πόλιν ὅτι μᾶλιστα
dημοκρατεῖσθαι ἢ ὀλιγαρχεῖσθαι, ἀλλ` δ` πλείστον
χρόνον. οἱ δ` νῦν δημαγωγοί χαριζόμενοι τοῖς 2

¹ Scaliger.

² Book V.
up the democracy at Cyrene; different tribes and brotherhoods must be created outnumbering the old ones, and the celebrations of private religious rites must be grouped together into a small number of public celebrations, and every device must be employed to make all the people as much as possible intermingled with one another, and to break up the previously existing groups of associates. Moreover the characteristics of a tyranny also are all thought to be democratic, I mean for instance licence among slaves, which may really be advantageous for the popular party up to a point, and among women and children, and indulgence to live as one likes; a constitution of this sort will have a large number of supporters, as disorderly living is pleasanter to the mass of mankind than sober living.

III. But it is not the greatest or only task of the legislator or of those who desire to construct a constitution of this kind merely to set it up, but rather to ensure its preservation; for it is not difficult for any form of constitution to last for one or two or three days. We must therefore employ the results obtained in the inquiries that we have made already into the causes of the preservation and the destruction of constitutions, and attempt in the light of those results to establish the safety of the state, carefully avoiding the things that cause destruction, and enacting such laws both written and unwritten as shall best compass the results preservative of constitutions, and not think that a measure is democratic or oligarchic which will cause the state to be democratically or oligarchically governed in the greatest degree, but which will cause it to be so governed for the longest time. But the demagogues
δήμοισ πολλά δημεύονσι διὰ τῶν δικαστηρίων. διὸ δὲ πρὸς ταῦτα ἀντιπράττειν τοὺς κηδομένους τῆς πολιτείας, νομοθετοῦντας μηδὲν εἶναι δημό-
σιον τῶν καταδικαζομένων καὶ φερόμενον¹ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν, ἀλλ' ἔφορόν ὀι μὲν γὰρ ἄδικοντες
οὐδὲν ἣττον εὑλαβεῖς ἐσονταί (ξημιώσονται γὰρ ὁμοίως), ὃ δ' ὅχλος ἦττον καταψηφιεῖται τῶν κρι-
νομένων λήψεσθαι μηδὲν μέλλων. ἐτὶ δὲ τὰς γινομένας δημοσίας δίκας ὡς ὀλιγίστας ἀεὶ ποιεῖν,
μεγάλοις ἐπιτιμίοις τοὺς εἰκῇ γραφομένους κωλύον-
τας· οὐ γὰρ τοὺς δημοτικοὺς ἄλλα τοὺς γνωρίμους
eἰσόθασιν εἰσάγειν, δεὶ δὲ καὶ ταύτη τῇ² πολιτεία
πάντας μάλιστα μὲν εὖντας εἶναι τοὺς πολίτας, εἰ
dὲ μή, μὴ τοὶ γε ὡς πολεμίους νομίζειν τοὺς κυρίους. ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ τελευταίαι δημοκρατίαι πολυ-
3 ἀνθρωποὶ τέ εἰσι καὶ χαλεπῶν ἐκκλησίαζε σιμάθους,
tοῦτο δ' ὁποιον πρόσδοκι μὴ τυγχάνουσιν οὐσι
πολέμιον τοὺς γνωρίμους (ἀπὸ τε γὰρ εἰσφορὰς καὶ
dημεύσεως ἀναγκαῖοι γίνεσθαι καὶ δικαστηρίων
φάυλων, ἃ πολλὰς ἥδη δημοκρατίας ἀνέτρεψεν)—
ὁπον μὲν οὖν πρόσδοκι μὴ τυγχάνουσιν οὐσι,
dεῖ ποιεῖν ὀλίγας ἐκκλησίας, καὶ δικαστηρία
πολλῶν μὲν ὀλίγας δ' ἡμέρας (τοῦτο γὰρ φέρει μὲν
καὶ πρὸς τὸ μὴ φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς πλουσίους τὰς
dαπάνας κἂν³ οἱ μὲν εὐποροὶ μὴ λαμβάνωσι δικα-
στικῶν οἱ δ' ἀπόροι, φέρει δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὸ κρίνε-

¹ Bernays: φερομένων ΓΡ¹: φερόντων cet.
² ταύτῃ τῇ Immisch: τῇ codd.
³ κἂν Immisch: ἐὰν.
of to-day to court the favour of the peoples often use the law-courts to bring about confiscations of property. Hence those who are caring for the safety of the constitution must counteract this by enacting that nothing belonging to persons condemned at law shall be confiscated and liable to be carried to the public treasury, but that their property shall be consecrated to the service of religion; for malefactors will be no less on their guard, as they will be punished just the same, while the mob will less often vote guilty against men on trial when it is not going to get anything out of it. Also they must always make the public trials that occur as few as possible, checking those who bring indictments at random by big penalties; for they do not usually indict men of the people but notables, whereas even with this form of constitution it is desirable for all the citizens if possible to be friendly to the state, or failing that, at all events not to think of their rulers as enemies. And inasmuch as the ultimate forms of democracy tend to have large populations and it is difficult for their citizens to sit in the assembly without pay, and this in a state where there do not happen to be revenues is inimical to the notables (for pay has to be obtained from a property-tax and confiscation, and from corruption of the law-courts, which has caused the overthrow of many democracies before now),—where therefore there happen to be no revenues, few meetings of the assembly must be held, and the law-courts must consist of many members but only sit a few days (for this not only contributes to the rich not being in fear of the cost of the system even if the well-off do not take the pay and only the poor do, but also leads to far greater efficiency in the
The fifty daughters of Danaus were married to their cousins, and all but one murdered their husbands on the bridal night, and were punished in Hades by having to pour water into the jar described.
trial of law-suits, for the well-to-do, though not wishing to be away from their private affairs for many days, are willing to leave them for a short time), while where there are revenues men must not do what the popular leaders do now (for they use the surplus for doles, and people no sooner get them than they want the same doles again, because this way of helping the poor is the legendary jar with a hole in it\(^a\)), but the truly democratic statesman must study how the multitude may be saved from extreme poverty; for this is what causes democracy to be corrupt. Measures must therefore be contrived that may bring about lasting prosperity. And since this is advantageous also for the well-to-do, the proper course is to collect all the proceeds of the revenues into a fund and distribute this in lump sums to the needy, best of all, if one can, in sums large enough for acquiring a small estate, or, failing this, to serve as capital for trade or husbandry, and if this is not possible for all, at all events to distribute the money by tribes or some other division of the population in turn, while in the meantime the well-to-do must contribute pay for attendance at the necessary assemblies, being themselves excused from useless public services. By following some such policy as this the Carthaginians have won the friendship of the common people; for they constantly send out some of the people to the surrounding territories and so make them well-off. And if the notables are men of good feeling and sense they may also divide the needy among them in groups and supply them with capital to start them in businesses. It is also a good plan to imitate the policy\(^b\) of the Tarentines. They

\(^a\) Cf. 1263 a 35.
Aristotle 1320b

κτήματα τοὺς ἀπόρους ἐπὶ τὴν χρήσιν εύνοου παρα-
σκευάζουσι τὸ πλῆθος· ἐτι δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς πᾶσας
ἐποίησαν δικτᾶς, τὰς μὲν αἱρέτας τὰς δὲ κληρωτὰς,
τὰς μὲν κληρωτὰς ὅπως ὁ δῆμος αὐτῶν μετέχῃ,
τὰς δὲ αἱρέτας ἵνα πολιτεύονται βέλτιον. ἔστι δὲ
15 τοῦτο ποιήσαι καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς1 μερίζοντας
τοὺς μὲν κληρωτοὺς τοὺς δὲ αἱρετοὺς.

Πῶς μὲν οὖν δεῖ τὰς δημοκρατίας κατασκευά-
ζειν, ἐφησαί.

IV. Σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς ὀλυγαρχίας πώς δεὶ 1

φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων. ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων γὰρ δεῖ

20 συνάγειν, ἐκάστην ὀλυγαρχίαν πρὸς τὴν ἐναντίαν

δημοκρατίαν ἀναλογιζόμενον, τὴν μὲν εὐκρατοῦν

μάλιστα τῶν ὀλυγαρχιῶν καὶ πρώτην—ἀὐτὴ δ’

ἔστιν ἡ σύνεγγυς τῇ καλουμένη πολιτεία, ἢ δεὶ τὰ

25 τιμήματα διαμείνῃ, τὰ μὲν ἐλάττω τὰ δὲ μείζω

ποιοῦντας, ἐλάττω μὲν ἀφ’ ὧν τῶν ἀναγκαίων

μεθέξουσιν ἀρχῶν, μείζω δ’ ἀφ’ ὧν τῶν κυ-

ρωτέρων· τῷ τε κτωμένῳ τὸ τίμημα μετέχειν

ἐξείναι τῆς πολιτείας, τοσοῦτον ἑσαγομένοις τοῦ

20 δήμου πλῆθος διὰ τοῦ τιμήματος μεθ’ ὧν κρέιτ-

τονες ἔσονται τῶν μὴ μετεχόντων· ἀεὶ δὲ δεὶ

παραλαμβάνειν ἐκ τοῦ βελτίωνος δήμου τοὺς

κοινωνοὺς. ὅμως δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐχομένην ὀλυγ-

2

ἀρχὰν ἐπιτείνοντας δεὶ μικρῶν κατασκευάζειν.

τῇ δ’ ἀντίκειμενῇ τῇ τελευταίᾳ δημοκρατίᾳ, τῇ

1 Γ’: ἀρχῆς αὐτῆς codd.

---

a This seems to mean that the land was in private ownership, but that there was some system of poor-relief, to provide for the destitute out of the produce.

b In contrast with the first and best form of democracy, c. ii. init.

512
get the goodwill of the multitude by making property communal for the purpose of use by the needy; also they have divided the whole number of their magistracies into two classes, one elected by vote and the other filled by lot,—the latter to ensure that the people may have a share in them, and the former to improve the conduct of public affairs. And it is also possible to effect this by dividing the holders of the same magistracy into two groups, one appointed by lot and the other by vote.

We have then said how democracies should be organized.

IV. It is also fairly clear from these considerations how oligarchies ought to be organized. We must infer them from their opposites, reasoning out each form of oligarchy with reference to the form of democracy opposite to it, starting with the most well-blended and first form of oligarchy—and this is the one near to what is called a constitutional government, and for it the property-qualifications must be divided into one group of smaller properties and another of larger ones, smaller properties qualifying their owners for the indispensable offices and larger ones for the more important; and a person owning the qualifying property must be allowed to take a share in the government,—introducing by the assessment a large enough number of the common people to secure that with them the governing class will have a majority over those excluded; and persons to share in the government must constantly be brought in from the better class of the common people. And the next form of oligarchy also must be constructed in a similar way with a slight tightening up of the qualification. But the form of oligarchy that stands
ARISTOTLE

1320 b
dυναστικωτάτη καὶ τυραννικωτάτη τῶν ὀλιγαρχῶν,
ὅσω περ χειρίστη τοσοῦτοι δεῖ πλείονοι φυλακῆς.
ὡσπερ γὰρ τὰ μὲν σώματα ἐὰν διακείμενα πρὸς
ὑγίειαν καὶ πλοῦτα τὰ πρὸς ναυτιλίαν καλῶς ἔχοντα
tοῖς πλωτήρων ἐπίδεχεται πλείους ἀμαρτίας ὅστε
μὴ φθείρεσθαι δι’ αὐτάς, τὰ δὲ νοσερῶς ἔχοντα
tῶν σωμάτων καὶ τὰ τῶν πλοίων ἐκλελυμένα καὶ
πλωτήρων τετυχηκότα φαύλων οὐδὲ τὰς μικρὰς
δύναται φέρειν ἀμαρτίας, οὕτω καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν
1321 a αἱ χειρίσται πλεῖστης δέονται φυλακῆς. τὰς μὲν 3
οὖν δημοκρατίας ὅλως ἡ πολυανθρωπία σφίξει,
tοῦτο γὰρ ἀντίκειται πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον τὸ κατὰ τὴν
αξίαν· τὴν δ’ ὀλιγαρχίαν δῆλον ὅτι τούναντίον
ὑπὸ τῆς εὐταξίας δεὶ τυγχάνειν τῆς σωτηρίας.

5 Ἡσπεῖ δὲ τέτταρα μὲν ἐστὶ μέρη μάλιστα τοῦ
πλῆθους, γεωργικῶν βάναυσον ἀγοραίον θητικόν,
tέτταρα δὲ τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς πόλεμον, ἦπτικὸν
ὀπλιτικὸν ψυλὸν ναυτικόν, οὓς μὲν συμβέβηκε τὴν
χώραν εἶναι ἐπιπάσιμον, ἐνταῦθα μὲν εὐφυῶς ἔχει
10 κατασκευάζειν τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἰσχυράν (ὡ γὰρ
σωτηρία τοῖς οἰκοῦσι διὰ ταύτης ἐστὶ τῆς δυ-
νάμεως, αἱ δὲ ἐπιτροφίαι τῶν μακρὰς οὐσίας
κεκτημένων εἰσίν), ὅπου δὲ ὀπλῖτιν, 1 τὴν ἐχομένην
ὀλιγαρχίαν (τὸ γὰρ ὀπλιτικὸν τῶν εὐπόρων ἐστὶ
μᾶλλον ὡς τῶν ἀπόρων), ἣ δὲ ψυλὴ δύναμις καὶ
15 ναυτικὴ δημοκρατικὴ 2 πάμπαν. νῦν μὲν οὖν ὅπου 4
τοιοῦτον πολὺ πλῆθός ἐστιν, ὅταν διαστῶσι, πολ-

1 Lambinus: ὀπλῖτην codd.
2 cod. inf.: δημοτικὴ cct.
POLITICS, VI. iv. 2-4

opposite to the last form of democracy, the most autocratic and tyrannical of the oligarchies, in as far as it is the worst requires a correspondingly great amount of safe guarding. For just as human bodies in a good state of health and ships well equipped with their crews for a voyage admit of more mistakes without being destroyed thereby, but bodies of a morbid habit and vessels strained in their timbers and manned with bad crews cannot endure even the smallest mistakes, so also the worst constitutions need the most safe-guarding. Democracies therefore generally speaking are kept safe by the largeness of the citizen-body, for this is the antithesis of justice according to desert; but oligarchy on the contrary must manifestly obtain its security by means of good organization.

And since the mass of the population falls principally into four divisions, the farming class, artisans, retail traders and hired labourers, and military forces are of four classes, cavalry, heavy infantry, light infantry and marines, in places where the country happens to be suitable for horsemanship, there natural conditions favour the establishment of an oligarchy that will be powerful (for the security of the inhabitants depends on the strength of this element, and keeping studs of horses is the pursuit of those who own extensive estates); and where the ground is suitable for heavy infantry, conditions favour the next form of oligarchy (for heavy infantry is a service for the well-to-do rather than the poor); but light infantry and naval forces are an entirely democratic element. As things are therefore, where there is a large multitude of this class, when party strife occurs the oligarchs often get the worst of
λάκις ἀγωνίζονται χεῖρον. δεῖ δὲ πρὸς τοῦτο φάρμακον παρὰ τῶν πολεμικῶν λαμβάνειν στρατηγῶν, οἱ συνδυάζοντι πρὸς τὴν ἐπιτικὴν δύναμιν καὶ τὴν ὀπλιτικήν τὴν ἀρµόττοςαν τῶν ψιλῶν. ταῦτη

d' ἐπικρατοῦσαν ἐν ταῖς διαστάσεσιν οἱ δῆμοι τῶν εὐπόρων, ψιλοὶ γὰρ ὄντες πρὸς ἐπιτικὴν καὶ ὀπλιτικὴν ἀγωνίζονται βαδίως. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τούτων 5 καθιστάναι ταῦτην τὴν δύναμιν ἐφ' εαυτοὺς ἐστὶ καθιστάναι, δεὶ δὲ διηρημένης τῆς ἡλικίας, καὶ τῶν μὲν ὄντων πρεσβυτέρων τῶν δὲ νέων, ἵπτε μὲν ὄντας νέους τοὺς αὐτῶν υἱὲς διδάσκεσθαι τὰς κούφας καὶ τὰς ψιλᾶς ἔργασιας, ἐκκεκριμένους δὲ ἐκ παιδῶν ἀθλητὰς εἶναι αὐτοὺς τῶν ἔργων. τὴν δὲ μετάδοσιν γίνεσθαι τῷ πλήθει τοῦ πολιτεύματος ἦτοι καθάπερ ἐφηται πρότερον, τοῖς τὸ τίμημα κτωμένοις, ἣ καθάπερ Θηβαῖοι, ἀποσχομένοις

χρόνον τυλὶ τῶν βαναύσων ἔργων, ἢ καθάπερ ἐν Μασσαλίᾳ, κρίσιν ποιομένους τῶν ἀξίων τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι καὶ τῶν ἔξωθεν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ ταῖς 6 ἀρχαίς ταῖς κυριωτάταις, ὡς δεὶ τοὺς ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ κατέχειν, δεὶ προσκείσθαι λειτουργίας, ἵν' ἔκων οἱ δῆμοι μὴ μετέχη καὶ συγγνώμην ἔχῃ τοῖς ἀρχουσι ως μισθοὺν πολὺν διδοῦσι τῆς ἀρχῆς. ἀρµόττει δὲ θυσίας τε εἰσιόντας ποιεῖσθαι μεγαλοπρεπεῖς καὶ κατασκευάζειν τί τῶν κοινῶν, ἵνα τῶν περὶ τὰς ἐστιάσεις μετέχων οἱ δῆμος καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὄρῳ κοσμομενήν τα μὲν ἀναθήμασι τὰ δὲ

1 τοὺς Niemeyer.

---

a i.e. by superior mobility.  
b § 1, 1320 b 25 ff.  
c If the text is correct it seems to mean that the list was revised from time to time and some old names taken off and new ones put on.

516
the struggle; and a remedy for this must be adopted from military commanders, who combine with their cavalry and heavy infantry forces a contingent of light infantry. And this is the way in which the common people get the better over the well-to-do in outbreaks of party strife: being unencumbered they fight easily against cavalry and heavy infantry. Therefore to establish this force out of this class is to establish it against itself, but the right plan is for the men of military age to be separated into a division of older and one of younger men, and to have their own sons while still young trained in the exercises of light and unarmed troops, and for youths selected from among the boys to be themselves trained in active operations. And the bestowal of a share in the government upon the multitude should either go on the lines stated before, and be made to those who acquire the property-qualification, or as at Thebes, to people after they have abstained for a time from mechanic industries, or as at Marseilles, by making a selection among members of the governing classes and those outside it of persons who deserve inclusion. And furthermore the most supreme offices also, which must be retained by those within the constitution, must have expensive duties attached to them, in order that the common people may be willing to be excluded from them, and may feel no resentment against the ruling class, because it pays a high price for office. And it fits in with this that they should offer splendid sacrifices and build up some public monument on entering upon office, so that the common people sharing in the festivities and seeing the city decorated both with votive offerings and with buildings.
The phrase suggests that in a democracy public duties are chiefly undertaken for their emoluments.

b Book IV. 1297 b 35 ff., 1299 a 3 ff.

c Cf. c. iv. § 1.

d Book IV. 1299 b 30 ff.
may be glad to see the constitution enduring; and an additional result will be that the notables will have memorials of their outlay. But at present the members of oligarchies do not adopt this course but the opposite, for they seek the gains of office just as much as the honour; hence these oligarchies are well described as miniature democracies.

Let this then be a description of the proper way to organize the various forms of democracy and of oligarchy.

1 V. As a consequence of what has been said there follow satisfactory conclusions to the questions concerning magistracies—how many and what they should be and to whom they should belong, as has also been said before. For without the indispensable magistracies a state cannot exist, while without those that contribute to good order and seemliness it cannot be well governed. And furthermore the magistracies are bound to be fewer in the small states and more numerous in the large ones, as in fact has been said before; it must therefore be kept in view what kinds of magistracies it is desirable to combine and what kinds to keep separate. First among the indispensable services is the superintendence of the market, over which there must be an official to superintend contracts and good order; since it is a necessity for almost all states that people shall sell some things and buy others according to one another's necessary requirements, and this is the readiest means of securing self-sufficiency, which seems to be the reason for men's having united into a single state. Another superintendency connected very closely with this one is the curatorship of public and private properties in the city, to secure good
πυπτόντων οἰκοδομημάτων καὶ ὀδῶν σωτηρία καὶ
dιόρθωσις, καὶ τῶν ὅριων τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλους,
ὅπως ἀνεγκλήτως ἔχωσιν, καὶ ὅσα τούτοις ἄλλα
tῆς ἐπιμελείας ὦμοιότροπα. καλοῦσι δὲ ἀστυνομίαν
οἱ πλεῖστοι τὴν τοιαύτην ἀρχὴν, ἔχει δὲ μόρια
25 πλείω τὸν ἄριθμόν, ὃν ἐτέρους ἐφ' ἐτερα καθ-
ιστάσω ἐν ταῖς πολυανθρωποτέραις πόλεσιν, οἷον
τειχοποιούσι καὶ κρηνῶν ἐπιμελητάς καὶ λιμένων
φύλακας. ἀλλη δ' ἀναγκαία τε καὶ παραπλησία
tαύτην περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν μὲν γάρ, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν
χώραν ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ [τὰ]1 περὶ τὰ ἔξω τοῦ ἁστεος.
30 καλοῦσι δὲ τοὺς ἄρχοντας τούτους οἱ μὲν ἀγρο-
νόμους οἱ δ' ὦλωροις. αὐταὶ μὲν οὖν ἐπιμελείαι
eἰσι τούτων τρεῖς, ἀλλη δ' ἄρχη πρὸς ἦν αἱ πρό-
σοδοι τῶν κοινῶν ἀναφέρονται, παρ' ὑν φυλαττόν-
tων μερίζονται πρὸς ἐκάστην διοίκησιν καὶ ταῦται
d' ἀποδέκτας τούτους καὶ ταμίας. ἐτέρα δ' ἄρχη
35 πρὸς ἦν ἀναγράφεσθαι δεῖ τὰ τε ἑδια συμβόλαια
καὶ τὰς κρίσεις τὰς2 ἐκ τῶν δικαστηρίων παρὰ
d' τοὺς αὐτοὺς τούτους καὶ τὰς γραφὰς τῶν δικῶν
γίνεσθαι δεὶ καὶ τὰς εἰσαγωγάς. ἐνιαχοῦ μὲν οὖν
μερίζουσι καὶ ταύτην εἰς πλείους, ἐστὶ δ' οὖ3
μία κυρία τούτων πάντων καλοῦσι δὲ ἱερο-
μνήμονες καὶ ἐπιστᾶται καὶ μνήμονες καὶ τούτοις
40 ἄλλα ὀνόματα σύνεγγυς. μετὰ δὲ ταύτην ἔχομενεν 5
μὲν ἀναγκαστάτη δὲ σχέδον καὶ χαλεπωτάτη τῶν
ἀρχῶν ἐστὶν ἢ περὶ τὰς πράξεις τῶν καταδικασθέν-

1 om. Γ.          2 τὰς inseruit Wilamowitz.
3 δ' oδ Thurot: δ' codd.
order and the preservation and rectification of falling buildings and roads, and of the bounds between different persons' estates, so that disputes may not arise about them, and all the other duties of superintendence similar to these. An office of this nature is in most states entitled that of City-controller, but it has several departments, each of which is filled by separate officials in the states with larger populations, for instance Curators of Walls, Superintendents of Wells, Harbours-guardians. And another office also is indispensable and closely akin to these, for it controls the same matters but deals with the country and the regions outside the city; and these magistrates are called in some places Land-controllers and in others Custodians of Forests. These then are three departments of control over these matters, while another office is that to which the revenues of the public funds are paid in, the officials who guard them and by whom they are divided out to the several administrative departments; these magistrates are called Receivers and Stewards. Another magistracy is the one that has to receive a written return of private contracts and of the verdicts of the law-courts; and with these same officials the registration of legal proceedings and their institution have also to take place. In some states this office also is divided into several, but there are places where one magistracy controls all these matters; and these officials are called Sacred Recorders, Superintendents, Recorders, and other names akin to these. And after these is the office connected with it but perhaps the most indispensable and most difficult of all, the one concerned with the execution of judgement upon persons cast in suits and those posted as de-
ARISTOTLE

1322 a τῶν καὶ τῶν προτιθεμένων κατὰ τὰς ἐγγραφὰς καὶ περὶ τὰς φυλακὰς τῶν σωμάτων, χαλεπῇ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ πολλὴν ἔχειν ἀπέχθειαιν, ὡστε ὅποιν μὴ μεγάλα ἐστὶς κερδαίνειν, οὔτ' ἀρχειν ὑπομένουσιν αὐτὴν οὔθ' ὑπομείναντες ἑθέλουσιν πράττειν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους· ἀναγκαία δ' ἐστὶν, ὅτι οὐδὲν ὄφελος γίνεσθαι μὲν δίκας περὶ τῶν δικαίων ταύτας δὲ μὴ λαμβάνειν τέλος, ὡστ' εἰ μὴ γιγνομένων κοινώνειν ἀδύνατον ἀλλήλοις, καὶ πρᾶξιν μὴ γιγνομένων. διὸ βέλτιον μὴ μίαν εἶναι ταύτην τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀλλ' ἄλλους εξ' ἁλλων δικαστηρίων, καὶ περὶ τὰς προθέσεις τῶν ἀναγεγραμμένων ωσαύτως πειράσθαι διαίρειν, ἔτι δ' ἐνια πράττεσθαι καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς τε ἄλλας καὶ τὰς τῶν ἔνων μᾶλλον τὰς νέας, καὶ τὰς τῶν ἐνεστῶτων ἐτέρας καταδικασάσης ἐτέραν εἶναι τὴν πραττομένην, οἰον ἀστυνόμους τὰς παρὰ τῶν ἀγορανόμων, τὰς δὲ παρὰ τούτων ἐτέρους. ὅσω γὰρ ἂν ἑλάττων ἀπέχθεια ἐνή τοῖς πραττομένοις, τοσοῦτω μᾶλλον λήμμον τέλος αἱ πράξεις· τὸ μὲν οὖν τοῖς αὐτοῖς εἶναι τοὺς καταδικάζοντας καὶ πραττομένους ἀπέχθειαν ἔχει διπλῆν, τὸ δὲ περὶ πάντων τούς αὐτοὺς πολεμίους πᾶσιν ποιεῖ. πολλαχοῦ δὲ διηρῆται καὶ ἡ φυλάττουσα πρὸς τὴν πραττομένην, οἰον Ἀδημήθος ἡ τῶν ἐνδεκα

1 quater pro τὰς Niemeyer τὰ.
2 ἔνων Scaliger: νέων codd.
3 poiē inseruit mg. cod. inf. (post autouς Welldon).
4 ἡ inseruit Coraes.

a This example looks like a mistaken note interpolated in the text. The Eleven had both functions.
522
faulters according to the lists, and with the custody of prisoners. This is an irksome office because it involves great unpopularity, so that where it is not possible to make a great deal of profit out of it men will not undertake it, or when they have undertaken it are reluctant to carry out its functions according to the laws; but it is necessary, because there is no use in trials being held about men’s rights when the verdicts are not put into execution, so that if when no legal trial of disputes takes place social intercourse is impossible, so also is it when judgements are not executed. Hence it is better for this magistracy not to be a single office but to consist of several persons drawn from different courts, and it is desirable similarly to try to divide up the functions connected with the posting up of people registered as public debtors, and further also in some cases for the sentences to be executed by magistrates, especially by the newly elected ones preferably in suits tried by the outgoing ones, and in those tried by men actually in office for the magistrate executing the sentence to be different from the one that passed it, for instance the City-controllers to execute the judgements passed on from the Market-controllers and other magistrates those passed on by the City-controllers. For the less odium involved for those who execute the judgements, the more adequately the judgements will be carried out; so for the same magistrates to have imposed the sentence and to execute it involves a twofold odium, and for the same ones to execute it in all cases makes them the enemies of everybody.

And in many places also the office of keeping custody of prisoners, for example at Athens the office of the magistrates known as the Eleven, is separate from
ARISTOTLE

1322 a kalouμένων. 1 διό βέλτιον καὶ ταύτην χωρίζειν, καὶ τὸ2 σόφισμα ζητεῖν καὶ περὶ ταύτην. ἀναγκαῖα μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν οὐχ ἦττον τῆς εἰρημένης, συμβαίνει δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἐπιεικεῖς φεύγειν μάλιστα ταύτην τὴν ἀρχὴν, τοὺς δὲ μοχθηροὺς οὐκ ἀσφαλὲς ποιεῖν κυρίους. αὐτοὶ γὰρ δέονται φυλακῆς μᾶλλον ἄλλων 3 ἡ φυλάττειν ἄλλους δύνανται. διὸ δεῖ μὴ μίαν ἀποτελειμένην ἀρχὴν εἶναι πρὸς αὐτοῖς μηδὲ συνεχῶς τὴν αὐτὴν, ἀλλὰ τὰ νέων, ὅποιν τις ἐφίβων ἡ φρουρῶν ἔστι τάξεις, καὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν δεὶ κατὰ μέρη ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἐτέρους.

30 Ταύτας μὲν οὖν τὰς ἀρχὰς ὡς ἀναγκαστάτας ὧν θέτειν εἶναι πρῶτας, μετὰ δὲ ταύτας τὰς ἀναγκαίας μὲν οὕθεν ἦττον, ἐν σχήματι δὲ μείζονι τεταγμένας, καὶ γὰρ ἐμπειρίας καὶ πίστεως δέονται πολλῆς: τοιαῦτα δὲ εἶναι αἱ τε περὶ τὴν φυλακὴν τῆς πόλεως, καὶ ὅσαι τάττονται πρὸς τὰς πολέμικὰς χρείας. δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐν εἰρήνη καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ πυλῶν τε καὶ τειχῶν φυλακῆς ὁμοίως ἐπιμελητᾶς εἶναι καὶ ἐξετάσεως καὶ συντάξεως τῶν πολιτῶν. ἐνθα μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ πάσοι τούτοις ἀρχαὶ πλείους εἰσίν, ἐνθα δὲ ἐλάττους, οἷον ἐν ταῖς μικραῖς πόλεις μία περὶ πάντων. καλοῦσι δὲ στρατηγοὺς καὶ πολέμιας ἀρχαί τοὺς τοιούτους. ἔτι δὲ κἂν ὅσιν ὑπείρας ἡ ψυλοὶ ἡ τοξόται ἡ ναυτικὸν, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων ἐκάστων ἐνίοτε καθίστανται ἀρχαῖ, αἱ καλοῦσιν

1 οἶον . . . καλουμένων scell. Susemihl.
2 καὶ τὶ mg. cod. inf.
3 μᾶλλον ἄλλων ed. (aliorum magis Guil.): ἄλλων M: μᾶλλον cet.

a At Athens and elsewhere young citizens from eighteen to twenty were enrolled in training corps for military instruction; these served as police and home troops.

524
the magistracy that executes sentences. It is better therefore to keep this also separate, and to attempt the same device with regard to this as well. For though it is no less necessary than the office of which I spoke, yet in practice respectable people avoid it most of all offices, while it is not safe to put it into the hands of the base, for they themselves need others to guard them instead of being able to keep guard over others. Hence there must not be one magistracy specially assigned to the custody of prisoners nor must the same magistracy perform this duty continuously, but it should be performed by the young, in places where there is a regiment of cadets or guards, and by the magistrates, in successive sections.

8 These magistracies therefore must be counted first as supremely necessary, and next to them must be put those that are not less necessary but are ranked on a higher grade of dignity, because they require much experience and trustworthiness; in this class would come the magistracies concerned with guarding the city and those assigned to military requirements. And both in peace and in war it is equally necessary for there to be magistrates to superintend the guarding of gates and walls and the inspection and drill of the citizen troops. In some places therefore there are more magistracies assigned to all these duties, and in others fewer—for instance in the small states there is one to deal with all of them. And the officers of this sort are entitled Generals or War-lords. And moreover if there are also cavalry or light infantry or archers or a navy, sometimes a magistracy is appointed to have charge of each of these arms also, and they carry the titles
ναὐσαρχίαι καὶ ἐπισαρχίαι καὶ ταξιαρχίαι, καὶ κατὰ μέρος δὲ αὐτῶν τάυτας τριμαρχίας καὶ λοχαγίας.
5 καὶ φυλαρχίαι καὶ ὄσα τούτων μόρια. τὸ δὲ πάν ἐν τῷ τοῦτων ἐστὶν εἴδος, ἐπιμελείας\(^1\) πολεμικῶν.
10 περὶ μὲν οὖν ταύτην τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχει τῶν τρόπων ἐπεὶ δὲ ἕνα τῶν ἀρχῶν, εἰ καὶ μὴ πάσαι, διαχειρίζοντόι πολλὰ τῶν κοινῶν, ἀναγκαῖον ἐτέραν
15 εἶναι τὴν ληψομένην λογισμὸν καὶ προσευκτικοῦν
αὐτὴν μὴδὲν διαχειρίζοντον ἐτέρων· καλοῦσι δὲ τούτους οἱ μὲν εὐθύνουσι οἱ δὲ λογιστὰς οἱ δὲ ἐξεταστὰς οἱ δὲ συνηγόρουσι. παρὰ πάσας δὲ ταύτας τὰς ἀρχὰς ἡ μάλιστα κυρία πάντων ἐστὶν· ἡ γὰρ αὐτῇ πολλάκις ἔχει τὸ τέλος καὶ τὴν ἐισφοράν,\(^2\) ἡ\(^3\) προκάθηται τοῦ πλῆθους όποιον
20 κύριός ἐστιν ὁ δῆμος· δεὶ γὰρ εἶναι τὸ συνάγων τὸ κύριον κύριον\(^4\) τῆς πολιτείας. καλεῖται δὲ ἐνθα μὲν\(^5\) προβολοῖ διὰ τὸ προβολεύειν, όποιο δὲ πλῆθός ἐστι, βουλή μάλλον. αἱ μὲν οὖν πολιτικαὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν σχεδὸν τοσαῦτα τινὲς εἰσὶν· ἀλλό\(^6\) ἐνθα εἴδος ἐπιμελείας ἡ περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς, οἷον Ἰερεῖς
25 τε καὶ ἐπιμεληται τῶν περὶ τὰ ἱερὰ τοῦ σφίξεσθαι τε τὰ ὑπάρχοντα καὶ ἀνορθοῦσθαι τὰ πίπτοντα τῶν οἰκοδομημάτων καὶ τῶν ἀλλων ὅσα τέτακται πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς. συμβαίνει δὲ τὴν ἐπιμελείαν ταύτην ἐνιαχοῦ μὲν εἶναι μίαν, οἷον ἐν ταῖς μικραῖς

---

\(^1\) ἐπιμελεία Lambinus.  \(^2\) ἐφορεῖα ΠΜΡ\(^4\).  \(^3\) Ἡ Μ: ἡ cet.  \(^4\) κύριον κύριον ed.: κύριον codd.  
\(^5\) μὲν <νομοφύλακες ἐνθα δὲ> Schneider.
of Admiral, Cavalry-commander and Taxiarch, and also the divisional commissions subordinate to these of Captains of Triremes, Company-commanders and Captains of Tribes, and all the subdivisions of these commands. But the whole of this sort of officers constitute a single class, that of military command. This then is how the matter stands in regard to this office; but inasmuch as some of the magistracies, if not all, handle large sums of public money, there must be another office to receive an account and subject it to audit, which must itself handle no other business; and these officials are called Auditors by some people, Accountants by others, Examiners by others and Advocates by others. And by the side of all these offices is the one that is most supreme over all matters, for often the same magistracy has the execution of business that controls its introduction, or presides over the general assembly in places where the people are supreme; for the magistracy that convenes the sovereign assembly is bound to be the sovereign power in the state. It is styled in some places the Preliminary Council because it considers business in advance, but where there is a democracy it is more usually called a Council. This more or less completes the number of the offices of a political nature; but another kind of superintendence is that concerned with divine worship; in this class are priests and superintendents of matters connected with the temples, the preservation of existing buildings and the restoration of those that are ruined, and the other duties relating to the gods. In practice this superintendence in some places forms a single office, for instance in

---

*a Cf. 1323 a 9 below. Apparently πληθὸς ἐστι stands for τὸ πλῆθος κύριον ἐστὶ, but editors quote no parallel.*
πόλεσιν, ἐνιαοὺς δὲ πολλὰς καὶ κεχωρισμένας τῆς
25 ἱερωσύνης, οἷον ἱεροποιούς καὶ ναοφυλακας καὶ
tαμίας τῶν ἱερῶν χρημάτων. ἐχομένη δὲ ταύτης
ἡ πρὸς τὰς θυσίας ἀφωρισμένη τὰς κοινὰς πάσας
ἐσεὶ μὴ τοῖς ἱερεύσιν ἀποδιδοσίν ὁ νόμος ἄλλῳ
ἀπὸ τῆς κοινῆς ἐστίνας ἔξοικοι τήν τιμήν καλοῦσι
δ' οἱ μὲν ἄρχοντας τούτους οἵ δὲ βασιλεῖς οἱ δὲ
80 πρυτάνεις. αἱ μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαίαι ἐπιμελεῖαι εἰς 12
περὶ τουτῶν, ὡς εἰπεῖν συγκεφαλαυσμόνους, περὶ
tε τὰ δαιμόνια καὶ τὰ πολεμικὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς
προσόδους καὶ περὶ τὰ ἀναλοικόμενα, καὶ περὶ
ἀγοράν καὶ περὶ τὸ ἀστυ καὶ λιμένας καὶ τὴν
χώραν, ἐτὶ τὰ περὶ τὰ δικαστήρια καὶ συναλλαγ-
μάτων ἀναγραφὰς καὶ πράξεις καὶ φυλάκας, καὶ
ἐπὶ λογισμοὺς¹ τε καὶ ἐξετάσεις, καὶ πρὸς εὐθύνας
τῶν ἀρχόντων, καὶ τέλος αἱ περὶ τὸ βουλευόμενον
eἰςιν περὶ τῶν² κοινῶν. ἰδίᾳ δὲ ταῖς σχολαστι- 13
κωτέραι καὶ μᾶλλον εὐθυροῦσας πόλεσιν, ἐτὶ
dὲ φροντιζοῦσας εὔκοσμίας, γυναικομία νομο-
φυλακία παιδονομία γυναισιαρχία, πρὸς βεντοίς
περὶ ἀγώνας ἐπιμέλεια γυνικοὺς καὶ Διονυσια-
κούς καὶ εἰ τινὰς ἐτέρας συμβαίνει τουιτῶν
gίνεσθαι θεωρίας. τούτων δ' ἐνιαοὺς εἰσὶν
οὐ δημοτικαί τῶν ἄρχων, οἷον γυναικομία καὶ
5 παιδονομία: τοῖς γὰρ ἀπόροις ἀνάγκη χρησθαι καὶ
γυναίξι καὶ παιοῦν ὡσπερ ἀκολουθοῦσι διὰ τῆν
ἀδολιάν. τιμῶν δ' οὐσῶν ἄρχων καθ'³ δ' αἱροῦν-
tαι τινὲς ἄρχας τὰς κυρίους, νομοφυλάκων προ-

¹ πὲ λογισμοὺς Spengel (circa ratiocinationes Guil.):
ἐπιλογισμοῖς codd.
² περὶ τῶν Richards: τῶν codd.
³ [καθ'] Heinsius.
the small cities, but in others it belongs to a number of officials who are not members of the priesthood, for example Sacrificial Officers and Temple-guardians and Stewards of Sacred Funds. And connected with this is the office devoted to the management of all the public festivals which the law does not assign to the priests but the officials in charge of which derive their honour from the common sacrificial hearth, and these officials are called in some places Archons, in others Kings and in others Presidents. To sum up therefore, the necessary offices of superintendence deal with the following matters: institutions of religion, military institutions, revenue and expenditure, control of the market, citadel, harbours and country, also the arrangements of the law-courts, registration of contracts, collection of fines, custody of prisoners, supervision of accounts and inspections, and the auditing of officials, and lastly the offices connected with the body that deliberates about public affairs. On the other hand, peculiar to the states that have more leisure and prosperity, and also pay attention to public decorum, are the offices of Superintendent of Women, Guardian of the Laws, Superintendent of Children, Controller of Physical Training, and in addition to these the superintendence of athletic and Dionysiac contests and of any similar displays that happen to be held. Some of these offices are obviously not of a popular character, for instance that of Superintendent of Women and of Children; for the poor having no slaves are forced to employ their women and children as servants. There are three offices which in some states supervise the election of the chief magistrates—Guardians of the Laws, Preliminary Councillors and Council; of
ARISTOTLE

1323 a

βούλων βουλής, οἱ μὲν νομοφύλακες ἀριστοκρα
tικῶν, ὀλιγαρχικῶν δὲ οἱ πρὸβουλοὶ, βουλὴ δὲ δῆμο-
10 τικῶν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀρχῶν ὡς ἐν τύπῳ
σχεδῶν εἰρηται περὶ πασῶν.
these the Guardians of the Laws are an aristocratic institution, the Preliminary Councillors oligarchic, and a Council democratic.

We have now therefore spoken in outline about almost all the offices of state.
I. Περὶ πολιτείας ἀρίστης τὸν μέλλοντα ποιήσα- 1
15 σθαί τὴν προσήκουσαν ξήτησιν ἀνάγκη διορίσασθαι
πρῶτον τὶς αἱρετώτατος βίος. ἀδήλου γὰρ ὅντος
tοῦτον καὶ τὴν ἀρίστην ἀναγκαῖον ἀδήλου εἶναι
πολιτείαν, ἀριστα γὰρ πράπτεν προσήκει τοὺς
ἀριστα πολιτευομένους ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αὐτῶις,
ἐὰν μὴ τι γίγνηται παράλογον. διὸ δεῖ πρῶτον
20 ὅμολογεῖσθαι τὶς ὁ πᾶσιν ὡς εἰπεῖν αἱρετώτατος
βίος, μετὰ δὲ τὸ τοῦτο πότερον κοινὴ καὶ χωρὶς ὁ
αὐτὸς ἢ ἔτερος. νομίζασιν οὖν ἰκανῶς πολλὰ 2
λέγεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις περὶ
tῆς ἀρίστης ζωῆς, καὶ νῦν χρηστέον αὐτῶις. ὡς
ἀληθῶς γὰρ πρὸς γε μίαν διαίρεσιν οὐδεὶς ἀμφι-
25 βητήσειν ἂν ὡς οὐ τρὶς ὡς οὐδὲν μερίσων, τῶν
tε ἐκτὸς καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ
ψυχῇ, πάντα ταῦτα ὑπάρχειν τοῖς μακαρίων χρή. 1
οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν φαίη μακάριον τὸν μηθέν μόριον
ἐχοντα ἄνδρείας μηδὲ σωφροσύνης μηδὲ δικαιο-
σύνης μηδὲ φρονήσεως, ἀλλὰ δεδιότα μὲν τὰς
80 παραπετομένας μυίας, ἀπεχόμενον δὲ μηθενὸς, ἂν

1 δεῖ Victorius.

---

* Book IV. in some editions.
* Cf. c. iii. § 6. It is debated whether the phrase refers to Aristotle’s own popular writings, or to those of other
BOOK VII

1 I. The student who is going to make a suitable investigation of the best form of constitution must necessarily decide first of all what is the most desirable mode of life. For while this is uncertain it is also bound to be uncertain what is the best constitution, since it is to be expected that the people that have the best form of government available under their given conditions will fare the best, exceptional circumstances apart. Hence we must first agree what life is most desirable for almost all men, and after that whether the same life is most desirable both for the community and for the individual, or a different one. Believing therefore in the adequacy of much of what is said even in extraneous discourses on the subject of the best life, let us make use of these pronouncements now. For as regards at all events one classification of things good, putting them in three groups, external goods, goods of the soul and goods of the body, assuredly nobody would deny that the ideally happy are bound to possess all three. For nobody would call a man ideally happy that has not got a particle of courage nor of temperance nor of justice nor of wisdom, but is afraid of the flies that flutter by him, cannot refrain from any of the most philosophers, or to discussions of the subject in ordinary intercourse.
1323a ἐπιθυμήσῃ τοῦ φαγεῖν ἢ πιεῖν, τῶν ἐσχάτων. ἐνεκα δὲ τεταρτημορίου διαφθείροντα τοὺς φιλτάρους [φίλους], ομοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν οὕτως ἄφρονα καὶ διεφευγόνων ὁσπερ τι παύδιον ἢ μανόμεον. ἀλλὰ ταύτα μὲν λεγόμενα [ὁσπερ] 2 ἀριστεῖν συγχωρήσειν, διαφέρονται δὲ ἐν τῶ ἡποτί καὶ ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς. τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς ἐχειν ἰκανόν εἶναι νομίζονται ὄποσονον, πλοῦτον δὲ καὶ χρημάτων καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ δόξης καὶ πάντων τῶν ποιουτῶν εἰς ἀπειρον ζητούν τὴν ὑπερβολὴν. ἡμεῖς δὲ αὐτοῖς ἔρομεν ὅτι ῥάδιον μὲν περὶ τούτων καὶ διὰ τῶν ἑργῶν λαμβάνει 3 τὴν πίστιν, ὁρῶντας ὅτι κτῶνται καὶ φυλάττουσιν οὐ τῶς ἀρετᾶς τοῖς ἐκτός ἀλλὰ ἐκείνα ταύτας, καὶ τὸ ἔδαπρόνως, εἰτ' ἐν τῷ χάρειν ἐστίν εἰτ' ἐν ἀρετῇ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εἰτ' ἐν ἀμφοῖν, ὅτι μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει τοῖς τὸ ἦδος μὲν καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν κεκοσμημένας εἰς ὑπερβολὴν περὶ δὲ τὴν ἔσω κτῆσιν τῶν ἀγαθῶν μετριάζουσιν τοῖς ἐκείνα μὲν κεκισμημένας πλείω τῶν χρήσιμων ἐν δὲ τούτους ἑλλείπουσιν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον 4 σκοπούμενος ἑυσύνοπτον ἐστίν. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκτὸς ἑχει πέρας, ὁσπερ ὄργανον τὶ (πῶς δὲ τὸ χρήσιμον εἰς τὶ), ὅν τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἢ βλάπτειν ἀναγκαῖον ἢ μηθὲν ὃθελος εἶναι 5 τοῖς ἑχουσιν τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχῆς ἐκαστὸν ἀγαθῶν, ὁσοὶ περὶ ὑπερβάλλης, τοσοῦτος μᾶλλον χρήσιμον εἶναι, εἰ δεὶ καὶ τούτοις ἐπιλεγεῖς μὴ μόνον τὸ

outrageous actions in order to gratify a desire to eat or to drink, ruins his dearest friends for the sake of a farthing, and similarly in matters of the intellect also is as senseless and mistaken as any child or 3 lunatic. But although these are propositions which when uttered everybody would agree to, yet men differ about amount and degrees of value. They think it is enough to possess however small a quantity of virtue, but of wealth, riches, power, glory and everything of that kind they seek a larger and larger amount without limit. We on the other hand shall tell them that it is easy to arrive at conviction on these matters in the light of the actual facts, when one sees that men do not acquire and preserve the virtues by means of these external goods, but external goods by means of the virtues, and that whether the life of happiness consists for man in enjoyment or in virtue or in both, it is found in larger measure with those who are of surpassingly high cultivation in character and intellect but only moderate as regards the external acquisition of goods, than with those who own more than they can use of the latter but are deficient in the former. Not but what the truth is also easily seen if we consider the matter in the light of reason. For external goods have a limit, as has any instrument (and everything useful is useful for something), so an excessive amount of them must necessarily do harm, or do no good, to its possessor; whereas with any of the goods of the soul, the more abundant it is, the more useful it must be—if even to goods of the soul not only the term 'noble' but

6 χρήσιμον [εἶναι], <χρῆ> χρήσιμον εἶναι, χρήσιμόν εστι edd. (sed fortasse ἀναγκαῖον intelligendum).
ARISTOTLE

1823 b
calón állla kai to xhrísmon. ólws te dhlou ús ákoloutheiv fóssomen tîn diáthesin tîn árísthn ékástou prágmatos pro's álhlala káta tîn úper-
15 oixn ēnter eîlthe diástasin òn fámèn autás eînai diáthesíseta tautâs. óst' eînter étstîn òn psyxî kai tîs kttêsews kai toû sóumatos tîmîwmteron kai ápllos kai ãmmîn, ánâgyk kai tîn diáthesin tîn árísthn ékástou ánâlogon toûtwn éxein. étî de tîs psyxîs énekev tauta péfukev aîretâ kai deî 20 pàntas aîreîsthai toutès eîn frounoúntas, álll' ouk ékeînwn énekev tîn psyxîn. ótî mèn ouîn ékástw 5 tîs eúdaimonías épißalhe tosoúton òson per áretîs kai frounîsews kai toû prâttewn kata tautâs, éstîw suwnomolohmewn ãmmîn, márturi tû ìw̄ chrwmenois, ðs eúdaimwn mèn ëstî kai makaîrios, 25 di' ouîn èn tîn ëxwterikôn ãgathôn álllà di' autón autós kai tîw poios tîs eînai tîn fúson. èpteî kai tîn eútuxiân tîhs eúdaimonías dia taut' ánagkaîoun êteran eînai, tîwn mèn gar èktos ãgathôn tîs psyxîs autôn taútonomatôn kai ò tûxî, dikaios ð' ouîdes ouîdè swfrwos ãpò tûxîs ouîde 30 diâ tîn tûxîn ëstîn. èxòmenon ð' ëstî kai tîw autôn lógon déumwn kai tôlon eúdaimona tîn árísthn eînai kai prâttousan kallolid.' ãdûnaton de kallós prâttewn toutâ ì tî kallà prâttousw: ouîhen de kallon èrghon ouî' ènððos ouîte póleos

a e.g. the finest man excels the finest monkey to the degree in which the species man excels the species monkey.
b Aristotle taught that some events are the result of the undesigned interaction of two lines of causation in nature's design: he denoted this (1) in general, by 'the automatic' or self-acting (represented in Latin by sponte, spontaneous), (2) as concerning man, by 'fortune.'

536
also the term ‘useful’ can be properly applied. And broadly, it is clear that we shall declare that the best condition of each particular thing, comparing things with one another, corresponds in point of superiority to the distance that subsists between the things of which we declare these conditions themselves to be conditions. Hence inasmuch as our soul is a more valuable thing both absolutely and relatively to ourselves than either our property or our body, the best conditions of these things must necessarily stand in the same relation to one another as the things themselves do. Moreover it is for the sake of the soul that these goods are in their nature desirable, and that all wise men must choose them, not the soul for the sake of those other things. Let us then take it as agreed between us that to each man there falls just so large a measure of happiness as he achieves of virtue and wisdom and of virtuous and wise action: in evidence of this we have the case of God, who is happy and blessed, but is so on account of no external goods, but on account of himself, and by being of a certain quality in his nature; since it is also for this reason that prosperity is necessarily different from happiness—for the cause of goods external to the soul is the spontaneous and fortune, but nobody is just or temperate as a result of or owing to the action of fortune. And connected is a truth requiring the same arguments to prove it, that it is also the best state, and the one that does well, that is happy. But to do well is impossible save for those who do good actions, and there is no good action either of a

537

* The common play on the ambiguity of 'do well,' meaning either 'prosper' or 'act rightly.'
χωρὶς ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως· ἀνδρεία δὲ πόλεως καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ φρόνησις\(^1\) τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει
δύναμιν καὶ μορφὴν ὧν μετασχῆν ἑκατὸς τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγεται δίκαιος καὶ\(^2\) φρόνιμος καὶ σωφρόν.

'Αλλὰ γὰρ ταῦτα μὲν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἑστὶ πεφρο- βισμένα τῷ λόγῳ· οὔτε γὰρ μὴ θυγάνειν αὐτῶν δυνατὸν, οὔτε πάντας τοὺς οἰκείους ἐπεξελθεῖν ἐνδέχεται λόγους, ἑτέρας γὰρ ἑστὶν ἐργὸν σχολῆς ταῦτα. νῦν δὲ ὑποκεῖσθω τοσοῦτον, οτι βίος μὲν ἀριστος, καὶ χωρὶς ἐκάστω καὶ κοινῇ ταῖς πόλεσιν, ὁ μετὰ ἀρετῆς κεχορηγημένης ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὥστε μετέχειν τῶν καὶ ἀρετὴν πράξεων, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀμφιβολοῦντας, ἐάσαντας ἐπὶ τῆς νῦν μεθὸδου, διασκεπτέον ύστερον, εἰ τις τοῖς εἰρημένοις τυγ-
χάνει μὴ πειθόμενος.

II. Πότερον δὲ τὴν εὐδαίμονίαν τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι φατέον ἐνός τε ἐκάστου τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ πόλεως ἢ μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν λοιπὸν ἑστὶν εἰπείν. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ τούτω· πάντες γὰρ ἄν ὀμολογήσειν εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν· ὅσοι γὰρ ἐν πλούτῳ τὸ ἔτη ἐν τίθενται ἐφ' ἐνός, ὡστὶ καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὅλην ἔαν ὁ πλουσία μακαρίζουσιν, ὅσοι τε τὸν τυραννικὸν βίον μάλιστα τιμῶσιν, οὕτω καὶ πόλιν τὴν πλείστων ἄρχοσαν εὐδαιμονεστάτην ἀν εἶναι φαίεν· εἰ τὴ τοῖς τὴν ἐνα δι' ἀρετὴν ἀποδέχεται, καὶ πόλιν εὐδαιμονεστέραν φήσει τὴν σπουδαιοτέραν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτ' ᾳδη δύο ἑστὶν ἄ δειται οἰκείες, ἐν μὲν πότερος αἱρετώτερος βίος, ὁ διὰ τοῦ συμπολιτεύε-

\(^1\) φρόνησις <καὶ σωφροσύνη> Coraes.
\(^2\) καὶ <ἀνδρείας καὶ> Coraes.

\(^{a}\) Eth. Nic. i. 1099 a 32, x. 1179 a 4 ff.
man or of a state without virtue and wisdom; and courage, justice and wisdom belonging to a state have the same meaning and form as have those virtues whose possession bestows the titles of just and wise and temperate on an individual human being.

6 These remarks however must suffice by way of preface to our discourse: for neither is it possible to abstain from touching on these subjects altogether, nor is it feasible to follow out all the arguments that are germane to them, for that is the business of another course of study. For the present let us take it as established that the best life, whether separately for an individual or collectively for states, is the life conjoined with virtue furnished with sufficient means for taking part in virtuous actions; while objections to this position we must pass over in the course of the present inquiry, and reserve them for future consideration, if anyone is found to disagree with what has been said.

1 II. On the other hand it remains to say whether the happiness of a state is to be pronounced the same as that of each individual man, or whether it is different. Here too the answer is clear: everybody would agree that it is the same; for all those who base the good life upon wealth in the case of the individual, also assign felicity to the state as a whole if it is wealthy; and all who value the life of the tyrant highest, would also say that the state which rules the widest empire is the happiest; and if anybody accepts the individual as happy on account of virtue, he will also say that the state which is the better morally is the happier. But there now arise these two questions that require consideration: first, which mode of life is the more desirable, the life of active citizenship and participation in politics,
sigmai kaì koiwnevèn politeias ò mellos ò xenikòs
kai tòs politikês koinonias apolecumènos, eti
dè tìna politeias thètov kai poìan diàtheos pol-
lews arístèn, eìte pásow òntos aíretov koiwnevèn
polews eìte kai tìsì mèn mè tois dè plêistov.

"Oti mèn oðn anagkaiòn eìnan politeian arístèn 3
tautèn kath' òn tazìn kàn óstisouì arístè práttoi
kai òpìa òmikà phaineròn èstìnu. òmivìthetiai
dè pare autòv tòv òmologouìntov tòv met' áretìs
eìnan bìon aíretòtaton póteron ò politikos kai
praktikos bíos aíretos ò mellos ò pàntov tòv
èktòs apolecumènos, òiòn thèwriktikos tis, òn
monon tìnès fàswon eìnan philòsophon. 2 schèdon giì
toutous
tous dúo bìous tòv anbròptov oì philòtìmòtatoi
pròs áretìn fainontai prosairoìmenoi kai tìn
proteron kai tìn vnì, légyo dè dûo tòn te politi-
kivn kai tòn philòsophon. diaferéi dè ou mikron 4
proteros eìche to alèthè. ánagkh giì tòn ge 3 eìv
fronouìta pròs tòn bèltìw skopòn sünntátetobai
kai tòn anbròptov èkastov kai kòshì tìn politi-
keian. vnomizouì d' oì mèn tò tòn pèlas árchèn
despotikos mèn gignómènon met' ádikias tìnòs
eìnan tòs megísthè, politikos dè tò mèn ádikov
1 mèn giì codd. plurimi.
2 philòsophoi Jackson: philòsophon Richards.
3 ge Spengel: te codd.

Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give 'which alone is said to be desirable by some philosophers.'

540
or rather the life of an alien and that of detachment from the political partnership; next, what constitution and what organization of a state is to be deemed the best,—either on the assumption that to take an active part in the state is desirable for everybody, or that it is undesirable for some men although desirable for most. But as it is the latter question that is the business of political study and speculation, and not the question of what is desirable for the individual, and as it is the investigation of politics that we have now taken up, the former question would be a side issue, and the latter is the business of political inquiry.

3 Now it is clear that the best constitution is the system under which anybody whatsoever would be best off and would live in felicity; but the question is raised even on the part of those who agree that the life accompanied by virtue is the most desirable, whether the life of citizenship and activity is desirable or rather a life released from all external affairs, for example some form of contemplative life, which is said by some to be the only life that is philosophic. For it is manifest that these are the two modes of life principally chosen by the men most ambitious of excelling in virtue, both in past times and at the present day—I mean the life of politics and the life of philosophy. And it makes no little difference which way the truth lies; for assuredly the wise are bound to arrange their affairs in the direction of the better goal—and this applies to the state collectively as well as to the individual human being. Some persons think that empire over one’s neighbours, if despotically exercised, involves a definite injustice of the greatest kind, and if constitutionally, although
ARISTOTLE

1324a οὐκ ἔχειν, ἐμπόδιον δὲ ἔχειν τῇ περὶ αὐτοῦ εὐθυμερίας τοῦτων δ᾽ ὦστερ ἐξ ἑναντίας ἔτεροι
tυγχάνουσι δοξάζοντες, μόνον γὰρ ἄνδρος τὸν πρακτικὸν εἶναι βίον καὶ πολιτικόν, ἐφ' ἐκάστης
γὰρ ἀρετῆς οὐκ εἶναι πράξεις μάλλον τοῖς ἰδιώταις
1324b ἣ τοῖς τὰ κοινὰ πράττουσι καὶ πολιτευομένοις.
oἱ μὲν οὖν οὗτοι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, οἱ δὲ τὸν δὲσποτικόν καὶ τυραννικὸν τρόπον τῆς πολιτείας
eἶναι μόνον εὐδαιμονία φαιν. παρ' ἐνίοις δὲ καὶ
tῆς πολιτείας οὗτος ὅρος καὶ τῶν νόμων ὅπως
dεσπόζωσι τῶν πέλασ. διὸ καὶ τῶν πλείστων
νομίμων χύδην ὡς εἶπεῖν κειμένων παρὰ τοῖς
πλείστοις, ὁμος εἴ ποὺ τι πρὸς ἐν οἱ νόμοι βλέπουσιν,
tοῦ κρατεῖν στοχάζονταί πάντες, ὦστερ ἐν Δακε
dαιμον καὶ Κρήτη πρὸς τοὺς πολέμους συντετα
tαί σχέδον ἣ τε παιδεία καὶ τὸ τῶν νόμων πλῆθος.
10 ἐτὶ δ' ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσι πᾶσι τοῖς δυναμένοις πλεον
eκτεῖν ἡ τοιαύτη τετίμηται δύναμις, οἶκον ἐν Σκύθ
θαις καὶ Πέρσαις καὶ Θρακεῖ καὶ Κελτοῖς. ἐν δὲ
ἐνίοις γὰρ καὶ νόμοι τινὲς εἰσὶν παροξύνοντες πρὸς
τὴν ἀρετὴν ταύτην, καθάπερ ἐν Καρχηδόνι φασὶ
tὸν ἐκ τῶν κρίκων κόσμου λαμβάνειν ὅσα ἂν
15 στρατεύσωσι τραπεζάς. ἦν δὲ ποτὲ καὶ περὶ
Μακεδονίαν νόμος τὸν μηθένα ἀπεκταγότα πολέ
μον ἄνδρα περιεξώσθαι τὴν φορβείαν. ἐν δὲ
Σκύθαις οὐκ ἔζην πόλεν ἐν ἐορτῇ τυλί σκύφων
περιφερόμενον τῷ μηθένα ἀπεκταγότα πολέμων
ἐν δὲ τοῖς Ἰβηρσίων, ἔθνει πολεμικῶν, τοσοῦτος τὸν

1 ἀφ' Richards.
2 καὶ τῶν Congreve (δ' οὗτος καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ τῆς πολιτείας ὅρος ἸΜ, et sic cum παιδείας pro πολιτείας Busse): τῶν codd.
it carries no injustice, yet is a hindrance to the ruler's own well-being; but others hold almost the opposite view to these—they think that the life of action and citizenship is the only life fit for a man, since with each of the virtues its exercise in actions is just as possible for men engaged in public affairs and in politics as for those who live a private life. Some people then hold the former view, while others declare that the despotic and tyrannical form of constitution alone achieves happiness; and in some states it is also the distinctive aim of the constitution and the laws to enable them to exercise despotic rule over their neighbours. Hence even though with most peoples most of the legal ordinances have been laid down virtually at random, nevertheless if there are places where the laws aim at one definite object, that object is in all cases power, as in Sparta and Crete both the system of education and the mass of the laws are framed in the main with a view to war; and also among all the non-Hellenic nations that are strong enough to expand at the expense of others, military strength has been held in honour, for example, among the Scythians, Persians, Thracians and Celts. Indeed among some peoples there are even certain laws stimulating military valour; for instance at Carthage, we are told, warriors receive the decoration of armlets of the same number as the campaigns on which they have served; and at one time there was also a law in Macedonia that a man who had never killed an enemy must wear his halter instead of a belt. Among Scythian tribes at a certain festival a cup was carried round from which a man that had not killed an enemy was not allowed to drink. Among the Iberians, a warlike race, they
ARISTOTLE

1324 b 20 ἀριθμὸν ὀβελίσκους καταπηγνύοντι περὶ τὸν τάφον ὅσους ἂν διαφθείρῃ τῶν πολεμίων· καὶ ἄτερα δὴ παρ’ ἐτέρους ἐστὶ τοιαύτα πολλά, τὰ μὲν νόμοις κατειλημμένα τὰ δὲ ἐδεσω.

Καίτοι δοξεῖν ἂν ἄγαν ἀτοπον ὑσως εἶναι τοῖς 7 βουλομένοις ἐπισκοπεῖν, εἰ τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν ἔργον τοῦ πολιτικοῦ, τὸ δύνασθαι θεωρεῖν ὅπως ἀρχῇ καὶ δεσπόζῃ τῶν πλησίων καὶ βουλομένων καὶ μὴ βουλομένων. πῶς γὰρ ἂν εἰ ἡ τὸτε πολιτικὴν ἡ νομοθετικὴν ὡς γε μὴ δὲ νόμιμον ἐστὶν; οὐ νόμιμον δὲ τὸ μὴ μόνον δικαίως ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄδικως ἀρχεῖν, κρατεῖν δ’ ἐστὶ καὶ μὴ δικαίως. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ’ 8 ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιστήμαις τούτο ἔχωμεν· οὔτε γὰρ τοῦ ἰατροῦ οὔτε τοῦ κυβερνήτου ἔργον ἐστὶ τὸ ἡ πείσαι ἡ βιάσασθαι τοῦ μὲν τοὺς θεραπευομένους τοῦ δὲ τοὺς πλωτήρας. ἀλλ’ εἰσικαίνοι οἱ πολλοὶ τὴν δεσποτικὴν πολιτικὴν οὔεσθαι εἶναι, καὶ ὅπερ αὐτοῖς ἐκαστοὶ οὐ φασιν εἶναι δίκαιον οὐδὲ συμφέρον, τοῦτ’ οὐκ αἰσχύνονται πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀσκοῦντες· αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ παρ’ αὐτοῖς τὸ δικαίως ἀρχεῖν ἄντοθι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους οὐδὲν μέλει τῶν δικαίων. ἀτοπον δὲ εἰ μὴ φύσει τὸ μὲν 9 δεσποτῶν ἐστὶ τὸ δὲ οὐ δεσποτῶν. 2 ὡστε εἴπερ ἐχει τὸν τρόπον τούτον, οὐ δὲ πάντων πειράζονται δεσπόζειν, ἀλλὰ τῶν δεσποτῶν, ὡστερ οὐδὲ 40 θηρεύειν ἐπὶ θοινῆν ἡ θυσίαν ἀνθρώπους, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς τοῦτο θηρευτὲν· ἐστὶ δὲ θηρευτὸν δ ἂν ἄγρων ἡ ἐδεστὸν ἔστων. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ γ’ ἂν καὶ καθ’

1 τὴν πολιτικὴν δεσποτικὴν? Richards.
2 δεσποτῶν (bis) Stahr: δεσπόζων (bis) codd.
3 Lambinus: δεσποτῶν codd.

* Or perhaps ‘pointed stones.’
fix small spits\textsuperscript{a} in the earth round a man's grave corresponding in number to the enemies he has killed. So with other races there are many other practices of a similar kind, some established by law and others by custom.

Nevertheless those who wish to examine the matter closely might perhaps think it exceedingly strange that it should be the business of a statesman to be able to devise means of holding empire and mastery over the neighbouring peoples whether they desire it or not. How can that be worthy of a statesman or lawgiver which is not even lawful? and government is not lawful when it is carried on not only justly but also unjustly—and superior strength may be unjustly exercised. Moreover we do not see this in the other sciences either: it is no part of a physician’s or ship-captain’s business to use either persuasion or compulsion upon the patients in the one case and the crew\textsuperscript{b} in the other. Yet most peoples seem to think that despotic rule is statesmanship, and are not ashamed to practise towards others treatment which they declare to be unjust and detrimental for themselves; for in their own internal affairs they demand just government, yet in their relations with other peoples they pay no attention to justice. Yet it is strange if there is not a natural distinction between peoples suited to be despotically ruled and those not suited; so that if this is so, it is not proper to attempt to exercise despotic government over all people, but only over those suited for it, just as it is not right to hunt human beings for food or sacrifice, but only the game suitable for this purpose, that is, such wild creatures as are good to eat. And more-

\textsuperscript{a} Or perhaps 'the passengers.'
έαυτήν μία πόλις ευδαιμων, ἡ πολιτεύεται ὑλιν-ʻ

τι καλῶς, εὑρε ἐνδέχεται πόλιν οἰκεῖσθαι πον

καθ' έαυτήν νόμους χρωμένην σπουδαίος, ἃς

tῆς πολιτείας ἡ σύνταξις οὐ πρὸς πόλεμον οὐδέ

πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν ἔσται τῶν πολεμίων. μηθὲν γὰρ

ὕπαρχετω τοιοῦτον. δῆλον ἀρα ὅτι πάσας τὰς

πρὸς τῶν πόλεμον ἐπιμελείας καλὰς μὲν θετεόν,

οὐχ ὡς τέλος δὲ πάντων ἀκρόταταν ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνον

χάριν ταύτας. τοῦ δὲ νομοθέτου τοῦ σπουδαίου

ἔστι τὸ θεάσασθαι πόλιν καὶ γένος ἀνθρώπων καὶ

πάσαν ἄλλην κοινωνίαν, ἱωῆς ἀγαθῆς πῶς μεθ-

εξουσι καὶ τῆς ἐνδεχομένης αὐτοῖς εὐδαιμονίας.

dιοίσει μέντοι τῶν ταττομένων ἕνα νομίμων καὶ

tοῦτο τῆς νομοθετικῆς ἐστὶν ἱδεῖν, εἶν τιν ὑπ-

ἀρχωσι γεννιῶντες, ποία πρὸς ποῖους ἀσκητέσων ἡ

πῶς τοῖς καθ' ἑκάστους χρηστέον.

'Αλλά τούτο μὲν καὶ ὑστερον τύχοι τῆς προσ-

ηκούσης σκέψεως, πρὸς τί τέλος δεῖ τὴν ἀρίστην

πολιτείαν συντεῖνειν.

III. Πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ὑμολογοῦντας μὲν τὸν μετ' 1

ἀρετῆς εἰναι βίον αἱρετῶτατον διαφερομένους δὲ

περὶ τῆς χρήσεως αὐτοῦ, λεκτέον ἡμῖν πρὸς ἀμφο-

τέρους αὐτοὺς (οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀποδοκιμάζουσι τὰς

πολιτικὰς ἀρχὰς, νομίζοντες τὸν 2 τοῦ ἔλευθέρου

βίον ἐπερών τινα εἰναι τοῦ πολιτικοῦ καὶ πάντων

αἱρετῶτατον, οἱ δὲ τοῦτον ἁριστον, ἀδύνατον γὰρ

tὸν μηθὲν πράττοντα πράττειν εὖ, τὴν δ' εὐπρα-

γίαν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εἰναι ταύτον), ὅτι τὰ μὲν

ἀμφότεροι λέγουσιν ὥρθως τὰ δ' οὐκ ὥρθως, οἱ μὲν

1 ὡς: καὶ ? Richards.

2 Spengel: τὸν τε codd.

See cc. xiii., xiv.

b On the ambiguous use of ' do well' see 1323 b 32 n.

546
over it is possible even for a single state in isolation to be happy, that is one that is well governed, inasmuch as it is conceivable that a state might be carried on somewhere in isolation, enjoying good laws, and in such a state the system of the constitution will not be framed for the purpose of war or of overpowering its enemies—for we are to suppose everything to do with war to be excluded. It is evident therefore that while all military pursuits are to be deemed honourable, they are not so as being the ultimate end of all things but as means to that end. And it is the business of the good lawgiver to study how a state, a race of men or any other community is to partake of the good life and the happiness possible for them. Some however of the regulations laid down will vary; and in case there exist any neighbour peoples, it is the business of the legislative art to consider what sort of exercises should be practised in relation to what sort of neighbours or how the state is to adopt the regulations that are suitable in relation to each. But this question of the proper end for the best constitutions to aim at may receive its due consideration later.\(^a\)

III. We turn to those who, while agreeing that the life of virtue is the most desirable, differ about the way in which that life should be pursued. Some disapprove of holding office in the state, thinking that the life of the free man is different from the life of politics and is the most desirable of any; whereas others think the political life the best life, for they argue that it is impossible for the man who does nothing to do well, and doing well and happiness are the same thing.\(^b\) To these two parties we must reply that both are partly right and partly wrong. The
οτί δ' τοῦ ἐλευθέρου βίος τοῦ δεσποτικοῦ ἀμείνων.

25 τούτο γὰρ ἄληθες, οὐθέν γὰρ τὸ γε δουλω, ἢ δοῦλος, χρῆσθαι σεμνών, ἢ γὰρ ἐπίταξις ἢ περὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων οὔδενὸς μετέχει τῶν καλῶν. τὸ 2 μέντοι νομίζειν πάσαν ἀρχήν εἶναι δεσποτείαν οὐκ ὁρθὸν, οὐ γὰρ ἐλαττον διέστηκεν ἢ τῶν ἐλευ-
θέρουν ἀρχῆς τῆς τῶν δουλῶν ἢ αὐτὸ τὸ φύσει

30 ἐλευθερον τοῦ φύσει δούλου. διώρισται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἰκανῶς ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις. τὸ δὲ μᾶλλον ἑπανείν τὸ ἀπρακτεῖν τοῦ πράττειν οὐκ ἄληθες. ἢ γὰρ εὐδαμονία πράξεως ἔστω, ἐτί δὲ πολ-

lῶν καὶ καλῶν τέλος ἔχουσιν αἱ τῶν δικαίων καὶ σωφρόνων πράξεις. καίτοι τάχ', ἀν ὑπολάβοι τις 3

85 τούτων οὕτω διωρισμένων ὦτὶ τὸ κύριον εἶναι πάντων ἀριστον, οὕτω γὰρ ἄν πλείστων καὶ καλλιστών κύριος εἲν πράξεων. ὡστε οὐ δεῖν 1 τὸν δυνάμενον ἀρχεῖν παρέναι τῷ πλησίον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀφαρέθωθαι, καὶ μήτε πατέρα παιδῶν μήτε παῖδας πατρός μήθ' ὅλως φίλον φίλον μηθένα

40 ὑπόλογον ποιεῖσθαι. 2 μηδὲ πρὸς τούτῳ φροντίζειν· τὸ γὰρ ἄριστον ἀἱρετῶτατον, τὸ δ' εὖ πράττειν ἀριστον. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἂληθῶς ἵσως λέγουσιν, 4

1325 b εἴπερ ὑπάρξει τοῖς ἀποστεροῦσι καὶ βιαζομένοις τὸ τῶν δυντῶν ἀἱρετῶτατον. ἀλλ' ἵσως οὐχ οἶλον τε ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλ' ὑποτίθενται τοῦτο ψεύδος. οὐ γὰρ ἐτι καλὰς τὰς πράξεις ἐνδέχεται εἶναι τῷ μὴ διαφέροντι τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἀνὴρ γυναικὸς ἢ πατὴρ

1 Susemihl: δεὶ codd.
2 ὑπόλογον ποιεῖσθαι Madvig: ὑπολογεῖσθαι codd. (v.l. ὑπο-

λογεῖν, ὑπολογίζειν).
former are right in saying that the life of the free man is better than the life of mastership, for this is true—there is nothing specially dignified in employing a slave, as a slave, for giving orders about menial duties has in it nothing of nobility; yet to think that all government is exercising the authority of a master is a mistake, for there is as wide a difference between ruling free men and ruling slaves as there is between the natural freeman and the natural slave themselves. But these things have been adequately decided in the first discourses. But to praise inaction more highly than action is an error, for happiness is an activity, and further the actions of the just and temperate have in them the realization of much that is noble. Yet on the strength of these decisions somebody might perhaps suppose that the highest good is to be the master of the world, since thus one would have the power to compass the greatest number and the noblest kind of actions, and therefore it is not the duty of the man that is capable of ruling to surrender office to his neighbour, but rather to take it from him, and no account must be taken by father of sons nor by sons of father nor in general by one friend of another, and no heed must be paid to them in comparison with this; for the best thing is the most to be desired, and to do well is the best thing. Now this statement is perhaps true if it is the case that the most desirable of existing things will belong to men that use robbery and violence. But perhaps it cannot belong to them, and this is a false assumption. For a man's acts can no longer be noble if he does not excel as greatly as a man excels a woman or a father his children or

\(^a\) i.e. Book I.
τέκνων ἡ δεσπότης δούλων, ὡστε ὁ παραβαίνων οὐθέν ἂν τηλικοῦτον κατορθώσειεν ὑστερον ὅσον ἦδη παρεκβεβηκε τῆς ἀρετῆς· τοῖς γὰρ ὁμοίοις τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τῷ ἐν¹ μέρει, τούτῳ γὰρ ἤσον καὶ ὁμοίον, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἤσον τοῖς ἵσοις καὶ τὸ μὴ ὁμοίον τοῖς ὁμοίοις παρὰ φύσιν, οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν καλὸν. διό καὶ ἄλλος τις ἡ κρείττων κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν τῆν πρακτικὴν τῶν ἀριστῶν, τούτῳ καλὸν ἀκολουθεῖν καὶ τούτῳ πείθεσθαι δίκαιον. δεῖ δὴ οὐ μόνον ἀρετὴν ἄλλα καὶ δύναμιν ὑπάρχειν καθ᾽ ἦν ἐσται πρακτικὸς. ἀλλ᾽ εἰ ταῦτα λέγεται καλῶς καὶ τὴν 5 εὐδαμονίαν εὑπραγίαν θετέον, καὶ κοινῆ πάσης πόλεως ἂν εἴη καὶ καθ᾽ ἔκαστον ἀριστος βίος ὁ πρακτικὸς. ἀλλὰ τὸν πρακτικὸν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς ἐτέρους, καθάπερ οἶνον ὑπ᾽ ὑπόκειται πάντως, οὐδὲ τὰς διανοίας εἶναι μόνος ταύτας πρακτικὰς τὰς τῶν ἀποβαίνοντων χάριν γιγνομένας ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον τὰς αὐτοτελεῖς καὶ τὰς αὐτῶν ἐνέκειν θεωρίας καὶ διανοήσεις· ἡ γὰρ εὑπραξία τέλος, ὡστε καὶ πρᾶξisas τις. μάλιστα δὲ καὶ πράττειν λέγομεν κυρίως καὶ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν πράξεων τοὺς ταῖς διανοίας ἄρχιτέκτωνας. ἀλλὰ 6 μὴν οὔδ᾽ ἀπρακτεῖν ἀναγκαῖον τὰς καθ᾽ αὐτὰς πόλεις ἰδρυμένας καὶ ζῆν οὕτω προηρμενέας· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ κατὰ μέρη καὶ τούτῳ συμβαίνειν, πολλαὶ γὰρ κοινωνίαι πρὸς ἀλληλα τοῖς μέρεσι τῆς πόλεως εἰσο. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο ὑπάρχει καὶ

¹ τῷ ἐν Thurot: τῷ codd.

550

* Cf. 1323 b 32 n., 1325 a 21.
a master his slaves, so that one who transgresses cannot afterwards achieve anything sufficient to rectify the lapse from virtue that he had already committed; because for equals the noble and just consists in their taking turns, since this is equal and alike, but for those that are equal to have an unequal share and those that are alike an unlike share is contrary to nature, and nothing contrary to nature is noble. Hence in case there is another person who is our superior in virtue and in practical capacity for the highest functions, him it is noble to follow and him it is just to obey; though he must possess not only virtue but also capacity that will render him capable of action. But if these things are well said, and if happiness is to be defined as well-doing, the active life is the best life both for the whole state collectively and for each man individually. But the active life is not necessarily active in relation to other men, as some people think, nor are only those processes of thought active that are pursued for the sake of the objects that result from action, but far more those speculations and thoughts that have their end in themselves and are pursued for their own sake; for the end is to do well, and therefore is a certain form of action. And even with actions done in relation to external objects we predicate action in the full sense chiefly of the master-craftsmen who direct the action by their thoughts. Moreover with cities also, those that occupy an isolated situation and pursue a policy of isolation are not necessarily inactive; for state activities also can be sectional, since the sections of the state have many common relations with one another. And this is also possible similarly in the
καθ' ἐνὸς ὅτουον τῶν ἀνθρώπων· σχολὴ γὰρ ἂν ὁ θεὸς εἰχὲν καλῶς καὶ πάς ὁ κόσμος, οὐς οὐκ εἰσὶν.

30 ἐξοτερικὴν πράξεις παρὰ τὰς οἰκείας τὰς αὐτῶν.

"Οτι μὲν οὖν τὸν αὐτὸν βίον ἀναγκαίον εἶναι τὸν ἀριστον ἐκάστῳ τε τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ κοινῆς ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις," φανερὸν ἔστων.

IV. 'Επεὶ δὲ πεφρομίαστα τὰ νῦν εἱρημένα 1 περὶ αὐτῶν, καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας ἦμιν

35 τεθεώρηται πρὸτερον, ἀρχὴ τῶν λοιπῶν εἰπεῖν πρῶτον ποίας τινὰς δεῖ τὰς ὑποθέσεις εἰναι περὶ τῆς μελλούσης κατ' εὐχήν συνεστάναι πόλεως. οὐ γάρ οἶον τε πολιτείαν γενέσθαι τῆν ἀρίστην ἁνευ συμμέτρου χορηγίας. διὸ δεὶ πολλὰ προοπο-

36 τεθεώρησθαι καθάπερ εὐχομένους, εἶναι μέντοι μηθὲν

40 τούτων ἄδυνατον. λέγω δὲ οἶον περὶ τε πλῆθους πολιτῶν καὶ χώρας. ὡσπερ γὰρ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις 2 δημιουργοῖς, οἶον ύφάντη καὶ ναυτήγορο, δεὶ τὴν

1326 a ύλὴν ύπάρχειν ἐπιτηδεῖαν οὐδαν πρὸς τὴν ἐργα-

σίαν (ὁσοὶ γὰρ ἂν αὐτὴ τυγχάνῃ παρεσκευασμένη βέλτων, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ γεγυγμένου ὑπὸ τῆς τέχνης εἶναι κάλλιον), οὕτω καὶ τῷ πολιτικῷ καὶ τῷ

5 νομοθέτῃ δεὶ τὴν οἰκείαν ύλὴν χωρίων ἐπι-

τηδεῖας ἔχουσαν. ἔστι δὲ πολιτικῆς χορηγίας

πρῶτον τὸ τε πλῆθος τῶν ἀνθρώπων, πόσους τε καὶ ποῖους τινὰς υπάρχειν δεὶ φύσει, καὶ κατὰ τὴν

χώραν ὡσαύτως, πόση τε εἶναι καὶ ποίαν τινὰ
taυτην. οἶονται μὲν οὖν οἱ πλείστοι προσήκειν 3 μεγάλην εἶναι τὴν εὐδαίμονα πόλιν· εἴ δὲ τούτῳ

10 ἄληθες, ἀγνοοῦσι πολὰ μεγάλη καὶ πολὰ μικρὰ

1 ed. : ἐξοι codd.

2 ἀνθρώποις ἄλλοις ᾿Coraes : πολίταις Richards.

a This seems to refer to Books IV.-VI.  

552
case of any individual human being; for otherwise God and the whole universe could hardly be well circumstanced, since they have no external activities by the side of their own private activities.

It is therefore manifest that the same life must be the best both for each human being individually and for states and mankind collectively.

IV. And as we have prepared the way by this prefatory discussion of the subject, and have previously studied all the other forms of constitution, the starting-point for the remainder of our subject is first to specify the nature of the conditions that are necessary in the case of the state that is to be constituted in the ideally best manner. For the best constitution cannot be realized without suitable equipment. We must therefore posit as granted in advance a number of as it were ideal conditions, although none of these must be actually impossible. I mean for instance in reference to number of citizens and territory. All other craftsmen, for example a weaver or a shipwright, have to be supplied with their material in a condition suitable for their trade, for the better this material has been prepared, the finer is bound to be the product of their craft; so also the statesman and the lawgiver ought to be furnished with their proper material in a suitable condition. Under the head of material equipment for the state there first come the questions as to a supply of population—what precisely ought to be its number and what its natural character? and similarly in regard to the territory, what is to be its particular size and nature? Most people imagine that the prosperous state must be a great state; but granted the truth of this, they fail to realize in what quality the
πόλις· κατ’ ἀριθμοῖν γὰρ πλῆθος τῶν ἑνοικοῦντων κρίνουσι τὴν μεγάλην, δεὶ δὲ μᾶλλον μή εἰς τὸ πλῆθος εἰς δὲ δύναμιν ἀποβλέπειν. ἐστὶ γάρ τι καὶ πόλεως ἔργου, ὥστε τὴν δυναμένην τούτο μάλιστ’ ἀποτελεῖν, ταύτην οἰητέον εἶναι μεγίστην, ὣν Ἰπποκράτην οὐκ ἄνθρωπον ἄλλ’ ἰατρὸν εἶναι μείζων φύσεις ἂν τοῦ διαφέροντος κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ σώματος. οὐ μὴν ἄλλα κἂν εἰ δεὶ κρίνειν πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος ἀποβλέποντας, οὐ κατὰ τὸ τυχὸν πλῆθος τοῦτο ποιητέον (ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι ἰσως ὑπάρξειν καὶ δούλων ἀριθμοὺν πολλῶν καὶ μετοίκων καὶ ξένων), ἀλλ’ ὅσοι πόλεις εἰσὶ μέρος καὶ ἦς ἡν συνισταται πόλις οἰκεῖων μορίων· ἡ γὰρ τούτων ὑπεροχή τοῦ πλῆθους μεγάλης πόλεως σημεῖον, ἡς ἢς δὲ βάναυσοι μὲν ἐξερχονται πολλοὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὑπλῖται δὲ ολόγου, ταύτην ἄδυνατον εἶναι μεγάλην. οὐ γὰρ ταύτων μεγάλη τε πόλις καὶ πολυάνθρωπος. ἀλλὰ μήν καὶ τοῦτο γε ἐκ τῶν ἐργῶν φανερόν, ὅτι χαλεπών, ἂνως δ’ ἄδυνατον, εὐνομεῖσθαι τὴν λίαν πολυάνθρωπον. τῶν γοῦν δοκουσῶν πολιτεύσθαι καλῶς οὐδεμίαν δρώμεν οὐσάν ἀνειμένην πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος. τούτῳ δὲ δὴ λοιπὸν καὶ διὰ τῆς τῶν λόγων πίστεως. ὅ τε γὰρ νόμος τάξεις τίς ἐστιν, καὶ τὴν εὐνομίαν ἀναγκαίον εὐταξίαν εἶναι: ὃ δὲ λίαν ὑπερβάλλων ἀριθμὸς οὐ δύναται μετέχειν τάξεως, θείας γὰρ ἥ τοῦτο δυνάμεως ἔργου, ἡτίς καὶ τὸδε συνέχει τὸ πᾶν. διό καὶ πολὺν ἦς μετὰ μεγέθους

1 Camerarius: oïtheo codd. (cf. 14).

*: In the mss. this clause follows the next.
greatness or smallness of a state consists: they judge a great state by the numerical magnitude of the population, but really the more proper thing to look at is not numbers but efficiency. For a state like other things has a certain function to perform, so that it is the state most capable of performing this function that is to be deemed the greatest, just as one would pronounce Hippocrates to be greater, not as a human being but as a physician, than somebody who surpassed him in bodily size. All the same, even if it be right to judge the state by the test of its multitude, this ought not to be done with regard to the multitude of any and every class (for states are doubtless bound to contain a large number of slaves and resident aliens and foreigners), but the test should be the number of those who are a portion of the state—the special parts of which a state consists. It is superiority in the number of these that indicates a great state; a state that sends forth to war a large number of the baser sort and a small number of heavy-armed soldiers cannot possibly be a great state—for a great state is not the same thing as a state with a large population. But certainly experience also shows that it is difficult and perhaps impossible for a state with too large a population to have good legal government. At all events we see that none of the states reputed to be well governed is without some restriction in regard to numbers. The evidence of theory proves the same point. Law is a form of order, and good law must necessarily mean good order; but an excessively large number cannot participate in order: to give it order would surely be a task for divine power, which holds even this universe together. Hence that state also must
ARISTOTLE

1326 a

δ' λεχθεῖ σοι υπάρχει, ταύτην εἰναι καλλιότην ἀναγκαίουν· ἐπεὶ τὸ γε καλὸν ἐν πλήθει καὶ θ μεγέθει εἴσιθε γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐστι τι καὶ πόλεις μεγέθους μέτρον, ὡσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων, ζωον φυτῶν ὄργανων· καὶ γὰρ τούτων ἐκαστὸν οὔτε λίαν μικρὸν οὔτε κατὰ μέγεθος ὑπερβάλλον ἕξει τὴν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν, ἀλλ' ὅτε μὲν ὅλως ἐστερημένον ἐσται τῆς φύσεως, ὅτε δὲ φαίλως ἔχον, οἷον πλοῖον σπιθαμαίοιν μὲν οὐκ ἐσται πλοῖον ὅλως, οὐδὲ δυοῖν σταδίων, εἰς δὲ τι μέγεθος ἐλθὸν ὅτε μὲν διὰ σμικρότητα φαύλην πονησθεὶ τὴν ναυτιλίαν ὅτε δὲ διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν. οἷοιος δὲ καὶ ἡ πόλις ἢ μὲν ἐξ ὀλίγων λίαν οὐκ αὐτάρκης (ἡ δὲ πόλις αὐτάρκης), ἤ δὲ ἐκ πολλῶν ἄγαν ἐν τοῖς μὲν ἀναγκαῖοις αὐτάρκης, ὡσπερ ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλ' οὐ πόλις, πολιτείαν γὰρ οὐ πάροικον ὑπάρχει—τὶς γὰρ στρατηγὸς ἐσται τοῦ λιαν ὑπερβάλλοντος πλῆθος; ἢ τὶς κηρύξ μη Στεντόρειος; διὸ πρῶτην μὲν εἶναι πόλιν ἀναγκαίον τὴν ἐκ τοσοῦτον πλῆθος δο πρώτος πλῆθος αὐτάρκες πρὸς τὸ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν. ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ τὴν ταύτην ὑπερβάλλουσαν κατὰ πλῆθος εἶναι μείζων πόλιν· ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' οὐκ ἐστὶν, ὡσπερ εἴπομεν, ἀόριστον, τὶς δ' ἐστὶν ὁ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς ὅρος, ἐκ τῶν ἐγραφῶν ἰδεῖν πάροικον· εἰδό γὰρ αἱ πράξεις τῆς πόλεως τῶν μὲν ἀρχόντων τῶν δ' ἀρχομένων,

1 ὡσπερ ἄνθρωπος, vel <αὐτάρκης δ'> ὡσπερ Jackson.

* i.e. presumably an Ethnos in the usual sense, a community composed of villages loosely bound together by relationship and trade, and united for defence, but not for political life; not an Ethnos of associated cities.

556
necessarily be the most beautiful with whose magnitude is combined the above-mentioned limiting principle; for certainly beauty is usually found in number and magnitude, but there is a due measure of magnitude for a city-state as there also is for all other things—animals, plants, tools; each of these if too small or excessively large will not possess its own proper efficiency, but in the one case will have entirely lost its true nature and in the other will be in a defective condition; for instance, a ship a span long will not be a ship at all, nor will a ship a quarter of a mile long, and even when it reaches a certain size, in the one case smallness and in the other excessive largeness will make it sail badly. Similarly a state consisting of too few people will not be self-sufficing (which is an essential quality of a state), and one consisting of too many, though self-sufficing in the mere necessaries, will be so in the way in which a nation is, and not as a state, since it will not be easy for it to possess constitutional government—for who will command its over-swollen multitude in war? or who will serve as its herald, unless he have the lungs of a Stentor? It follows that the lowest limit for the existence of a state is when it consists of a population that reaches the minimum number that is self-sufficient for the purpose of living the good life after the manner of a political community. It is possible also for one that exceeds this one in number to be a greater state, but, as we said, this possibility of increase is not without limit, and what the limit of the state's expansion is can easily be seen from practical considerations. The activities of the state are those of the rulers and those of the persons ruled, and the work of a ruler is to direct the ad-
This promise is not fulfilled in the work as it has come down to us.

The distinction seems to be between owning (or perhaps getting) wealth and using it; but a probable emendation of the Greek gives ‘how we ought to stand in relation to its employment.’
ministration and to judge law-suits; but in order to
decide questions of justice and in order to distribute
the offices according to merit it is necessary for the
citizens to know each other's personal characters,
since where this does not happen to be the case the
business of electing officials and trying law-suits is
bound to go badly; haphazard decision is unjust in
both matters, and this must obviously prevail in an
8 excessively numerous community. Also in such a
community it is easy for foreigners and resident aliens
to usurp the rights of citizenship, for the excessive
number of the population makes it not difficult to
escape detection. It is clear therefore that the best
limiting principle for a state is the largest expansion
of the population with a view to self-sufficiency that
can well be taken in at one view.

Such may be our conclusion on the question of the
size of the state.

1 V. Very much the same holds good about its
territory. As to the question what particular kind
of land it ought to have, it is clear that everybody
would command that which is most self-sufficing (and
such is necessarily that which bears every sort of
produce, for self-sufficiency means having a supply of
everything and lacking nothing). In extent and
magnitude the land ought to be of a size that will
enable the inhabitants to live a life of liberal and
at the same time temperate leisure. Whether this
limiting principle is rightly or wrongly stated must
be considered more precisely later on, when we
come to raise the general subject of property
and the ownership of wealth,—how and in what
way it ought to be related to its actual em-
ployment; about this question there are many
γὰρ περὶ τὴν σκέψιν ταύτην εἰσὶν ἀμφισβητήσεις
diὰ τοὺς ἐλκοντας ἐφ’ ἐκατέραν τοῦ βίου τὴν ὑπερ-
βολὴν, τοὺς μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν γλυσχότητα τοὺς δὲ ἐπὶ
tὴν τρυφὴν. τὸ δ’ εἰδος τῆς χώρας οὐ χαλεπὸν 2
εἰπεῖν (δεὶ δ’ ἔννα πείθεσθαι καὶ τοῖς περὶ τὴν
στρατηγικὰν ἐμπείροις), ὅτι χρὴ μὲν τοῖς 1 πολεμίοις
eἰναι δυσέμβολον αὐτοῖς δ’ εὐεξοδον, ἔτι δ’,
ωσπερ τὸ πλῆθος τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὐσύνοπτον
ἐφαμεν εἰναι δεῖν, οὕτω καὶ τὴν χώραν, τὸ δ’
eὐσύνοπτον τὸ εὐβοήθητον εἰναι τὴν χώραν ἐστὶν.
tῆς δὲ πόλεως τὴν θέσιν εἰ χρὴ ποιεῖν κατ’ εὐχήν,
5 πρὸς τε τὴν θάλατταν προσήκει κείσθαι καλῶς
πρὸς τε τὴν χώραν. εἰς μὲν ὁ λεγθεῖσιν ὁρος, δεῖ
γὰρ πρὸς τὰς ἐκβοηθεῖσι κοινής εἰναι τῶν τόπων
ἀπάντων· δ’ ἔνδοις πρὸς τὰς τῶν γιγνομένων
καρπῶν παραπομπὰς, ἔτι δ’ τῆς περὶ ἕνα ἥλιος
κἂν εἰ τινὰ ἄλλην ἐργασίαν ἡ χώρα τυγχάνοι
10 κεκτημένη τοιαύτην, εὐπαρακόμωστον.3

Περὶ δὲ τῆς πρὸς τὴν θάλατταν κοινωνίας, 3
πότερον ὦφελίμοις ταῖς εὐνομομέναις πόλεως ἢ
βλαβερά, πολλὰ τυγχάνουσιν ἀμφισβητοῦντες· τὸ
τε γὰρ ἐπιξενοῦσθαι τινας ἐν ἄλλοις τεθραμμένοις
15 νόμοις ἀσύμφορον εἰναι φασι πρὸς τὴν εὐνομίαν,
καὶ τὴν πολυναθρωπίαν, γίνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ
χρήσθαι τῇ θαλάσσῃ διαπέμποντας καὶ δεχομένους
ἐμπόρων πλῆθος, ὑπεναντίαν δ’ εἰναι πρὸς τὸ
πολιτεύεσθαι καλῶς. ὅτι μὲν οὖν, εἰ τὰῦτα μὴ 4
συμβαίνει, βέλτιον καὶ πρὸς ἀσφαλείαν καὶ πρὸς

1 τοῖς μὲν Richards.
2 <τὸδ> εὐπαρακόμωστον ? Immisch.

a At the beginning of § 2.
controversies, owing to those that draw us towards either extreme of life, the one school towards parsimony and the other towards luxury. The proper configuration of the country it is not difficult to state (though there are some points on which the advice of military experts also must be taken): on the one hand it should be difficult for enemies to invade and easy for the people themselves to march out from, and in addition, on the other hand, the same thing holds good of the territory that we said about the size of the population—it must be well able to be taken in at one view, and that means being a country easy for military defence. As to the site of the city, if it is to be ideally placed, it is proper for it to be well situated with regard both to the sea and to the country. One defining principle is that mentioned above—the city must be in communication with all parts of the territory for the purpose of sending out military assistance; and the remaining principle is that it must be easily accessible for the conveyance to it of the agricultural produce, and also of timber-wood and any other such material that the country happens to possess.

As to communication with the sea it is in fact much debated whether it is advantageous to well-ordered states or harmful. It is maintained that the visits of persons brought up under other institutions are detrimental to law and order, and so also is a swollen population, which grows out of sending out abroad and receiving in a number of traders, but is unfavourable to good government. Now it is not difficult to see that, if these consequences are avoided, it is advantageous in respect of both security and the supply of necessary commodities.
20 εὐπορίαν τῶν ἀναγκαίων μετέχειν τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν χώραν τῆς θαλάττης, οὐκ ἄδηλον. καὶ γὰρ πρὸς τὸ βὰον φέρειν τοὺς πολέμους ἐυβοηθήτους εἶναι δεὶ κατ’ ἀμφότερα τοὺς σωθησόμενους, καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θαλάσσαν· καὶ πρὸς τὸ βλάψαι τοὺς ἐπιτιθεμένους, εἰ μὴ κατ’ ἀμφῶς δυνατόν,
25 ἀλλὰ κατὰ θάτερον ὑπάρξει μᾶλλον ἀμφοτέρων μετέχουσιν. οὕτα τ’ ἂν μὴ τυγχάνῃ παρ’ αὐτοῖς ὑπηρέτη, δεξασθαι ταῦτα καὶ τὰ πλεονάζοντα τῶν γεγυμνομένων ἐκπέμβασθαι τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστιν· αὐτὴ γὰρ ἐμπορικὴν, ἀλλ’ οὐ τοῖς ἄλλοις δεὶ εἶναι τὴν πόλιν· οἱ δὲ παρέχοντες σφάς αὐτοῖς 5 πᾶσιν ἄγορὰν προσόδον χάριν ταῦτα πράππουσιν,
30 ἂν δὲ μὴ δεὶ πόλιν τουαύτης μετέχειν πλεονεξίας, οὐδ’ ἐμπόριον δεὶ κεκτηθαι τοιοῦτον. ἔπει δὲ καὶ νῦν ὅρωμεν πολλαῖς ὑπάρχωντα καὶ χώραις καὶ πόλεσιν ἐπίνεια καὶ λιμένας εὐφυῶς κείμενα πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, ὡστε μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ νέμειν ἀπὸ τὸ πόρρω λινὰν ἀλλὰ κρατεῖσθαι τείχεσθαι καὶ τοιοῦτοις ἄλλοις ἐρύμασι, φανερὸν ὡς εἰ μὲν ἀγαθὸν τι συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι διὰ τῆς κοινωνίας αὐτῶν, ὑπάρξει τῇ πόλει τούτῳ τὸ ἀγαθὸν, εἰ δὲ τῷ βλαβερῷ, φυλάξασθαι ῥάδιον τοῖς νόμοις φρά- 35 ξοντας καὶ διορίζοντας τίνας οὐ δεὶ καὶ τίνας ἐπι-
μίσθεσθαι δεὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους. περὶ δὲ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως, οτι μὲν βέλτιστον ὑπάρχειν μέχρι τῶν πλήθους, οὐκ ἄδηλον (οὐ γὰρ μόνον αὐτοῖς ἄλλα καὶ τῶν πλησίον τισὶ δεὶ καὶ φοβεροὺς εἶναι καὶ

1 Sylburg: πολεμίους codd. 2 [πρὸς] e 21 Richards. 3 ed.: αὐτοῖς codd. 4 Welldon: ὑπάρχων codd. 5 τὸ αὐτὸ νέμειν: αὐτὸ νέμειν τὸ? ed. (ipsum Guil.).

562
that the city and the country should have access to the sea. With a view to enduring wars more easily people that are to be secure must be capable of defensive operations on both elements, land and sea, and with a view to striking at assailants, even if it be not possible on both elements, yet to do so on one or the other will be more in the power of people that have access to both. And the importation of commodities that they do not happen to have in their own country and the export of their surplus products are things indispensable; for the state ought to engage in commerce for its own interest, but not for the interest of the foreigner. People that throw open their market to the world do so for the sake of revenue, but a state that is not to take part in that sort of profit-making need not possess a great commercial port. But since even now we see many countries and cities possessing sea-ports and harbours conveniently situated with regard to the city, so as not to form part of the same town and yet not to be too far off, but commanded by walls and other defence-works of the kind, it is manifest that if any advantage does result through the communication of city with port the state will possess this advantage, and if there is any harmful result it is easy to guard against it by means of laws stating and regulating what persons are not and what persons are to have intercourse with one another.

On the question of naval forces, there is no doubt that to possess them up to a certain strength is most desirable (for a state ought to be formidable, and also capable of the defence of not only its own people

* Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give 'part of the town itself.'
δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν, ὡσπερ κατὰ γῆν, καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν). περὶ δὲ πλήθους ἑδη καὶ μεγέθους τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης πρὸς τὸν βίον ἀποσκεπτέον τῆς πόλεως· εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἠγεμονικὸν καὶ πολιτικὸν ἦσσεταί βίων, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν ὑπάρχειν πρὸς τὰς πράξεις σύμμετρον. τὴν δὲ πολυανθρωπίαν τὴν γιγανμένην περὶ τὸν ναυτικὸν ὄχλον οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν ταῖς πόλεσι· οὕθεν γὰρ αὐτοὺς μέρος εἶναι δεῖ τῆς πόλεως. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιβατικὸν ἐλεύθερον καὶ τῶν πεζεύοντων ἔστιν, ὁ κυρίων ἔστι καὶ κρατεῖ τῆς ναυτικᾶς· πλῆθος δὲ ὑπάρχοντος περιοικών καὶ τῶν τὴν χώραν γεωργοῦντων, ἀφθονίαν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ ναυτῶν. ὀρὼμεν δὲ καὶ τούτο καὶ νῦν ὑπάρχον τισίν, οἷον τῇ πόλει τῶν Ἡρακλεώτων· πολλὰς γὰρ ἐκπληροῦσι τριήρεις κεκτημένοι τῷ μεγέθει πόλιν ἐτέρων ἐμμελεστέραν.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν χώρας καὶ λιμένων τῶν πόλεων καὶ θαλάσσης καὶ περὶ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως ἐστὶ διαρισμένα τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.

VI. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ πλήθους, τίνα μὲν ὁρον ὑπάρχειν χρῆ πρότερον εἴπομεν, ποῖος δὲ τινὰς τὴν φύσιν εἶναι δεῖ νῦν λέγωμεν. σχεδὸν δὴ κατανοῆσιν ἂν τις τοῦτο γε βλέπας ἐπὶ τε τὰς πόλεις τὰς εὐδικαιοῦσας τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ πρὸς πᾶσαν τὴν οἰκουμένην ὡς διείληπται τοῖς ἔθνεσιν. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ψυχροῖς τόποις ἔθνη καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδαν θυμοῦ μὲν ἐστὶ πλήρη, διανοιαὶ δὲ ἐνδεέστερα καὶ τέχνης, διότερον ἐλεύθερα μὲν διατελεῖ μᾶλλον, ἀπολύειται δὲ καὶ τῶν

1 τῶν ed.: καὶ codd.
but also some of its neighbours, by sea as well as by land; but when we come to the question of the number and size of this force, we have to consider the state's manner of life: if it is to live a life of leadership and affairs, it must possess maritime as well as other forces commensurate with its activities. On the other hand it is not necessary for states to include the teeming population that grows up in connexion with the sailor crowd, as there is no need for these to be citizens; for the marines are free men and are a part of the infantry, and it is they —who have command and control the crew; and if there exists a mass of villagers and tillers of the soil, there is bound to be no lack of sailors too. In fact we see this state of thing existing even now in some places, for instance in the city of Heraclea; the Heracleotes man a large fleet of triremes, although they possess a city of but moderate size as compared with others.

Let such then be our conclusions about the territories and harbours of cities, and the sea, and about naval forces.

VI. About the citizen population, we said before what is its proper limit of numbers. Let us now speak of what ought to be the citizens' natural character. Now this one might almost discern by looking at the famous cities of Greece and by observing how the whole inhabited world is divided up among the nations. The nations inhabiting the cold places and those of Europe are full of spirit but somewhat deficient in intelligence and skill, so that they continue comparatively free, but lacking in political

\(^a\) i.e. active interference with other states—a broader term than hegemony, leadership of an alliance: cf. 1265 a 23 n.

\(^b\) c. iv. fin.
πλησίον ἀρχεῖν οὐ δυνάμενα· τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν διανοητικὰ μὲν καὶ τεχνικὰ τὴν ψυχήν, ἄθυμα δὲ, διόπερ ἀρχόμενα καὶ δουλεύοντα διατελεῖ· τὸ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένος ὅσπερ μεσεύει κατὰ τοὺς τόπους, οὕτως ἀμφοῖν μετέχει, καὶ γὰρ ἐνθυμοῦν καὶ διανοητικὸν ἔστιν, διόπερ ἐλεύθερον τε διατελεῖ καὶ βέλτιστα πολιτεύμονα καὶ δυνάμενον ἀρχεῖν πάντων, μιᾶς τυγχάνον πολιτείας. τὴν αὐτὴν δ' ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐθνὶ πρὸς ἅλληα· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει 2 τὴν φύσιν μονόκωλων, τὰ δὲ εὖ2 κέκραται πρὸς ἀμφοτέρας τὰς δυνάμεις ταύτας. φανερὸν τοῖνυν ὅτι δεὶ διανοητικοὺς τε εἶναι καὶ θυμοειδεῖς τὴν φύσιν τοὺς μέλλοντας εὐαγώγους ἔσεσθαι τῷ νομοθετῷ πρὸς τὴν ἄρετην. ὅπερ γὰρ φασὶ τυχεῖν δεῖν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς φύλαξι, τὸ φιλητικὸς μὲν εἶναι τῶν γνωρίμων πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀγνώτατας ἄγρίους, ὁ θυμός ἐστιν ὁ ποιῶν τὸ φιλητικὸν· αὐτὴ γὰρ εἰς τῶν γνωρίμων πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀγνώτατας ἄγρίους, ὁ θυμός ἐστιν ὁ ποιῶν τὸ φιλητικὸν· αὐτὴ γὰρ εἰς τῶν γνωρίμων πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀγνώτατας ἄγρίους, ὁ θυμός ἐστιν ὁ ποιῶν τὸ φιλητικὸν. σημεῖον 3 δὲ· πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς συνήθεις καὶ φίλους ὁ θυμὸς αἴρεται μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγνώτας, ἀληθεῶς οὖσαν νομίσας. διὸ καὶ 'Αρκίλοχος προσθηκόντως τοῖς φίλοις ἐγκαλῶν διαλέγεται πρὸς τὸν θυμὸν.

σὺ3 γὰρ δὴ παρὰ φίλων ἀπάγχει. καὶ τὸ ἀρχον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἀπὸ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης ὑπάρχει πάσιν· ἀρχικὸν γὰρ καὶ ἀπήττητον ὁ θυμός. οὐ καλῶς δ' ἔχει λέγειν

1 πρὸς ΓΡ1: καὶ πρὸς cett. 2 εὖ ΓΜΡ1: εὖ τε cett. 3 σὺ Schneider: οὐ codd.

a i.e. intelligence and high spirit, capacity for self-government and capacity for empire.

b The ruling class in Plato’s Ideal State, Republic 375 c.
organization and capacity to rule their neighbours. The peoples of Asia on the other hand are intelligent and skilful in temperament, but lack spirit, so that they are in continuous subjection and slavery. But the Greek race participates in both characters, just as it occupies the middle position geographically, for it is both spirited and intelligent; hence it continues to be free and to have very good political institutions, and to be capable of ruling all mankind if it attains constitutional unity. The same diversity also exists among the Greek races compared with one another: some have a one-sided nature, others are happily blended in regard to both these capacities. It is clear therefore that people that are to be easily guided to virtue by the lawgiver must be both intellectual and spirited in their nature. For as to what is said by certain persons about the character that should belong to their Guardians—they should be affectionate to their friends but fierce towards strangers—it is spirit that causes affectionateness, for spirit is the capacity of the soul whereby we love. A sign of this is that spirit is more roused against associates and friends than against strangers, when it thinks itself slighted. Therefore Archilochus for instance, when reproaching his friends, appropriately apostrophizes his spirit:

For 'tis thy friends that make thee choke with rage.

Moreover it is from this faculty that power to command and love of freedom are in all cases derived; for spirit is a commanding and indomitable element.

Archilochus of Paros (one of the earliest lyric poets, fl. 600 B.C., the inventor of the iambic metre, which he used for lampoons), fr. 61 Bergk, 676 Diehl, 67 Edmonds, Elegy and Iambus, ii. 133.
χαλεποὺς εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ἀγνῶτας· πρὸς οὐθένα
gὰρ εἶναι χρή τουοῦτον, οὔδ’ εἰσὶν οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι
tὴν φύσιν ἄγριοι πλῆν πρὸς τοὺς ἄδικοιντας, τοῦτο
dὲ μᾶλλον ἔτι πρὸς τοὺς συνήθεις πάσχουσιν, ὅπερ
eὐρήται πρῶτερον, ἂν ἀδικεῖοθαι νομίσωσιν. καὶ 4
tοῦτο συμβαίνει κατὰ λόγον· παρ’ οἷς γὰρ ὅφει-
λεσθαι τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ὑπολαμβάνουσι, πρὸς τῷ
βλάβει καὶ ταῦτης ἀποστερεῖοθαί νομίζουσιν· ὅθεν
eὐρήται

χαλεποὶ γὰρ πόλεμοι ἀδελφῶν
καὶ
οἶ τοι πέρα στέρζαντες, οἳ δὲ καὶ πέρα
μισοῦσιν.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πολιτευμένων, πόσους τε
ὑπάρχειν δεῖ καὶ πολίους τινὰς τὴν φύσιν, ἔτι δὲ
tὴν χώραν πόσην τέ τινα καὶ ποιάν τινα, διώρισται
20 σχεδὸν· οὐ γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀκρίβειαν δεὶ ἔπει
διὰ τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν γιγνομένων διὰ τῆς
αισθήσεως.

VII. Ἐπεὶ δ’, ὥσπερ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ φύσιν 1
συνεστῶτων οὐ ταῦτα3 ἐστὶν μόρια τῆς οἷς συ-
stάσεως ὃν ἀνεύ τὸ θλὸν οὐκ ἂν εἶχεν, δῆλον ως
25 μήτε πόλεως μέρη θετέων ὥσα ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄναγ-
καίον ὑπάρχειν (οὔτ’ ἄλλης κοινωνίας οὐδεμᾶς,
ἐξ ἢς ἐν τι τὸ γένος, ἐν γὰρ τι καὶ κοινὸν εἶναι δεῖ
καὶ ταύτῳ τοῖς κοινωνοῖς, ἀν τε ἵνων ἂν τε ἀνισον

1 τῆν Schneider: δεῖν (vel δεῖ, δέ) τῆν codd.
2 ἐπὶ Richards.
3 ταῦτα cod. inf.: πάντα Wyse.

a Euripides fr. 965.
But it is a mistake to describe the Guardians as cruel towards strangers; it is not right to be cruel towards anybody, and men of great-souled nature are not fierce except towards wrongdoers, and their anger is still fiercer against their companions if they think that these are wronging them, as has been said before.

And this is reasonable, because they think that in addition to the harm done them they are also being defrauded of a benefit by persons whom they believe to owe them one. Hence the sayings

For brothers’ wars are cruel,⁴

and

They that too deeply loved too deeply hate.⁵

We have now approximately decided what are the proper numbers and the natural qualities of those who exercise the right of citizens, and the proper extent and nature of the territory (for we must not seek to attain the same exactness by means of theoretical discussions as is obtained by means of the facts that come to us through sense-perceptions).

VII. But since, just as with all other natural organisms those things that are indispensable for the existence of the whole are not parts of the whole organization, it is also clear that not all the things that are necessary for states to possess are to be counted as parts of a state (any more than this is so with any other association that forms something one in kind, for there must be something that is one and common and the same for the partners, whether the shares that they take be equal or unequal:

⁴ Trag. incert. fr. 78 Nauck.

⁵ i.e. they are not all of them parts: the ‘parts’ of a thing are among the ‘indispensable conditions’ of its existence, but there are others also.
The sentence is unfinished.

Possibly the words from the beginning of § 2 'But when' to this point should be transferred below to § 3 mid. after 'different constitutions.'
for example this common property may be food or an area of land or something else of the same sort)—² but when of two related things one is a means and the other an end, in their case there is nothing in common except for the one to act and the other to receive the action. I mean for instance the relation between any instrument or artificer and the work that they produce: between a house and a builder there is nothing that is produced in common, but the builder's craft exists for the sake of the house. Hence although states need property, the property is no part of the state. And there are many living things that fall under the head of property.³ And the state is one form of partnership of similar people, and its object is the best life that is possible. And since the greatest good is happiness, and this is some perfect activity or employment of virtue, and since it has so come about that it is possible for some men to participate in it, but for others only to a small extent or not at all, it is clear that this is the cause for there arising different kinds and varieties of state and several forms of constitution; for as each set of people pursues participation in happiness in a different manner and by different means they make for themselves different modes of life and different constitutions. And we must also further consider how many there are of these things referred to that are indispensable for the existence of a state; for among them will be the things which we pronounce to be parts of a state, owing to which their presence is essential. We must therefore consider the list of occupations that a state requires: for from these it will appear what the indispensable classes are. First then a state must have a supply of food;
τροφήν, ἐπειτα τέχνας (πολλῶν γὰρ ὄργανων δεῖται τὸ ζήν), τρίτον δὲ ὅπλα (τοὺς γὰρ κοινωνοῦντας ἀναγκαίον καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχειν ὅπλα πρὸς τῇ τὴν ἀρχήν, τῶν ἀπειθοῦντων χάριν, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐξωθεὶν ἀδικεῖν ἐπιχειροῦντας), ἐτὶ χρημάτων τινὰ εὐπορίαν, ὡς ἐξωθῆ καὶ πρὸς τὰς καθ’ αὐτοὺς χρείας καὶ πρὸς πολεμικὰς, πέμπτον δὲ καὶ πρῶτον τὴν περὶ τὸ θεῖον ἐπιμέλειαν, ἣν καλοῦσιν ἱερατείαν, ἐκτὸν δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ πάντων ἀναγκαίοτατον κρίσιν περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων καὶ τῶν δικαίων τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλους. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐργα 5 ταῦτ’ ἔστιν ὅτι δεῖται πᾶσα πόλις ὡς εἰπεῖν (ἡ γὰρ πόλις πλῆθος ἔστων οὐ τὸ τυχὸν, ἄλλα πρὸς ἡμῶν αὐταρκεῖς, ὡς φαμέν, ἐὰν δὲ τῷ τυχανῇ τούτων ἐκλείπων, ἀδύνατον ἀπλῶς αὐτάρκη τῇ κοινωνίᾳ εἶναι ταύτην). ἀνάγκη τοῖνυν κατὰ τὰς ἔργασίας 20 ταῦτας συνεστάναι πόλιν. δεῖ ἀρα γεωργῶν τ’ εἶναι πλῆθος οἱ παρασκευάσουσι τῇ τροφῆν, καὶ τεχνίτας, καὶ τὸ μάχιμον, καὶ τὸ εὑποροῦν, καὶ ἱερεῖς, καὶ κρίτας τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ συμφερόντων.

VIII. Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων λοιπὸν σκέψασθαι 1 πότερον πάσι κοινωνητέον πάντων τούτων (ἐνδεχεται γάρ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀπαντᾷ εἶναι καὶ γεωργοὺς καὶ τεχνίτας καὶ τοὺς βουλευομένους καὶ δικαζόντας), ἡ καθ’ ἐκαστὸν ἐργὸν τῶν εἰρημένων ἄλλους υποθετέον, ἡ τὰ μὲν ἰδια τὰ δὲ κοινὰ τούτων

1 δικαίων Lambinus.

a Cf. Π. i. 7, Π. i. 8, v. ii. 10.

572
POLITICS, VII. vii. 4—viii. 1

secondly, handicrafts (since life needs many tools); third, arms (since the members of the association must necessarily possess arms both to use among themselves and for purposes of government, in cases of insubordination, and to employ against those who try to molest them from without); also a certain supply of money, in order that they may have enough both for their internal needs and for requirements of war; fifth, a primary need, the service of religion, termed a priesthood; and sixth in number and most necessary of all, a provision for deciding questions of interests and of rights between the citizens. These then are the occupations that virtually every state requires (for the state is not any chance multitude of people but one self-sufficient for the needs of life, as we say, and if any of these industries happens to be wanting, it is impossible for that association to be absolutely self-sufficient). It is necessary therefore for the state to be organized on the lines of these functions; consequently it must possess a number of farmers who will provide the food, and craftsmen, and the military class, and the wealthy, and priests and judges to decide questions of necessity and of interests.

VIII. These matters having been settled, it remains to consider whether everybody is to take part in all of these functions (for it is possible for the whole of the people to be at once farmers and craftsmen and the councillors and judges), or whether we are to assume different classes corresponding to each of the functions mentioned, or whether some of them must necessarily be specialized and others combined.

Perhaps the text should be altered to give 'matters of justice.'
εξ ἀνάγκης ἔστίν. οὐκ ἐν πάσῃ δὲ ταύτῳ1 πολιτείᾳ. 30 καθάπερ γὰρ εὑπομεν, ἐνδέχεται καὶ πάντας κοινωνεῖν πάντως καὶ μὴ πάντας πάντως ἀλλὰ τινὰς τινῶν. ταύτα γὰρ καὶ ποιεῖ τὰς πολιτείας ἑτέρας: ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις μετέχουσι πάντες πάντων, ἐν δὲ ταίς ὀλιγαρχίαις τούναντιον. ἐπεὶ 2 δὲ τυγχάνομεν σκοποῦντες περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας, αὕτη δὲ ἐστὶ καθ’ ἣν ἡ πόλις ἂν εὑρῇ μάλιστ' εὐδαίμων, τὴν δ’ εὐδαιμονίαν ὅτι χωρὶς ἀρετῆς ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν εὑρῆται πρότερον, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων ὡς ἐν τῇ κάλλιστα πολιτευμένη πόλει, καὶ τῇ κεκτημένῃ δικαίους ἄνδρας ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, οὕτε βάναυσον βίον οὐτ’ 40 ἀγοραῖον δὲι ἢν τοὺς πολίτας (ἀγεννήσ γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος βίος καὶ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ὑπεναντίοι) οὐδὲ δὴ γεωργοῦς εἰναι τοὺς μέλλοντας ἐσεθαί2 (δει γὰρ σχολῆς καὶ πρὸς τὴν γένεσιν τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ πρὸς τὰς πράξεις τὰς πολιτικὰς). ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ 3 πολεμικὸν καὶ τὸ βουλευόμενον περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων καὶ κρῖνων περὶ τῶν δικαίων ἐνυπάρχει καὶ μέρη φαίνεται τῆς πόλεως μάλιστα ὅντα, πότερον ἑτερα3 καὶ ταύτα βιεῦν ἢ τοῖς αὐτῶις ἀποδοτέον ἀμφοτερον ἀμφῶς; φανερὸν δὲ καὶ τούτο, διότι τρόπον μὲν τινα τοῖς αὐτώις, τρόπον δὲ τινα καὶ ἑτέροις. ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἑτέρας ἀκμῆς ἐκάτερον τῶν ἐργῶν, καὶ τὸ μὲν δεῖται φρονήσεως τὸ δὲ δυνά-

1 taútò Spengel: τούτῳ codd.
2 [τοὺς] μέλλοντας ἐσεθαί supra post ἢν τοὺς 40 Richards.
3 ἑτερα <ἑτέροις> Coraes.

---

a Cf. iv. iv. and xiv. b c. i. § 5.

574
But it will not be the same in every form of constitution; for, as we said, it is possible either for all the people to take part in all the functions or for not all to take part in all but for certain people to have certain functions. In fact these different distributions of functions are the cause of the difference between constitutions: democracies are states in which all the people participate in all the functions, oligarchies where the contrary is the case. But at present we are studying the best constitution, and this is the constitution under which the state would be most happy, and it has been stated before that happiness cannot be forthcoming without virtue; it is therefore clear from these considerations that in the most nobly constituted state, and the one that possesses men that are absolutely just, not merely just relatively to the principle that is the basis of the constitution, the citizens must not live a mechanic or a mercantile life (for such a life is ignoble and inimical to virtue), nor yet must those who are to be citizens in the best state be tillers of the soil (for leisure is needed both for the development of virtue and for active participation in politics). And since the state also contains the military class and the class that deliberates about matters of policy and judges questions of justice, and these are manifestly in a special sense parts of the state, are these classes also to be set down as distinct or are both functions to be assigned to the same persons? But here also the answer is clear, because in a certain sense they should be assigned to the same persons, but in a certain sense to different ones. Inasmuch as each of these two functions belongs to a different prime of life, and one requires wisdom, the other strength,
ARISTOTLE

1329 a 10 μεως, ἐτέροις: ἢ δὲ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστὶ τοὺς δυναμένους βιάζεσθαι καὶ καλύειν, τούτους ὑπομένειν ἀρχομένους ἀεὶ, ταύτῃ δὲ τοῖς αὐτοῖς: οἱ γὰρ τῶν ὁπλων κύριοι καὶ μένειν ἢ μὴ μένειν κύριοι τὴν πολιτείαν. λείπεται τοῖς τοῖς αὐτοῖς μὲν ἀμφότεροις ἀποδιδόναι τὴν πολιτείαν ταύτῃ, 3 μὴ ἀμα δὲ, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ πέφυκεν ἢ μὲν δύναμις ἐν νεωτέροις ἢ ἐν φρόνησις ἐν πρεσβυτέροις εἶναι, ἔοικεν οὕτως ἀμφότεροι νευμὴσθαι συμφέρειν καὶ δίκαιον εἶναι: ἔχει γὰρ αὐτὴ ἡ διαίρεσις τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὰς κτήσεις δεῖ εἶναι περὶ τούτους: ἀναγκαίον γὰρ εὔποροιν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς πολιταῖς, πολίται δὲ οὕτωι. τὸ γὰρ βάπαυσον οὐ μετέχει τῆς πόλεως, οὕτω οὕθεν γένος δ’ μὴ τῆς ἀρετῆς δημιουργὸν ἐστὶν. τούτῳ δὲ δῆλον ἕκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως: τὸ μὲν γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀναγκαίον ὑπάρχειν μετὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς, εὐδαιμονέα δὲ πόλιν οὐκ εἰς μέρος τι βλέπαντας δεὶ λέγειν αὐτὴς ἀλλ’ εἰς πάντας τοὺς πολιταῖς. φανερῶν δὲ καὶ ὧτι δεῖ τὰς κτήσεις εἶναι τούτων, εἶπεν ἀναγκαίον εἶναι τοὺς γεωργοὺς δούλους ἢ βαρβάρους περιοίκους. λοιπὸν δ’ ἐκ τῶν καταρθυμηθέντων τῷ δὲ όρεών θέσεις: φανερὰ δὲ καὶ οὐ τούτων τάξεις. οὕτε γὰρ γεωργῶν οὔτε βαπαύσον ἐρεά καταστατέον, ὑπὸ

1 ἀμφότερα? Susemihl. 2 ταύτα? Susemihl. 3 εἶναι ἐοικεν ... συμφέρει Immisch: ἐστίν σοικουν ... συμφέρει codd. (sed pro εἶναι esse videtur Guil.). 4 εἶπεν Hayduck. 5 ὧτι Hayduck. 6 βαρβάρους Susemihl: βαρβάρους ἢ codd.

a Or, amending this curious Greek, ‘for the constitution to assign both these functions to the same people.’
b A Platonic phrase, Republic 500 d.
they are to be assigned to different people; but inasmuch as it is a thing impossible that when a set of men are able to employ force and to resist control, these should submit always to be ruled, from this point of view both functions must be assigned to the same people; for those who have the power of arms have the power to decide whether the constitution shall stand or fall. The only course left them is to assign this constitutional function to both sets of men without distinction, yet not simultaneously, but, as in the natural order of things strength is found in the younger men and wisdom in the elder, it seems to be expedient and just for their functions to be allotted to both in this way, for this mode of division possesses conformity with merit. Moreover the ownership of properties also must be centred round these classes, for the citizens must necessarily possess plentiful means, and these are the citizens. For the artisan class has no share in the state, nor has any other class that is not 'an artificer of virtue.' 

And this is clear from our basic principle; for in conjunction with virtue happiness is bound to be forthcoming, but we should pronounce a state happy having regard not to a particular section of it but to all its citizens. And it is also manifest that the properties must belong to these classes, inasmuch as it is necessary for the tillers of the soil to be slaves, or serfs of alien race. There remains of the list enumerated the class of priests; and the position of this class also is manifest. Priests must be appointed neither from the tillers of the soil nor from the artisans, for it is seemly that the gods should be

As this is a new point, perhaps we should transpose 'inasmuch as' (ἐλπιὸν) and 'that' (ὅτι) in the line above.
Aristotle

1329 a

30 γὰρ τῶν πολιτῶν πρέπει τιμᾶσθαι τοὺς θεοῦσ' ἐπεὶ δὲ διήρηται τὸ πολιτικὸν εἰς δύο μέρη, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ τε ὀπλιτικὸν καὶ τὸ βουλευτικὸν, πρέπει δὲ τὴν τε θεραπείαν ἀποδιδόναι τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ τὴν ἀνάπαυσιν ἤχειν περὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς διὰ τὸν χρόνον ἀπειρηκότας, τούτοις ἂν εἰη τὰς ἱερωσύνας ἀποδοτέον.

35 Ὡν μὲν τοίνυν ἄνευ πόλις οὐ συνισταται καὶ ὅσα μέρη πόλεως ἐφηται. γεωργοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ τεχνύται καὶ πάν τὸ θητικὸν ἀναγκαίουν [ὑπάρχειν] ταῖς πόλεσιν, μέρη δὲ τῆς πόλεως τὸ τε ὀπλιτικὸν καὶ βουλευτικὸν καὶ κεχώρισται δὴ τούτων ἕκαστον, τὸ μὲν ἂεί, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος.

40 IX. Ἅρμικε δ' οὐ νῦν οὐδὲ νεωστὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι 1 γνώριμον τοῖς περὶ πολιτείας φιλοσοφοῦσιν, ὅτι δεῖ διηρήσασθαι χωρὶς κατὰ γέννῃ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὸ τε μάχημον ἐπερον εἶναι καὶ τὸ γεωργοῦν. ἐν Ἀὐγοῦτω τε γὰρ ἦκεν τὸν τρόπον τούτον ἔτι καὶ νῦν τὰ τε περὶ τῆν Κρήτην, τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ Ἀὐγοῦτον Σεσωστρίως, ὡς φασίν, οὕτω νομοθετήσαντος, Μίνω δὲ τὰ περὶ Κρήτην. ἄρχαία δ' 2 ἐνοκεν εἶναι καὶ τῶν συσσιτίων ἡ τάξις, τὰ μὲν περὶ Κρήτην γενόμενα περὶ τὴν Μίνω βασιλείαν, τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν 'Ιταλίαν πολλῷ παλαιότερα τούτῳ φασὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγοι τῶν ἔκει κατοικοῦντων 'Ιταλοῖ τοια γενέσθαι βασιλέα τῆς 'Οινωπίας, ἀφ' οὗ τὸ τε ὄνομα μεταβαλόντας 'Ιταλοὺς ἀν' 'Οινωτρῶν κληθῆναι καὶ τὴν ἄκτην ταύτην τῆς 'Εὐρώπης.

1 v.l. τῶν.
3 Spengel.

3 sp. aitou s' post τὰς tr. Richards.

i.e. the 'appurtenances' are permanently separate from the army and the deliberative, which are the 'parts,' and

578
worshipped by citizens; and since the citizen body is divided into two parts, the military class and the councillor class, and as it is seemly that those who have relinquished these duties owing to age should render to the gods their due worship and should spend their retirement in their service, it is to these that the priestly offices should be assigned.

We have therefore stated the things indispensible for the constitution of a state, and the things that are parts of a state: tillers of the soil, craftsmen and the labouring class generally are a necessary appurtenance of states, but the military and deliberative classes are parts of the state; and moreover each of these divisions is separate from the others, either permanently or by turn. a

1 IX. And that it is proper for the state to be divided up into castes and for the military class to be distinct from that of the tillers of the soil does not seem to be a discovery of political philosophers of to-day or one made recently. b In Egypt this arrangement still exists even now, as also in Crete; it is said to have been established in Egypt by the legislation of Sesostris and in Crete by that of Minos.

2 Common meals also seem to be an ancient institution, those in Crete having begun in the reign of Minos, while those in Italy are much older than these. According to the historians one of the settlers there, a certain Italus, became king of Oenotria, and from him they took the name of Italians instead of that of Oenotrians, and the name of Italy was given to all which are separate from each other only 'by turn,' i.e. a citizen passes on from one to the other.

a Perhaps to be read as denying the originality of Plato's Republic.
'Italían toúnoíma labheín ósthe tetoúkhkev éntos óúsa toú kólpou toú Skullhíthikou và toú Lámmíthikou: ápexei dé tauta áp állhílw ódón Ímíseías Íméras. toúton dé légousi tôn 'Italóvn nomádas 3
tous Oínwtrouús óntas pouízai geywryou, và nómuvs állous te autoís théshai và tá sússítia kattasthíai prpwton. dió và vín éti twn áp ékeíwn tíves chrwntai tois sússítiovs và twn nómuw énious. wíkon dé to mév prós tín Turrhíán
Oπíkóù và próteron và vín kaloúmevoi týn
épewnwívan Aúsoves, to dé prós týn 'Iapunýían và
ton 'Íónovn Xówves, týn kaloúménh Óúrtw. hísan
dé và kaí oi Xówves Oínwtroi tó gênos. í mév oûn
twv sússítíwn tázíes éntetbhe gýnove prwton, ò
dé chrwmímos ò kátà gênos toú politéikou plýthous
éz Aínuptou. polú gar ýpertaínei tois chrónios
týn Mínω basíleiaν Í Seswóstrios. schédov mév
óûn và tâ álλa déi nómuízein eúrítshai pólλakis
èn tòv polłw chrónw, mállon ð' ápewrákis: tâ mév
gár anagkaia tîn chréian dídáskein eíkòs aúthîn,
tâ ð' eíz éuvxhísmuynh và periouían úpærchóntwn
'hdh toútwv eúlygon lâmbánein týn aúxhoun: òste
kai tâ peri tòs polítéias oísebhai déi tòn aútwv
èxein prwton. òtì dé pánta árxhai, smheïwv tâ 5
peri Aínuptwv èstwv oûtwi gár árxhíotatoi mév
dokousw eínai, nómuw dé tewukhíkasw (áei)² kai
táxeos polítikhýs. diò déi tois mév eúrhmévnois³

1 Súrtw Goettling. 2 Bernays et Susemihl.
3 Lambinus: eúrhmévnois codd.

---

¹ i.e. the south-west peninsula or toe of Italy.
² i.e. the Gulfs of Squillace and Eufemia.
that promontory \(^a\) of Europe lying between the Gulfs of Scylletium and of Lametus,\(^b\) which are half a day's journey apart. It was this Italus then who according to tradition converted the Oenotrians from a pastoral life to one of agriculture and gave them various ordinances, being the first to institute their system of common meals; hence the common meals and some of his laws are still observed by certain of his successors even to-day. The settlers in the direction of Tyrrhenia \(^c\) were Opicans, who to-day as in former times bear the surname of Ausonians; the region towards Iapygia \(^d\) and the Ionian Gulf, called Syrtis, was inhabited by the Chones, who also were Oenotrians by race. It is from this country that the system of common meals has its origin, while the division of the citizen-body by hereditary caste came from Egypt, for the reign of Sesostris long antedates that of Minos. We may almost take it therefore that all other political devices also have been discovered repeatedly, or rather an infinite number of times over, in the lapse of ages; for the discoveries of a necessary kind are probably taught by need itself, and when the necessaries have been provided it is reasonable that things contributing to refinement and luxury should find their development; so that we must assume that this is the way with political institutions also. The antiquity of all of them is indicated by the history of Egypt; for the Egyptians are reputed to be the oldest of nations, but they have always had laws and a political system. Hence we should use the results of previous dis-

\(^a\) The modern Tuscany, \(i.e.\) the people of Lucania, Campania and Latium.
\(^b\) The south-east promontory or heel of Italy.
ικανῶς χρῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ παραλειμμένα πειράσθαι ζητεῖν.

"Οτι μὲν οὖν δεῖ τὴν χῶραν εἶναι τῶν ὀπλα
κεκτημένων καὶ τῶν τῆς πολιτείας μετεχόντων,
εἰρηται πρότερον, καὶ διότι τοὺς γεωργοῦντας
αὐτῶν ἐτέρους εἶναι δεῖ, καὶ πόσην τινά χρῆ καὶ
ποιαν εἶναι τὴν χῶραν. περὶ δὲ τῆς διανομῆς καὶ τῶν
γεωργοῦντων, τίνας καὶ ποιους εἶναι χρῆ,
λεκτέον πρῶτον, ἐπειδή οὔτε κοινὴν φαμεν εἶναι
δεῖν τὴν κτῆσιν, ὥσπερ τινὲς εἰρήκασιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ
χρῆσει φιλικῶς γινομένην κοινῆν, οὔτ' ἀπορεῖν
οὕθενα τῶν πολιτῶν τροφῆς. περὶ συσσιτίων τέ
συνδοκεῖ πάσι χρῆσιμον εἶναι ταῖς εὐ κατεσκευα-
ασμέναις πόλεων ὑπάρχειν. δι' ἣν δ' αὐτίαν συνδοκεῖ
καὶ ημῖν, ὅστερον ἑροῦμεν. δεὶ δὲ τούτων κοι-
νωνεῖν πάντας τοὺς πολίτας, οὐ βάδιον δὲ τοὺς
ἀπόρους ἀπὸ τῶν ἱδίων τε εἰσφέρειν τό συντεταγ-
μένον καὶ διουκεῖν τὴν ἀλλην οἰκίαν. ἔτι δὲ τὰ 7
πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς δαπανήματα κοινά πάσης τῆς
πόλεως ἐστιν. αναγκαῖον τοῖς εἰς δύο μέρη
dιηρήσασι τὴν χώραν, καὶ τὴν μὲν εἶναι κοινῆν τὴν
dὲ τῶν ἱδωτῶν, καὶ τούτων ἑκατέραν διηρήσασι
dίχα πάλιν, τῆς μὲν κοινῆς τὸ μὲν ἐτέρου μέρος
eἰς τὰς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς λειτουργίας, τὸ δὲ ἐτέρου
εἰς τὴν τῶν συσσιτίων δαπάνην, τῆς τὸ δὲ τῶν
ἱδωτῶν τὸ ἐτέρου μέρος τῷ πρὸς τὰς ἐσχατίας,
ἐτέρον δὲ τοῦ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, ἵνα δύο κληρὼν εκα-
1 τὸ bis del. Richards.

a This vague phrase (based on the proverb κοινὰ τὰ τῶν
φίλων, 'friends' goods are common property') seems to
denote some sort of customary communism in the cultivation
of the land and enjoyment of the produce, combined with
private ownership of the freehold.

582
covery when adequate, while endeavouring to investigate matters hitherto passed over.

It has been stated before that the land ought to be owned by those who possess arms and those who share the rights of the constitution, and why the cultivators ought to be a different caste from these, and what is the proper extent and conformation of the country. We have now to discuss first the allotment of the land, and the proper class and character of its cultivators; since we advocate not common ownership of land, as some have done, but community in it brought about in a friendly way by the use of it, and we hold that no citizen should be ill supplied with means of subsistence. As to common meals, all agree that this is an institution advantageous for well-organized states to possess; our own reasons for sharing this view we will state later. But the common meals must be shared by all the citizens, and it is not easy for the poor to contribute their assessed share from their private means and also to maintain their household as well. And moreover the expenses connected with religion are the common concern of the whole state. It is necessary therefore for the land to be divided into two parts, of which one must be common and the other the private property of individuals; and each of these two divisions must again be divided in two. Of the common land one portion should be assigned to the services of religion, and the other to defray the cost of the common meals; of the land in private ownership one part should be the district near the frontiers, and another the district near the city, in order that

b This promise is not fulfilled.
στὶς νεμηθέντων ἀμφοτέρων τῶν τόπων πάντες μετέχωσιν. τὸ τε γὰρ ἵσον οὔτως ἔχει καὶ τὸ δίκαιον 8 καὶ τὸ πρὸς τοὺς ἀστυγείτονας πολέμους ὀμονοητικώτερον. ὅποιν γὰρ μὴ τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, οἱ μὲν ὀλγοφοροῦσι τῆς πρὸς τοὺς ὄμορους ἐχθρας 20 οἱ δὲ λίαν προντίζουσι καὶ παρὰ τὸ καλὸν. διὸ παρ' ἐνίοις νόμοις ἐστὶ τοὺς γειτνιώντας τοῖς ὄμοροις μὴ συμμετέχειν βουλῆς1 τῶν πρὸς αὐτοὺς πολέμων, ὡς δὲ τὸ ἔδιον οὐκ ἂν δυναμένους βουλεύσασθαι καλῶς. τὴν μὲν οὖν χώραν ἀνάγκη διηρήσθαι 25 τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον διὰ τὰς προειρημένας αἰτίας.

Τοὺς δὲ γεωργήσοντας μάλιστα μὲν, εἰ δεὶ κατ' εὐχήν, δοῦλους εἶναι, μήτε ὀμοφύλων πάντων2 μήτε θυμοειδῶν (οὔτω γὰρ ἂν πρὸς τῇ ἐργασίᾳ εἰλὲν χρήσιμοι καὶ πρὸς τὸ μηδὲν νεωτερίζειν ἁσφαλεῖς), δεύτερον δὲ βαρβάρους3 περιοίκους παραπλησίους 30 τοῖς εἰρημένοις τὴν φύσιν. τούτων δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἱδίους ἐν τοῖς ἱδίοις εἶναι [ἱδίους]4 τῶν κεκτημένων τὰς οὐσίας, τοὺς δ’ ἐπὶ τῇ κοινῇ γῇ κοινοῖς. τίνα δὲ δεὶ τρόπον χρήσαται δοῦλοις, καὶ διότι βέλτιον πάσι τοῖς δοῦλοις ἄθλον προκεῖσθαι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, ύστερον ἐροῦμεν.

Χ. Τὴν δὲ πόλιν ὅτι μὲν δεὶ κοινῇ εἶναι τῆς 85 ἤπειρον τε καὶ τῆς θαλάσσης καὶ τῆς χώρας ἀπάσης ὀμολύως ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων, εἰρηται πρότερον· αὕτης δὲ προσάντης τὴν θέσιν εὐχησθαι δεὶ κατα-

1 βουλῆς <περί> Richards. 2 πάντων <οντων> Richards. 3 βαρβάρους <ῃ> Schneider (cf. 1329 a 27). 4 om. cod. deterior. 5 Immisch: πρὸς αὐτὴν εἶναι codd. 584
two plots may be assigned to each citizen and all may have a share in both districts. This arrangement satisfies equity and justice, and also conduces to greater unanimity in facing border warfare. Where this system is not followed, one set of people are reckless about quarrelling with the neighbouring states, and the other set are too cautious and neglect considerations of honour. Hence some people have a law that the citizens whose land is near the frontier are not to take part in deliberation as to wars against neighbouring states, on the ground that private interest would prevent them from being able to take counsel wisely. The land must therefore be divided up in this manner because of the reasons aforesaid.

Those who are to cultivate the soil should best of all, if the ideal system is to be stated, be slaves, not drawn from people all of one tribe nor of a spirited character (for thus they would be both serviceable for their work and safe to abstain from insurrection), but as a second best they should be alien serfs of a similar nature. Of these labourers those in private employment must be among the private possessions of the owners of the estates, and those working on the common land common property. How slaves should be employed, and why it is advantageous that all slaves should have their freedom set before them as a reward, we will say later.

X. It has been said before that the city should so far as circumstances permit be in communication alike with the mainland, the sea and the whole of its territory. The site of the city itself we must pray that fortune may place on sloping ground, having

* This promise is not fulfilled.
ARISTOTLE

1330a

τυγχάνειν πρὸς τέταρτα βλέποντας, πρῶτον μὲν, ὡς ἀναγκαῖον, πρὸς τὴν υγίειαν (αἱ τε γὰρ πρὸς ἐν τῇ ἐγκλισιν ἐξουσία καὶ πρὸς τὰ πνεῦματα τὰ πνεύματα ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνατολίης ὑγιεινότερα, δεύτερον δὲ κατὰ βορέαν, εὐχείμεροι γὰρ αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον), τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν πρὸς τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις καὶ πολεμικὰς καλῶς ἔχει.¹ πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὰς πολεμικὰς αὐτοῖς μὲν εὐεξοδόν εἶναι χρή, τοῖς δ’ ἐναντίοις δυσπρόσωδοι καὶ δυσπερίληπτοι, ὕδατων τε καὶ ναμάτων μάλιστα μὲν ὑπάρχειν πλῆθος οἰκείων, εἰ δὲ μὴ, τούτῳ γ’ εὐρηταὶ διὰ τοῦ κατα- 

1330b

σκευάζειν ὑποδοχὰς ὁμβρίως ὕδασων ἀφθόνοις καὶ μεγάλας, ὥστε μηδέποτε ὑπολείπειν εἰργομένους τῆς χώρας διὰ πόλεμον. ἔπει δὲ δεὶ περὶ ὑγιείας 3 

φροντίδες τῶν ἐνοικούντων, τούτῳ δ’ ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ 

κείσθαι τὸν τόπον ἐν τε τοιούτῳ καὶ πρὸς τοιούτῳ καλῶς, δεύτερον δὲ ὕδασιν ὑγιεινοῖς χρήσασθαι, καὶ τούτου τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἔχειν μὴ παρέργως. οἷς γὰρ πλείστοις χρώμεθα πρὸς τὸ σώμα καὶ πλείστοις, ταῦτα πλείστον συμβάλλειν πρὸς τὴν 

ὑγιείαν. ἡ δὲ τῶν ὕδατων καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος 

δύναμις τοιαῦτην ἔχει τὴν φύσιν. διότερ ἐν ταῖσ ἐν δορνοῦσαι δεὶ διωρίσθαι πόλεσιν, εἰκὸν μὴ πάνθ’ ὀμοία μηδ’ ἀφθονία τούτων ἡ ναμάτων, χωρίς τὰ τε εἰς τροφήν ὕδατα καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἄλλην χρέιαν. περὶ δὲ τῶν ὕδατων τῶν ἐρυμνῶν οὐ πάσαις 

δομοίως ἔχει τὸ συμφέρον ταῖς πολιτείαις. οἷον 

20 ἀκρόπολις ὀλυγαρχικὸν καὶ μοναρχικὸν, δημο-

¹ Immisch: ἔχειν codd. ² Coraes: μηδ’ codd.

* Apparently (1) fresh air, (2) water supply, (3) administration, (4) military requirements.

586
regard to four considerations: first, as a thing essential, the consideration of health (for cities whose site slopes east or towards the breezes that blow from the sunrise are more healthy, and in the second degree those that face away from the north wind, for these are milder in winter); and among the remaining considerations, a sloping site is favourable both for political and for military purposes. For military purposes therefore the site should be easy of exit for the citizens themselves, and difficult for the adversary to approach and to blockade, and it must possess if possible a plentiful natural supply of pools and springs, but failing this, a mode has been invented of supplying water by means of constructing an abundance of large reservoirs for rain-water, so that a supply may never fail the citizens when they are debarred from their territory by war.

And since we have to consider the health of the inhabitants, and this depends upon the place being well situated both on healthy ground and with a healthy aspect, and secondly upon using wholesome water-supplies, the following matter also must be attended to as of primary importance. Those things which we use for the body in the largest quantity, and most frequently, contribute most to health; and the influence of the water-supply and of the air is of this nature. Hence in wise cities if all the sources of water are not equally pure and there is not an abundance of suitable springs, the water-supplies for drinking must be kept separate from those for other requirements. As to fortified positions, what is expedient is not the same for all forms of constitution alike; for example, a citadel-hill is suitable

* Literally, 'in the direction in which the north wind blows.'
1330 b

κρατικὸν δ' ὁμαλότης, ἀριστοκρατικὸν δ' οὐδέτερον ἄλλα μᾶλλον ἰσχυροὶ τόποι πλείους. ἢ δὲ τῶν ἰδίων οἰκήσεων διάθεσις ἥδιως μὲν νομίζεται καὶ χρησιμωτέρα πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις ἃν εὔτομος ἢ καὶ κατὰ τὸν νεώτερον καὶ τὸν Ἰπποδάμειον τρόπον, πρὸς δὲ τὰς πολεμικὰς ἀσφαλείας τούναντίον ὡς εἰχὼν κατὰ τὸν ἄρχαιον χρόνον. δυσεἰσοδος γὰρ ἐκεῖνη τοῖς ἧ行 καὶ δυσεἰερεύνητος τοῖς ἐπιτιθεμένοις. διὸ δεῖ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων μετέχειν ὅ (ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ἂν τις οὗτως κατασκευᾶτη καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς γεωργίοις ὡς καλοῦσι τινες τῶν ἀμπέλων συστάδας) καὶ τὴν μὲν ὅλην μη ὅποιες πόλεις εὐτομον, κατὰ μέρη δὲ καὶ τόπους οὗτω γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ κόσμου ἔξει καλῶς.

Περὶ δὲ τειχῶν, οἵ μὴ φάσκοντες δεῖν ἔχει τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀντιποιουμένας πόλεις λιαν ἄρχαϊως ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, καὶ ταῦθ ὀρῶντες ἐλεγχομένας ἐργῷ τὰς ἐκεῖνως καλλωπισμένας. ἔστι δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ὁμοίους καὶ μὴ πολὺ τῷ πλήθει διαφέροντας οὐ καλὸν τὸ πειράζοντες σωζέσθαι διὰ τῆς τῶν τειχῶν ἐρυμνότητος. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ συμβαίνειν ἐνδέχεται πλεῖον τὴν ἱπεροχήν γίγνεσθαι τῶν ἐπιστόμων τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὅλιγοις ἀρετῆς, εἰ δεῖ σωζέσθαι καὶ μὴ πᾶσχεν κακῶς

1 δυσεἰσοδος ed. (sic Jackson transpositis δυσεἰσοδος et δυσεἰερεύνητος): δυσεῖδος codd.
3 γεωργίοις Scaliger.
4 sic ? Richards: δε (aut δὲ καὶ) συμβαίνει καὶ ἐνδέχεται codd.
5 τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης Spengel: καὶ τῆς ἀνθ. καὶ codd.

See II. v.

i.e. an enemy’s mercenaries; but the mss. give 'difficult for foreign troops to make sorties from' [i.e. presumably] 588
for oligarchy and monarchy, and a level site for
democracy; neither is favourable to an aristocracy,
but rather several strong positions. The arrange-
ment of the private dwellings is thought to be more
agreeable and more convenient for general purposes
if they are laid out in straight streets, after the
modern fashion, that is, the one introduced by
Hippodamus; but it is more suitable for security in
war if it is on the contrary plan, as cities used to be
in ancient times; for that arrangement is difficult
for foreign troops to enter and to find their way
about in when attacking. Hence it is well to com-
bine the advantages of both plans (for this is possible
if the houses are laid out in the way which among
the farmers some people call 'on the slant' in the
case of vines), and not to lay out the whole city in
straight streets, but only certain parts and districts,
for in this way it will combine security with beauty.

As regards walls, those who aver that cities which
pretend to valour should not have them hold too old-
fashioned a view—and that though they see that the
cities that indulge in that form of vanity are refuted
by experience. It is true that against an evenly
matched foe and one little superior in numbers it is
not honourable to try to secure oneself by the strength
of one's fortifications; but as it may possibly happen
that the superior numbers of the attackers may be
too much for the human valour of a small force, if
the city is to survive and not to suffer disaster or
to find their way out when once they have got in, cf. Thuc.
ii. 4. 2] and for attackers to find their way about in.

The Roman *quincunx*, each plant of one row being in
line with the gap between two plants of the next row,
thus: . . . . . .
Perhaps a word should be added to the Greek giving

590
insult, the securest fortification of walls must be deemed to be the most warlike, particularly in view of the inventions that have now been made in the direction of precision with missiles and artillery for sieges. To claim not to encompass cities with walls is like desiring the country to be easy to invade and stripping it of hilly regions, and similarly not surrounding even private dwellings with house-walls on the ground that the inhabitants will be cowardly. Another point moreover that must not be forgotten is that those who have walls round the city can use their cities in both ways, both as walled cities and as open ones, whereas cities not possessing walls cannot be used in both ways. If then this is so, not only must walls be put round a city, but also attention must be paid to them in order that they may be suitable both in regard to the adornment of the city and in respect of military requirements, especially the new devices recently invented. For just as the attackers of a city are concerned to study the means by which they can gain the advantage, so also for the defenders some devices have already been invented and others they must discover and think out; for people do not even start attempting to attack those who are well prepared.

And since the multitude of citizens must be distributed in separate messes, and the city walls must be divided up by guard-posts and towers in suitable places, it is clear that these facts themselves call for some of the messes to be organized at these guard-posts. These things then might be arranged in this manner. XI. But it is fitting that the dwellings assigned to the gods and the most important of the 'desiring to make the country easy to invade, and to strip it—'.

591
1331 a ἀρμόττει τόπον ἐπιτήδειον τε ἔχειν καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν, ὅσα μὴ τῶν ἱερῶν ὁ νόμος ἀφορίζει χωρίς ἢ τι μαντεῖον ἄλλο πυθόρχηστον. εἰκὴ δ' ἂν τοιοῦτος ὁ τόπος ὁστὶς ἐπιφάνειαν τε ἔχει πρὸς τὴν τῆς θέσεως ἀρετὴν ἢ καὶ πρὸς τὰ γευστικά μέρη τῆς πόλεως ἐρυμνοτέρως. πρέπει δ' ὑπὸ μὲν τοῦτον τὸν τόπον τοιαύτης ἁγορᾶς εἶναι κατα- σκευήν οἶνον καὶ περὶ Θετταλίαν νομίζουσιν ἢν ἐλευθέραιν καλοῦσιν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἢν δεῖ καθαρὰν εἶναι τῶν ὁνίων πάντων καὶ μήτε βάναυσον μήτε γεωργὸν μὴ ἄλλον μηδένα τοιοῦτον παραβάλλειν μὴ καλοῦμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἁρχόντων. εἰκὴ δ' ἂν εὐχαρις ὁ τόπος εἰ καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἔχοι τὴν τάξιν ἑνταῦθα: πρέπει γὰρ διηρήσθαι κατὰ τὰς ἥλικιας καὶ τοῦτον τὸν κόσμον, καὶ παρὰ μὲν τοῖς νεωτέροις ἁρχοντάς τινας δια- τρίβειν, τοὺς δὲ πρεσβυτέρους παρὰ τοῖς ἁρχονσιν· ἢ γὰρ ἐν ὥρθαλμοις τῶν ἁρχόντων παρουσία μάλιστα ἐμποτεί τὴν ἀληθινὴν αἰδῶ καὶ τὸν τῶν ἐλευθέρων φόβον. τὴν δὲ τῶν ὁνίων ἁγορᾶν ἐτέραν τε δεὶ ταύτης εἶναι καὶ χωρίς, ἐχουσαν τόπον εὐθυνάγωγον τοῖς τε ἀπὸ τῆς θαλάττης πεπομένοις καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας πάσιν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ πλῆθος διαιρεῖται τῆς πόλεως εἰς ἱερεῖς καὶ εἰς ἁρχοντας, πρέπει καὶ τῶν ἱερέων συστία περὶ τὴν τῶν ἱερῶν οἰκοδομημάτων ἔχειν τὴν τάξιν. τῶν δ' ἁρχείων ὅσα περὶ τὰ συμβόλαια ποιεῖται τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν, περὶ τε γραφὰς δικών καὶ

1 Lambinus: ἀρετῆς θείου codd. (Ieretelas θείου Jackson).
2 Lambinus: ὄνομάζουσι codd. 3 proestos Newman.
4 καὶ εἰς Thomas Aquinas: εἰς codd.
official messes should have a suitable site, and the same for all, excepting those temples which are assigned a special place apart by the law or else by some utterance of the Pythian oracle. And the site would be suitable if it is one that is sufficiently conspicuous in regard to the excellence of its position, and also of superior strength in regard to the adjacent parts of the city. It is convenient that below this site should be laid out an agora of the kind customary in Thessaly which they call a free agora, that is, one which has to be kept clear of all merchandise and into which no artisan or farmer or any other such person may intrude unless summoned by the magistrates. It would give amenity to the site if the gymnasia of the older men were also situated here—for it is proper to have this institution also divided according to ages, and for certain magistrates to pass their time among the youths while the older men spend theirs with the magistrates; for the presence of the magistrates before men's eyes most engenders true respect and a freeman's awe. The agora for merchandise must be different from the free agora, and in another place; it must have a site convenient for the collection there of all the goods sent from the seaport and from the country. And as the divisions of the state's populace include priests and magistrates, it is suitable that the priests' mess-rooms also should have their position round that of the sacred buildings. And all the magistracies that superintend contracts, and the registration of actions at law, summonses

* Or 'for in this noble practice different ages should be separated' (Jowett).
* Perhaps the Greek should be altered to τὸ προεστός, 'as the governing class is divided into.'
τὰς κλήσεις καὶ τὴν ἄλλην τὴν τοιαύτην διοίκησιν, ἔτι δὲ περὶ τὴν ἀγορανομίαν καὶ τὴν καλομένην
αἰστυνομίαν, πρὸς ἀγορᾶ μὲν δεὶ καὶ συνόδῳ τῶν
κοινῆς κατεσκευάσθαι, τοιοῦτος δὲ ὁ περὶ τὴν ἀναγ-
καίαν ἀγοράν ἐστι τόπος· ἐνσχολάζειν μὲν γὰρ τὴν
ἀνω τίθεμεν, ταύτην δὲ πρὸς τὰς ἀναγκαίας
πράξεις.
Μεμιμήσθαι1 δὲ χρή τὴν εἰρημένην τάξιν καὶ τὰ 4
περὶ τὴν χώραν· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεί τοῖς ἀρχοῦσιν οὐς
καλοῦσιν οὐ μὲν ὑλωροὺς οὐ δὲ ἀγρονόμους καὶ
φυλακτήρια καὶ συσσώτια πρὸς φυλακὴν ἀναγκαῖον
ὑπάρχειν, ἔτι δὲ ἱερὰ κατὰ τὴν χώραν εἶναι νεκ-
μημένα, τὰ μὲν θεοῖς τὰ δὲ ἥρωσιν. ἀλλὰ τὸ
dιατρίβειν νῦν ἄκρυβολογουμένους καὶ λέγοντας
περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀργὸν ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ χαλεπὸν
ἐστὶ τὰ τοιαύτα νοῆσαι, ἀλλὰ ποιῆσαι μᾶλλον· τὸ
μὲν γὰρ λέγειν εὐχῆς ἔργον ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ συμβῆναι
tύχης. διὸ περὶ μὲν τῶν τοιούτων τὸ γε ἐπὶ πλείον
ἀφεύσθω τὰ νῦν.
ΧII. Περὶ δὲ τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῆς, ἐκ τῶν καὶ 1
ἐκ ποίων δεὶ συνεστάναι τὴν μέλλουσαν ἔσεσθαι
πόλιν μακαρίαν καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι2 καλῶς, λεκτέον.
ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ ἐστὶν ἐν οἷς γίγνεται τὸ εὖ πᾶσι, τούτων
δὲ ἐστὶν ἐν μὲν ἐν τῷ τὸν σκοπὸν κεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ
tέλος τῶν πράξεων ὀρθῶς, ἐν δὲ τὰς πρὸς τὸ τέλος
φεροῦσαν πράξεις εὐρίσκειν (ἐνδεχεται γὰρ ταῦτα
καὶ διαφωνεῖν ἄλληλοι καὶ συμφωνεῖν· ἐνίοτε γὰρ
ὁ μὲν σκοπὸς ἐκκείται καλῶς ἐν δὲ τῷ πράττειν
τοῦ τυχεῖν αὐτοῦ διαμαρτάνουσιν, ἐνίοτε δὲ τῶν

1 νεμεμήθαι ΓΜΡ. 2 Coraes: πολιτεύεσθαι codd.
and other such matters of administration, and also those that deal with the control of the markets and with what is termed policing the city, should have buildings adjacent to an agora or some public place of resort, and such a place is the neighbourhood of the business agora, for we assign the upper agora as the place in which to spend leisure, and this one for necessary business.

The arrangements in the country also should copy the plan described; there too the magistrates called in some states Wardens of the Woods and in others Land-superintendents must have their guard-posts and mess-rooms for patrol duty, and also temples must be distributed over the country, some dedicated to gods and some to heroes. But to linger at this point over the detailed statement and discussion of questions of this kind is waste of time. The difficulty with such things is not so much in the matter of theory but in that of practice; to lay down principles is a work of aspiration, but their realization is the task of fortune. Hence we will relinquish for the present the further consideration of matters of this sort.

We must now discuss the constitution itself, and ask what and of what character should be the components of the state that is to have felicity and good government. There are two things in which the welfare of all men consists: one of these is the correct establishment of the aim and end of their actions, the other the ascertainment of the actions leading to that end. (For the end proposed and the means adopted may be inconsistent with one another, as also they may be consistent; sometimes the aim has been correctly proposed, but people fail to achieve it in action, sometimes they achieve all
μὲν πρὸς τὸ τέλος πάντων ἐπιτυγχάνοντι ἄλλα τὸ τέλος ἑλθείτο φαύλον, ὅτε δὲ ἐκατέρου διαμαρτ. 
85 τάνουσιν, οἷον περὶ ἱστρικὴν—οὕτε γὰρ ποιόν τι δεί τὸ υγιαίνων εἶναι σῶμα κρίνοντων ἐνιστε καλῶς
οὕτε πρὸς τὸν ὑποκείμενον αὕτως ὅρον τυγχάνοναι
tῶν ποιητικῶν. δεὶ δ’ ἐν ταῖς τέχναις καὶ ἐπιστήμαις ταύτα ἀμφότερα κρατεῖσθαι, τὸ τέλος καὶ
tάς εἰς τὸ τέλος πράξεισ). οἳ μὲν οὖν τοῦ τ’ εὖ 2
ζήν καὶ τῆς εὐδαμονίας ἐφείσται πάντες φανερῶν,
ἀλλὰ τούτων τοῖς μὲν ἐξουσία τυγχάνειν, τοῖς δὲ
οὐ, διὰ τινα τύχην ἡ φύσιν (δεῖται γὰρ καὶ χορηγίας
τινὸς τὸ ζῆν καλῶς, τούτου δὲ ἐλάπτουν μὲν
τοῖς ἀμείνων διακειμένων πλείωσος δὲ τοῖς χειρον),
oi δ’ εὐθὺς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ζητοῦσι τὴν εὐδαμονίαν
ἐξουσίας ὑπαρχοῦσης. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ προκείμενον ἐστι
5 τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ἱδεῖν, αὕτη δ’ ἐστί καθ’ ἣν
ἀριστ’, ἀν πολιτεύοντο πόλις, ἀριστά δ’ ἄν πολιτεύοντο καθ’ ἣν εὐδαμονεῖν μᾶλλον ἐνδέχεται τὴν
πόλιν, δῆλον ὅτι τὴν εὐδαμονίαν δεὶ τί ἐστι μὴ
λανθάνειν. φαμέν δὲ (καὶ διωρίσμεθα ἐν τοῖς
3 θύμιος, εἰ τὶ τῶν λόγων ἕκεινων ὀφελος) ἐνέργειαν
10 εἶναι καὶ χρῆσιν ἀρετῆς τελείαν, καὶ ταύτην 2 οὐκ
ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀλλ’ ἀπλῶς. λέγω δ’ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως
τάναγκαια, τὸ δ’ ἀπλῶς τὸ καλῶς. οἴον τὰ περὶ
tὰς δικαιὰς πράξεις, αἱ 4 δίκαιαι τιμωρίαι 4 καὶ
κολάσεις ἀπ’ ἀρετῆς μὲν εἰσιν, ἀναγκαῖαι δέ, καὶ
τὸ καλῶς ἀναγκαῖως ἑχοῦσιν (ἀἱρετῶτερον μὲν
5 1 ταύτης Schneider.
2 ταύτης ? Stahr. 3 αἱ <γὰρ> Reiz.
4 πράξεις διὰ τὰς τιμωρίας Jackson. 5 [μὲν] Coraes.

a i.e. they misconceive the nature of happiness and select the wrong thing to aim at.
596
the means successfully but the end that they posited was a bad one, and sometimes they err as to both—for instance, in medicine practitioners are sometimes both wrong in their judgement of what qualities a healthy body ought to possess and unsuccessful in hitting on effective means to produce the distinctive aim that they have set before them; whereas in the arts and sciences both these things have to be secured, the end and the practical means to the end.) Now it is clear that all men aim at the good life and at happiness, but though some possess the power to attain these things, some do not, owing to some factor of fortune or of nature (because the good life needs also a certain equipment of means, and although it needs less of this for men of better natural disposition it needs more for those of worse); while others, although they have the power, go wrong at the start in their search for happiness. But the object before us is to discern the best constitution, and this is the one under which a state will be best governed, and a state will be best governed under the constitution under which it has the most opportunity for happiness; it is therefore clear that we must know what happiness is. The view that we maintain (and this is the definition that we laid down in Ethics, if those discourses are of any value) is that happiness is the complete activity and employment of virtue, and this not conditionally but absolutely. When I say ‘conditionally’ I refer to things necessary, by ‘absolutely’ I mean ‘nobly’: for instance, to take the case of just actions, just acts of vengeance and of punishment spring it is true from virtue, but are necessary, and have the quality of nobility only in a limited manner (since it would be preferable that
15 γάρ μηθενός δείσθαι τῶν τοιούτων μήτε τὸν ἄνδρα μήτε τὴν πόλιν), αἱ δ' ἐπὶ τὰς τιμὰς καὶ τὰς εὐπορίας ἀπλῶς εἰσὶ κάλλισται πράξεις· τὸ μὲν γάρ ἐτερον κακοῦ τινὸς ἀναίρεσις ἐστὶν, αἱ τοιαύτη τὲ πράξεις τούναντίον, κατασκευαὶ γὰρ ἀγαθῶν εἰσὶ καὶ γεννήσεις. χρῆσαιτο δ' ἂν ὁ σπουδαῖος 4
20 ἀνήρ καὶ πενία καὶ νόσῳ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τύχαις ταῖς φαύλαις καλῶς, ἄλλα τὸ μακάριον ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἐστὶν (καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο διώρισται κατὰ τοὺς ἥθικους λόγους, ὅτι τοιοῦτος ἐστιν ὁ σπουδαῖος ὥ διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀγαθῶς ἐστὶ τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθά, δήλον δ' ὅτι καὶ τὰς χρήσεις ἀναγκαίον
25 σπουδαίας καὶ καλὰς εἶναι ταύτας ἀπλῶς): διὸ καὶ νομίζων ἄνθρωποι τῆς εὐδαμονίας αὐτὰ tά ἔκτος εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὡσπερ εἰ τοῦ κιθαρίζων λαμπρῶν καὶ καλῶς αἰτιῶντο τὴν λύραν μᾶλλον τῆς τέχνης. ἀναγκαίοι τοῖνυν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν τὰ δὲ παρασκευάζοι τὸν νομοθέτην.
30 διὸ κατατυχεῖν εὐχόμεθα τὴν τῆς πόλεως σύστασιν ὅν ἡ τύχη κυρία (κυρίαν γὰρ αὐτὴν ὑπάρχειν τίθεμεν): τὸ δὲ σπουδαίον εἶναι τὴν πόλιν οὐκέτι τύχης ἔργον, ἀλλ' ἐπιστήμης καὶ προαιρέσεως. ἀλλά μὴν σπουδαία πόλις ἐστὶ τῶν πολιτῶν μετέχοντας τῆς πολιτείας εἶναι σπουδαίους.
35 ἦμιν δὲ πάντες οἱ πολίται μετέχουσι τῆς πολιτείας. τοὺτ' ἄρα σκεπτοῦν, πῶς ἄνήρ γίνεται σπουδαῖος. καὶ γὰρ εἰ πάντας ἐνδέχεται σπουδαίους εἶναι μὴ
1 προεδρίας Jackson. 2 ἀναίρεσις Schneider: αἰρεσίς codd. 3 Reiz: τὰ ἀγαθὰ codd. 4 Muret: αἰτιῶντο codd. 5 Coraes: κατ' εὐχήν codd.

A conjectural emendation gives 'distinctions.'
598

This is a conjectural emendation; the mss. give 'the adoption.'

Eth. Nic. 1113 a 15 ff.
neither individual nor state should have any need of such things), whereas actions aiming at honours and resources are the noblest actions absolutely; for the former class of acts consist in the removal of something evil, but actions of the latter kind are the opposite—they are the foundation and the generation of things good. The virtuous man will use even poverty, disease, and the other forms of bad fortune in a noble manner, but felicity consists in their opposites (for it is a definition established by our ethical discourses that the virtuous man is the man of such a character that because of his virtue things absolutely good are good to him, and it is therefore clear that his employment of these goods must also be virtuous and noble absolutely); and hence men actually suppose that external goods are the cause of happiness, just as if they were to assign the cause of a brilliantly fine performance on the harp to the instrument rather than to the skill of the player. It follows therefore from what has been said that some goods must be forthcoming to start with and others must be provided by the legislator. Hence we pray that the organization of the state may be successful in securing those goods which are in the control of fortune (for that fortune does control external goods we take as axiomatic); but when we come to the state’s being virtuous, to secure this is not the function of fortune but of science and policy. But then the virtue of the state is of course caused by the citizens who share in its government being virtuous; and in our state all the citizens share in the government. The point we have to consider therefore is, how does a man become virtuous? For even if it be possible for the citizens to be virtuous...
ARISTOTLE

1332 a  καθ' ἐκαστον δὲ τῶν πολιτῶν, οὐτως αἱρετῶτερον· ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ τῷ καθ' ἐκαστον καὶ τὸ πάντας· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθοὶ γε καὶ σπουδαῖοι γίγνονται διὰ τινὰ τριῶν· τὰ τρία δὲ ταῦτα ἐστὶ φύσις ἔδος λόγος. καὶ γὰρ φῦναι δεῖ πρῶτον οἷον ἄνθρωπον ἀλλὰ μὴ τῶν ἄλλων τι ζῷων, εἴτα1 καὶ ποιὸν τινα τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν. ἐναὶ τε οὐθὲν ὀφελος φῦναι, τὰ γὰρ ἐθή μεταβαλεῖν ποιεῖ· ἐναὶ γὰρ ἐστὶ διὰ τῆς φύσεως ἐπαμφοτερίζοντα διὰ τῶν ἐθῶν ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα τῶν ζῴων μάλιστα μὲν τῇ φύσει ἥν, μικρὰ δὲ ἐναὶ καὶ τοῖς ἐθεσιν, ἄνθρωπος δὲ καὶ λόγω, μόνον γὰρ ἐχει λόγον· ὡστε δεῖ ταῦτα συμφωνεῖν ἀλλήλως· πολλὰ γὰρ παρὰ τοὺς ἐθισμοὺς καὶ τὴν φύσιν πράττουσι διὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐκ πεισθὼς ἄλλως ἐχει βέλτιον. Τὴν μὲν τοῖνυν φύσιν οἷον εἶναι δεῖ τοὺς μέλλοντας εὐχειρώτους ἐσεθαί τῷ νομοθέτῃ, διωρίσμεθα πρότερον, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἔργων ἦδη παιδείας· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐθισμοὶν μανθάνουσι, τὰ δὲ ἀκούοντες. Ἡ. Ἑπεὶ δὲ πᾶσα πολιτικὴ κοινωνία συν- ἐστικεν ἐξ ἀρχόντων καὶ ἀρχόμενων, τοῦτο δὴ σκεπτέον, εἰ ἐτέρους εἶναι δεῖ τοὺς ἀρχόντας καὶ τοὺς ἀρχόμενους ἢ τοὺς αὐτοὺς διὰ βίου· δὴ λοις γὰρ ὡς ἀκολουθεῖν δεῖσι καὶ τὴν παιδείαν κατὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν ταύτην. εἰ μὲν τοῖνυν εἴησαν τοσοῦτον

1 mg. cod. inferior: οὗτος cet. 2 ἦδη I'M.

a In c. vi.
collectively without being so individually, the latter is preferable, since for each individual to be virtuous entails as a consequence the collective virtue of all. But there are admittedly three things by which men are made good and virtuous, and these three things are nature, habit and reason. For to start with, one must be born with the nature of a human being and not of some other animal; and secondly, one must be born of a certain quality of body and of soul. But there are some qualities that it is of no use to be born with, for our habits make us alter them; some qualities in fact are made by nature liable to be modified by the habits in either direction, for the worse or for the better. Now the other animals live chiefly by nature, though some in small degrees are guided by habits too; but man lives by reason also, for he alone of animals possesses reason; so that in him these three things must be in harmony with one another; for men often act contrary to their acquired habits and to their nature because of their reason, if they are convinced that some other course of action is preferable.

Now we have already defined the proper natural character of those who are to be amenable to the hand of the legislator; what now remains is the task of education, for men learn some things by practice, others by precept.

XIII. But since every political community is composed of rulers and subjects, we must therefore consider whether the rulers and the subjects ought to change, or to remain the same through life; for it is clear that their education also will have to be made to correspond with this distribution of functions. If then it were the case that the one class differed from
Aristotle

1332 b

diaφέροντες ἀπεροί τῶν ἄλλων ὅσον τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἡρωᾶς ἡγοῦμεθα τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφέρειν, εὐθὺς πρῶτον κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πολλῆν ἔχοντες

20 ὑπερβολὴν, εἶτα κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν, ὡστε ἀναμφισβήτητον εἶναι καὶ φανερὰν τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῖς ἀρχομένοις τὴν τῶν ἀρχόντων, δῆλον ὅτι βέλτιον ἄει τοὺς αὐτοὺς τοὺς μὲν ἄρχειν τοὺς δ’ ἀρχεσθαι καθάπαξ ἐπεὶ δὲ τούτ’ οὐ γάρ δοὺν λαβεῖν οὐδ’ ἔστιν 2 ὡσπερ ἐν Ἰνδοῖς φησί Σκύλαξ εἶναι τοὺς βασιλέας
tossoúton diaφéron tas τῶν ἀρχομένων, φανερὸν ὅτι διὰ πολλὰς αἰτίας ἀναγκαῖον πάντας ὁμοίως κοινωνεῖν τοῦ κατὰ μέρος ἄρχειν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι. τὸ τε γὰρ ἵσον2 ταύτων τοὺς ὁμοίως, καὶ χαλεπῶν μένειν τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν συνεστηκυίαν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον. μετὰ γὰρ τῶν ἀρχομένων ὑπάρχουσι νεωτερίζειν βουλόμενοι πάντες οἱ κατὰ τὴν χώραν, τοσσοῦτος τε εἶναι τοὺς ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι τὸ πλῆθος ὅστ’ εἶναι κρείττους πάντων τούτων ἐν τῷ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστὶν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι γε 3 δεῖ τοὺς ἀρχοπτας διαφέρειν τῶν ἀρχομένων ἀναμφισβήτητον. πῶς οὖν ταύτ’ ἐσται καὶ πῶς μεθ-έξουσι δεὶ σκέφασθαι τὸν νομοθέτην. ἐφηται δὲ πρότερον περὶ αὐτοῦ. ἢ γὰρ φύσις δὲδωκε τῇ διαίρεσιν3 ποιήσασα αὐτῷ τῷ γένει ταύτῳ τὸ μὲν νεώτερον τὸ δὲ πρεσβύτερον, ὅν τοῖς μὲν ἀρ-χεσθαι πρέπει, τοῖς δ’ ἄρχειν ἀγανακτεῖ δὲ ὀὐδεὶς καθ’ ἡλικίαν ἀρχόμενος, οὐδὲ νομίζει εἶναι κρείτ-των, ἄλλως τε καὶ μέλλων ἀντιλαμβάνειν τούτον

1 Richards: ἔχοντες codd.
2 ἵσον <δίκαιον καὶ> Richards.
3 Aretinus: αἱρεῖν codd.
4 τότε μὲν—τότε δὲ MP1.

The emendation suggested by Richards gives 'For
the other as widely as we believe the gods and heroes to differ from mankind, having first a great superiority in regard to the body and then in regard to the soul, so that the pre-eminence of the rulers was indisputable and manifest to the subjects, it is clear that it would be better for the same persons always to be rulers and subjects once for all; but as this is not easy to secure, and as we do not find anything corresponding to the great difference that Scylax states to exist between kings and subjects in India, it is clear that for many reasons it is necessary for all to share alike in ruling and being ruled in turn. For equality means for persons who are alike identity of status, and also it is difficult for a constitution to endure that is framed in contravention of justice. For all the people throughout the country are ranged on the side of the subject class in wishing for a revolution, and it is a thing inconceivable that those in the government should be sufficiently numerous to over-power all of these together. But yet on the other hand that the rulers ought to be superior to the subjects cannot be disputed; therefore the lawgiver must consider how this is to be secured, and how they are to participate in the government. And this has been already discussed. Nature has given the distinction by making the group that is itself the same in race partly younger and partly older, of which two sets it is appropriate to the one to be governed and for the other to govern; and no one chafes or thinks himself better than his rulers when he is governed on the ground of age, especially as he is going to get back what he has thus contributed to the common equality and identity (of status) are just for persons who are alike, and it is difficult, etc.
The sentence here breaks off into a long parenthesis, after which it is not resumed.
stock when he reaches the proper age. In a sense therefore we must say that the rulers and ruled are the same, and in a sense different. Hence their education also is bound to be in one way the same and in another different. For he who is to be a good ruler must have first been ruled, as the saying is (and government, as has been said in the first discourses, is of two sorts, one carried on for the sake of the ruler and the other for the sake of the subject; of these the former is what we call the rule of a master, the latter is the government of free men. . . .

But some of the commands given differ not in nature of the services commanded but in their object. Hence a number of what are thought to be menial services can be honourably performed even by freemen in youth; since in regard to honour and dishonour actions do not differ so much in themselves as in their end and object). But since we say that the goodness of a citizen and ruler are the same as that of the best man, and that the same person ought to become a subject first and a ruler afterwards, it will be important for the legislator to study how and by what courses of training good men are to be produced, and what is the end of the best life.

The soul is divided into two parts, of which one is in itself possessed of reason, while the other is not rational in itself but capable of obeying reason. To these parts in our view belong those virtues in accordance with which a man is pronounced to be good in some way. But in which of these two parts the end of man rather resides, those who define the

\[6\]

One sentence or more has been lost here.

\[d\] Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give 'of the best citizen.'
 overturns it, since as we have said, the two lower ones, the three being the activities of the theoretic reason, of the practical reason, and of the passions that although irrational are amenable to reason.
parts of the soul in accordance with our view will have no doubt as to how they should decide. The worse always exists as a means to the better, and this is manifest alike in the products of art and in those of nature; but the rational part of the soul is better than the irrational. And the rational part is subdivided into two, according to our usual scheme of division; for reason is of two kinds, practical and theoretic, so that obviously the rational part of the soul must also be subdivided accordingly. A corresponding classification we shall also pronounce to hold among its activities: the activities of the part of the soul that is by nature superior must be preferable for those persons who are capable of attaining either all the soul's activities or two out of the three; since that thing is always most desirable for each person which is the highest to which it is possible for him to attain. Also life as a whole is divided into business and leisure, and war and peace, and our actions are aimed some of them at things necessary and useful, others at things noble. In these matters the same principle of preference that applies to the parts of the soul must apply also to the activities of those parts: war must be for the sake of peace, business for the sake of leisure, things necessary and useful for the purpose of things noble. The statesman therefore must legislate with all these considerations in view, both in respect of the parts of the soul and of their activities, and aiming more particularly at the greater goods and the ends. And the same principle applies in regard to modes of life and choices of conduct: a man should be capable of engaging in business and war, but still more capable of living in peace and leisure; and he should do what is neces-

1
2
3
The chief aim is training for leisure and peace.
καὶ τάναγκαια καὶ τὰ χρήσιμα δὲ
πράττεν, τὰ
dὲ καλὰ δεὶ μάλλον. ὥστε πρὸς τούτοις τοὺς
σκοποὺς καὶ πᾶδας ἐτί ὄντας παιδευτέουν καὶ τὰς
ἀλλὰ ἥλικίας ὃσαι δέονται παιδείας. οἱ δὲ νῦν
ἀριστα δοκοῦντες πολιτεύσθαι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ
tῶν νομοθετῶν οἱ ταύτας καταστήσαντες τὰς
πολιτείας, οὔτε πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον τέλος φαίνονται
συντάξαντες τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας οὔτε πρὸς
πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν παιδείαν,
ἀλλὰ φορτικῶς ἀπέκλιναν πρὸς τὰς χρησίμους
eἶναι δοκούσας καὶ πλεονεκτικωτέρας. παραπλη-
σίως δὲ τούτους καὶ τῶν ὕστερον τινες γραφαντῶν
ἀπεφήγαντο τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν. ἔπαινοντες γὰρ τὴν
Λακεδαίμωνις πολιτείαν ἤγαντο τοῖς νομοθέτοις
tῶν σκοπὸν ὅτι πάντα πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν καὶ πρὸς
πόλεμον ἐνομοθέτησεν. δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον
ἔστιν εὐελεγκτα καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις ἐξελήθηκαται νῦν.
ὡσπερ γὰρ οἱ πλείστοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔτοιμοι τὸ
πολλῶν δεσπόζειν ὅτι πολλῆς χορηγία γίγνεται τῶν
eὐτυχιμάτων, οὕτω καὶ Θάγρων ἀγάμενος φαίνεται
tῶν τῶν Λακώνων νομοθέτην καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
ἐκαστὸς τῶν γραφόντων περὶ τῆς πολιτείας
ἀυτῶν ὅτι διὰ τὸ γεγυμνάσθαι πρὸς τοὺς κυιδύ-
νους πολλῶν Ἰρχον. καὶ τῶν δὴλον ὡς ἐπειδὴ νῦν
γε οὐκέτι ὑπάρχει τοῖς Λάκωσι τὸ ἄρχειν, οὐκ
εὐδαίμονες, οὔτε ο νομοθέτης ἄγαθός. ἔστι δὲ
tοῦτο γελοῖον, εἰ μένοντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις αὐτοῦ,
kai μηδὲν τὸν εἰποδίζοντος πρὸς τὸ χρησθαι τοῖς
νόμοις, ἀποβεβλήκασι τὸ ἔθνη καλῶς. οὐκ ὅρθος

1 om. ΓΜΡ: δὲ? Stahr.
2 peri tῆς Schneider: peri codd.
3 Congreves: ἔτι codd.
sary and useful, but still more should he do what is noble. These then are the aims that ought to be kept in view in the education of the citizens both while still children and at the later ages that require education. But the Greek peoples reputed at the present day to have the best constitutions, and the lawgivers that established them, manifestly did not frame their constitutional systems with reference to the best end, nor construct their laws and their scheme of education with a view to all the virtues, but they swerved aside in a vulgar manner towards those excellences that are supposed to be useful and more conducive to gain. And following the same lines as they, some later writers also have pronounced the same opinion: in praising the Spartan constitution they express admiration for the aim of its founder on the ground that he framed the whole of his legislation with a view to conquest and to war.

These views are easy to refute on theoretical grounds and also have now been refuted by the facts of history. For just as most of mankind covet being master of many servants because this produces a manifold supply of fortune’s goods, so Thibron and all the other writers about the Spartan constitution show admiration for the lawgiver of the Spartans because owing to their having been trained to meet dangers they governed a wide empire. Yet it clearly follows that since as a matter of fact at the present day the Spartans no longer possess an empire, they are not happy, and their lawgiver was not a good one. And it is ridiculous that although they have kept to his laws, and although nothing hinders their observing the laws, they have lost the noble life. Also

\[ a \text{ Or possibly, ‘covet a wide empire.’} \quad b \text{ Unknown.} \]
ARISTOTLE

1333 b

δ' ὑπολαμβάνονσιν οὐδὲ περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἢν δεῖ
tιμῶντα φαίνεσθαι τὸν νομοθέτην· τοῦ γὰρ δεσπο-
tικῶς ἄρχειν ἢ τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἄρχη καλλίων καὶ
μᾶλλον μετ’ ἀρετῆς. ἐτὶ δ’ οὐ διὰ τοῦτο δεῖ τὴν 13

80 πόλιν εὐδαιμόνα νομίζειν καὶ τὸν νομοθέτην ἐπι-
αινεῖν, ὅτι κρατεῖν¹ ἦσκησεν ἐπὶ τὸ τῶν πέλας
ἀρχεῖν· ταῦτα γὰρ μεγάλην ἔχει βλάβην, δῆλον
gὰρ ὅτι καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν τῶν δυναμένων τοῦτο πει-
ρατέον διώκειν, ὅπως δύνηται τῆς οἰκείας πόλεως
ἀρχεῖν· ὀπέρ ἐγκαλοῦσιν οἱ Λάκωνες Παυσανία

85 τῷ βασιλεῖ, καὶ περ ἔχοντι τηλικαύτην τιμῆν. οὐτὲ
ὅτι πολιτικὸς τῶν τοιούτων λόγων καὶ νόμων
οὐθεὶς οὔτε ὕφελιμος οὔτε ἀληθῆς ἐστιν· ταῦτα
gὰρ ἀριστα καὶ ἴδια καὶ κοινῆ, τὸν τε νομοθέτην
ἐμποιεῖν δεῖ ταῦτα ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων. 14

τὴν τε τῶν πολεμικῶν ἀσκησιν οὐ τοῦτον χάριν

40 δεὶ μελετᾶν, ἵνα καταδουλώσωσιν τοὺς ἀναξίους,
ἀλλ’ ἵνα πρῶτον μὲν αὐτοὶ μὴ δουλεύσωσιν ἐτέροις,

1334 a ἐπιταῦ ὅπως ζητῶ σιν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τῆς ὑφελείας
ἐνεκα τῶν ἁρχομένων, ἀλλὰ μὴ πάντων δεσπο-
τείας· τρίτων δὲ τὸ ² δεσπόζειν τῶν ἁξίων δουλεύειν.
ὅτι δὲ δεὶ τοῦ νομοθέτην μᾶλλον σπουδάζειν ὅπως 15
καὶ τὴν περὶ τὰ πολεμικὰ καὶ τὴν ἅλλην νομοθεσίαν

5 τοῦ σχολάζειν ἐνεκεν τάξη καὶ τῆς εἰρήνης,
μαρτυρεῖ τὰ γυγνόμενα τοῖς λόγοις· αἱ γὰρ πλεῖσται
τῶν τοιούτων πόλεων πολεμοῦσι μὲν σῷζονται,
κατακτησάμεναι δὲ τὴν ἁρχὴν ἀπολλυνται· τὴν

¹ [κρατεῖν] Reiz. ² τὸν <τε> Thurot: τὸν codd.
³ τῶ Victorius: τοῦ Coraes.
writers have a wrong conception of the power for which the lawgiver should display esteem; to govern freemen is nobler and more conjoined with virtue than to rule despotically. And again it is not a proper ground for deeming a state happy and for praising its lawgiver, that it has practised conquest with a view to ruling over its neighbours. This principle is most disastrous; it follows from it that an individual citizen who has the capacity ought to endeavour to attain the power to hold sway over his own city; but this is just what the Spartans charge as a reproach against their king Pausanias, although he attained such high honour. No principle therefore and no law of this nature is either statesmanlike or profitable, nor is it true; the same ideals are the best both for individuals and for communities, and the lawgiver should endeavour to implant them in the souls of mankind. The proper object of practising military training is not in order that men may enslave those who do not deserve slavery, but in order that first they may themselves avoid becoming enslaved to others; then so that they may seek suzerainty for the benefit of the subject people, but not for the sake of world-wide despotism; and thirdly to hold despotic power over those who deserve to be slaves. Experience supports the testimony of theory, that it is the duty of the lawgiver rather to study how he may frame his legislation both with regard to warfare and in other departments for the object of leisure and of peace. Most military states remain safe while at war but perish when they have won their empire; in peace-time they lose

* A probable emendation gives 'that he has trained it with a view to ruling.'
γαρ βαφήν ἀφιάσων, ἵστερ δ' σιδηρός, εἰρήνην ἀγοντες. αὐτίος δ' ὁ νομοθέτης οὐ παιδεύσας δύνασθαι σχολάζειν.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τέλος εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ κοινὴ, καὶ ἱδίᾳ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ὅρον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τῷ τε ἀρίστῳ ἀνδρὶ καὶ τῇ ἀρίστῃ πολιτείᾳ, φανερὸν ὃτι δεῖ τὰς εἰς τὴν σχολὴν ἄρετὰς ὑπάρχειν· τέλος γὰρ, ὡσπερ εἰρηταὶ πολλάκις, εἰρήνη μὲν πολέμου, σχολὴ δ' ἀσχολίας. χρήσιμοι δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν εἰσὶ πρὸς τὴν σχολὴν καὶ διαγωγὴν ὅτι τε ἐν τῇ σχολῇ τὸ ἔργον καὶ ὅν ἐν τῇ ἁγιολίᾳ, δεῖ γὰρ πολλὰ τῶν ἀναγκαיהν ὑπάρχειν ὅπως ἔξαγγελοι. διὸ σώφρονα τὴν πόλιν εἶναι προσήκει καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ καρτερικῆν· κατὰ γὰρ τὴν παρομίαν, οὐ σχολὴ δουλοῖς, οὐ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενοι κινοῦντες ἀνδρεῖς δουλοὶ τῶν ἐπιόντων εἰσίν. ἀνδρίας μὲν οὖν καὶ καρτερίας δεῖ πρὸς τὴν ἁγιολίαν, φιλοσοφίας δὲ πρὸς τὴν σχολὴν, σωφροσύνης δὲ καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἐν ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς χρόνοις, καὶ μᾶλλον εἰρήνην ἄγοντι καὶ σχολάζοντος· οὐ μὲν γὰρ πόλεμος ἀναγκάζει δικαιότητα εἶναι καὶ σωφροσύνη, ἵ δὲ τῆς εὐτυχίας ἀπολαύσοι καὶ τὸ σχολάζειν μετ’ εἰρήνης ὑβριστὰς ποιεῖ μᾶλλον. πολλῆς οὖν δεῖ δικαιοσύνης καὶ πολλῆς σωφροσύνης τοὺς ἁρισταὶ δοκοῦντας πράττειν καὶ πάντων τῶν μακραίζομένων ἀπολαύσων, οἴον εἰ τινὲς εἰσίν, ὡσπερ οἱ ποιηταὶ φασίν, ἐν μακάρων νήσοις· μάλιστα γὰρ οὗτοι δεήσονται φιλοσοφίας καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης, ὃσι

1 ὑπερέχειν Susemihl.
2 [σώφρονα] Susemihl.
3 σωφροσύνης <μετέχειν> Coraes, <τυχάνειν> Richards.

612
their keen temper, like iron. The lawgiver is to blame, because he did not educate them to be able to employ leisure.

16. And since it appears that men have the same end both collectively and individually, and since the same distinctive aim must necessarily belong both to the best man and to the best government, it is clear that the virtues relating to leisure are essential; since, as has been said repeatedly, peace is the end of war, leisure of business. But the virtues useful for leisure and for its employment are not only those that operate during leisure but also those that operate in business; for many of the necessaries must needs be forthcoming to give us opportunity for leisure. Therefore it is proper for the state to be temperate, brave and enduring; since, as the proverb goes, there is no leisure for slaves, but people unable to face danger bravely are the slaves of their assailants. Therefore courage and fortitude are needed for business, love of wisdom for leisure, temperance and justice for both seasons, and more especially when men are at peace and have leisure; for war compels men to be just and temperate, whereas the enjoyment of prosperity and peaceful leisure tend to make them insolent. Therefore much justice and much temperance are needed by those who are deemed very prosperous and who enjoy all the things counted as blessings, like the persons, if such there be, as the poets say, that dwell in the Islands of the Blest; these will most need wisdom, temperance and

* i.e. an iron blade when not used loses keenness and has to be re-tempered.
* i.e. to the state as well as to the individual.
μᾶλλον σχολάζουσιν ἐν ἀφθονίᾳ τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθῶν. διότι μὲν οὖν τὴν μέλλουσαν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ σπουδαίαν ἐσεσθαι πόλιν τούτων δει τῶν ἀρετῶν μετέχειν, φανερόν· αὐτῷ όρον ὄντος μὴ δύνασθαι χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ἔτι μᾶλλον μὴ δύνασθαι ἐν τῷ σχολάζειν χρῆσθαι, ἀλλὰ ἀσχολοῦντας μὲν καὶ πολεμοῦντας φαίνεσθαι ἄγαθοῖς, εἰρήνην δὲ ἀγοντας καὶ σχολάζοντας ἀνδραποδῶν δεις. διὸ δεῖ μὴ καθάπερ ἡ Δακεδαιμονίων πόλις 20 τῇ ἀρετῇν ἀσκεῖν. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ οὐ ταύτῃ διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων, τῷ μὴ νομίζειν ταύτα τοῖς ἄλλοις μεγίστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἀλλὰ τῷ γίνεσθαι ταύτα μᾶλλον διὰ τῶν ἀρετήσι· ἐπεὶ δὲ μείζω τε ἀγαθὰ ταύτα καὶ τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν τῆς τούτων ἡ τῆς τῶν ἀρετῶν . . .

5 . . . 3 καὶ ὅτι διὰ αὐτῆν, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων· τῶν 21 δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν ἔσται, τοῦτο δὴ θεωρητέον. τυγχάνομεν δὴ διηρημένοι πρότερον ὅτι φύσεως καὶ ἔθους καὶ λόγου δει· τούτων δὲ ποῖος μὲν τίνας εἶναι χρῆ τὴν φύσιν, διώρισται πρότερον, λοιπὸν δὲ θεωρῆσαι πότερον παιδευτέοι τῷ λόγῳ 10 πρότερον ἡ τοῖς ἔθεσιν. ταύτα γὰρ δεῖ πρὸς ἀλληλα συμφωνεῖν συμφωνιὰς τὴν ἀριστην· ἐν- δέχεται ταί γὰρ διημαρτηκέναι καὶ τὸν λόγον τῆς βελτιστησίας ὑποθέσεως καὶ διὰ τῶν ἔθων ὄμοιως ἥχθαι. φανερὸν δὴ τοῦτο γε πρῶτον μὲν, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς 22 ἄλλοις, ὡς ἡ γένεσις ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς ἐστὶ 5 καὶ τὸ τέλος

1 <τοῦ> μὴ Richards. 2 Schneider: γενέσθαι codd. 3 lacunam Camerarius. 4 ἡ <τε> Richards. 5 ἐστὶ<ν> ante ἄλλων tr. ? Richards.

a The end of this sentence and the beginning of the next appear to have been lost.
justice, the more they are at leisure and have an abundance of such blessings. It is clear therefore why a state that is to be happy and righteous must share in these virtues; for if it is disgraceful to be unable to use our good things, it is still more disgraceful to be unable to use them in time of leisure, and although showing ourselves good men when engaged in business and war, in times of peace and leisure to seem no better than slaves. Therefore we must not cultivate virtue after the manner of the state of Sparta. The superiority of the Spartans over other races does not lie in their holding a different opinion from others as to what things are the greatest goods, but rather in their believing that these are obtained by means of one particular virtue; yet because they both deem these things and their enjoyment to be greater goods than the enjoyment of the virtues...

... and that it is to be practised for its own sake is manifest from these considerations; but it must now be considered how and by what means this will come about. Now we have indeed previously decided that it requires nature and habit and reason, and among these, what particular quality of nature men ought to possess has been defined previously; but it remains to consider whether men ought to be educated first by means of the reason or by the habits. For between reason and habit the most perfect harmony ought to exist, as it is possible both for the reason to have missed the highest principle and for men to have been as wrongly trained through the habits. This therefore at all events is clear in the first place, in the case of men as of other creatures, that their engendering to start with and the end
ARISTOTLE

1334 b

άπο τινος ἀρχῆς ἀλλοι τέλους, ο δέ λόγος ἡμᾶς καὶ ο νοῦς τῆς φύσεως τέλος, ὡστε πρὸς τούτοις τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν τῶν έθῶν δεὶ παρασκευάζειν μελέτην. ἔπειτα ὦσπερ ψυχῆ καὶ σῶμα δύ’ εστιν, 23 οὕτω καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὰρώμεν δύο μέρη, τὸ τε ἄλογον καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχουν, καὶ τὰς ἔξεις τὰς τούτων δύο τὸν ἀριθμὸν, ὡς τὸ μὲν ἔστιν ὄρεξις τὸ δε νοῦς. ὦσπερ δὴ τὸ σῶμα πρότερον τῆς γενέσεως τῆς ψυχῆς, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἄλογον τοῦ λόγου ἔχοντος. φανερὸν δέ καὶ τούτο: θυμός γὰρ καὶ βουλήσις, ἐτι δὴ ἐπιθυμία, καὶ γενομένοις εὐθύς ὑπάρχει τοῖς παιδίοις, ὥς καὶ λογισμὸς καὶ ο νοῦς προϊόνθιν 25 ἐγγίνεσθαι πέφυκεν. διὸ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦ σώματος τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι προτέραν ἢ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἔπειτα τὴν τῆς ὄρεξεως, ἕνεκα μέντοι τοῦ νοὸ τῆς τῆς ὄρεξεως, τῆς δὲ τοῦ σώματος τῆς ψυχῆς.

XIV. Εἴπερ οὖν ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς τὸν νομοθέτην ὅραν 1 20 δεὶ ὅπως βέλτιστα τὰ σώματα γένηται τῶν τρεφομένων, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιμελητέον περὶ τὴν σύζευξιν, πότε καὶ ποιόν τινάς ὄντας χρή ποιεῖν, καὶ τὸ αὐτοῦ ἄλλοις τῇ γαμμήν ὀμλίαν. δεὶ δ’ ἀποβλέποντα νομοθετεῖν ταῦτα τῇ κοινωνίᾳ πρὸς αὐτοὺς τε καὶ τὸν τοῦ ζην χρόνου, ἡν παγκαταβαίνωσι ταῖς ἡλικίαις ἐπὶ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν καὶ μὴ διαφωνῶσιν αἱ δυναμεῖς τοῦ μὲν ἐτι δυναμεῖν γενναν τῆς δὲ μὴ δυναμένης, ἡ

1 ἀρχῆς (ἀρχή) Thurot.

1 i.e. every process and partial end are means to an ultimate end. A conjecture gives 'the end to which a beginning leads is itself the beginning of another end.' The active reason is the completion and purpose of human birth and growth.

616
from any beginning is relative to another end, and that reason and intelligence are for us the end of our natural development, so that it is with a view to these ends that our engendering and the training of our habits must be regulated. And secondly, as soul and body are two, so we observe that the soul also has two parts, the irrational part and the part possessing reason, and that the states which they experience are two in number, the one being desire and the other intelligence; and as the body is prior in its development to the soul, so the irrational part of the soul is prior to the rational. And this also is obvious, because passion and will, and also appetite, exist in children even as soon as they are born, but it is the nature of reasoning and intelligence to arise in them as they grow older. Therefore in the first place it is necessary for the training of the body to precede that of the mind, and secondly for the training of the appetite to precede that of the intelligence; but the training of the appetite must be for the sake of the intellect, and that of the body for the sake of the soul.

XIV. Inasmuch therefore as it is the duty of the lawgiver to consider from the start how the children reared are to obtain the best bodily frames, he must first pay attention to the union of the sexes, and settle when and in what condition a couple should practise matrimonial intercourse. In legislating for this partnership he must pay regard partly to the persons themselves and to their span of life, so that they may arrive together at the same period in their ages, and their powers may not be at discord through the man being still capable of parentage and the wife...
ταύτης μὲν τοῦ δ’ ἀνδρὸς μή (ταῦτα γὰρ ποιεῖ καὶ στάσεις πρὸς ἄλληλους καὶ διαφοράς), ἐπειτα καὶ 2 πρὸς τὴν τῶν τέκνων διαδοχήν, δεὶ γὰρ οὔτε λίαν 40 ὑπολείπεσθαι ταῖς ἡλικίαις τὰ τέκνα τῶν πατέρων (ἀνόνητος γὰρ τοῖς μὲν πρεσβυτέροις ἡ χάρις παρά τῶν τέκνων, ἡ δὲ παρὰ τῶν πατέρων βοήθεια τοῖς τέκνοις), οὔτε λίαν πάρεγγυς εἰναι (πολλὴν γὰρ ἔχει δυσχέρειαν, ἡ τε γὰρ αἴδως ἢττον ὑπόρχει τοῖς τοιούτοις ῥώσπερ ἡλικιώταις καὶ περὶ τὴν οἰκονομίαν ἐγκληματικὸν τὸ πάρεγγυς). ἔτι δ’, 5 ὅθεν ἀρχόμενοι δεύτερο μετέβημεν, ὅπως τὰ σώματα τῶν γεννωμένων ὑπάρχη πρὸς τὴν τοῦ νομοθέτου βούλησον. σχεδὸν δὴ πάντα ταῦτα συμβαίνει κατὰ 3 μίαν ἑπιμέλειαν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὑρίστατε τέλος τῆς γεννήσεως ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλείστον εἰπεῖν ἀνδράσι μὲν ὁ τῶν ἐβδομήκοντα ἐτῶν ἀριθμὸς ἔσχατος, πεντή- 10 κοντά δὲ γυναιξὶν, δεὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς συζευξεῖως κατά τὴν ἡλικίαν εἰς τοὺς χρόνους καταβαίνειν τούτους. ἔστι δ’ ὅ τῶν νέων συνδυασμὸς φαίλος 4 πρὸς τεκνοποιίαν· ἐν γὰρ πάσι ξὼν ἀτελὴ τὰ τῶν νέων ἔγγονα καὶ θηλυτόκα μᾶλλον καὶ μικρὰ τὴν μορφὴν, ὥστ’ ἀναγκαίον ταῦτα τοῦτο συμβαίνειν 15 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. τεκμήριον δὲ· ἐν ὃσιοι γὰρ τῶν πόλεων ἐπιχωρίαζεται· τὸ νέους συζευγνύ- ναι καὶ νέας, ἀτελεῖς καὶ μικρὸ τὰ σώματα εἰσιν. ἔτι δὲ ἐν τοῖς τόκοις οἱ νέαι πονοῦτοι τε μάλλον καὶ διαφθείρονται πλείους· διὸ καὶ τὸν χρησμὸν 20 γενέσθαι τινὲς φασὶ διὰ τοιαῦτην αἰτίαν τοῖς 1 ὡς παρ’ Ellis.  2 ἐπιχωρίαζει M.

---

* Some editors write θηλυτόκα and interpret 'more likely to be born females.' (θηλυτόκα, 'likely to bear females,' is applied to the young parents themselves in Hist. An. iv. 766 b 29.)
incapable, or the wife capable and the man not (for this causes differences and actual discord between them), and also he must consider as well the succession of the children, for the children must neither be too far removed in their ages from the fathers (since elderly fathers get no good from their children's return of their favours, nor do the children from the help they get from the fathers), nor must they be too near them (for this involves much unpleasantness, since in such families there is less respect felt between them, as between companions of the same age, and also the nearness of age leads to friction in household affairs); and in addition, to return to the point from which we began this digression, measures must be taken to ensure that the children produced may have bodily frames suited to the wish of the lawgiver. These results then are almost all attained by one mode of regulation. For since the period of parentage terminates, speaking generally, with men at the age of seventy at the outside, and with women at fifty, the commencement of their union should correspond in respect of age with these times. But the mating of the young is bad for child-bearing; for in all animal species the offspring of the young are more imperfect and likely to produce female children, and small in figure, so that the same thing must necessarily occur in the human race also. And a proof of this is that in all the states where it is the local custom to mate young men and young women, the people are deformed and small of body. And again young women labour more, and more of them die in childbirth; indeed according to some accounts such was the reason why the oracle was given to the

\[ \text{\textit{Mη τέμνε νέαν ἄλοκα}} \] (‘cut not a new furrow’) schol.
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΣ

1335 a Τροιζήνιοισ, ώς πολλῶν διαφθειρομένων διὰ τὸ γαμίσκεσθαι τὰς νεωτέρας, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὴν τῶν καρπῶν κομιδὴν. ἦτι δὲ καὶ πρὸς σωφροσύνην 5 συμφέρει τὰς ἐκδόσεις ποιεῖσθαι πρεσβυτέρας, ἀκολαστότεραι γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσι νεὰι χρησάμεναι ταῖς συνομοσίαις. καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀρρένων δὲ σώματα βλάπτεσθαι δοκεῖ πρὸς τὴν αὐξήσιν ἐὰν ἦτι τοῦ σπέρματος 1 αὐξανομένου ποιώντα τὴν συνομοσίαν καὶ γὰρ τούτων τις ὑρισμένος χρόνος, ὅν οὐχ ὑπερβαίνει πληθὺν ἤτι. διὸ τὰς μὲν ἀρμόττει περὶ τὴν 6 τῶν ὀκτωκαίδεκα ἐτῶν ἡλικίαν σύζευγνῡναι, τοὺς δὲ ἐπτὰ καὶ τριάκοντα, ἢ μικρὸν πρότερον 2 ἐν τοσοῦτῳ γὰρ ἀκμάζουσὶ τε τοῖς σώμασιν ἡ 3 σύζευξις ἐσται καὶ πρὸς τὴν παύλαν τῆς τεκνοποίας συγκαταβήσεται τοῖς χρόνοις εὐκαίρως. ἦτι δὲ ἡ διαδοχή τῶν τέκνων τοῖς μὲν ἀρχομένης ἐσται τῆς ἀκμῆς, ἐὰν γίγνηται κατὰ λόγον εὐθὺς ἡ γένεσις, τοῖς δὲ ἡδὴ καταλευμένης τῆς ἡλικίας πρὸς τὸν τῶν ἐβδομήκοντα ἐτῶν ἀριθμὸν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ 7 πότε δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν σύζευξιν, εἰρηταί, τοῖς δὲ περὶ τὴν ὄραν χρόνοις ώς οἱ πολλοὶ χρῶνται, καλῶς καὶ νῦν ὄρισαντες χείμάνον τῇς συναιλίαν ποιεῖσθαι ταύτην. δεὶ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὺς ἡδὴ θεωρεῖν 40 πρὸς τὴν τεκνοποίαν τὰ τε παρὰ τῶν ἱατρῶν λεγόμενα καὶ τὰ παρὰ τῶν φυσικῶν οἱ τε γὰρ ἱατροὶ τοὺς καλοῦσι τῶν σωμάτων ἰκανῶς λέγουσι, καὶ περὶ τῶν πνευμάτων οἱ φυσικοὶ, τὰ βόρεια τῶν

1 σώματος Γ.
2 μικρὸν πρότερον Immisch (paulo ante Ramus): μικρὸν codd., μικρὸν <παραλλάσσουται> Richards (plus minusve Vittori).
3 ἢ add. Richards.

620
people of Troezen, because many were dying owing to its being their custom for the women to marry young, and it did not refer to the harvest. And again it also contributes to chastity for the bestowal of women in marriage to be made when they are older, for it is thought that they are more licentious when they have had intercourse in youth. Also the males are thought to be arrested in bodily growth if they have intercourse while the seed is still growing; for this also has a fixed period after passing which it is no longer plentiful. Therefore it is fitting for the women to be married at about the age of eighteen and the men at thirty-seven or a little before\(^a\)— for that will give long enough for the union to take place with their bodily vigour at its prime, and for it to arrive with a convenient coincidence of dates at the time when procreation ceases. Moreover the succession of the children to the estates, if their birth duly occurs soon after the parents marry, will take place when they are beginning their prime, and when the parents’ period of vigour has now come to a close, towards the age of seventy. The proper age therefore for union has been discussed; as to the proper times in respect of the season we may accept what is customary with most people, who have rightly decided even as it is to practise marital cohabitation in winter. And people should also study for themselves, when their time comes, the teachings of physicians and natural philosophers on the subject of the procreation of children; the suitable bodily seasons are adequately discussed by the physicians, and the question of weather by the natural philosophers, who say that north winds are more favour-

\(^a\) The word ‘before’ is a conjectural insertion.
νοτίων ἐπαινοῦντες μᾶλλον. ποίων δὲ τινῶν τῶν ὑσμάτων ὑπαρχόντων μᾶλιστ' ἂν ὦφελος εἴη τοῖς γεννωμένοις, ἐπιστήσασι μὲν μᾶλλον λεκτέον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς παιδονομίας, τύπῳ δὲ ἰκανὸν εἶπεῖν καὶ νῦν. οὕτε γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἀθλητῶν χρήσιμος ἐξίσ πρὸς πολιτικὴν εὐεξίαν οὐδὲ πρὸς ύγίειαν καὶ τεκνοποίουσ, οὕτε ἡ θεραπευτικὴ καὶ κακοπονητικὴ λίαν, ἂλλ' ἡ μέση τούτων. πεποιημένην μὲν οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ τὴν ἔξιν, πεποιημένην δὲ πόνοις μὴ βιαίοις, μητὲ πρὸς ἑναὶ μόνοι, ὁσπερ ἡ τῶν ἀθλητῶν ἐξίσ, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἐλευθερίων πράξεις. ὀμοίως δὲ δεῖ ταύτα ὑπάρχειν ἀνδράσι καὶ γυναιξίν. χρὴ δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐγκύους ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν σωμάτων, μὴ βαθμουσίας μὴν ἀραιά τροφή χρωμένας· τούτῳ δὲ βάδιον τῷ νομοθέτῃ ποιῆσαι προστάξαντι καθ' ἕμέραν τών ποιεῖσθαι πορείαν πρὸς θεῶν ἀποθεραπεῖαν τῶν εἰληχώτων τῆς περὶ τῆς γενέσεως τιμῆν. τῆν μέντοι διάνοιαν τοῦναντίων τῶν σωμάτων βαθμοτέρως ἀρμόττει δι᾿ ἀγείν· ἀπολαύσαντα γὰρ φαίνεται τὰ γεννώμενα τῆς ἐχούσης ὁσπερ καὶ τὰ φυόμενα τῆς γῆς. περὶ δὲ ἀποθέσεως καὶ τροφῆς τῶν γεννωμένων ἑστῶ νόμος μηδὲν πεπηρωμένων τρέφειν· διὰ δὲ πλῆθος τέκνων, ἐὰν ἡ τάξις τῶν ἔθων κωλύη μηδὲν ἀποτίθεσαι τῶν γεννωμένων, ὥρισθαι δεῖ τῆς τεκνοποίουσ τὸ πλῆθος, ἐὰν δὲ τοι γίγνεται παρὰ ταῦτα συνδυασθέντων, πρὶν αἰσθησιν ἐγγενέσθαι καὶ ζωήν

1 Μ : μάλιστα cet. 2 ἐν Schneider. 3 πόνοι ? Immisch. 4 ταῖς εἰληχώταις Γ. 5 τέκνων ἡ τάξις—κωλύει Π1: τέκνων (ἡ γὰρ τάξις—γεγυνωμένων) Wallies.

622
8 able than south. The particular kind of bodily constitution in the parents that will be most beneficial for the offspring must be dwelt on more in detail in our discussion of the management of children; it is sufficient to speak of it in outline now. The athlete’s habit of body is not serviceable for bodily fitness as required by a citizen, nor for health and parentage, nor yet is a habit that is too valetudinarian and unfit for labour, but the condition that lies between them. The bodily habit therefore should have been trained by exercise, but not by exercises that are violent, and not for one form of labour only, as is the athlete’s habit of body, but for the pursuits of free men. And these arrangements must be provided alike for men and women. And pregnant women also must take care of their bodies, not avoiding exercise nor adopting a low diet; this it is easy for the lawgiver to secure by ordering them to make a journey daily for the due worship of the deities whose office is the control of childbirth. As regards the mind, however, on the contrary it suits them to pass the time more indolently than as regards their bodies; for children before birth are evidently affected by the mother just as growing plants are by the earth. As to exposing or rearing the children born, let there be a law that no deformed child shall be reared; but on the ground of number of children, if the regular customs hinder any of those born being exposed, there must be a limit fixed to the procreation of offspring, and if any people have a child as a result of intercourse in contravention of these regulations, abortion must be practised on it before it has developed sen-

- This was never written, or has been lost.
ARISTOTLE

1335 b

25 ἐμποιεῖσθαι δεῖ τὴν ἄμβλωσιν τὸ γὰρ ὅσιον καὶ τὸ μὴ διωρισμένον τῇ αἰσθήσει καὶ τῷ ξῆν ἔσται. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ μὲν ἀρχὴ τῆς ἡλικίας ἄνδρὶ καὶ γυναικὶ διωρισται πότε ἀρχεσθαι χρὴ τῆς συζεύξεως, καὶ πόσον χρόνον λειτουργεῖν ἁρμότει πρὸς τεκνοποιίαν ὑρίσθω. τὰ γὰρ τῶν προσβυτέρων ἑκγονα, καθάπερ τὰ τῶν νεωτέρων, ἀτελὴ γίνεται καὶ τοῖς σώμασι καὶ ταῖς διανοίασι, τὰ δὲ τῶν γεγηρακότων ἀσθενὴ. διὸ κατὰ τὴν τῆς διανοίας ἁκμὴν αὐτὴ δὲ ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις ἦνπερ τῶν ποιητῶν τινὲς εἰρήκασιν οἱ μετροῦντες ταῖς ἔβδομασι τὴν ἡλικίαν, περὶ τὸν χρόνον τὸν τῶν πεντῆκοντα ἑτῶν. ὥστε τέτταρσιν ἡ πέντε ἔτεσιν ὑπερβάλλοντα τὴν ἡλικίαν ταύτην ἀφεῖσθαι δεῖ τῆς εἰς τὸ φανερὸν γεννήσεως, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ύψιειάς χάριν ἡ τινὸς ἄλλης τοιαύτης αὐτίας φαινεσθαι δεὶ ποιομένους τὴν ὁμιλίαν. περὶ δὲ τῆς πρὸς ἄλλην ἡ πρὸς ἄλλον, ἔστω μὲν ἄπλως μὴ καλὸν ἀπτόμενον φαινεσθαι μηδαμὴ μηδαμώς ὅταν ἢ καὶ προσ-

1336 a

τεκνοποιίας εάν τις φαίνηται τοιοῦτον τι δρῶν, ἀτμιὰ ζημιοῦσθω πρεποῦσθ' ἀπο τῆν ἀμαρτίαν.

XV. Γενομένων δὲ τῶν τέκνων οἴεσθαι δεῖ ἡ μεγάλην εἶναι διαφορὰν πρὸς τὴν τῶν σωμάτων ἰδύναι τὴν τροφῆν, ὅποια τίς ἂν ἦ. φαίνεται δὲ διὰ τε τῶν ἄλλων ζῶων ἐπισκοποῦσι καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐθνῶν οἷς ἐπιμελὲς ἐστίν ἄγειν εἰς τὴν πολεμικὴν

1 ὅταν <ἀνὴρ> ἦ ? Richards.
2 οἴεσθαι δεί Spengel: οἴεσθαι codd.
3 ἄγειν eis Richards: ἄγειν ΠΜΠ: εἰςάγειν cet.: ἄσκειν Coraes.

* Solon, fragment 27.
sation and life; for the line between lawful and unlawful abortion will be marked by the fact of having sensation and being alive. And since the beginning of the fit age for a man and for a woman, at which they are to begin their union, has been defined, let it also be decided for how long a time it is suitable for them to serve the state in the matter of producing children. For the offspring of too elderly parents, as those of too young ones, are born imperfect both in body and mind, and the children of those that have arrived at old age are weaklings. Therefore the period must be limited to correspond with the mental prime; and this in the case of most men is the age stated by some of the poets, who measure men’s age by periods of seven years—a—it is about the age of fifty. Therefore persons exceeding this age by four or five years must be discharged from the duty of producing children for the community, and for the rest of their lives if they have intercourse it must be manifestly for the sake of health or for some other similar reason. As to intercourse with another woman or man, in general it must be dishonourable to be known to take any part in it in any circumstances whatsoever as long as one is a husband and bears that name, but any who may be discovered doing anything of the sort during the period of parentage must be punished with a loss of privilege suited to the offence.

1. XV. When the children have been born, the particular mode of rearing adopted must be deemed an important determining influence in regard to their power of body. It appears from examining the other animals, and is also shown by the foreign races that make it their aim to lead to the military habit of
εξεν ἢ τοῦ γάλακτος πληθύνουσα τρόφη μάλιστ' οἰκεῖα τοῖς σώμασιν, ἁοινοτέρα δὲ διὰ τὰ νοσήματα. 10 ἔτι δὲ καὶ κινήσεις ὅσα ἐνδέχεται ποιεῖσθαι 2 τηλικούτων συμφέρει. πρὸς δὲ τὸ μὴ διαστρέφε- σθαι τὰ μέλη διὰ ἀπαλότητα χρῶνται καὶ νῦν ἐνια τῶν ἐθνῶν ὄργανοι τισὶ μηχανικὸι ὀ τὸ σῶμα ποιεῖ τῶν τοιούτων ἀστραβές. συμφέρει δ' εὔθύς καὶ πρὸς τὰ ψύχη συνεδίζειν ἐκ μικρῶν παιδῶν, τούτο γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ πρὸς πολέμικος 15 πράξεις εὐχρηστότατον. διὸ παρὰ πολλοῖς ἐστὶ τῶν βαρβάρων ἔθος τοῖς μὲν εἰς ποταμὸν ἀπο- βάπτειν τὰ γιγνόμενα ψυχρόν, τοῖς δὲ σκέπασμα μικρὸν ἄμπυσχεν, οἶνον Κελτοῖς. πάντα γὰρ ὁσα 3 δυνατὸν [ἐθίζειν]4 εὔθυς ἀρχομένων βέλτιον ἐθίζειν 20 μὲν, 2 ἐκ προσαγωγῆς δ' ἐθίζειν· εὐφυής δ' ἡ τῶν παιδῶν ἐξεν διὰ θερμότητα πρὸς τὴν τῶν ψυχρῶν ἀσκησιν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τὴν πρῶτην συμφέρει ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπιμελείαν τοιαύτην τε καὶ τὴν 4 ταύτην παραπλησίαν· τὴν δ' ἑξομένην ταύτης ἡλικίαν μέχρι πέντε ἔτῶν, ἣν οὖτε πιὰ πρὸς μάθησιν καλῶς ἔχει προσάγειν οὐδεμίαν οὔτε πρὸς ἀναγκαῖον πόνος, ὅπως μὴ τὴν αὐξήσων ἐμ- ποδίζωσιν, δεῖ 3 τοσαύτης τυγχάνειν κινήσεως ὡστε διαφεύγειν τῇ ἀργίᾳ τῶν σωμάτων· ἢν χρῆ 25 παρασκευάζειν καὶ δι' ἄλλων πράξεων καὶ διὰ τῆς παιδιᾶς. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰς παιδιὰς εἶναι μήτε ἀνελευθέρους μήτε ἑπιπόνους μήτε ἀνεμιμένας. καὶ περὶ λόγων δὲ καὶ μύθων, ποίοις τινὰς 5 άκούειν δεῖ τοὺς τηλικούτων, ἑπιμελέσ ἐστι τοῖς ἀρχοντικοῖς καὶ παιδιοῦσι. πάντα γὰρ

1 Richards. 2 Richards: μὲν ἐθίζειν codd. 3 δεῖ δὲ codd. cet.
body, that a diet giving an abundance of milk is most suited to the bodies of children, and one that allows rather little wine because of the diseases that it causes. Moreover it is advantageous to subject them to as many movements as are practicable with children of that age. To prevent the limbs from being distorted owing to softness, some races even now employ certain mechanical appliances that keep the bodies of infants from being twisted. And it is also advantageous to accustom them at once from early childhood to cold, for this is most useful both for health and with a view to military service. Hence among many non-Greek races it is customary in the case of some peoples to wash the children at birth by dipping them in a cold river, and with others, for instance the Celts, to give them scanty covering. For it is better to inure them at the very start to everything possible, but to inure them gradually; and the bodily habit of children is naturally well-fitted by warmth to be trained to bear cold. In the earliest period of life then it is expedient to employ this or a similar method of nursing; and the next period to this, up to the age of five, which it is not well to direct as yet to any study nor to compulsory labours, in order that they may not hinder the growth, should nevertheless be allowed enough movement to avoid bodily inactivity; and this exercise should be obtained by means of various pursuits, particularly play. But even the games must not be unfit for freemen, nor laborious, nor undisciplined. Also the question of the kind of tales and stories that should be told to children of this age must be attended to by the officials called Children's Tutors. For all such
1336 a
deĩ tα τοιαύτα προοδοπευῖν πρὸς τὰς ὑστερον
diatribás. διὸ τὰς παιδιὰς εἶναι δεῖ τὰς πολλὰς
μυθήσεις τῶν ὑστερον ὀπουδαξομένων. τὰς δὲ 6
diatásēs tōn paḯdōn kai ἱκλαυνοῦσα οὔκ ὅρθως
ἀπαγορεύουσιν οἱ κωλύοντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις
συμφέρουσι γὰρ πρὸς αὐξήσιν γίνεται γὰρ τρόπον
τῶν γυμνασίων τοῖς ζωμάσων, ἢ γὰρ τοῦ πνεύματος
cáthezis ποιεῖ τὴν ἴσχυν τοῖς πονοῦσιν, δ συμβαίνει
καὶ τοῖς παιδίοις διατεινομένοις. ἐπισκεπτέον δέ
40 τοῖς παιδονόμοις τὴν τοῦτων διαγωγὴν τῆν τ'
ἀλλην καὶ ὅπως ὅτι ἡκιστα μετὰ δοῦλων ἐσται.

1336 b
taútēn γὰρ τὴν ἥλικιαν, καὶ μέχρι τῶν ἐπτά ἑτῶν,
ἀναγκαῖον οὐκού τὴν τροφὴν ἔχειν. εὑλογον ὅν ῥ
ἀπολαίειν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀκουσμάτων καὶ τῶν ὀραμάτων ἀνελευθερίαν καὶ τηλικούτους ὄντας. ὅλως
μὲν οὐν αἰσχρολογίαν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ὀσπερρ
5 ἀλλο τι, δεὶ τὸν νομοθέτην ἐξορίζειν (ἐκ τοῦ γὰρ
ἐὐχερῶς λέγειν ὅτι οὖν τῶν αἰσχρῶν γίνεται καὶ τὸ
ποιεῖν σύνεγγυς), μάλιστα μὲν οὐν ἕκ τῶν νέων,
ὅπως μῆτε λέγωσι μήτε ἀκούσω μηδὲν τοιοῦτον.
ἐδὼ δὲ τῆς φαίνεται τὶ λέγων ἡ πράττων τῶν
ἀπηγορευμένων, τὸν ἐλεύθερον μὲν ἑκ τῶν ἑπτά-
10 κλησεως ἡξιωμένον ἐν τοῖς συσσυνίους ἄτιμαι
κολάζει καὶ πληγαίς, τὸν δὲ πρεσβύτερον τῆς
ἡλικίας ταὐτῆς ἄτιμαις ἀνελευθέρως ἀνδραπο-
δώδειας χάριν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ λέγειν τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐ
ἐξορίζομεν, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν ἡ γραφᾶς
ἡ λόγους ἀσχήμωνας. ἐπιμελές μὲν οὖν ἐστὼ τοῖς

1 καὶ τοὺς MP1: κατὰ τοὺς Γ. 2 ἀπελαίειν codd. cet.
3 εἰπέρ Lambinus. 4 μέντοι ? Richards.
5 μὲν hic Richards, ante ἐλεύθερον codd.
6 [ἄτιμαι] Buecheler, ἀνελεῖσθε Richards.
amusements should prepare the way for their later pursuits; hence most children’s games should be
imitations of the serious occupations of later life. The legislators in the *Laws* forbids allowing children to
have paroxysms of crying, but this prohibition is a mistake; violent crying contributes to growth, for it
serves in a way as exercise for the body, since holding the breath is the strength-giving factor in hard
labour, and this takes place also with children when they stretch themselves in crying. The Tutors must
supervise the children’s pastimes, and in particular must see that they associate as little as possible with
slaves. For children of this age, and up to seven
years old, must necessarily be reared at home; so
it is reasonable to suppose that even at this age they
may acquire a taint of illiberality from what they
hear and see. The lawgiver ought therefore to banish
indecent talk, as much as anything else, out of the
state altogether (for light talk about anything dis-
graceful soon passes into action)—so most of all from
among the young, so that they may not say nor hear
anything of the sort; and anybody found saying or
doing any of the things prohibited, if he is of free
station but not yet promoted to reclining at the
public meals, must be punished with marks of dis-
honour and with beating, and an older offender must
be punished with marks of dishonour degrading to a
free man, because of his slavish behaviour. And since
we banish any talk of this kind, clearly we must also
banish the seeing of either pictures or representations
that are indecent. The officials must therefore be

* Laves vii. 792 a. Plato merely says that a child’s crying
shows it to be annoyed, and that it ought to have as little
pain as possible or else it will grow up morose.
1336 b 15 ἀρχούσι μὴθεν μήτε ἀγαλμα μήτε γραφὴν εἶναι
toiouτων πράξεων μίμησιν, εἰ μὴ παρὰ τοις θεοῖς
toiouτοις οἷς καὶ τὸν τωθασμὸν ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ
νόμος· πρὸς δὲ τοῦτος ἀφόησιν ὁ νόμος τοὺς τὴν
ἡλικίαν ἔχοντας ἔτι τὴν ἴκνουμένην καὶ ὑπὲρ
αὐτῶν καὶ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν τιμαλφείν τοὺς
20 θεοῖς. τοὺς δὲ νεωτέρους οὔτ’ ιάμβων οὔτε 9
κωμῳδίας θεατὰς ἔστεον,3 πρὶν ἤ τὴν ἡλικίαν
λάβωσιν ἐν ἥ καὶ κατακλίσεως ὑπάρξει κοινωνεῖν
ἥδη καὶ μέθης καὶ τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν τοιουτών γυναι-
κήνης βλάβης ἀπαθείς ἡ παιδεία πονησει πάντας.
νῦν μὲν οὖν ἐν παράδοσι τοῦτον πεποιῆμεθα
25 τὸν λόγον· ὑστερὸν οὖτ’ ἐπιστήσατας δεὶ διορίσαι
μᾶλλον, εἴτε μὴ δεὶ πρῶτον εἴτε δεὶ διαπορήσατας,
καὶ πῶς δεὶ· κατὰ δὲ τὸν παρόντα καιρὸν ἐμνήσθη-
μεν ὡς4 ἀναγκαῖον. ὡς γὰρ οὐ κακῶς ἔλεγε5 τὸ 10
toioúton Theodúros ὁ τῆς τραγῳδίας ὑποκρίτης·
οὕθεν γὰρ πώποτε παρῆκεν ἑαυτῷ προεσάγειν
30 οὐδὲ τῶν εὐτελῶν ὑποκρίτων, ὡς οἰκειομένων τῶν
θεατῶν ταῖς πρῶταις ἀκοαῖς· συμβαίνει δὲ ταύτῳ
τοῦτο καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἄνθρωπων ὀμιλίας καὶ
πρὸς τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων· πάντα γὰρ στέργομεν
τὰ πρώτα μᾶλλον. διὸ δεὶ τοῖς νέοις πάντα
35 τοιεῖν ἔξαν τὰ φαύλα, μάλιστα δ’ αὐτῶν ὃς ἔχει
ἡ μοιχηρίαν ἢ δυσμένειαν.

3 ἔστεον Immisch (einae eateon Jackson): θετεον, θετητεον, νομοθετητεον codd.
4 δοσ Richards. 5 ἔλεω ? Newman.

* The ms. text gives 'and in addition to these'; and the word 'still' may be an interpolation.
careful that there may be no sculpture or painting that represents indecent actions, except in the temples of a certain class of gods to whom the law allows even scurrility; but in regard to these the law permits men still of suitable age to worship the gods both on their own behalf and on behalf of the children and women. But the younger ones must not be allowed in the audience at lampoons and at comedy, before they reach the age at which they will now have the right to recline at table in company and to drink deeply; and at which their education will render all of them immune to the harmful effects of such things. For the present therefore we have merely mentioned these matters in passing, but later we must stop to settle them more definitely, first discussing fully whether legislation prohibiting the attendance of the young is desirable or not, and how such prohibition should be put in force; but on the present occasion we have touched on the question only in the manner necessary. 

For perhaps the tragic actor Theodorus used to put the matter not badly: he had never once allowed anybody to produce his part before him, not even one of the poor actors, as he said that audiences are attracted by what they hear first; and this happens alike in regard to our dealings with people and to our dealings with things—all that comes first we like better. On this account we ought to make all base things unfamiliar to the young, and especially those that involve either depravity or malignity.

b Iambic verses, often abusive and indecent, recited at festivals of Dionysus.

c A great Athenian performer of Sophocles; he took the part of Antigone.

d Loosely put for 'to appear on the stage.'
Διελθόντων δὲ τῶν πέντε ἐτῶν τὰ δύο μέχρι τῶν ἐπτὰ δεῖ θεωροῦσ ἡδη γίγνεσθαι τῶν μαθήσεων ὁς δεήσει μανθάνειν αὐτοὺς. δύο δ' εἰσὶν ἡλικίαι πρὸς ἀναγκαῖον διηρήσθαι τὴν παιδείαν, μετὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπτὰ μέχρι ἡβης καὶ πάλιν μετὰ τὴν ἀφ' ἡβης μέχρι τῶν ἔνδο καὶ εἴκοσιν ἔτων. οἱ γὰρ ταῖς ἐβδομάδις διαιροῦντες τὰς ἡλικίας ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ λέγουσιν οὐ κακῶς, δεὶ δὲ τὴ διαιρέσει τῆς φύσεως ἑπακολούθειν τάσα γὰρ τέχνη καὶ παιδεία τὸ προσλείπον βούλεται τῆς φύσεως ἀναπληρῶν. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν σκεπτέον εἰ ποιητέον τάξιν τινὰ περὶ τοὺς παιδας, ἐπειτα πότερον συμφέρει κοινῆς ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν αὐτῶν ἡ κατ' ἰδίον τρόπον, δ' γίνεται καὶ νῦν ἐν ταῖς πλείσταις τῶν πόλεως, τρίτον δὲ ποιαν τινὰ δεῖ ταύτην.

1 μετὰ—μετὰ: κατὰ—κατὰ Richards.
2 Muretus: καλῶς codd.
But when the five years from two to seven have passed, the children must now become spectators at the lessons which they will themselves have to learn. And there are two ages corresponding to which education should be divided—there must be a break after the period from seven to puberty, and again after that from puberty to twenty-one. For those who divide the ages by periods of seven years are generally speaking not wrong, and it is proper to follow the division of nature, for all art and education aim at filling up nature's deficiencies. First therefore we must consider whether some regulation in regard to the boys ought to be instituted, next whether it is advantageous for their supervision to be conducted on a public footing or in a private manner as is done at present in most states, and thirdly of what particular nature this supervision ought to be.

* i.e. in gymnastics and music.
* The mss. give 'not right.'
I. "Ότι μὲν οὖν τῷ νομοθέτῃ μάλιστα πραγματευτέον περὶ τὴν τῶν νέων παιδείαν, οὐδεὶς ἂν ἀμφισβητήσειν. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν οὐ γινόμενον τούτο βλάπτει τὰς πολιτείας. δεῖ γὰρ 15 πρὸς ἐκάστην παιδεύσασθαι, τὸ γὰρ ἢθος τῆς πολιτείας ἐκάστης τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ φυλάττειν εἰσὶν ἡ πολιτεία καὶ καθίστησιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, οἷον τὸ μὲν δημοκρατικὸν δημοκρατίαν, τὸ δ’ ὀλιγαρχικὸν ὀλιγαρχίαν· ἀεὶ δὲ τὸ βέλτιον ἢθος βελτίωνος αὐτοῦ πολιτείας. ἔτι δὲ πρὸς πᾶσας δυνάμεις καὶ 20 τέχνας ἔστων δ’ ἔστιν προπαιδεύεσθαι καὶ προεδρίζοντεσθαι πρὸς τὰς ἐκάστων ἐργασίας, ὥστε δὴ λοιπὸν ὅτι καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς πράξεως. ἔπει δ’ ἐν τῷ τέλος τῆς πόλει πάση, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τὴν παιδείαν μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαίον εἶναι πάντων καὶ ταύτης τὴς ἐπιμέλειαν εἶναι κοινῆ καὶ μὴ κατ’ ἵδιαν, ὅν 25 τρόπον νῦν ἐκάστος ἐπιμελεῖται τῶν αὐτῶν τέκνων ἱδία τε καὶ μάθησιν ἱδίαν ἃν ἂν δόξη διδάσκων. δεῖ δὲ τῶν κοινῶν κοινῆν ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν ἁσκησιν. ἀμα δὲ οὐδὲ χρὴ νομίζειν αὐτῶν αὐτοῦ τινὰ εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν, ἄλλα πάντας τῆς πόλεως, μόριον

1 Susemihl (disciplinam accommodari Aretinus): πολιτεύεσθαι codd. 2 βέλτιον M, βέλτιστον vulg.
I. Now nobody would dispute that the education of the young requires the special attention of the lawgiver. Indeed the neglect of this in states is injurious to their constitutions; for education ought to be adapted to the particular form of constitution, since the particular character belonging to each constitution both guards the constitution generally and originally establishes it—for instance the democratic spirit promotes democracy and the oligarchic spirit oligarchy; and a better spirit always produces a better constitution. Moreover in regard to all the faculties and crafts certain forms of preliminary education and training in their various operations are necessary, so that manifestly this is also requisite in regard to the actions of virtue. And inasmuch as the end for the whole state is one, it is manifest that education also must necessarily be one and the same for all and that the superintendence of this must be public, and not on private lines, in the way in which at present each man superintends the education of his own children, teaching them privately, and whatever special branch of knowledge he thinks fit. But matters of public interest ought to be under public supervision; at the same time also we ought not to think that any of the citizens belongs to himself, but that all belong to the

* Book V. in some editions.


1337 a
γὰρ ἕκαστος τῆς πόλεως, ἦ δ’ ἐπιμέλεια πέφυκεν ἐκάστου μορίου βλέπειν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὀλου ἑπι-
μέλειαν. ἐπαινέσειε δ’ ἂν τις κατὰ τούτο Δακέ-δαμινίους· καὶ γὰρ πλείστην ποιοῦντα σπουδὴν
περὶ τοὺς παιδας καὶ κοινὴ ταύτην.

"Οτι μὲν οὖν νομοθετητέον περὶ παιδείας καὶ
taυτην κοινην ποιητεον, φανερον τις δ’ ἐστιν ἡ
παιδεία καὶ πῶς χρῆ παιδεύεσθαι, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν.
νῦν γὰρ ἀμφισβητεῖται περὶ τῶν ἔργων· οὐ γὰρ
ταυτὰ πάντες ὑπολαμβάνουσι δεῖν μανθάνειν τοὺς
νέους οὔτε πρὸς ἀρετὴν οὔτε πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν
ἀμυστον, οὐδὲ φανερὸν πότερον πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν
πρέπει μᾶλλον ἡ πρὸς τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἠθὸς. ἐκ τε

1337 b
tῆς ἐμποδῶν παιδείας ταραχῶδης ἡ σκέψις, καὶ
δὴν οὐδὲν πότερον ἀσκεῖν ἐκ τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς
τὸν βίον ἡ τὰ τείνοντα πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἡ τὰ περιττα-
πάντα γὰρ εἰληφε ταῦτα κριτάς τινας. περὶ τε
tῶν πρὸς ἀρετὴν οὐθὲν ἐστιν ὀμολογούμενων· καὶ
γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν εὐθὺς πάντες τιμῶ-
σων, ὡστ’ εὐλόγως διαφέρονται καὶ πρὸς τὴν
ἀσκησιν αὐτῆς.

II. "Οτι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἀναγκαία δεῖ διδάσκεσθαι 1
tῶν χρησίμων, οὐκ ἀδηλον· οτι δὲ οὐ πάντα,
dιηρημένων τῶν τε ἑλευθέρων ἔργων καὶ τῶν
ἀνελευθέρων, φανερον, καὶ ὅτι3 τῶν τοιούτων
dεῖ μετέχειν ὅσα τῶν χρησίμων ποιήσει τὸν μετ-

1 Sylburg: καὶ codd.
2 <διδάσκειν Busse.
3 καὶ ὅτι Richards: ὅτι codd.
636
POLITICS, VIII. 1. 2—II. 1

state, for each is a part of the state, and it is natural for the superintendence of the several parts to have regard to the superintendence of the whole. And one might praise the Spartans in respect of this, for they pay the greatest attention to the training of their children, and conduct it on a public system.

It is clear then that there should be legislation about education and that it should be conducted on a public system. But consideration must be given to the question, what constitutes education and what is the proper way to be educated. At present there are differences of opinion as to the proper tasks to be set; for all peoples do not agree as to the things that the young ought to learn, either with a view to virtue or with a view to the best life, nor is it clear whether their studies should be regulated more with regard to intellect or with regard to character. And confusing questions arise out of the education that actually prevails, and it is not at all clear whether the pupils should practise pursuits that are practically useful, or morally edifying, or higher accomplishments—for all these views have won the support of some judges; and nothing is agreed as regards the exercise conducive to virtue, for, to start with, all men do not honour the same virtue, so that they naturally hold different opinions in regard to training in virtue.

II. It is therefore not difficult to see that the young must be taught those useful arts that are indispensably necessary; but it is clear that they should not be taught all the useful arts, those pursuits that are liberal being kept distinct from those that are illiberal, and that they must participate in such among the useful arts as will not render the person
ARISTOTLE

1337 b

έχοντα μὴ βάναυσον. βάναυσον δ' ἔργον εἶναι δὲ τοῦτο νομίζειν καὶ τέχνην ταύτην καὶ μάθησιν
10 ὅσαι πρὸς τὰς χρήσεις καὶ τὰς πράξεις τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀχρηστον ἀπεργάζονται τὸ σῶμα τῶν
ἐλευθέρων ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν. διὸ τὰς τε
τοιαύτας τέχνας ὅσαι τὸ σῶμα παρασκευάζουσι
χείρων διακείσθαι βαναύσους καλοῦμεν καὶ τὰς
μυσθαρικὰς ἐργασίας· ἀσχολον γὰρ ποιοῦσι τήν
diánoian καὶ ταπεινήν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐλευθε-
2 ῥῶν ἐπιστημῶν μέχρι μὲν τῶν ἐνῶν μετέχειν
οὐκ ἄνελεύθερον, προσδέρευει δὲ λίαν πρὸς τὸ
ἐντελές ἐνοχὸν ταῖς εἰρημέναις βλάβαις. ἔχει δὲ
πολλὴν διαφορὰν καὶ τὸ τῶν χάριν πράττει τις ἡ
μαθάνει· αὐτοῦ μὲν γὰρ χάριν ἡ φίλων ἡ δὲ
20 ἀρετῆς οὐκ ἄνελεύθερον, δ' ἐκ τούτου τοῦτο πράττων
d' ἄλλους πολλάκις θητικὸν καὶ δουλικὸν δόξειν
ἀν πράττειν.

Αἱ μὲν οὖν καταβεβλημέναι νῦν μαθήσεις,
καθάπερ ἐλέχθη πρὸτερον, ἐπαμφοτερίζουσιν. ἔστι 3
δὲ τέτταρα σχεδὸν ὁ παιδεύεις εἰώθασιν, γράμματα
25 καὶ γυμναστικὴν καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ τέταρτον ἐνιοὶ
γραφικῆς, τὴν μὲν γραμματικὴν καὶ γραφικὴν ὡς
χρησίμους πρὸς τὸν βίον οὕσας καὶ πολυχρῆστοις,
tὴν δὲ γυμναστικὴν ὡς συντείνουσαν πρὸς ἄνδραν,
tὴν δὲ μουσικὴν ἡ διαφορέσθαι ἐν τῖς. νῦν μὲν
γὰρ ὡς ἣδονῆς χάριν οἱ πλείστοι μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς.
30 οἱ δ' ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔταξαν ἐν παιδείᾳ διὰ τὸ τὴν ὕσυν
αὐτῆς ξητεῖν, ὀπερ πολλάκις εἰρηταί, μὴ μόνον
ἀσχολεῖν ὃρθῶς ἀλλὰ καὶ σχολάζειν δύνασθαι
καλῶς· αὐτῇ γὰρ ἀρχῇ πάντων, ἰνα καὶ πάλιν
eἰπώμεν περὶ αὐτῆς. εἰ γὰρ ἀμφότερον οὐδεὶς, μᾶλλον 4

1 Richards: αὐτὸ codd.
who participates in them vulgar. A task and also
an art or a science must be deemed vulgar if it
renders the body or soul or mind of free men useless
for the employments and actions of virtue. Hence
we entitle vulgar all such arts as deteriorate the
condition of the body, and also the industries that
earn wages; for they make the mind preoccupied
and degraded. And even with the liberal sciences, al-
though it is not illiberal to take part in some of them
up to a point, to devote oneself to them too assid-
uously and carefully is liable to have the injurious
results specified. Also it makes much difference what
object one has in view in a pursuit or study; if one
follows it for the sake of oneself or one's friends, or
on moral grounds, it is not illiberal, but the man who
follows the same pursuit because of other people would
often appear to be acting in a menial and servile manner.

The branches of study at present established fall
into both classes, as was said before. There
are perhaps four customary subjects of education,
reading and writing, gymnastics, music, and fourth,
with some people, drawing; reading and writing and
drawing being taught as being useful for the purposes
of life and very serviceable, and gymnastics as con-
tributing to manly courage; but as to music, here
one might raise a question. For at present most
people take part in it for the sake of pleasure; but
those who originally included it in education did so
because, as has often been said, nature itself seeks
to be able not only to engage rightly in business but
also to occupy leisure nobly; for—to speak about it
yet again—this is the first principle of all things.

For if although both business and leisure are

\[a\] Use of leisure.

\[b\] Cf. VII., 1334 a 2-10.

\[a\] c. i. § 4.
ARISTOTLE

1337 b
dé aíretov tó scholázein tís áscholías kai télos,
35 zeti téon tì poutóntas déi scholázein. ou yar dé
paízontas: télos yar ánagkáion éiinai₁ toù bión
tìn pайдiàn ἢμιν. ei dé toúto ádúnavon, kai
mállon ev taís áscholíaís chrístéon taís pайдiás
(ó yar ponów déitai tís ánapsúsews, ἢ dé pайдiά
χάρiv ánapsúsewós éstiv, tò ʾáscholeiv suμbáinei
40 metà pónoun kai συντονίαι), diá toúto déi pайдiás
eiságvesbai kairoφulaktoúntas tìn χρήωn, ὡς
proságontas pharmakeías χάρiv: ἀνεσίς yar ἂ
τοιαύτη kínhsis tís ψυχῆς, kai diá tìn ἤδονήν
ἀνάπαυσις. tò dé scholázein échew aúto dokèi tìn
5 ἤδονην kai tìn eúdaimonían kai tò ἐva μakaríws.
tòúto ʾô ou toís áscholóuνin úpárxhei álla toís
scholázeoun: ó mév yar áscholóv éneka tivos
4 áscholei télovs ὡς ouχ úpárxontos, ἢ ʾô eúdaimonía
télos éstiv, ἢn ou méta λύτης ἀllá méth ἤδονής
oíontai pántes éinai. taúttin méntoi tìn ἤδονήν
oukètì tìn autηn tībēsou, ἀllá kath’ éautous
ékastos kai tìn éξwv tìn autvón, ὡ de āριστος tìn
ἀρίστην kai tìn ápò tòvν kalλístovn. ὧste
10 fanevón ὡτι deī kai prós tìn én tìn diáγwgyị
[σχολήν]² mánthaneiv áttas kai páideúseidai, kai
tauta mé taxíma kai tautas tás máthseis
eautwv éinai χάριν, tás dé prós tìn áscholían ὡς
ἀναγκαίαs kai χάρv ἀllwv. dió kai tìn músovkhηn 6
ou πρότερoν eis páideian ētaξan ouχ ὡς ἀναγκαίον
15 (ouدةn yar échεi touoútoν) ouδ’ ὡς χρήσιμον (ὡσπερ

₁ <ἡ> éiinai Spengel.

² Jackson.
necesary, yet leisure is more desirable and more fully an end than business, we must inquire what is the proper occupation of leisure. For assuredly it should not be employed in play, since it would follow that play is our end in life. But if this is impossible, and sports should rather be employed in our times of business (for a man who is at work needs rest, and rest is the object of play, while business is accompanied by toil and exertion), it follows that in introducing sports we must watch the right opportunity for their employment, since we are applying them to serve as medicine; for the activity of play is a relaxation of the soul, and serves as recreation because of its pleasantness. But leisure seems itself to contain pleasure and happiness and felicity of life. And this is not possessed by the busy but by the leisured; for the busy man busies himself for the sake of some end as not being in his possession, but happiness is an end achieved, which all men think is accompanied by pleasure and not by pain. But all men do not go on to define this pleasure in the same way, but according to their various natures and to their own characters, and the pleasure with which the best man thinks that happiness is conjoined is the best pleasure and the one arising from the noblest sources. So that it is clear that some subjects must be learnt and acquired merely with a view to the pleasure in their pursuit, and that these studies and these branches of learning are ends in themselves, while the forms of learning related to business are studied as necessary and as means to other things. Hence our predecessors included music in education not as a necessity (for there is nothing necessary about it), nor as useful (in the way in which reading
ARISTOTLE

1338a
tά γράμματα πρὸς χρηματισμὸν καὶ πρὸς οἰκονο-
μίαν καὶ πρὸς μάθησιν καὶ πρὸς πολιτικὰς πράξεις
πολλάς, δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ γραφικὴ χρήσιμος εἰναι πρὸς
tὸ κρίνειν τὰ τῶν τεχνιτῶν ἔργα κάλλιον), οὖν'
20 αὖ καθάπερ ἡ γυμναστικὴ πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ ἀλκήν
(οὐδέτερον γὰρ τούτων ὄρομεν γιγνόμενον ἐκ τῆς
μουσικῆς). λειτεται τοῖνυν πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ
διαγωγὴν, εἰς ὁπερ καὶ φαίνονται παράγοντες
αὐτὴν, ἢν γὰρ οἶονται διαγωγὴν εἰναι τῶν ἐλευ-
θέρων, ἐν ταύτῃ τάττουσιν. διόπερ "Ομηρος
οὕτως ἔποιήσεν'.

25 ἀλλ' οἶνον¹ μέν² ἐστι καλεῖν ἐπὶ δαίτα θαλεῖν·
καὶ οὕτω προειπών ἐτέρους τινὰς
οἱ καλέουσιν ἀοιδὸν
φησιν,
δ' κεν τέρπησιν ἀπαντας.
καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις δέ φησιν 'Οδυσσεῖς ταύτην ἄριστην
ἐιναι διαγωγήν, ὅταν εὐθυγραμμένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων
δαιμονίων δ' ἀνὰ δώματ' ἀκούαζωνται ἀοιδὸν
ἡμενοι ἔξεις.
III. "Οτι μὲν τοίνυν ἐστὶ παιδείᾳ τις ἢν οὐχ ὡς 1
χρησίμην παιδευτέον τοὺς νείχες οὐδ' ὡς ἀναγκαίαν
ἀλλ' ὡς ἐλευθερίων καὶ καλήν, φανερὸν ἐστιν-
πότερον δὲ μία τῶν ἄριμμον ἡ πλείους, καὶ τίνες
αὐταὶ καὶ πῶς, ὑστερον λεκτέον περὶ αὐτῶν, νῦν δὲ

¹ Schneider: οἶνον codd. ² θέμις Ellis.

---

a This line is not in our Odyssey, but apparently followed xvii. 383. The passage runs (382 ff.):

τίς γὰρ ὦ ἔξειν καλεὶ ἀλλοθὲν αὐτὸς ἐπελθὼν
ἀλλον γ' , εἰ μὴ τῶν οἱ δημοσεργοὶ ἔσσι,
μάντιν ἢ ἦθηρα κακῶν ἢ τέκτων δούρων,
ἡ καὶ βέσιν ἀοιδήν, δ' κεν τέρπησιν ἀείδων;

642
and writing are useful for business and for household management and for acquiring learning and for many pursuits of civil life, while drawing also seems to be useful in making us better judges of the works of artists), nor yet again as we pursue gymnastics, for the sake of health and strength (for we do not see either of these things produced as a result of music); it remains therefore that it is useful as a pastime in leisure, which is evidently the purpose for which people actually introduce it, for they rank it as a form of pastime that they think proper for free men. For this reason Homer wrote thus:

But him alone
'Tis meet to summon to the festal banquet a;

and after these words he speaks of certain others

Who call the bard that he may gladden all. b

And also in other verses Odysseus says that this is the best pastime, when, as men are enjoying good cheer,

The banqueters, seated in order due
Throughout the hall, may hear a minstrel sing. c

III. It is clear therefore that there is a form of Liberal education in which boys should be trained not because it is useful or necessary but as being liberal and noble; though whether there is one such subject of education or several, and what these are and how they are to be pursued, must be discussed later, d but as it is

b The third line quoted corresponds to this, but not exactly.
Odyssey, ix. 5 f.

This promise is not fulfilled.
1338 a

35 tosoouton he'min einai pro odoi gegeven, oti kai para tov arxaiov exomiev tina marturian ek tov kata-

38 beblhmenovn paiideumaton. he yar mouistiktou to esto

40 poiwei dhloun. eti de kai tov chrismovn oti dei tina

pайдевосбай товс пайдас оу мован диа то хрхимон,

oin tnv tnv grammatwn makhtovn, alla kai dia

to pollas endexesbathe giynvesbaiti autovn madh-

seis eterass. omois de kai tihn grafikhn oux ina

2 en tois idious wnois u' diamarthnson alla dous

anexapaghtov pro's tihn tov skevon onhn te kai

prarou, alla1 malloin oti poiwei thewrtikovn tou

peri ta svolata kallos. to de zhteiw pantachou

to chrhismon hkiosta armobtee tois megaloiphtovn

ei tois eleutheroi. etei de fanerovn protorov2

tois thesen he tov logov pai'devteon einai, kai peri

to svolma protorov he tihn diavonai, dhloun ek tou'ton

oti paradotetov tovs pайдas gamvastikh kai pai'do-

trivikh. tou'ton yar he men pouan tina poiwei tihn

exi ton svomatos. he de ta erga.

Nv nv ouv ai malista dokousoi tov polewon 3

epimeleisbhai tnv pайдwn ai men aithhtikh exi

empoiouon, lovoinemai tia te eido kai tihn aixhos

oun tov svomatovn, oti de Lakones tauntan men oux

hmar ton tihn a'martian, thrmades h aperegaxontai

tois pwnou, h vs touto prof anbria malista

sufereon. kai tov, kathaper erietai pollakias, ou'te

prof main ou'te prof malista taunti blenonta

1 alla Thurot: he codd. (malloin he Postgate).

2 Demetrius: potevon codd.

3 i.e. premature and disproportionate muscular develop-

ment, directed to some particular competition. Cf.

1288 b 12 ff.

644
we have made this much progress on the way, that we have some testimony even from the ancients, derived from the courses of education which they founded—for the point is proved by music. And it is also clear that some of the useful subjects as well ought to be studied by the young not only because of their utility, like the study of reading and writing, but also because they may lead on to many other branches of knowledge; and similarly they should study drawing not in order that they may not go wrong in their private purchases and may avoid being cheated in buying and selling furniture, but rather because this study makes a man observant of bodily beauty; and to seek for utility everywhere is entirely unsuited to men that are great-souled and free. And since it is plain that education by habit must come before education by reason, and training of the body before training of the mind, it is clear from these considerations that the boys must be handed over to the care of the wrestling-master and the trainer; for the latter imparts a certain quality to the habit of the body and the former to its actions.

Now at the present time some of the states reputed to pay the greatest attention to children produce in them an athletic habit to the detriment of their bodily form and growth, while the Spartans although they have avoided this error yet make their boys animal in nature by their laborious exercises, in the belief that this is most contributory to manly courage. Yet, as has often been said, it is not right to regulate education with a view to one virtue only, or to this one most of all; indeed they do not even investigate the question.
ποιητέον τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν· εἰ τε καὶ πρὸς ταῦτην, οὖθέ τοῦτο ἐξευρίσκουσον. οὔτε γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἦτοι οὔτ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἐθνῶν ὄρωμεν τὴν ἁνδρίαν ἀκολουθοῦσαν τοὺς ἀγριωτάτους, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοῖς ἡμερωτέροις καὶ λεοντώδεις ἥθεσιν. πολλὰ δ' ἐστὶ τῶν ἐθνῶν ἀ πρὸς τὸ κτείνεν καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀνθρωποφαγίαν εὐχερῶς ἔχει, καθάπερ τῶν περὶ τὸν Πόντον Ἀχαιοὶ τε καὶ Ἡμίοχοι, καὶ τῶν ἡπειρωτικῶν ἐθνῶν ἔτερα, τὰ μὲν ὁμοίως τούτους τὰ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἣ ληστικὰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀνδρείας δ' οὐ μετελήφασιν. ἔτι δ' αὐτοὺς τοὺς Λάκωνας ἵσμεν, ἔως μὲν αὐτόλι προσήδρευον ταῖς φιλοσοφίαις, ὑπερέχοντας τῶν ἄλλων, νῦν δὲ καὶ τοῖς γυμνασίοις καὶ τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἁγώοι λειτουμένους ἐτέρων· οὐ γὰρ τῶν τοὺς νέους γυμνάζειν τὸν πρόπον τοῦτον διέφερον, ἀλλὰ μόνον τῷ πρὸς μὴ ἀσκοῦντας ἀσκεῖν.

靺τε τὸ καλὸν ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ θηρίωδες δεῖ πρωταγωνιστεῖν· οὐ γὰρ λύκος οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων θηρίων τί ἀγωνίσατο ἀνουθένα καλὸν κίνδυνον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀνηρ ἁγάθος. οὐ δὲ λίαν εἰς ταῦτα ἀνέντες τοὺς πάϊδας καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαῖων ἀπαιδαγωγήτων ποιῆσαντες βαλαβάδους κατεργάζονται κατὰ γε τὸ ἀληθὲς, πρὸς ἐν τε μόνον ἑργον τῇ πολιτικῇ χρησίμοις ποιησάσετε καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο χεῖρον, ὡς φησὶν ὅ λόγος, ἐτέρων. δεῖ δὲ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν προτέρων ἑργον κρίνειν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν νῦν ἀνταγωνιστάς γὰρ τῆς παιδείας νῦν ἐχοῦσιν, πρότερον δ' οὐκ εἶχον.

IV. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν χρηστέον τῇ γυμναστικῇ, καὶ

---

1 αὐτόλι <μόνον> Eucken.
3 οὔθεν Goettling.
4 ἐν τῇ ? ed.
5 δεὶ δὲ—εἶχον ante 29 ὡστε transp. Bekker.
whether this virtue is to be had in view at all. For neither in the lower animals nor in the case of foreign races do we see that courage goes with the wildest, but rather with the gentler and lion-like temperaments. And there are many foreign races inclined to murder and cannibalism, for example among the tribes of the Black Sea the Achaeans and Heniochi, and others of the mainland races, some in the same degree as those named and some more, which although piratical have got no share of manly courage. And again we know that even the Spartans, although so long as they persisted by themselves in their laborious exercises they surpassed all other peoples, now fall behind others both in gymnastic and in military contests; for they used not to excel because they exercised their young men in this fashion but only because they trained and their adversaries did not. Consequently honour and not animal ferocity should play the first part; for it is not a wolf nor one of the other wild animals that will venture upon any noble hazard, but rather a good man. But those who let boys pursue these hard exercises too much and turn them out untrained in necessary things in real truth render them vulgar, making them available for statesmanship to use for one task only, and even for this task training them worse than others do, as our argument proves. And we must not judge them from their former achievements but from the facts of to-day; for they have rivals in their education now, but they used to have none before.

IV. It is therefore agreed that we should employ

---

* Hist. An. 629 b 8 (the lion is gentle except when hungry); Plato, Soph. 231 a (the dog the gentlest of animals).

* This sentence would come better at the end of § 4.
πῶς χρηστέον, ὁμολογούμενον ἐστιν. μέχρι μὲν γὰρ ἡβής κουφότερα γυμνάσμα προσοιστέον, τὴν βίαν τροφῆν καὶ τοὺς πρὸς ἀνάγκην πόνους ἀπείροντας, ἦν μηθὲν ἐμπόδιον ἢ πρὸς τὴν αὐξησιν. οὕτω εἰς ἄρ να μικρὸν ὅτι δύναται τοῦτο παρασκευάζειν, ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ὀλυμπίοικοις δύο τις ἂν ἲ τρεῖς εὕροι τοὺς αὐτοὺς νευκηκότας ἄνδρας τε καὶ παιδὰς διὰ τὸ νέος ἀσκοῦντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὴν δύναμιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαῖων γυμνασίων. ὅταν δὲ ἀφ' ἡβής ἔτη τρία πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις μαθήματι γένωνται, τότε ἀρμόττει καὶ τοῖς πόνοις καὶ ταῖς ἀναγκοφαγίαις καταλαμβάνειν τὴν ἔχομενην ἡλικίαν. ἀμα γὰρ τῇ τε διανοίᾳ καὶ τῷ σώματι διαπονεῖν τούτῳ, τοῦναντίον γὰρ ἐκάτερος ἀπεργάζεσθαι πέφυκε τῶν πόνων, ἐμποδίζων ὃ μὲν τοῦ σώματος πόνοι τῆν διάνοιαν δὲ ταῦτας τὸ σῶμα.

Περὶ δὲ μονικής ἐνα μὲν διαπορησαμέν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ πρῶτον, καλῶς δ' ἔχει καὶ νῦν ἀναλαβόντας αὐτὰ προαγαγεῖν, ἢν ῥόσπερ ἐνδόσιμον γεννηται τοῖς λόγοις οὐς ἂν τις εἴπειεν ἀποφαίνωμενοι περὶ αὐτῆς. οὔτε γὰρ τίνα ἔχει δύναμιν ῥάδιον περὶ αὐτῆς διελείπειν, οὔτε τίνος δεῖ χάριν μετέχειν αὐτῆς, πότερον παιδίας ἐνεκα καὶ ἀναπαύσεως, καθάπερ ὑπνοι καὶ μέθης (ταῦτα γὰρ καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν οὖτε τῶν σπουδαίων, ἀλλ' ἤδεα, καὶ ἀναπαύει μέριμναν, ὃς φησὶν Εὐριπίδης, διὸ καὶ τάττουσιν αὐτὴν καὶ χρώναι τάσι τούτοις ὁμοίως,

1 Goettling: ἡμα παῦει μέριμναν aut ἡμα μέριμναν τοιει codd.
2 πρᾶττουσιν Richards.

*i.e.* compulsion to eat very large rations of prescribed food—the Greek way of training.

648
gymnastic training, and how we should employ it. For until puberty we should apply lighter exercises, forbidding hard diet and severe exertions, in order that nothing may hinder the growth; for there is no small proof that too severe training can produce this result in the fact that in the list of Olympic victors one would only find two or three persons who have won both as men and as boys, because when people go into training in youth the severe exercises rob them of their strength. But when they have spent three years after puberty upon their other studies, then it is suitable to occupy the next period of life with laborious exercises and strict training diet; for it is wrong to work hard with the mind and the body at the same time, for it is the nature of the two different sorts of exertion to produce opposite effects, bodily toil impeding the development of the mind and mental toil that of the body.

About music on the other hand we have previously raised some questions in the course of our argument, but it is well to take them up again and carry them further now, in order that this may give the key so to speak for the principles which one might advance in pronouncing about it. For it is not easy to say precisely what potency it possesses, nor yet for the sake of what object one should participate in it—whether for amusement and relaxation, as one indulges in sleep and deep drinking (for these in themselves are not serious pursuits but merely pleasant, and ‘relax our care,’ as Euripides says; owing to which people actually class music with them and employ

\[ Bocchae 378 (Bromios) \delta\tau\delta'\ 'ε\'ε\'ε, \| \theta\'ια\'σ\'ε\'βε\'ι\nu\ τ\ε\ χ\'ο\'ρ\'ο\'ι\ν \| \mu\'ε\τ\α τ\' α\'ι\'λ\'ω\ν \gamma\'ε\'λ\'α\'σα\ι | \'\α\'ν\α\'π\α\'\υ\'σα\ι \τ\ε \μ\'ε\'ρ\'ι\'μ\'υ\'α\ι. \]  

\[ Or ' and it is owing to this that people perform music.' \]
The term *διαγωγή*, 'pastime,' is idiomatically used of the pursuits of cultured leisure—serious conversation, music, the drama.

Or, altering the text, 'relaxation.'
all of these things, sleep, deep drinking and music, in the same way, and they also place dancing in the same class); or whether we ought rather to think that music tends in some degree to virtue (music being capable of producing a certain quality of character just as gymnastics are capable of producing a certain quality of body, music accustoming men to be able to rejoice rightly); or that it contributes something to intellectual entertainment and culture (for this must be set down as a third alternative among those mentioned). Now it is not difficult to see that one must not make amusement the object of the education of the young; for amusement does not go with learning—learning is a painful process. Nor yet moreover is it suitable to assign intellectual entertainment to boys and to the young; for a thing that is an end does not belong to anything that is imperfect. But perhaps it might be thought that the serious pursuits of boys are for the sake of amusement when they have grown up to be men. But if something of this sort is the case, why should the young need to learn this accomplishment themselves, and not, like the Persian and Median kings, participate in the pleasure and the education of music by means of others performing it? for those who have made music a business and profession must necessarily perform better than those who practise only long enough to learn. But if it is proper for them to labour at accomplishments of this sort, then it would also be right for them to prepare the dishes of an elaborate cuisine; but this is absurd. And the same difficulty also arises as to the question whether learning music can improve their characters; for why should they learn to per-
ARISTOTLE

1339 b γὰρ τί δεὶ μανθάνειν αὐτοῦς, ἀλλ' οὖχ ἐτέρων ἀκούοντας ὀρθῶς τε χαίρειν καὶ δύνασθαι κρίνειν, ὡσπερ οἱ Λάκωνες; ἔκεινοι γὰρ οὖ μανθάνοντες ὄμως δύνανται κρίνειν ὀρθῶς, ὡς φασί, τὰ χρηστὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ χρηστὰ τῶν μελῶν. ὃ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος 5 κἂν εἰ πρὸς εὐημερίαν καὶ διαγωγὴν ἐλευθέρων χρηστέουν αὐτῇ· τί δεὶ μανθάνειν αὐτοὺς, ἀλλ' οὖχ ἐτέρων χρωμένων ἀπολαύειν; σκοπεῖν δ' ἔξεστι 7 τὴν ὑπόληψιν ἣν ἔχομεν περὶ τῶν θεῶν· οὐ γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ἄδει καὶ κιθαρίζει τοῖς ποιηταῖς. ἀλλὰ καὶ βαναύσουσι καλοῦμεν τοὺς τοιούτους καὶ τὸ 10 πράττειν οὖν ἀνδρὸς μὴ μεθύοντος ἢ παύοντος.

V. Ἀλλ' ἦσως περὶ μὲν τοῦτων ὑστερον ἐπι- 1 σκεπτέον· ἣ δὲ πρῶτη ζήτησις ἐστὶ πότερον οὐ θετέον εἰς παιδείαν τὴν μουσικὴν ἡ θετέον, καὶ τί δύναται τῶν διαπορθηθέντων τριῶν, πότερον παι- 15 δείαν ἡ παιδιὰν ἡ διαγωγὴν. εὐλόγως δ' εἰς πάντα τάττεται καὶ φαίνεται μετέχειν. ἡ τε γὰρ παιδιὰ χάριν ἀναπαύσεως ἐστὶ, τὴν δ' ἀνάπαυσιν ἀναγκαίον ἢ δεῖαν εἶναι (τῆς γὰρ διὰ τῶν πόνων λύπης ἰατρεία τίς ἐστιν), καὶ τὴν διαγωγὴν ὀμο- 20 λογομορφίαν δεῖ μὴ μόνον ἔχειν τὸ καλὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν (τὸ γὰρ εὐδαίμονεν ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τοῦτων ἔστιν· τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν πάντες εἶναι φαίμεν τῶν ἡδίστων, καὶ ψιλὴν οὕτων καὶ μετὰ μελωδίας (φησὶ γνῶν καὶ Μουσαίος εἶναι βροτοῖς ἡδίστοις 2 άείδειν, διὸ καὶ εἰς τὰς συνουσίας καὶ διαγωγὰς εὐλόγως παραλαμβάνουσιν αὐτὴν ὡς δυναμένην

A semi-legendary bard, to whom a number of oracular verses that were current were attributed.

652
form edifying music themselves, instead of learning to enjoy it rightly and be able to judge it when they hear others performing, as the Spartans do? for the Spartans although they do not learn to perform can nevertheless judge good and bad music correctly, so it is said. And the same argument applies also if music is to be employed for refined enjoyment and entertainment; why need people learn to perform themselves instead of enjoying music played by 7 others? And we may consider the conception that we have about the gods: Zeus does not sing and harp to the poets himself. But professional musicians we speak of as vulgar people, and indeed we think it not manly to perform music, except when drunk or for fun.

1 V. But perhaps these points will have to be considered afterwards; our first inquiry is whether music ought not or ought to be included in education, and what is its efficacy among the three uses of it that have been discussed—does it serve for education or amusement or entertainment? It is reasonable to reckon it under all of these heads, and it appears to participate in them all. Amusement is for the sake of relaxation, and relaxation must necessarily be pleasant, for it is a way of curing the pain due to laborious work; also entertainment ought admittedly to be not only honourable but also pleasant, for happiness is derived from both honour and pleasure; but we all pronounce music to be one of the pleasantest things, whether instrumental or instrumental and 2 vocal music together (at least Musaeus*a says, ‘Song is man’s sweetest joy,’ and that is why people with good reason introduce it at parties and entertainments, for its exhilarating effect), so that for this
αὖτε καὶ ἐνετεύθεν ἃν τις ὑπολάβοι
παιδεύεσθαι δεῖν αὐτὴν τοὺς νεωτέρους. ὅσα γὰρ ἀβλαβῆ τῶν ἥδεων, οὐ μόνον ἀρμότετε πρὸς τὸ
tέλος ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀνάπαυσιν· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐν
μὲν τῷ τέλει συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὀλγάκις
γίγνεσθαι, πολλάκις δὲ ἀναπαύονται καὶ χρῶνται
ταῖς παιδιαῖς οὐχ ὅσον ἐπὶ πλέον ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν
ἡδονὴν, χρήσιμον ἃν εὔθεια διαναπαύεων ἐν ταῖς ἀπὸ
tαύτης ἡδοναῖς. συμβέβηκε δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις 3
ποιεῖσθαι τὰς παιδιὰς τέλος· ἐχεῖ γὰρ ἅπας ἡδονήν
tινα, καὶ τὸ τέλος, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν, ζητοῦντε
δὲ ταύτην λαμβάνουσιν ὡς ταύτην ἐκείνην διὰ
τὸ τῷ τέλει τῶν πράξεων ἐχείν ὁμοιώματι τι. τὸ τε
γὰρ τέλος οὐθένος τῶν ἐσομένων χάριν αἰρετόν,
καὶ αἱ τοιαύται τῶν ἡδονῶν οὐθένος εἰσι τῶν
ἐσομένων ἕνεκεν, ἀλλὰ τῶν γεγονότων, ὅπως πόνων
καὶ λύπης. δι' ἣν μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν ζητοῦσι τὴν
ἐνδαιμονίαν γίγνεσθαι διὰ τούτων τῶν ἡδονῶν,
ταύτην ἃν τις εἰκότως ὑπολάβοι τὴν αἰτίαν· περὶ 4
δὲ τοῦ κοινωνεῖν τῆς μούσικῆς, οὐ διὰ ταύτην
μόνην, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι πρὸς τὰς
ἀναπαύσεις, ὡς ἔοικεν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ ζητητέον μὴ
ποτε τοῦτο μὲν συμβέβηκε, τιμωτέρα δ' αὐτής ἡ
φύσις ἐστὶν ἡ κατὰ τὴν εἰρημένην χρείαν, καὶ δει
μὴ μόνον τῆς κοινῆς ἡδονῆς μετέχειν ἀπ' αὐτής,
ἡς ἔχουσι πάντες αἰσθήσεων (ἐγεῖ γὰρ ἡ μουσικὴ τὴν
ἡδονὴν φυσικῆν, διὸ πάσαις ἡλικίαις καὶ πᾶσιν
ἡθειν ἡ χρήσις αὐτῆς ἐστὶ προσφιλής), ἀλλ' ἵναν
reason also one might suppose that the younger men ought to be educated in music. For all harmless pleasures are not only suitable for the ultimate object but also for relaxation; and as it but rarely happens for men to reach their ultimate object, whereas they often relax and pursue amusement not so much with some ulterior object but because of the pleasure of it, it would be serviceable to let them relax at intervals in the pleasures derived from music.

3 But it has come about that men make amusements an end; for the end also perhaps contains a certain pleasure, but not any ordinary pleasure, and seeking this they take the other as being this because it has a certain resemblance to the achievement of the end of their undertakings. For the end is desirable not for the sake of anything that will result from it, and also pleasures of the sort under consideration are not desirable for the sake of some future result, but because of things that have happened already, for instance labour and pain. One might then perhaps assume this to be the reason which causes men to seek to procure happiness by means of those pleasures; but in the case of taking part in music, this is not because of this reason only, but also because performing music is useful, as it seems, for relaxation. But nevertheless we must examine whether it is not the case that, although this has come about, yet the nature of music is more honourable than corresponds with the employment of it mentioned, and it is proper not only to participate in the common pleasure that springs from it, which is perceptible to everybody (for the pleasure contained in music is of a natural kind, owing to which the use of it is dear to those of all ages and characters), but to see if its influence
ARISTOTLE

1340 a

ei πη καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἱθὸς συντείνει καὶ πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν. τοῦτο δ' ἀν εἰη δῆλον εἰ ποιοὶ τινες τὰ ἱθη γιγνόμεθα δι' αὐτῆς. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁτι γιγνόμεθα 5 ποιοί τινες, φανερών διὰ πολλῶν μὲν καὶ ἑτέρων, 10 οὐχ ἡκίστα δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν Ὄλυμπου μελῶν· ταῦτα γὰρ ὁμολογοµένως ποιεῖ τὰς ψυχὰς ἐνθουσιαστικὰς, ὃ δ' ἐνθουσιασμὸς τοῦ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἱθους πάθος ἐστίν. ἐτὶ δὲ ἀκροώµενοι τῶν μιμήσεων γίγνονται πάντες συµπαθεῖς, καὶ χωρὶς τῶν ῥυθµῶν καὶ τῶν μελῶν αὐτῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ συµβέβηκεν 15 εἶναι τὴν µουσικὴν τῶν ἱδέων, τὴν δ' ἀρέτην περὶ τὸ χαίρειν ὅρθως καὶ φιλεῖν καὶ µισεῖν, δεῖ δῆλον ὅτι µανθάνειν καὶ συνεθιζεῖσθαι µηθὲν οὕτως ὧς τὸ κρίνειν ὅρθως καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς ἑπιεικεῖσιν ἱδεσι καὶ ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν· ἐστὶ δ' ὁµοώµατα 6 μάλιστα παρὰ τὰς ἀληθινὰς φύσεις ἐν τοῖς ῥυθµοῖς 20 καὶ τοῖς µέλεσιν ὤργης καὶ πραοτητος, ἐτι δ' ἀνδρίας καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων τούτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἱθικῶν (δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων, µεταβάλλοµεν γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀκροώµενοι τοιούτων). ὃ δ' ἐν τοῖς ὁµοίοις ἐθισµὸς τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ χαίρειν ἐγγὺς ἐστὶ τῷ πρὸς τὴν ἀληθείαν 25 τῶν αὐτῶν ἔχειν τρόπον (οἶνον εἰ τις χαίρει τήν εἰκόνα τινὸς θεώµενος μὴ δι' ἄλλην αὐτὶαν ἄλλα διὰ τὴν μορφὴν την αὐτήν, ἀναγκαίον τούτω καὶ αὐτὴν ἐκείνην τὴν θεωρίαν οὕτω τὴν εἰκόνα θεωρεῖ ἱδε IOError εἶναι) συµβέβηκε δὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐν μὲν 7 τοῖς ἄλλοις µηθέν ὑπάρχειν ὀµοίωµα τοῖς ἱθεσιν,

1 hic lacunam Γ: <τῶν λόγων διὰ> Susemihl.
2 ἱθόων Richards.

---

A Phrygian composer of the seventh century B.C.

Music dramatically expressing various states of emotion.
reaches also in a manner to the character and to the soul. And this would clearly be the case if we are affected in our characters in a certain manner by it.  

But it is clear that we are affected in a certain manner, both by many other kinds of music and not least by the melodies of Olympus; for these admittedly make our souls enthusiastic, and enthusiasm is an affection of the character of the soul. And moreover everybody when listening to imitations is thrown into a corresponding state of feeling, even apart from the rhythms and tunes themselves. And since it is the case that music is one of the things that give pleasure, and that virtue has to do with feeling delight and love and hatred rightly, there is obviously nothing that it is more needful to learn and become habituated to than to judge correctly and to delight in virtuous characters and noble actions; but rhythms and melodies contain representations of anger and mildness, and also of courage and temperance and all their opposites and the other moral qualities, that most closely correspond to the true natures of these qualities (and this is clear from the facts of what occurs—when we listen to such representations we change in our soul); and habituation in feeling pain and delight at representations of reality is close to feeling them towards actual reality (for example, if a man delights in beholding the statue of somebody for no other reason than because of its actual form, the actual sight of the person whose statue he beholds must also of necessity give him pleasure); and it is the case that whereas the other objects of sensation contain no representation of

A probable correction of the Greek gives 'by the rhythms and tunes themselves, even apart from the words.'
ARISTOTLE

30 οίον ἐν τοῖς ἀπτοῖς καὶ τοῖς γευστοῖς (ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ὀρατοῖς ἥρεμα, σχήματα γάρ ἐστὶ τοιαύτα, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ μικρὸν, κοῦ 1 πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσιν. ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶ ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἠθῶν ἀλλὰ σημεία μᾶλλον τὰ γυγνόμενα σχήματα καὶ χρώματα τῶν ἠθῶν, καὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾽ ὅσον διαφέρει καὶ περὶ τὴν τούτων θεωρίαν, δεῖ μὴ τὰ Παύσωνος θεωρεῖν τοὺς νέους ἀλλὰ τὰ Πολυννώτον κἂν εἰ τίς ἄλλος τῶν γραφεῶν ἡ τῶν ἀγαλματοποιῶν ἐστὶν ήθικός), ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέλεσιν αὐτοῖς 8 ἐστὶ μιμήματα τῶν ἠθῶν καὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ φανερὸν, εὐθὺς γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἀρμονίων διέστηκε φύσις ὡστε ἀκούοντας ἅλλως διατίθεσθαι καὶ μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν ἔχειν τρόπον πρὸς ἐκάστην αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν ἐνίας ὀδυρτικωτέρως καὶ συνεσθηκότως μᾶλλον, οἴον πρὸς τὴν μιξολυδιστὴ καλομένην, πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαλακωτέρως τὴν διάνοιαν, οἴον πρὸς τὰς ἀνεμένας, μέσως δὲ καὶ καθεστηκότως μᾶλιστα πρὸς ἐτέραν, οἴον δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἡ δωριστὶ μόνη τῶν ἀρμονίων, ἐνθουσιαστικοὺς δ᾽ ἡ φρυγιστὴ ταῦτα 9 γὰρ καλῶς λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ τῆν παιδείαν ταύτην πεφιλοσοφηκότες, λαμβάνουσι γὰρ τὰ μαρτύρια τῶν λόγων ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς ρυθμοὺς ὁι μὲν γὰρ ἡθος ἐχοντα στασιμωτέρων οἱ δὲ κινητικον καὶ τοῦτων οἱ μὲν φορτικωτέρας ἔχουσι τὰς κινήσεις

1 koū Mueller: kai codd.

1. ‘Not’ is a conjectural insertion.
2. i.e. these visual impressions do vary to some extent in moral effect.
3. Pauson is a painter otherwise little known. Polygnotus decorated the Stoa Poikile and other famous public buildings.
character, for example the objects of touch and taste (though the objects of sight do so slightly, for there are forms that represent character, but only to a small extent, and not all men participate in visual perception of such qualities; also visual works of art are not representations of character but rather the forms and colours produced are mere indications of character, and these indications are only bodily sensations during the emotions; not but what in so far as there is a difference even in regard to the observation of these indications, the young must not look at the works of Pauson but those of Polygnotus, and of any other moral painter or sculptor), pieces of music on the contrary do actually contain in themselves imitations of character; and this is manifest, for even in the nature of the mere melodies there are differences, so that people when hearing them are affected differently and have not the same feelings in regard to each of them, but listen to some in a more mournful and restrained state, for instance the mode called Mixolydian, and to others in a softer state of mind, but in a midway state and with the greatest composure to another, as the Dorian mode alone of tunes seems to act, while the Phrygian makes men enthusiastic; for these things are well stated by those who have studied this form of education, as they derive the evidence for their theories from the actual facts of experience. And the same holds good about the rhythms also, for some have a more stable and others a more emotional character, and of the latter some are more vulgar in their at Athens, in the middle of the 5th century B.C. 'Polygnotus represented men as better than they really were, Pauson as worse' (Poetics 1448 a 5).
The former doctrine is Pythagorean, the latter is stated by Plato, Phaedo 93.

Archytas a Pythagorean philosopher, mathematician,
emotional effects and others more liberal. From these considerations therefore it is plain that music has the power of producing a certain effect on the moral character of the soul, and if it has the power to do this, it is clear that the young must be directed to music and must be educated in it. Also education in music is well adapted to the youthful nature; for the young owing to their youth cannot endure anything not sweetened by pleasure, and music is by nature a thing that has a pleasant sweetness. And we seem to have a certain affinity with tunes and rhythms; owing to which many wise men say either that the soul is a harmony or that it has harmony.  

VI. We ought now to decide the question raised earlier, whether the young ought to learn music by singing and playing themselves or not. It is not difficult to see that it makes a great difference in the process of acquiring a certain quality whether one takes a part in the actions that impart it oneself; for it is a thing that is impossible, or difficult, to become a good judge of performances if one has not taken part in them. At the same time also boys must have some occupation, and one must think Archytas's rattle a good invention, which people give to children in order that while occupied with this they may not break any of the furniture; for young things cannot keep still. Whereas then a rattle is a suitable occupation for infant children, education serves as a rattle for young people when older. Such considerations therefore prove that children should be trained in music so as actually statesman, and general of Tarentum, contemporary with Plato. He was interested in mechanics; but one tradition ascribes the toy in question to a carpenter of the same name.
It is difficult not to think that either the nouns or the adverbs in the Greek have been erroneously transposed, and that we should translate 'either for learning them now or for practising them later on.'
2 to take part in its performance; and it is not difficult to distinguish what is suitable and unsuitable for various ages, and to refute those who assert that the practice of music is vulgar. For first, inasmuch as it is necessary to take part in the performances for the sake of judging them, it is therefore proper for the pupils when young actually to engage in the performances, though when they get older they should be released from performing, but be able to judge what is beautiful and enjoy it rightly because of the study in which they engaged in their youth.

3 Then as to the objection raised by some people that music makes people vulgar, it is not difficult to solve it by considering how far pupils who are being educated with a view to civic virtue should take part in the actual performance of music, and in what times and what rhythms they should take part, and also what kinds of instruments should be used in their studies, as this naturally makes a difference. For the solution of the objection depends upon these points, as it is quite possible that some modes of music do produce the result mentioned. It is manifest therefore that the study of music must not place a hindrance in the way of subsequent activities, nor vulgarize the bodily frame and make it useless for the exercises of the soldier and the citizen, either for their practical pursuit now or for their scientific study later on. And this would come about in respect of their study if the pupils did not go on toiling at the exercises that aim at professional competitions, nor the wonderful and elaborate performances which have now entered into the competitions and have passed from the competitions into
1341 a

τὴν παιδείαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ τουαῦτα μέχρι περ ἂν δύνανται χαίρειν τοῖς καλοῖς μέλεσι καὶ 
15 ὑθμοῖς, καὶ μὴ μόνον τῷ κοινῷ τῆς μουσικῆς, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔνια ζώων, ἔτι δὲ καὶ πλῆθος 
ἀνδραπόδων καὶ παιδίων. δὴ λοι ἐκ τοῦτων 5 καὶ ποίους ὀργάνους χρῆστεν. οὔτε γὰρ αὐλοῦς 
eis παιδείαν ἀκτέον οὔτ' ἄλλο τεχνικόν ὀργανον, 
οἷον κιθάραι κἂν εἴ τι τουιττον ἐτερον ἐστιν, ἀλλ' 
20 ὅσα ποιῆσιει αὐτῶν8 ἀκροατὰς ἀγαθοὺς ἡ τῆς μουσικῆς παιδείας ἡ τῆς ἁλλης. ἔτι δ' οὔκ ἐστιν ὁ 
αὐλός ἑθικον ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὄργανοικον, ὡστε πρὸς τοὺς τοιουτους αὐτῶ παιροὺς χρηστεῖον ἐν οἷς ἡ 
θεωρία κάθαραν μᾶλλον δύναται ἡ μάθησιν. 
προσθάμεν δὲ ὅτι συμβέβηκεν αὐτῷ8 ἐναντίον 
25 πρὸς παιδείαν καὶ τὸ κωλύειν τῷ λόγῳ χρῆσθαι 
τὴν αὐλήσιν. διὸ καλῶς ἀπεδοκίμασαν αὐτόὺς2 οἱ 
πρότερον τὴν χρήσιν ἧκ τῶν νέων καὶ τῶν ἐλευ-
θέρων, καὶπερ χρησάμενοι τὸ πρῶτον αὐτῶ. 
σχολαστικότεροι γὰρ γιγνόμενοι διὰ τὰς εὐπο-
ρίας καὶ μεγαλομυχότεροι πρὸς ἀρετήν, ἔτε 
πρότερον καὶ μετὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ φρονηματισθέντες 
ἐκ τῶν ἐργών, πάσης ἡπτοντο μαθῆσεως, οὐδὲν 
διακρίνοντες ἀλλ' ἑπιζητοῦντες. διὸ καὶ τὴν 
αὐλητικὴν ἡγαγον πρὸς τὰς μαθῆσεις. καὶ γὰρ ἐν 
Λακεδαίμονι τὸς χορηγὸς αὐτὸς ἡμίσει τῷ χορῷ, 
καὶ περὶ Ἀθηνῶς οὕτως ἐπεχωρίασεν ὡστε σχεδὸν

1 τὰ μὴ Immisch: τὰ codd. 
2 αὐτῶν, αὐτῷ, αὐτοῦ propter hiatum secludenda ? Immisch: 
lege poiyse tovouton—enantion autow—ol proteron autow Richards.

See 1341 b 33 ff. 
A wealthy citizen who undertook the duty of equipping
education, but also only practised exercises not of that sort until they are able to enjoy beautiful tunes and rhythms, and not merely the charm common to all music, which even some lower animals enjoy, as well as a multitude of slaves and children. And it is also clear from these considerations what sort of instruments they should use. Flutes must not be introduced into education, nor any other professional instrument, such as the harp or any other of that sort, but such instruments as will make them attentive pupils either at their musical training or in their other lessons. Moreover the flute is not a moralizing but rather an exciting influence, so that it ought to be used for occasions of the kind at which attendance has the effect of purification rather than instruction. And let us add that the flute happens to possess the additional property telling against its use in education that playing it prevents the employment of speech. Hence former ages rightly rejected its use by the young and the free, although at first they had employed it. For as they came to have more leisure because of their wealth and grew more high-spirited and valorous, both at a still earlier date and because after the Persian Wars they were filled with pride as a result of their achievements, they began to engage in all branches of learning, making no distinction but pursuing research further. Because of this they even included flute-playing among their studies; for in Sparta a certain chorus-leader played the flute to his chorus himself and at Athens and training a chorus for a religious celebration (especially the production of a drama at Athens) usually had an assistant of lower station to supply the instrumental music. The office of choregus is not elsewhere referred to as existing at Sparta.
ARISTOTLE

35 oí polloi tōn eleuthērōn metaeixōn autēs· dhlon
dē ek toú pínakos òn anéthke Θρασιππος 'Ek-
phantidē xorēgýsas. òsteron ó' apedokimásothi diá tē
thēs peíras autēs, bēltion doumāmenon krínein tò
prōs ārethēn kai tò μή prōs ārethēn suunteínōn
õmioiws de kai pollla tōn ὅργανων tōn ārhoiwn,

341 b οtōn tēktidēs kai bárβitoi kai tā prōs hēdonē
suunteínonta tōs ákouousi tōn χρωμένων,1 épata-

γωνa kai trýgōnva kai samβúkai, kai pānta tā
deōmena xeiropoρhikēs épistēmēs. eulógyws ó' ēxei 8
kai tō perī tōn aulōw ùpò tōn ārhoiwn meμυθo-
loghēmenov. fasi gár ði tēn 'Aθhnān eũrhoúsan
āpobalēin tōs aulōus. oú kakώs méν oðn ēxei

5 φάναι kai diā tēn áσχημοσύνηn tōu prōswpou
tou to poúthēsai duxheρáνasan tēn ðeōn. oú mή
álλα μάllon eikόs ðti prōs tēn diάνoiañ oðthēn
éstin h ἡ παιδεία tēs aulēsēs, ði dē 'Aθhnā tēn
épistēmēn periptēmeñ kai tēn tēkhēn.

VII. 'Επεὶ dē tōn te ὅργανων kai2 tēs érgasías 1

10 ápodoκimázoomen tēn teκnikēn παιδείαν (teκnikēn
dē tīθemēn tēn prōs tōs aγώnas, ën tāutē yār ὁ
prάtτων oú tēs aútō metalexeirίzetai χάριν ārethēs,
álλa tēs aκouòntωn hēdonēs, kai tāutēs

fortikēs, diòsper oú tōn éleuthērōn krímomeñ ēnai
tēn érgasían, álλa θητικώτερα kai βανάσουσ

15 ðh suμβαινει γίγνεσθαι, poñhros yār ὁ skopōs

1 χρωμάτων ? Immisch. 2 <ἐνα> kai Immisch.

a Ephantides was one of the earliest comic poets; Thras-
ippus is not elsewhere recorded. Who the flute-player was
is unknown.

b These were old-fashioned forms of the lyre.

c A possible emendation of the Greek gives ' those who
listen to their modulations.'
it became so fashionable that almost the majority of freemen went in for flute-playing, as is shown by the tablet erected by Thrasippus after having provided the chorus for Ecphantides. But later on it came to be disapproved of as a result of actual experience, when men were more capable of judging what music conduced to virtue and what did not; and similarly also many of the old instruments were disapproved of, like the pectis and the barbitos and the instruments designed to give pleasure to those who hear people playing them, the septangle, the triangle and the sambyc, and all the instruments that require manual skill. And indeed there is a reasonable foundation for the story that was told by the ancients about the flute. The tale goes that Athene found a flute and threw it away. Now it is not a bad point in the story that the goddess did this out of annoyance because of the ugly distortion of her features; but as a matter of fact it is more likely that it was because education in flute-playing has no effect on the intelligence, whereas we attribute science and art to Athene.

VII. And since we reject professional education in the instruments and in performance (and we count performance in competitions as professional, for the performer does not take part in it for his own improvement, but for his hearers' pleasure, and that a vulgar pleasure, owing to which we do not consider performing to be proper for free men, but somewhat menial; and indeed performers do become vulgar, since the object at which they aim

3 Three different stringed instruments, the last having four strings stretched in a triangular frame.

4 The Greek should probably be altered to give 'reject some instruments and professional education in performance.'
πρὸς δὲν ποιοῦνται τὸ τέλος, ὦ γὰρ θεατὴς φορτικὸς ὥν μεταβάλλειν εἰσεῖς τὴν μουσικὴν, ὡστε καὶ τοὺς τεχνίτας τοὺς πρὸς αὐτὸν μελετῶντας αὐτούς τε ποιοῦσα τινα ποιεῖ καὶ τὰ σώματα διὰ τὰς κινήσεις σκεπτέον δὴ τις περὶ τε τὰς ἀρμονίας καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς, καὶ πρὸς παιδείαν πότερον πάσας χρηστέον ταῖς ἀρμονίαις καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς ἤ διαιρετέον, ἐπειτὰ τοῖς πρὸς παιδείαν διαπονοούσι πότερον τῶν αὐτῶν διορισμὸν θῆσομεν ἢ τρίτον δεὶ τινὰ ἐτερον (ἐπειδὴ τὴν μὲν μουσικὴν ὅρῳμεν διὰ μελοποιίας καὶ ῥυθμῶν οὕσαν, τούτων δὲ ἐκάτερον οὐ δεὶ λεληθέναι τίνα ἔχει δύναμιν πρὸς παιδείαν), καὶ πότερον προαιρετέον μᾶλλον τὴν εὐμελὴ μουσικὴν ἢ τὴν εὐρυθμον. νομίζαντες οὖν τὸν τὸν καλῶς λέγειν περὶ τούτων τῶν τε νῦν μουσικῶν ἔνιος καὶ τῶν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ὅσοι τήν ἠχοντος ἐμπείροντες ἔχοντες τῆς περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν παιδείας, τὴν μὲν καθ’ ἐκαστὸν ἀκριβολογιαν ἀποδοῦσομεν ἦτείν τοῖς βουλομένους παρ’ ἐκείνους, νῦν δὲ νομικῶς διέλωμεν, τοὺς τύπους μόνον εἰπόντες περὶ αὐτῶν. ἐπει δὲ τὴν διαιρέσιν ἀποδεχόμεθα τῶν μελῶν ὡς διαμορφών τινα τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφία, τα μὲν ἥθικα τὰ δὲ πρακτικὰ τὰ δὲ ἐνθουσιαστικὰ τιθέντες, καὶ τῶν ἀρμονίων τὴν φύσιν πρὸς ἐκαστα τούτων οἰκεῖαν ἀλλὴν πρὸς ἀλλῳ μέρος τιθέασι, φαίμεν δ’ οὐ μᾶς ἔνεκεν ὑφελείας τῇ μουσικῇ χρήσθαι δεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ πλεονων χάριν (καὶ γὰρ παιδείας ἐνεκεν καὶ καθάρσεως—

1 ὁμολογεῖ Busse (illius modi Ar.).
2 δὴ τι ed.: δὲ τι, δ’ ετί codd.: δὲ τὰ, ετὶ τὰ, δὴ ετί edd.
3 λογικῶς Richards.
4 μέλος Tyrwhitt.
is a low one, as vulgarity in the audience usually influences the music, so that it imparts to the artists who practise it with a view to suit the audience a special kind of personality, and also of bodily frame because of the movements required)—we must therefore give some consideration to tunes and rhythms, and to the question whether for educational purposes we must employ all the tunes and all the rhythms or make distinctions; and next, whether for those who are working at music for education we shall lay down the same regulation, or next we to establish some other third one (inasmuch as we see that the factors in music are melody and rhythm, and it is important to notice what influence each of these has upon education), and whether we are to prefer music with a good melody or music with a good rhythm. Now we consider that much is well said on these matters by some of the musicians of the present day and by some of those engaged in philosophy who happen to be experienced in musical education, and we will abandon the precise discussion as to each of these matters for any who wish it to seek it from those teachers, while for the present let us lay down general principles, merely stating the outlines of the subjects. And since we accept the classification of melodies made by some philosophers, as ethical melodies, melodies of action, and passionate melodies, distributing the various harmonies among these classes as being in nature akin to one or the other, and as we say that music ought to be employed not for the purpose of one benefit that it confers but on account of several (for it serves the purpose both of education and of pur-

\* i.e. representative of character, of action and of emotion.
τί δὲ λέγομεν τήν κάθαρσιν, νῦν μὲν ἀπλῶς, πάλιν
d' ἐν τοῖς περὶ πονητικῆς ἐροῦμεν σαφέστερον,—
τρίτον δὲ πρὸς διαγωγήν, πρὸς ἀνεσίν τε καὶ πρὸς
tὴν τῆς συντονίας ἀνάπαυσιν), φανερὸν ὅτι χρηστέον μὲν
πάσας ταῖς ἀρμονίαις, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον
πάσας χρηστέον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν τὴν παιδείαν ταῖς
ηθικώταται, πρὸς δὲ ἀκρόασιν ἔτερων χειροπ-
γούντων καὶ ταῖς πρακτικαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἐνθουσια-
στικαῖς (ὅ γὰρ περὶ ἐνὶς συμβαίνει πάθος ψυχᾶς
ἰσχυρῶς, τοῦτο ἐν πάσαις ὑπάρχει, τῷ δὲ ἦττον
dιαφέρει καὶ τῷ μάλλον—οἶδον ἐλεος καὶ φόβος,
ἔτι δ' ἐνθουσιασμός, καὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς
κυνήσεως κατακώχμιοι τινές εἰσιν, ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἵερῶν
μελῶν ὀρῶμεν τούτους ὅταν χρήσωται τοῖς
eξοργιάζουσι τὴν ψυχήν μέλεσι καθισταμένους
ἀσπερ ἀτρείας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως: ταύτῳ δ'
ὅ τοῦτο ἀναγκαῖον πάσχειν καὶ τοὺς ἑλεήμονας
καὶ τοὺς φοβητικοὺς καὶ τοὺς ὅλως παθητικοὺς
τοὺς ἅλλους καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει τῶν τοιούτων
ἐκάστω, καὶ πάσι γίγνεσθαι τινα κάθαρσον καὶ
κουφιζεσθαι μεθ' ἠδονῆς· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μέλη
tὰ καθαρτικὰ παρέχει χαράν ἁβλαβῆ τοῖς ἀν-
θρώποις). διὸ ταῖς μὲν τοιαύταις ἀρμονίαις καὶ
tοῖς τοιούτοις μέλεσι θετέον2 τοὺς τὴν θεατρικὴν
μουσικὴν μεταχειριζομένους ἀγνωστάς (ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ 7
θεστὴς διὸ τούτων, καὶ μὲν ἐλεύθερος καὶ πεπαιδευμένος,
δὲ φορτικὸς ἐκ βαναύσων καὶ θητῶν καὶ ἄλλων
τοιούτων συγκείμενοι, ἀποδοτεόν ἁγώνας καὶ
θεωρίας καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις πρὸς ἀνάπαυσιν· εἰσὶ

1 τοὺς Immisch: τοὺς ὅ' codd.
2 παιδευτέον Jebb: ἐτέον <χρησθαι> Richards.
Purification—the term purgation we use for the present without explanation, but we will return to discuss the meaning that we give to it more explicitly in our treatise on poetry—and thirdly it serves for amusement, serving to relax our tension and to give rest from it), it is clear that we should employ all the harmonies, yet not employ them all in the same way, but use the most ethical ones for education, and the active and passionate kinds for listening to when others are performing (for any experience that occurs violently in some souls is found in all, though with different degrees of intensity—for example pity and fear, and also religious excitement; for some persons are very liable to this form of emotion, and under the influence of sacred music we see these people, when they use tunes that violently arouse the soul, being thrown into a state as if they had received medicinal treatment and taken a purge; the same experience then must come also to the compassionate and the timid and the other emotional people generally in such degree as befalls each individual of these classes, and all must undergo a purgation and a pleasant feeling of relief; and similarly also the purgative melodies afford harmless delight to people). Therefore those who go in for theatrical music must be set to compete in harmonies and melodies of this kind (and since the audience is of two classes, one free-men and educated people, and the other the vulgar class composed of mechanics and labourers and other such persons, the latter sort also must be assigned competitions and shows for relaxation; and just as

* In Poetics c. vi. tragedy is said to purge the emotion of pity and fear by giving them an outlet; the reference here is probably to the lost Second Book of Poetics.
ARISTOTLE

1342 a

δέ ωσπερ αυτῶν αἱ ἄντικα παρεστραμμέναι τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἔξεως, οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἀρμονίων παρεκβάσεις εἰσὶ καὶ τῶν μελῶν τὰ σύντονα καὶ παρακεχρωσμένα, ποιεῖ δὲ τῇ ἡδονῇ ἐκάστοις τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ὁικεῖον, διόσπερ ἀποδοτέον ἐξουσίαν τοῖς ἀγωνιζομένοις πρὸς τὸν θεατὴν τὸν τοιοῦτον τουτούτῳ τῷ χρήσθαι τῷ γένει τῆς μουσικῆς. πρὸς δὲ παιδεῖαν, ὠσπερ ἐφηται, τοῖς θηκοῖς τῶν 8 μελῶν χρηστέον καὶ ταῖς ἀρμονίαις ταῖς τοιαύταις.

tοιαύτη δ' ἡ δωριστὶ, καθάπερ εἴπομεν πρότερον δέχεσθαι δὲ δεῖ καὶ τινα ἀλλήν ἡμῖν δοκιμάζοντων οἱ κοινωνικοὶ τῆς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατριβής καὶ τῆς περὶ τῆς μουσικῆς παιδείας. ὁ δ' ἐν τῇ Πολυτείᾳ Σωκράτης οὐ καλῶς τῆς φρυγιστὶ μόνην καταλείπει

1342 b

μετὰ τῆς δωριστὶ, καὶ ταῦτα ἀποδοκιμάσας τῶν ὄργανων τὸν αὐλόν. ἔχει γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν ἡ φρυγιστὶ τῶν ἀρμονίων ἑνπερ αὐλὸς ἐν τοῖς ὄργανοις άμφω γὰρ ὀργιαστικὰ καὶ παθητικά. δηλοῖ δ' ἡ ποίησις· πάσα γὰρ βακχεία καὶ πάσα 9

ἡ τοιαύτη κίνησις μᾶλιστα τῶν ὄργανων ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς αὐλοῖς, τῶν δ' ἀρμονίων ἐν τοῖς φρυγιστὶ μέλεισι λαμβάνει ταύτα τὸ πρέπον, οἷον ὁ διήθυραμβὸς ὀμολογουμένως εἶναι δοκεῖ Φρύγιον, καὶ τούτων πολλὰ παραδείγματα λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ τὴν σύνεσιν ταύτην ἀλλα σα, καὶ διότι Φιλόξενος ἐγ-

10 χειρήσας ἐν τῇ δωριστὶ ποιῆσαι διήθυραμβὸν τοῦς Μύσους1 οὐχ οἶδος τ' ἡ, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως

---

1 Reiz: μύθων codd.

---

* Said to mean divergent from the regular scale in having smaller intervals.

1 399 A.

2 Or perhaps βακχεία and κίνησις denote bodily movement.
their souls are warped from the natural state, so those harmonies and melodies that are highly strung and irregular in coloration are deviations, but people of each sort receive pleasure from what is naturally suited to them, owing to which the competitors before an audience of this sort must be allowed to employ some such kind of music as this); but for education, as has been said, the ethical class of melodies and of harmonies must be employed. And of that nature is the Dorian mode, as we said before; but we must also accept any other mode that those who take part in the pursuit of philosophy and in musical education may recommend to us. Socrates in the Republic does not do well in allowing only the Phrygian mode along with the Dorian, and that when he has rejected the flute among instruments; for the Phrygian mode has the same effect among harmonies as the flute among instruments—both are violently exciting and emotional. This is shown by poetry; for all Bacchic versification and all movement of that sort belongs particularly to the flute among the instruments, and these metres find their suitable accompaniment in tunes in the Phrygian mode among the harmonies: for example the dithyramb is admittedly held to be a Phrygian metre, and the experts on this subject adduce many instances to prove this, particularly the fact that Philoxenus when he attempted to compose a dithyramb, The Mysians, in the Dorian mode was unable to do so, accompanying the song; or they may denote the emotional frenzy expressed and stimulated by it. The dithyramb was a form of poetry of this class, originally celebrating the birth of Dionysus. Philoxenus, one of the most famous dithyrambic poets, 435-380 B.C., lived at Athens, and later at the court of Dionysius of Syracuse.
αὐτής ἔξεπεσεν εἰς τὴν φρυγιστὶ τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀρμονίαν πάλιν. περὶ δὲ τῆς δωριστὶ πάντες 10 ὀμολογοῦσι ὡς στασιμωτάτης οὐσης καὶ μάλιστ' ἤθος ἐχουσῆς ἀνδρείων. ἦτι δὲ ἐπεὶ τὸ μέσον μὲν 15 τῶν ὑπερβολῶν ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ χρήναι διώκειν φαμέν, ἡ δὲ δωριστὶ ταύτην ἔχει τὴν φύσιν πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἀρμονίας, φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ Δώρια μέλη πρέπει παιδεύεσθαι μᾶλλον τοῖς νεωτέροις. εἰσὶ δὲ δύο σκοποί, τὸ τε δυνατὸν καὶ τὸ πρέπον· καὶ γὰρ τὰ δυνατὰ δεῖ μεταχειρίζεσθαι μᾶλλον καὶ τὰ πρέποντα ἕκαστοις· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ταύτα ὠρισμένα ταῖς ἡλικίαις, οἷον τοῖς ἀπειρηκόσι διὰ χρόνου οὐ βάδιον ἄδειαν τὰς συντόνους ἀρμονίας, ἀλλά τὰς ἀνεμιμένας ἡ φύσις υποβάλλει τοῖς τηλυκούτοις. διὸ καλῶς ἐπιτιμῶσαι καὶ τοῦτο Σωκράτει τῶν περὶ 11 τὴν μουσικὴν τινὲς, ὅτι τὰς ἀνεμιμένας ἀρμονίας ἀποδοκιμάσειν εἰς τὴν παιδίαν,1 ὡς μεθυστικὰς λαμβάνων αὐτὰς, οὐ κατὰ τὴν τῆς μέθης δύναμιν, βακχευτικὸν γὰρ ἡ γε μέθη ποιεῖ μᾶλλον, ἀλλ' ἀπειρηκύνας. ἡστε καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐσομένην ἡλικίαν, τὴν τῶν πρεσβυτέρων, δεῖ καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀρμονίων ἀπτεθαι καὶ τῶν μελῶν τῶν τοιούτων, 20 ἦτι δ' εἰ τίς ἑτεί τοιαύτῃ τῶν ἀρμονίων ἡ πρέπει τῇ τῶν παιδίων ἡλικία διὰ τὸ δύνασθαι κόσμον τ' ἐχειν ἃμα καὶ παιδείαν, οἷον ἡ λυδιστὶ φαινε- ται πεπονθέναι μάλιστα τῶν ἀρμονίων. δῆλον οὖν 2 ὅτι τούτους ὄρους τρεῖς ποιητέον εἰς τὴν παιδείαν, τὸ τε μέσον καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ τὸ πρέπον.3

1 Immisch olim: παιδελαν codd.
2 δῆλον οὖν Schneider: δῆλον codd., γ τῆλον Goettling.
3 Reliqua huius operis in Graeco nondum inueni Gufl.

674
but merely by the force of nature fell back again into 10 the suitable harmony, the Phrygian. And all agree that the Dorian mode is more sedate and of a specially manly character. Moreover since we praise and say that we ought to pursue the mean between extremes, and the Dorian mode has this nature in relation to the other harmonies, it is clear that it suits the younger pupils to be educated rather in the Dorian melodies. But there are two objects to aim at, the possible as well as the suitable; for we are bound rather to attempt the things that are possible and those that are suitable for the particular class of people concerned; and in these matters also there are dividing lines drawn by the ages—for instance, those whose powers have waned through lapse of time cannot easily sing the highly strung harmonies, but to persons of that age nature suggests the re- 11 laxed harmonies. Therefore some musical experts also rightly criticize Socrates because he disapproved of the relaxed harmonies for amusement, taking them to have the character of intoxication, not in the sense of the effect of strong drink, for that clearly has more the result of making men frenzied revellers, but as failing in power. Hence even with a view to the period of life that is to follow, that of the comparatively old, it is proper to engage in the harmonies and melodies of this kind too, and also any kind of harmony that is suited to the age of boyhood because it is capable of being at once decorous and educative, which seems to be the nature of the Lydian mode most of all the harmonies. It is clear therefore that we should lay down these three canons to guide education, moderation, possibility and suitability.

* Republic 338e.
INDEX I.—SUBJECTS

References are to the pages, columns (a and b) and lines of the Berlin edition of Aristotle, 1831, marked in the margin of this text. Of the page-numbers the first two figures are here omitted, so that 52-99 stand for 1252-1299 and 00-42 for 1300-1342. The first line only of each passage referred to is usually given.

Absolute monarchy, 87 a 1
Admirals, Spartan, 71 a 37
Adultery, 06 a 28, 35 b 38
Aesymnetae, 85 a 30, b 25, 95 a 14
Agorae, 31 a 31
Aliens, 75 a 7, b 37, 63 a 33
Alms demoralizing, 20 a 29
Andria, 72 a 3
Animals, 53 a 7-54, b 23, 56 a 20, b 10, 90 b 25
Archons, 22 b 29
Areopagus, 73 b 39, 74 a 7, 04 a 20, 15 b 22
Aristocracy, case for, 81 a 11; kinds, 93 b 1; faction in, 06 b 22; safeguards, 08 b 38
Artillery, 31 a 1
Artisans, morals and status, 60 a 37, 67 b 15, 77 b 1, 78 a 17, 91 a 1, 19 a 26, 26 a 22, 28 b 39, 29 a 19, 31 a 33
Athletics, 35 b 5, 33 b 9
Barter, 57 a 6, 59 b 1
Birth-control, 65 a 38, 74 b 3
Blest, Islands of the, 34 a 31
Boys, love of, 69 b 29, 72 a 24
Business, science of, 53 b 12
Cannibalism, 38 b 19
Castes, Egyptian, 29 b 2, 23
Cavalry, 59 b 36, 97 b 17, 21 a 8
Children, crying healthy for, 36 a 34. See Cold

Choregiae, 09 a 19
Chrematistike, 53 b 12
Citizenship, nature of, 74 b 41; of working-class, 77 b 35
Civic virtue, 76 b 17
Class distinctions necessary, 61 a 22; historic, 29 a 40
Climate and character, 27 b 20
Coinage, invention of, 57 a 31
Cold, children inured to, 36 a 12
Communism, 60 b 36
Community of wives, 61 a 4, b 16; of property, 62 b 37, 29 b 41
Conservatism, 68 b 25
Constitutional Government, 89 a 26, 93 a 39, b 22
Constitutions classified, 79 a 26
Contemplative life, 24 a 5, 32 b 12
Cookery, science of, 55 b 22
Cosmi, 72 a 6, 29, b 3
Courage, training of, 38 b 13; of women, 60 a 22, 77 b 20
Crime, cause of, 68 b 22, 66 b 58, 71 a 16

Deliberative, varieties of the, 98 a 3
Delphic knife, 52 b 2
Demagogues, 74 a 5, 92 a 4, 10 a 2; and revolution, 04 b 20
Democracy rule of the poor, 79 b 8; of the free, 90 b 1; causes, 17 a 20; frequency, 96 a 22; features, 17 b 10; four safeguards, 97 a 35, 09 a 14

678
INDEX I. SUBJECTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Page Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dithyramb,</td>
<td>42 b 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dorian mode,</td>
<td>76 b 9, 90 a 21, 40 b 4, 42 a 34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dowries,</td>
<td>66 b 2, 70 a 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drawing lessons,</td>
<td>37 b 25, 88 a 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drink,</td>
<td>74 b 11, 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynasty,</td>
<td>92 b 10 n.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earth-born men,</td>
<td>69 a 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy, domestic, Bk. I.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education,</td>
<td>60 b 16, 63 b 36; political, 10 a 19; state-controlled, Bk. VIII.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elders of Sparta,</td>
<td>70 b 35, 94 b 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crete,</td>
<td>72 a 7, 35; Elis, 66 a 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carthage,</td>
<td>72 b 38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eleven,</td>
<td>the, 22 a 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emigration a safety-valve,</td>
<td>73 b 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entail of estates,</td>
<td>66 b 18, 70 a 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enthusiasm,</td>
<td>40 a 10, 41 a 21, 42 a 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ephors,</td>
<td>65 b 39, 70 b 6, 72 a 6, 75 b 10, 94 b 31, 01 b 20, 13 a 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality, numerical and proportional,</td>
<td>79 b 11, 01 b 29, 08 a 11; and justice, 80 a 7, 82 b 14, 83 b 40, 01 a 27, 10 a 30, 25 b 8, 32 b 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethics quoted,</td>
<td>61 a 31, 80 a 18, 82 b 19, 95 a 36, 32 a 8, 21, Bk. VIII. init. (see p. xiii)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive,</td>
<td>the, 95 a 1, 99 a 3, 21 b 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exposure of infants,</td>
<td>35 b 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family,</td>
<td>the, Bk. I.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer-serfs,</td>
<td>30 a 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female inferiority,</td>
<td>54 b 13, 59 a 39, 60 a 9; virtue, 59 b 28, 77 b 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First impressions strongest,</td>
<td>36 b 28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flatterers of tyrants,</td>
<td>92 a 21, 18 b 39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flute,</td>
<td>41 a 18, 28, b 3, 42 b 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food-supply,</td>
<td>56 a 19, 28 b 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry,</td>
<td>21 b 30, 31 b 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fortifications,</td>
<td>30 b 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four Hundred,</td>
<td>the, 04 b 12, 05 b 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gentleness and courage,</td>
<td>27 b 38, 38 b 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geography books,</td>
<td>62 a 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>God,</td>
<td>52 b 24, 54 b 33, 59 b 12, 23 b 21, 25 b 23, 26 a 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gymnastics,</td>
<td>64 a 21, 68 b 35, 88 b 15, 97 a 29, 23 a 1, 37 b 23, 38 b 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Happiness of state and individual,</td>
<td>24 a 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbours,</td>
<td>27 a 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harp,</td>
<td>41 a 19, 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and city site,</td>
<td>30 a 38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heiresses,</td>
<td>70 a 24, 74 b 25, 04 a 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helot system,</td>
<td>64 a 35, 69 a 34, 72 b 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heroic monarchy,</td>
<td>95 a 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homicide,</td>
<td>67 b 37, 74 b 23, 75 b 10, 00 b 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homosipyi,</td>
<td>52 b 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horses and wealth,</td>
<td>89 b 35, 97 b 18, 21 a 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunting,</td>
<td>55 b 38, 56 a 35, 23 b, 24 b 39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideal State,</td>
<td>Bks. VII. and VIII.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indecent language, pictures, etc.,</td>
<td>36 b 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indians,</td>
<td>32 b 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judiciary,</td>
<td>the, 00 b 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalokagathia,</td>
<td>59 b 35 n.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kings of Sparta,</td>
<td>71 a 19; of Crete, 72 a 8; of Carthage, 72 b 37, 73 a 25; of Macedon, 10 b 39; of Molossi, 13 a 24; of Persia, 39 a 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberty, democratic,</td>
<td>80 a 5, 91 b 30, 94 a 11, 17 a 40, 18 a 5, 19 b 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lot, election by,</td>
<td>73 a 18, 74 a 5, 94, b 7, 00 a 19, 17 b 20, 18 a 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lydian harp,</td>
<td>41 a 40; mode, 42 a 82, 23 b, 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male and female,</td>
<td>52 a 28, 53 b 5, 54 b 13, 59 a 37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage, regulation of,</td>
<td>34 b 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercenaries,</td>
<td>85 a 26, 11 a 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-class government,</td>
<td>95 a 25, 96 b 34, 08 b 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military class,</td>
<td>29 a 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed constitution,</td>
<td>97 a 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixolydian mode,</td>
<td>40 b 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modes, musical,</td>
<td>76 b 9, 90 a 20, 40 a 40, 41 b 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monarchy,</td>
<td>85 b 33; stability of, 10 a 39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money, invention of,</td>
<td>97 a 34; fluctuations in value, 05 b 9, 08 a 35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monopoly,</td>
<td>59 a 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monstrosities,</td>
<td>02 b 34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music in education,</td>
<td>39 a 11, 41 b 38, Bk. VIII, c. v.-end</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INDEX I. SUBJECTS

Musical instruments, 40 b 20-41 b 18

National character and constitutions, 96 b 13
Navy, size of, 27 a 40
Nobility, 59 b 35 n.
Number, Plato's, 16 a 1
Nursing of infants, 36 a 4

Oath, official, 55 b 12, 10 a 7
Occupations and classes, 28 b 24
Office, limited tenure of, 08 a 15;
sale of, 73 a 35, b 8
Oligarchy rule of the rich, 79 b 7,
90 b 2; four kinds, 92 a 39, 20 b 18;
frequency, 96 a 22; safeguards,
97 a 14, 09 a 21; fall, 05 a 37
Olympic overtraining, 39 a 1
Omnipotence, 52 b 14
Ostracism, 84 a 3, 88 a 25, 02 b 18,
03 b 19
Otyeunstai, 13 b 15
Ovipara, 56 a 13

Paintings, 81 b 12, 84 b 8, 36 b 14,
40 a 35
Parenthood, 52 a 28, 53 b 7, 56 b 10, 58 a 35, 59 a 37
Patrimony. See Entail
Pay for public services 67 b 1,
74 a 8, 93 a 5, 17 b 31, 20 a 17
Peace, 33 a 35, 34 a 2, 26
Penestae, 64 a 35, 69 a 37
Pentacosiomeni, 74 a 19
Perieeci, 69 b 3, 71 b 30, 72 a 18,
03 a 8, 27 b 11, 29 a 26, 30 a 29
Persian Wars, 74 a 13, 03 a 5, b 33,
04 a 21, 07 a 4, 41 a 30
Phidita, 71 a 27, 72 a 3, b 34
Phrygian music, 70 b 9, 90 a 22,
40 b 4, 42 a 32
Pillory, 06 b 2
Plain, men of the, 05 a 24
Play to imitate work, 30 a 32
Pluralism at Carthage, 73 b 8
Plutocracy at Carthage, 73 a 25.
See Oligarchy
Poetics, 41 b 39
Poetry, judgement of, 81 b 7
Population, limit of, 65 a 13, 38,
68 b 8, 70 b 4, 20 a 5, b 20, 27 a 15,
35 b 21
Potagogites, 13 b 13
Priests necessary, 28 b 11; old
men, 29 a 27; duties, 22 b 18;
syssitia for, 31 b 5
Professional music, 41 b 8
Property, sense of, 61 b 16, 63 a 40;
due limits of, 65 a 29, 26 b 30
Proverbs, 55 b 29, 63 a 30, 03 b 29,
14 a 5, 34 a 20
Prytanes, 05 a 17, 22 b 29
Punishment, 22 a 6, 32 a 12
Purification by music, 41 b 33
Pyramids, 15 b 21

Rattle, invention of, 40 b 26
Reason, training of, 34 b 8
Relaxation, 37 b 33, 33 a 13, 39 a
16, b 15
Religion, state, 85 a 6, 14 b 38, 22
b 18, 28 b 11, 29 a 27, 30 a 8
Revolution, sources of, 01 a 26;
alms, 01 b 5, 02 a 32; causes, 02 a
17; modes, 04 b 8; in a democracy,
04 b 19; caused by small reforms,
07 a 34; by foreigners, 17 b 20;
Plato's formula for, 16 a 1
Royalty, 84 b 35, 86 b 6, 87 b 37,
95 a 5, 10 b 2; fall of, 12 b 33;
safeguards of, 13 a 18
Ruling class, 97 b 9, 29 a 2

Sea-ports, 27 a 11
Senate, Spartan, 70 b 35
Serfs, 30 a 25
Sex. See Male and female
Site of city, 27 a 4, 30 a 34
Slave, a live tool, 53 b 32; virtue
of, 59 b 23; school for, 55 b 23
Slavery, natural, 52 a 4, 54 b 20,
75 b 33; criticized, 53 b 29, 55 a 3;
agricultural, 30 a 25
Speculation and action, 24 a 25,
33 a 16
Speech, human, 53 a 9
Spies, 13 b 11
Split-lamps, 99 b 10
Stability of constitution, 07 b 26
Stage, control of, 36 b 13
Syssitia, 65 a 8, 72 a 13, 13 a 41, 29
b 5, 30 a 3, 31 a 19

Tactics modern, 97 b 20
Taxation, 71 b 13, 13 b 26, 14 b 14,
20 a 20, b 3

679
## INDEX I. SUBJECTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Temple sites, 31 a 24, b 17</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Territory, nature of, 26 b 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Thēles</em>, 74 a 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thirty, the, 05 b 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torch-races, 09 a 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town-planning, 67 b 22, 30 b 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade, origin of, 56 b 40, 57 a 17; unpopularity, 58 b 1; branches, 58 b 12; writers on, 58 b 40; foreign, 27 a 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripods, walking, 53 b 35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyranny, 79 b 5, 87 b 39, 98 b 28, 95 a 1; fall of, 11 a 23, 12 a 21; safeguards of, 13 a 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity of state, 61 a 10, 63 b 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usury unnatural, 58 b 7, 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village-communities, 52 b 16, 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walls, city, 30 b 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War, natural, 55 b 37, 56 b 23, 33 b 38; a moral education, 70 a 5, 34 a 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water-supply, 30 b 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth, acquisition of, 53 b 12, 56 a 1; distribution of, 09 b 20; kinds of, 54 a 15–57 b 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winds, 90 a 13, 30 a 39, 55 b 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's education and status, 60 b 15, 62 a 20, 64 b 4, 69 b 12, 24, 99 a 22, 00 a 7, 13 b 33, 14 b 27, 19 b 28, 22 b 39, 35 a 9. See Communism, and Female Working-class citizenship, 77 b 35, 23 b 24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INDEX II.—PERSONS AND PLACES

References as noted on p. 677.

Short foot-notes on some of these names will be found in the text.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Person/Place</th>
<th>References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abydos</td>
<td>05 b 33, 06 a 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achaeans</td>
<td>69 b 6, 03 a 29, 88 b 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achilles</td>
<td>73 a 37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adamas</td>
<td>11 b 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aegina</td>
<td>91 b 24, 06 a 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agamemnon</td>
<td>78 a 37, 85 a 11, 87 b 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agesilaus</td>
<td>06 b 35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcaeus</td>
<td>85 a 37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcyone</td>
<td>74 a 35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcmaeidae</td>
<td>06 a 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amadocus</td>
<td>12 a 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amasis</td>
<td>59 b 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambracia</td>
<td>03 a 23, 04 a 31, 11 a 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphipolis</td>
<td>03 b 2, 06 a 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amyntas</td>
<td>11 b 3, 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anaxilans</td>
<td>16 a 38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andromadas</td>
<td>74 b 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andros</td>
<td>70 b 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antileon</td>
<td>16 a 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antimenides</td>
<td>85 a 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antissa</td>
<td>03 a 34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antisthenes</td>
<td>84 a 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aphrodite</td>
<td>69 a 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aphytae</td>
<td>19 a 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apollodorus</td>
<td>59 a 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apollonia</td>
<td>90 b 11, 03 a 36, 06 a 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arcadians</td>
<td>61 a 29, 69 b 4, 70 a 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archelaus</td>
<td>11 b 8, 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archias</td>
<td>06 b 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archilochus</td>
<td>28 a 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archytas</td>
<td>40 b 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ares</td>
<td>69 b 28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argo</td>
<td>84 a 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argos</td>
<td>69 b 4, 70 a 2, 02 b 18, 03 a 6, 04 a 25, 10 b 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aristobazanes</td>
<td>12 a 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aristogiton</td>
<td>11 a 38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aristophanes</td>
<td>62 b 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrabaeus</td>
<td>11 b 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artaphernes</td>
<td>11 b 38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>71 b 36, 85 a 21, 89 b 40, 27 b 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Astyages</td>
<td>12 a 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atarneus</td>
<td>67 a 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athena and the flute</td>
<td>41 b 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athens, constitutional history</td>
<td>73 b 37; revolution, 03 a 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attalus</td>
<td>11 b 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anones</td>
<td>29 b 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autophrades</td>
<td>67 a 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Babylon</td>
<td>65 a 14, 76 a 23, 84 b 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bacchiadai</td>
<td>74 a 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basilidae</td>
<td>05 b 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Sea</td>
<td>33 b 22, 03 a 37, 05 b 36, 38 b 41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byzantium</td>
<td>91 b 23, 03 a 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camicus</td>
<td>71 b 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carthage</td>
<td>72 b 24, 75 b 11, 89 a 36, 93 b 15, 16 a 34, b 5, 20 b 4, 24 b 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catana</td>
<td>74 a 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celts</td>
<td>69 b 27, 24 b 12, 36 a 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chalcidians</td>
<td>74 b 24, 03 b 3, 06 a 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chalcidice</td>
<td>74 a 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chalcis</td>
<td>89 b 39, 04 a 29, 16 a 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chares</td>
<td>06 a 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charetides</td>
<td>58 b 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charicles</td>
<td>05 b 96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charilaus</td>
<td>71 b 25, 16 a 34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charondas</td>
<td>52 b 14, 74 a 23, 96 a 21, 97 a 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chios</td>
<td>59 a 13, 84 a 40, 91 b 24, 03 a 34, 06 b 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INDEX II. PERSONS AND PLACES

Chiones, 29 b 21
Chytrum, 03 b 9
Cinadon, 06 b 34
Clazomenae, 03 b 9
Cleander, 16 a 37
Cleisthenes of Athens, 75 b 36, 19 b 21; of Sicyon, 15 b 16, 16 a 31
Cleomenes, 03 a f
Cleopatra, 11 b 15
Cleopinus, 06 a 2
Cnidus, 05 b 12, 06 b 5
Codus, 10 b 37
Colophon, 00 b 15, 03 b 10
Corinth, 65 a 13, 74 a 31, 00a 23, 10 b 29, 13 a 37, 15 b 22
Cos, 14 b 25
Cotys, 11 b 21
Crates, 11 b 8
Crete, 64 a 21, 69 a 29, 71 a 29, b 20, 29 b 2; education, 24 b 7
Cyclopes, 52 b 2
Cyne, 69 a 1, 05 a 1
Cyprus, 13 b 22
Cyprus, 10 b 29, 15 b 24
Cyrene, 19 b 18
Cyrus, 10 b 38, 12 a 12
Daedalus, 53 b 35
Daphnis, 05 a 26
Darius, 11 b 35
Decamnichus, 11 b 30
Delphi, 52 b 2, 03 b 37
Derdas, 11 b 4
Dexander, 04 a 9
Diagram, 06 a 36
Dicaea (a mare), 62 a 24
Diocles, 74 a 82
Dion, 12 a 4, 34 b 16
Dionysus the elder, 59 a 28, 05 a 25, 06 a 1, 07 a 39, 10 b 30, 13 b 28; the younger, 07 a 39, 12 a 4, 35 b 9
Diophantus, 67 b 19
Draco, 74 b 15
Echard, 41 a 36
Egypt, 88 a 13, 18 b 21, 29 a 40
Elimea, 11 b 13
Elis, 06 a 16
Ephialtes, 74 a 8
Epidamnus, 67 b 18, 87 a 7, 01 b 21, 04 a 13
Epimenides, 52 b 14
Eretria, 89 b 39, 06 a 35
Erythrae, 05 b 18

Ethiopia, 90 b 5
Eubulus, 67 a 31
Euripides, 11 b 33; quoted, 52 b 8, 77 a 19, 10 a 34, 28 a 15, 39 a 19
Eurytion, 06 a 39
Enthocrates, 64 a 12
Evagoras, 11 b 5
Gelo, 02 b 32, 12 b 10, 15 b 35, 16 a 33
Gorgias, 60 a 23, 75 b 26
Harmodius, 11 a 37
Hellanocrates, 11 b 17
Hemiochus, 33 b 22
Hephaestus, 53 b 36
Heraclea, 04 b 31, 05 b 5, 37, 06 a 37, 27 b 14
Heracleodorus, 03 a 19
Heracles, 84 a 23
Heracles, 11 b 21
Heracles, 15 a 30
Heraea, 03 a 15
Hesiod quoted, 52 b 10, 12 b 4
Hestia, 03 b 33
Ilios, 12 b 11, 13 b 14, 15 b 34
Hipparchus, 06 a 1
Hippocrates, 26 a 15
Hippodamus, constitution of, 67 b 23, 30 b 24
Homer quoted, 52 b 23, 53 a 5, b 36, 59 b 13, 67 a 1, 78 a 36, 85 a 10, 87 b 14, 92 a 13, 33 a 24, 26, 27
Honest Lady (a mare), 62 a 24
Iapiggians, 03 a 5, 29 b 20
Iberians, 24 b 19
Indians, 32 b 24
Iphiades, 06 a 31
Istros, 05 b 5
Italy, 29 b 9
Italy, 74 a 24, 29 b 5
Jason of Phææ, 77 a 24

Lametic Gulf, 29 b 13
Larissa, 75 b 29, 05 b 23, 06 a 29, 11 b 18
Leonidus, 10 b 29, 16 a 36
Lesbos, 84 a 40
Leucas, 66 b 22
Leuctra, 70 a 33
Libya, 62 a 20
Loss, 66 b 19, 74 a 22, 07 a 33
Lyctus, 71 b 28
Lycurgus, 70 a 7, 71 b 25, 73 b 33, 74 a 29, 95 a 20
INDEX II. PERSONS AND PLACES

Lygdamis, 05 a 41  
Lysander, 01 b 19, 06 b 33

Macedon, 10 b 39, 24 b 15  
Magnesia, 69 b 7, 89 b 39  
Maera, 97 b 14

Mantinea, 04 a 26, 18 b 25  
Marseilles (Massalia), 05 b 4, 21 a 30  
Meander, 89 b 40  
Medes, 84 b 1, 39 a 35  
Megacles, 11 b 27

Megara, 80 b 14, 00 a 17, 02 b 31, 04 b 35, 05 a 24  
Messenae, 69 b 4, 70 a 3, 06 b 33  
Midas, 57 b 16

Minos, 71 b 51, 39, 29 b 4, 25  
Mithridates, 12 a 16  
Mitylene, 85 a 33, 04 a 4, 11 b 26

Mnason, 04 a 12  
Molossus, 10 b 40  
Musaeus, 39 b 22  
Myron, 16 a 30  
Mysians, 42 b 10

Naxos, 45 a 41  
Notium, 03 b 10

Oenophyta, 03 b 29  
Oenotria, 29 b 4  
Olympieum, 13 b 33

Olympus, 40 a 9  
Onomarchus, 04 a 12  
Opici, 29 b 19  
Opsi, 87 a 8  
Orens, 03 a 18

Orthogoras, 15 b 13  
Oxylus, 19 a 12

Pachus, 04 a 6  
Panesteus, 10 b 29, 16 a 37

Parthenia, 06 b 29  
Pausanias, 01 b 20, 07 a 4, 33 b 34; of Macedon, 11 b 2

Pauson, 40 a 36  
Pediaci, 05 a 24  
Penthilidae, 11 b 27  
Periander of Corinth, 84 a 26, 11 a 20, 13 a 37, 15 b 26; of Ambracia, 04 a 32, 11 a 39

Pericles, 74 a 8

Pherhaebi, 69 b 6  
Persia, 84 b 1, 18 a 38, b 9, 24 b 11, 39 a 34  
Phalaris, 10 b 28

Phaleas, constitution of, 65 a 39, 74 b 9  
Pharsalian mare, 62 a 24  
Pharsalus, 06 a 10  
Phidon of Argos, 10 b 26; of Corinth, 65 b 12  
Philemon, 55 b 30 n.

Philip, 11 b 2  
Philolaus, 74 a 31  
Philozenus, 42 b 9  
Phocis, 04 a 10  
Phocylides, 95 b 33  
Phorbas, 04 a 29  
Phreatto, 00 b 29

Piraeus, 04 a 29  
Piræus, 18 a 30

Pisistratus, 05 b 23, 10 b 30, 15 b 21, 31

Pittacus, 74 b 18, 85 a 35  
Plato, Laws, 64 b 27, 71 b 2, 74 b 9; Meno, 60 a 22; Republic, 61 a 6, 91 a 11, 93 b 1, 16 a 2, 42 a 32; Symposium, 62 b 12

Polycrates, 13 b 24  
Polygnosis, 40 a 37  
Pontus. See Black Sea

Pythagoras, 63 a 30 n.

Pytho, 11 b 20

Reggio (Rhegium), 74 b 23, 16 a 33  
Rhodes, 71 b 37, 02 b 23, 32, 04 b 27

Salamis, 04 a 22  
Samos, 84 a 31, 03 a 36, 13 b 24  
Sardanapalus, 12 a 1  
Scylax, 32 b 24  
Scylla, 29 b 12  
Sicyonia, 24 b 11  
Sesostris, 29 b 4, 25  
Seuthes, 12 a 14  
Sicily, 59 a 33, 71 b 30, 74 a 25, 16 a 35  
Sicyon, 15 b 12, 16 a 30  
Simus, 06 a 30  
Sirius, 22 b 21

Siras, 11 b 12  
Smerdis, 11 b 29

Socrates. See Plato

Solon, 56 b 32, 66 b 17, 73 b 35

Sparta, concentration of estates,
## INDEX II. PERSONS AND PLACES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Page Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stentor</td>
<td>26 b 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sybaris</td>
<td>03 a 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syracuse</td>
<td>55 b 24, 86 b 40, 02 b 32, 03 a 38, b 20, 04 a 26, 06 a 1, 12 b 8, 32, 13 b 13, 26, 15 b 35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taranto (Tarentum)</td>
<td>91 b 23, 03 a 8, 06 b 31, 20 b 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenedos</td>
<td>01 b 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thales</td>
<td>59 a 6, 74 a 28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thaetas</td>
<td>05 a 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thessaly</td>
<td>69 a 37, b 5, 31 a 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thibron</td>
<td>33 b 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thirty, the</td>
<td>05 b 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thrace</td>
<td>74 b 24, 12 a 14, 24 b 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thrasippus</td>
<td>41 a 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thasius of Miletus</td>
<td>84 a 27, 11 a 20, of Syracuse, 12 b 11, 15 b 38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thurii</td>
<td>03 a 29, 07 a 27, b 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timochari</td>
<td>04 a 7, 06 a 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triopium</td>
<td>71 b 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thrasybulus</td>
<td>80 a 36, 29 b 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyrtaeus</td>
<td>06 b 39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xerxes</td>
<td>11 b 38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaleucus</td>
<td>74 a 22, 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zanci</td>
<td>03 a 35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeus</td>
<td>59 b 13, 81 b 18, 84 b 31, 39 b 8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Printed in Great Britain by R. & R. Clark, Limited, Edinburgh
THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY

VOLUMES ALREADY PUBLISHED

LATIN AUTHORS

Ammianus Marcellinus. J. C. Rolfe. 3 Vols. (3rd Imp. revised.)

Apuleius: The Golden Ass (Metamorphoses). W. Adlington (1566). Revised by S. Gaselee. (7th Imp.)


St. Augustine: Select Letters. J. H. Baxter. (2nd Imp.)

Ausonius. H. G. Evelyn White. 2 Vols. (2nd Imp.)

Bede. J. E. King. 2 Vols. (2nd Imp.)


Caesar: Civil Wars. A. G. Peskett. (6th Imp.)

Caesar: Gallic War. H. J. Edwards. (11th Imp.)

Cato and Varro: De Re Rustica. H. B. Ash and W. D. Hooper. (3rd Imp.)

Catullus. F. W. Cornish; Tibullus. J. B. Postgate; and Pervigilium Veneris. J. W. Mackail. (13th Imp.)


Cicero: Brutus and Orator. G. L. Hendrickson and H. M. Hubbell. (3rd Imp.)

Cicero: De Fato; Paradoxa Stoicorum; De Partitio Oratoria. H. Rackham. (With De Oratore, Vol. II.) (2nd Imp.)
THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY

Cicero: De Finibus. H. Rackham. (4th Imp. revised.)
Cicero: De Inventione, etc. H. M. Hubbell.
Cicero: De Natura Deorum and Academica. H. Rackham. (3rd Imp.)
Cicero: De Officiis. Walter Miller. (7th Imp.)
Cicero: De Oratore. E. W. Sutton and H. Rackham. 2 Vols. (2nd Imp.)
Cicero: De Republica, De Legibus, Somnium Scipionis. Clinton W. Keyes. (4th Imp.)
Cicero: De Senectute, De Amicitia, De Divinatione. W. A. Falconer. (6th Imp.)
Cicero: In Catilinam, Pro Murena, Pro Sulla, Pro Flacco. Louis E. Lord. (3rd Imp. revised.)
Cicero: Letters to Atticus. E. O. Winstedt. 3 Vols. (Vol. I 7th Imp., Vols. II and III 4th Imp.)
Cicero: Pro Caecina, Pro Lege Manilia, Pro Cluentio, Pro Rabirio. H. Grose Hodge. (3rd Imp.)
Cicero: Pro Quinctio, Pro Roscio Amerino, Pro Roscio Comedo, Contra Rullum. J. H. Freese. (3rd Imp.)
[Cicero]: Rhetorica ad Herennium. H. Caplan.
Cicero: Tusculan Disputations. J. E. King. (4th Imp.)
Claudian. M. Platnauer. 2 Vols. (2nd Imp.)
Columella: De Re Rustica; De Arboribus. H. B. Ash, E. S. Forster, E. Heffner. 3 Vols. (Vol. I 2nd Imp.)
Florus. E. S. Forster; and Cornelius Nepos. J. C. Rolfe. (2nd Imp.)

Frontinus: Stratagems and Aqueducts. C. E. Bennett and M. B. McElwain. (2nd Imp.)

Fronto: Correspondence. C. R. Haines. 2 Vols. (3rd Imp.)


Horace: Odes and Epodes. C. E. Bennett. (14th Imp. revised.)

Horace: Satires, Epistles, Ars Poetica. H. R. Fairclough. (9th Imp. revised.)

Jerome: Select Letters. F. A. Wright. (2nd Imp.)

Juvenal and Persius. G. G. Ramsay. (8th Imp.)


Lucan. J. D. Duff. (4th Imp.)

Lucretius. W. H. D. Rouse. (7th Imp. revised.)


Ovid: The Art of Love and other Poems. J. H. Mozley. (4th Imp.)

Ovid: Fasti. Sir James G. Frazer. (2nd Imp.)

Ovid: Heroides and Amores. Grant Showerman. (7th Imp.)


Ovid: Tristia and Ex Ponto. A. L. Wheeler. (3rd Imp.)

Petronius. M. Heseltine; Seneca: Apocolocyntosis. W. H. D. Rouse. (9th Imp. revised.)


THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY


Propertius. H. E. Butler. (7th Imp.)


Qwintilian. H. E. Butler. 4 Vols. (Vols. I and IV 4th Imp., Vols. II and III 3rd Imp.)


Sallust. J. C. Rolfe. (4th Imp. revised.)


Silius Italicus. J. D. Duff. 2 Vols. (Vol. I 2nd Imp., Vol. II 3rd Imp.)

Statius. J. H. Mozley. 2 Vols. (2nd Imp.)


Tacitus: Dialogus. Sir Wm. Peterson; and Agricola and Germania. Maurice Hutton. (7th Imp.)


Terence. John Sargeaunt. 2 Vols. (Vol. I 8th Imp., Vol. II 7th Imp.)

Tertullian: Apologia and De Spectaculis. T. R. Glover; Minucius Felix. G. H. Rendall. (2nd Imp.)

Valerius Flaccus. J. H. Mozley. (3rd Imp. revised.)

Varro: De Lingua Latina. R. G. Kent. 2 Vols. (3rd Imp. revised.)

Velleius Paterculus and Res Gestae Divi Augusti. F. W. Shipley. (2nd Imp.)
Virgil. H. R. Fairclough. 2 Vols. (Vol. I 19th Imp., Vol. II 14th Imp. revised.)

GREEK AUTHORS

Achilles Tatius. S. Gaselee. (2nd Imp.)
Aeneas Tacticus, Asclepiodotus and Onasander. The Illinois Greek Club. (2nd Imp.)
Aeschines. C. D. Adams. (3rd Imp.)
Aeschylus. H. Weir Smyth. 2 Vols. (Vol. I 7th Imp., Vol. II 6th Imp. revised and enlarged.)
Apollodorus. Sir James G. Frazer. 2 Vols. (3rd Imp.)
Apollonius Rhodius. R. C. Seaton. (5th Imp.)
Aristophanes. Benjamin Bickley Rogers. 3 Vols. (5th Imp.) Verse trans.
Aristotle: Art of Rhetoric. J. H. Freese. (3rd Imp.)
Aristotle: Athenian Constitution, Eudemian Ethics, Virtues and Vices. H. Rackham. (3rd Imp.)
Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics. H. Rackham. (6th Imp. revised.)
THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY

Diogenes Laertius. R. D. Hicks. 2 Vols. (Vol. I 5th Imp., Vol. II 4th Imp.)
Dionysius of Halicarnassus: Roman Antiquities. Spelman’s translation revised by E. Cary. 7 Vols. (Vols. I-V 2nd Imp.)
Epictetus. W. A. Oldfather. 2 Vols. (3rd Imp.)
Galen: On the Natural Faculties. A. J. Brock. (4th Imp.)
The Greek Bucolic Poets (Theocritus, Bion, Moschus). J. M. Edmonds. (7th Imp. revised.)
Greek Mathematical Works. Ivor Thomas. 2 Vols. (3rd Imp.)
Hesiod and the Homeric Hymns. H. G. Evelyn White. (7th Imp. revised and enlarged.)
Homer: Iliad. A. T. Murray. 2 Vols. (7th Imp.)
Homer: Odyssey. A. T. Murray. 2 Vols. (8th Imp.)
THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY

Isaeus. E. S. Forster. (3rd Imp.)
Isocrates. George Norlin and LaRue Van Hook. 3 Vols. (2nd Imp.)
St. John Damascene: Barlaam and Ioasaph. Rev. G. R. Woodward and Harold Mattingly. (3rd Imp. revised.)
Longus: Daphnis and Chloe. Thornley’s translation revised by J. M. Edmonds; and Parthenius. S. Gaselee. (4th Imp.)
Lyra Graeca. J. M. Edmonds. 3 Vols. (Vol. I 5th Imp., Vols. II (revised and enlarged) and III 4th Imp.)
Lysias. W. R. M. Lamb. (3rd Imp.)
Manetho. W. G. Waddell; Ptolemy; Tetrabiblos. F. E. Robbins. (3rd Imp.)
Marcus Aurelius. C. R. Haines. (4th Imp. revised.)
Menander. F. G. Allinson. (3rd Imp. revised.)
Nonnos: Dionysiaca. W. H. D. Rouse. 3 Vols. (2nd Imp.)
Oppian, Colluthus, Tryphiodorus. A. W. Mair. (2nd Imp.)
Two Supplementary Vols. Translation only from an Armenian Text. Ralph Marcus.
THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY

V and VIII 3rd Imp., Vols. II-IV, VI and VII 2nd Imp.)

THEOPHRASTUS: Characters. J. M. Edmonds; Herodes, etc. A. D. Knox. (3rd Imp.)

THEOPHRASTUS: Enquiry into Plants. Sir Arthur Hort. 2 Vols. (2nd Imp.)


TRYPHIODORUS. Cf. Oppian.


XENOPHON: Memorabilia and Oeconomicus. E. C. Marchant. (3rd Imp.)

XENOPHON: Scripta Minora. E. C. Marchant. (3rd Imp.)

VOLUMES IN PREPARATION

GREEK AUTHORS


PLOTINUS. A. H. Armstrong.

LATIN AUTHORS

BABRIUS AND PHAEDRUS. B. E. Perty.

DESCRIPTIVE PROSPECTUS ON APPLICATION

LONDON

WILLIAM HEINEMANN LTD

Cloth 15s.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

HARVARD UNIV. PRESS

Cloth $3.00